CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
VIII ~r
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 67
OCI NO.4899/60
13 October 1960
State Department review
completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I.II OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
Ca DECLASS{FIED Ar%
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
VIEW DATE:
25X1 RE
wu~rl: HA 70 2
IDATe:__~REV"ul CONFIDENTIAL
14 MAY 1980
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WE Y SUMMARY
13 October 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV LAP THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev devoted the final phase of his UN activi-
ties to an effort to restore disarmament and renewed East-
West negotiations to the forefront of public attention. He
called for a special UN session on disarmament next spring
with heads of government in attendance and claimed that
Prime Minister Macmillan had assured him of a new summit
meeting on Berlin. The postponement of Khrushchev's visit
to North Korea and his own admission that he stayed in New
York longer than he expected provide additional evidence
that one of his purposes in attending the General Assembly
session was to strengthen his hand in dealing with the
Chinese Communists. In view of the erosion of support
for Nationalist China, many of the supporters of a mora-
torium believe this procedure would be doomed if presented
in any future session.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The power struggle in Leopoldville remains stale-
mated, but army chief Mobutu is determined to arrest
Lumumba. The situation is described as extremely tense,
and use of force by Mobutu would bring him into conflict
with the UN Command in Leopoldville. Meanwhile, Lumumba
continues to enjoy the support of Ghana, Guinea, and the
UAR. The situation in Katanga Province is becoming more
serious as the tribal fighting against President Tshombd
spreads throughout the central and northern regions of the
province.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The peace talks between the Souvanna Phouma govern-
ment and the Communist Pathet Lao which began in Vientiane
on 11 October have been limited to a review of the "general
situation" and the establishment of ground rules for future
sessions. The Pathet Lao has taken two government outposts
in Phong Saly Province and is reportedly operating through-
out the southeastern part of the province in augmented
strength. A four-man Soviet delegation is expected momen-
tarily in Vientiane, presumably to complete the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Laos,
and is likely to offer Souvanna economic assistance.
III F
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ARGENTINE POLITICAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
state.
Argentine President Frondizi faces one of the most
severe crises in his two and one half years in office as
a result of the 11 October army demands to dismiss some
of his advisers and modify some of his policies. These
demands are widely varied, but center on the removal of
advisers who favor an attempt to attract Peronista politi-
cal support and moves to strengthen the national petroleum
company. The crisis was eased somewhat following Frondizi's
12 October radio appeal for constitutional procedures, but
new difficulties may result from negotiations with the
powerful army commander in chief, Toranzo Montero, whom
Frondizi dismissed but was apparently compelled to rein-
BRAZILIAN POLITICAL OUTLOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Janio Quadros' victory in Brazil's 3 October presi-
dential election will bring about the first basic shake-
up in Brazil's administrative machinery since Vargas came
to power in 1930. The new regime, sponsored by the
traditional "out" parties, will probably lay heavy stress
on its declared intention to "clean house" when it takes
office on 31 January, but it is likely to retain most of
the basic programs of the popular Kubitschek regime.
Under Quadros, a temperamental and controversial personality,
the government is likely to be even more aggressive than in
the past in bargaining for US economic aid and may also
seek broader ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
country.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Although growing counterrevolutionary violence in
Cuba is symptomatic of opposition to Castro, it does not
at this point seriously threaten his regime. The govern-
ment is having difficulties operating the nationalized
petroleum refineries. Soviet ships arriving on 1 and 9
October brought what are probably the second and third
major shipments of Soviet bloc military equipment and
more such ships are expected. The Cuban-Bulgarian trade
agreement signed on 7 October was the seventh such agree-
ment signed by Cuba this year with a Sino-Soviet bloc
CHINESE AND SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS DEBATE
COEXISTENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Recent articles by military spokesmen have spelled
out the military rationale underlying the different
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
PART II (continued)
approaches of Moscow and Peiping to "peaceful coexist-
ence." Moscow sees modern war as unacceptably destruc-
tive and therefore urges strategies which do not press
the West to the point of armed retaliation. Peiping
feels that the balance of military power has shifted
so decisively in favor of the bloc that the Communists
now can pursue more militant strategies than were
feasible before the Soviet ICBM successes of 1957.
SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER REDUCTION PROGRAM . . . . . . . . Page 6
Although some progress has been made in Khrushchev's
.program to reduce Soviet armed forces by 1,200,000 by
1961, the number of demobilized personnel thus far seems
to be below what might have been expected. Problems of
resettling dischargees and morale among:remaining service
personnel, particularly officers, may have contributed to
this apparent slowdown.
RACISM RISING AMONG AFRICANS IN SOUTH AFRICA . . . . . . Page 7
Although all African nationalist organizations in
South Africa were dealt crippling blows by the Verwoerd
government's repressive actions earlier this year, the
moderate leaders of the African National Congress, which
advocated equal rights for all races, apparently have
suffered the greatest loss in prestige. The effective-
ness of the Pan-Africanist Congress' demand for an
"Africa for the Africans," with its appeal to racism,
indicates that African nationalists may espouse racism
to an increasing extent in the future. At the same
time, this may lead to a weakening of the influence
among Africans of the largely non-African local Commu-
nist party.
FRENCH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS . .
Page 8
The four French Community states associated in the
Conseil de l'Entente--Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger,
and Dahomey--appear increasingly determined to assert
the independence they gained last August. While ready
to negotiate bilateral cooperation accords with Paris,
the four states are unwilling to accept French direction
of their coordinated foreign policies--especially on the
Algerian issue--as the price for continued French economic
aid. Moreover, they all regard the diversification of
sources of foreign aid as politically.necessary, and three
of the states, which presently lack non-French resident
diplomatic representatives, are extremely anxious to ac-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
PART II (continued)
PAKISTAN EXTENDS CONTROL OVER NORTHWEST FRONTIER BORDER
AREAS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Pakistani Government apparently is exploiting its
border trouble with Afghanistan to increase its presence
in tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the frontier
which traditionally have been autonomous. The govern-
ment's action in deposing two tribal rulers will enable
it to install more amenable leaders and to deploy security
forces directly on the frontier. Some fighting apparently
is continuing in various border zones, although on a
smaller scale than previously. Elements of Pakistan's
quasi=military security forces have been involved, but
none of the regular army units being moved to the vicinity
have been committed.
JAPANESE POLITICAL SITUATION .
. . . . . . . . Page 11
The Japanese Diet will convene on 17 October for an
extraordinary session in expectation of lower house elec-
tions tentatively scheduled for 20 November. Prime Minister
Ikeda plans for the session to deal with only perfunctory
legislative business and quickly to announce dissolution
of the Diet and a definite date for the elections. In
planning no significant legislation for this final session,
Ikeda presumably hopes the wave of early public enthusiasm
for his cabinet will carry over to election time. The
Socialists, however, will seek to prolong the session by
exploiting popular emotional response to the assassination
of Socialist party chairman Asanuma and by attacking
the government on the rising price level and policy
toward Communist China.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The UAR and Jordan are continuing their free-swinging
propaganda battle, with Cairo accusing King Husayn's uncle
of murdering a Syrian MIG-17 pilot who crash-landed in
Jordanian territory. Syrian troops have so far not at-
tempted to interfere with Israeli dredging work begun on
10 October south of the Banat Yaqub bridge in the Israeli-
Syrian demilitarized zone. In Libya, the House of Deputies
has sharply increased its pressure for replacement of the
Kubar government. The situation in Oman is relatively
quiet, but Omani rebel leaders in Saudi Arabia are.con-
tinuing their efforts to train and equip an "Omani expedi-
tionary force" for an eventual move to "liberate" the
country from the rule of the British-backed Sultan of
Muscat and Oman.
RIGHTIST OPPOSITION TO DE GAULLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Some French rightist opponents of De Gaulle's Algerian
policy now seem to be bidding for broad foreign and domestic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
PART II (continued)
support by aligning themselves publicly with prominent
individuals who are worried by De Gaulle's policies on
NATO and supranational European institutions. Some of
these rightists are linked with plots to overthrow the
regime or efforts to reverse De Gaulle's policy of self-
determination for Algeria. Meanwhile, De Gaulle is
beginning to show concern that his middle-of-the-road
policy may be imperiled by the increasing polarization
of French opinion between proponents of a French Algeria
and of an independent Algeria.
TENSIONS OVER BERLIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Bonn's cancellation on 30 September of its 1961 inter-
zonal trade agreement with East Germany has aroused serious
misgivings among West German government and party leaders.
Many view it as an ineffective countermeasure to the re-
cent East German traffic restrictions in Berlin, and
some fear that it will ultimately enhance the prestige
of the East German regime by necessitating new trade
negotiations on a government-to-government basis.
There is also concern in Bonn over the-evident unwill-
ingness of other Western European nations to join in
an economic embargo against East Germany. East Germany,
which has shown some concern over the projected embargo,
is trying to exploit these West German misgivings.
BRITISH LABOR PARTY OUTLOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Despite Hugh Gaitskell's recent defeat on pro-NATO
defense policies at the Labor party conference, he seems
assured of enough support from the Labor members of
Parliament, who are predominantly moderates, to retain
the party leadership for at least the coming year. The
conference intensified the party rift over policy and
leadership, and the left wing will probably continue its
agitation for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain.
Labor's effectiveness as a parliamentary opposition will
further decline.
FINNISH LABOR SCHISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
The expected formation later this fall of.a new na-
tional labor federation controlled by regular Social
Democrats will complete the breach within Finnish organ-
ized labor. Creation of a rival organization will in
effect abandon the present federation to the dissident
Social Democrats and the Communists and involve Finnish
labor in a tug-of-war between the two politically oriented
groups. Prospects for the new federation are uncertain
in view of the relatively small membership it will begin
with and the tendency of employers to favor dealing with
the larger existing group.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTEREST IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Communist China, which has pledged support for all
national independence movements, has directed particular
attention toward Africa in this year of emerging African
states. It has sought to enhance its prestige through
propaganda, trade, economic assistance, and cultural
ties. Having gained diplomatic recognition by five
African states, Peiping has laid the groundwork for
increasing its influence throughout the area.
JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN THE RYUKYU. ISLANDS . . . . . . . . Page 6
The Japanese Government is moving quickly to carry
out limited economic and technical assistance programs
for the Ryukyus within a framework recently authorized
by the US High Commissioner. Tokyo's stated immediate
objective is to allay sentiment in Japan for reversion
of the islands to Japanese control. There are some
indications, however, that Tokyo is moving ahead of,
rather than merely satisfying, popular Japanese desires
for participation in Ryukyuan affairs, and that Tokyo
is eager to broaden the basis for eventual assertion
of its rights there.
THE PERUVIAN-ECUADOREAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The new Ecuadorean Government's informal denunciation
of the Rio Protocol of 1942, which provided for the settle-
ment of the Peruvian-Ecuadorean boundary dispute, has re-
vived the animosity between the two countries that led to
an undeclared war in 1941. Although both Peru and Ecuador
insist they will not resort to armed force except in self-
defense, the.dispute could provoke a series of frontier
clashes. Latin American Communists, who are waging a
continuing campaign to undermine the Organization of
American States, will probably attempt to exploit the
boundary dispute to create an atmosphere of violence
around the 11th inter-American conference, now set for
Quito in March 1961.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Khrushchev devoted the final
phase of his UN activities to an
effort to restore disarmament
and renewed East-West negotia-
tions to the forefront of public
attention. On 11 October he wrote
off the value of this UN session
in dealing with disarmament and
sought to blame the US elections
for preventing the United States
from taking "an active part in
the discussion." Anticipating
defeat of his proposal that dis-
armament should be discussed by
the General Assembly itself
rather than be referred to the
Political Committee, Khrushchev
called for a special session
of the assembly next March or
April in Europe to be attended
by the heads of government and
to deal only with disarmament.
In a second address on the
same day, Khrushchev adopted an
aggressive pose and warned that
failure to reach agreement would
lead to war. While disclaiming
that he was serving an ultima-
tum to the assembly, Khrushchev
reserved the right to withdraw
from disarmament discussions
in the UN Political Committee
and urged the creation of a new
15-nation committee as Moscow
has proposed. He indicated
willingness to change his plan
to return to Moscow on 13 Octo-
ber and remain in New York as
long as necessary toxeach a
disarmament agreement..
Following Khrushchev's de-
mand for a condemnation of the
U-2 and RB-47 flights as the
conditions for a meeting with
President Eisenhower, the Soviet
bloc abstained throughout the
General Assembly voting on the
formal resolutions for a meeting
sponsored by the neutralists
and on the Western amendments.
