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November 7, 2008
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October 27, 1960
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Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 DOCUmFNT NO. F 1pEA31 At cap Nov. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY State Dept. review completed N? CHANGE IN CLASS. ^ 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: Md-A& RUTH: HR 70-2 _ DATE: REVIEWER: Z 5 MAY 1980 COPY NO. OCR NO- 4901/60 27 October 1960 DIA review(s) completed. 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 ~ 'ftw. CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 While continuing to attack Western policies on dis- armament, nuclear testing, and Berlin, Moscow has initi- ated moves designed to set the stage for a new effort at General Assembly session in March or April to be at- tended by the heads of government. The bloc has also moved to establish a deadline on the nuclear test ban talks and to bring the issue before the UN General summit meeting on Berlin by April at the latest. At the UN the bloc delegations are apparently preparing to walk out of the disarmament discussion in the Political Com- mittee and launch an intensified campaign for a special negotiations on these issues. Khrushchev repeated his call for Assembly. Che Guevara has departed for the Sino-Soviet bloc with an economic mission to arrange for next year's trade and further integrate Cuba economically with the bloc. Soviet bloc military specialists continue active in Cuba and many more will be required to train Cubans in the use of bloc military equipment. While most Latin Ameri- can governments believe the new US restrictions on ex- ports to Cuba were justified, there has been strong criticism by Chile and Mexico. The Castro regime, at least for the moment, has increased its popularity among the lower classes through the urban reform law. Scat- tered opposition groups, however, continue active inside Cuba despite the regime's denials. In the Dominican Republic, a further weakening of Trujillo's position is evidenced in the poor turnout for his birthday demonstration on 24 October and in the worsening economic situation. Page 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7 Fighting has resumed in southeastern Phong Saly Province, apparently as the result of Laotian Government efforts to retake two posts lost earlier to the Pathet Lao. Persistent but still unsubstantiated rumors are current that Captain Kong Le's paratroopers are prepar- ing to resume attacking Phoumi's forces southeast of Pak Sane, CONFIDENTIAL THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART I (continued) Souvanna's recent movement toward a more openly anti-Communist position could conceivably incline Kong Le toward such action. SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 Events appear to be moving in Lumumba's favor. Colonel Mobutu is confronted with growing disorders in the armed forces and political opposition in at least two provinces. Mobutu's major difficulty, however, is with the UN Command in Leopoldville. For its part, the UN has been unable to discover a local government which would have significant Congolese support and satisfy the demands for "legitimacy" on the part of Ghana, Guinea, UAR, and Morocco. NOTES AND COMMENTS SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE:CONTINUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Preparatory committees are reported to have been work- ing for some weeks in Moscow on a resolution to be present- ed to the meeting of world Communist parties--scheduled to be held around 7 November--which has been called to consider the Sino-Soviet dispute. Recent authoritative statements from both parties have reaffirmed their basic positions and add to indications that they will find it difficult to resolve their conflicting views. USSR PURCHASING LARGE FREE-WORLD TANKERS . . . . . . . . . Page 3 To ensure the long-term growth and stability of its petroleum exports, the Soviet Union is making a major of-- fort to expand its relatively small and slow tanker fleet by purchasing large, modern tankers in the free world. Russian crews have taken possession of two such vessels recently constructed in Japan and the Netherlands, and the USSR is negotiating with Italy for six or seven large tankers. The expansion of the USSR's oil exports--- dramatized this year by a commitment to supply all Cuban needs--has required substantial readjustments in Soviet tanker operations. THE CASE OF COMRADE LARIONOV--A LESSON FOR SOVIET PACE SETTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 The personal tragedy of central committee member Aleksey Nikolayevich Larionov has a distinctly Soviet SECRET ii THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET ~.r CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 PART II (continued) twist and is symptomatic of the great pressures generated by this year's agricultural difficulties. Larionov, the party boss of Ryazan Oblast, had been singled out for praise by Khrushchev at the December 1959 party plenum for his accomplishments in agriculture. By the time of his death in late September, he was in official disfavor, apparently for failing to fulfill the extravagant pledges for his oblast,to which Khrushchev had pointed as an ex- ample for all. UNCERTAINTY IN PEIPING OVER FUTURE ECONOMIC MOVES . . . . Page 5 The Communist regime in Peiping appears worried over the state of the Chinese economy and uncertain over what to do about it. Peiping's comments on industrial achieve- ments so far this year have been uncommonly vague, but the major troubles are clearly in agriculture, which Peiping admits is still progressing too slowly. For the second straight year the harvest in China will be poor, and this will have an adverse effect on food supplies and the level of exports. GHANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7 Frustrations experienced by Ghanaian President Nkrumah in his attempts to promote his pan-African am- bitions appear to be influencing him to adopt an increasingly less friendly posture toward the West and to welcome wider contacts and tactical collaboration with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, new emphasis by Ghanaian leaders on the "transition to socialism" in Ghana seems likely to reduce established Western economic interests and to provide new opportunities for the bloc to exploit. SECRET THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 PART II (continued) BRITISH EAST AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8 Political activity looking toward independence is increasing in the four British-controlled territories of East Africa. Elections in Zanzibar are scheduled for January and in Kenya and Uganda for February, but progress toward self-government continues to be hampered by racial tension, tribalism, and squabbles among African politi- cians. A constitutional convention for Tanganyika, the most advanced of the four, is set for March, and Julius Nyerere, the territory's newly appointed chief minister, 25X1 all the t- erritories become independent. MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 UAR-Jordanian relations appear to be moving into a more critical phase and may involve a UAR-sponsored