CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002700070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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toHIFIDS-1-11M
COPY NO. 57
OCR NO. 2274/60
12 May 1960
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIA review(s)
completed.
DEC;LASSIFIE
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DOCUMENT NO.._._._._..._ -. 7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. C--
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's aggressive exploitation of the aircraft
incident of 1 May reflects his confidence that he can use
this issue to good advantage in strengthening his negotiat-
ing position. At the same time, however, he has indicated
that he does not wish to slam any doors in or upset at the
last minute his long campaign to bring the Western leaders
to a meeting under what he considers highly favorable con-
ditions. Soviet propaganda, Khrushchev?s private remarks,
and the formal Soviet protest note show that Moscow is
preparing the ground for further measures to capitalize
on the incident, including a complaint to the United Na-
tions and a trial of the American pilot.
CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The reasons underlying the recent shifts in the top
leadership of the Soviet party are not clear, but judging
from the changes themselves and events leading up to them,
the basic problem lay in the party secretariat. There had
been signs for some time that Khrushchev was not satisfied
with the work of this body, and now, after a series of
temporizing measures, he has undertaken a major reorganiza-
CUBA . . . . . Page 5
The resumption of Cuban diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union on 7 May will provide the USSR with expanded
opportunities for activity in Latin America.. under diplo-
matic cover. The probable Cuban ambassador to Moscow has
few qualifications for a diplomatic post and has a record
of collaboration with Communists. Cuba and Czechoslovakia
are concluding a trade agreement. The seizure of the larg-
est of the two remaining newspapers opposed to the Castro
government on 11 May will probably discourage further the
already intimidated domestic opposition groups.
TRUJILLO'S GROWING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION . . . . . . . Page 6
Increasing antipathy in the western hemisphere toward
the Trujillo dictatorship is reflected in the recent break-
ing of diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
PART I (continued)
Colombia and Peru. Venezuela, which broke relations near::
ly a year ago, is angered by Dominican involvement in the
20-21 April military uprising against President Betancourt
and is threatening to withdraw from the Organization of
American States..
TURKISH INTERNAL SITUATION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Political tension remains high in Turkey, although no
major demonstrations have occurred since 5 May. The gov-
erning Democratic party appears to be split between ex-
tremists,.who favor severe.repressive action against the
opposition Republican People's party, and moderates, who
advocate a speedy return to normal democratic procedures.
Premier Menderes.reportedly has joined with the moderates
in calling for an end to "abnormal" methods. Menderds'
conciliatory tone may have been adopted in the hope of re-
gaining popularity within the country and simultaneously
further limiting the influence of President Bayar, his
long-time rival for power.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KHRUSHCHEV'S ECONOMIC PROPOSALS . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's speech on 5 May to the Supreme Soviet
expressed general satisfaction with the USSR's economic
achievements and continued optimism over prospects, par-
ticularly for the Soviet consumer. He showed character-
istic confidence in the country's ability to fulfill the
Seven-Yeas Plan and to catchup with the United States.
He detailed plans for eliminating most direct personal
taxes, reducing the workweek, and revaluating the currency.
In a speech on 7 May he warned that lags in adding to the
building materials capacity could pose a threat to the in-
vestment program of the Seven-Year Plan. (Confidential)
EAST GERMAN REGIME CRACKS DOWN ON EVANGELICAL CHURCH. . . Page 5
The Ulbricht regime apparently Intends to destroy the
independence of the Evangelical Church, the only effective
opposition force in East Germany and the last remaining.
all-German organization there. It has begun to,collecti-
vize church lands and has threatened to cut off the
church's financial support from West Germany. It will
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probably follow these moves by offering to pay the pas-
tors and church expenses in order to make the church de-
pendent on the regime. Chancellor Adenauer intends to
12 May 1960
PART II (continued)
raise the matter of West German support for the church
with President Eisenhower in Paris.
CHOU CONTINUES SWING THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA . . . . . . . . Page 6
Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Cambodia from 5 to 9
May--at a time of-increased Cambodian - South Vietnamese
frictions--provided the Chinese Communists with the oppor-
tunity to encdurage Sihanouk's neutral position and coun-
terbalance American influence there. The Chinese premier
made no formal commitment to guarant8e Cambodian borders
against South Vietnam and confined himself to expressions
of moral support for Phnom Penh.
GROWING CRITICISM OF DIEM REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM .
effected.
. Page 7
The Diem regime in South Vietnam, in addition to
facing a stiff challenge from resurgent Communist guerrilla
forces, is also confronted with an erosion of strength
from within, which would play into Communist hands. Diem
shows no inclination to relax his authoritarian rule de-
spite widespread discontent within the administration and
growing public criticism. Many high-level Vietnamese of-
ficials, including Vice President Tho, fear for the gov-
ernment's stability unless political reforms are speedily
SECRET `e
The South Korean National Assembly is moving toward
amendment of the constitution to reduce the powers of the
president and establish a cabinet with a prime minister
responsible to the legislature. Although sporadic demon-
strations have continued on a reduced scale calling for
the resignation of the incumbent assembly prior to amend-
ment of the constitution, the general public seems willing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
PART II (continued)
to have the changes made by the present legislature. Mean-
while, martial law commander Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, who
has been using only moderate force to break up demonstra-
tions, is concerned over the threat of Communist agent ex-
ploitation of the present unrest.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13)
President Shihab of Lebanon is establishing a neutral,
caretaker cabinet to supervise the parliamentary elections
scheduled to begin on 12 June. Further violence.between
Lebanese Christians and Moslems is to be expected as the
campaign proceeds. In Iraq, the Qasim regime is trying to
block moves by an antiregime faction in the National Demo-
cratic party to gain control of the party and withdraw its
support from the government. The termination of the picket-
ing of the UAR freighter Cleopatra in New York was treated
by the Arab press, radio, and officialdom as a major vic-
tory for Arab unity; the ending of the Arab retaliatory
boycott was probably greeted with relidf by leaders. of most
Arab governments.
The imminent independence and union of two Somali
states has increased apprehension in Addis Ababa over the
integrity of the Ethiopian empire, which includes a siz-
able Somali minority. Ethiopia suspects that acquiescence
by Britain and Italy to Somali nationalist demands is part
of an effort to maintain dolonial influence in the Horn of
Africa.
Page 12
DISORDERS IN THE BELGIAN CONGO . . . ... . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Disorders in the Belgian Congo--including anti-Euro-
pean demonstrations and scattered. strikes--have resulted in
a serious deterioration of internal security. Local po-
lice have failed to intervene effectively in several re-
cent instances of violence. The period leading up to
Congolese independence on 30 June probably will be marked
by new disorders, particularly since Belgian authorities
seem disinclined to take strong countermeasures.
TENSION IN MALI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Acute tension has developed between Senegal and
Soudan--the component states of the French Community's
Mali Federation in West Africa--over constitutional and
political issues which should be settled before Mali be-
comes:: indepeldent :next montb . The immediate controversy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
PART II (continued)
revolves around the office of chief of state and the allo-
cation of Mali's new defense and foreign affairs portfo-
lios. While compromise arrangements will probably pre-
serve the federation and leave the door open for the pos-
sible future entry of additional states, friction between
Senegal and Soudan over basic constitutional issues will
FRENCH BASES IN AFRICA
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Recent French negotiations concerning bases in Africa
suggest that Paris' long-term plans for the defense of Af-
rica and Europe's southern approaches will center on a few
major air and naval bases in, Africa. There are hints of
some French willingness to give up eventually all bases
in independent African states except two in North Africa,
one in West Africa, and one on Madagascar. De Gaulle has
also sought Allied coordination on an African program to
complement French plans.
TAMBRONI GOVERNMENT'S DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Premier Tambroni's caretaker Christian Democratic
government in Italy faces continued attack from the small
democratic parties which backed earlier governmentq~ and
possible revolt by Christian Democrats who object to his
parliamentary dependence on the neo-Fascists.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet Union, with active support from the satel-
lites, is consolidating its initial economic ties with
Cuba in an effort to lay the foundations for a'.long-term
relationship. Successt4Of':this effort will depend chiefly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
PART III (continued)
on Havana's ability to achieve some degree of domestic
stability. Prospects that the Sino-Soviet bloc might take
over the US economic position in Cuba are remote, but the
present agreements are already being hailed by both parties
as a significant victory over "Western imperialism."
NEO-FASCISTS IN POSTWAR ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The recently formed cabinet of Fernando Tambroni is
unique among postwar Italian governments in that his
Christian Democratic party is dependent for its majority
in the lower house on the neo-Fascist Italian Social Move-
ment. This development, which came about over vehement
objections both in and outside the ruling Christian Demo-
cratic party, has focused renewed attention on the long
struggle of Italian fascism to reassert and rehabilitate
itself. The neo-Fascists, proponents of an authoritarian,
nationalist, anti-Communist solution for Italy's political
difficulties, can hope to profit from continuance of the
stalemate within the Christian Democratic party.
EAST GERMAN ECONOMY: PROSPECTS IN THE EARLY 1960'S . . . Page
Economic problems Are less likely to contribute to
political instability in East Germany during the next few
years than they have in the recent past. Living standards
at present are comparable to levels in West Germany in
1953, and further economic growth will probably be more rap-
id than in West Germany. There is little likelihood, how-
ever, that agricultural production will increase signifib.
cantly over the next few years. Personal consumption is
now increasing less rapidly than production, and during-:the
next few years consumption will remain about 25-30 percent
HOUSING CONDITIONS AND THE SOVIET CITIZEN . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Housing conditions in the USSR cause more widespread
and intense dissatisfaction than any other aspect of So-
viet life. Visible signs of improvement since the regime
launched a major program in 1957 to eliminate the housing
shortage have tended to bring to the surface long-sup-
pressed feelings of personal injustice. While it is likely
that in the next decade the Soviet leaders can go a long
way toward solving the housing shortage, they will prob-
ably be plagued for some time with steadily in:creas>ing;public
demands. Expressions of discontent and. protest, however, are
not expected to pose a serious challenge to the re me,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
Khrushchev's aggressive
exploitation of the aircraft
incident of 1 May reflects his
confidence that he can use
this issue to good advantage
in strengthening his negotiat-
ing position. At the same
time, however, he has indi-
cated that he does not wish
to slam any doors in or upset
at the last minute his long
campaign to bring the Western
leaders to a meeting under what
he considers highly favorable
conditions. Soviet propaganda,
Khrushchev's remarks, and the
formal Soviet protest note show
that Moscow is preparing the
ground for further measures
to capitalize on the incident,
including a complaint to the
United Nations and a trial of
the American pilot.
Soviet propaganda media
are giving the-plane incident.
relatively moderate publicity.
Several previous Khrushchev
speeches have been given great-
er coverage by Moscow than his
7 May speech, and routine radio
comment has not been voluminous,
Domestic propaganda has not
stressed the danger of acci-
dental war as a result of such
flights. A Pravda editorial
of 9 May made clear that
the incident should not be con-
sidered a "crisis" situation.
There have been no demonstra-
tions before the US Embassy in
Moscow, although the embassy
has received a number of pro-
test telegrams. Mass meetings
of workers reportedly have been
held in several cities, but
there has been no concerned
effort to arouse anti-American
feeling.
Khrushchev gave the lead
in this approach by stressing
in his 7 May speech that his
exposure of details of the in-
cident should not be interpreted
as a "call to strain nerves in
our country," but as an "appeal
for calmness," vigilance, and
reason. He followed this up
in his remarks at the Czech
Embassy reception on 9 May by
calling for an end to further
aggravation of US-Soviet re-
lations.
Khrushchev's remarks. re-
garding President Eisenhower
at an impromptu press conference
during the display of the
downed aircraft would seem to
undermine to some extent the
position he took in his Su-
preme Soviet speeches on 5 and
7 May in which he carefully
avoided attributing direct re-
sponsibility for the aircraft
incident to the President. Ac-
cording to Western press re-
ports, the Soviet Western press
reports, the Soviet premier
stated that his estimate of the
President had been revised, but
Moscow imposed censorship on sub-
sequent accounts until the of-
ficial TASS version was released.
TASS omitted some of Khru-
shchev's remarks and altered other
statements. TASS quotes Khru-
shchev as saying that Secretary
Herter's statement "has made us
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
doubt the correctness of our
earlier conclusion that the
President, the American Gov-
ernment, did not know about
the flights." The Soviet ver-
sion of Khrushchev's remarks
also avoids the question of the
President's visit to the USSR.
TASS quotes Khrushchev's ref-
erences to the politeness of
the Soviet people, although it
with the sanction of the Amer-
ican Government.