Khrushchev then told UN press
correspondents on 7 October that
Prime Minister Macmillan had
assured him a summit meeting.
would take place after the US
elections. In return, Khrushchev
publicly reaffirmed the position
he took after the abortive Paris
summit meeting--that the status
quo would be maintained in Ber-
lin.
In a further move to justi-
fy his refusal to agree to a
meeting with the President,
Khrushchev alleged on a tele-
vision program on 9 October that
the US had planned a U-2 flight
on the eve of his departure for
the UN meeting, and claimed that
only a strong warning 'had de-
terred the United States.
The Soviet premier also
used his press conference with
UN correspondents and his tele-
vision interview to intensify
his warnings of possible Soviet
noncompliance with UN actions.
He declared that even if 99 per-
cent of the UN supported the
secretary general, the USSR would
not accept the decision and
would "rely on its own strength"
to uphold its position. He also
confidently predicted that in
such a situation the UN. would
"wither and die."
The political objective of
Khrushchev's personal antics at
the assembly, climaxed by a dis-
ruptive display during the 12
October debate on colonialism,
was to demonstrate that without
Soviet cooperation the UN's work
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
becomes ineffective. As Khru,
shchev put it after his shoe-
thumping performance, "It's the
beginning of the end...it shows
how shaky the UN is."
made in vain does not understand
everything that goes on. We
have sown good seeds here...."
Sino-Soviet Relations
The postponement of Khru,-'
shchev's visit to North Korea,
originally scheduled for early
October, and his admission that
he stayed in New York longer
than expected strongly suggest
that his performance has been
calculated to strengthen his
hand in dealing with the Chinese
Communists. The apparent fail-
ure of a reported meeting be-
tween top Soviet and Chinese
negotiators either to reach an
accommodation of views or ar-
range for a further meeting with
Khrushchev during his Korean
trip probably increased his in-
centive to prolong the UN ven-
ture and obtain some results
he could use to "prove" the
success and correctness of his
policies.
Soviet propaganda has
stressed the close identity be-
tween Soviet proposals and the
attitudes and desires of neutral
states. At the same time, Soviet
commentaries have attempted to
portray the West as increasing-
ly isolated. According to Mos-
cow, the General Assembly vote
on the Australian amendment
calling for a four-power summit
rather than on the neutralists'
request for contacts between
Khrushchev and the President
was an "overwhelming defeat for
the West." Bloc propagandists
also assessed the results of
the debate on the representation
for Communist China as a pyrrhic
victory for the United States
and its allies.
Khrushchev may have had
the Chinese in mind when he
told reporters, "He who be-
lieves that our efforts were
An additional factor in
Khrushchev's decision to extend
his stay may have been his hope
that he could exploit the impact
of a successful technological
achievement such as a space
flight.
East-West Issues
Khrushchev's four-week stay
in New York yielded no important
advances in Soviet positions
on disarmament, Germany and Ber-
lin, nuclear testing, or the
general question of renewed con-
tacts between East and West.
Khrushchev clearly indicated
that serious East-West talks
will be deferred until a new
administration takes office in
Washington. In his second con-
versation with Prime Minister
Macmillan, he acknowledged that
Berlin negotiations at the sum-
mit would have to wait until a
new American administration was
firmly established, thus backing
down from his insistence in
their first meeting that a sum-
mit should be held in January.
Khrushchev has virtually
ignored the negotiations on a
nuclear test ban, Although
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Prime Minister Macmillan raised
the issue, Khrushchev did not
respond. At the talks in Geneva,
the Soviet delegation adhered
to its proposal for a four- to
five-year moratorium on small
underground tests, and termed
a US proposal for a two-year
moratorium unacceptable.
The Soviet chief delegate
also reiterated the USSR's po-
sition that any action by the
United States to conduct uni-
lateral nuclear tests during a
research program for improving
detection techniques would be
regarded as an indication that
the US was resuming weapons
tests, and the Soviet Union
would consider itself free to
resume testing. Izvestia re-
peated this warning on 8-73cto-
ber in an article charging the
US with the intention of break-
ing up the talks as part of a
campaign to prevent an improve-
ment in East-West relations.
On the Berlin and German
questions, Khrushchev'. New
York performance has been ac-
companied by an extensive diplo-
matic and propaganda campaign.
Since the announcement on 30
September of Bonn's abrogation
of the interzonal trade agree-
ment, bloc moves against .rest
Germany have been gradually in-
creased and sharpened.
On 6 October Po-
land dispatched to
the NATO countries
an aide-memoire in-
tended to document
charges of stepped-
up West German mili-
taristic and revanch-
ist actions. At the
same time, Moscow
protested to the
four powers against
West German rearma-
ment with nuclear
weapons and warned
that the bloc countries would
take measures to ensure their
own security. Moscow and War-
saw then joined with East Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia in a
joint declaration appealing to
all the wartime allies to pre-
vent West German nuclear re-
armament and press for the con-
clusion of a German peace treaty.
The well-coordinated cam-
paign may be part of an effort
to justify bloc countermeasures
against Bonn. After playing
down any suggestion of impend-
ing crisis on the Berlin issues,
Pravda on 9 October reportedly
tooTFan unusually sharp line in
claiming that the West; German
action in denouncing the trade
pact was provocative and could
lead to "a general war." At
the same time, however, bloc
comments have been careful to
stress the probability of sum-
mit negotiations on Berlin.
Chinese UN Representation
The 8 October vote of the
15th UN General Assembly to up-
hold the moratorium on discus-
sion of the Chinese representa-
tion issue emphasized the con-
tinuing erosion of support for
Nationalist China. Forty-two
nations voted for, 34 against,
and 22 abstained, giving Taipei
the slimmest margin since 1951.
MORATORIUM ON CHINESE UN REPRESENTATION
VOTES OF UN MEMBERS
VOTES NOT TOTAL
FOR AGAINST ABSTENTIONS RECORDED MEMBERSHIP
37 11 4 8 60
42 7 11 - - 60
44 10 2 4 60
43 11 6 - - 60
42 12 6 - - 60
47 24 8 - - 79
48 27 6 1 82
44 28 9 - - 81
44 29 9 - - 82
42 34 22 1 99
13 OCTOBER 1960
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
None of the 16 newly admitted
states supported the moratorium,
and opposing votes were cast by
three--Mali, Senegal, and Ni-
geria. Taipei also lost the
support of Laos and Malaya,
both of which abstained. Ethi-
opia and Cuba, which had ab-
stained last year, voted against
the moratorium.
Initially a few of the new
African. states planned to vote
for the moratorium, but after
the opening of the General As-
sembly session, a strong trend
developed toward abstention and
even opposition. Delegations
which had previously indicated
they would support it, later
explained their abstention on
the ground that they could not
break the unity of the new
states. Even the abstentions
were obtained with great dif-
ficulty by the West in view of
the energetic campaign by the
Soviet bloc and some neutralist
members in behalf of Peiping's
admission.
Following the balloting,
various African delegates made
public statements indicating
that the abstentions were grudg-
ing and would not be repeated
in the future. The general
mood of many supporters of the
moratorium after the voting
was that the issue would be
doomed if presented to any future
session.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
The power struggle in Leo-
poldville remains stalemated,
but army chief Joseph Mobutu
is determined to arrest Lu-
mumba. His efforts have led
to a very tense situation, and
any implementation of his
threats to use force would
bring him into open conflict
with the UN Command. On 12
October he reportedly had
about 1,000 Congolese troops
in the vicinity of Lumumba's
residence.
His first effort to send
a Congolese Army unit to arrest
the former premier was frus-
trated by the UN guard..---largely
Ghanaian-.at his official res-
idence. Mobutu then demanded
that the UN yield Lumumba, but
was turned down on 11 October.
A government spokesman then
threatened a "nation wide up.
rising" if Lumumba were not
surrendered. However, UN rep-??
resentat ive Dayal has stated
that Lumumba can can'be surrend-
ered only'if parliament with-
draws his parliamentary immunity.
Mobutu then charged the UN of-
ficial with a "false interpreta-
tion" of Congolese law, and
Dayal countered that the move
to arrest Lumumba was a "trick"
and not a proper solution to the
Congo's problem.
Mobutu is likely to move
slowly on any appeal to the
populace because of Lurrrumba's
demonstrated spellbinding capa-
bility. If Mobutu is dissuaded
from using force, however, he
may be prompted to reconvene par-
liament, whose members have
lately been. critical of Lumumba,
in order to deprive thef.ormer
premier of his legislative im-
munity.
Active support for Lumumba
from Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR
has counterbalanced to some ex
tent the fall in Lumumbals
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s1~ rIp(
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
domestic prestige. On 11 Octo-
ber, after Mobutu had set the
first of several deadlines for
the UN to surrender Lumumba,
a Ghanaian-operated
IL-18 turboprop, air-
craft loaded with
about 60 Ghanaian
troops took off front
Accra, reportedly For
the purpose of rescu-
ing Lumumba. from
"house arrest" in
Leopoldville and set-
ting him up as head
of a government-in-
exile based in Accra.
The plane turned
back, allegedly be-
cause of bad weather,
and the flight may
have been for a rou-
tine troop rotation;
a similar flight left
Accra on 12 October.
While press at-
tention is centered
on the political sit-
uation in Leopold-
ville, the Congo's
economic difficulties
threaten to become
overwhelming. The
sels stated that the Congolese
Government had requested its
last line of credit and after
that was exhausted--around 15
13 OCTOBER 1960
0 MILES 200
financial consultant for the
Congo, who is working under UN
auspic es has stated that a
crisis will occur this week
unless a coordinated salvage
program is undertaken immedi-
ately. The government report-
edly will be unable to meet
its military and civilian pay-
rolls on 15 October, which on
the basis of past experience
would lead to renewed disorder
and chaos.
Recently, the director of
the Congo Central Bank in Brus-
ti
',Albertville
ANGANYIKA
IL.ke
October--the Congo would have
no further funds. He noted,
however, that it might be pos-
sible to permit further borrow-
ing by raising the present debt
ceiling.
At-a recent meeting with
Justin Bomboko, head of the
technical commission forming
the Congo's administration, the
Congolese leader agreed that
the government must act swift-
ly and without regard to con-
stitutional limitations requir-
ing parliamentary approval of
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REPUBLIC
i
So T H E _CONGO 'xindu
r
=tfrani
` - IConcfolo
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
international banking agree-
ments. Bomboko on 11 October
established a monetary coun-
cil and promised to enter fi-
nancial negotiations with Bel-
gium to arrange the distribu-
tion of the assets of former
semipublic Belgian corpora-
tions in the Congo.
Meanwhile, the situation
in Katanga Province is also
serious., Anti-Tshomb6 Baluba
tribesmen appear to control
large areas of northern and
central Katanga and to have
made numerous depredations
against Europeans. Many offi-
cials in Elisabethville re-
portedly fear that this tribal
guerrilla conflict with the
Katanga government now is en-
tering a critical phase which
could become a full-scale civil
war. The widened scope of
rebel activities suggests that
some form of Baluba political
organization is taking shape.
President Tshomb6 has strongly
criticized the UN Command for
failing to give his troops a
free hand in putting down the
disorders.
Tshomb6 also seems to be
under pressure from anti-Bel-
gian elements within his Conakat
party, and apparently as a re-
sult has lately attacked Brus-
sels for failing to grant Ka-
tanga diplomatic recognition.
SITUATION IN LAOS
Peace talks between the
Souvanna Phouma government and
the Pathet Lao began in Vien-
tiane on 11 October. During
the initial encounter, the gov-
ernment reportedly demanded a
cessation of Pathet Lao guerril-
la:-,attacks, the restoration of
Sam Neua Province to government
control, and the rearming of
government troops disarmed by
the Pathet Lao after the fall
of Sam Neua town in late Sep-
tember. The Pathet Lao pro-
posed the integration of Pathet
troops with Vientiane troops
to fight General Phoumi and of-
ficial action by the Souvanna
government condemning Phoumi's
Savannakhet Revolutionary Com-
mittee.
The Pathet proposals ap-
pear propagandistic in nature
and will undoubtedly be aug-
mented in future sessions by a
set of more specific demands
bearing on..the role the Pathets
hope to play in the national po-
litical life. These may include
reintegration of Pathet func-
tionaries into the civil serv-
ice, fixed territorial enclaves
for Pathet troops, membership
in Souvanna's government, and
new national elections.
