CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
DOCUmFNT NO.
F 1pEA31 At
cap
Nov.
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
N? CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: Md-A&
RUTH: HR 70-2 _
DATE: REVIEWER:
Z 5 MAY 1980
COPY NO.
OCR NO- 4901/60
27 October 1960
DIA review(s)
completed.
25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
~ 'ftw. CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
While continuing to attack Western policies on dis-
armament, nuclear testing, and Berlin, Moscow has initi-
ated moves designed to set the stage for a new effort at
General Assembly session in March or April to be at-
tended by the heads of government. The bloc has also
moved to establish a deadline on the nuclear test ban
talks and to bring the issue before the UN General
summit meeting on Berlin by April at the latest. At the
UN the bloc delegations are apparently preparing to walk
out of the disarmament discussion in the Political Com-
mittee and launch an intensified campaign for a special
negotiations on these issues. Khrushchev repeated
his call for
Assembly.
Che Guevara has departed for the Sino-Soviet bloc
with an economic mission to arrange for next year's trade
and further integrate Cuba economically with the bloc.
Soviet bloc military specialists continue active in Cuba
and many more will be required to train Cubans in the
use of bloc military equipment. While most Latin Ameri-
can governments believe the new US restrictions on ex-
ports to Cuba were justified, there has been strong
criticism by Chile and Mexico. The Castro regime, at
least for the moment, has increased its popularity among
the lower classes through the urban reform law. Scat-
tered opposition groups, however, continue active inside
Cuba despite the regime's denials. In the Dominican
Republic, a further weakening of Trujillo's position
is evidenced in the poor turnout for his birthday
demonstration on 24 October and in the worsening
economic situation.
Page 4
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Fighting has resumed in southeastern Phong Saly
Province, apparently as the result of Laotian Government
efforts to retake two posts lost earlier to the Pathet
Lao. Persistent but still unsubstantiated rumors are
current that Captain Kong Le's paratroopers are prepar-
ing to resume attacking Phoumi's forces southeast of
Pak Sane,
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART I (continued)
Souvanna's recent movement toward
a more openly anti-Communist position could conceivably
incline Kong Le toward such action.
SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Events appear to be moving in Lumumba's favor.
Colonel Mobutu is confronted with growing disorders in
the armed forces and political opposition in at least
two provinces. Mobutu's major difficulty, however, is
with the UN Command in Leopoldville. For its part, the
UN has been unable to discover a local government which
would have significant Congolese support and satisfy the
demands for "legitimacy" on the part of Ghana, Guinea,
UAR, and Morocco.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE:CONTINUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Preparatory committees are reported to have been work-
ing for some weeks in Moscow on a resolution to be present-
ed to the meeting of world Communist parties--scheduled
to be held around 7 November--which has been called to
consider the Sino-Soviet dispute. Recent authoritative
statements from both parties have reaffirmed their basic
positions and add to indications that they will find it
difficult to resolve their conflicting views.
USSR PURCHASING LARGE FREE-WORLD TANKERS . . . . . . . . . Page 3
To ensure the long-term growth and stability of its
petroleum exports, the Soviet Union is making a major of--
fort to expand its relatively small and slow tanker fleet
by purchasing large, modern tankers in the free world.
Russian crews have taken possession of two such vessels
recently constructed in Japan and the Netherlands, and
the USSR is negotiating with Italy for six or seven
large tankers. The expansion of the USSR's oil exports---
dramatized this year by a commitment to supply all Cuban
needs--has required substantial readjustments in Soviet
tanker operations.
THE CASE OF COMRADE LARIONOV--A LESSON FOR SOVIET
PACE SETTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The personal tragedy of central committee member
Aleksey Nikolayevich Larionov has a distinctly Soviet
SECRET
ii
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET ~.r
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
PART II (continued)
twist and is symptomatic of the great pressures generated
by this year's agricultural difficulties. Larionov, the
party boss of Ryazan Oblast, had been singled out for
praise by Khrushchev at the December 1959 party plenum
for his accomplishments in agriculture. By the time of
his death in late September, he was in official disfavor,
apparently for failing to fulfill the extravagant pledges
for his oblast,to which Khrushchev had pointed as an ex-
ample for all.
UNCERTAINTY IN PEIPING OVER FUTURE ECONOMIC MOVES . . . . Page 5
The Communist regime in Peiping appears worried over
the state of the Chinese economy and uncertain over what
to do about it. Peiping's comments on industrial achieve-
ments so far this year have been uncommonly vague, but the
major troubles are clearly in agriculture, which Peiping
admits is still progressing too slowly. For the second
straight year the harvest in China will be poor, and this
will have an adverse effect on food supplies and the
level of exports.
GHANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Frustrations experienced by Ghanaian President
Nkrumah in his attempts to promote his pan-African am-
bitions appear to be influencing him to adopt an
increasingly less friendly posture toward the West and
to welcome wider contacts and tactical collaboration
with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, new emphasis by
Ghanaian leaders on the "transition to socialism" in
Ghana seems likely to reduce established Western
economic interests and to provide new opportunities
for the bloc to exploit.
SECRET
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
PART II (continued)
BRITISH EAST AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Political activity looking toward independence is
increasing in the four British-controlled territories of
East Africa. Elections in Zanzibar are scheduled for
January and in Kenya and Uganda for February, but progress
toward self-government continues to be hampered by racial
tension, tribalism, and squabbles among African politi-
cians. A constitutional convention for Tanganyika, the
most advanced of the four, is set for March, and Julius
Nyerere, the territory's newly appointed chief minister,
25X1
all the t- erritories become independent.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
UAR-Jordanian relations appear to be moving into a
more critical phase and may involve a UAR-sponsored at--
tempt to overthrow the Husayn regime.
The Sudanese military
government's handling of the problem of resettlement
of some 50,000 inhabitants of the Wadi Halfa area who
are to be displaced by construction of the Aswan High
Dam has resulted in riots and has added to pressures
for a return to civilian rule. Shifts in the government
of the oil-producing Persian Gulf state of Qatar are only
temporary adjustments in a,.factional struggle there.
THE TURKISH POLITICAL TRIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Turkey's mass political trial has failed either to
gain momentum or to capture popular enthusiasm. There
has been general criticism of the relatively minor
character of the charges, designed mostly to ridicule
leaders of the former regime, which have been presented
thus far, although 38 of the 500 prisoners face possible
death sentences for other offenses. While the regime
is becoming more sensitive to adverse domestic reaction
and foreign criticism, it. still seems determined to re-
move any possible threat to its existence from the
leaders of the previous government. J25X1
125X6
SECRET
iv
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
~~.TIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
41
27 October 1960
PART II (continued)
has warmly approved the prime minister's announcement
that Canada intends to maintain amicable relations with
Cuba.
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
President Frondizi's steps to meet some of the
Argentine Army's demands for changes among his advisers
and policies have greatly eased the political crisis,
but some time will be required to resolve the various
complaints ranging from inefficiency in the state oil
company to pro-Peronista and Communist activities.
Frondizi kept intact the economic team responsible
for the US-backed stabilization program, but made some
conciliatory changes in army appointments. His new
committee to channel military complaints and a special
commission to investigate Communist activities are al-
ANTIGOVERNMENT' VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
As a result of antigovernment student disturbances
in Venezuela between 19 and 26 October, the armed forces
are on an alert status and President Betancourt's three-
party coalition has come under severe strain. The
leftist Democratic Republic Union party, long a dis-
satisfied component of the coalition, was partly in-
volved in the violence, and its representatives in the
cabinet have since resigned on party orders. The party
may be considering withdrawing from the government at all
levels, and aligning itself with the leftist-Communist
ready in operation.
HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN FRICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
There has been an intensification recently of the
chronic Honduran-Nicaraguan squabbles over the use of
bases in Honduras by Nicaraguan revolutionaries, some of
opposition.
~ ~ ~CONFIDENTlqL
TU4i. WV VV TN RRTRV
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
PART II (continued)
whom are apparently aided by Cuba. These frictions have
increased bitterness over the two countries' century-old
border dispute, now before the International Court of
Justice. The court's decision is expected before Decem?-
ber and could well threaten the government in whichever
country loses the dispute.
COUP IN EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
The six-man military-civilian junta that ousted
President Lemus early on 26 October sought immediately
to secure the backing of the leftist elements whose
demonstrations last August and September critically
weakened the Lemus administration. The coup was military-
led, however and
the military will main-
tain control over the civilian component of the junta.
Ex-President Oscar Osorio, a retired army officer who
retains strong backing in the armed forces and is widely
popular throughout the country, will probably emerge as
the real leader of the new government. Strongly anti-
Communist, he is known to favor thoroughgoing reforms
to alleviate the country's deep-seated socio-economic
problems.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE CULT OF MAO TSE-TUNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Chinese Communist cult of Mao Tse-tung, which
has fluctuated with the exigencies of party policies, in
the past year has-approached idolatry..'The cult has two
aspects: the adulation of Mao Tse-tung as a father-figure
of the Peiping regime who is "great, brilliant, wise,
compassionate, tender, and trustworthy"; second, the claim
that Mao is pre-eminent as a Marxist theoretician, "the
most prominent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary, politician,
and theorist among all living contemporaries." The
present extravagant claims for Mao as the legitimate
heir of Lenin are interwoven with Peiping's defense of
its position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
As the UN General Assembly moves toward consideration
of the Algerian situation, the contending forces remain
stalemated, although pressures on them are apparently be-
coming more intense. The rebels continue under severe
French military pressure, but have received additional
SECRET
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
PART III (continued)
backing in recent approaches to Moscow and Peiping, and
are almost certain to have substantial Afro-Asian support
in the General Assembly for their effort to "interna-
tionalize" the conflict. De Gaulle's 1959 offer of self-
determination remains France's official position, but
there appears to be a growing diversity of French views.
Popular opinion now seems to be swinging in favor of
political negotiations with the rebels and even toward
eventual independence for Algeria; but army sentiment
is still adamant against such negotiations, and rightist
leaders have in the past few months become more inclined
to challenge De Gaulle directly on this issue.
SECRET
vii
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
While continuing to attack
Western policies on disarmament,
nuclear testing, and Berlin,
Moscow has initiated moves de-
signed to set the stage for a
new effort at negotiations on
these issues. Khrushchev re-
eated
his call for
a summit meeting on Berlin ear-
ly next spring. At the UN the
bloc delegations are apparently
preparing to walk out of the
disarmament discussion in the
Political Committee .and launch
an intensified campaign for a
special General Assembly ses-
sion in March or April to be
attended by the heads of govern-
ment. The bloc has also moved
to ` estiblish,'a:i.d :adline oh the
nuclear test ban talks and to
bring the issue before the UN
General Assembly.
Germany and Berlin
Khrushchev used his con-
versation with West German Am-
bassador Kroll on 18 October
to make clear his determination
to settle the Berlin problem in
1961. He indicated that Moscow
will press for an early summit
conference and mentioned Febru-
ary or March, or April at the
latest. He ruled out any long
delays, and, as in his 20 October
speech in Moscow, he indicated
that postponement of Berlin
negotiations until after the
West German elections ,,..in Sep-
tember 1961 would be unac-
ceptable.
Khrushchev also insisted
on ,tbet permanent '.nature of -the
Oder-Neisse boundary and the
necessity of an early peace
treaty with "both German states,"
as well as a settlement of the
Berlin problem.
Khrushchev emphasized his
desire for not merely normal
but friendly relations with
Bonn, and reversed the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's position by
agreeing that if West Germans
in the Soviet Union wanted to
be repatriated, the procedures
which lapsed last December could
be continued. The Soviet pre-
mier also agreed to refrain from
public attacks on Adenauer,
and indicated he would exclude
some remarks from his 20 Octo-
ber speech, which did not con-
tain the lengthy diatribes a-
gainst Adenauer, as many Soviet
pronouncements in recent months
have.
Despite Khrushchev's re-
affirmation of the USSR's in-
tention not to undertake unilat-
eral steps in Berlin, the East
Germans are continuing to exert
pressures, although the pace has
slowed down.
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
Disarmament and the UN
The East Germans made no attempt
to carry out a threat to inter-
fere with or prevent a visit of
Eleanor Dulles and members of
her "Crusade for Freedom" party
to East Berlin on 21 October.
The East Germans have not pub-
lished their warning against
this visit contained in a note
to the US Mission in Berlin on
19 October.
The East Germans continue
to press for a resumption of
interzonal trade talks and have
used the issue in a new effort
to drive a wedge between West
German, and West Berlin author-
ities by calling for separate
negotiations.