Khrushchev has seized on
the incident to renew pressure
against countries which grant
bases to the United States, In
an effort to generate distrust
and alarm over US utilization
of these bases, Khrushchev
Lockheed U-2 high-altitude research plane.
would be difficult for them to
welcome him as a guest.
Khrushchev also moved to
forestall speculation that ex-
ploitation of the incident was
an effort to disrupt the summit
by sending notes on 9 May to
the Western heads of government
confirming proposed procedural
details and expressing hope for
a successful summit. In Moscow's
official protest note of 10 May,
however, the Soviet Government
r;hallenn;ed the US statement
that the flight was not author-
1.z ed by Washington. In building
its case against the US, the
note charged that this version
"does not correspond to reality"
and concluded that "espionage
activities" were carried on
charged that the Soviet Govern-
ment considered Norway, Turkey,
and Pakistan "accomplices"
in the matter. He warned on 7
May that the involvement of
these governments was a "hostile
act against the Soviet Union"
and emphasized that they "must
now see" the consequences of
lending their territories for
"aggressive purposes."
More explicitly, in his 9
May speech he called on those
countries which have foreign
bases to "note carefully" that
flights from these bases would
draw direct retaliation. At the
Czech reception he made a point
of publicly upbraiding the Nor-
wegian ambassador and the Paki-
stani charge.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
In developing his threats
of retaliation against the US,
Khrushchev has been careful to
avoid any direct commitment.
In his 7 May address, he re-
called that an "adventurist,
prone to dizziness" could drop
a hydrogen bomb on foreign soil,
which would lead to the dropping
of a more destructive bomb on
the country where the adventur-
ist was born. The official pro-
test to the US, however, was
limited to stating that if
"similar provocations are re-
peated, the USSR will be
obliged to take retaliatory
measures."
Moscow apparently plans a
further series of moves to ex-
tract the maximum propaganda
value from the incident. Khru-
shchev reaffirmed on 11 May
his intention to take the mat-
ter to the UN Security Council,
but gave no indication of the
timing of such a move. He
added that if the Security
Council does not "take the
right decision," the USSR will
raise the matter in the General
Assembly. As a prelude to a
trial of the pilot, formal
charges together with an al-
leged confession were placed
on display at the exhibition
of the aircraft of the air-
craft wreckage on 11 May.
Peiping's propaganda treat-
ment of the incident, while re-
markably low in volume, is cen-
tered on "proving" lack of Amer-
ican sincerity in the forth-
coming summit meeting. A
People's Daily editorial on 9
May safes that the incident
"is by no means accidental"
and that the US Government "is
devoid of any sincerity regard-
ing the summit conference." In
an effort to justify Peiping's
basic disagreement with Khru-
shchev's detente tactics, the
editorialasserts that "Amer-
ican military provocations and
the threat of war against China
continue." The editorial im-
plies that Peiping had been
right all along, and Khrushchev
wrong, and that his "patient,
conciliatory, and accommodating
attitude" is regarded by the
United States "as a sign of
Soviet weakness."
This Chinese view, expressed
in part by Premier Chou En-lai's
remark in Hanoi that the West
is taking advantage of the re-
laxation of tension and continu-
ing to wield "the butcher's
knife," stems from Peiping's
fear that the summit could per-
petuate the existing status quo
in the Far East. The Chinese
leaders, calculating that at
some future period they will
find the opportune moment to
again probe US - Chinese Na-
tionalist determination to
defend the offshore islands
in the face of international
opinion reluctant to see a
major war flare up over these
islands, are trying to place
the onus for any Increased
hostilities on the United
States.
Current Chinese Commu-
nist propaganda on US in-
tentions is a direct con-
tinuation of the line
stressed by Chou En-lai in
September 1958, when he claimed
that the United States "often
uses peaceful negotiation" as
a cover for its action of
"continuously expanding ag-
gression...and interfering
in China's internal affairs."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
The reasons underlying the
recent shifts in the top leader-
ship of the Soviet party are not
clear, but judging from the
changes themselves and events
leading up to them, the basic
problem lay in the party sec-
retariat--the administrative
head of the party and the focal
point for control of the profes-
sional party machine. The
changes in the party presidium
--the removal of Belyayev and
Kirichenko, and the promotion
of candidates Kosygin, Podgorny,
and Polyansky to full member-
ship--for the most part formal-
ized an existing situation.
There have been signs that
Khrushchev was not wholly satis-
fied with the operations of the
AS OF 1 MARCH 1959
FIRST SECRETARY
CURRENT
FIRST SECRETARY
Khrushchev
SECRETARIES
Kirichenko (dismissed)
Brezhnev
Kuusinen
Mukhitdinov
Suslov
Aristov
Furtseva
Ignatov (transferred)
Pospelov
00512 3
been Khrushchev's second in
command and strong right arm
in running the secretariat.
Whatever may have been
the direct cause of Kirichenko's
downfall--disagreements over
policy or personal reasons--
the net result, taken in con-
junction with the shift of
Khrushchev's attention more
and more from domestic prob-
lems and internal party matters
to foreign affairs and travel,
was that the secretariat was
left without the firm leader-
ship of a strong administrator.
After a series of temporizing
measures--putting Mikhail Sus-
lov temporarily in charge in
the secretariat, bringing Igna-
tov back to full-time secre-
tariat work, and finally re-
moving Kirichenko entirely
from the scene by assigning
him to a post in the provinces
--Khrushchev now has sought a
more radical solution.
and Mikoyan stated
Kozlov was a natural choice
to fill the vacuum left by Kiri-
chenko's removal. Khrushchev
in June lubu a
secretarial. For example, the
assignment in April 1959 of
Nikolay Ignatov to a ceremonial
post in the Russian Republic
(RSFSR) government,, an apparent de-
motion, was apparently an effort to
their successor, thus indicat-
ing that they were highly im-
pressed with his abilities and
they had picked Kozlov to be
political reliability. More-
over, if Khrushchev is serious
about establishing Kozlov as
his successor, this new assign-
ment could be part of the build-
up, since the post is a vantage
point for gaining control of the
professional party machine.
to solve secretariat problems. His At this particular junc-
transfer mays-not have, achieved.itspur- ture, however, Khrushchev is
pose , because he was recalled. in Novem- probably more concerned with
ber to full-time work on the sec- securing order and effective
retariat. The strongest indica- administration inthe party
tion that the secretariat was machine at home while he con-
not working smoothly was the centrates on delicate negotia-
loss of influence in mid-1959 tions in the international arena
of Aleksey Kirichenko, who had than in establishing a successor.
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SECRETARIES
Kozlov (new)
Brezhnev
Kuusinen
Mukhitdinov
Suslov
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
The release, simultaneously
with Kozlov's appointment of
five secretaries--Aristov, Pos-
pelov, Kirichenko, Ignatov, and
Furtseva--and the subsequent
addition of ailing Kliment Voro-
shilov's job as ceremonial head
of the Soviet state to the duties
of party secretary Leonid Brezh-
nev may reflect Kozlov's influ-
ence and could indicate that
Khrushchev has given him a
relatively free hand in dealing
with the secretariat problem.
By doing so, however,
Khrushchev has not relinquished
control over the essentials of
party power. He probably feels 25X1
today as he did when he said,
"I am very jealous of my pre-
rogatives; while I live, I
will run the party."
The 7 May announcement of
the establishment of relations
between the Castrol regime and
the Soviet Union formalizes the
increasingly close economic and
political ties since Mikoyan's
visit to Cuba last February,
when a five-year trade pact
and a $100,000,000 Soviet credit
were announced. The statement
said that Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions had in effect existed
since January 1959, when the
USSR recognized the Castro gov-
ernment almost seven years af-
ter the USSR's break with the
Batista regime. The USSR claims
it never recognized Batista
after his 1952 coup, although
it did not break relations,ttn-
tit more than a week after the
coup, when Batista officials in-
terfered with Soviet diplomatic
couriers going from Mexico to
the Cuban Legation in Havana.
The Soviet ambassador to
Mexico, who was in Havana for
the announcement and for the
exchange of ratifications of the
recent Soviet-Cuban trade pact,
may also have transmitted his
government's agrement for Faure
Chaumont, chosen as Cuban am-
bassador to Moscow. Chaumont
has few qualifications for a
diplomatic post, and the advisers,
who are to accompany him will
play important roles. He has
been known primarily as leader
of a student-worker group--con-
sidered political gangsters--
who cooperated with Castro's
guerrillas to overthrow Batista.
Chaumont is believed to have
allowed the Communists to use
his now practically defunct
Revolutionary Directorate as
a front, and in 1959 he was
sent by Castro to Communist
China, Czechoslovakia, and
other countries "to make friends
for the Cuban revolution."
A Cuban radio station said
on 7 May that a Czech mission
had arrived in Havana to con-
elude a trade agreement.
Cuba's oldest newspaper,
the strongly anti-Communist,
Catholic-supported Diario de
la Marina, which has roug man
outsp oT en but losing battle
against growing Communist in-
fluence in Cuba, was seized on
11 May by unions of its workers
after it had published a par-
ticularly strong antiregime
editorial. This leaves only
one paper which still speaks
critically of the government
and two "independent" dailies
which remain out of government
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
control by remaining silent on
internal political issues.
The takeover of the news-
paper will further discourage
domestic opposition:groups.
Leaders of the Christian,
TRUJILLO':S GROWING
Increasing antipathy in
the western hemisphere toward
the Trujillo. dictatorship is
reflected in.the 'recent breaking
of diplomatic relations with
the Dominican Republic' by Co-,
lombia and Peru. Venezuela,
which broke relations nearly
a year ago, is aroused by
Dominican involvement in the
20-21 April military uprising
against President Betancourt
and is pressing for strong ac-
tion against Trujillo by the
Organization: ofAmerican. States
(OAS).
Colombia broke relations
in protest over the use of its
'territory by Dominican-supported
leaders:of the Venezuelan revolt
Ecuador and probably other Latin
American nationsar.e consider-
ing breaking.relations. The
Mexican Government,may also re.-
view its relations policy after
the recent assassination in
Mexico of a'Dominican exile by
alleged Trujillo-agents... Cuba.
broke. relations with the Domin-
can Republic about the same time
as Venezuela, Uruguay,. Honduras,
and Bolivia do not maintain
diplomatic representation in,
Ciudad Trujillo.
President Betancourt's
regime has reflected a growing
impatience and frustration with
Democratic Movement, formed in
late 1959,in hopes of, solidi-
fying Catholics and other anti-
Communists into an ovezt political
opposition, have either fled
or are intimidated by the gov-
ernment's growing repressions.
INTERNATIONAL?ISO.LATION
what it considers ?,. a .negative
position of the , .OAS .on the
Dominican nterventionist ac-
tivities in thee..Car.ibbean, es-
pecially in..light,o.f Trujillo's
recent., plotting against Venezuela.
Top Venezuelan officials hinted
even prior to the April uprising
that armed action against the
Dominican Republic was a strong
possibility, and influential
Venezuelan pro-Castro elements,
who have been causing difficul-
ties for.Betancourt's three-party
coaliti?on,? are in favor of sharp
measures in retaliation.
.Aside from.Betancourt's
fear of further Dominican plot-
ting,agains't .him,, `he. has a long-
standing'hatred.of Trujillo and
seeks his overthrow. He has in-
vited Colombia to: join Venezuela
in presenting specific charges
before the OAS and presumably
seeks the denunciation and pos-
sibly expulsion of..the Dominican
regime from the organization.
An.. .at.tempt .to .so.ive ,Caribbean
problems outside the 'framework
of the OAS, particularly through
bilateral Venezuelan action,
would probably 'damage the pres-
tige of the organization, which
has been under frequent attack
.by Castro. and?by,.Latin American
Communists,as,?an . "instrument of
US.imperialism."
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C'JRt?ENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 19G0
TURKISH INTERNAL SITUATION
Political tension remains
high in Turkey, although no ma-
jor demonstrations have occurred
since 5 May. Many student lead-
ers in Istanbul, where the riot-
ing began on 28 April, apparent-
ly remain in custody, while those
not arrested appear to be dis-
organized. Many students have
returned to the smaller cities
after the closing of the univer-
sities in Istanbul and Ankara.
The opposition Republican
People's party (RPP) is waiting
to see how far the government
will go in carrying out repres-
sive measures. The RPP consid-
ers the next two weeks as most
critical, and RPP leader Inonu
has given "firm instructions'
that there should be no demon-
stration::; or riots until local
reactions become clear. The
RPP is "particularly worried"
about possible demonstrations
in eastern Turkey as news of the
Ankara and Istanbul incidents
reaches there.