Souvanna has claimed to
the American ambassador that
he will break off the talks if
the Pathet Lao rejects the pre-
conditions for substantive talks
enunciated in the first session.
In any event, he states that he
will attempt to string the nego-
tiations out for as long as
possible. The premier will be
under considerable pressure,
however, to reach a settlement.
Captain Kong Le, in particular,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY. SUMMARY
C H I N A
S f_3 4
LUANG PRABANG
INDONESIA
tee:
will be watching the course of
the talks and may move to over-
throw Souvanna if he precipi-
tately breaks off the talks or
takes too hard a line with the
Pathet Lao.
Reports from Phong Saly
Province indicate continued
Pathet attacks on government
outposts despite the nominal
cease-fire supposedly obtain-
ing in the area. The local
Laotian Army commander reports
that the Pathet Lao has consid-
erably augmented its strength
in the southeastern part of the
province and that
two government out-
posts have fallen.
This activity is
clearly designed to
bring additional pres-
sure on Souvanna to
give the Pathet Lao
what it wants in the
Vientiane negotia-
tions.
No discernible
progress has been made
in bringing about a
reconciliation be-
tween Souvanna and
General Pho,umi or in
repairing the related
deep split in the
Laotian Army. The
King has in effect
washed his hands of
the problem, indicat-
ing to Ambassador
Brown that, whatever
his personal feelings,
he was in no posi-
tion to impose a set-
tlement on the two
sides. He stated that
he would not form a
new government unless
Souvanna resigned or
was forced out by the
National Assembly.
The King implied that
public opinion was running
against Savannakhet and had
been attracted by Souvanna's
"illusory" offer of peace through
negotiations with the Pathet
Lao.
Phoumi's position was bol-
stered somewhat by another turn-
over in the military command
structure in the Second Military
Region, after which it was an-
nounced that the region had re-
aligned itself with Savannakhet.
On 28 September, the region had
announced its support of Sou-
vanna. The professed motive
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NORTH
Bien Phu VIETNAM
.Hanoi
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13 October 1960
for the latest switch was con-
cern over growing Pathet ac-
tivity inXieng Khouang Province.
Pressure from Meo tribal groups
was said to have played an
important, if still somewhat
obscure, role in the realign-
ment. This development may
tend to stiffen Phoumi's re-
sistance to any new attempts
by Souvanna to induce him to
drop his opposition to the gov-
ernment.
A senior Laotian Foreign
Ministry official has informed
Ambassador Brown that a Soviet
delegation will arrive in Laos
on 13 October and will probably
"not come empty-handed." The
delegation reportedly will be
SECRET
led by A. N. Abramov, the So-
viet ambassador to Cambodia
who will also be accredited to
Laos. In addition to complet-
ing the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations, the dele-
gation will probably extend
offers of aid to the Souvanna
government. Recent Soviet
propaganda commentary on the
Laotian situation has em-
phasized the dire consequences
of the Thai economic blockade
and has accused the United
States of "stifling" the legal
government by suspending aid.
Souvanna may be tempted to ac-
cept any Soviet offer of assist-
ance as a means of widening his
area of political maneuver.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BU
13 October 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ARGENTINE POLITICAL CRISIS
Argentine President Fron-
dizi faces one of the most se-
vere crisis .yin his two and one
half years in office as a re,
sult.c f the 11 October army ul-
timatum to dismiss some of his
advisers and to modify and
"clarify" some of his policies.
His skill in negotiating a rec-
onciliation of his policies
with the army demands will de-
termine the continuance of his
regime and of his petroleum
and US-backed stabilization pol-
i0ies.,., which have been consid-
ered models for Latin America.
The army demands vary wide-
ly, but important among them are
the removal of advisers who
favor wooing Peronista political
support away from Peron and
steps to strengthen the national
petroleum company. A particular
target is Rogelio Frigerio--now
an "unofficial" but influential
adviser. He helped negotiate
Peronista support for Frondizi's
election in February 1958 and,
as a member of Frondizi's pres-
idential staff, pressed for
the adoption of the US-backed
stabilization program initiated
in January 1959. The army,
which forced Frigerio's ouster
in May 1959, mistrusts Frigerio's
economic advice as well as his
own political ambitions in the
future
The army believes Frigerio
encourages official help for
"soft-core" Peronista labor
leaders in union elections in
an effort to attract support
for Frondizi's Intransigent
Radical party in the gubernato-
rial and congressional elections
in March 1962. The Peronistas
are still badly split, and those
supporting Peron openly call
for subversion.
Frondizi's petroleum policy
of making contracts with foreign
companies, mainly US, for aid in
developing oil resources and his
moves to reduce funds for the
state oil company (YPF) have
aroused fears of a sellout-"t6
foreigners, While major army
spokesmen say they favor such
foreign contracts, at the same
time they wish to see YPF
strengthened and made more ef-
ficient.
Other related demands of
the army, which has had to re-
press Peronista and Communist
terrorism for the past two years,
include firmer anti-Communist
measures, federal control over
several provincial governments
accused of Peronista or leftist
leanings, and paradoxically a
change in economic and financial
policies to reduce state coni
trols and opportunities for
graft.
Frondizi's departure from
his party's traditionally
nationalist platform in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY :'.MM4 Y
direction of free enterprise
has caused him severe difficul-
ties even within his own party,
and there is widespread dissat-
isfaction over the austerity
measures of the stabilization
program. These complaints af-
fect army attitudes. Highly
respected retired General Pedro
Aramburu, who helped oust Peron
is 1955 and turned over power
to Frondizi, stated on 11 Octo-
ber that "the army is a sound-
ing box for all the unrest....
The country suffers from a pro-
found moral and material crisis."
In a radio reply to the
army's ultimatum, Frondizi
strongly defended his policies
and constitutional procedures
as essential to economic and
political recovery. This eased
the situation somewhat, but new
difficulties may result; from
negotiations with the powerful
army commander in chief, General
Carlos Toranzo Montero, whom
Frondizi dismissed on 12
October, but was apparently
compelled to reinstate.
POLITICAL' OUTLOOK.
Janio Quadros' victory in
Brazil's 3 October presidential
election will bring about the
first basic shake-up in Brazil's
administrative machinery since
Vargas came to power in 1930.
The new regime, sponsored by
the traditional "out" parties,
will probably lay heavy stress
on its declared intention to
"clean house" when it takes of-
fice on 31 January, but it is
likely to retain most of the
central programs of the popular
Kubitschek regime. Under Quad-
r'os`;, a temperamental and con-
troversial personality, the
government is likely to be even
more aggressive than in the
past in bargaining with the
United States for economic aid
and may also seek broader ties
with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
During the campaign, Quad-
ros refrained from direct at-
tacks on Kubitschek's program
and promised to continue its
two distinctive features: rapid
economic development and "Opera-
tion Pan America," a plan for a
massive assault on underdevelop-
ment in the hemisphere. Quad-
ros also promised to control
inf lat ion:_and balance the budg-
et without sacrificing develop-
ment.
Quadros' restraint during
the campaign and the wide mar-
gin of his victory have been
attributed by some sources to
a reported secret deal. between
him and Kubitschek. Kubitschek
was ineligible to succeed him-
self but is believed eager to
run again in 1965; he may there-
fore consider it an advantage
to have his party out of power
during the next five years.
Quadros will inherit far
fewer problems than the outgo-
ing regime did in 1956, but is
likely to have difficulty meas-
uring,, up to Kubitschek's
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extraordinary popularity and
preventing a sense of letdown
after the exuberant economic
growth of the past five years.
He will also face a serious bal-
ance-of-payments crisis--the
deficit will probably be at
least $125,000,000 for 1960--
a continuing coffee surplus,
and strong pressure for wage
increases that if granted
would undermine this year's suc-
cess in curbing the rate of in-
flation.
Quadros will also confront
the problem of patching togeth-
er a working majority in con-
gress; the present body was
elected in 1958 and will not be
renewed until 1962. Some ob-
servers fear that Quadros' emo-
tional instability may lead him
to adopt ill-considered posi-
tions in attempting to deal
with these problems.
Brazil's relations with
the United States, which have
been severely strained several
times in the past few years--
mainly over questions of eco-
nomic aid and trade policy--
will probably be
especially
delicate during the early
months of
the Quadros adminis-
tration.
Quadros
apparently
shares the
nearly
unanimous
Brazilian
opinion
that Wash-
ington has
chosen
to "discard"
BRAZIL
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 3 OCTOBER 1960
UNOFFICIAL RETURNS APPROXIMATELY 90% COMPLETE
CANDIDATE VOTE
QUADROS 5,0131 ,638
LOTT 3,405, 002
DE BARROS 2, 101, 356
its former close ties with
Brazil and at the same time
refuses to recognize Brazil's
claim to special status as an
"emerging world power,"
Quadros has openly expressed
admiration for the bargaining
tactics of the neutral na-
tions and has hinted broadly
that during his projected pre-
inaugural world tour, he
will seek economic aid from
all sources.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS
The growing counterrevolu-
tionary violence in Cuba, al-
though symptomatic of increas-
ing opposition, does not at ,
this point seriously threaten
the Castro regime. Counter-
revolutionary groups are di-
vided into mutually antagonistic
factions and lack leaders with
wide popular appeal. The re-
cent capture of two guerrilla
leaders and a number of their
followers in the Escambray
Mountains of Las Villas Province
is a sharp setback for the
counterrevolutionaries. These
men and others captured in
Oriente Province were tried
promptly. Sixteen, including
one American, were executed on
13 October.
On the other hand, the es-
cape on 8 October of 15 officers
imprisoned since last November
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13 October 19610
is an important psychological
blow for the regime. These of-
ficers were associated with the
popular anti-Communist Major
Huber Matos, formerly a close
associate of Fidel Castro`; who
was denigrated and jailed a
year ago. They may eventually
form the core of a fighting
group with a genuine popular
following.
In Oriente Province, where
only a few of last week's small
band of "invaders" .' remkin,+ at
large, there are reports of de-
fections by armed forces elements
and militia personnel, who have
apparently taken to the moun-
tains for antigovernment guer-
rilla operations.
The Cuban petroleum indus-
try, forced to shut down opera-
tions at the nationalized Esso
refinery because of a shortage
in the catalyst used in the re-
fining process, received eight
carloads of the material on 3
October from a company in the
United States. Plans were made
to reactivate the refinery, and
a scheduled rationing of petro-
leum products was indefinitely
postponed.
Cuba has received what are
probably its second and third
major shipments of Soviet bloc
military equipment, and further
shipments are expected. The'
Soviet vessel Sergey Kirov began
unloading at a small port some
38 miles west of Havana on 1
October.
The Nikolay
n ro arrived in Havana on 9
October, and there is strong evi-
dence that it carried a large
military cargo.
The Cuban-Bulgarian com-
mercial agreement signed in Ha-
vana on 7 October was the sev-
enth such agreement concluded
by Cuba this year with a Sino-
Soviet bloc country. Bulgaria
agreed to buy at least 20,000
tons of Cuban sugar annually
for the next five years and to
increase its purchases of other
Cuban products. A protocol on
scientific and cultural coopera-
tion was also signed, and the
two countries agreed to estab-
lish diplomatic relations on
the embassy level.
The US Embassy has received
an unevaluated but plausible
report on current thinking with-
in high Cuban Communist circles.
Communist leaders are said to
estimate that Cuba will be sub-
jected to military attack by the
United States early next year.
The Cuban Communists, who re-
portedly control 8,000 to 10,000
members of the militia, would
have the mission of fighting to 25X1
the end and causing the great
est possible chaos for as long
as possible.
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One of the USSR's most
noted writers on military doc-
trine, Maj, Gen. Nikolay Talen-
sky, presented in the October
issue of the magazine Interna-
tional life the most explicit
scussion yet to appear in the
Soviet press on the effects of
modern war. He condemned as
"harmful and inhuman" the idea
--which he almost certainly im-
putes to the Chinese Communists
--that war might be justified ;
if it meant the end of capital-
ifmte. on the grounds that another
war, even if it were '-'local or
limited" would be "nothing
less than a prelude to a general
rocket nuclear war." This, he
implied, would result in un-
acceptable destruction to the
USSR. Talensky said failure to
see these dangers was harmful,
whereas to see and then under-
estimate them was "criminal."
Talensky wrote that casual-
ties in such a war in "the
probable main theater"--North
America and "almost all of
Europe"--would run to "not less
than 500 to 600 million"--some
three quarters of the population;
this estimate was said to have
been made "according to the most
careful calculations" and did
not include the effects of chem-
ical and bacteriological weapons.