On 21 October, East German
Foreign Trade Minister Rau ad-
dressed separate letters to Bonn
and to West Berlin Mayor Brandt
offering to negotiate And em-
phas.izing the damaging economic
effects of Bonn's denunciation
of the 1961 trade pact. Rau used
an interview with a West German
paper to appeal to West German
businessmen to bring pressure
on Bonn for new talks. He also
suggested that the West Berlin
authorities offer new proposals
.concerning the city's communi-
cations with West Germany. East
German concern over the future
effects of the cancellation of
the trade agreement may have
prompted a special economic mis-
sion, including the head of the
State Planning Commission, to
go to Moscow last week.
Since Khrushchev's depar-
ture from New York on ].3 October,
Soviet delegates at the UN have
vigorously pressed his demands
on disarmament and reorganization
of the UN executive. In his open-
ing speech on 19 October before
the UN Political Committee, So-
viet delegate Zorin echoed Khru-
shchev's warning of a Soviet boy-
cott of disarmament negotiations
in the committee if Soviet dis-
armament principles were not accept-
ed as the basis for discussions.
While calling for general
and complete disarmament, Zorin
pressed the Soviet drive to se-
cure recognition of three coequal
blocs by repeating Khrushchev's
call for the addition of India,
Indonesia, the UAR, Ghana, and
Mexico to the Disarmament Commit-
tee, now composed of five Soviet
bloc and five Western nations. On
25 October, Zarin again repeated
his threat to walk out of the
Political Committee and renewed
Khrushchev's call for a special
assembly session on disarmament
next spring to be attended by
the heads of government, who could
give "clear directives" to a new
negotiating committee replacing
the ten-nation group.
The Soviet Union may feel
that a walkout will create pres-
sure on the West to attend a sum-
mit session on disarmament and to
accept Moscow's concept of uni-
versal disarmament as the basis
for negotiations. Bloc propa-
ganda accompanying such a walkout
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
would probably echo the
earlier
On 24 October Poland in-
claim, made after the bloc with-
drawal from the ten-nation dis--
troduced a resolution in the
Political Committee calling
armament conference
in Geneva
for an agreement on the cessa-
last June, that the USSR refuses
tion of nuclear weapons tests
to abuse world hopes for dis-
by 1 April 1961. If this dead-
armament by engaging in fruit-
line is not met, the resolution
less discussions with those who
calls for immediate submission
seek only "control without dis-
of the problem to a special
armament."
session of the General. Assembly,
The Soviet Union has indi-
cated its determination to press
for a reorganization of the UN
executive by directly attacking
Secretary General Hammarskjold
in the Administrative and Budget-
ary Committee. During the past
week, bloc delegates frequently
charged Hammarskjold with "ex-
travagant spending" to further
US policies in Congo, Laos, and
Guinea, and the Soviet delegate
demanded a $50,000,000 ceiling
on the UN budget for 1961--for
which the secretary general has
asked $67,500,000. It appears
that the USSR may concentrate
its attack on the UN Secretariat
in the Budgetary Committee,
which reviews the composition
of the professional staii. At
present the Soviet Union and its
satellites, with only 84
representatives on the staff,
are far below their assigned
quota of 216.
' Nuclear -Test, .Bab~.Ta-lks
For the first time since
the nuclear test talks began in
Geneva in 1958, the bloc has
moved toward setting a deadline
on the negotiations and bring-
ing this issue before the UN
General Assembly.
which Khrushchev called for
while in New York. In private
conversations with Western dele-
gates in Geneva during the past
two weeks, Soviet delegates
said they expected no major
American moves at the nu-
clear test ban talks before
the US election, and gave
no indication that any new
initiative was planned by
Moscow.
Soviet chief delegate
Tsarapkin told a UN official
he believed it would be some
time before US policy would
be decided and real negotiations
could be resumed. In a talk
with an American official,
Tsarapkin was "completely un-
yielding" on the principal
issues under negotiation. He
restated the USSR's position
that if the US resumed
testing, whether for research
or weapons purposes, the
USSR would break up the
conference and consider it-
self free to resume tests.
Soviet propaganda, citing
recent statements by AEC
Chairman McCone as evidence,
has claimed that the United
States intends to resume
nuclear weapons tests in
order to bury the Geneva
talks and intensify :the nuclear
a.rms?:race
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pace 3 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Che Guevara's ten-man eco-
nomic mission to Czechoslovakia,
the USSR, Communist China, North
Korea, and East Germany left
Cuba on 21 October. On the eve
of his departure, Guevara told
a television audience that he
was going primarily to negotiate
Cuba's commercial exchange for
the coming year under trade
pacts with these countries.
Guevara will probably seek ex-
panded arrangements with the
bloc to compensate for items
that Cuba can no longer receive
from the United States. However,
because of the nature of Cuba's
industrial plant, it may be
forced to seek immediate alter-
native sources of supply in
nonbioc countries, which are
better equipped to supply Cuba's
import needs.
His TV talk clearly implied
efforts toward the further eco-
nomic integration of Cuba with
the bloc. He referred to
foreign "comrades" in the Cuban
Petroleum Institute "who are
going to the USSR to get equip-
ment" and implied that bloc
technicians in other industries
are also performing such serv-
ices.
Cuba and Rumania signed a
trade agreement and technical
assistance protocol in Havana
on 25 October, and a joint
communique declared their in-
tentionto exchange ambassadors.
The composition of the Rumanian
delegation suggests that that
country may provide Cuba with
technical assistance for its
petroleum industry.
Moscow has moved on several
fronts this past week to foster
the impression that there is
a real danger that the US will
intervene militarily in Cuba
and that, in that event, the
USSR stands ready to lend
every assistance to Cuba. The
Soviet objectives are apparent-
ly to increase suspicion of US
intentions and to stimulate
some action by the neutralists
in the United Nations which
might put the United States
in an embarrassing position.
Soviet propaganda cover-
age of the Cuban situation has
been stepped up and now in-
cludes daily warnings of al-
leged American plans for "coun-
terrevolutionary invasions,"
along with denunciations of US
trade restrictions and of
Ambassador Bonsai's recall.
At the United Nations, the
Soviet delegation has come out
strongly in support of the
Cuban complaint, which includes
the charge that the US is
planning to begin a large-scale
invasion of the country "in
a few days."
Despite these efforts to
arouse concern over the possi-
bility of US intervention in
Cuba, it seems unlikely that
the USSR anticipates such
action. Khrushchev's threat
on 9 July to use rockets "if
necessary" in defense of the
Castro Government in the event
of US aggression was so quali-
fied as not actually to con-
stitute a commitment to any
specific course of action, and
it has never been repeated.
Furthermore, TASS quoted Khru-
shchev as saying in a press
interview on 25 September, when
asked about his rocket threat,
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE TNTEnF,CP Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 4 of 10
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
"...you needn't worry.... Since
America does not intend to
attack Cuba, this means that.
there is no danger whatsoever."
Soviet bloc military ship-
ments to Cuba thus far include
small arms, machine guns, anti-
aircraft artillery, and tanks.
More shipments are expected., The
quantity of this equipment is
clearly excessive for Cuban in-
ternal needs and will permit re-
lease of Cuba's Western-manufac-
tured weapons for clandestine
military support elsewhere in
the hemisphere, should this be
the Cuban intention.
In view of the lack of qual
ified personnel in Cuba, the Cas
tro regime will be required to
rely heavily on the Soviet bloc
for training the Cuban military
in the use and maintenance of
the new weapons and military-
related items such as communica-
tions equipment and radar. In-
creasing numbers of Cubans will
probably be sent to the bloc
for training, particularly if
the Castro regime follows
through with its apparent de-
cision to build up a qualified
"defense force" based on Soviet
bloc equipment.
The Cuban Government re-
sponded to the new US export
restrictions by increasing its
propaganda attacks on the United
States for this "new act of
aggression." On 25 October,
most of the remaining American-
owned businesses in Cuba were
nationalized.
Most other Latin American
governments appear to feel that
the US action was justified.
Official circles in Mexico and
Chile, however, are critical
and feel it will give Castro an
important propaganda advantage
in the hemisphere. Other govern-
ments, while sympathetic to the
US position, have expressed con-
cern over what they expect will
be a strong negative reaction
among the Latin American public.
Some of these governments
may also see the move as obviat-
ing the need for their own
participation in any future mul-
tilateral sanctions against the
Castro regime. Many Latin
American leaders prefer to re-
gard the Cuban issue as a bilat-
eral problem between the United
States and Cuba, and the Ecua-
dorean foreign minister frankly
explained that a number of Latin
American governments are too
weak to run ahead of public.
opinion on this issue.
The Castro regime, which
has been embarrassed by a num-
ber of defections this year
among Cuban officials abroad,
is apparently recalling dip-
lomatic and consular officers to
screen them. Officials in Bra-
zil and Mexico are already re-
turning home, and more will prob-
ably follow. A decree of 27
September removed job tenure
rights from foreign service
personnel. It is becoming ap-
parent that those officials re-
garded as "reliable" for foreign
assignment are those who unques-
tioningly accept and are willing
to promote the Communist position
on Cuban and international issues.
The Cuban ambassador appointed
to Paris on 20 October, for in-
stance, has a long record of
Communist associations.
Scattered opposition groups
continue' active inside Cuba de-
spite elaborate government ef-
forts to give the impression they
have been wiped out. Widespread
rumors in Oriente Province sug-
gest that a new "invasion
force" of about 80 persons landed
on the north coast; on or
about 20 October, and in-
creased government military
SECRET
PART T OF TMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
activity noted in the province
lends support to reports of
continued guerrilla activity.
There is still no indica-
tion, however, that the
opposition has the unity and
leadership necessary to be-
come a genuine threat to
the regime.
In the cities, tenants are
reported to have reacted with
enthusiasm to the 15 October
urban reform law, which offers-
them the prospect of becoming
homeowners. The government
probably calculated that the
solidification of its support
among lower income groups
would more than compensate
for the further alienation of
the landlords, many of whom
will lose their sole source
of income.
Dominican Republic
The Trujillo regime is giv-
ing signs of further weakening.
One example was the apathetic
showing, during the 24 October
rally honoring the dictator on
his 69th birthday, which con-
trasted sharply with previous
staged. demonstrations of "loyal-
ty." Trujillo's efforts to
prove to the world that he is
implementing a program of "de
mocratization" .havegenerally
been recognized as a sham. Af-
ter some months in which his
controlled propaganda media
followed a viciously anti-US and
pro-Castro and pro-Soviet line,
Trujillo's speech on 24 October
promised "undeviating" friend-
ship for the United States in
tacit admission of the failure
of his previous tactics.
The economic situation is
worsening. Trujillo's efforts
to promote trade with Western
Europe have not compensated
for the financial losses result-
ing from the country's elimina-
tion from the benefits of the
higher price for sugar in the
US market and from continuing
Venezuelan efforts to impose
a petroleum boycott on the Do-
minican Republic. Unemployment
continues to be a serious prob-
leap, and there are indications
that present Dominican efforts
to refinance loans granted in
past years by Canadian banks
may fail.
Dissidents inside the coun-
try are showing unexplained op-
timism, which could indicate
that a new plan to oust the re-
gime is in the final stages of
preparation. There are grow-
ing rumors in dissident circles
of an imminent invasion by exile
groups from Venezuela. There
are also indications, :however,
that those dissidents with mod-
erate and pro-US views are los-
ing ground to more radical ele-
ments, in the underground move-
ment. According to the American
Consulate, these pro-US groups
were enthusiastic over the role
of the United States in the Au-
gust OAS conference that condemned
Trujillo, but the lack of further
decisive action against Trujillo
has demoralized them and
reduced their influence.
SECRET
PART I MP TANA Mnrem' T'AT?F1t'T 'C1m 6 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
SITUATION IN LAOS
Premier Souvanna Phouma
appears to have made some prog-
ress during the past week in
strengthening the position of
his regime. During a week-end
trip to Luang Prabang, he ap-
parently succeeded in delay-
ing a'. ;previously contem-
plated breakaway by
the First Military
Region, a move which
would have seriously
jeopardized his posi-
tion as premier. Sou-
vanna also appears to
have convinced lead-
ers from northern
Laos, including King
Savang, that he is
prepared to take a
harder line against
the Pathet Lao, both
in the present nego-
tiations in Vientiane
and in the limitation
of further Pathet
military gains.
Pressures are
mounting, however, for
Souvanna to come to
terms with General
Phoumi's Savannakhet
Revolutionary Commit-
tee. General Ouane,
the armed forces com-
mander, and Col. Houm-
panh, the First Mili-
tary Region Commander,
both warned Souvanna
that if he did not
reach a settlement with
Phoumi within a rea-
sonably short time,
they would lead the
fore reaching a settlement be-
tween Vientiane and Savannakhet.