The governing Democratic
party (DP) appears to be split
between extremists, who favor
severe repressive action against
the RPP, and moderates, who ad-
vocate a speedy return to normal
democratic procedures. The ex-
tremists have proposed suspen-
sion of parliamentary immunity
to make possible the arrest of
several RPP parliamentary depu-
ties, suppression of the party,
and the establishment of "peo-
ple's courts'" to try RPP leaders
Moderate spokesmen, appar-
ently representing a majority
of the DP parliamentary group,
opposed these moves and suggest-
ed abolishing the investigating
commission set up by the Nation-
al Assembly on 18 April to ex-
amine the 'illegal and subver-
sive" acts of the RPP--an act
which led directly to the present
unstable political situation.
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CURRENT :INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
primarily responsible for
the present situation.
Men eres may
be considering the dismissal of
Minister of Interior Gedik and
the removal of Cemal Goktan from
his position as general direc-
tor of the National Police. Both
are associated in the public
mind with repression of the riots
and the deaths of several stu-
dent demonstrators.
Relations between Menderes
and Bayar have been strained
for many years because, of th6ir
conflicting ambitions, In
the past, this rift has al-
ways been subordinate to the
need for unity in the face of
outside pressures. In the
present situation, however,
with a majority of his party
colleagues favoring moderation,
If Menderes has joined with
the moderate faction, this could
lead to further disagreement be-
tween him and President Bayar,
long regarded as one of the ad-
vocatesof repressive measures.
At the parliamentary group meet-
ings, J3ayar was attacked, along
with the interior ministe4 as
Menderes may have decided to
adopt a conciliatory course
in the hope of regaining popu-
larity within the country and
of simultaneously further lim-
iting the influence of a long-
time rival for ower
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12 May 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Khrushchev's speech on 5
May to the Supreme Soviet ex-
pressed considerable satisfac-
tion with the USSR's economic
achievements and continued
optimism over prospects, par-
ticularly for the-Soviet con-
sumer. Showing characteristic
confidence in the country's
ability to fulfill the Seven-
Year Plan (1959-65) and catch
up with the United States, he
said repeatedly that the So-
viet Union will reach the lev-
el of the US in consumer goods
in the "immediate future." The
Soviet people, Khrushchev said
will then "enter the open sea,
in which no comparisons with
capitalism will anchor us....
We will plow deeper and wider
furrows in people's minds and
show them that it is not capi-
talism, but Communism, which
gives people all the opportu-
nities for the best possible
life on earth."
Abolition of Some Taxes
As one step in this proc-
ess, Khrushchev outlined a
plan for the gradual elimina
tion of personal income taxes
and the tax on bachelors by
1965, a move which would raise
the take-home pay of almost
all employed persons except
collective farmers, those in
producers' cooperatives, mili-
tary personnel, and some pro-
fessionals.
Under this measure, seven
out of eight Soviet workers
will have their monthly take-
home pay increased 1.5 to 12
percent. Persons with relative-
ly high monthly incomes, how-
ever, will have wages or salary
reductions which will partially
or wholly offset the tax reduc-
tions, but in no case will the
take-home pay of an individual
be reduced. Collective farmers
do not pay the personal income
tax. The so-called "agricul-
tural tax," which amounts to a
tax on the income obtained by
collective farmers from their
private plots, is to be re-
tained.
Because workers with month-
ly incomes above 2,000 rubles
will get no increase in take-
home pay and. those with monthly
incomes between 1,200 and 2,000
rubles will receive relatively
small increases, the tax aboli-
tion will be of greatest bene-
fit to workers earning between
700 and 1,200 rubles per month.
The abolition of the taxes, in
the absence of offsetting
forces, will thus tend to nar-
row differentials in take-home
pay between low- and high-paid
workers.
Revenues from the income
and bachelor taxes amount to
only 45.6 billion rubles or 6.8
percent of total budget revenue
in 1958. Plans for 1959 and
1960, however, called for an in-
crease of 65 billion rubles in
the tax on profits of state en-
terprises alone. The small part
of total budget revenue provided
by the taxes to be eliminated
can thus be obtained readily from
other sources, and Khrushchev's
plan will offer benefits to the
population at minimum cost to
the state. It will not, however,
relieve the taxpayer of his bur-
dens, as Khrushchev claims, because
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960.
the burden of the indirect
taxes which support the Soviet
system will continue to fall
on the Soviet consumer.
Khrushchev explicitly
recognized the need to provide
additional consumer goods and
services in order to absorb the
increased purchasing power gen-
erated by the tax abolition,but
was very vague regarding the
provision of such goods. This
problem can be postponed to
the next plan period, however,
since the major impact of the
measure will not be felt until
1965. There will be very little
immediate effect on consumer
welfare.
Shortening of Workweek
Khrushchev reiterated the
goal of a 41-hour workweek for
all except collective farmers
by the end of 1960,and of start-
ing on a 35-hour workweek in
1964. Less than 30 percent of
the 58,000,000 workers now have
the 41-hour workweek, however,
USSR: SCHEDULE FOR
Personal Monthly Incomes
(in rubles)
AB
(e
OLITION OF INCOME TAXES
Schedule
ffective 1 October of year given)
371 - 500
501 - 600
1960
601 - 700
1961
701 - 800
1962
801 - 900
1963
901 - 1000
Over 1000
1965*
(accompanied
by wage cuts)
1965 SCHEDULE OF WAGE CUTS
Personal Monthly Incomes I
(in rubles)
Percent of
Abolished Tax
1001 - 1200
1201 - 1400
1401-1600
1601 - 1800
1801 - 2000
Over 2000
I 100
The value of these salary rubles, in terms of purchasing power,
is approximately reflected by the tourist rate of 10 rubles equals
one dollar.
00511 3
SECRET
and the changeover
has hardly begun out-
side of heavy industry.
The ability to carry,
out the cut in man-
hours while continu-
ing to increase out-
put depends on more
efficient use of
labor and on tech-
nological improve-
ments.
Currency and Price
Change
Khrushchev an-
nounced on 5 May that
a revaluation of So-
viet currency and do-
mestic prices will be-
come effective at the
beginning of 1961.
This move will en-
tail a 90-percent
across-the-board re-
duction of all prices,
accompanied by the
issuance of one new,
or "heavy," ruble for
ten of the present 25X1
rubles,with exchange
permitted over a three-
month period. Khrushchev
emphasized that these measures
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'12 May 1966
will leave price relationships
in the economy unchanged and
pointed out, "The population
will be able to acquire with
its income the same quantity
of commodities as before."
Although Khrushchev claims
the measure will simplify book-
keeping, make the use of auto-
matic vending machines more
feasible, and contribute to
"the rational use of material,
labor, and monetary means,"
the primary importance of the
change is from the standpoint
of Soviet relations with the
rest of the world. By assign-
ing a new and higher gold con-
tent to the ruble, hence rais-
ing its official exchange
rate, Soviet leaders will try
to demonstrate the growing
international power and pres-
tige of the Soviet economy.
Thus these adjustments may be
used for a major propaganda
effort.
The degree of appreciation
of the ruble for foreign trade
has still to be determined by
Soviet financial authorities,
but it appears likely that the
new gold content will make the
ruble (now.222 gram) roughly
equivalent to the US dollar
(.888 gram) at the same time
that its internal value is in-
creased by ten. This action,
in effect, would depreciate the
heretofore considerably over-
stated value of their foreign
trade currency relative to their
internal currency. With such
a change, domestic and external
prices as a whole would be
brought into a more reasonable
relationship; e.g., prices of
goods moving in Soviet foreign
trade would be somewhat
closer to their internal
prices.
An unrealistic exchange
rate among Soviet bloc coun-
tries has handicapped economic
planning for the bloc as a whole
and has stood in the way of
merging the seven separate
satellite markets into a single
market area for certain prod-
ucts,, It is expected, however,
that bloc exchange rates will
be adjusted along with the
Soviet change to reflect more
accurately the relation of the
internal purchasing powers of
the various bloc currencies
tb that of the Soviet
ruble and with Western cur-
rencies.
Building Materials
In his final speech to
the Supreme Soviet on 7 May,
Khrushchev limited discussion
of economic affairs to a call
for greater development in the
building materials industry--
especially cement. He warned
that further lags in adding
new building materials capac-
ity? must be prevented, or re-
sulting shortages would pose
a threat to the investment,
program of the Seven-Year Plan,
Similar criticism has been prev-
alent. for years. In recent
years, the over-all volume of
construction has been increas-
ing at a rate substantially
greater than called for under
the plan, but the rate of in-
crease in production of build-
ing materials has not been
keeping pace.
(Prepared by VMrEJ
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
EAST GERMAN REGIME CRACKS DOWN ON EVANGELICAL CHURCH
The Ulbricht regime ap-
pears determined to crush the
Evangelical Church, the only
effective opposition force in
East Germany, by cutting off
its financial support from West
Germany. Such a move may well
be followed by an offer to pay
the church's pastors and other
expenses in an attempt to
make it financially dependent
on the regime and to increase
its susceptibility to Commu-
nist pressure. If this were
achieved, Ulbricht would be
free to sever remaining ties
between the church in East
Germany and its leaders in
West Berlin and West Germany.
the past the regime has per-
mitted West German church of-
ficials to purchase certain
commodities in West Germany for
delivery to East German enter-
prises and in return has made
the proceeds available to the
church in East Germany.
The Evangelical Church has
already been placed under heavy
pressure as a result of the
regime's determination to si-
lence public criticism by church-
men of the coercive methods
used to collectivize peasants.
A variety of pressures has
been used to elicit expressions
of approval from rural minis-
ters to "prove" that the church
actually supports the "social-
ist" system.
One of the few remaining
independent sources of church
revenue is that derived from
church-owned farmland, and this
is beginning to come under re-
gime control. As part of the
collectivization drive, pres-
sure is being put on farmers
cultivating these lands to join
collectives and on the church
itself to lease the lands to
collectives. Although the
church has resisted this pres-
sure, its officials in some
cases reportedly have permit-
ted the lands to be incorpor-
ated into collectives. Min-
isters of churches which derive
revenue from these leases re-
portedly are finding it in-
creasingly difficult to refuse
to cooperate with the regime.
West German leaders are
greatly concerned over the
prospects of a further weaken-
ing of ties between the church
in East and West Germany.
Chancellor Adenauer has told a
West German church representa-
tive he would take up the mat-
ter with President Eisenhower
in Paris with the aim of having
the President bring pressure
on Khrushchev to stop Ulbricht
from staging a showdown with 25X1
the church.
West 25X1
German officials - the Economics
Ministry, however, view eco-
nomic reprisals as ineffective,
since goods denied by the Fed-
eral Republic could easily be
purchased elsewhere, and they
fear they would invite retalia-
tion against West Berlin.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
CHOU CONTINUES SWING THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA
Premier Chou En-lai's visit
to Cambodia from 5 to 9 May--
at a time of increased Cambodi-
an - South Vietnamese frictions
--provided the Chinese Commu-
nists with the opportunity to
encourage Sihanouk's neutral
position and counterbalance
American influence there. Chou
presided at the inauguration of
a textile mill completed with
part of the $28,000,000 already
granted Cambodia and, in a dis-
play of concern for Cambodia
sensibilities, called on Chi-
nese in the country to obey the
laws of the land. Prince Si-
hanouk said the visit was the
"most successful" by a foreign
leader, but he made it clear
that Cambodia's neutrality in-
cludes acceptance of aid from
the United States and France as
well as China.
Despite rumors that Chou
would guarantee Cambodian bor-
ders against South Vietnam, the
Chinese premier made no commit-
ment and confined himself to an
expression of moral support for
Phnom Penh. With Sihanouk, he
toured the islands in the Gulf
of Siam which are in dispute
with South Vietnam and later
stated at a press conference
that encroachment by any neigh-
boring country would be unjust
and should be condemned. In
the joint communique issued on
9 May, Chou endorsed Phnom
Penh's policy of "strict neu-
trality," and both sides af-
firmed their belief that the
preservation of peace lay in
respecting the agreements al-
ready concluded between the
two countries.
No additional Chinese eco-
nomic aid was announced, but
both sides affirmed their de-
sire for further cooperation in
"all fields."
The joint communique ex-
pressed the hope that agreements
on the question of banning nu-
clear weapons and on general
disarmament would be reached at
the summit conference. Similar
statements were incorporated in
the communique issued after
Chou's recent visits to Burma,
India, and Nepal. Chou's de-
sire for an Asian "summit meet-
ing" is indicated by his press
conference statement calling
for the convocation of another
Bandung-type meeting of Asian
and African nations.