at-- tempt to overthrow the Husayn regime. The Sudanese military government's handling of the problem of resettlement of some 50,000 inhabitants of the Wadi Halfa area who are to be displaced by construction of the Aswan High Dam has resulted in riots and has added to pressures for a return to civilian rule. Shifts in the government of the oil-producing Persian Gulf state of Qatar are only temporary adjustments in a,.factional struggle there. THE TURKISH POLITICAL TRIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12 Turkey's mass political trial has failed either to gain momentum or to capture popular enthusiasm. There has been general criticism of the relatively minor character of the charges, designed mostly to ridicule leaders of the former regime, which have been presented thus far, although 38 of the 500 prisoners face possible death sentences for other offenses. While the regime is becoming more sensitive to adverse domestic reaction and foreign criticism, it. still seems determined to re- move any possible threat to its existence from the leaders of the previous government. J25X1 125X6 SECRET iv THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 ~~.TIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 41 27 October 1960 PART II (continued) has warmly approved the prime minister's announcement that Canada intends to maintain amicable relations with Cuba. ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 President Frondizi's steps to meet some of the Argentine Army's demands for changes among his advisers and policies have greatly eased the political crisis, but some time will be required to resolve the various complaints ranging from inefficiency in the state oil company to pro-Peronista and Communist activities. Frondizi kept intact the economic team responsible for the US-backed stabilization program, but made some conciliatory changes in army appointments. His new committee to channel military complaints and a special commission to investigate Communist activities are al- ANTIGOVERNMENT' VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 As a result of antigovernment student disturbances in Venezuela between 19 and 26 October, the armed forces are on an alert status and President Betancourt's three- party coalition has come under severe strain. The leftist Democratic Republic Union party, long a dis- satisfied component of the coalition, was partly in- volved in the violence, and its representatives in the cabinet have since resigned on party orders. The party may be considering withdrawing from the government at all levels, and aligning itself with the leftist-Communist ready in operation. HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN FRICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17 There has been an intensification recently of the chronic Honduran-Nicaraguan squabbles over the use of bases in Honduras by Nicaraguan revolutionaries, some of opposition. ~ ~ ~CONFIDENTlqL TU4i. WV VV TN RRTRV Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET PART II (continued) whom are apparently aided by Cuba. These frictions have increased bitterness over the two countries' century-old border dispute, now before the International Court of Justice. The court's decision is expected before Decem?- ber and could well threaten the government in whichever country loses the dispute. COUP IN EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 The six-man military-civilian junta that ousted President Lemus early on 26 October sought immediately to secure the backing of the leftist elements whose demonstrations last August and September critically weakened the Lemus administration. The coup was military- led, however and the military will main- tain control over the civilian component of the junta. Ex-President Oscar Osorio, a retired army officer who retains strong backing in the armed forces and is widely popular throughout the country, will probably emerge as the real leader of the new government. Strongly anti- Communist, he is known to favor thoroughgoing reforms to alleviate the country's deep-seated socio-economic problems. PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES THE CULT OF MAO TSE-TUNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The Chinese Communist cult of Mao Tse-tung, which has fluctuated with the exigencies of party policies, in the past year has-approached idolatry..'The cult has two aspects: the adulation of Mao Tse-tung as a father-figure of the Peiping regime who is "great, brilliant, wise, compassionate, tender, and trustworthy"; second, the claim that Mao is pre-eminent as a Marxist theoretician, "the most prominent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary, politician, and theorist among all living contemporaries." The present extravagant claims for Mao as the legitimate heir of Lenin are interwoven with Peiping's defense of its position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 As the UN General Assembly moves toward consideration of the Algerian situation, the contending forces remain stalemated, although pressures on them are apparently be- coming more intense. The rebels continue under severe French military pressure, but have received additional SECRET THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 PART III (continued) backing in recent approaches to Moscow and Peiping, and are almost certain to have substantial Afro-Asian support in the General Assembly for their effort to "interna- tionalize" the conflict. De Gaulle's 1959 offer of self- determination remains France's official position, but there appears to be a growing diversity of French views. Popular opinion now seems to be swinging in favor of political negotiations with the rebels and even toward eventual independence for Algeria; but army sentiment is still adamant against such negotiations, and rightist leaders have in the past few months become more inclined to challenge De Gaulle directly on this issue. SECRET vii THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST While continuing to attack Western policies on disarmament, nuclear testing, and Berlin, Moscow has initiated moves de- signed to set the stage for a new effort at negotiations on these issues. Khrushchev re- eated his call for a summit meeting on Berlin ear- ly next spring. At the UN the bloc delegations are apparently preparing to walk out of the disarmament discussion in the Political Committee .and launch an intensified campaign for a special General Assembly ses- sion in March or April to be attended by the heads of govern- ment. The bloc has also moved to ` estiblish,'a:i.d :adline oh the nuclear test ban talks and to bring the issue before the UN General Assembly. Germany and Berlin Khrushchev used his con- versation with West German Am- bassador Kroll on 18 October to make clear his determination to settle the Berlin problem in 1961. He indicated that Moscow will press for an early summit conference and mentioned Febru- ary or March, or April at the latest. He ruled out any long delays, and, as in his 20 October speech in Moscow, he indicated that postponement of Berlin negotiations until after the West German elections ,, Sep- tember 1961 would be unac- ceptable. Khrushchev also insisted on ,tbet permanent '.nature of -the Oder-Neisse boundary and the necessity of an early peace treaty with "both German states," as well as a settlement of the Berlin problem. Khrushchev emphasized his desire for not merely normal but friendly relations with Bonn, and reversed the Soviet Foreign Ministry's position by agreeing that if West Germans in the Soviet Union wanted to be repatriated, the procedures which lapsed last December could be continued. The Soviet pre- mier also agreed to refrain from public attacks on Adenauer, and indicated he would exclude some remarks from his 20 Octo- ber speech, which did not con- tain the lengthy diatribes a- gainst Adenauer, as many Soviet pronouncements in recent months have. Despite Khrushchev's re- affirmation of the USSR's in- tention not to undertake unilat- eral steps in Berlin, the East Germans are continuing to exert pressures, although the pace has slowed down. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 Disarmament and the UN The East Germans made no attempt to carry out a threat to inter- fere with or prevent a visit of Eleanor Dulles and members of her "Crusade for Freedom" party to East Berlin on 21 October. The East Germans have not pub- lished their warning against this visit contained in a note to the US Mission in Berlin on 19 October. The East Germans continue to press for a resumption of interzonal trade talks and have used the issue in a new effort to drive a wedge between West German, and West Berlin author- ities by calling for separate negotiations. On 21 October, East German Foreign Trade Minister Rau ad- dressed separate letters to Bonn and to West Berlin Mayor Brandt offering to negotiate And em- phas.izing the damaging economic effects of Bonn's denunciation of the 1961 trade pact. Rau used an interview with a West German paper to appeal to West German businessmen to bring pressure on Bonn for new talks. He also suggested that the West Berlin authorities offer new proposals .concerning the city's communi- cations with West Germany. East German concern over the future effects of the cancellation of the trade agreement may have prompted a special economic mis- sion, including the head of the State Planning Commission, to go to Moscow last week. Since Khrushchev's depar- ture from New York on ].3 October, Soviet delegates at the UN have vigorously pressed his demands on disarmament and reorganization of the UN executive. In his open- ing speech on 19 October before the UN Political Committee, So- viet delegate Zorin echoed Khru- shchev's warning of a Soviet boy- cott of disarmament negotiations in the committee if Soviet dis- armament principles were not accept- ed as the basis for discussions. While calling for general and complete disarmament, Zorin pressed the Soviet drive to se- cure recognition of three coequal blocs by repeating Khrushchev's call for the addition of India, Indonesia, the UAR, Ghana, and Mexico to the Disarmament Commit- tee, now composed of five Soviet bloc and five Western nations. On 25 October, Zarin again repeated his threat to walk out of the Political Committee and renewed Khrushchev's call for a special assembly session on disarmament next spring to be attended by the heads of government, who could give "clear directives" to a new negotiating committee replacing the ten-nation group. The Soviet Union may feel that a walkout will create pres- sure on the West to attend a sum- mit session on disarmament and to accept Moscow's concept of uni- versal disarmament as the basis for negotiations. Bloc propa- ganda accompanying such a walkout SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY would probably echo the earlier On 24 October Poland in- claim, made after the bloc with- drawal from the ten-nation dis-- troduced a resolution in the Political Committee calling armament conference in Geneva for an agreement on the cessa- last June, that the USSR refuses tion of nuclear weapons tests to abuse world hopes for dis- by 1 April 1961. If this dead- armament by engaging in fruit- line is not met, the resolution less discussions with those who calls for immediate submission seek only "control without dis- of the problem to a special armament." session of the General. Assembly, The Soviet Union has indi- cated its determination to press for a reorganization of the UN executive by directly attacking Secretary General Hammarskjold in the Administrative and Budget- ary Committee. During the past week, bloc delegates frequently charged Hammarskjold with "ex- travagant spending" to further US policies in Congo, Laos, and Guinea, and the Soviet delegate demanded a $50,000,000 ceiling on the UN budget for 1961--for which the secretary general has asked $67,500,000. It appears that the USSR may concentrate its attack on the UN Secretariat in the Budgetary Committee, which reviews the composition of the professional staii. At present the Soviet Union and its satellites, with only 84 representatives on the staff, are far below their assigned quota of 216. ' Nuclear -Test, .Bab~.Ta-lks For the first time since the nuclear test talks began in Geneva in 1958, the bloc has moved toward setting a deadline on the negotiations and bring- ing this issue before the UN General Assembly. which Khrushchev called for while in New York. In private conversations with Western dele- gates in Geneva during the past two weeks, Soviet delegates said they expected no major American moves at the nu- clear test ban talks before the US election, and gave no indication that any new initiative was planned by Moscow. Soviet chief delegate Tsarapkin told a UN official he believed it would be some time before US policy would be decided and real negotiations could be resumed. In a talk with an American official, Tsarapkin was "completely un- yielding" on the principal issues under negotiation. He restated the USSR's position that if the US resumed testing, whether for research or weapons purposes, the USSR would break up the conference and consider it- self free to resume tests. Soviet propaganda, citing recent statements by AEC Chairman McCone as evidence, has claimed that the United States intends to resume nuclear weapons tests in order to bury the Geneva talks and intensify :the nuclear a.rms?:race SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pace 3 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN Che Guevara's ten-man eco- nomic mission to Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, and East Germany left Cuba on 21 October. On the eve of his departure, Guevara told a television audience that he was going primarily to negotiate Cuba's commercial exchange for the coming year under trade pacts with these countries. Guevara will probably seek ex- panded arrangements with the bloc to compensate for items that Cuba can no longer receive from the United States. However, because of the nature of Cuba's industrial plant, it may be forced to seek immediate alter- native sources of supply in nonbioc countries, which are better equipped to supply Cuba's import needs. His TV talk clearly implied efforts toward the further eco- nomic integration of Cuba with the bloc. He referred to foreign "comrades" in the Cuban Petroleum Institute "who are going to the USSR to get equip- ment" and implied that bloc technicians in other industries are also performing such serv- ices. Cuba and Rumania signed a trade agreement and technical