Ouane claims that the
premier will send a committee
to Savannakhet to negotiate,
atl ba sis is four ncompromise 'has wast yet
north into open opposition
against his regime. The King
also believes it urgent that
Souvanna reach an early accord
with Phoumi. The~King is op-
posed, however, to dissolving
the Revolutionary Committee be-
ATiOPE
developed. Souvanna has so far
seemed intent on excluding
Phoumi from any important role
in the government, although he
has been willing to welcome
Phoumi's followers back into
the fold. Phoumi, on the other
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
BURMA
PHONG
SALY
AMTHA,
Sam Ne..a
IIJAMG PRABANG 1 SAM NEUA
Luang Prabang 7? ,_
S; YABOURYl
VIENTIANE MLA _
.,VIENTIANE?
Savannakhet " VANNAKHET
XI ENG
KHOUANG
t
3i
7 of 10
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
hand, may still harbor the hope
that Souvanna's government will
fall and that he will have a
much more prominent role in a
successor government.
Negotiations between the
government and the Pathet Lao
in Vientiane are proceeding
at an exceedingly leisurely
pace, possibly by design on the
part of Souvanna. The negotia-
tors now are feeling each other
out on the question of how far
Laos should go in establishing
ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc
and are apparently trying to
devise the mechanics for a su-
pervised truce between their
opposing military forces. The
renewal of fighting in Phong
Saly Province may have reversed
any progress toward a firm
cease-fire they might have made
and could conceivably lead to
a breakdown in the talks.
Only preliminary reports
have been received regarding
the new fighting in Phong Saly,
but it presumably reflects im-
plementation of the First Military
Region's reported plans to retake two
posts lost by the: Pathet Lao earlier
in the month. Col. Houmpanh
has with Souvanna's approval
reportedly been marshaling his
forces for such an offensive
for several days. He told the
American army attache on 25
October that he expected his
forces to engage the Pathet Lao
momentarily.
Col. Kouprasith,
the nominal commander of the
Fifth Military Region in Vien-
tiane, has denied any build-
up in the Pak Sane area, al-
though he does credit the Pathet
Lao with the capability to
launch an independent attack on
Phoumi's forces. In any event,
Kouprasith's disapproval would
probably prove no deterrent if
Kong Le and his lieutenants
chose to resume operations.
Kong Le has undertaken no
new initiatives recently, but
there are increasing indications
that he is subject to strong
Pathet influence. He is re-
ported, for example, to have
permitted Col. Singkapo, a rank-
ing Pathet military leader, to
address officers in Vientiane
on the virtues of a neutral for-
eign policy. He is also alleged
to engage in frequent consulta-
tions with the wife of Pathet
Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong;
she is reputed to be a doctri- 25X1
naire Communist.
Faced with a rapidly
worsening petroleum supply sit-
uation in Vientiane as the
SECRET
PART I n' T,.RHT. n T A m'e T*rmru1c m Da 8 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
result of the unofficial Thai
blockade, Souvanna has threat-
ened to ask the newly ac-
credited Soviet ambassador
for aid in alleviating the
oil shortage. He also told
Ambassador Brown that if
Thailand persisted in pre-
venting the entry of goods into
Vientiane, he would take
"this act of aggression" to
the UN Security Council. The
Soviet ambassador finally pre-
sented his credentials to
King Savang on 26 October,
alter having been kept wait-
ing in Vientiane for 13 days.
Colonel Mobutu's control
seems to be slipping, but this
does not necessarily guarantee
the early return of Patrice Lu-
mumba to power, although events
appear to be moving in his
favor. Mobutu's decision not
to leave the Congo at this
time for a personal appeal to
UN Secretary General Hammar-
skjold has probably delayed a
showdown and the army chief's
eclipse.
Chaos within the armed
forces appears to be widespread,
with lines of authority unclear.
Last week mutinies reportedly
occurred in Leopoldville and
in the provincial capitals of
Stanleyville and Coquilhatville.
Disorderly Congolese troops
terrorized the African quarter
of Leopoldville and routed
the police patrols of provincial
governor Cleophas Kamitatu.
Mobutu flew to Coquilhatville
in an effort to restore order
Mobutu apparently is de-
pending on the 5,000-man force
based at Thysville--the army's
principal garrison about 80
miles south of Leopoldville--to
regain control of the capital
city. However, his recent effort
to bring an armored unit to Leo-
poldville was opposed by the UN
Command,,which ordered its forces
to set up roadblocks to prevent
the unit's advance. On 26 October,
the UN Command ordered Mobutu to
withdraw his troops from Leopold-
ville, and he acquiesced.
The Thysville garrison may
assume increasing importance if
its commander, Lt. Col. Louis
Boboso,tries to become the new
strong man of the Congo. Boboso,
reportedly a stronger personality
than Mobutu, is said to be under
pressure from army elements to re-
place him. Boboso's political
inclinations are not known.
UN spokesmen have charged
that Belgian specialists are aid-
ing Congolese troops to ready
armored vehicles in Thysville,
presumably for an attempt to
25X1 SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pave 9 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
? .......,.,.... SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 Octobor 1960
intimidate the UN into releasing
Lumumba so that Mobutu could
serve an arrest warrant on him.
Mobutu's political prob-
lems are increasing. Antoine
Gizenga, Lumumba's erstwhile
vice premier, is reported to be
active on Lumumba 's behalf in
Orientale Province.
According to press
reports, pro-Lumumba
police in Stanley-
ville have arrested
the local army com-
mander on Gizenga's
orders. Previously,
the pro-Lumumba gov-
ernor of Leopoldville
Province began press-
ing Mobutu with the
threat of secession,
and provincial police
now are reportedly
planning joint patrols
with UN forces in
Leopoldville.
The army chief
has not been able to
gain the support of
the local UN Command
for action against
Lumumba. His efforts
to arrest the,-'jousted
premier have been re-
pulsed,-and his de-
mands that Lumumba be
.The situation in both Kasai
and Katanga is deteriorating. In
southern Kasai, f ight ing has been
resumed as Congolese troops from
Luluabourg reportedly :Launched an
attack on secessionist forces.
Secessionist leader Ngalula blames
the UN for failing to maintain a
neutral, demilitarized zone be-
CONGO
REPUBLIC
Ocean
f Lotto
f -2-7- OCTOBER 1960
removed from the official resi-
dence of the premier have been
refused. At the same time, UN
representative Dayal has been
frustrated in his efforts to
effect a reconciliation between
the Congolese leaders. Nor has
he been able to have the assem-
bly reconvened to form a:..Congo--
lese government with wide local
support as several African na-
tions have demanded.
At present, the UN seems
to have lost much of its initia-
tive, and may rely on a good-
offices commission of several
African states to try to resolve
the Congo situation. In such a
commission, Ghana or Guinea would
probably play a major role.
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
tween Congolese and Kasai
forces.
In Katanga, President Tshom-
bd's government, angered by the
reported undisciplined activities
of UN troops in northern Katanga,
has demanded the recall of the
UN's top representatives there,
a challenge which the UN met by
sending reinforcements to Elisa-
bothville on 26 October. During
the last seven weeks, Tshombd's
government reportedly has taken
several repressive measures, in-
cluding burbing Baluba opposition
party activities, widespread ar-
rests and imprisonment of Katanga
Balubas, and repatriation of tribes-
men from Kasai Province to the war-
torn area around Bakwanga.
SECRET 25X1
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 10 of 10
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
V
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Preparatory committees are
reported to have been working
for some weeks in Moscow on a
resolution to be presented to
the meeting of world Communist
parties--scheduled to begin
around 7 November--which has
been called to consider the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
non-
bloc as well as bloc Communist
party delegations have been tak-
ing part in at least some of the
preparatory meetings. The Chi-
nese Communists have apparently
also been represented at these
meetings, perhaps by politburo
members Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng
Chen, who apparently were ab-
sent from Peiping from mid-Sep-
tember to 25 October, when Peng
Chen reappeared in Peiping.
Recent public statements
from both Moscow and Peiping
have given no indication that
either intends to compromise
significantly on the substantive
issues in dispute. Khrushchev's
20 October speech in Moscow in-
cluded a vigorous and complete
defense of Soviet propositions,
and Soviet publications continue
indirectly to engage in condem-
nations of Chinese Communist
theoretical positions. In ad-
dition to these efforts to in-
doctrinate the population on
the incorrectness of leftism,
dogmatism, and sectarianism, an
attack on Chinese positions was
probably the purpose of a series
of three lectures on issues
which have been in dispute.
American Embassy personnel were
refused admission to the lec-
tures which began in Moscow on
12 October.
resolution of the dispute.
According to a Moscow
rumor, presidium member Suslov 2bA11
has also recently told, a number
of party meetings in Moscow that
unless the Chinese admit their
ideological errors, a breach
in Sino-Soviet party relations 25X1
should be expected.
Chinese are said to be "unable
to understand" why the Russians
are in such a hurry to settle
the dispute, and to believe that
Moscow and Peiping should em-
phasize their points of agree-
ment while continuing to dis-
cuss their differences. The
Chinese apparently favor dis-
cussions but "do not believe
that the dispute can be settled
at one sitting."
Several recent developments
suggest a Chinese effort to
present an appearance of reason-
ableness prior to the meeting.
The official party newspaper
People's Daily on 22 October
pri~thefuull text of Khru-
shchev':s 20 October speech, and
The USSR is apparently try- ! Peiping's message of thanks to
ing to foster the impression the Soviet leaders for their
that the forthcoming meeting I 1 October National Day greetings
SECRET
PART I I NnTFS ANTS MMMENT.Iq Pc l of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
emphastzcd.isolidarity with .the
USSR and gratitude for Soviet
aid.
The mid-October issue of
the Chinese theoretical journal,
Red Flag, has been canceled,
perhaps because it carried an
article which the Chinese lead-
ers decided at the last moment
would exacerbate the situation.
Peiping announced on 16 October,
the day the magazine was sched-
uled to appear, that it would
be combined with the next issue,
to be published at a later, un-
specified date.
At the same time, Peiping
has not budged from any of its
basic positions in the dispute,
continuing to reiterate on
suitable occasions its belief
in the necessity of struggle
against US imperialism. I rther"
more, the Chinese are openly
encouraging the Albanians and
other Communists to support
their stand. A telegram from
Peiping, broadcast by Tirana on
24 October, stressed the theme
of Albania's consistent struggle
against. "modern revisionism"
and its great contribution to
defending "the purity of Marxism-
Leninism.'" Among other actions
which Moscow may well regard
as provocative, Peiping has sent
a military delegation to Albania,
and during the last two weeks
has signed scientific, technical,
and cultural exchange and coop-
eration agreements with Tirana.
Peiping is using the 10th
,anniversary of the entry of its
forces into the Korean war to
reaffirm strongly several of
its basic positions along the
lines of the Chinese party's
endorsement in late September
of Mao Tse-tung's handling of
the Chinese civil war. The
regime's propaganda is asserting
that the Korean experience is
applicable to today's world sit-
uation because the Korean con-
flict proved that the United
States is a "paper tiger" and
that peace cannot be begged for
but can only be won through "res-
olute? struggle."
By emphasizing Sino-Korean
unity both during the Korean
war and afterward,,;. Peiping is
attempting to give the impres-
sion that Pyongyang is a stanch
supporter of Communist China's
present policies which conflict
with Moscow's. The North Koreans,
in effect, have agreed with the
Chinese on the practicality of
a tougher bloc effort to drive
the United States out of Asia,
but are more circumspect about
endorsing all aspects of Pei-
ping,'s views.
European satellite leaders,
with the exception of the Alba
nians, continue to restate their
solid support for Khrushchev's
personal leadership and conduct.
Party leaders of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland have made
this clear in public speeches,
and top-level government meet-
ings are expected to be held
in the other satellites to en-
dorse Khrushchev's policies
before the November meeting in
Moscow.
The Albanian regime, how-
ever, continues to be conspicu-
ous by its endorsement of Mao's
views. In a 25 October speech
dealing with the UN General As-
sembly meeting, Albanian Premier
Mehmet Shehu, who recently re-
turned from New York, asserted
that China was following a cor-
rect Marxist-Leninist line in
its policies. He praised the
"valiant" Mao Tse-tung, and
spoke at length on China's role
in world affairs. Shehu played
down the value of Soviet peace
proposals and mentioned present
aspects of Soviet foreign policy
only in passing, while criticiz-
ing Yugoslav "revisionism" and
American "imperialism" extensively.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
While Albania remains the
only Communist party which ap-
pears to be endorsing the
Chinese party and all of its
views, considerable uneasiness
over the Sino-Soviet dispute
and its implications continues
to be evidenced in the other
satellite parties and in Com-
munist parties throughout the
world. It seems likely that
this uneasiness exists in the
Soviet and Chinese parties as
well, and that they will both
attempt to use the coming meet-
ing to prevent a complete break
in party relations. Neverthe-
less, developments of the past
few weeks add to earlier indi 25X1
cations that they will find it
very difficult to resolve their
conflicting views.
USSR PURCHASING LARGE FREE-WORLD TANKERS
To ensure the long-term
growth and stability of its pe-
troleum exports, the Soviet
Union is launching a major ef-
fort to procure large, modern
tankers in the free world. Rus-
sian crews have taken over two
such vessels recently construct-
ed in Japan and the Netherlands.