Sihanouk apparently decid-
ed to use the visit to high-
light Communist China's support
of Cambodia's foreign policy,
hoping this would give South
Vietnam and Thailand cause to
reconsider any hostile designs
on Cambodia. Sihanouk and Pre-
mier Pho Proeung accepted an
invitation to visit Communist
China in the future.
Chou arrived on 9 May in
North Vietnam,where he will
probably discuss the situation
in Laos--particularly the re-
cent elections and the efforts
of the Neo Lao Hak Sat to func-
tion as a legal political par-
ty. Except for a single Hanoi
commentary, there has been no
Peiping-Hanoi propaganda reac-
tion to the Laotian elections,
suggesting that the Communists
will refrain from a major propa-
ganda campaign--at least until
a premier is appointed and the
situation clarified.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
GROWING CRITICISM OF DIEM REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnamese President
Diem, beset with a serious chal-
lenge from resurgent Communist
guerrilla forces, also faces a
growing problem of dissatisfac-
tion among officials of his own
regime, as well as among the
public. Diem is taking urgent
steps--chiefly military--in an
effort to redress the internal
security situation, but shows
no inclination to liberalize
his regime despite growing
criticism. This attitude
is consistent with his tough-
mindedness, and with his belief
that the exigencies of the
times require authoritarian
rule.
A number of important Viet-
namese figures, including high
government officials, labor or-
ganizers, members of the Nation-
al Assembly, and leaders of po-
litical parties, have privately
expressed discontent and frus-
tration with their "puppet"
roles. Their complaint is that
Diem's refusal to delegate au-
thority beyond a tight circle
of relatives and close associ-
ates has paralyzed effective
government, fostered favoritism
and corruption, alienated the
people, and facilitated Commu-
nist subversion. Vice Presi-
dent Nguyen Ngoc Tho and other
cabinet members fear for the
government's stability unless
political reforms are undertaken
.immediately.
A principal cause for wide-
spread resentment is the perva-
sive influence of the Can Lao,
a semicovert organization which
exercises the real power and
control in the government on
Diem's behalf. Under the di-
rection of Diem's brother and
chief political adviser, Ngo
Dinh Nhu, the Can Lao had gradu-
ally fashioned a commissar-like
network throughout the govern-
ment's political and military
substructure.
Diem thus far has refused
to acknowledge any serious short-
comings in his entourage, and
brushes off critics of the regime
a's eith ,opportunists, crackpots, or
crypto-Communists. He has dismissed
as "inconsequential!' the public peti-
tion for more democratic practices
issued in Saigon recently by a
group of former Vietnamese gov-
ernment officials and civic
leaders. This unprecedented
attack on the Diem regime by a
cohesive, non-Communist group,
however, could be the forerunner
of developments similar to
those in South Korea which re-
sulted in the overthrow of the
Rhee regime. While this does
not seem an immediate likelihood,
Communist subversion--which has
already gained a toehold in cer-
tain rural areas--is a particu-
larly dangerous factor in the
over-all situation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
The South Korean National
Assembly is moving toward amend-
ment of the constitution to re-
duce the powers of the president
and establish a cabinet with a
prime minister responsible to
the legislature. Sporadic dem-
onstrations have continued on a
reduced scale calling for the
resignation of the incumbent
assembly, but the majority of
students and the general public
seem willing to have the changes
made by the present legislature.
Any prolonged delay, however,by
the assembly or the Huh adminis-
tthatiOn iii reforming the gov-
ernment or holding new assembly
elections could provoke new
widespread disturbances.
The assembly on 5 May
opened public hearings on the
proposed constitutional changes.
Those testifying generally ap-
proved the establishment of a
responsible cabinet system head-
ed by a prime minister, support-
ed election by the legislature
of a president with drastically
restricted powers, and agreed
that the incumbent assembly
need not be dissolved prior to
amendment of the constitution.
They objected, however, to the
assembly's draft provisions re-
stricting freedom of speech,
press, and assembly, as well as
to proposed emergency powers.
According to unconfirmed press
reports, the legislature will
vote on the measure about mid-
June, and elections for
a new assembly will be
called within the next 30
days.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
In early May, Acting Chief
of .State Huh Chung said the
time required to draw up new
voting lists and make other
preparations would make it dif-
ficult to hold the elections
within the prescribed legal
time limits. The minority Dem-
ocratic party then charged in
the assembly that local offi-
cials were deliberately delay-
ing preparations for the elec-
tion, and Home Minister Yi Ho
on 10 May promised that the
government would do its best
to hold the elections on time.
Huh, while assuring Ambas-
sador McConaughy that the elec-
tions would be completely free,
has pointed out that members
of the former Progressive par-
ty, which Huh equated with the
Communists, will be elected to
a new assembly. The late Pro-
gressive party leader Cho Pong-
am, who was executed last year
by the Rhee regime, polled
over 2,000,000 votes against
5,000,000 for Rhee in the 1956
presidential elections.
Both Rhee's Liberal party
and the conservative opposition
Democratic party have been ap-
prehensive over the development
of a strong leftist opposition
party. A senior government
official recently attributed
the continuing demonstrations
in Pusan to an alliance of for-
mer Progressive party members
and college professors. The
official allegedly feared that
a "socialist uprising" in the
area was imminent.
New Minister of
Defense Yi Chong-chan,
following a visit to
Pusan, reported to
the Huh cabinet on 9
May that law and or-
der had been restored
throughout the coun-
try. He found no
evidence of Commu-
nist instigation of
the Pusan demonstra-
tions. The United
States Eighth Army
has commented that
martial law command-
er Song confirmed
that there was no
evidence of Commu-
nist instigation, al-
though some Communist pam
phlets"had recently been un-
covered in the area.
Song, who has expressed
concern over the threat of Com-
munist agent exploitation of
the present unrest, reportedly
has been in favor of using what-
ever means are necessary to sup-
press any further disturbances,
but has employed only moderate
force to break up demonstrations.
Yi insists that the demonstra-
tions be permitted and that
martial law be ended as soon
as possible so the army can re-
turn to its regular duties.
Commenting on foreign af-
fairs, Hu Chung has explained
that his recent demand that
Tokyo stop the repatriation Of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
Koreans in Japan to North Korea
was not a prerequisite to a
resumption of negotiations but
a precondition for a final set-
tlement. It now appears that
in the recently reported shoot-
ing incident involving a Japa-
nese fishing boat, a Korean
police patrol boat fired four
rounds of blank ammunition.
The embassy notes that the
incident, which apparently
did not involve the South Ko-
rean Coast Guard, does not
invalidate Huh's assertion
that-further ggeizures of Japa-
nese fishing boats will be
avoided.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
The Karami cabinet in Leb-
anon resigned on 11 May in prep-
aration for the parliamentary
elections beginning 12 June and
ending 3 July. A neutral care-
taker government will 'take over
in the interim. Now that dates
have been set for the election,
the pace of political maneuver-
ing has increased.
An unexpected development
is the reconciliation between
former President Chamoun and
Maronite Patriarch Maushi,
bitter political enemies since
1952 when President Bishara al-
Khuri, a relative of Maushi,was
ousted from office. The recent
accord apparently was a by-
product of the 1 May incident
in which Moslem-directed police
fired on a crowd of Maronites
attending a pontifical mass.
The Maushi-Chamoun entente is
most likely to move to offset
the influence of Minister of
Works Pierre Jumayyil, leader
of the Phalange, the political
action arm of the Maronite
Church. President Shihab can
only be displeased at the
patriarch's joining forces with
Shihab's most bitter enemy.
Iraq
The Qasim regime, trying
to block an attempt by antire-
gime National Democratic par-
ty elements to seize control
of the party, has nullified
the election of party officers
representing the faction led
by Kamil Chadirchi. The Cha -
dirchi faction has been demand-
ing the withdrawal of the par-
ty's support for the Qasim
regime, while the group led by
Muhammad Hadid, minister of
finance who resigned on 27
April, has insisted on the par-
ty's participation in the gov-
ernment.
The Chadirchi faction,
apparently by refusing voting
credentials to its opponents
at the party convention, se-
cured "unanimous" election of its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
slate of officers to the par-
ty's "administrative commit-
tee." An Iraqi judge, who was
present in accordance with the
law regarding political par-
ties, declared the election il-
legal because of a lack of a
quorum; the Chadirchi faction
has appealed to the Ministry of
Interior to upset the judge's
ruling.
The splinter. Communist fac-
tion led by Daud Sayigh which
received legal recognition by
the Qasim regime in February
is running into organizational
difficulties. Lacking a solid
body of supporters, it has been
delaying holding its legally re-
quired convention. The group's
difficulties have engendered
numerous rumors regarding its
fate and future course of ac-
tion. One of these centers
around negotiations between
Sayigh and the orthodox Commu-
nists, who have been refused a
license to operate.
Qasim is said to be urging
reunion of the two groups, while
promising Sayigh to "freeze"
the activities of some of the
more prominent and forceful
leaders of the orthodox faction.
Another possibility is that the
Chadirchi wing of the NDP will
form a coalition with Sayigh's
group, whose members might be
termed nationalist Communists.
Relations between Iraqis
and American officials in Bagh-
dad are gradually improving. At
recent social events, Iraqi of-
ficers have made a point of
telling American personnel about
their opposition to Communism
and their friendliness to the
United States. The commander
of the troops guarding Radio
Baghdad has stated that Qasim,
in a meeting with him on 6 May,
expressed strong sentiments
against the Communists and in-
timat6d that he would continue
actions to undermine them.
Arab Boycott Ends
The Arab press, radio, and
officials spent most of the
week crowing over the "victory"
of Arab unity signaled by the
6 May decision of the Seamen's
International Union to cease
picketing the UAR ship Cleopatra
in New York. Despite the public
display"of solidarity maintained
during the seven-day Arab boy-
cott of American vessels, its
end was probably greeted with
relief by officials of most Arab
governments. Official support
in such states as Lebanon and
Libya was lukewarm at best,
given only in order to avoid
standing on the wrong side of
an issue which had assumed
enormous proportions in the pub-
lic eye.
UAR President Nasir, capi-
talizing on the affair, deliv-
ered a stinging speech on 7 May
against the United States and
the alleged Zionist influence
behind the Cleopatra picketing
as well as the Congressional
amendment to the Mutual Security
Act, The following day, by
contrast, he praised the USSR
for the "unconditional" aid it
had furnished the UAR. The two
performances were models illus-
trating the policy he has often
described as "befriending those
who befriend us and antagonizing
those who antagonize us,"
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0=01V %WWW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
25X1
King Husayn's absence from
Jordan : ,oh a._ trip,- whidh':ends
On 16 May and the presence in
his entourage of several key
government and military figures,
together with the scheduled
visit to Iran by the director
of public security, reflect an
apparent confidence on the part
of the regime that the country's
internal security is under ade-
quate control. The regime re-
mains concerned about subver-
sive activity, particularly
that emanating from Syria.
The
American army attach4 in Amman,
however, now doubts that the
Jordanian Army, because of the
damage sustained in a warehouse
fire on 3 May, in which more
than $500,000 worth of military
supplies were destroyed,could
contemplate any serious military
operations until the losses are
replaced.
Arab League
The eight people implicated
in the plot to assassinate Prime
Minister Majalli and the King's
uncle, Sharif Nasir, were sen-
tenced on 4 May. The alleged
organizers of the plot, former
Jordanian Army Chief of Staff
All Abu Nuwar and former Foreign
Minister Abdullah Rimawi, a
Baathist, were sentenced in ab-
sentia to 15 years in prison.
They are in exile i'p. Syria.
Husayn apparently still
clings to his ambitious designs
on Syria and Iraq.
One of the results of
Husayn's visit to Morocco
is that
the King was given to under-
stand that Morocco would sup-
port Jordan vis-a-vis the UAR
within the Arab League. UAR-
Jordanian differences, which
at league meetings have cen-
tered on Palestine "entity"
proposals, will again be aired
at an Arab League meeting
at the foreign ministers'
level to be held in Beirut
sometime between 20 and
25 June. Scheduling of the
meeting for Beirut presum-
ably will result in attend-
ance by the Iraqis, who
have boycotted the leap
meetings in Cairo.