He also said, "Immense territo:-
ries will be poisoned by death
dealing doses of radiation."
In a veiled jibe at the Chinese,
Talensky said that "the most
active and most cultured part
of mankind" would thus disappear.
In presenting this argument,
Talensky dismissed the point de-
bated by Soviet military theo-'
r;ists'in recent years that a mass
surprise attack by any power
could bring victory, arguing that
retaliation would still destroy
all the vital centers of the at-
tacker.
Talensky argued that the
bloc cannot afford to adopt
policies which run a serious
risk of even limited war. He
explained to the Chinese
that with the advent of the nu-
clear age, it is necessary to
update Marxism-Leninism , to
ON LIMITED WAR ...
Nikolau Talensky: "...1ocal and 1tm- Fu Chung: "As to the actual war,
tied wars in contemporary conditions when, where, with whom, and on what
will be nothing less than a prelude
to a general, rocket-nuclear war...."
scale it is to be carried out...
to a matter of contingency."
"Local wars have not ceased in
the 15 years since the end of World
War II... ..
ON GLOBAL, NUCLEAR WAR...
Nikola:i Talensky: "The population Fu Chuna "If the imperialists lose
of the world as a result of a new all human qualities and launch a nu-
global war would, in the first an- clear war, we will not fear them."
alysts, be out in half, and it would
be the most active, capable, and "The outcome of any future war
cultured part of mankind that would is not dependent on either missiles
be killed. One should not forget, or atomic bombs. It is dependent
too, that in this case the material- on men."
technical base of life of the people
would bedestroyed also. Thermonu-
clear weapons would destroy factories
and plants, burn fields and orchards,
wipe out means of communications and
transport, almost all houses, hospi-
tals.... This would mean that human
society would be thrown backward and
its path to ConvwMsm immeasurably
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"Atomic bombs could by no means
destroy the human race. This is ac-
knowledged even by some bourgeois mili-
tarists. History will soon prove
that atomic bombs do not conquer
people, but, contrarily, people conquer
atomic bombs."
-Include the dogma=of
noninevitab:ility
(avoidance) of war
and to stress the
necessity of "peace-
ful coexistence."
The article was
reviewed by TASS on
30 September, pre-
sumably to give it
more publicity and
emphasis. Within a
week the Chinese Com-
munists restated their
viewpoint. Articles
in People's Daily on
6 an c o e'er by
General Fu Chung, a
deputy director of
the Political Depart-
ment of the Chinese
Communist Army, described
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
as a "naive illusion" the view
that wars can be avoided while
the class system exists. Ifi'his
view, limited wars in particular
are inevitable--a rationale per-
haps in part offered to justify
hostilities to "liberate"
Taiwan.
On the question of global
wars, he conceded the possibili-
ty that they could be avoided,
but he did not accept the So-
viet view that general war is
a receding possibility. He re-
affirmed Mao Tse-tung's views
that "atomic bombs could by no
means destroy the human race"
and that the outcome of a fu-
ture war would depend on men
and not atomic bombs. These
have long been fundamental con-
tentions of the Chinese, who
look to their 650,000,000 popu-
lation, their communes; and par-
ticularly to their 200,000000-
man militia, for the survival
of Communist China in a nuclear
war.
General Fu's articles were
in the form of a commentary on
the publication of a, new
volume of Mao Tse-tung's writ-
ings on the Chinese Communist
revolution and as such are in-
tended to carry great weight.
The commentary amounts. to an
unequivocal disparagement of
the USSR's cautious approach
to war. Peiping thus still
attempts to force on the bloc
what Moscow regards as a high-
risk strategy and does not ac-
cept that the world Communist
program should be limited by
rigid adherence to the coexist-
ence line.
The program to reduce So-
viet military manpower by 1,200,-
000 by the end of 1961 appears
to be continuing, but plans ap-
parently are encountering diffi-
culties, and a recent uncon-
firmed report indicates that
initial demobilization goals
have been scaled down.
remote areas of the Soviet Un-
ion. The local inhabitants were
preparing to receive them with
open arms, according to the
accounts, and special atten-
tion was devoted to the impor-
tant jobs they could take over
in their new homes.
Articles began to appear
in the press, shortly after Khru-
shchev'.s, announderne.nt ..:of..,the,;.
program on 14 January, praising
the "socialist devotion" of
discharged servicemen who had
volunteered to go to various
The program envisages
movement of released personnel
into frontier areas suffering
local labor shortages and lack-
ing the. amenities of modern,
urban society. Recruitment ap-
parently was to be on a volun-
tary basis, and "agitation" was
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13 October 1960
begun to get volunteers to go
to the New Lands,
There is some evidence that
the number of such volunteers
has been less than the regime
hoped for. Several press arti-
cles have criticized the failure
of some unit commanders to "take
the most elementary steps" to
induce their men to serve on
the frontier. In the staged de-
mobilization of a heavy tank
division in Belorussia, observed
by Western correspondents early
this summer, the contingent of
volunteers which entrained at
Osipovichi for the New Lands ap-
pears to have been but a minor
part of the command; the others
evidently either returned to
their home villages or went to
Moscow. The capital city is
doubtless the goal of many.
Poor planning and adminis-
tration of the resettlement pro-
gram is also indicated by re-
ports of friction between volun-
teers and the local population,
probably occasioned by competi-
tion for housing and other
scarce facilities. Various
press articles have castigated
the inhabitants of some areas
for an "inhospitable attitude"
and even for "cheating the ex-
servicemen` out of their
rights,"
Disgust at such developments
has evidently caused some volun-
teers to leave the areas to
Which they were sent and "shame-
lessly run home." Others, chief-
ly officers, have been, visiting
several localities before choos-
ing one or perhaps rejecting all.
Aside from difficulties as-
sociated with absorption of the
released personnel into the
civilian economy, there are seri-
ous.,:; problems affecting the
morale of career officers. Ac-
cording to the original plan,
250,000 of the dischargees were
to be officers, who, unlike the
draftee enlisted men, have a
vested interest in a military
life that provides them with se-
curity and status. Recognizing
this, the government has made a
great effort to reassure vulner-
able officers, sending; high of-
ficials to meet them and promis-
ing aid for resettlement. Never-
theless:,, there are numerous in-
dications of great and continuing
concern among officers. Selec-
tions of officers to be retained
may also injure morale by arous-
ing suspicion of favoritism.
The effect on the morale': of
promising junior officers whom
the government would wish to
retain in service will, suffer as
a result of the doubts as to the
security offered by a military
career. There have been hints
of this in two recent Red Star
articles describing the _"ie-
habilitation" of young; officers
who had "rashly" resigned their
commissions.
Although both the African
National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)--
the two leading African nation-
alist bodies in South Africa--
were dealt crippling blows by
the Verwoerd government's re-
pressive actions following civil
disturbances last March, the
moderates of the ANC apparently
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
suffered the greater loss in
prestige.
African leaders reportedly
were impressed by the effective-
ness of the PAC's demand for an
"Africa for the Africans," with
its implied appeal to racism, in
contrast to the ANC's cautious
advocacy of equal rights for
all races. They also believe
that ANC President Luthuli was
outmaneuvered by, the PAC's ag-
gressive campaign and that the
ANC leaders then bungled in
their effort to recover the ini-
tiative. As a result the PAC
has emerged with an enhanced
reputation for energetic action,
while the indecisive leadership
of Luthuli has been discredited.
The PAC's success derived
from the emotional appeal of its
program father than from any or-
ganizational strength, as the
imprisonment of its leaders ap-
pears to have destroyed what
little organization it had. PAC
President Robert Sobukwe remains
a popular hero: however, it is
questionable whether his popular-
ity will survive his absence
during his present three-year
jail term. Nonetheless, it seems
likely that the racist appeal of
Sobukwe's aggressive program
will be copied by other black
South African nationalists to an
increasing extent in the future.
Such a trend is evident in
reported attempts to foment un-
rest in rural African reserves,
and in increased aggressiveness
among activists within the ANC.
The ANC's "leftist" faction has
long been dissatisfied.with Lu-
thuli's moderate approach, and,
with some members defecting to
the PAC, those militants who re-
tain some freedom of action are
attempting to establish a reputa-
tion for strong leadership.
Shortly after the state of emer-
gency in South Africa was lifted
on 31 August, one such militant
stated, "If we are arrested
again, let's go to jail fighting,
not doing nothing."
The ANC's leftist militants
will be hampered in their compe-
tition with the PAC by their long
history of association with the
clandestine South Africa Commu-
nist party. South African Com-
munists, most of them white or
Indian, have become influential
in the nonwhite movement through
their organizational abilities,
and the ANC's "nonracial" plat-
form was designed in part to
protect these key Communists
from African racism.
With the growth of militant
African sentiment, however, look-
ing to such African states as
Ghana for organizational support,
Africans may tend to reject or-
ganizations and individuals that
have become associated with a
"European" ideology. The few
black African Communists in 25X1
South Africa may therefore break
at least their overt ties with
the party.
The four French Community
states associated in the coopera-
tive Conseil de 1'Entente-
Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger,
and Dahomey--appear increasingly
determined to assert the inde-
pendence they gained last August.
While ready now to negotiate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
bilateral cooperation accords
with Paris, the four states are
unwilling to accept French direc-
tion of their coordinated for-
eign policies as the price for
continued French economic aid.
Hamani Diori, President of
Niger and, for this year, of the
Entente as well, told the Ameri-
ican charge at Abidjan, who is
SP NISH
FIARA
SENEGAL
.In Salah
ALGERIA
accredited to all four states,
in late September that Niger
and its partners would begin
negotiations with France 'in mid-
October for diplomatic, military,
technical, and other bilateral
agreements. Unlike the other
seven Community states which have
gained their "international sov-
ereignty" so far, the Entente
states were unwilling, despite
their previous pro-French orien-
tation, to negotiate such accords
before being admitted to the UN,
a goal attained on 20 September.
Although he expressed con-
fidence in the outcome of these
negotiations, Diori pointedly
stated that his government would
not accept any French aid condi-
tioned on Niger's following French
direction in foreign affairs,
"such as voting for France on the
Algeriangilestion." .Ivory Coast Pres-
ident Houphouet-Boigny creator and
dominant personality of the~Entente
--and Upper Volta President,. Y. ameogo
have also indicated recently that
their states would not support
France on the Algerian issue at
the UN even if threatened with
the loss of much-needed French
assistance.
Diori also revealed to the
charge that he was thinking of
requesting the withdrawal of
French military elements now sta-
tioned in northern Niger. He ap-
peared to link them with incidents
which he alleged occur almost
LIBYA
daily along the Niger-
Algerian frontier as a
result of attempts by
"a few stupid French"
to incite nomadic Tuareg
tribesmen to "stay with
France" by going to
Algeria.
Viewed in conjunc-
tion with a recent re-
port of similar con-
tacts between Tuaregs
and French army officers
in neighboring Mali,
Diori's allegation sug-
gests that the French
have recently stepped
up their efforts to se-
cure the southern ap-
proaches to Algeria.
The clash between rebel guerril-
las and French troops which oc-
curred late last month in the
heart of the Algerian Sahara near
In Salah has undoubtedly added
strong impetus to such efforts.
Since becoming independent,
the Entente states have indicated
that, for political as well as
economic reasons,, they desire to
obtain economic aid from other
countries besides France, especial-
ly from the United States. More-
over, three of the states--Niger,
Upper Volta, and Dahomey--which
presently lack non-French resi-
dent diplomatic representatives,
are extremely anxious to obtain
them. In both cases the feelings
of Entente leaders are so strong
that they are probably prepared
to turn to the Sino-Soviet bloc--
despite a wariness of involve-
ment with Communist countries--
if other Western nations do 25X1
not act promptly to fulfill ' their
desires for enhanced interna-
tional status.
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but has had to go slow in view
of the Pushtoon tribesmen's his-
toric resistance to outside
authority.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY iS " '`Ry
The Pakistani Government
apparently is exploiting its
present border trouble with Af-
ghanistan to increase its pres-
ence in its frontier tribal
areas which have traditionally
enjoyed considerable autonomy.