Both of the new tankers origi-
nally were contracted for by
Greek owners and prior to de-
livery were sold to the USSR--
apparently for cash.
The Japanese-built vessel,
of more than 39,000 tons, is a
particularly significant addi-
tion, as most of the present
Soviet tankers carrying petro-
leum exports are in the 11,000-
ton class. The two largest ves-
sels, Pekin and Varshava, are
of 30,000 tons; another vessel
of this class will soon be
launched. The entire bloc
tanker fleet, with some 136 ships
and a total of about
1,200,000 dead-weight tons,
is still small and slow by
world standards.
The American Embassy in
Rome is reliably informed that
Moscow is offering to purchase
Italian merchant vessels total-
ing about 300,000 dead,-weight
tons in exchange for wheat. The
USSR has expressed particular
interest in acquiring two
tankers of 47,700 tons each,
which were launched earlier
this year, and in four or five
tankers of 35,000 tons each.
This proposal is the larg-
est'. single offer the USSR
has made thus far in at-
tempting to purchase more
Western tankers.
Representatives of the So-
viet ship procurement agency,
Sudoimport, have also made in-
quiries recently in Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, and West Ger-
many. By rejecting all but the
newest ships and, at least for
SECRET
PART IT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
the moment, willing to pay cash,
the USSR has aroused consider-
able interest among Western ship-
builders, several of whom al-
ready are supplying other types
of vessels and smaller tankers
to the Soviet Union.
If the present purchases
are part of a long-range pro-
curement program, it is likely
that Moscow will eventually re-
quest deferred payment pro-
visions, as it already receives
in some capital equipmenttrans-
actions with Western suppliers.
COCOM restrictions on the sales
of tankers to the bloc have been
drastically eased since 1958;
the only prohibition remain-
ing is against supplying ships
with speeds in excess of 18
knots.
The expansion of the USSR's
oil exports--dramatized this
year by a commitment-to supply
all Cuban needs--has required
substantial readjustments in
Soviet tanker operations. By
chartering Western vessels, the
Soviet Union has been able to
boost the amounts delivered to
Cuba and to Other distant des-
tinations without affecting
deliveries elsewhere. In 1959
more than 60 percent of the 17,-
400,000 tons of bloc oil moved
from the Black Sea was carried
on free-world vessels.
The low rates prevailing in
the depressed tanker market and
the large amount of idle free-
world tonnage available for
charter probably preclude any
immediate transportation diffi-
culties for the Soviet oil-export
program. Soviet economic policy
is opposed to unnecessary re-
liance on free-world resources
of any kind, however, and the
purchase of large, new Western
tankers to supplement bloc .
building programs is the most.
rapid method'to reduce this de-
pendence, It may also.be'a less
expensive way of maintaining the
Soviet petroleum trade, since.
acquisition of its own vessels
will spare the USSR mounting ex-
penditures of foreign exchan e .
for chartered tankers
THE CASE OF COMRADE LARIONOV--A LESSON FOR SOVIET PACE SETTERS
On 22 September, the Soviet
press announced the death after
a "serious illness" of central
committee member Aleksey Niko-
layevich Larionov, first secre-
tary of Ryazan Oblast in the
Russian Republic. The personal
tragedy of Larionov, who at the
December 1959 party plenum was
probably the most highly praised
man in agriculture, has a dis-
tinctly Soviet twist and is
symptomatic of the great pres-
sures generated by this year's
agricultural difficulties.
Larionov, party boss of
Ryazan since 1948, reached the
height of his career in December
1959. He was awarded the title
"Hero of Socialist Labor,"
decorated with the Order of
Lenin and the medal "Hammer and
Sickle" for achievements in
livestock production, and
singled out by Khrushchev at the
plenum for lengthy and extrava-
gant praise. His past successes
and his pledge to fulfill the
Seven-Year Plan livestock goals
in only three years were held up
repeatedly by Khrushchev as
examples to officials in all
lagging agricultural. areas.
Larionov could ill afford
to fail. "I know Comrade
Larionov," said Khrushchev at
the plenum. "He would never
consider taking an unrealistic
pledge, to sprint, only to
founder the next day; that, he
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ..SUMMARY
27 Od.tbber L960
would not agree to do." This,
however, is exactly what Larionov
did.
The quarterly bulletins of
the RSFSR Council of Ministers
on the results of the "social-
ist competition in the produc-
tivity and delivery of livestock
products" tell the story. Ryazan,
still the winner according to
the October 1959 issue, had by
the time of the next quarterly
report in February 1960 dropped
to fourth place. In the two
subsequent reports, in April
and July, Ryazan was not listed
among the many oblasts cited
for good performances. No fig-
ures were released on the agri-
cultural situation in Ryazan,
nor was?:.~ the nature of Larionov's
difficulties. revealed.
On 25 June, a satirical
poem appeared in the main agri-
cultural newspaper clearly di-
rected at Larionov. The poem
twitted a certain "Hero Larion"
for blaming insufficient fodder
supplies on pilfering mice.
The piece ended with the sug-
gestion that getting rid of
Larion rather than the mice was
the better solution. The next
ominous sign for Larionov was
the removal of two oblast party
bosses in September, specifiy--
cally for failing to fulfill
their, livestock pledges for
1960. They had made these
pledges in response to the pres-
sure to emulate Larionov.
Dissatisfaction with Lari-
onov was demonstrated in the of-
ficial treatment of his death
and funeral. Only an obituary
and a brief statement of con-
dolences from the party central
committee were published. Al-
most all other full members of
the central committee who have
died in the last five years
have had a funeral commission
appointed, a state funeral with
honor guards, and been buried
in the Kremlin wall; Larionov
was accorded none of these honors.
The official cold shoulder
given Larionov undoubtedly re-
flects Khrushchev's own attitude.
Larionov's botching of his agri-
cultural pledges must have been
a source of considerable dis-
appointment and embarrassment 25X1
to Khrushchev,who had lavished
so much praise on him
UNCERTAINTY IN PEIPING OVER
The Communist regime in
Peiping appears worried over
the state of the Chinese econ-
omy and uncertain over what to
do about it. The major trouble
is clearly in agriculture, which
Peiping admits is still pro
gresSingL.too, Slowly. The food
situation has been bad all year.
Food shortages have per-
sisted through the summer months,
despite the summer grain and
vegetable harvests, and the pop-
ulation can evidently look for-
FUTURE ECONOMIC MOVES
ward to no improvement this win-
ter. Drought, floods, and in-
sects have inflicted "serious
losses" on at least one sixth
of the area sown to grain, and
the outlook is for a crop about
the same as last year's disap-
pointing'harvest. This year's
crop will have to feed some 17,-
000,000 additional persons.
"",,,The regime's concern over
the farm situation is betrayed
by its continued efforts to
keep a tight ' lid , on-food
SECRET
IT N(1TT:S AND COMMENTS ..!Page 5 O f'19
PART I Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2.7,October 1960
consumption, by its encouragement
to urban and rural residents
alike to grow more vegetables,
by its exhortations to grow more
catch crops and to go to the
hills and gather wild plants,
and by an admission that Chi-
nese agriculture remains more
at the mercy of weather than
does the agriculture of more
developed countries. In addi-
tion, authorities in Kwangtung
have agreed to exempt peasants
from state taxes and purchase
quotas on some of next spring's
harvest.
Industry's performance so
far this year has been somewhat
brighter than agriculture's,
from the regime's point of view,
but Peiping has been uncommonly
vague about accomplishments.
Shortages of raw materials have
plagued various industries, and
the press still expresses
frequent concern over the
quality of industrial prod-
ucts, especially those from
the vaunted small-scale enter-
prises.
Shortages of petroleum
products have apparently af-
fected transport. Urban passen-
ger transport schedules in
Peiping and Shanghai have re-
portedly been sharply curtailed.
Transport has been hard
hit this summer, with un-
usually frequent traffic
interruptions because of
weather.
There is some evidence
that China is having difficul-
ties in fulfilling current
trade commitments. Trade dif-
ficulties have apparently not
been confined to the bloc.
Trade with the sterling area
and with Western Europe
has declined since early
summer, and the "'.level of
China's total trade this
year may fall below last
year's high level.
Communist China, in spite
of its rapid economic advance,
remains dependent on the USSR
for key items for its industrial-
ization program and for technical
assistance. Some Soviet tech-
nicians have already been with-
drawn, and further withdrawals
could be made.
In the past, China has been
permitted to fall behind in its
short-term obligations to the
rest of the bloc, principally
the USSR. It must face the pos-
sibility that the USSR, and the
European satellites in particu-
lar, may not be willing to per-
mit China to accumulate addi-
tional indebtedness in trade.
Further, the USSR has not greeted
with any warmth Mao Tse-tung's
much-publicized sorties into the
field of economic policy, par-
ticularly his "three magic keys"
to economic growth--including
the leap forward and the com-
munes. Although the validity
of these concepts continues to
be reaffirmed, recent publicity
has not been extensive,
suggesting that Peiping may
have growing doubts about
their long-range efficacy in
solving China's economic
.problems. (Prepared
by ORR)
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
Frustrations experienced
by Ghana's President Nkrumah in
his attempts to promote his pan-
African ambitions appear to be
influencing him to adopt an in-
creasingly less friendly pos-
ture toward the West and to wel-
come wider contacts and tacti-
calcollaboration with the Sino-
Soviet bloc. Moreover, new
emphasis by Ghanaian leaders on
the "construction of a socialist
economy" in Ghana seems likely
to reduce established Western
economic interests and to pro-
vide new opportunities for the
bloc to exploit.
This trend toward greater
involvement with the bloc would
be accelerated should Western
financing for Ghana's extensive
Volta River hydroelectric-alu-
minum project not materialize,
despite the apparent imminence
of a final agreement between
Nkrumah's regime and a Western
consortium which is considering
the scheme.
Ghana's drift from the
West and toward a variety of
"positive neutralism" showing
greater parallelism with posi-
tions espoused by Moscow was
pointed up dramatically by Nkru-
mah's performance at the United
Nations last month. .Displaying
none of the appreciation for
US attitudes he has shown in
private meetings with American
officials, his public state-
ments were consistently critical
of the West and made clear his
basic agreement with the Soviet
Union's attacks on Secretary
General Hammarskjold and the UN
Secretariat,
told his people that his talks
in New York with Khrushchev had
convinced him that "Russia wants
peace more than anything else."
The chaotic situation in
the Congo seems to have prompted
Nkrumah's new course more than
any other single factor. There
are strong indications that he
has been deeply embittered by
what he apparently regards as
the responsibility of 'Western
"imperialists"--first for the
"secession" of Katanga Province
and then for the failure of the
UN to act as an agent of the
Lumumba government. Nkrumah has
counted on Lumumba to align the
Congo with a Ghana-led crusade
for a political union of African
states. Since the Soviet bloc's
unilateral intervention seemed
to serve the objective of keep-
ing Lumumba in power, it did not
draw Nkrumah's ire, but rather
appears to have added to his
growing disposition, encouraged
by influential leftist advisers,
to collaborate more closely with
the Communist world.
In any event, the USSR suc-
ceeded in achieving its first
major breakthrough in Ghana last
August at a time when its involve-
ment in the Congo was increasing
rapidly. A technical assistance
and other agreements were con-
cluded providing for a $40,000,-
000 credit to Ghana and for trade,
cultural cooperation, and the
purchase by Ghana of four to six
Soviet IL-18 aircraft. As a re- 25X1
suit the number of Soviet tech-
nical personnel in Ghana appears
to be increasing rapidly.
In a speech following his
return to Accra, Nkrumah in ef-
fect accused the United States
of failing "to take a positively
decisive stand on the question
of peace." At the same time, he
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Accra seems prepared to
take greater advantage of edu-
cational and training scholar-
ships offered by the bloc and
also to encourage close ties
between cooperative organiza-
tions in bloc countries and
Ghana's government-controlled
National Cooperative Council,
which has been assigned a major
role in the "transition to
socialism." In these areas,
a particularly prominent role
is being played by East Germany,
whose leaders have made Ghana
one of the principal targets
in their campaign for recogni-
tion. So far Nkrumah's response
to this effort has been wary,
although he reportedly agreed
last month, in a letter to Prime
Minister Grotewohl, that diplo-
matic relations should be
established between the two
countries "in due time."
Political activity looking
toward independence is increas-
ing in the four British-con-
trolled territories of East
Africa--Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda,
and Zanzibar. Tanganyika, the
most advanced of the four, is
scheduled to take a further
stop toward independence next
parts of the Central African
Federation as well.