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12 May 1960
The imminent independence
and union for the British So-
maliland protectorate and the
Italian-administered trust ter-
ritory of Somalia has increased
apprehension in Addis Ababa
over the integrity of the Ethi-
opian empire, which includes a
sizable Somali minority. Ethi-
opia suspects that acquiescence
by Britain and Italy to Somali
nationalist demands is part of
an effort to maintain colonial
influence in the Horn of Africa.
Tension, beyond the normal
friction between Ethiopian po-
strong since February that
Britain has abandoned its time-
tables for the protectorate's
political evolution and has
agreed to independence by 1 July.
Despite British disclaim-
ers of support for Somali ex-
pansionism, Ethiopia was partic-
ularly alarmed at the statement
issued in late April by repre-
sentatives of the two Somali
states following a conference
to discuss the possibilities
of union and creation of a com-
mon government. This statement
envisioned the Somali union as
lice and the nomadic tribesmen
from the British Somaliland
protectorate, is mounting as
Christian-dominated Ethiopia
feels increasingly imperiled
by Moslem Somali nationalism.
Addis Ababa was resigned to
the independence of the Italian
trust territory of Somali on 1
July 1960, but the rush of the
British protectorate to freedom
has created new problems. Na-
tionalism there has become so
the "first practical step" to-
ward the creation of a Greater
Somalia--a concept which seeks
to include 600,000 Ethiopian
Somalis in a Somali nation of
about 3,000,000.
Addis Ababa for some time
has beets reinforcing its se-
curity forces in the Somali-
inhabited areas, which consti-
tute about one third of the
total of the country, and the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
Emperor on 11 May based his re-
quest for more American mili-
tary equipment on the danger
of aggression from Somali ter-
ritory. Moscow offered on 30
April to provide Ethiopia with
arms and military equipment,
area--Britain and Italy.
Its con-
trolled press has charged that
the Somali Union is a "neo-im-
perialist scheme" designed to
serve the purposes of the for-
mer "colonial masters" of the
Disorders in the Belgian
Congo--including anti-European
demonstrations and scattered.
strikes--have resulted in a
serious deterioration of in-
ternal security. Local po-
lice have failed to inter-
vene effectively in recent
instances of violence. The
period leading up to Congolese
independence on 30 June will
probably be marked by new dis-
orders, particularly since
Belgian authorities seem dis-
inclined to take strong coun-
termeasures.
The agency responsible for
internal security in the Congo
remains the 28,000-man, Belgian-
officered Force Publique. De-
spite occasional reports which
have cast doubt on its po-
litical reliability, the
Force Publique to date has
stayed aloof from Congolese
politics and has been a major
stabilizing factor in the
colony. In the past year,
however, it has been hard
pressed to maintain order be-
tween the Lulua and Baluba
tribes in Kasai Province,
where intermittent warfare
has cost several hundred
lives.
More recently, the main-
tenance of order has been made
more difficult by the general
excitement of the populace.in
anticipation of independence,
the inability of Congolese
leaders to control their fol-
lowers, and an apparent abdica-
tion by some Belgian adminis-
trators of their responsibili-
ties.
New outbreaks in the Lulua-
Baluba war in early May coin-
cided with riots at Stanley-
Ville, where cars of Europeans
were stoned on 3 May in the
first major anti-European
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SECRET,
12 May 1960
demonstration of the pre-elec-
tion period. The Stanleyville
incident--which may have stemmed
from ol.ectioe7 passions in
the area--was followed by trib-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBII
_Ail
early May appear to have been stimulated
by'agitatoro associated with
various African political parties.
Although
condemned
the strikes have been
by union leaders, the
Belgian administration
has done little to
restore order. Since
the large mining firms
in Katanga Province
are owned by Euro-
peans, the strikes
could take on a no-
ticeable anti-Euro-
pean bias if not
brought under con-
trol.
E Q U A T E U R ?Stanleyville 4r--J
Lpluaburg?
T BEL,G1AN RONGO
Leopoldville K A S Al l
LEOPOLDVILLE
AN40-ULA
.S's
AND NYASALAND
al. clashes in Leopoldville'
Province on 7 and 8 May. Ef-
forts by the Force Publique to
restore order resulted in in-
cidents between the soldiers
and local police, who accused
the Force Publique of acting
from tribal prejudice.
In Katanga Province,
strikes which have occurrdd since
Sentiment for
the establishment of
a Katanga state in-
dependent of the Con-
go on 30 June remains
strong in the Elisa-
bethville area; it
would probably in-
crease in the event
of a further deteri-
oration in the secu-
rity situation. Bel-
gian airlines report-
edly have chartered
80 special flights
between 10 May and
30 June for Belgian residents
wanting to leave the Congo, and
shipping lines report record waitiuig
lists. Many Belgians are delay-
ing their departures because of
exchange restrictions which pe:-.
mit them to transfer only $200
per month from the Congo.
Acute tension has developed
between Senegal and Soudan--the
component states of the French
Community's Mali Federation--
over constitutional and polit-
ical issues which should be
Settled before Mali becomes in-
dependent next month. However,
compromise arrangements, which
will preserve the federation
and leave the door open for
the possible future entry of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 19 60
additional states, will probably
be worked out.
Mali has been troubled by
...Action between its Senegalese
and Soudanese partners since
its creation in January 1959.
Much of this discord has been
bn constitutional is-
sues. The Soudanese
generally favor a
highly centralized
unitary state, while
most Senegalese lead-
ers want to retain
the present federal
structure which gives
the constituent states
extensive autonomy.
A head-on clash
had been avoided until
last week, when dis-
cussions began between
the two states on the
distribution of the
new powers Mali will
assume when it becomes
--probably during the
first week of June--
threats to secede from Mali, the
talks were broken off and the
developing crisis was referred
to Mali's top policy-making au-
thority--the executive bureau
of the dominant African Federa-
tion party. This body, which
met in Dakar on 7 and 8 May, ap-
OCEAN
the Community's first fully in-
dependent African state. The
talks were immediately confront-
ed with rival claims to the new
federal portfolios of defense
and foreign affairs and differ-
ing stands on the federation's
constitution, especially regard-
ing the position of the chief
of state.
The Senegalese, who regard
themselves as the natural lead-
ers of France's former colonies
in West Africa, pressed for the
establishment of a new office
of "president of the republic'--
to be held, at least initially,
by a Senegalese. This bid was
rejected by the Soudanese, whose
leader, Modibo Keita,.holds the
present top-ranking Mali post of
"president of the government."
After three days of increas-
ingly bitter wrangling, which
reportedly included Soudanese
ministerial Hosts.
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? 25X1
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parently reached agreement quick-
ly on the Iprinciples" which
should govern constitutional re-
vision. However, it left to a
special 10-man commission the
task of working out--by 20 May---
the details of a compromise which
will presumably allocate a share
of the new federal powers and
prerogatives to each state.
Such arrangements may well
lead to increased influence on
the federal level for Soudanese
elements with a predilection
toward friendship and ties with
the Sino-Soviet bloc and could
put them in a position to deter-
mine in large measure Mali's
foreign policy orientation.
Their leader, Soudanese Interior
Minister Madeira Keita, has
been advanced as one of Soudan's
candidates for the new federal
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Bizerte
French forces in Morocco
and Tunisia have been cut grad-
ually, but France insists it
will not withdraw entirely.
Paris maintains that French op-
eration of Bizerte is not nego-
tiable because it controls the
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
FRENCH BASES IN AFRICA
Recent French negotiations
concerning bases in Africa sug-
gest that Paris's long-term plans
for the defense of Africa and
Europe's southern approaches
will center on a few major air
and naval bases in Africa.
SECRET
U AR
(EGYPT)
BELGIAN }
CONGO
French Strategic Bases
in Africa
There are hints of some French
willingness to give up eventual-
ly all bases in independent
African states except Bizerte,
Kenitra (formerly Port Lyautey),
Dakar, and Diego Suarez.
critical central
Mediterranean area
and "atom-proof"
storage facilities
have been installed
there. In Morocco,
France is adhering
to a fine legalistic
line on the present
turnover of outlying
bases jointly occu-
pied with the United
States, presumably
in an effort to
strengthen its claim
to Kenitra. There
are indications that
Paris has begun to
soften on the other
French facilities in
Morocco, primarily
air and naval air
training stations.
It wants to hold Ken-
itra for air defense
and protection of
lines of communica-
tion between France
and West Africa.
Paris has care-
fully guarded its
right to strategic
bases in French Com-
munity territories
scheduled for inde-
pendence in June.
The pre-independence
agreement between
France and Mali "cede;"
to France the rightF;
to Dakar and several other base:
"for defense of the Community."
Similarly, the Malagasy Republic
will grant France "free use" of
Diego Suarez and three other
sites. Dakar is a modernized
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12 May 1960
base equipped to support major
operations in wartime. Diego
Suarez, whose importance would
be greatly enhanced if use of
the Suez Canal were denied, has
anchorage for up to 200 naval
vessels in numerous sheltered
bays which would provide con-
siderable protection against
blast in a nuclear attack.
De Gaulle's view that the
defense of Africa is an integral
part of the defense of Europe
has led him to insist that
African security should be or-
ganized among the Western allies
"as it is in Europe." Paris
maintains that its Bizerte base 25X1
serves a function similar to
that of the British base at
Cyprus
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
TAMBRONI GOVERNMENT'S DIFFICULTIES
Premier Tambroni's care-
taker Christian Democratic gov-
ernment faces continued attack
from the small democratic parties
which backed earlier governments,
and possible revolt by Chris-
tian Democrats who object to his
parliamentary dependence on the
neo-Fascists.
Democratic Socialist leader
Saragat had urged that the Cham-
ber of Deputies reopen the in-
vestiture debate on the grounds
that Tambroni achieved his vic-
tory through two inconsistent
positions: he accepted neo-
Fascist support in the lower
house, but repudiated it in the
Senate, where he had a majority
without it. Chamber President
Leone, a Christian Democrat,
ruled, however, that Tambroni
had fulfilled constitutional re-
quirements simply by obtaining
a majority in both houses.
In addition to the Demo-
cratic Socialists, spokesmen
for the Republicans, Liberals,
and Nenni Socialists opposed
Leone's decision, but did not
challenge it formally. No issue
was made of the constitutional
requirement that approval by
both houses of parliament must
be obtained within ten days 'of
a premier's investiture. Tam-
broni's government was invested
on 26 March, but the Senate vote
did not take place until 29
April.
Even if the Christian Dem-
ocrats can avoid a party crisis
at their national council meet-
ing reportedly planned for the
last week of May, government-
sponsored legislation faces
formidable obstacles in the
lower house, where the composi--
tion of several important com-
mittees does not reflect the
majority combination of Chris-
tian Democrats and neo-Fascists
on which Tambroni depends.
Some center politicians be-
lieve the Tambroni regime may
seriously endanger parliamentary
government, and that Tambroni
himself would not be averse to
using extra constitutional tactics
--possibly a show of force by
the Carabinieri or by hoodlums
from. among his neo-Fascist al-
lies--in an attempt to remain in
power. Such a situation might
arise after the budget is ap-
proved if there is then pressure
from left-wing Christian Demo-
crats for a broader legislative
program than Tambroni couldenact
with his present allies.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
The Soviet Union, with ac-
tive support from the European
satellites, is consolidating
its initial economic ties with
Cuba in an effort to lay the
foundations for a long-term
taken to ensure successful im-
plementation of new contracts,
and the bloc probably will com-
plete the year with a record of
filled commitments. Prospects
that the Sino-Soviet bloc might
take over the US economic posi-
tion in Cuba are remote, but the
present economic agreements are
already being hailed by both par-
ties as a significant victory
over "Western imperialism" and
as adequate vindication for the
propaganda claims about the new
ties.
Soviet Trade Pact
Mike>yan opens Soviet exhibition
in Havana, February 1960
economic relationship. Mikoyan's
visit to Cuba last -February,.re-
suited in the first formal eco-
nomic ties between the Castro
regime and the bloc, signaling
a shift from cautious Soviet en-
dorsement of the Cuban revolu-
tion to active support for the
new regime. On 7 May,Cuba re-
newed diplomatic relations with
the USSR and agreed to establish
missions on the embassy level.
Prior to this year, bloc
economic contacts were limited
to sugar imports by the USSR
and a few Czech sales to Cuba.
Since Mikoyan's visit, East
Germany and Poland have followed
the Soviet lead in concluding
bilateral trade agreements with
Cuba, and details now are being
worked out in Havana for an
agreement with Czechoslovakia.
Present activity suggests
that considerable care is being
The USSR is committed to
purchase 1,000,000 tons of Cuban
sugar annually for the next five
years--four times the recent av-
erage. Barter provisions call
for 20 percent of the USSR's im-
ports during 1961-64 to be paid
for in US dollars and 80 percent
to be covered by shipments of
Soviet goods.