Rawalpindi has long wanted to
bring these isolated mountain
areas along the Durand line--
the old boundary between Afghan-
istan and British India--under
its regular local administration,
Foreign Minister
Qadir announced on 8
October that the Nawab
of Dir, hereditary
ruler of a tribal
state bordering Afghan-
istan north of the
Khyber Pass, had been
arrested along with
the Khan of Jandul,
the Nawab's son and
ruler of a small trib-
alI. region just to the
south of Dir. Qadir
explained that the
arrests were made fol-
lowing "many accusa-
tions of double-deal-
ing" against the Push-
toon leaders "by people
and leaders of the trib-
A l' areas who were en-
gaged in heroic efforts
to repel Afghan tribes-
men." The Nawab re-
portedly had appealed
to Kabul in September
for help against rival
tribal elements seek-
ing, possibly with the
support of the Paki.-
stani authorities, to
overthrow his regime.
Rawalpindi prob-
ably felt the recent
Afghan incursions
provided a pretext to
intervene and install
an amenable ruler.
It probably was also
motivated by a desire
to position border security
forces directly on the Durand
line, thereby enabling it for
the first time to control con-
tacts between tribal groups in
this:region living on both sides
of the frontier.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
Rawalpindi's strong-arm
action in deposing the Nawab of
Dir probably will arouse con-
siderable resentment among his
tribes and may lead them to re-
sist forcibly the government's
attempts to extend its control
over the region. Rawalpindi,
however, has named another of
the Nawab's sons to succeed
him, apparently having decided
not to abolish the tribal dy-
nasty or to bring the state
under West Pakistan's adminis-
trative system, as it is attempt-
ing to do with other tribal
regions along the frontier.
Some fighting apparently
is continuing in the Afghan-
Pakistani border zone, although
on a smaller scale than in
September. Despite reports
from Kabul that Pakistani
"troops" have been involved,
there is still no evidence that
Rawalpindi has committed regu-
lar army forces. Units of the
quasii4ailit'azcy . border security
forces have, however, been
moved into the troubled
Bajaur area and reportedly
have been engaged in some
clashes.
The Japanese Diet will
convene on 17 October for an
extraordinary session, its
first under the Ikeda govern-
ment, and what will probably
be a brief but stormy launching
of the final phase of the campaign
for lower house elections, ten-
tatively set for 20 November.
Prime Minister Ikeda and
his principal cabinet ministers,
including Foreign Minister Kosaka
and Finance Minister Mizuta, are
scheduled to deliver major policy
speeches in which they probably
will reiterate the Liberal Demo-
cratic party's (LDP) platform
pledges of close cooperation with
the free world, tax reductions,
and expanded welfare services.
This platform and the public
revulsion against leftist excess-
es in the May-June demonstrations
appear to have been major reasons
for LDP victories in four guber-
natorial elections since early
July as well as for the strong
conservative showing in a recent
series of public opinion polls.
Ikeda does not plan any
significant legislative action
at this session, presumably on
the assumption that the wave of
early popular enthusiasm for
his cabinet will carry over to
election time. He hopes to
dissolve the Diet well before
the end of October.
The Socialists probably
will strive to prolong the ses
sion while seeking a new approach
for attacking the government.
The Japanese Socialist party
(JSP) until ."recently' has'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
lacked an issue to exploit, but
may have found one in the recent
marked rise in consumer prices,
which had been relatively con-
stant since 1953. The price
rise, although not yet a serious
liability to Ikeda, does under-
line contentions by the Social-
ists and many Japanese finan-
ciers that Ikeda's expansionist
economic program will create a
serious inflationary problem.
The government has announced
a four-point program to counter
the increase.
Communist China's strong-
propaganda attacks on Ikeda on
11-October ended Peiping's hope-
ful waiting for a less "hostile"
policy from the new Japanese
prime minister. Obviously in-
tended to assist the Japanese
Socialists in the elections,
Peiping's move may backfire as
in the elections of May 1958.
Nevertheless, the current
two-week visit of Tatsunosuke
Takas9k?,a second-line conserv-
ative:, leader, to Communist
China could also prove untimely
for the Ikeda government. Al-
though Takasaki failed to ob-
tain governmental endorsement
for his trip, which is intended
to explore means for solving
Sino-Japanese differences, he
favors a more liberal policy
than Ikeda toward Peiping and
could play into Socialist hands
by causing difficulties in
Tokyo's efforts to hold the line
against Peiping's terms for a
full-scale resumption of trade.
The most immediate effect
of the assassination of Social-
ist party chairman Asanuma on
12 October probably will be on
the JSP itself. Asanuma, who
was the symbol of the JSP's
anti-American, pro-Communist
orientation, recently had been
attempting to retreat to a more
neutral position in the wake of
adverse public reaction to So-
cialist extremism in the May-
June crisis. Strong opposition
by intraparty elements and the
Sohyo labor federation to any
retrenchment may result in a
struggle in naming a new party
chairman.
The Socialists have inti-
mated that Asanuma's assassina-
tion was a calculated plot and
will use the incident in an ef-
fort to develop a sympathy vote
in the elections. However, there
is no indication of conservative
involvement or sign as yet that
it will significantly affect the
elections.
For the Democratic Social-
ist party (DSP), caught; in the
middle with a moderate but nebu-
lous program, the forthcoming
election is critical. Informed
observers believe that unless
the DSP adds substantially to
its 40 seats in the lower house,
it cannot survive. They believe
further that if the party does
increase its strength, which
is not at all certain, it will
probably do so at the ex-
pense of the Socialists in
the form of a protest
against the JSP's extremism.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
UAR-Jordan
Cairo and Damascus radios
are continuing their intensive
attacks on the Jordanian Govern-
ment for its responsibility in
the alleged murder of a Syrian
MIG-17 pilot following a forced
landing in Jordan. The UAR's
Middle East News Agency accuses
Sharif Nasir, King Husayn's
uncle, of being the murderer.
Heavy coverage was given the
pilot's funeral in Damascus
after Jordan returned his body
to Syria. The "martyr" has
been promoted posthumously to
flight captain,and eulogized in a
ceremony at Cairo University,
and a book about him is to be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
published. Jordan continues to
assert that he committed suicide.
The uproar over this issue
appears to have returned the
propaganda initiative to the
UAR, which had been at a disad-
vantage in propaganda exchanges
with Jordan since the assAssi-
nation of Jordanian Prime Min-.
ister Majalli. King Husayn's
allegation before the UN General
Assembly that the UAR had a
role in Majalli's assassination
apparently angered Nasir, who
in a homecoming statement in
Cairo castigated Husayn as a
Zionist tool. The UAR has sent
a note to the Arab League sec-
retariat protesting the King's
speech.
The UAR may also step up
its subversive activities::.,.,
against the Jordanian regime.
Meanwhile, among Jordan's troops
deployed in the border area,
the prolonged idleness and rear---
strictions:`'.imposed on bone leaves
reportedly are contributing to
a drop in morale.
are part of a plan for ultimate
diversion of the river.
Syrian troops in positions
which overlook the river have
thus far not tried to stop the
Israelis. The situation still
contains dangerous elements,
however, and the UAR, to fore-
stall criticism by Jordan and
possibly other Arab states, may
still feel compelled to take
some action.
Libya
King Idris is under strong
pressure to replace Prime Min-
ister Kubar and other cabinet
members as a'result of new mani-
festations of public and parlia-
mentary disapproval of corruption
in the government. After hearing
speeches by opposition deputies
in its meetings on 3 and 6 Octo-
ber, the House of Deputies on 10
October passed by an overwhelm-
ing vote a resolution demanding
cancellation of the government's
Fezzan Road contract and calling
for investigation of the scandal
by a parliamentary committee.
Israel-UAR
On 10 October, after a
week's postponement apparently
at the request of UN Secretary
General Hammarskjold, Israel
began dredging 300 meters of
the Jordan River channel south
of the Banat Yaqub bridge in
the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized
zone. The work has the approval
of the UN chairman of the Mixed
Armistice Commission, but the
UAR objects, believing--despite
Israeli claims to the contrary
--that the dredging operations
A majority of the deputies
went further by backing a reso-
lution for a vote of no confi-
dence; in line with Libyan con-
stitutional procedures, this
question will be debated at a
subsequent session scheduled for
18 October. In the 10 October
meeting, 20 deputies spoke
against the government; and
against Abdullah Abid Sanussi,
whose company holds the road con-
tract. The government; put pp no
defense; at one point, when Kubar
attempted to speak, he was ruled
out of order.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
If. the King.ignores Par_:
Iianleilii;' or' orders:.it dissolved
and continues support of Kubar,
he will risk a further build-
up of antigovernment pressures
endangering the monarchy it-
self.
Omani rebel leaders, with
headquarters in Dammam on the
Saudi Arabian Persian Gulf
Coast, are continuing their
efforts to train and equip an
"Omani expeditionary force"
which could eventually return
to "liberate" the country from
the rule of the British-backed
Sultan of Muscat and Oman.
Although the rebels are still
able to smuggle occasional ship-
ments of weapons through to
their supporters in inner Oman,
sniping and mining activities
there have diminished in recent
weeks: In Saudi Arabia, on the
other hand, the rebels are
gradually augmenting and train=
ing a force of several hundred.
Offices of the
"Imamate of Oman" in
Cairo and Damascus
have stepped up their
publication of propa- 25X1
ganda booklets; their
handouts get frequent
play in the radio and
press of the UAR, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia; and
they are pressing for
increased support from
all the Arab states.
Meanwhile, the
British, hoping to
avoid again becoming
involved in a major
military operation-
against the rebels,
have moved both to
strengthen the Sultan
and to maintain clan-
destine contacts with
rebel leaders. London
has little hope that these nego-
tiations will result in a settle-
ment in the foreseeable future
but considers them useful to
occupy the rebels. British
forces continue coastal patrols
against smuggling and periodic
military exercises in the inter--
rior -:to 'n'timjdats the :rebels.
Over the long term, however,
the British emphasize -they, expect
to win support for the Sultan
through implementation of a
development program. London
recently agreed to provide near-
ly $3,500,000 in capital costs
for the Sultan's army and air
force, $784,000 in capital costs
for development, and a recurrent 25X1
annual subsidy of $3,780,000,
which is more than double the
previous: Subsidy.
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Some French rightist oppo-'-
nernts of :De Gaulle's Algerian
policy now seem to be bidding
for broad foreign and domestic
support by aligning themselves
publicly with prominent individ-
uals who are worried by De
Gaulle's policies on NATO and
supranational European institu-
tions. Some of these rightists
are linked with plots to over-
throw the regime or efforts to
reverse De Gaulle's policy of
self-determination for Algeria.
The willingness of many
strongly nationalistici-deputies
to join in criticism of De
Gaulle's proposal for a French
nuclear striking force suggests
that their antipathy to his Al-
gerian program is leading them
to try to rally the broadest
possible opposition to the gov-
ernment. Jacques Soustelle re-
cently called publicly for more
integration of NATO forces as
part of his over-all program in
opposition to De Gaulle. He and
his friends have previously
said privately that the suc-
cessor regime they envisage
would be a much firmer US ally
than De Gaulle.
De Gaulle seems to be un-
usually concerned over the way
French public opinion on Algeria
seems to be drifting toward two
antithetical views--one favoring
outright independence--the other
calling for integration with
France. His pointed public
references to them during his
recent provincial tour indicates
his fear that they are handi-
capping his self-determination
policy.
expected to reciprocate.
and rightist toughs can be
later this month in protest a-
gainst the Algerian war. Some
elements among the students are 25X1
talking of a "bloody showdown,"
This polarization, evidenced
by leftist manifestoes and right-
ist countermanifestoes directed
toward French youth, will un-
doubtedly be accelerated by the
demonstrations which both Com-
munist and non-Communist stu-
dent organizations are planning
West Germany's cancellation
on 30 September of its 1961
interzonal trade agreement with
East Germany has aroused serious
misgivings among government and
party leaders in Bonn. Many
officials and Bundestag mem-
bers view the cancellation as
an ineffective countermeasure
to the recent East German traffic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
13 October 1960
restrictions in Berlin and fear
that it ultimately will enhance
the prestige of the East German
regime by necessitating new
trade negotiations on a govern-
ment-to-government basis.
Bonn apparently is retreat-
ing a little from its trade pact
decision and feels somewhat de-
fensive about it. Chancellor
Adenauer is reported to have
told members of his Chribtian
Democratic party (CDU) that he
was maneuvered into the move by
the Western Allies. He added,
however, that although the ac-
tion might lead to an improve-
ment of the international status
of East Germany, Bonn could not
afford to leave the whole burden
of taking countermeasures to the
Allies.