Nyerere hopes to sell Brit-
ish Colonial Secretary Macleod
on the federation idea before
the Tanganyika constitutional
talks open. If he wins Macleod's
support, he will ask for full
internal autonomy for
Tanganyika by January
1962 but delay his de-
mands for independence
until the other ter-
ritories have reached
a similar level and
together with Tangan-
yika can attain in-
dependence as a unit.
Otherwise, he plans
to drive for full in-
dependence for Tan-
ganyika "sometime in
1961."
Although the
British may have some
qualms about Nyerere's
federation plans in
March when a conference is to
formulate a new constitution.
Julius Nyerere, the territory's
newly appointed African chief
minister, is promoting the idea
of federation of the four ter-
ritories when they become inde-
pendent which might include
view of the problems they face
elsewhere in the area, they are
unlikely to oppose him outright,
both because they tend to favor
federation as enhancing East
Africa's economic viability and
because they are unwilling to
undermine Nyerere's position
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
.. SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
vis-a-vis Tanganyika's more ex-
treme nationalists.
In the other East African
territories, progress toward
self-government continues to be
hampered by racial tension, trib-
alism, quarrels among African
politicians, and--in the case
of Zanzibar--by growing Communist
influence. Elections in both
Kenya and Uganda are scheduled
for next February. The politic--
cal scene in Uganda is compli-
cated by the unwillingness on
the part of traditional tribal
rulers to participate
in the protectorate's
activities without
guarantees that their
position will be safe-
guarded. As a protest,:
rulers in the most im-
portant province have
persuaded voters there
.
hot ctq 7.regi'ster.
In Kenya, where
Africans are certain
to dominate the legis-
lative council as a
result of the election,
the principal African
party--the Kenya Afri-
can National Union
(KANU)--is beset by
personal and tribal
jealousies. The auto-
cratic behavior of KANU
Secretary General Tom Mboya, who
is a member of the Luo tribe,
reportedly is resented by the
other leaders, many of whom are
of the Kikuyu tribe, the backbone
of KANU support. The KANU lead-
MIDDLE EAST
Jordan-UAR
King Husayn has replied to
Nasir's diatribes of last week
in Syria by making his most vio-
lent personal attack on the UAR
ers are likely to preserve a fa-
cade of unity, however, since the
party is under attack from both
the white settlers and from the
Kenya African Democratic Union,
a rival group of minority Afri-
can tribes.
Zanzibar, whose elections
are tentatively scheduled for
January, is the scene of rising
tensions between the more numerous
Africans and the traditionally
dominant Arab minority. In ad-
dition, Communist influence is
increasing, particularly among
the Arab leaders of the Zanzibar
Nationalist party, which may
win an important place in the
next legislature as a result
of a split among the Africans.
DEVELOPMENTS
President. In a speech on 21
October, the King referred to
Nasir as "dictator," "blood-
thirsty," and "clown,"" and as
"the red agent (who) has ridden
On the bandwagon of Communism."
SECRET
r NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 19
PART I. Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
Now
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
The virulence of Husayn's
attack reflects not only his
animosity toward Nasir but
also the necessity for appeas-
ing his Bedouin and Majalli
tribal supporters in the Jordan.!
nian Army, who are still incensed
over the assassination of Prime
Minister Majalli and pressing
for some retaliatory action
against the UAR. The speech
probably was also intended to
placate the Bedouin-Majalli
faction for the failure to obtain
any redress for Majalli's assas-
sination through UN mediation
in New York.
Husayn's attempts to satis-
fy his army supporters in his
speeches have thwarted UN medi-
atory efforts, however, accord-
ing to UN representative Spinelli
in Amman. Both Spinelli and
Hammarskjold feel Nasir's moder-
ate attitude toward Jordan in New
York might well have led to a
modus vivendi between the two
countries. When Husayn arrived
in New York, he too was prepared
to make a moderate statement on
his government's position, Spi-
nelli said, but a last-minute
plea from Amman for a more ex-
treme statement in deference to
the Bedouin-Majalli army faction
resulted in the speech on 3 Oc-
tober which antagonized Nasir
and probably provoked his prop-
aganda blasts in Syria.
Spinelli stated Husayn had
appeared contrite in talking to
Hammarskjold the day after the
General Assembly speech, and
that Hammarskjold had told the
King his speech had dissipated
the initial atmosphere of con-
ciliation. The UAR and Jorda-
nian foreign ministers neverthe-
less are quietly consulting in
New York to see if any progress
can be made in resolving impor-
tant points in the dispute, such
as the activities of Jordanian
political exiles in Syria and
the extradition by the UAR of
the three alleged assassins of
Majalli.. Spinelli indicated he
had reason to believe the UAR
may be ready to moderate its
propaganda if Jordan will do
likewise. He intends to suggest
this to Husayn, but admits there
is "little room for optimism"
in the present situation.
The continuation of Jor-
danian-sponsored acts of ter-
rorism in Syria promises to
push UAR-Jordanian relations in-
to a new, more critical phase.
The 25 October bombings in Da-
mascus, apparently instigated
by Jordanian agents, are likely
to be followed by further such
acts. The UAR has widely
puolicized the Damascus bombings,
as well as earlier ones near
the Jordanian border, in an ap-
parent effort to stir up Syrian
feeling against Husayn.
Having adopted this tactic,
it seems certain the UAR will
feel compelled to retaliate in
Jordan or risk the appearance
of impotence. UAR involvement
in the overthrow or assassina-
tion of Husayn could bring
direct Israeli military inter-
vention in Jordan.
Iraq
Dissatisfaction with the
Qasim regime continues to mount,
and criticism is becoming more
outspoken. Most Iraqi contacts
of the American Embassy in Bagh-
dad seem to feel that the regime
is doomed; none, however, is
willing to set a date for its
demise.
Qasim has lost the confidence
of "most government officials,
army officers, and the civilian
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
populace." Dissatisfaction
largely arises from Qasim's con-
stant vacillation, from deterio-
rating economic conditions, and
from recent instances of patron-
age of the Communists.
Plans for a 21 October demon-
stration in Baghdad by anti-
Communist religious leaders were
thwarted when security forces
arrested a number of members of
the Islamic party, including one
imam who had delivered a vicious
personal attack on Qasim in a
sermon.
Evidence of economic dis-
content lately has become ap-
parent in the Iraqi press with
numerous editorials discussing
price increases and rising liv-
ing costs. Demands voiced for
an official investigation into
the causes of this phenomenon
apparently have forced the re-
gime to seek refuge in the ap-
pointment of a committee to "in-
vestigate" the price situation.
However, it is doubtful that
this subterfuge will have much
popular impact.
Sudan
Demonstrations and rioting
took place on 23 October in Wadi
Haifa, a Sudanese town on the
Nile near the Egyptian border.
This was in part a reaction of
the local inhabitants to a visit
by several members of the Suda-
nese cabinet. The high-level
delegation came to present the
government's decision to resettle
the more than 50,000 residents
of the town and the surrounding
area because the territory will
become a reservoir when the UAR's
Aswan High Dam is completed
several years hence.
The officials told them
they are to be resettled at
Khashm al-Girba, on the Atbara
River in Kassala Province where
a new dam and irrigation system
is to be constructed. Most
residents of Wadi Haifa, have
previously indicated their oppo-
sition to moving to this area,
preferring either to resettle
at,.WAdi al-Khowi on the Nile
some 200 miles south of their
present location, or on the
Northern Gezira plain.
The riots were serious
enough to require the use of
tear gas and police reinforce-
ments. By 24 October, how-
Al....drIa
LIAR
(EGYPT)
w.a, R.ua
Port suaxn;
q,
WADI EL KHOVt
SUDAN
GEZIRA
ever, the situation in Wadi
Haifa had been brought under
control, and small sympathetic
demonstrations by students
in Khartoum had been quickly
dissipated.
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
-27 '?October 1960
The Abboud military govern-
ment has, nevertheless, blundered
in its handling of the problem.
Even if it now reconsiders its
decision, it has added one more
element to the various political
and religious groups which are
exerting pressure for a return
to civilian rule.
Qatar
The Ruler of the small,.oil-
producing Persian Gulf state of
Qatar has abdicated as part of
an attempt by key members of the
ruling family to resolve a con-
test between Sheik Ahmad al-
Thani, the Ruler's son, and
Sheik Khalifa Ibn Hamid, the
Ruler's young nephew. The Ruler,
in his seventies, no longer takes
much interest in the government.
Sheik Ahmad now has been named
Ruler and Sheik Khalifa, heir
apparent.
This arrangement will prob- 25X1
ably not prove durable, especi-
ally if-
Sheik
Knalira Is to be given control 25X1
over most of the government
machinery. Concerned about
growing unrest and popular re-
sentment over the extent and
flamboyance of expenditures by
the more than 400 members of
the ruling family, Khalifa hopes
to undertake political reforms
and a substantial economic de-
velopment program. If opposition
by Ahmad or other members of the
ruling family blocks the insti-
tution of such measures, the
British, who are the ultimate
arbiters of Qatar politics,
may be confronted with
traditional order.
THE TURKISH POLITICAL TRIAL
Turkey's mass political
trial, which got off to a slug-
gist start on 14 October, has
failed either to gain momentum
or capture popular enthusiasm.
The military regime faces the
problem of removing a constant
threat to itself without alien-
ating the Turkish people or
seriously damagin" Turkish
prestige abroad. Member} of the
ruling Committee of National
Union (CNU) appear.. to feel that
Turkey as a nation:. and they as
its leaders are as much on trial
as the members of'the regime
they ousted on 27 May 1960.
The primary attention thus
far in the trial has been fo-
cused on an Afghan hound sold
by ex-President Bayar, an al-
leged illegitimate child of
ex-Premier Menderes, and the
destructive anti-Greek riots
of 1955. The CNU appears to
have blundered in opening the
long-heralded political trial
with a charge of "dog thievery,"
with which it apparently in-
tended to denigrate Bayar and
Menderes personally.
At the present rate, the
trial, which involves about 500
defendants and required months
of investigation and preparation,
will last so long that the key
defendants are more likely to
meet death from old age than
from the hangman's noose. As
the trial drags on, friction
will probably increase between
the procedurally correct judges
and the impatient military. Un-
less publicity regarding the
trial is handled more effective-
ly, the entire venture may back-
fire on the present regime.
The CNU is showing sensi-
tivity to foreign and domestic
SECRET
PART I I NOTES AND COMMPNTS u" ' 2 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
criticism. Farmers in the east-
central province of Kutahya were
reported to have set fire to
the forests in the area to pro-
test the possible execution of
Menderes. Pro-Menderes elements
in the tightly packed Istanbul
slums are another potential dan-
ger. Elements of the Third Army
apparently either have been or
soon will be moved into the
Istanbul area from eastern Tur-
key as a security precaution.
The army may be expected to
crush ruthlessly any group en-
dangering domestic stability.
The government has can-
celed all leaves for the Turk-
ish National Police for the
duration of the trial. The
police are reluctant to take
forceful action against popular
demonstrators because they bore
the brunt of popular criticism
growing out of the repression
of demonstrations before the
coup. None of the groups known
to be critical of the trial ap-
pears to have the potential for
mounting a successful counter-
coup. Nonetheless, subversive
activity, including distribu-
tion of leaflets.,. posters, and
threatening letters, continues.
Opposition to death sen-
tences for political prisoners
is increasing in Turkish polit-
ical circles. Many Turks fear
that such action would pave the
way for future retaliation against
both the CNU and the Republican
Peoples' party and would damage
the further development of Turk-
ish democracy. They are also
concerned over the effect on
Turkey's prestige abroad.
Meanwhile, economic stag-
nation which has plagued the
country since the coup appears to
be easing somewhat with a par-
tial renewal of public confidence
and the prospects of a record
wheat crop. Although domestic
economic prospects appear bright-
er, however, Turkey faces a
significant cash deficit in its
balance of payments, and Turk-
ish officials are again sug-
gesting the need for substantial
foreign economic aid and a
further rescheduling of foreign
debt repayments.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Paae 13 of 19.
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President Frondizi's steps
to meet some of the Argentine
Army's demands for changes among
his advisers and policies have
greatly eased the political
crisis, but some time will be
required to resolve the various
complaints ranging from inef-
ficiency in the state oil com-
pany to pro-Peronista and Com-
munist activities.
Frondizi kept intact the
economic team responsible for
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pane 15 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
*Am,, 14W
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the US-backed stabilization
program--despite demands for
the replacement of Economy Mini-
ster Alsogaray--but made some
conciliatory changes in army
appointments. War Secretary
Larcher, special target of Army
Commander in Chief General
Carlos Toranzo Montero, was re-
placed'by General Rosendo Fraga.
A new chief of staff was also
appointed.
Frondizi established a
high-level committee under the
minister of defense to hear con-
structive suggestions from the
military on government policy.