In order to ensure complete
and rapid fulfillment during 1960,
the text of the agreement speci-
fies that only the 425,000 tons
of this year's total commitments
SHIPPED IN
1959
USSR
OTHER BLOC
SCHEDULED FOR
1960
(3.5x OF VALUE OF TOTAL
CUBAN SUGAR SALES)
USSR
1,000,000
66.5
POLAND
150,000
10 .2
COMMUNIST CHINA
130,000
8 .6
EAST GERMANY
60,000
4 .2
89.5
(15x OF ESTIMATED
VALUE OF TOTAL
CUBAN SUGAR SALES)
which were purchased after the
signing of the trade pact will
be on a bartered basis, and that
earlier purchases, totaling
575,000 tons, will be paid for
in cash. This arrangement should
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
forestall the initial difficul-
ties often experienced by under-
developed countries in arrange-
ing to purchase bloc industrial
goods as provided under the
bloc?s ?bilateral trade agree-
ments.
The Soviet Union is rapidly
concluding contracts and sched-
uling shipments of goods called
for in 1960, almost all of which
are raw materials easily shipped
on short notice, A Soviet tank-
er arrived with a cargo of crude
oil on 18 April as the first
shipment under a $12,000,000
contract calling for 600,000
tons of petroleum, half in crude
and half in refined products.
Subsequent shipments have now
arrived and will continue for
several months. Almost all the
trade is being carried in Soviet
vessels--some on scheduled runs
from the Baltic--in an effort,
however uneconomical, to under-
score the Soviet presence in the
Caribbean.
Other Soviet barter goods
specified for 1960, such as
wheat, pig iron, and fertiliz-
ers, are arriving in quanti-
ties which will quickly use
up the $30,000,000 necessary
to balance this year's sugar
commitment. While this trade
is minor in terms of total
Cuban imports, it will serve
both sides as superficial evi-
dence that the new ties are
paying off.
A more accurate appraisal
of Soviet-Cuban economic rela-
tions awaits developments next
year, i when Cuba. is to import
Soviet goods worth nearly
twice as much as this year's
purchases to balance sugareship-
ments;and, in addition, begin
receiving Soviet industrial
products under the $100,000,000
credit. Difficulties are like-
ly at that time, and lengthy
negotiations and sound planning
will be required if Cuba is to
benefit.
Satellite and Chinese Activity
Since the autumn of 1959,
the leading European satellites.
have stepped up their commer-
cial activities in Cuba to ex-
ploit the readiness of the Cas-
tro government to nurture rela-
tions with the bloc. After sev-
eral months of intermittent ne-
gotiations, a one-year trade a-
greement was concluded with East
Germany calling initially for
the barter of 60, 000 t s of sugar
for East German machinery and
small industrial plants. The
results, although admittedly
just a beginning, are unexpected-
ly meager after the grandiose
hopes expressed earlier for a
long-term pact worth some $200,-
000,000. An East German commer-
cial mission is in Havana to
promote further transactions.
A one-year trade agreement
with Poland signed on 31 March
provides the framework for de-
livery of Polish industrial goods,
including ships, small plants,
and light, commercial types of
aircraft in exchange for Cuban
sugar, minerals, metals, and
other raw materials. On 30 April
a new Polish order for 50,000
tons:'ot',sugart-wae;?doncluded at
world market prices,
Czechoslovakia has for sev-
eral years.. been the most active
satellite in promoting trade
with Cuba. Heretofore the only
bloc source of Cuban imports,
the Czechs have established a
trade mission in Havana and are
working chiefly through the
powerful Institute of Agrarian
Reform to supply trucks, automo-
biles, tractors, mining ma-
chinery, and construction equip-
ment in exchange for Cuban sugar
and some iron ore. No sizable
shipments of Czech goods are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
known to have arrived in Cuba,
but .a few Czech technicians:+_;arq
presentto train., Cubans ih'the use
of bloc machinery and to nego-
tiate for further shipments.
Communist China, perhaps
the strongest bloc supporter
of the present Cuban Government,
is not expected to play a prom-
inent role in the bloc's eco-
nomic program in Cuba. Chi-
nese sugar orders for 1960 total
130,000 tons, worth $8,600,000.
These sales have been strictly
for cash, and additional large
Chinese purchases are unlikely.
Peiping probably will not be
extravagant with its foreign
exchange reserves, even for po-
litical reasons, for the luxury
of increased sugar consumption.
The possibility of a formal
trade arrangement might offer
barter opportunities, but this
probably would be confined to
a token effort to back up, ex-
aggerated Chinese propaganda
support.
Bloc:? Edonomio= ?Assistance ,
Real efforts toward imple-
mentation of the Soviet Union's
$100,000,000 line of credit are
not yet under way. This credit,
the only specific credit offer
yet extended to Cuba by the
bloc, is the standard Soviet
gambit when timing for maximum
political impact is desired
and a sound development pro-
gram has not been prepared.
The credit is to cover the
costs of capital equipment im-
ports and technical assistance
for new industrial plans to be
undertaken during a five-year
period beginning in 1961. The
first projects envisaged at
this stage are a steel mill
and an oil refinery; the latter
is probably intended to proc-
essro Soviet crude oil in order
to reduce Cuba's present de-
pendence on privately owned
refineries and Western oil
sources.
In terms of Cuban develop-
ment goals, the Soviet credit
is small, but successful utili-
zation will serve to increase
trade, and the 12-year repayment
terms in Cuban goods assure
economic ties over some 17 years.
By the end of 1960, Soviet tech-
nicians should be coming to Cuba
to undertake surveys.
There is no reliable evi-
dence indicating arrangements
for the delivery of bloc mil-
itary aid to Cuba, although ru-
mors of such deals have been
rampant for nearly a year, par-
ticularly regarding possible
sales of bloc combat jet air-
craft. Cuban representatives
are known to have visited the
bloc, possibly in search of
MIGs, but apparently without
success.
In view of Castro's intense
desire to obtain military equip-
ment, Cuban officials almost
certainly pressed Mikoyan for
some military aid during his
visit. At a reception in Cuba
on 12 February, when asked
whether the USSR would sell
planes to the Cuban Government,
Mikoyan replied that it would
if requested, but before leav-
ing Havana he denied to the press
that the issue of such sales
had ever been raised. Subse-
quently he stressed that the
Cuban people need "tractors and
plows...not military planes."
The bloc's refusal to pro-
vide the Cuban Government with
military equipment at this time
reflects Moscow's decision to
avoid this type of provocative
action prior to the summit and
during a period of "peaceful
coexistence."
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J+t IQ
%we
12 May 1960
Significance to Cuba
The most important change
brought about by Havana's new
bloc economic contacts is that,
for the first time, Cuba will
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF
CUBA'S 1960 SUGAR EXPORTS
BASED ON TOTAL VOLUME OF 6,100,000 TONS
REST OF
THE WORLD
UNITED STATES
51%
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
220
tons) of total Cuban sugar ex-
ports will be sold to the United
States at the premium price
paid for all US sugar im-
ports; the other half will be
sold to the rest of the world
at market prices, with total
volume set by the Internation-
al Sugar Council,
The long-term hope of Cuban
leaders is for the new bloc
sales to result in an expansion
of world demand which eventual-
ly will boost the export quotas
set by the council. Until the
quotas are raised, however, the
increase in sales to the bloc
will largely be at the expense
of those to traditional markets,
with little if any net gain to
Cuba.
Scheduled bloc imports of
Cuban sugar for 1960 total 1,-
340,000 tons--about 45 percent
of estimated Cuban sales to
the world market outside the
United States. In recent years
annual bloc sugar imports from
Cuba have averaged about 300,-
000 tons. In terms of #Iotal
trade the bloc will account for
at least 10 percent of the value
of Cuba's estimated foreign
begin ':to accept significant
amounts of bloc goods instead
of cash payments for its sugar
sales. The effects of this
change will not be pronounced
until 1961, as more than half
of this year's sales to the
bloc have been for
cash and the barter
provisions for 1960
with the USSR are
easily fulfilled by
diverting raw materi-
al.imports from West-
ern'.to bloc sources.
.Substantially in-
creased sugar sales -.
to .the bloc will' not
necessarily result in
greater Cuban sugar
SINO-SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH CUBA ioo.o
(MILLION DOLLARS)
exports, as all these 005098
exports outside the
United States--including those
Lo the bloc--are governed by
the quota system of the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement. For
1960 more than one half: (3, 100,000
1959
(PARTIALLY
ESTIMATED)
1960
(ESTIMATED)
trade for 1960, as compared with
less than 2 percent in 1959.
At best, Soviet bloc trade
of the planned magnitude will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
replace some essential imports
from the West--a goal consid-
ered an end in itself by the
Castro government. Soviet ex-
ports for the development of in-
dustry and agriculture, supple-
mented by aid deliveries, will
partially compensate for the
lack of new economic develop-
ment credit available to Cuba
from other sources.
Prospects
The chaotic situation in
Cuba does not present the USSR
with its best hope of setting
up a workable economic rela-
tionship as a model for the rest
of Latin America. Both coun-
tries possess the economic re-
sources to work out the kind of
permanent relationship now
sought by Moscow. but it is
doubtful that the more necessary
ingredients are present for the
establishment of fruitful, long-
term cooperation.
Currently it takes very
little for a bloc or neutral
country to please the Castro
regime, and the immediate pros-
pects are for considerable bloc
success in exploiting the situa-
tion in Cuba. In the long run,
the success of the new relation-
ship will hinge on its tangible
benefits to Cuba, and transfor-
mation of present contacts into
firm economic bonds will depend
chiefly on Cuba's ability to
achieve some degree of domestic
tranquillity. Present conditions
offer numerous opportunities
for the bloc to set up new trade
and aid ties, but profitable
long-term cooperation leading
toward successful Cuban economic
development will demand sound
planning and rational adminis-
tration. (Prepared by
NEO-FASCISTS IN POSTWAR ITALY
The recently formed cab-
inet of Fernando Tambroni is
unique among postwar Italian
governments in that his Chris-
tian Democratic party is de-
pendent for its majority in the
lower house on the neo-Fascist
Italian Social Movement (MSI).
This development, which came
about over vehement objections
both in and outside the ruling
Christian Democratic party, has
focused renewed attention on
the long struggle of Italian
fascism to reassert and rehabil-
itate itself. As proponents of
an authoritarian, nationalist,
anti-Communist solution for
Italy's political difficulties,
the neo-Fascists can hope to
profit from continuance of the
division within the Christian
Democratic party.
Postwar Development
At the end of World War II,
most Fascists from the Mussolini
era sought refuge in other
political groupings, including
the Communist and Christian
Democratic parties. A small
hard core, however, joined a
new group, the Common Man party,
which was later absorbed by a
Republican Revolutionary Action
group. In December 1946, this
became the Italian Social
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12 May 1960
Movement, headed by Mussolini's
secretary of popular culture.
The early MSI stressed revolu-
tionary aims, used strong-arm
tactics against moderates as
well as Communists, and coop-
erated with the Communists in
support of a bill to deprive
the security forces of fire-
arms. The MSI survived numer-
ous attempts to outlaw it, but
in the first national elections
in 1948, it polled less than 2
percent of the vote and elected
five deputies.
During the next 10 years
the growing influence of the
party's conservative wing re-
sulted in fewer electoral alli-
also include refugees from for-
mer Italian overseas territories,
noncommissioned officers, police-
men, and civil servants, as well
as shopkeepers and artisans dis-
located by the postwar changes
in the Italian economy. Subject
to sharp divergencies among its
hoodlum and conservative follow-
ing, the MSI is at the same time
nationalist, corporativist, re-
publican, anti-Marxist, and anti-
capitalist. In general it is
anticlerical, a fact which has
not deterred former Catholic
Action chief Luigi Gedda from
urging--almost successfully in
1951--Christian Democratic elec-
toral alliances with the MSI.
Like the Commu-
nists and both Social-
ist parties, the neo-
Fascists at first
were strongly op-
posed to the North
Atlantic Treaty. The
MSI now pays lip
service to NATO and
has tried to improve
its relations with
Without any exaggerated alarms, without believing that Hanni-
bal is at the gates and a march on Rome is in preparation (I was
among the very first in 1919, on the eve of the apparent Socialist
triwnph, to warn of the Fascist peril), I retain the right and the
duty to raise my voice at the first symptoms, at the still faraway
portents.