assistance protocol in Havana on 25 October, and a joint communique declared their in- tentionto exchange ambassadors. The composition of the Rumanian delegation suggests that that country may provide Cuba with technical assistance for its petroleum industry. Moscow has moved on several fronts this past week to foster the impression that there is a real danger that the US will intervene militarily in Cuba and that, in that event, the USSR stands ready to lend every assistance to Cuba. The Soviet objectives are apparent- ly to increase suspicion of US intentions and to stimulate some action by the neutralists in the United Nations which might put the United States in an embarrassing position. Soviet propaganda cover- age of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now in- cludes daily warnings of al- leged American plans for "coun- terrevolutionary invasions," along with denunciations of US trade restrictions and of Ambassador Bonsai's recall. At the United Nations, the Soviet delegation has come out strongly in support of the Cuban complaint, which includes the charge that the US is planning to begin a large-scale invasion of the country "in a few days." Despite these efforts to arouse concern over the possi- bility of US intervention in Cuba, it seems unlikely that the USSR anticipates such action. Khrushchev's threat on 9 July to use rockets "if necessary" in defense of the Castro Government in the event of US aggression was so quali- fied as not actually to con- stitute a commitment to any specific course of action, and it has never been repeated. Furthermore, TASS quoted Khru- shchev as saying in a press interview on 25 September, when asked about his rocket threat, SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE TNTEnF,CP Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 4 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 " needn't worry.... Since America does not intend to attack Cuba, this means that. there is no danger whatsoever." Soviet bloc military ship- ments to Cuba thus far include small arms, machine guns, anti- aircraft artillery, and tanks. More shipments are expected., The quantity of this equipment is clearly excessive for Cuban in- ternal needs and will permit re- lease of Cuba's Western-manufac- tured weapons for clandestine military support elsewhere in the hemisphere, should this be the Cuban intention. In view of the lack of qual ified personnel in Cuba, the Cas tro regime will be required to rely heavily on the Soviet bloc for training the Cuban military in the use and maintenance of the new weapons and military- related items such as communica- tions equipment and radar. In- creasing numbers of Cubans will probably be sent to the bloc for training, particularly if the Castro regime follows through with its apparent de- cision to build up a qualified "defense force" based on Soviet bloc equipment. The Cuban Government re- sponded to the new US export restrictions by increasing its propaganda attacks on the United States for this "new act of aggression." On 25 October, most of the remaining American- owned businesses in Cuba were nationalized. Most other Latin American governments appear to feel that the US action was justified. Official circles in Mexico and Chile, however, are critical and feel it will give Castro an important propaganda advantage in the hemisphere. Other govern- ments, while sympathetic to the US position, have expressed con- cern over what they expect will be a strong negative reaction among the Latin American public. Some of these governments may also see the move as obviat- ing the need for their own participation in any future mul- tilateral sanctions against the Castro regime. Many Latin American leaders prefer to re- gard the Cuban issue as a bilat- eral problem between the United States and Cuba, and the Ecua- dorean foreign minister frankly explained that a number of Latin American governments are too weak to run ahead of public. opinion on this issue. The Castro regime, which has been embarrassed by a num- ber of defections this year among Cuban officials abroad, is apparently recalling dip- lomatic and consular officers to screen them. Officials in Bra- zil and Mexico are already re- turning home, and more will prob- ably follow. A decree of 27 September removed job tenure rights from foreign service personnel. It is becoming ap- parent that those officials re- garded as "reliable" for foreign assignment are those who unques- tioningly accept and are willing to promote the Communist position on Cuban and international issues. The Cuban ambassador appointed to Paris on 20 October, for in- stance, has a long record of Communist associations. Scattered opposition groups continue' active inside Cuba de- spite elaborate government ef- forts to give the impression they have been wiped out. Widespread rumors in Oriente Province sug- gest that a new "invasion force" of about 80 persons landed on the north coast; on or about 20 October, and in- creased government military SECRET PART T OF TMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 activity noted in the province lends support to reports of continued guerrilla activity. There is still no indica- tion, however, that the opposition has the unity and leadership necessary to be- come a genuine threat to the regime. In the cities, tenants are reported to have reacted with enthusiasm to the 15 October urban reform law, which offers- them the prospect of becoming homeowners. The government probably calculated that the solidification of its support among lower income groups would more than compensate for the further alienation of the landlords, many of whom will lose their sole source of income. Dominican Republic The Trujillo regime is giv- ing signs of further weakening. One example was the apathetic showing, during the 24 October rally honoring the dictator on his 69th birthday, which con- trasted sharply with previous staged. demonstrations of "loyal- ty." Trujillo's efforts to prove to the world that he is implementing a program of "de mocratization" .havegenerally been recognized as a sham. Af- ter some months in which his controlled propaganda media followed a viciously anti-US and pro-Castro and pro-Soviet line, Trujillo's speech on 24 October promised "undeviating" friend- ship for the United States in tacit admission of the failure of his previous tactics. The economic situation is worsening. Trujillo's efforts to promote trade with Western Europe have not compensated for the financial losses result- ing from the country's elimina- tion from the benefits of the higher price for sugar in the US market and from continuing Venezuelan efforts to impose a petroleum boycott on the Do- minican Republic. Unemployment continues to be a serious prob- leap, and there are indications that present Dominican efforts to refinance loans granted in past years by Canadian banks may fail. Dissidents inside the coun- try are showing unexplained op- timism, which could indicate that a new plan to oust the re- gime is in the final stages of preparation. There are grow- ing rumors in dissident circles of an imminent invasion by exile groups from Venezuela. There are also indications, :however, that those dissidents with mod- erate and pro-US views are los- ing ground to more radical ele- ments, in the