Following several meetings with
Frondi21, this group announced
that the armed forces support
the economic stabilization pro-
gram but are critical of its
implementation. This was a dip-
lomatically softened version of
earlier army charges that the
program was handicapped by in-
efficiency, graft, and the polit-
i.cal'. maneuvers of some off i-
cials trying to woo Peronista
electoral support for forth-
coming elections.
These charges were partly
responsible for the dismissal
of Arturo Sabato, executive di-
rector of the state oil company
(YPF). Sabatohad clashed with
retired General Pedro Charpy,
unofficial army representative
on YPF's board of directors,
over YPF's efficiency and poli-
cies. Charpy also objected to
YPF's plans to solicit offers
from foreign oil companies to
operate on a production-type
contract basis in the south
flank of the Comodoro Rivadavia
area, which he maintained should
be exploited by YPF itself.
While the majority of the armed
forces do not object to Frondizi's
policy--begun in 1958--of per-
mitting foreign companies to
participate in oil development
on a contract basis, Charpy's
complaints over specific details
helped spark the recent crisis.
To expedite action on an-
other major military concern--
Communist influence in labor,
the universities, and in pro-
vincial governments--Frondizi
on 18 October established a
special commission to investi-
gate Communist activities.
Since then, the police re-
portedly have arrested more
than 100 Communists in nation-
wide raids, and the government
is unofficially reported to have
asked the USSR to reduce its dip-
lomatic staff from 15 to four,
the number Argentina has in Mos-
cow. Personnel in the six Soviet- 25X1
bloc missions in Argentina total
an estimated 200, including some
50 with diplomatic status.
ANTIGOVERNMENT VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA
As a result of antigovern-
ment student disturbances in
Caracas and several provincial
cities of Venezuela between 19
and 26 October, the armed forces
are on an alert status and
President Betancourt's three-
party coalition has come under
severe strains. The leftist
Democratic Republican Union
(URD), long a dissatisfied com-
ponent of the coalition, was
partly involved in the out-
breaks and has made no public
condemnation of them. :[ts two
remaining representativ(3s in
the cabinet have resigned on
orders of the party in order
to leave the President free to
reorganize the government."
SECRET
NwTr:R A Am rnuuwwTc --- , of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURREN' INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The student demonstrations
were promoted by the Venezuelan
Communists, the Marxist Leftist
Revolutionary Movement (MIR),
and elements of the URD, all of
which are pro-Castro and have
reportedly received sizable
subsidies from the Cuban regime
and maintained close liaison
with it. The meetings were
called to protest the arrest of
MIR leaders allegedly responsi-
ble for a press article inciting
the "popular masses" to over-
throw Betancourt,
These three factions have
allied themselves closely in
recent weeks, particularly in
a sporadically violent struggle
with Betancourt's Democratic
Action party for control of
organized labor, as well as in
demonstrations of support for
Castro, toward whom Betancourt
is hostile. They will probably
attempt to exploit the govern-
ment's critical economic dif-
ficulties, which include a high
level of unemployment and a con-
tinuing decline of foreign ex-
change reserves,
Early in September, pro-
Castro URD Foreign Minister
Arcaya resigned in protest
against the governmeht's policy
toward Cuba, but top URD leaders
have subsequently given at least
lip service to the necessity of
maintaining the coalition. The
party's growing dissatisfaction
is reflected, however, in the
two further resignations of URD
ministers and URD demands for a
new government which will carry
out a "nationalist" policy and
find solutions to the nation's
economic problems. These moves
suggest the possibility that
the URD may be considering with-
drawing from the government at
all levels and aligning with
the leftist and Communist opposi-
tion,
The armed forces, which for
the most part are believed loyal
to Betancourt, apparently favor
strong action against agitators,
and responsible moderate groups
are demanding similar measures.
This backing will strengthen 25X1
Betancourt's hand in dealing with
any unrest from a possible breakup
HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN FRICTIONS
Recent intensification of
chronic Nicaraguan-Honduran
squabbles over Nicaraguan exile
activities in Honduras has fur-
ther increased bitterness over
the century-old border dispute
between those countries which
now is before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The
court's decision in the case is
expected before December and
could well threaten the govern-
ment in whichever country loses
the dispute.
Nicaraguan President Somoza,
who has been a special target
of Castro's hostility, has com-
plained that Honduran President
Villeda Morales is only paying
lip service to the commitments
he made under an OAS agreement
in 1958 to control the activi-
ties of Nicaraguan revolutionary
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pacrp 17 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
-SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October' 1960
groups. Somoza charges that
Honduran expulsion of exiles is
meaningless, since they are al-
lowed to return, some of them
directly from Cuba. Active
prosecution and neutralization
of the rebel groups by the
Villeda government is apparent-
ly deterred by two factors:
financial inability to mount
adequate army operations in the
:roadless border area and fear
that strong action might bring
into open conflict the already
feuding left and right wings
of the ruling party, thus jeop-
ardizing the constitutional
government.
Villeda evidently does not
take seriously the Nicaraguan
suggestion that Cuba might use
the revolutionaries against his
government, professing to believe
that Honduras, as a friend of
all progressive social movements,
has nothing to fear from them.
The embassy lees this attitude
is based at least partly on
Villeda's awareness of the pro-
Castro and anti-Somoza attitudes
of his party's important left
wing.
Somoza and Villeda both
face considerable domestic op-
position to their respective
governments, and a clear-cut
ICJ decision would pose a real
threat to the administration of
the losing country, although the
disputed area is sparsely settled
and largely undeveloped. Neither
Nicaragua nor Honduras is polit-
ically mature enough to accept
serenely any adverse results of
a juridical process, and the gov-
ernment would be held responsi- 25X1
ble for a defeat. Honduras be-
lieves the Somoza government is
already using alarms over exile
activity to divert attention from
what the Villeda government is
sure will be Nicaragua's "ab-
ject defeat at The Hague,"
The six-man civilian-mili-
tary junta that replaced Presi-
dent Jose Maria Lemus early on
26 October in a bloodless coup
sought immediately to secure
the backing of the leftist ele-
ments whose demonstrations last
August and September critically
weakened the Lemus administra-
t e new government 25X1
will be friendly to the United
States and that the military
elements in the junta will main-
tain control over the civilian
member.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Puue 18 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
'27 October 1960
One of these civilian junta
members; Dr. Fortin Magana, is
known to have extreme leftist
tendencies and has reportedly
announced that all existing rec-
ognized political parties, as
well as the previously illegal
Communist-front group, will be
permitted to participate in
elections due in 1962. Public
reaction to the change of gov-
ernment has been generally
apathetic, although there has
been some rejoicing in the
streets, apparently over the
release of all political pris-
oners.. Junta members told news-
men that exiles also would be
permitted to return. Probably
most of those being freed or al-
lowed to return were pro-Castro
or pro-Communist participants
in the August and September dis-
orders. Press reports that
Lemus now is in Guatemala are
unconfirmed.
The ouster of Lemus prob-
ably was engineered by followers
of ex-President Oscar Osorio.
Colonels Escamilla and Miguel
Angel Castillo, a junta member,
are reported to have held weekly
meetings with Osorio for several
weeks prior to the coup. Osorio,
a retired army officer, appears
to have strong backing in the
armed forces, which began to
consider ousting Lemus after
he showed himself as a weak
and inept executive in dealing
with pro-Communist and pro-
Castro demonstrators who threat-
ened the government during Au-
gust and September. ()sorio
would almost certainly attempt
to implement reforms to al-
leviate the country's deep-
seated social and economic prob-
lems. While Osorio is known to
be strongly anti-Communist, he
might attempt to apply some
radical reform measures. The
US Embassy stated last month
that as president he probably
would not be as openly pro-US
or as amenable to US suggestions
as Lemus was.
The Soviet news agency
TASS commented almost immedi-
,tteiy, that Lemus lost au-
thority among the people be-
cause of "his complete sub-
mission to the interests of
the United States." The New
China News Agency attributed
the coup to "seething discon-
tent" with Lemus for "fol-
lowing the United States in' its 25X1
inter: vention ':in Cuba and suppres-
sion of democratic forces at
home. "
SECRET
PART IT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 19 of 19
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY GARY
.27 October 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
"Chairman Mao's thinking
is the only correct thinking
guiding the party, and if one
separates oneself from it un-
der any circumstances...mistakes
are apt to occur." This eulogy
to Mao in 1960 contrasts with
the position taken in 1956 that
"our party has always held that
no political parties or indi-
viduals are free from flaws...
and our party abhors the deifi-
cation of the individual." The
1956 statement was China's
somewhat reluctant echo of the
USSR's denigration of Stalin,
but the gulf between the two
pronouncements indicates the
extent to which the cult of the
individual has flourished of
late in Communist China.
This cult is not limited
to the often repeated boast
that Mao Tse-tung is the
"world's greatest contempo-
rary theoretician of Marxism-
Leninism," but extends into
the personal sphere as well.
"Great, brilliant, wise, com-
passionate, tender, and trust-
worthy" are a few of the ad-
jectives used to describe him.
The physical prowess of the 67-
year-old Mao is acclaimed in
tales of how he swims the
Yangtze River, and his person-
al magnetism is extolled by
visitors "thrilled" to meet
him. His frugality and dis-
dain for personal comfort are
popular legends, according to
the Peiping press. In short,
Come lets go together
To the golden bridge of happiness;...
Sing, let's sing together,
A paen of praise to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
--Tibetan song.
We worship no god, nor temples build,
Chairman Mao's love is greater manifold.
Gods we destroy, and temples tear down,
Better than gods we worship the One Man.
Mountains may shake, earth may quake,
And we are not afraid,
But we dare not forget what the Chairman said.
--Inner Mongolian song.
the regime has portrayed Mao
as an omniscient paragon of
virtue--a perfect father-fig-
ure.
On the domestic front, this
benevolent image of Mao has been
intended in large part to en-
courage popular loyalty to the
regime and to arouse enthusiasm
But during the 21 years since the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935,
our party under the leadership of the central committee headed by Comrade
Mao Tse-Tung has not made any mistake in its line.
- -Liu Shao-chi, September 1956
We defintely cannot take an attitude of compromise in dealing with
the various thoughts, trends, and feelings which are opposed to the
thought of Mao Tse-tung, no matter where such reactionary thoughts are
found.... --Political Stud-u 12 October 1960
Failure to understand his thinking means failure to understand
politics; to let politics take command actually means to let Mao Tse-
tung assume command. --Creation. 1 February 1960
Now with my own eyes I saw his forehead, as he put out his hand
and personally invited us inside. I shook hands with Chairman Mao,
whose hands were soft with a tenderness that seemed ready to embrace
me entirely. --Chinese Literature. September 1960
SECRET
for the tremendous
efforts and sacri-
fices needed to carry
out Communist pro-
grams in China.
Internationally,
the Chinese Commu-
nists have attempted
to use Mao's reputa-
tion to enhance their
standing in the bloc.
They have relied on
his prestige as a
Marxist theoretician
to support their pre-
tensions to ideolog-
ical pre-eminence in
the bloc and to but-
tress their argu-
ments in the dispute
PART III PATTERNS Awn PERSPF["TTVES Parr? 1 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October .1.960
with the Soviet Union. The
'2ussians have taken obvious um-
brage at this effort.ru-
shchev felt it necessary to at-
tack Mao personally at the
9ucharest meeting last June,
compared him to Stalin, and
stated that Mao's theories are
formulated without any contact
with reality. The Chinese del-
egate angrily retorted that Khru-
shchev was the one out of touch
with reality, and a revisionist
as well.
Before De-Stalihization
Mao Tse-tung was one of
the original founding members
of the Chinese Communist party
in 1921 and has been its un-
disputed leader for the past
25 years. Nonetheless, his
rise to power within the party
entailed many setbacks and dis-
appointments, including expul-
sion from the party central
committee at one time. When
Mao won control in 1935 during
the "Long March," the Commu-
nists were on the run and at a
low ebb in their power. Many
of the claims now advanced for
Mao rest simply on the fact
that he built the party and its
military machine into a force
that eventually defeated the
Nationalists. Since Mao was
successful, he was "correct."
Although Mao formally as-
sumed the party chairmanship in
1938, the leadership cult did
not develop until the early
1:940s. In discussing the edu-
cation of party members in 1939,
for example, party theoretician
Liu Shao-chi wrote: "The term
collective leadership and demo-
cratic centralism means that
leadership is not an individual
matter; on the contrary, the
leaders are bound by policies
that have been derived by demo-
cratic methods." Liu did not
extol Mao's virtues at all in
that article.
At the seventh party con-
gress in 1945, however, Liu--
influenced in part by the So-
viet glorification of Stalin--
set forth the authoritative
view of Mao as China's counter-
part of the great Stalin: "Our
party, and this is very impor-
tant, is one that now has its
own great leader, Comrade Mao
Tse-tung.... He has pointed
out to the Chinese people, sunk
in deep misery, the only clear,
sure road to complete! and thor-
oughgoing liberation, the Mao
Tse-tung road."