West Berlin Mayor Willy
Brandt is said to view the trade
pact cancellation as of doubt-
ful value and sees no possibili-
ty of effective Western action to
prevent a further deterioration
of,.~the ,situation in Berlin: -: He
stated that if Adenauer desired
to relieve the Allies of some
of their burden, he should have
moved to establish closer ties
with the Berlin government. This
could have been done by treat-
ing traffic to and from West
Berlin as actually traffic be-
tween two parts of the Federal
Republic, any interruption of
which would have resulted in
Bonn's cutting all East German
transit traffic in West Germany,
including the use of the ports
of Hamburg and Bremen.
Foreign Minister von Bren-
stated,
"These other Allies have grown
tired of the Berlin issue."
American Ambassador Whitney re-
ported after an interview on 7
October that Macmillan believes
the pressures on Berlin are not
serious at present; the ambas-
sador inferred that Britain was
not willing to apply any economic
sanctions at this time.
Belgian banks on 11 October
agreed to extend a five-year
credit of $8,000,000 to East
Germany, with a possible future
increase to $12,000,000. Belgium,
which has lost sizable markets
in the Congo and believes that
its NATO allies have not sup.--
ported it there, will probably
not be influenced by West Ger-
man protests.
East Germany appears to be
attempting to exploit a number
of these West German misgivings
on the trade agreement issue.
In an article on 9 October in
Neues Deutschland, Foreign Trade
Minister Rau a=ccred that any
new agreement would have to re-
flect the legal and factual sit-
uation,suggesting that East Ger-
many will attempt to secure the
reopening of negotiations on at
least the Foreign Trade Ministry
level. Moreover, in a Leipziger
Volkszeitung article oc-
oer, Rau contended--?in an obvi-
ous attempt to appeal to West-
ern businessmen and neutralists
--that any attempt to impose an
embargo on the bloc countries
would be "madness," since the
bloc would then develop its own
production and become a competi-
tor of Western businessmen.
Both Rau and Premier Grote-
wohl have strongly asserted that
Bonn's measures--if implemented
--would at most have only a
temporary adverse effect on the
regime's economy, evidently in
an effort to allay the reported
fears of East German foreign
trade and planning officials
who hold contrary views. Never-
theless, they have aLso recent-
ly called for special efforts
by East German enterprises to
expand production, which sug-
gests that the regime is less
confident of its ability to
stand up to a West German embar-
go than public statements allege.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In an apparent move to as-
sert its claim that West Berlin
is "in its territory," the East
German regime since 2 October
has ceased to issue transit per-
mits for certain shipments from
bloc countries to West Berlin.
The regime on 12 October an-
nounced that, under a ruling
not hitherto known to exist, it
reserves the right to refuse
permits "only if similar goods
of equal quality, offered by
East Germany, were rejected by
the West Berlin authorities as
an act of sabotage againstintra-
German 'trade." Although West
Berlin`: obtains only 1.4 per-
cent of its total imports from
the bloc, the East German ac-
tion is designed to underline
the regime's ability to isolate
West Berlin without further
notice.
Meanwhile, West Berlin
officials are concerned with
the recent increase in the number
of East Berliners and East Ger-
mans who work in the Western
sectors of Berlin. The increase
of more than 6,000 since 30 June
1960--for a total of almost 50,-
000--seems to be in response to
abundant work opportunities
rather than deliberate Commu-
nist political infiltration.
Berlin officials .:have
privately warned West Berlin
manufactures of the risks they
incur by permitting themselves
to become dependent on East
German labor.
British Labor party leader
Hugh Gaitskell seems in no im-
mediate danger of losing his
position despite his major-de-
feat on 5 October on defense
policies at the Labor party con-
ference. Because some 80 per-
cent of the local Labor con-
stituency representatives--the
political arm of the Labor move-
ment--endorsed his pro-NATO
policies at the conference,
Gaitskell will probably be re-
elected by a fairly large ma-
jority when the 255 Labor mem-
bers of Parliament--who are
predominantly moderates--or-
ganize for the beginning of
the new session early in No-
vember.
Faced with this endorse-
ment, the left-wingers led by
the transport workers' Frank
Cousins' are likely to continue
their agitation for unilateral
nuclear disarmament by Britain
but will bide their time on
trying to oust Gaitskell. Their
representation in the top party
hierarchy has been increased
by the election at the confer-
ence of Harry Nicholas, Cousin'
principal union assistant, as
party treasurer.
In the vote for new members
of the party's powerful 25-mem-
ber National Executive Committee,
two moderates were replaced by
proponents of unilateral disarma-
ment. Chairmanship of the com-
mittee goes this year by rota-
tion to leftist-inclined Richard
Crossman, whom Gaitskell dropped
from the "shadow" cabinet last
spring for his opposition to the
party's official defense state-
ment.
Gaitskell's tenure as party
leader depends largely on the
absence of any immediate alter-
native and will continue to be
precarious. His longer range
prospects will depend on the
positions taken by such moderates
as George Brown and James Callag-
han, who generally support Gait-
skell but feel that his leader-
ship has been a major factor in
the party's decline. Gaitskell's
chances may also be affected by
the tactical moves of "shadow"
chancellor of the Exchequer
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Harold Wilson, the leading con-
tender for election to Anelirin-
Deva.n's former. position,. as dep-
uty leader. of the, party in Par- .
liament . Now the favorite of the
left wing, Wilson may try to
broaden his support so that he
can seriously challenge {:'.Gait-
skell some timef':tin,the fu-
ture.
The radicals' success in get-
ting the conference to administer
the first major rebuff to the par-
ty leaders in the postwar period
will stimulate their heretofore
futile campaign to capture the
Labor party organization. The re- 25X1
sultant strife will further limit
Labor's effectiveness as a parlia-
mentary opposition.
The expected formation later-
this fall of a new national labor.
federation will complete the
breach in Finnish organized labor.
The regular Social Democrats
plan to form the new federation
to rival the Finnish Confedera-
tion of Trade Unions (SAK), now
controlled by a coalition of
dissident Social Democrats
(Skogists) and Communists. Last
May, after the Skogists and Com-
munists had gained control of
the SAK executive committee,
the regular Social Democratic
chairman resigned, and other
party regulars have since been
replaced by Skogists in almost
all the confederations _ execu-
tive posts.
Creation of the new organi-
zation will lead to labor unrest,
because the two politically
oriented federations will be
competing in most branches of
the labor market. The Social
Democratic organization will
initially be handicapped by its
relatively small membership--
perhaps 50,000-75,000 members,
as compared with the 150,000-
200,000 expected to remain in
SAK. Employers, although prob-
ably more sympathetic political-
ly to the new confederation,
prefer to deal with a strong
central labor organization. Tb
be prepared for the wage con-
tract negotiations this fall,
the regular Social Democrats
plan soon to announce formation
of the new organization in the
hope of affiliating immediately
a number of the unions already
out of SAK. A formal assembly
of the members will not take
place before late December.
The Skogist leaders in SAK
depend on support from the Com-
munists, who have so far re-
mained in the background and
have not fought Skogist moves
blocking them from executive
posts. At the same time, they
are consolidating their posi-
tion by refusing to agree to
admit additional unions which
might strengthen the position
of the Skogists. The Communists
probably expect that the steady
withdrawal of Social Democratic
unions will inevitably result
in shifting the balance of power
in their favor.
Finland's relations with
the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), of which SAK is a
member, may also be affected
by these developments. It ap-
pears likely that the affilia-
tion will be switched to the
new organization once it is
established, and the ICFTU chair-
man has already been approached
by various Social Democratic 25X1
leaders in regard to this
problem.
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JG(;Klr 1
Communist China, which
has pledged support for all na-
tional independence movements,
has directed particular atten-
tion toward Africa in this year
of emerging African states. In
seeking influence there, it en-
counters formidable competition
not only from Nationalist China,
which so far has been more suc-
cessful than Peiping in gaining
recognition from the new states,
but also from the UAR, which has
ambitions of its own for hegem-
ony over Africa. Peiping also
finds itself in disagreement
with Moscow over how best to
exploit the situation in Afri-
ca. Despite their limited ad-
vances to date, the Chinese
Communists feel they have paved
the way for increasing their
influence on the continent as
leftist African forces gain as-
cendancy.
Propaganda
In broadcasts and other
propaganda to Africa, Communist
China depicts itself as a fel-
low victim of past foreign ex-
ploitation, implying that its
progress since "liberation" is
a model for other new states.
The Chinese have concentrated
on "neo-colonialism" or US eco-
nomic aid,' which they warn is an at=
tempt by the US--,,,the most vicious
enemy"--to supplant the old
colonial powers. Timely prop-
aganda and mass rallies are de-
voted to special themes such
as "Quit Africa Day," "Congo
Day," and "Portuguese Africa
Day."
Peiping's effort involves
an ambitious and expanding pro-
gram of broadcasts to Africa
in English, French, Portuguese,
and Arabic. In addition, Can-
tonese-language broadcasts are
directed toward Chinese minori-
ties, which number about 6,000
in South Africa, 5,000 in the
Malagasy Republic, and 16,000
on Mauritius.
Peiping is also trying to
enlist African talent, and may
be contemplating broadcasts in
African tongues. Three Zanzibar
residents were recently brought
to China to train as broadcast-
ors.,
Peiping frequently finances
such trips and then prompts its
African guests to make anti-US
remarks which it can quote in
its propaganda. The Chinese
have offered scholarships to
students from Guinea, Ghana,
Cameroun, and the Somali Repub-
lic.
Large quantities of Chinese
Communist publications are re-
portedly available in Zanzibar
bookshops, and increasing num-
bers have been appearing in Sen-
egal and Guinea. Peiping has
also moved to expand the activ-
ities of its New China News
Agency (NCNA) in Africa. NCNA
offices have been set up in
Morocco and Ghana, and one is
planned for Guinea. The head
of the NCNA office in Paris
visited the Congo shortly after
it attained independence and
said consideration was being
given to opening an office there
after the situation quiets down.
On the "people's diplomacy"
level, a Chinese-African Peo-
ple's Friendship Association was
formed in April 1960 to promote
cultural contacts with Africa.
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A local friendship association
was set up in the Congo in July
during the visit of the NCNA
Paris representative. Touring
dance ensembles and opera
troupes from Peiping are used
to arouse popular interest in
China; an acrobatic troupe, for
example, recently concluded a
seven-month tour of Sudan, Guin-
ea, Morocco, and Ethiopia. The
activities of such groups are
not, however, limited to on-
stage performances--a Chinese
Moslem delegation devoted its
recent nine-day visit to the
Somali Republic almost entirely
to the cultivation of opposition
parties.
The Afro-Asian movement
affords Peiping a potentially
valuable vehicle for enhancing
its prestige and influence in
Africa. The scope for maneu-
ver, however, is often circum-
scribed by Nasir and other neu-
tralists who are ambitious to
extend their own influences in
the movement. The Chinese Com-
munist representative on the
Permanent Secretariat of the
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
Organization in Cairo led a
drive in 1959 to discredit the
incumbent UAR secretary general,
and at the organization meeting
in Conakry in April of this
year the Chinese delegation
made a strong but unsuccessful
effort to depose the secretary
general and move the secretari-
at from Cairo.
Communist China sent the
largest delegation to the Con-
akry meeting and made a strong
bid to inject its bitter hos-
tility toward the US into the
"national liberation struggle."
Peiping's heavy-handed approach
turned out to be self-defeating,
however, and even the bloc-ori-
ented President of Guinea
rebuked those who brought to
Africa "their quarrels and dif-
ferences."
Peiping is also a member
of the Afro-Asian Economic Or-
ganization, an informal group-
ing of chambers of commerce.
In this organization, as in the
Solidarity Organization, Peiping
has been only partially success-
ful in projecting its influence.
At the second Afro-Asian econom-
ic conference in Cairo in April
and May 1960, Peiping fought un-
successfully to get the USSR
and the five Central Asian So-
viet republics admitted to mem-
bership. Here again it clashed
with the UAR. After the UAR
Withdrew its initial support
for the proposal, the session
became the occasion for angry
exchanges between the Chinese
and UAR delegates.
Recognition
The quest for broader in-
ternational recognition and the
concomitant undercutting of Tai-
pei's international standing
are major motivations in Com-
munist China's campaign in Afri-
ca. It has been quick to ac-
cord recognition to new states,
in some cases taking this step
before the date of actual inde-
pendence. However, none of the
16 states which have gained in-
dependence this year has recog-
nized Peiping. Togo, Cameroun,
Senegal, Mali, the Malagasy
Republic, and the Congo Repub-
lic (former French), which were
recognized by both Communist and
Nationalist China, chose Taipei,
and the Nationalists stand a
good chance of gaining recogni-
tion from other former French
territories.