underground move- ment. According to the American Consulate, these pro-US groups were enthusiastic over the role of the United States in the Au- gust OAS conference that condemned Trujillo, but the lack of further decisive action against Trujillo has demoralized them and reduced their influence. SECRET PART I MP TANA Mnrem' T'AT?F1t'T 'C1m 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 SITUATION IN LAOS Premier Souvanna Phouma appears to have made some prog- ress during the past week in strengthening the position of his regime. During a week-end trip to Luang Prabang, he ap- parently succeeded in delay- ing a'. ;previously contem- plated breakaway by the First Military Region, a move which would have seriously jeopardized his posi- tion as premier. Sou- vanna also appears to have convinced lead- ers from northern Laos, including King Savang, that he is prepared to take a harder line against the Pathet Lao, both in the present nego- tiations in Vientiane and in the limitation of further Pathet military gains. Pressures are mounting, however, for Souvanna to come to terms with General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Commit- tee. General Ouane, the armed forces com- mander, and Col. Houm- panh, the First Mili- tary Region Commander, both warned Souvanna that if he did not reach a settlement with Phoumi within a rea- sonably short time, they would lead the fore reaching a settlement be- tween Vientiane and Savannakhet. Ouane claims that the premier will send a committee to Savannakhet to negotiate, atl ba sis is four ncompromise 'has wast yet north into open opposition against his regime. The King also believes it urgent that Souvanna reach an early accord with Phoumi. The~King is op- posed, however, to dissolving the Revolutionary Committee be- ATiOPE developed. Souvanna has so far seemed intent on excluding Phoumi from any important role in the government, although he has been willing to welcome Phoumi's followers back into the fold. Phoumi, on the other SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 BURMA PHONG SALY AMTHA, Sam Ne..a IIJAMG PRABANG 1 SAM NEUA Luang Prabang 7? ,_ S; YABOURYl VIENTIANE MLA _ .,VIENTIANE? Savannakhet " VANNAKHET XI ENG KHOUANG t 3i 7 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY hand, may still harbor the hope that Souvanna's government will fall and that he will have a much more prominent role in a successor government. Negotiations between the government and the Pathet Lao in Vientiane are proceeding at an exceedingly leisurely pace, possibly by design on the part of Souvanna. The negotia- tors now are feeling each other out on the question of how far Laos should go in establishing ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc and are apparently trying to devise the mechanics for a su- pervised truce between their opposing military forces. The renewal of fighting in Phong Saly Province may have reversed any progress toward a firm cease-fire they might have made and could conceivably lead to a breakdown in the talks. Only preliminary reports have been received regarding the new fighting in Phong Saly, but it presumably reflects im- plementation of the First Military Region's reported plans to retake two posts lost by the: Pathet Lao earlier in the month. Col. Houmpanh has with Souvanna's approval reportedly been marshaling his forces for such an offensive for several days. He told the American army attache on 25 October that he expected his forces to engage the Pathet Lao momentarily. Col. Kouprasith, the nominal commander of the Fifth Military Region in Vien- tiane, has denied any build- up in the Pak Sane area, al- though he does credit the Pathet Lao with the capability to launch an independent attack on Phoumi's forces. In any event, Kouprasith's disapproval would probably prove no deterrent if Kong Le and his lieutenants chose to resume operations. Kong Le has undertaken no new initiatives recently, but there are increasing indications that he is subject to strong Pathet influence. He is re- ported, for example, to have permitted Col. Singkapo, a rank- ing Pathet military leader, to address officers in Vientiane on the virtues of a neutral for- eign policy. He is also alleged to engage in frequent consulta- tions with the wife of Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong; she is reputed to be a doctri- 25X1 naire Communist. Faced with a rapidly worsening petroleum supply sit- uation in Vientiane as the SECRET PART I n' T,.RHT. n T A m'e T*rmru1c m Da 8 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 result of the unofficial Thai blockade, Souvanna has threat- ened to ask the newly ac- credited Soviet ambassador for aid in alleviating the oil shortage. He also told Ambassador Brown that if Thailand persisted in pre- venting the entry of goods into Vientiane, he would take "this act of aggression" to the UN Security Council. The Soviet ambassador finally pre- sented his credentials to King Savang on 26 October, alter having been kept wait- ing in Vientiane for 13 days. Colonel Mobutu's control seems to be slipping, but this does not necessarily guarantee the early return of Patrice Lu- mumba to power, although events appear to be moving in his favor. Mobutu's decision not to leave the Congo at this time for a personal appeal to UN Secretary General Hammar- skjold has probably delayed a showdown and the army chief's eclipse. Chaos within the armed forces appears to be widespread, with lines of authority unclear. Last week mutinies reportedly occurred in Leopoldville and in the provincial capitals of Stanleyville and Coquilhatville. Disorderly Congolese troops terrorized the African quarter of Leopoldville and routed the police patrols of provincial governor Cleophas Kamitatu. Mobutu flew to Coquilhatville in an effort to restore order Mobutu apparently is de- pending on the 5,000-man force based at Thysville--the army's principal garrison about 80 miles south of Leopoldville--to regain control of the capital city. However, his recent effort to bring an armored unit to Leo- poldville was opposed by the UN Command,,which ordered its forces to set up roadblocks to prevent the unit's advance. On 26 October, the UN Command ordered Mobutu to withdraw his troops from Leopold- ville, and he acquiesced. The Thysville garrison may assume increasing importance if its commander, Lt. Col. Louis Boboso,tries to become the new strong man of the Congo. Boboso, reportedly a stronger personality than Mobutu, is said to be under pressure from army elements to re- place him. Boboso's political inclinations are not known. UN spokesmen have charged that Belgian specialists are aid- ing Congolese troops to ready armored vehicles in Thysville, presumably for an attempt to 25X1 SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pave 9 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 ? .......,.,.... SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Octobor 1960 intimidate the UN into releasing Lumumba so that Mobutu could serve an arrest warrant on him. Mobutu's political prob- lems are increasing. Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's erstwhile vice premier, is reported to be active on Lumumba 's behalf in Orientale Province. According to press reports, pro-Lumumba police in Stanley- ville have arrested the local army com- mander on Gizenga's orders. Previously, the pro-Lumumba gov- ernor of Leopoldville Province began press- ing Mobutu with the threat of secession, and provincial police now are reportedly planning joint patrols with UN forces in Leopoldville. The army chief has not been able to gain the support of the local UN Command for action against Lumumba. His efforts to arrest the,-'jousted premier have been re- pulsed,-and his de- mands that Lumumba be .The situation in both Kasai and Katanga is deteriorating. In southern Kasai, f ight ing has been resumed as Congolese troops from Luluabourg reportedly :Launched an attack on secessionist forces. Secessionist leader Ngalula blames the UN for failing to maintain a neutral, demilitarized zone be- CONGO REPUBLIC Ocean f Lotto f -2-7- OCTOBER 1960 removed from the official resi- dence of the premier have been refused. At the same time, UN representative Dayal has been frustrated in his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the Congolese leaders. Nor has he been able to have the assem- bly reconvened to form a:..Congo-- lese government with wide local support as several African na- tions have demanded. At present, the UN seems to have lost much of its initia- tive, and may rely on a good- offices commission of several African states to try to resolve the Congo situation. In such a commission, Ghana or Guinea would probably play a major role. FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND tween Congolese and Kasai forces. In Katanga, President Tshom- bd's government, angered by the reported undisciplined activities of UN troops in northern Katanga, has demanded the recall of the UN's top representatives there, a challenge which the UN met by sending reinforcements to Elisa- bothville on 26 October. During the last seven weeks, Tshombd's government reportedly has taken several repressive measures, in- cluding burbing Baluba opposition party activities, widespread ar- rests and imprisonment of Katanga Balubas, and repatriation of tribes- men from Kasai Province to the war- torn area around Bakwanga. SECRET 25X1 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 10 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET V CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 NOTES AND COMMENTS Preparatory committees are reported to have been working for some weeks in Moscow on a resolution to be presented to the meeting of world Communist parties--scheduled to begin around 7 November--which has been called to consider the Sino- Soviet dispute. non- bloc as well as bloc Communist party delegations have been tak- ing part in at least some of the preparatory meetings. The Chi- nese Communists have apparently also been represented at these meetings, perhaps by politburo members Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, who apparently were ab- sent from Peiping from mid-Sep- tember to 25 October, when Peng Chen reappeared in Peiping. Recent public statements from both Moscow and Peiping have given no indication that either intends to compromise significantly on the substantive issues in dispute. Khrushchev's 20 October speech in Moscow in- cluded a vigorous and complete defense of Soviet propositions, and Soviet publications continue indirectly to engage in condem- nations of Chinese Communist theoretical positions. In ad- dition to these efforts to in- doctrinate the population on the incorrectness of leftism, dogmatism, and sectarianism, an attack on Chinese positions was probably the purpose of a series of three lectures on issues which have been in dispute. American Embassy personnel were refused admission to the lec- tures which began in Moscow on 12 October. resolution of the dispute. According to a Moscow rumor, presidium member Suslov 2bA11 has also recently told, a number of party meetings in Moscow that unless the Chinese admit their ideological errors, a breach in Sino-Soviet party relations 25X1 should be expected. Chinese are said to be "unable to understand" why the Russians are in such a hurry to settle the dispute, and to believe that Moscow and Peiping should em- phasize their points of agree- ment while continuing to dis- cuss their differences. The Chinese apparently favor dis- cussions but "do not believe that the dispute can be settled at one sitting." Several recent developments suggest a Chinese effort to present an appearance of reason- ableness prior to the meeting. The official party newspaper People's Daily on 22 October pri~thefuull text of Khru- shchev':s 20 October speech, and The USSR is apparently try- ! Peiping's message of thanks to ing to foster the impression the Soviet leaders for their that the forthcoming meeting I 1 October National Day greetings SECRET PART I I NnTFS ANTS MMMENT.Iq Pc l of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 emphastzcd.isolidarity with .the USSR and gratitude for Soviet aid. The mid-October issue of the Chinese theoretical journal, Red Flag, has been canceled, perhaps because it carried an article which the Chinese lead- ers decided at the last moment would exacerbate the situation. Peiping announced on 16 October, the day the magazine was sched- uled to appear, that it would be combined with the next issue, to be published at a later, un- specified date. At the same time, Peiping has not budged from any of its basic positions in the dispute, continuing to reiterate on suitable occasions its belief in the necessity of struggle against US imperialism. I rther" more, the Chinese are openly encouraging the Albanians and other Communists to support their stand. A telegram from Peiping, broadcast by Tirana on 24 October, stressed the theme of Albania's consistent struggle against. "modern revisionism" and its great contribution to defending "the purity of Marxism- Leninism.'" Among other actions which Moscow may well regard as provocative, Peiping has sent a military delegation to Albania, and during the last two weeks has signed scientific, technical, and cultural exchange and coop- eration agreements with Tirana. Peiping is using the 10th ,anniversary of the entry of its forces into the Korean war to reaffirm strongly several of its basic positions along the lines of the Chinese party's endorsement in late September of Mao Tse-tung's handling of the Chinese civil war. The regime's propaganda is asserting that the Korean experience is applicable to today's world sit- uation because the Korean con- flict proved that the United States is a "paper tiger" and that peace cannot be begged for but can only be won through "res- olute? struggle." By emphasizing Sino-Korean unity both during the Korean war and afterward,,;. Peiping is attempting to give the impres- sion that Pyongyang is a stanch supporter of Communist China's present policies which conflict with Moscow's. The North Koreans, in effect, have agreed with the Chinese on the practicality of a tougher bloc effort to drive the United States out of Asia, but are more circumspect about endorsing all aspects of Pei- ping,'s views. European satellite leaders, with the exception of the Alba nians, continue to restate their solid support for Khrushchev's personal leadership and conduct. Party leaders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have made this clear in public speeches, and top-level government meet- ings are expected to be held in the other satellites to en- dorse Khrushchev's policies before the November meeting in Moscow. The Albanian regime, how- ever, continues to be conspicu- ous by its endorsement of Mao's views. In a 25 October speech dealing with the UN General As- sembly meeting, Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, who recently re- turned from New York, asserted that China was following a cor- rect Marxist-Leninist line in its policies. He praised the "valiant" Mao Tse-tung, and spoke at length on China's role in world affairs. Shehu played down the value of Soviet peace proposals and mentioned present aspects of Soviet foreign policy only in passing, while criticiz- ing Yugoslav "revisionism" and American "imperialism" extensively. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 While Albania remains the only Communist party which ap- pears to be endorsing the Chinese party and all of its views, considerable uneasiness over the Sino-Soviet dispute and its implications continues to be evidenced in the other satellite parties and in Com- munist parties throughout the world. It seems likely that this uneasiness exists in the Soviet and Chinese parties as well, and that they will both attempt to use the coming meet- ing to prevent a complete break in party relations. Neverthe- less, developments of the past few weeks add to earlier indi 25X1 cations that they will find it very difficult to resolve their conflicting views. USSR PURCHASING LARGE FREE-WORLD TANKERS To ensure the long-term growth and stability of its pe- troleum exports, the Soviet Union is launching a major ef- fort to procure large, modern tankers in the free world. Rus- sian crews have taken over two such vessels recently construct- ed in Japan and the Netherlands. Both of the new tankers origi- nally were contracted for by Greek owners and prior to de- livery were sold to the USSR-- apparently for cash. The Japanese-built vessel, of more than 39,000 tons, is a particularly significant addi- tion, as most of the present Soviet tankers carrying petro- leum exports are in the 11,000- ton class. The two largest ves- sels, Pekin and Varshava, are of 30,000 tons; another vessel of this class will soon be launched. The entire bloc tanker fleet, with some 136 ships and a total of about 1,200,000 dead-weight tons, is still small and slow by world standards. The American Embassy in Rome is reliably informed that Moscow is offering to purchase Italian merchant vessels total- ing about 300,000 dead,-weight tons in exchange for wheat. The USSR has expressed particular interest in acquiring two tankers of 47,700 tons each, which were launched earlier this year, and in four or five tankers of 35,000 tons each. This proposal is the larg- est'. single offer the USSR has made thus far in at- tempting to purchase more Western tankers. Representatives of the So- viet ship procurement agency, Sudoimport, have also made in- quiries recently in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and West Ger- many. By rejecting all but the newest ships and, at least for SECRET PART IT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 the moment, willing to pay cash, the USSR has aroused consider- able interest among Western ship- builders, several of whom al- ready are supplying other types of vessels and smaller tankers to the Soviet Union. If the present purchases are part of a long-range pro- curement program, it is likely that Moscow will eventually re- quest deferred payment pro- visions, as it already receives in some capital equipmenttrans- actions with Western suppliers. COCOM restrictions on the sales of tankers to the bloc have been drastically eased since 1958; the only prohibition remain- ing is against supplying ships with speeds in excess of 18 knots. The expansion of the USSR's oil exports--dramatized this year by a commitment-to supply all Cuban needs--has required substantial readjustments in Soviet tanker operations. By chartering Western vessels, the Soviet Union has been able to boost the amounts delivered to Cuba and to Other distant des- tinations without affecting deliveries elsewhere. In 1959 more than 60 percent of the 17,- 400,000 tons of bloc oil moved from the Black Sea was carried on free-world vessels. The low rates prevailing in the depressed tanker market and the large amount of idle free- world tonnage available for charter probably preclude any immediate transportation diffi- culties for the Soviet oil-export program. Soviet economic policy is opposed to unnecessary re- liance on free-world resources of any kind, however, and the purchase of large, new Western tankers to supplement bloc . building programs is the most. rapid method'to reduce this de- pendence, It may'a less expensive way of maintaining the Soviet petroleum trade, since. acquisition of its own vessels will spare the USSR mounting ex- penditures of foreign exchan e . for chartered tankers THE CASE OF COMRADE LARIONOV--A LESSON FOR SOVIET PACE SETTERS On 22 September, the Soviet press announced the death after a "serious illness" of central committee member Aleksey Niko- layevich Larionov, first secre- tary of Ryazan Oblast in the Russian Republic. The personal tragedy of Larionov, who at the December 1959 party plenum was probably the most highly praised man in agriculture, has a dis- tinctly Soviet twist and is symptomatic of the great pres- sures generated by this year's agricultural difficulties. Larionov, party boss of Ryazan since 1948, reached the height of his career in December 1959. He was awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labor," decorated with the Order of Lenin and the medal "Hammer and Sickle" for achievements in livestock production, and singled out by Khrushchev at the plenum for lengthy and extrava- gant praise. His past successes and his pledge to fulfill the Seven-Year Plan livestock goals in only three years were held up repeatedly by Khrushchev as examples to officials in all lagging agricultural. areas. Larionov could ill afford to fail. "I know Comrade Larionov," said Khrushchev at the plenum. "He would never consider taking an unrealistic pledge, to sprint, only to founder the next day; that, he SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ..SUMMARY 27 Od.tbber L960 would not agree to do." This, however, is exactly what Larionov did. The quarterly bulletins of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on the results of the "social- ist competition in the produc- tivity and delivery of livestock products" tell the story. Ryazan, still the winner according to the October 1959 issue, had by the time of the next quarterly report in February 1960 dropped to fourth place. In the two subsequent reports, in April and July, Ryazan was not listed among the many oblasts cited for good performances. No fig- ures were released on the agri- cultural situation in Ryazan, nor was?:.