The revised party statutes
which Liu presented to the con-
gress paid tribute to Mao's al-
leged contribution to Marxist
theory: "The Chinese Communist
party takes the theories of
Marxism-Leninism and the com-
bined principles derived from
the practical experiences of
the Communist revolution--the
thought of Mao Tse-tong--as the
guiding principles of all its
work...."
If Mao was thus elevated
to the Marxist pantheon, the
Chinese were still careful to
keep him on a level Subordinate
to Stalin. Until the Soviet
dictator's death in 1953, the
claims pressed for Mao were
carefully hedged and for the
most part unpublicized beyond
the domestic scene. A People's
Daily editorial of 7 March1953
eulogizing Stalin put Mao in
the role of the Soviet dictator's
disciple: "The Chinese revolu-
tion achieved victory under the
leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-
tung, following the guidance
of Comrade Stalin."
After Stalin's death, the
new leaders in the Kremlin, per-
haps still unsure themselves or
hoping to cement the Sino-Soviet
alliance, apparently thought it
expedient to make some gestures
to flatter the Chinese ego. Be-
tween May and December 1953,
several reviews of Mao's works
appearing in Pravda and Izvestia
asserted that Mao iad maU_e__fra-
valuable contribution to the
SECRET
PART TTT PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES :Page 2 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMMtY
.,27 October 1960
treasure chest of Marxism-
Leninism." The reviewers point-
ed out, however, that the value
of Mao's contributions on Marx-
ism lies'in their application to
the Chinese scene, and that it
would be profitable for revolu-
tionaries in colonial and semi-
colonial countries to study his
work; they did not concede that
his work had universal signif-
icance.
The cult of Mao in China
flourished after Stalin's death.
Thus 1hrushchev's denunciation
of Stalin and the "cult of per-
sonality" at the Soviet 20th
party congress in February 1956
came as a bombshell to the Chi-
nese Communists.
Peiping's response was
carefully thought out. A Peo-
ple's Daily editorial of 4
pri 1956, entitled "On the
Historical Experience Concern-
ing the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat," did not echo the
emotional tone of Khrushchev's
denunciation. Instead, it es-
sayed a dispassionate discus-
sion of Stalin's errors and
concluded that, his mistakes
notwithstanding, Stalin had
made a great contribution to
Marxism-Leninism and that his
writings would continue to be
studied in China.
The Chinese were evidently
embarrassed by the parallels
many would have drawn between
Stalin and Mao; it was deemed
necessary to congratulate the
Soviet party for correcting its
mistakes but to imply that
Peiping had not fallen into
similar errors, inasmuch as
the Chinese Communist party
relied "on the wisdom of the
masses of the people."
Peiping did little that
really detracted from Mao Tse-
tung's stature in the subse-
quent period, although it made
some show of stress on "collec-
tive leadership." At the eighth
party congress, which met in
September 1956, the allusion
to "the thought of Mao Tse-tung"
was removed from the party stat-
utes. Nonetheless, speeches
at the congress were filled with
laudatory references to the
party chairman, and Teng Hsiao-
ping, who presented the new
party statutes, stated, "Marx-
ism has never denied the role
of outstanding individuals or
the role of leaders within the
party."
In at least one respect,
de-Stalinization was apparently
responsible for a significant
modification in Mao's own con-
cept of his role as a leader;
he appeared to think it more
necessary than ever to project
the image of a leader whose
ear was always attuned to "the
wisdom of the masses," From
his assumption of power in 1949
through 1956, Mao apparently
had made only ten trips outside
Peiping, but in 1957 alone he
made 13 trips to the hinter-
land, and from 1958 to date he
has made even more inspection
tours away from the capital. So
far this year, Mao has spent
less than half his time in Pei-
ping.
Between 1956 and early
1958, Peiping's propaganda or-
gans continued to treat Mao
deferentially, although in a
more muted tone than before
de-Stalinization. The prop-
aganda was not entirely suc-
cessful in creating the in-
tended public image of Mao.
The party leaders were clearly
shocked by the anti-Mao senti-
ments voiced by a few fool-
hardy intellectuals during the
"hundred flowers" campaign in
1957. According to the Com-
munist press, criticisms of
the Chinese leader included
such statements as "Chairman
Mao loves to be great and
meritorious," "meets only those
who seek to please him," is
"hot-tempered," "impetuous,"
and "reckless," and "assumes
the air of a benevolent god."
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Paap 3 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMgy
27 October .1960
There is probably some
truth in these charges; how-
ever, the infrequency of purg-
es among senior Chinese Commu-
nist leaders over the past 25
years suggests that Mao does
not suffer from the paranoia
which plagued Stalin.
Great Leap Forward
In 1958, Communist China
inaugurated sweeping economic
and social changes which were
hailed as harbingers of a
utopia: the "great leap for-
ward" was begun, and most of
the rural Chinese were reorgan-
ized into communes. Peiping's
aggressive, brash efforts were
probably predicated on the
leaders' grim realization of
the tremendous problems which
China faced in attempting to
transform itself quickly into
a modern, industrialized na-
tion. Desperate measures
seemed called for, and, in an
effort to obtain a maximum ef-
fort from the people, the re-
gime began to rely heavily on
"Maoism"--the term used by Pei-
ping to designate the theoret-
ical writings of Mao as well as
his personal qualities as a
leader.
An example of the treat-
ment accorded the party chair-
man in this period is the speech
Liu Shao-chi made in May 1958
before the second session of the
eighth party congress. Liu
credited Mao personally with
the speed-up of the First Five-
Year Plan, the proposals in the
draft program for agricultural
development, and for progress
in general. As Liu saw it, Mao-
ism was basic to future economic
development; achievements would
come more easily because of "the
practical experience gained in
the people's. struggle and of the
development of MaoTse-tung's
thinking in the past few years."
In June 1958 the regime
launched w major program to pro-
mote the study of Mao's works.
Millions of persons spent sev-
eral hours a week attempting to
understand Maoism. The party
apparently had two objectives:
to rebuild confidence among
those whose faith was shaken
during the antirightist campaign
of 1957-58 and to inculcate en-
thusiasm for the new leap-for-
ward program.
An attempt to personalize
the lofty figure of Mao was also
made. A spate of articles on
the theme "I knew Chairman Mao
when..." appeared in the press.
Most of these reminiscences,
written by soldiers who had ac-
companied the party chairman on
the Long March or before, were
filled with tales of his kind-
ness and consideration. They
all included such statements as,
"I felt in him the love of a
father."
Peiping's drive in 1958
for unparalleled progress fell
short of its objectives. Al-
though much economic headway
had been made, there was con-
siderable popular discontent
with the communes, which had
been organized too hastily.
Furthermore, the regime's gran-
diose scheme to double its iron
and steel output by establish-
ing "backyard" furnaces in the
communes failed miserably.
In December 1958 Mao Tse-
tung announced his decision to
retire as chief of state and in-
dicated that he wished to de-
vote his time to writing and
study and to his duties as par-
ty chairman. Tempting though
it may be to link Mao's resig-
nation from the government to
the failure of programs closely
associated with his name, there
is no evidence that his author-
ity had been challenged or that
his control over the party had
slipped.
It is true, on the other
hand, that the emphasis on both
Maoism and the adulation of Mao
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTTVES patrp 4 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
27 October 1960
as an individual slackened dur-
ing the period of consolidation
and review in early 1959. Pre-
mier Chou En-lai made a major
address before the National
People's Congress in April, for
example, in which he mentioned
Mao only three times. In a sim-
ilar speech in May 1958, Liu
Shao-chi had invoked the lead-
er's name 21 times. Feature
articles in People's Daily ap-
peared without any ref-erence
to the party chairman.
During the first half of
1059, statistical teams at-
tempted to verify the inflated
production claims for the pre-
vious year. The survey of the
statistical teams showed that
these claims had been grossly
overstated. It became obvious
to all that the 1959 economic
goals were completely unrealis-
tic, and the regime had to de-
termine whether it would con-
tinue to operate on the basis
of false claims or confess its
errors. To do the first would
have entailed maintaining an
almost impossible fiction and
made further planning extremely
difficult.
The decision to admit the
exaggeration of production fig-
ures and targets was made in
early August 1959. The central
committee did not concede that
Mao had made errors in princi-
ple; and fiercely castigated
those who had. been "viciously
slandering and attacking... our
great leap forward and people's
commune movement..., They have
suffered ignominious defeat."
In this defensive tone the cen-
tral committee went on to af-
firm: "The wisdom and the
might of the masses is unlim-
ited. Enlightened and led by
the party and Mao Tse-tung,
this wisdom and might have be-
come irresistible,,.,"
The thesis that the party
and Mao had been right all the
time was necessary unless there
was to be a major purge among
the leaders. Presumably Mao
was too strong to challenge,
or at least too many of the
other top leaders had jointly
authored the extremist policies,
The image of Mao the omniscient
was again invoked to inspire
the doubters and the shaken.
Shortly afterward, at the
tenth anniversary of the Chi-
nese Communist regime on 1 Oc-
tober 1959, extravagant claims
were put forward of Peiping's
achievements. It was in this
period that the first sweeping
assertion was made of Mao's
universal significance, when
central committee member Liu
Lan-tao termed him "the most
prominent Marxist-Leninist rev-
olutionary, politician, and
theorist among all living con-
temporaries."
Of greater importance, by
autumn of 1959 several disputes
had developed with Moscow over
Chinese domestic programs and
bloc strategy. The controversy
gave added impetus to the Chi-
nese effort to portray Mao as
the legitimate heir to Lenin,
It was deemed essential to show
that the Chinese, not the Zus-
sians, were the orthodox Marx-
ists: Peiping counted heavily
on Mao's prestige as a theoreti-
cian to lend authority to its
arguments.
Present Image
A mass movement 'to study
theory, launched by the party
in December 1959, has continued
to the present, Mao's thought
is portrayed as a development
and perfection of Marxism, and
the people are told how fortu-
nate they are to live in the
"era of Mao Tse-tung." Maoism
seems almost to have replaced
Marxism in emphasis. Ideolog-
ical articles always give a
nod to Marx and Lenin, but they
make it clear that Mao's inter-
pretations are what count, be-
cause he deals with practical-
ities and the present: "Maoism
is the key to Marxism."
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES T3nsr,- 5 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Claims for Mao as a Marx-
ist theorist are closely inter-
woven with assertions concern-
ing his ability as a military
strategist. The latter claims
were spotlighted in August 1960
when the revolutionary Military
Museum was formally opened in
Peiping. According to an arti-
cle in the regime's English-
language edition of Peking Re-
view, the museum epitom zed_
' e correct political and mil-
itary thinking of Comrade Mao
Tse-tung, our great, respected,
and beloved leader." Appropri-
ately enough, the motto over the
entrance, in eight-foot gold
letters, "A Single Spark Can
Start a Prairie Fire" is in
Mao's calligraphy and is the
title of one of his books.
Additional emphasis was
placed on the military aspects
of Mao's thought with the Octo-
ber 1960 publication of the
fourth volume of his Selected
Works, which deals wi Ee
UH'Inese civil war and revolu-
tion. The commentary and re-
views of the book use Mao's
analysis of the civil war to
defend Peiping's position in
the present Sino-Soviet dispute.
To do this, they first en-
deavor to demonstrate that Mao's
writings have the stature of the
other Marxist scriptures. This
demonstration is accomplished
mainly by fiat: "The Mao Tse-
tung ideology is Marxism-Lenin-
ism in its fullest developed
form in the era of the socialist
revolution by the proletariat";
i.e., Mao is the greatest theo-
rist since Lenin. Such asser-
tions do not sit well with the
Soviet Union.
Maoism has reached such
heights in Communist China that
it seems a permanent part of
the political landscape--to re-
main as long as Mao does, and
perhaps longer. After the par-
ty chairman's death or polit-
ical demise, especially if his
successor wants to improve re-
lations with the USSR, it is
possible that a re-evaluation
will take place, as in the case
of Stalin. If the successor
wishes to maintain present Chi-
nese positions against Moscow,
however, he will have no choice
but to retain "Maoism," Peiping's
pretensions to ideological lead-
ership will depend heavily on 25X1
the acceptance of Mao in the
Communist pantheon.
As the UN General Assem-
bly moves toward consideration
of the Algerian issue, the con-
tending forces remain stalemated,
although the pressures on them
are apparently becoming more in-
tense. The rebels continue un-
der severe French military pres-
sure, but have received addi-
tional backing in recent ap-
proaches to Moscow and Peiping,
and are almost certain to have
substantial Afro-Asian support
in the General Assembly for
their effort "to international-
ize" the conflict,
De Gaulle's 195 offer of
so : --C33"tL:''imLriaCion ;?emains
France's official position, but
there appears to be a growing
diversity of French views. Pop-
ular opinion now seems to be
swinging in favor of political
negotiations with the rebels
and even toward eventual inde-
pendence for Algeria, but army
sentiment is still adamant a-
gainst such negotiations, and
rightist leaders have in the
past few months become more in-
clined to challenge De Gaulle
directly on this issue.