From an editorial by Luigi Salvatorelli
in La Stampa, 26 April 1960.
ances with the Communists and
more with the Monarchists. It
won nearly 6 percent of the vote
in the local elections in 1951-
52, and came close to holding a
balance-of-power position be-
tween the Communists and Chris-
tian Democrats in some local
governments. In 1953 it elected
29 deputies to the national low-
er house. In the 1958 national
elections, however, with a na-
tional trend to the center-left,
it had declined to less than 5
percent of the vote and 24 dep-
uties. It nevertheless remains
the fourth largest party in a
parliament where at least ten
political groups are generally
represented.
Support and Program
In general, the MSI appeals
to down-at-the-heel. aristocrats,
petty bourgeoisie anxious to
clean up city hall, and protest
voters unwilling to support the
parties of the left. Supporters
US Embassy. Nevertheless, party
supporters are still ,bitter over
the American role.in the collapse
of fascism, and the neo-Fascist
paper Borghese described Pres-
ident Eisenhower on his European
trip last fall as "a murderer
who comes back to the scene of
his crime."
The neo-Fascists opposed
EDC; they now object to the
supranational aspects of the
European Community. In a sense,
the issue of nationalism has
been dimmed by Europe's post-
war efforts at integration, and
lost colonies, too, are becom-
ing an old story; corporativism
is still an ugly word. < At the
same time, remnants of fascism
remain alive in most of Western
Europe--as shown by the anti-
Semitic outbursts of the past
winter.-. Italy retains the
dubious prestige of having "in-
vented" f'ascism, even though
others may have administered it
more efficiently, and Italian
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
Fascists maintain relations
with those in other countries
through attendance at periodic
international meetings such as
that at Malmo, Sweden, in 1957.
Domestically, the MSI is
troubled by competition on sev-
eral of the issues for which?it
stands. The Communists claim
a monopoly on anticapitalism,
the Christian Democrats on anti-
Marxism. The lay democratic
parties--Liberals, Social Demo-
crats, Republicans--offer a
more respectable home for anti-
clericals. Practically every-
body is republican, even includ-
ing the monarchist parties, both
of which have formally become
the Italian Democratic party.
Nevertheless, the neo-Fas-
cists exemplify a basic Italian
nostalgia for international ad-
ventures and for the standing
of a great power. Italian na-
tionalism is undergoing a re-
vival as a result of Italian
resentment over nonparticipa-
tion in great-power conferences
and over US coolness toward the
Italian state-owned oil monop-
oly, ENI, and its holdings
abroad. Because the democratic
tradition is not deeply rooted
in Italy, there is
nostalgia also for an
authoritarian central
government which can
impose order.
Current Situation
There has been ,a
rapid comeback of Fas-
cists.in virtually.
every: : field of en-
deavor--as'university
professors, techni-
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 1
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS 17
clans, businessmen, and editors
--*hiie'in the diplomatic serv-
ice Fascists had simply con-
tinued on. Fascists also con-
trol a tiny fraction of or-
ganized labor. No stigma is
attached today in business
and social life to the espousal
of Fascist ideas, and a num-
ber of fairly prominent Chris-
tian Democrats 'were once prom-
inent Fascists. Fascist Marshal
Giovanni Messe, Rommel's suc-
cessor in the Tunisian cam-
paign, is now a Christian Demo-
cratic senator.
The party got its first
real break in 1957 when Pre-
mier Zoli reluctantly ac-
cepted one neo-Fascist vote
as part of his majority in
the lower house. By the time
Segni's all - Christian Demo-
cratic cabinet was formed in
1958--with the rightist par-
ties supplying it parliamentary
support--MSI influence on Ital-
ian Government policy was becoming
increasingly apparent, 'Seg'ni's
labor minister was the first
to attend a meeting of the neo-
Fascist labor confederation.
Italy's attitude toward the
touchy South Tirol minority
seemed to toughen under the
nationalistic influence of
the neo-Fascists, and Ital-
ian military visits to Spain
were stepped up.
ITALIAN
PARLIAMENT
SOUTH TYROLEANS(SVP)
VALDOSTAN UNION (UVD)
5-INDEPEND'T. MONARCHISTS
-NEO-FASCISTS(MSI)
The MSI is not yet entirely
respectable as a party, however,
and the Monarchists broke the
1956-59 unity-of-action pact for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
that reason. Limited working
alliances between the Christian
Democrats and the MSI have de-
veloped in 28 local governments,
including Milan, Genoa, and the
regional government of Sicily.
The neo-Fascists recently threat-
ened to withdraw and precipitate
crises in these governments if
the Christian Democrats should
form a center-left government
at the national level. On 4
June 1959, a national holiday
commemorating the 15th anni-
versary of Rome's liberation
of all other parties except his
own. Thus the MSI now can pose
as a patriotic supporter of the
government in time of emergency.
General Raffaele Cadorna,
celebrated leader of the anti-
Fascist wartime resistance, re-
cently voted in the Senate in
favor of Tambroni's neo-Fascist
- supported government and re-
signed his membership in the
association of Italian resist-
ance fighters. His action prob-
ably will snot. be: questioned by the
Post --Miussolini -gen-
eration, which never
participated in the
anti-Fascist guerril-
la fighting that con-
trasted so favorably
with. the efficiency
of the Italian armed
forces -in' . World
War II.
Prospects
De Marsanich and Michelini
by the Allies in World War II,
the Christian Democratic mayor
of Rome was "out of town" and
so avoided offending'the neo-
Fascists by being present for
the ceremonies and parade.
When the Liberal party
withdrew its support of the
Segni government in February,
Segni resigned rather than re-
ly solely on neo-Fascist and
Monarchist votes. Fernando
Tambroni, however, has now giv-
en the MSI a touch of respect-
ability by accepting neo-Fascist
backing for his "administrative"
cabinet against the opposition
The MSI's long-
range prospects are
not bright, as its
leaders, who are not
strong, have the
problem of holding
together its revolu-
tionary and conserva-
tive wings. Neither
the present party
secretary, Arturo
Michelini, nor his
colleague and pred-
ecessor Augusto de
Marsanich, has succeeded in
catching the public imagina-
tion. Nevertheless, the anarchic
state of Italian politics offers
the MSI two possible opportuni-
ties to exert strong influence
on the government.
It can hope to profit from
rising tensions between a right-
ist government and a leftist
electorate--tensions which could
build up to a rightist coup aimed
at preventing an "opening" to the
Socialists. Neo-Fascist bully
boys would probably be a major
element of any extremist venture
headed by figures such as former
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S
12 May 1960
Defense Minister Pacciardi or
Senate President Merzagora, who
appear to have right-wing revo-
lutionary leanings.
If such a coup does not oc-
cur, the neo-Fascists can hope
to exert ideological influence
more gradually in their role as
ally of a Christian Democratic
party apparently determined to
stay in power at all costs. Al-
though the quest for respecta-
bility makes':them initially
EAST GERMAN ECONOMY: PROSPECTS IN THE EARLY 1960'S
Economic problems are less
likely to contribute to polit-
ical instability in East Germany
East and West German National Incomes
(Index: 1936=100)
1936 1950 1955 1957
East Germany 100 85 117 127
West Germany 100 117 178 200
East German as I
percent of 44 32 29 28
West German
during the next few years than
they have in the recent past.
Living standards at present are
comparable to levels in West
Germany in 1953, and'further eco-
nomic growth will probably be
more rapid than in
West Germany. There
is little likelihood,
however, that agri-
cultural production
will increase signif-
icantly over the next
few years. Personal
consumption is, now
increasing less rap-
idly than production,
and during the next
few years consumption
will remain about
25-30 percent below
present West German
levels.
inexpensive allies. they would
eventually demand a quid pro
quo, possibly involving occu-
pancy of certain key govern-
ment positions and a more na-
tionalistic Italian foreign
policy. Because of the stigma
still attached to the neo-Fas-
cists, their inclusion in the
government could be expected
to bring about a reaction on
the part of the Italian public
toward the extreme left.
25X1
25X1
Factors in Economic Growth
The economy of East Ger-
many will continue its rapid
growth during the next few
years. The expected yearly
rates of growth of 5 percent
for gross national product
(GNP) and 7 percent for indus-
trial production in 1960-65 are
lower than those achieved in
1958-59 (7 percent for GNP and
10 percent for industrial pro-
duction), but they are slightly
higher thaii probable '.future- growth
rates in West Germany. The
present per capita GNP in East
Germany is still only 80 per-
cent of that in West Germany.
The principal reasons why
the East German economy has con-
tinued to lag behind West Germany
East and West German
Foreign Trade in Commodities
(Index: 1936=100)
East Germany
Imports
Exports
West Germany
Imports
Exports
West German imports in 1950 include US aid.
East German exports in 1950 and 1955 include reparations
deliveries, deliveries of uranium ore and concentrates,
and other uncompensated deliveries to the USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SCARY
12 May 1960
have been the low level of for-
eign trade and investments.The;se
lat't'er reasons are being over-
come or are becoming of less
importance, however, and their
effect will probably continue
to decline in the next few
years.
The low level of East Ger-
man foreign trade during the
postwar period is due largely
to the fact that the USSR,
which alone could replace West
Germany as the chief trading
partner of East Germany, was
very slow to take over that
role. This low level of trade
made for inefficient use of
East German manufacturing
capacity.and led to the de-
velopment and use of high-cost
domestic sources of raw mate-
rials.
The rapid increase in East
German foreign trade during the
past few years has considerably
improved economic efficiency in
East Germany. In 1958-59, sup-
plies of imported materials
were finally sufficient to elim-
inate abnormal fluctuations in
manufacturing output. Gains in
economic efficiency from further
increases in foreign trade will
continue to be significant dur-
ing the next few years, although
they will decline as East Ger-
man labor and capital assets
become more fully employed.
Through 1955, the level of
East German investment,rela-
tive to GNP, was very low--lower
than in Western Europe and much
lower than in the other Euro-
pean satellites--partly because
the USSR continued to exploit
East Germany and partly be-
cause the East German regime
had to concede more to the con-
sumer than did the other satel-
lite regimes, Since 1956, how-
ever, the USSR has largely.given
up the exploitation of East Ger-
many, and, investments have been
increasing rapidly. From 1955
through 1959 they more than
doubled, and they will continue
to increase during the next few
years, although at a somewhat
lower rate. With such resources
East Germany should considerably
reduce the lag behind West Ger-
many,both in industrial tech-
nology and in the amount of in-
vested capital per industrial
worker.
The soft spot in the East
German economy continues to be
agriculture. Productivity,
which was higher than in what is
now West Germany before World
War II, is now admittedly well
below the West German level.
Temporarily,: at least, the re-
gime has aggravated this weak-
ness by accelerating the forma-
tion of agricultural production
cooperatives. At the beginning
of this year only 52 percent of
the agricultural'land was in
state farms and cooperatives.
By mid-April all farmers had
been enrolled in cooperatives.
Because of this precipitate
collectivization, the regime
faces serious problems such as
finding qualified managerial
personnel, mollifying the farm-
ers,; providing for new con-
struction, and acquiring agri-
cultural machinery. The mass
flights of farmers to the West
will make these tasks even more
difficult.
These will occupy the re-
gime for at'least two or three
years. Consequently, farm out-
put over the'short run is at
best likely to rise little and
may decline. The regime, how-
ever, is prepared to invest far
more in collectivized agriculture
than was invested under the
"united' _system" 'of past years,
and the long-term result should
be an improvement in production
and efficiency, although prob-
ably at a high cost.
Dependence on. Soviet Policy
Soviet policy has been the
chief factor determining the
rate of East German economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 8M WAY
12 May 1960
recovery and growth. By far
the most important contribution
of the USSR to East German eco-
nomic growth is its willingness
to accept increased imports of
manufactured goods from East
Germany in exchange for fuels,
metals, grain, and other basic
materials, In mid-1958, Khru-
shchev took the unprecedented
step of committing the USSR
to deliver through 1965 large
amounts of the basic materials
most important to East Germany.
This commitment is the corner-
stone of East German economic
planning.
The USSR also finances
East German import surpluses
with Western Europe, accepting
Soviet chemical industry is
counting on the delivery of
this East German output. The
Soviet contribution to East
German investments is, how-
ever, very modest when com-
pared with the critical impor-
tance of Soviet decisions af-
fecting East German foreign
trade.