However, several of the new
states apparently believe they
can recognize both Peiping and
Taipei. When '' faced with
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Country having formal
diplomatic relations
with Nationalist China
Country having formal
diplomatic relations
with Communist China
ALGERIA
MALI
(SOUDAN)
Country that has become
independent in 1960
objections to a "two Chinas"
policy from both the Communists
and the Nationalists, at least
some will probably opt for Pei-
ping. Moreover, the present
moderate governments of some
of the new states may in time
be replaced by forces more re-
ceptive to Communist overtures.
Peiping is probably gratified
that three of the new African
members (Nigeria, Senegal, and
Mali) voted in its favor and
the rest abstained on the re-
cent UN General Assembly vote
on the moratorium on Chinese
Communist membership.
Only five African states
have recognized Communist China:
Egypt, the first Arab or Afri-
can state to do so, in May 1956;
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
KENYA
UAR
(EGYPT)
OF THE CONGO RUANDA
URUNDI
FEDERATION OFD
RHODESIA ANDS
_ .../\ NYASALAND
Morocco, in October 1958; Sudan,
in November 1958, almost three
years after Peiping accorded
recognition and after strong
Chinese Nationalist competition;
Guinea, in October 1959, a year
after Peiping extended recog-
nition; and Ghana, which claimed
to have inherited recognition
from Britain when it attained in-
dependence in 1957, in July 1960.
Agreement was reached with the
Algerian rebel government in May
1960 for setting up a diplomatic
post in Peiping, which had recog-
nized the rebel regime almost two
years before. The Algerian rep-
resentative and his staff were
killed in August in a plane crash
en route to the new post, and a
replacement has not yet been
named,
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It(,KL !'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Chinese Communist trade
with Africa has been slight,
remaining since 1957 around
$100,000,000 annually--about
half of which is with the UAR.
The exchange involves Chinese
light industrial goods--plus
tea to Morocco--for basic com-
modities such as wool, cotton,
fertilizer, and other raw ma-
terials.
The importance of this
trade for China lies in its
potential for promoting Pei-
ping's political position in
Africa. Peiping has pushed the
establishment of trade offices
in nonbloc countries as the
first major step toward diplo-
matic recognition. It signed
a trade pact with Morocco in
October 1957, hoping it would
promote interest in China. Af-
ter Morocco announced recogni-
tion "in principle" in Septem-
ber 1958, the Chinese Commu-
nists quickly sent a high-
level trade delegation to push
for full recognition, which
came the next month.
There is a potential for
trade expansion, although some-
what limited by distances in-
volved and the inability of
China to provide a large quan-
tity of industrial goods. A
trade pact signed with Guinea
during President Tourd's visit
last month to Peiping calls for
an annual exchange of almost
$10,000,000 in goods--some 10
percent of Guinea's foreign
trade. The Chinese will be
receptive to opportunities for
similar trade agreements with
the other new states of Africa.
While the Chinese are in
no position to extend aid to
Africa on the scale of the So-
viet outlay, Peiping is alive
to the political gains that can
accrue from an assistance pro-
gram. Guinea--again the target
of Peiping's first major effort
--received a $25,000,000 inter-
est-free credit during Tourd's
visit. Because of its inability
to extend sizable credits to all,
Communist China will probably
continue with smaller scale, eas-
ily implemented projects that
have a high utility and there-
fore a high psychological impact.
Along this line, China be-
fore the recent agreements had
sent rice agronomists to Guinea.
Similarly, Peiping last winter
sent tea-growing experts to
Morocco. The Chinese pleased
their hosts by declaring cer-
tain areas there suitable for
tea cultivation, after UN in-
vestigators had given an un-
favorable report. To Sudan, Pei-
ping has offered to give Chinese-
made short-wave radiotransmitters,
aware of the value underdeveloped
countries place on possession of
these prestige items.
Reflection 'of SinoSoviet 'Rift
The differences between
Peiping and Moscow on the best
strategy for exploiting the op-
portunities in Africa derive in
part from their differing as-
sessment of the possibilities
for early revolution there and
in part from the status, or lack
of status, which the two regimes
have on the international diplo-
matic scene. The Chinese be-
lieve there is an "unprecedent-
edly favorable" situation now
for revolutions in colonial and
semicolonial areas and that
Africa is a key area for turn-
ing the balance of international
forces against the West by mil-
itant methods, including revolu-
tionary violence. At the same
time, they are not constrained--
as is the USSR--by diplomatic
negotiations with the West, bi-
laterally and in the UN.
Chinese discussions of "na-
tional liberation" movements thus
assume a more aggressive note than
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
those of the Soviet Union.
While professing adherence to
the principle of peaceful co-
existence, the Chinese argue
that peace can be assured only
by the destruction of im-
perialism, and that "just wars"
against imperialism should be
encouraged and supported. In
the specific case of Algeria,
Peiping has been in obvious
disagreement with the Soviet
Union over such encouragement
and support.
In contrast, the Russians
feel the situation in most
African countries is not ripe
for revolutionary action, and
they are less willing than
Peiping apparently is to accept
the risk that such action may
rapidly develop into major war.
The example of Soviet economic
progress and a program of
trade, aid, and political sup-
port for the governments
are major factors in Moscow's
plans for raising the pres-
tige of revolutionary movements
and promoting the acceptance
of Communism in Africa. It
recognizes that strong national-
ist and anti-imperialist feeling
cannot automatically be har--
nessed in support of a Communist
revolution, and for the present
it is content to exploit these
feelings to undercut the West.
Nevertheless, when the
USSR sees a "national liberation
movement", such as that in the
Congo, which it believes:can
immediately be turned to its
advantage, it:rushes in with
strong propaganda and diplo-
matic support and material aid.
As Pravda put it on 26
August, the national bourgeoisie
must assume the initial leader-
ship in the liberation struggle.
It scored "doctrinairians" who
"sniff "at this form of nation-
al liberation movement--as ex-
emplified by present govern-
ments in India, Indonesia, the
UAR, and Iraq--just because
they are of a democratic and
not a socialistic character.
The typical Chinese rejoinder
evidences Peiping's impatience
with Moscow's gradualist strat-
egy. People's Daily on 30 Aug-
ust expressed dismay at the com-
rades who applauded liberation
movements led by the bourgeoisie
while disregarding the "anti-
imperialist struggles of the
masses of revolutionary people."
The disagreement with Mos-
cow apparently turns around the
length of time during which
cooperation with the national
bourgeoisie will be toler-
ated. The Russians argue that
in Africa the struggle for some
time to come will be against
"medieval remnants" rather than
capitalism, and therefore
"lengthy cooperation" with the
bourgeoisie is necessary.
Moscow has indicated a lack of
complete satisfaction with
nationalist leaderships, but
where it feels there is no other
choice it is prepared to bide
its time; Peiping apparently
is not.
Moscow feels that it is
necessary first to build up its
influence through economic ties,
and only later, when Communist
parties develop and are stronger,
to take control through action
of local Communists. Peiping's
inability to provide extensive
aid may in part account for its
more impatient attitude.
The expense-paid trips to
China show that the Chinese are
not insensible to the need for
courting non-Communist African
leaders. Peiping, moreover,
has never gone to the extent
of naming the nationalist lead-
ers it feels are ready for.re-
placement. It continues to in-
sist, however, that Communist
countries should give more
active support to revolutionary
forces not yet represented in
today's African governments.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Chinese have prompted
African visitors to China to
say that new African states
should all adopt a policy of
"'self-reliance," bolstered of
course by "friendly" foreign
aid. A nationalist from South-
West Africa, in a broadcast from
Peiping in August, made an ob-
lique reference to Sino-Soviet
JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS
The Japanese Government
is moving quickly to carry out
limited economic and technical
assistance to the R,yukyus with
in a framework authorized by
the US High Commissioner for
the islands. This approach,
conceived by the Kishi govern-
ment in 1958, is Tokyo's attempt
to resolve the conflict between
Japanese and Ryukyuan desires
for reversion of the islands to
Japan, on the one hand, and
American retention of full ju-
risdiction, on the other.
The Japanese have never
really diverted their attention
from the Ryukyuan question since
a protest vote against US land
policies resulted in the elec-
tion of a pro-Communist mayor
of Naha in late 1956. Periodi-
cally, issues have arisen which
rekindled Japanese demands for
greater authority in the Ryukyus.
Prominent among these was the
proposed revision by the US
Civil Administration for the
Ryukyus (USCAR) of the
Ryukyuan penal code, which
the Japanese contend is onerous
rivalry in Africa; without
specifically mentioning the
USSR, he affirmed that Com-
munist China was the most
effective world leader against
colonialism and that China a-
lone should be regarded as
the savior of the Africans.
and discriminatory. There
have been disputes over per-
sonal liability claims result-
ing from the crash of an
American jet fighter in mid-
1959.
Relatively inactive but
potentially dangerous issues
include the question of greater
self-government for the Ryukyus,
symbolized principally by a
desire for the..popular election
of the chief executive; the
introduction of nuclear
weapons; the acquisition of
additional land for missile
sites; and controls over labor
organizations, especially those
including employees of the
government and US security
forces.
The Japanese and Ryukyuan
governments have been seeking
the agreement of US officials
to a US-Japanese-Ryukyuan coun-
cil which would constitute a
formal mechanism for handling
matters of mutual concern. The
United States however, has
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1960
agreed, only to ad hoc consulta-
tion on cooperation in carry-
ing out individual projects,
although the Japanese Govern-
ment has for some ' time main-
tained a small liaison office
in Naha, Okinawa.
Educational Program
The government of the
Ryukyu Islands (GRI), an in-
digenous apparatus.; closely
supervised by USCAR, wants the
broadest possible assistance
from Japan. It believes, as
does Tokyo, that the Ryukyus
must be given a standard of
education equal to Japan's
and based on the Japanese
system. The GRI points out
that many of the 6,000 Ryukyuan
teachers in elementary and high
schools. were only partially
trained when they were employed
at the end of World War II and
that they remain below par but
cannot be discharged because of
tenure rights.
At GRI initia-
tive and following
discussions with
USCAR officials, the
Japanese Government
last year began an
in-service teacher-
training program,
Under this program,
financed mainly ~,by
Japan but partly
by the GRI, 24 Japa-.
nese consultants se-
lected from among .
teachers, principals,
and the staffs of
local boards of edu-
cation and the Edu-
cation Ministry
were sent to the
Ryukyus for six
months to give class-
room demonstrations
and specialized
guidance to teachers
in elementary and
junior high schools.
Japan also undertook
to train 43 Ryukyuan
teachers in Japan
for six months.
The GRI contends that
the program has been not only
highly effective, but ex-
tremely popular; there is, in
fact, some indication that this
and other Japanese programs
have lessened Ryukyuan concern
that tide United States might
attempt to annex the islands or
otherwise detach them completely
from Japan.
USCAR initially refused
to renew the program for 1960
but relented after Tokyo con-
tended that the Diet had already
approved the government's budg-
et', request for renewal. and that
AN
OKINAW
,
TIC
TAIWAN / R `~ aKMIYAKO
I . 4 ISHIG/ KI
IRIOMOTE v,5? P mILES 200
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
cancellation would have serious
political consequences in Japan.
The new program is less ambi-
tious, and Foreign Minister
Kosaka has stated that his gov-
ernment will screen out leftist
teacher consultants and in-
struct those approved to avoid
political statements and activi-
ties.
Kosaka has indicated that
Japan does not contemplate a
formal educational consultants'
program in 1961. Tokyo never.
theless is seeking USCAR ap-
proval for a broadened program
of educational assistance for
the fiscal year beginning next
April. The Education Ministry's
budget request for this pur-
pose totals $480,000.
Included in the draft pro-
gram are scholarships for
Ryukyuan students to attend
Japanese high schools, univer-
sities, and medical and dental
schools; an exchange of pro-
fessors between Japan and the
Ryukyu University; a summer
program of in-service training
for Ryukyuan teachers; a new
dormitory near Tokyo especially
for Ryukyuan students; and a
loan fund for students attend-
ing Ryukyuan'schools. Addi-
tional educational projects
will probably be listed in the
budget request.