Despite the apparently
hopeful evolution of negoti-
ating positions on each side
since Do Gaulle came to power,
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pare 6 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
J SOUDAN N
O Gas field
? Oil field
Oil pipeline
/~ om
Bechar Hassi Messuoud
I Colomb
J
Arrew
~yr /'~24" Oi peline
t
l
'G
e
izane
ran V
zap peel ne 15,000 ALN
` 24" pipeline
auggour> B'r Ro)ane
0
6 pipeline ?~\
?EI Gassi
/Tunis`'(f_
(. TUNISIA
110,000 u
ALN ekhire
Zuara - _; Gulf ofSldr~
Tripoli --\
V-Tdle! P 0 L I T
R E; N A I C A
?
Edjele Fields
F E Z Z A N
---Gas pipeline under construction
Electrified barrier
TT Railroad
NIGER
both French and rebel positions
have hardened since the failure
of preliminary talks at Melun
in June. The rebel leaders
have steadfastly rejected a
cease-fire without prior polit-
ical guarantees for the future
of their movement, and De Gaulle
has held to his stand that fight-
ing must cease before political
terms can be discussed.
Military Situation
The approximately 440,000
French military forces in Al-
geria--of which about one quar-
ter are Moslems--confront ap-
proximately 15,000 rebels dis-
persed in small units. An es-
timated 10,000 other rebel
soldiers are in Tunisia and
6,000 in Morocco, but the elec-
trified barriers which the
French constructed along both
borders have made it-increas-
ingly difficult for rebel re-
inforcements and supplies to
enter Algeria.
;decent military action
has been mostly limited to
minor local operations. The
French claim the level of ter-
rorist acts in Algeria has
dropped one third in the past
year, but the rebels will prob-
ably continue ambushes, assas-
sinations, and grenade attacks
to discourage the emergence of
a Moslem "third force" willing
to cooperate with France. Vic-
tims are far more frequently
Moslems than Europeans. The
rebel underground terrorist
organization in France on 23
October renewed its attacks on
the French police, apparently
as a demonstration of its abil-
ity to "carry the war into
France itself."
The Melun negotiations
were broken off primarily be-
cause of rebel demands to be
treated as representatives of
a government, and the Provi-
sional Algerian Government
(PGAR) has not modified its
conditions since then. It has,
however, intensified its ef-
forts to internationalize the
SECRET
6,000 ALN (Gas)
MOROCCO ?~
Hassi R' Mel b
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES na. da 7 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU'MEY
27 October 1960
conflict. Premier Ferhat Abbas'
recent trip to Peiping's Na-
tional Day celebrations and
two stopovers in Moscow on his
first visit to the Communist
bloc were designed to show the
West that the rebels are in
earnest when they say they will
accept Communist aid if neces-
sary in their fight for inde-
pendence. Abbas and his group,
like a previous rebel delegation
to Peiping last spring, were
accorded an enthusiastic recep-
tion and had several conferences
with top Chinese officials. A
joint communique of 5 October
affirmed Peiping's intention to
give "total assistance and its
support to the Algerian people
in pursuit and intensification
of its armed struggle."
The USSR, which previously
maintained a "neutral" stand so
as not to alienate De Gaulle,
has dropped its cautious atti-
tude toward the PGAR. Abbas
held talks with high Soviet of-
ficials in Moscow both en route
to and returning from his visit
to Peiping. Khrushchev, at his
own initiative, met with mem-
bers of the Algerian rebel
"delegation" while in New York,
and on 7 October
extended de facto
recognition to the
PGAR.
Tunisia and
Morocco are support-
ing the rebels' at-
tempts "to interna-
tionalize" the war,
partly through ef-
forts to get the UN
more directly in-
volved. Leaders of
both countries see
in the UN's Congo
operations a prece-
dent they feel
could be useful in
solving the Algerian
problem. Tunisian
President Bourgui-
ba's vague proposal
of "union" between
his government and
the rebels' regime was appar-
ently offered as a means either
of jarring De Gaulle into some
further proposals or of provok-
ing French incursions into Tu-
nisian territory which would
permit a new appeal to the UN
for protection.
In addition, Bourguiba
has recently said that he would
facilitate the passage of arms
and volunteers from any source
to help in the liberation of
Algeria. Morocco, anxious not
to seem less pro-PGAR than
Tunisia, has magnified several
recent violations of its terri-
tory by French troops in Al-
geria and has publicly consid-
ered various means of retalia-
tion.
While no change has been
made in the official French
policy favoring self--determi-
nation for Algeria, there has
been a considerable modifica-
tion of French opinions on the
subject of Algeria. De Gaulle's
constant' repetition of the
self-determination and "Algeri-
an Algeria" themes--sometimes
on occasions which seemed
The future of Algeria rests with the Algerians, not as thrust upon
them by machine gun and knife, but according to the wishes which they
will freely express through universal suffrage.... The three arrangements
which it is possible to conceive of will be the object of the consultation.
One of these would be secession, where some believe independence would
reside, France would then leave the Algerians, who would have expressed
their wish to become separated from her. They would organize, without
her, the territory in which they live, the resources which they have at
their call, the government which they desire.... Or else, out-and-out
identification with France, such as is implied in the equality of rights....
Or else, the government of Algeria by Algerians, backed up by French
help and in narrow relationship with her, for economy, teaching, defense,
and foreign relations.
--Television address, 16 Sept 1959
We wanted to solve the Algerian problem in a manner now well known
in every household in the world. First of all, we wanted the fighting
and assassinations to come to an end. We want the cooling-off period to
follow. We want everyone to return home. We want the people to renew
contacts with one another. We want them to look the situation in the
face, which is to say, to see the necessity of developing Algeria. Later,
when this necessity is understood, the Algerians will decide their own.
destiny. I am sure that they will decide in favor of an Algerian
Algeria in close union with France. That makes good sense both for
them and for us.
--Speech in Normandy, 7 July 1960
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
..
..SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October 1960
propitious for spelling out
further steps--has disappointed
many who had pinned their hopes
on a bold new move to settle
the question. The mounting
frustration in France over the
Algerian issue has combined
with discontent on economic
and other issues to bring De
Gaulle under the heaviest po-
litical attack since he came
to power.
The spectacular trial in
September of the "Jeanson net-
work" of French supporters of
the Algerian rebels has been
seized on by leftist, liberal,
and clerical groups to express
opposition to the army's meth-
ods of conducting the war. Calls
for peace negotiations--in some
cases even on the rebels' terms
--have been issued by the prin-
cipal labor unions and the for-
merly pro - De Gaulle Socialist
party. Teachers' associations
and the Catholic hierarchy have
expressed concern for the youths
compelled to participate in the
war, and a "manifesto" by a
group of leading intellectuals
goes so far as to proclaim the
right of soldiers to desert a
wrong cause.
Rightist leaders have
countered with appeals for the
maintenance of French Algeria
and to patriotism--as in the
case of the manifesto of 200
writers, teachers, and French
Academy members includin
Marshal Juin.
On balance, De Gaulle's
campaign has succeeded in win-
ning broad popular support for
his self-determination policy.
Most Frenchmen would probably
accept a carefully handled
French initiative leading to
political negotiations with the
rebels or even to Algerian in-
dependence.
Such a move, however, would
depend on the army, which has
probably been the principal
single force limiting ;De Gaulle's
freedom to solve the Algerian
problem. The majority of the
officer corps appears to be com-
ing around to the idea that Al-
gerian independence is inevitable.
These officers would not acqui-
esce in any negotiated settle-
ment requiring the army's with-
drawal from Algeria, however,
until they were certain that
European settlers and ;pro-French
Moslems were in no danger.from
rebel elements.
The army is further con-
cerned to have at least the ap-
pearance of a victory over the
rebels. Although a number of
"activists" wish to overturn
De Gaulle, they could not drag
the remainder into an overt
move against him unless he af-
forded a clear-cut pretext which
could be interpreted by them
as a "sellout"' to the rebels,
Progress in Algeria
Paris can point to some
progress within Algeria itself,
where official French policy in-
sists that the solution of the
problem requires the Moslem and
European communities to work to-
gether to build a modern econ-
omy and political structure.
Two-thirds of all elective of-
fices have been reserved for
Moslems in parliamentary and
local elections held since 1958.
The rebels failed to intimidate
Moslem candidates, but many of
these candidates were not rep-
resentative of Moslem opinion.
In September, Parris con-
vened meetings of commissions
appointed from among Algerian
elected officials to study
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
various aspects of the Algerian
administration. Their effective-
ness is doubtful thus far, but
they at least constitute a prec-
edent for French consultations
with a cross-section of Algerian
Moslems on nonpolitical issues.
Meanwhile, a gradual upward
trend is apparent in the Algeri-
an economy. Although the five-
year $4.3 billion Constantine
Plan for Algerian economic de-
velopment announced by De Gaulle
in October 1958 has not yet
been formalized, some new indus-
trial investment has
been attracted. Pro-
duction and exports
of Saharan petroleum
have been stepped up
with the completion
of two 24-inch pipe-
lines between the oil
fields and the Med-
iterranean, and pe-
troleum exports now
are approaching an
annual rate of
6,000,000 tons. Ma-
jor progress has also
been made on con-
struction of the
pipeline from the
Bassi R'mel natural
gas fields which will
ultimately supply
Algiers and Oran with
cheap power for in-
dustrial develop-
ment.
The French delegation will
take no part in the proceedings
at the UN on Algeria, and De
Gaulle's slighting references
to the UN in his speeches this
fall were probably designed to
condition the French public to
a setback on the Algerian issue.
in that body. Paris can be ex-
pected to refuse to take cog-
nizance of any UN resolution,
and will probably issue strong
protests to all allies of France
which fail to vote against "out-
side interference" in the Al-
gerian problem.
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION ON ALGERIA
1955
1959
01025 A
UN General Assembly
10th session inscribed question of Algeria
on its agenda. France walked out of Assem-
bly. Assembly later decided not to consider
the question further.
11th session adopted unanimously conciliatory
resolution expressing hope that a "peaceful,
democratic, and just solution will be found."
and Tunisia and expressing wish for a solution
through "pourparlers."
12th session adopted moderate resolution tak-
ing note of the offerof good offices by Morocco
people to independence" and urged negotia-
13th session failed by one vote to adopt reso-
lution which recognized "right of Algerian
14th session failed by one vote to adopt reso-
lution urging "pourparlers" take place looking
toward a peaceful solution based on the right
of self-determination.
The focus of attention
on the Algerian problem in the
next few weeks will be in the
UN General Assembly, where the
Political Committee is expected
to begin debate on the Algerian
item about mid-November. The
increase in UN members with an
anticolonial bias, plus the
USSR's injection of an appeal
for the end of all colonial re-
gimes, makes it almost certain
that this session will pass a
resolution on Algeria that goes
far beyond the 1956 and 1957 ex-
pressions of hope that a solu-
tion might be found through
negotiations.
With the support of the
African states belonging to the
French Community, a resolution
calling for a UN-conducted ref-
erendum in Algeria might receive
the necessary two-thirds major-
ity. An active campaign by
other members of the Afro-Asian
bloc--such as Tunisia, the UAR,
India, and Ghana--has already
begun to influence some of these
French Community states, although
counterpressures may be exerted
as a result of the meeting of
the French-speaking African
states at Abidjan called by
Ivory Coast Premier Houph-
ouet-Boigny on 24 October.
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page. 10 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 October.1960
The special weakness of
France's position in the UN
this year is that, unless pro-
French Houphouet-Boigny can
devise some suitable plan at
the Abidjan meeting, there will
probably be no moderating in-
fluence on the Algerian issue
from Asian or African UN mem-
bers, Unless such a moderat-
ing influence soon develops,
it is doubtful that a resolu-
tion mild enough to be accept-
able to France's allies will be
proposed.
There is a possibility
that an anti-French UN vote,
particularly if a resolution
calls for the UN's physical
presence in Algeria in any form,
might produce a new solidarity
in France behind another govern-
ment attempt to solve the Alge-
rian problem as an "internal"
question, French press specu-
lation is running to predictions
of a move to resume negotiations
with the rebels--possibly even
before the UN debate--or, if
such negotiations fail, to mateI r
srl.izd, of new steps by the French
to create institutions for self-
government along "Algerian Al-
geria" lines.
In line with the latter pos-
sibility, Premier Debre has
hinted that if the military sit-
uation is basically unchanged by
spring, the government may take
the initiative to assure great-
er local representation in ad-
ministration. In either of these
cases, one motive would be to
build up a responsible Moslem
group which might ultimately be
able to treat with the rebels,
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 11
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3
Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3