Finally, the virtual ces-
sation since 1956 of Soviet ex-
ploitation of East Germany has
been of considerable.help to
the East German economy, espe-
cially in permitting invest-
ments to
cause of
and, even
mantling
rise more rapidly. Be-
wartime destruction
more, of Soviet dis-
immediately after
World War II, East
Germany suffered a net
loss of fixed capital
assets: equal to near-
ly one half the value
of the 1939 fixed cap-
ital accounts,
Postwar Population of East and West Germany
(millions)
East Germany
West Germany
,(excluding West
Berlin)
East German goods in payment.
The importance of this support
lies not in. the amounts, which
are relatively small, but in
the fact that East German im-
ports from Western Europe--in
particular those financed with
Soviet credits--are likely, to . be
"bottleneck" items--spare parts,
research equipment, prototypes,
and the like--which are impor-
tant out of proportion to their
monetary value.
The USSR, besides its com-
mitments and policies in the
field of foreign trade, has ad-
vanced to East. Germany invest-
ment credits for the development
of its chemical industry, to be
repaid from production. The
The amount of
current production
taken by the USSR
during the postwar
period was also large
and included, in ad-
dition to formal
reparations deliveries,
goods bought with the
profits from Soviet-owned en-
terprises.in East Germany. The
USSR took uranium ore, a
good deal of machinery and
equipment, and substantial a-
mounts of chemicals. The prin-
cipal effect of this policy
was to depress the level of do-
mestic investment.
Trends in Living Standards
The East German Communist
regime has from the beginning
felt the overriding need, in
order to discourage emigration,
strengthen its authority at
home, and raise its stature in
the eyes of the world, to re-
duce the contrast iin living
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12 May 1960
conditions between East and
West Germany. Total personal
consumption increased by about
three quarters during 1950-1955,
whereas investments increased
by only about one half.
The contrast between East
and West German personal con-
sumption was at its greatest in
the late 1940's and early 1950.1s
and since then has been stead-
ily reduced. Since 1955, how-
ever, the annual increase in
per capita consumption has de-
clined from the 1950-55 average
of 12.5 percent to about 4 per-
cent, whereas investment has
begun to increase rapidly. This
slowdown in the upward movement
of consumption has occurred
chiefly because living'stand
ards have in most respects
reached or exceeded prewar lev-
els--except in housing.
The present per capita con-
sumption in East Germany is be-
tween 70 to 75 percent of that
in West Germany--while per cap-
ita production is about 80 per-
cent of West Germany's. The
ratio is significantly higher
for food, tobacco, and bever-
ages, East German consumption
of which by 1955 was 85 percent
of that of West Germany. This,
however, does not reflect fully
the less satisfactory assort-
ment of goods or the deteriora-
tion of quality in East Germany.
Consumption per capita in
the two areas is roughly compa-
rable for public transportation
and repair services. However,
East German consumption of.:tex-
tiles and. shoes, consumer dura-
bles,; professional services,
telephone service, entertain-
ment and--above all--housing
is well below West German lev-
els. The regime remains ex-
tremely sensitive to the con-
trast with West Germany, andit
has promised to "overtake"
West Germany in per capita con-
sumption in the near future,
but cannot possibly make good
on such a claim.
The average annual increase
in per capita consumption over
the next few years will prob-
ably be about 3 percent a year
or less. Because per capita con-
sumption is likely to grow at
least by this rate in West
Germany, the relative differ-
ence in living standards will
probably not change in favor of
East Germany. Of greater im-
portance, however, will be the
continued rise in the absolute
level of consumption in East
Germany.
In terms of the standard
of German living, the supply of
necessities should become quite
adequate--in quality as well as
in quantity--and other goods
should become more abundant and
cheaper. Moreover, the future
improvements in personal con-
sumption are to go chiefly to
the industrial workers, whose
approval is the most important
to the regime. Therefore, the
disruptive effect of the lag in
living standards on political
stability should be reduced in
future years. Pre-
pared by ORR)
* 25X1
Housing conditions in the
USSR cause more widespread and
intense dissatisfaction than
any other aspect of Soviet life.
The average urban family is
crowded into one room and must
share kitchen and bathroom facil-
ities with several other families.
Visible signs of improvement
since the regime launched a major
program in 1957 to eliminate
the shortage have tended to
bring to the surface long-sup-
pressed feelings of personal
injustice. While it is likely
that in the next decade the So-
viet leaders can go a long way
toward solving the housing short-
age, they will probably be plagued
for some time to come with. steadily
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
increasing popular demands.
Expressions of discontent and
protest, however, are not ex-
pected to pose a serious chal-
lenge to the regime.
Protests Over Housing
The Soviet citizen's view
of the housing situation was
probably typified recently at
a stormy public meeting at
which a deputy chairman of the
executive committee of one of
Moscow's rayons discussed
housing problems. The official,
apparently in charge of the
local housing program, gave a
short speech replete with opti-
mistic quotations from Khru-
shchev'.s speeches. He cautioned,
however, teat new housing con-
struction would "not be felt"
much in 1960 Or 1961.
Near--bedlam followed his
speech. He tried to avoid
answering the flood of written
questions that were sent to the
rostrum, but the audience was
so insistent he offered to let
individuals come to the front
of the hall.'and speak. A num-
ber of persons took immediate
advantage of this and assailed
him for what they claimed was
his personal failure to act.
Two individuals presented
letters signed by this official
in which he had promised that
their apartments would be re-
paired in 1959. Another man
made a fiery speech charging
that he had been living for
36 years in a cellar without
any windows. Judging from
the frequent shouts of "get us
out of the cellars," it seems
probable that'many in the audi-
ence shared his plight.
Perhaps the most serious
outbreak of popular protest
occurred last fall at the con-
struction site of the large
metallurgical plant in the town
of Temir-Tau. -'Bitter resentment
over living conditions, including
inadequate housing, led to
strikes and riots by workers
and students. For at least
three days the town was com-
pletely'jlnmobilized, and troops
had to be brought in from out-
side to quell the disturbance.
Housing History
Current problems in this
field are the culmination of
years of neglect of housing
construction. Urban housing,
far from adequate in prerevo-
lutionary Russia, deterioriated
steadily during the Soviet
drive for industrialization;
new construction was unable to
keep pace with urban population
growth. The per capita living
space--living rooms and bed-
rooms--was 69 square feet in
1923, but by 1940 had dropped
to 44 square feet., The down-
ward trend was arrested in the
early postwar years, however,
and was sharply reversed in
1957 under the present housing
program. The per capita space
today is estimated at 54 square
feet and is expected to increase
by 1970 to possibly as much as
97 square feet, which is rec-
ognized by Soviet health
authorities as the desired
sanitary minimum.
Influences of Housing
People from all walks of
life, of different ages, edu-
cation',`and tastes now are thrown
together, compelled to share
the same kitchen and bathroom.
Only' the minimum degree of
privacy is possible. Conditions
are often unsanitary; noise and
confusion are numbing.
These conditions prevail
in urban ' areas ` throughout the
country. For instance, a medium-
level offical working in Kam-
chatka complained "My family
consists of four persons. My
wife is sick.' We live in two
rooms, 226 square feet, which
we share"With"a trawler opera-
tor who is continually drunk
and who brings his crew,
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12 May 1960
persons of'questionable'charac-
ter, to spend the night."
Housing Administration
It. is little wonder that
housing conditions place a
severe strain on the people and
that bickering and feuds are
common. Soviet housing ordi-
nances, which attempt to antic-
ipate every possible area of
discord, reveal how unharmoni-
ous life can be in communal
dwelling, The ordinance spe-
cifically;, condemns such mis-
chief _as throwing out other
persons' belongings from the
kitchen and. other rooms ; in
common, spoiling.food.prepared
by other tenants. .,'
Despite the numerous regu-
lations, conflicts requiring
litigation constantly arise.
"Comrades' courts" attempt to
handle the less serious cases
such as the manner in which
common dwelling space is to be
used by several families and
disputes over how much to
assess tenants for repairs and
municipal utilities..
The regular people's courts
handle more serious problems.
The most. frequent disputes are
those between individuals or
between the tenants'and the
housing management over the dis-
position of dwelling space`.
one such case involved a suit
filed by a young woman against
her aunt for the legal right to
half of the-room which they
shared with two other persons.
From the regime's point of
view, one of the signifi-
cant aspects of the housing sit-
uation is its effect of
holding down the urban birth
rate. Young married couples
are often lucky if they can
get a corner of a room to'set
up housekeeping; the addition
of a child becomes a real bur-
den. As a-result it is unusual
for an urban family to have more
than two children.
State agencies assign
dwelling space and regulate all
conditions of tenancy. Rental
rates are maintained at a rela-
tively low level, and allotment
of dwelling space depends much
less on a person's ability to
pay than on his official status.
The average citizen is entitled
to no more than 97 square feet
of living space.. Certain priv-
ileged groups such as leading
party and government workers,
top members of the intelligent-
sia, high-ranking military
officers, and some outstanding
workers are entitled. to larger
quarters. The regime assigns
private residences or apart-
ments in specially built
houses to members of the
elite. ? .
Tenancy in state-owned
housing is established and gov-
erned by a contract normally
running for five years. As
long as the occupant abides by
all the conditions of the
lease and the building is
not requisitioned or razed, he
can usually count on the con-
tract being renewe'd. If the
tenant and his family leave
town for an extended period,
their living quarters automati-
cally pass into possession of
the local government. For those
whose housing is supplied by
enterprises, tenancy is usual-
ly conditioned on continued
work at the particular enter-
prise.
The strict control over
housing enables the regime to
control the movement. of workers
from.one area to another and to
prevent unrestricted migration
to the crowded .,cities. An
enterprise is forbidden to of-
fer a job unless it can provide
housing or the applicant can
give proof that he has adequate
living space.. At the same time,
housing authorities cannot
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 1960
authorize living space to a
new arrival unless he can give
proof of a regular job. Strict
efforts are made to enforce
these regulations in the major
cities, although there are fre-
quent complaints of violations
by factory and housing officials.
. Private Housing
Most housing is owned by
the state, either built and
managed by city soviets or by
individual enterprises or fac-
tories. The regime has frowned
on private ownership as stimu-
lating a "peasant psychology,"
but the pressure of the housing
shortage in recent years has
forced it to depend more and
more on construction by private
individuals. The volume of
such construction has increased
more than threefold since 1956.
Life in privately owned
housing is usually more harmo-
nious than in government quar-
ters. Crowding is probably
just as great, but those living
under the same roof are normally
either members of the same family
or paying tenants. Private
construction costs are high
and, even with substantial
government grants, more than
most workers can afford. Fur-
thermore, conditions are often
primitive. With the exception
of electricity, municipal
services such as gas, sewerage,
and water are things of the
future. Despite these draw-
backs, increasing numbers of
Soviet families, seeking greater
independence and privacy, have
taken advantage of the regime's
relaxation of restrictions
against private building.
Regime's Attitude
While the regime will not
tolerate a blatant challenge
to its authority such as the
strike staged at Temir-Tau, it
has made clear that it con-
siders demands for better housing
and consumer goods legitimate
and Justifiable. Elected
officials have recently been
noted running on such a platform.
Presidium member Anastas
Mikoyan last summer gave a
good indication of the attitude
of the top leadership toward
housing complaints. He also
explained why bitterness over
the housing shortage has become
intense just when concrete
measures to alleviate the prob-
lem are beginning to show re-
sults. Speaking to workers in
Gorky, he said: "Only a few
years ago the supplies of bread,
milk, and meat presented an acute
problem ...btit now there are next
to no complaints about food
shortages..,. There are, however,
many letters and complaints on
housing problems, and the more
we build, the more people ask
for apartments. This is under-
standable; when we built little,
there were fewer applications.
Now everyone thinks himself en-
titled by law to be given an
apartment. That is only as it
should be."
The Soviet leadership may
even welcome a certain degree
of popular pressure, which it
could then turn against the
vast bureaucracy,whose inef-
ficiency and corruption often
hinder both the fulfillment of
construction goals and fair
distribution of housing.
Prospects
The regime has proclaimed
that the housing shortage will
be "liquidated in 10 to 12 yen.rs."
Although just what "liquidation"
constitutes has been left pur-
posely vague, it is evident, on
the basis of the high overful-
fillment of annual housing con-
struction goals since 1957 and
the continued high priority to
be given such construction in the
future, that substantial progress
will be made. About 45 percent
of the 1959 urban population is to
get new quarters by 1965,
Whether the average Soviet
citizen will be satisfied with
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12 May 1960
his housing a decade from now,
however, is questionable. His
appetite has been whetted for
more spacious and better quality
housing, and some of the
Soviet families who have received
separate apartments in newly
constructed buildings are al-
ready complaining that these
are inadequate.
25X1
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