Iriomote Development
A USCAR plan to develop
the sparsely settled, heavily
forested island of Iriomote,
in the southern Ryukyus, to en-
able large numbers of Okinawans
to resettle there brought forth
a request by the Kishi govern-
ment in 1959 to participate in
the program. The Japanese were
permitted to explore the agri-
cultural and irrigation po-
tential, and USCAR undertook to
investigate mineral and fishery
resources, road and power de-
velopment, and the potential
for land reclamation and com-
mercial lumbering. The surveys,
to which USCAR contributed
$100,000 and Japan $12,000,
were completed earlier this year.
USCAR '3 ' plan'., to have
the GRI sell land in Iriomote
to settlers has created fric-
tion with Tokyo concerning the
disposition of public lands--
in Iriomote as well as else-
where in the Ryukyus--over which
the Japanese still claim tech-
nical ownership. Tokyo insists
that the lands be leased, where-
as USCAR contends that by the 1:9,52
US-Japanese peace treaty, Japan re-
linquish jurisdiction' offer their.:
disposition. USCAR also points
out that funds derived from the
sale or lease of public lands
are placed in a special account
which heretofore has been used
only to maintain Japanese-owned
buildings and other property in
the Ryukyus. The Ikeda govern-
ment has grudgingly acceded to
USCAR's plan but has reserved
its final position.
Other Programs
The Japanese Government
has drafted programs to provide
pensions to Ryukyuan veterans
of the World War II Japanese
Army or their survivors; to ex-
tend relief to Okinawan victims
of the war; and to redeem Japan's
pre-1945 obligations under the
nationwide postal savings and
insurance systems. These pro-
grams, which ultimately would
affect perhaps 400,000 persons--
almost half the population of
the islands--will serve to alert
a broad segment of the Ryukyuan
people to Tokyo's more active
interest in their affairs.
Some aspects of these plans
may not be completely salutary
from the Japanese viewpoint.
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For example, based on pre-1945
valuations of the Japanese cur-
rency, the postal redemption
obligations amount to $82,000,-
000, but they amount to only
$229,000 in terms of present
values. Because the US dollar
has replaced the Japanese yen
as the medium of exchange in
the Ryukyus, the settlement
presumably would represent a
loss of foreign exchange for
Japan. Although a final con-
version rate is yet to be de-
cided, Tokyo is inclining
strongly toward a settlement
which would average about one
dollar per claim--a move not
likely to arouse enthusiasm
among the claimants.
Also during 1961, Japan
contemplates rehabilitating its
leprosarium facilities, at an
estimated cost of perhaps $400,-
000, to accommodate up to 1,000
Ryukyuan lepers. Japanese doc-
tors also may be sent to re-
mote Ryukyuan villages at the
joint expense of the Japanese
and Ryukyuan governments. A
model farm and technical aid
projects in forestry and fish-
eries are among other programs
under consideration. Total
Japanese Government assistance
to the Ryukyus in fiscal 1961
is tentatively estimated at
$1,600,000.
The idea of the islands'
eventual reversion to Japan is
widely endorsed throughout
Japan and the Ryukyus, but it
does not appear to be a burn-
ing issue at present. Although
the Japanese assistance pro-
grams for the time being prob-
ably have allayed sentiment in
Japan for reversion of the is-
lands, there is some indication
that Tokyo's quest of a role in
the Ryukyus, however limited,
has been greater than is nec-
essary to accomplish this pur-
pose.
The two major Ryukyuan
political parties, the conserva-
tive Okinawa Liberal-Democratic
party and the middle-of-the-
road Okinawa Socialist Masses
party, have appealed to Japan's
Liberal-Democratic party (LDP)
and Democratic Socialist party,
respectively, for moral and
material support in the campaign
for the Ryukyuan legislative
election in November, but there
has been little response. A
large factor in the attitude
of the Japanese parties is that
they themselves are facing gen-
eral elections in November, but
in addition the ruling LDP's new
election platform has eliminated
the party's previous call for
speedy return of Japanese admin-
istrative rights in the Ryukyus
as well as mention of the US-
Japanese-Ryukyuan liaison coun-
cil.
Japanese leftists, however,
appear to be more active on the
Ryukyuan scene. The Okinawan
People's party reportedly is un-
der the operational guidance
and control of the Japanese Com-
munists, who provide it with
$550 to $600 monthly, On the oth-
er hand, when Sohyo, Japan's
leftist labor federation, made
a systematic attempt last Jan-
uary to establish ties with
Okinawan unions,'the reaction of
Ryukyuan labor leaders, still pre-
occupied with internal ;problems,
was unenthusiastic.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The new Ecuadorean Govern-
ments informal denunciation of
the Rio Protocol of 1942, which
provided for the settlement of
the Peruvian-Ecuadorean bound-
ary dispute, has revived bitter
animosity between the two coun-
tries and could lead to a series
of clashes along the frontier.
Both Peru and Ecuador insist,
however, that they have no in-
tention of resorting to armed
force except in self-defense.
Ecuadorean President Velas-
co, who began his fourth term
on 1 September, has
publicly declared--
both before and since
his inauguration--that
the Rio Protocol is
null and void. For-
eign Minister Chiri-
boga has made similar
statements, one of
tnem past monin curing
presentation of Ecua-
dor's position before
the UN General Assem-
bly.
makes no provision
for a unilateral re-
nunciation by one of
the signatories. In
any case, formal re-
pudiation, the logical
corollary step which
Ecuador apparently
The extreme position taken
by Ecuador could threaten the
11th inter-American conference,
postponed from early 1960 and
now set for Quito in March 1961.
Peru considered boycotting the
conference in 1960 if the bound-
ary dispute was to be discussed,
and is likely to do so in 1961
in the event Ecuador formally
denounces the protocol, insists
on placing the issue on
the agenda of the meeting,
or continues its inflammatory
pronouncements on the prob-
lem.
Disputed area claimed by Ecuador and ceded to Peru
by the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol
31391
plans to take at a propitious
moment, would require diplomat-
ic notes to Peru and the guar-
antor powers under the protocol
--the United States, Brazil,
Argentina, and Chile. Velasco,
however, seems to be thinking
in broader than: diplomatic
terms and has indicated he
intends to carry his campaign
for "justice" for Ecuador's
territorial aspirations'' "to the
people of the Americas." Re-
treat from this position does
not now seem politically feasi-
ble.
History of the Dispute
The dispute concerns por-
tions of the Amazon basin--still
an unpopulated and economically
unimportant area--and dates from
the early 19th century when Ecua-
dor and Peru attained their in-
dependence. The two countries
still maintain inflexible posi-
tions on the controversy--
positions which they consider
synonymous with national
honor and patriotism. Their
sUbmission:iof,the ,di pute to
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arbitration by the King of
Spain in 1887 was the one
serious attempt at settlement
prior to 1942, but the award
was deferred for several years
and was never implemented be-
cause of Ecuador's violent ob-
jection to the decision. The
territorial division tentative-
ly allowed followed lines simi-
lar to the demarcation set forth
in the Rio Protocol of 1942,
which was highly favorable to
Peru's claims,
Various efforts subsequent
to 1887 failed to achieve a
settlement, and there were
sporadic border clashes which
in 1941 expanded into a short,
undeclared war. Peru, which
had superior armed forces, in-
vaded Ecuador and was occupy-
ing two of its southern prov-
inces: at the time hostilities
were suspended later in the
year.
At the American foreign
mi.niste?s' meeting in Rio de
Janerio in January 1942,the
"Protocol of Peace, Friendship,
and Boundaries" was signed
providing for the withdrawal
of Peruvian troops from Ecuador
and outlining the general bound-
ary demarcation. The United
States, Brazil, Argentina,
and Chile, which persuaded the
warring nations to reach a
settlement and were signatories
along with the disputants, be-
came the guarantor powers of
the treaty, agreeing to assist
in implementing its provisions
until "a definitive demarcation
of frontiers between Ecuador
and Peru has been completed."
A mixed boundary commis-
sion proceeded to carry out the
demarcation, and by 1947 only
about 60 miles in two zones
remained undelineated: the
small and noncritical Lagarto-
cocha segment in the extreme
northeastern part of Ecuador
and the sector between the
Santiago and Zamora rivers in
the southeast, which still has
a strip of about 50 miles with-
out boundary markers and is the
real focus of conflict.
These two areas were subject
to arbitral award by the noted
Brazilian geographer Braz Diaz
de Aguiar--whose decisions have
been partly or wholly contested
by Ecuador on grounds of sub-
sequently discovered geographi-
cal information. The demarca-
tion of the Santiago-Zamora
sector, which the Rio Protocol
delineated by the watershed,
has been complicated by the
existence of a second watershed
revealed by a US aerial survey
in 1946, a discovery on which
Ecuador has based its refusal
to proceed with the final de-
marcation.
Issues at Stake
Ecuador's legal position
until recently was premised
essentially on the inapplicabil-
ity of the provision governing
the Santiago-Zamora sector be-
cause of the existence of two
watersheds instead of one.
Ecuador had not overtly chal-
lenged the validity of the
treaty, although it frequently
asserted that the division of
territory was inequitable. Its
real motive has been to block
final demarcation in order to
gain eventual territorial con-
cessions from Peru. It partic-
u.lar:ly,, wants direct access
to the Amazon River via the
Maranon River--which would re-
quire at least a broad revision
of the protocol.
Ecuador's most convincing
argument is that the protocol
was signed under duress when
two of its provinces were oc-
cupied by Peruvian troops--
"with a knife at our throats;'
as Ecuadorean politicians claim
--and that it was highly favor-
able to Peru. Ecuadorean
leaders insist that their na-
tion's "soul" is tied to the
Amazon, and their claims can-
not be renounced.
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Peru's equally inflexible
position is essentially that
the Rio Protocol is a valid in-
ternational agreement; that the
discovery of the second water-
shed in the Santiago-Zamoro
sector does not affect the
boundary at all or the undemar-
cated sector in any material
way; that the Diaz de Aguiar
awards are binding and must be
accepted by both parties; and
that the boundary commission
should proceed with demarcation
of the final disputed sector.
Peru believes that Ecuador's
position is a legalistic ruse
to abrogate or substantially
alter the protocol and gain
direct access to the Amazon
River.
A number of suggestions
for overcoming the present im-
passe have received some con-
sideration by the guarantor
powers or by the disputants
themselves. These suggestions
--which include aerial survey
of the Santiago-Zamora zone,
arbitration, submission of the
issue to the International
Court of Justice, and improve-
ment of bilateral relations--
seem, if anything, to have in-
tensified the mutual suspicions
of Peru and Ecuador,
Political Considerations
Any cool, rational ap-
proach to a settlement seems
virtually impossible. The
frontier question arouses
nationalistic sentiments among
all politically articulate
groups in both countries. In-
termittent border clashes since
1942 have deepened the hatreds
in each country, and the press
and politicians on both sides
have consistently taken a
chauvinistic stand on the issue.
The political careers of
the two incumbent )Presidents
are intimately connected with
the dispute. Velasco was in
exile from Ecuador at the time
the protocol was signed,and
later overthrew the government
which was the signatory. Dema-
gogic by nature and quick to
exploit any issue to promote
his personal popularity and
mass appeal, he now seems bent
on making his niche in history
as the renouncer of the Rio Pro-
tocol and, ipso facto, Ecuador's
modern hero.
Peru's Prado, on the other
hand, was serving his first
term as President when the war
broke out with Ecuador in 1941
and is unlikely to entertain
any proposed modification of
his country's stand, particular-
ly in view of Peru's superior
armed forces and Velasco's in-
formal denunciation of the pro-
tocol. Highly incensed by
Velasco's position, he recently
advised US Charge Neal that he
blames the United States for
blocking a joint declaration by
the guarantor powers reaffirm-
ing the validity of the proto-
col, and he categorically stated
that Peru had no intention of
attending the Quito conference
under present circumstances.
The Outlook
The sentiment in each coun-
try is so explosive on the prob-
lem that the granting of even a
minor concession by either govern-
ment to promote a settlement
would probably threaten its
stability. All guarantor powers
have displayed grave concern
over the latest Ecuadorean po-
sition on the treaty and are
attempting to prevent a formal
repudiation; some other Latin
American countries have also
expressed their concern.
With virtually no prospect
for any constructive progress
on the dispute, the outlook for
the OAS conference in Quito is
clouded. Latin American Com-
munists, in line with their
continuing efforts to under-
mine the prestige and effective-
ness of the OAS, were making
plans to disrupt the inter-Amer-
ican conference in 1960, and
will probably attempt to sur-
round the meeting in 1961 with
an atmosphere of violence by
exploiting Ecuadorean national-
ist feelings on the boundary
dispute,
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