~ the nature of Larionov's difficulties. revealed. On 25 June, a satirical poem appeared in the main agri- cultural newspaper clearly di- rected at Larionov. The poem twitted a certain "Hero Larion" for blaming insufficient fodder supplies on pilfering mice. The piece ended with the sug- gestion that getting rid of Larion rather than the mice was the better solution. The next ominous sign for Larionov was the removal of two oblast party bosses in September, specifiy-- cally for failing to fulfill their, livestock pledges for 1960. They had made these pledges in response to the pres- sure to emulate Larionov. Dissatisfaction with Lari- onov was demonstrated in the of- ficial treatment of his death and funeral. Only an obituary and a brief statement of con- dolences from the party central committee were published. Al- most all other full members of the central committee who have died in the last five years have had a funeral commission appointed, a state funeral with honor guards, and been buried in the Kremlin wall; Larionov was accorded none of these honors. The official cold shoulder given Larionov undoubtedly re- flects Khrushchev's own attitude. Larionov's botching of his agri- cultural pledges must have been a source of considerable dis- appointment and embarrassment 25X1 to Khrushchev,who had lavished so much praise on him UNCERTAINTY IN PEIPING OVER The Communist regime in Peiping appears worried over the state of the Chinese econ- omy and uncertain over what to do about it. The major trouble is clearly in agriculture, which Peiping admits is still pro gresSingL.too, Slowly. The food situation has been bad all year. Food shortages have per- sisted through the summer months, despite the summer grain and vegetable harvests, and the pop- ulation can evidently look for- FUTURE ECONOMIC MOVES ward to no improvement this win- ter. Drought, floods, and in- sects have inflicted "serious losses" on at least one sixth of the area sown to grain, and the outlook is for a crop about the same as last year's disap- pointing'harvest. This year's crop will have to feed some 17,- 000,000 additional persons. "",,,The regime's concern over the farm situation is betrayed by its continued efforts to keep a tight ' lid , on-food SECRET IT N(1TT:S AND COMMENTS ..!Page 5 O f'19 PART I Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 2.7,October 1960 consumption, by its encouragement to urban and rural residents alike to grow more vegetables, by its exhortations to grow more catch crops and to go to the hills and gather wild plants, and by an admission that Chi- nese agriculture remains more at the mercy of weather than does the agriculture of more developed countries. In addi- tion, authorities in Kwangtung have agreed to exempt peasants from state taxes and purchase quotas on some of next spring's harvest. Industry's performance so far this year has been somewhat brighter than agriculture's, from the regime's point of view, but Peiping has been uncommonly vague about accomplishments. Shortages of raw materials have plagued various industries, and the press still expresses frequent concern over the quality of industrial prod- ucts, especially those from the vaunted small-scale enter- prises. Shortages of petroleum products have apparently af- fected transport. Urban passen- ger transport schedules in Peiping and Shanghai have re- portedly been sharply curtailed. Transport has been hard hit this summer, with un- usually frequent traffic interruptions because of weather. There is some evidence that China is having difficul- ties in fulfilling current trade commitments. Trade dif- ficulties have apparently not been confined to the bloc. Trade with the sterling area and with Western Europe has declined since early summer, and the "'.level of China's total trade this year may fall below last year's high level. Communist China, in spite of its rapid economic advance, remains dependent on the USSR for key items for its industrial- ization program and for technical assistance. Some Soviet tech- nicians have already been with- drawn, and further withdrawals could be made. In the past, China has been permitted to fall behind in its short-term obligations to the rest of the bloc, principally the USSR. It must face the pos- sibility that the USSR, and the European satellites in particu- lar, may not be willing to per- mit China to accumulate addi- tional indebtedness in trade. Further, the USSR has not greeted with any warmth Mao Tse-tung's much-publicized sorties into the field of economic policy, par- ticularly his "three magic keys" to economic growth--including the leap forward and the com- munes. Although the validity of these concepts continues to be reaffirmed, recent publicity has not been extensive, suggesting that Peiping may have growing doubts about their long-range efficacy in solving China's economic .problems. (Prepared by ORR) SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 Frustrations experienced by Ghana's President Nkrumah in his attempts to promote his pan- African ambitions appear to be influencing him to adopt an in- creasingly less friendly pos- ture toward the West and to wel- come wider contacts and tacti- calcollaboration with the Sino- Soviet bloc. Moreover, new emphasis by Ghanaian leaders on the "construction of a socialist economy" in Ghana seems likely to reduce established Western economic interests and to pro- vide new opportunities for the bloc to exploit. This trend toward greater involvement with the bloc would be accelerated should Western financing for Ghana's extensive Volta River hydroelectric-alu- minum project not materialize, despite the apparent imminence of a final agreement between Nkrumah's regime and a Western consortium which is considering the scheme. Ghana's drift from the West and toward a variety of "positive neutralism" showing greater parallelism with posi- tions espoused by Moscow was pointed up dramatically by Nkru- mah's performance at the United Nations last month. .Displaying none of the appreciation for US attitudes he has shown in private meetings with American officials, his public state- ments were consistently critical of the West and made clear his basic agreement with the Soviet Union's attacks on Secretary General Hammarskjold and the UN Secretariat, told his people that his talks in New York with Khrushchev had convinced him that "Russia wants peace more than anything else." The chaotic situation in the Congo seems to have prompted Nkrumah's new course more than any other single factor. There are strong indications that he has been deeply embittered by what he apparently regards as the responsibility of 'Western "imperialists"--first for the "secession" of Katanga Province and then for the failure of the UN to act as an agent of the Lumumba government. Nkrumah has counted on Lumumba to align the Congo with a Ghana-led crusade for a political union of African states. Since the Soviet bloc's unilateral intervention seemed to serve the objective of keep- ing Lumumba in power, it did not draw Nkrumah's ire, but rather appears to have added to his growing disposition, encouraged by influential leftist advisers, to collaborate more closely with the Communist world. In any event, the USSR suc- ceeded in achieving its first major breakthrough in Ghana last August at a time when its involve- ment in the Congo was increasing rapidly. A technical assistance and other agreements were con- cluded providing for a $40,000,- 000 credit to Ghana and for trade, cultural cooperation, and the purchase by Ghana of four to six Soviet IL-18 aircraft. As a re- 25X1 suit the number of Soviet tech- nical personnel in Ghana appears to be increasing rapidly. In a speech following his return to Accra, Nkrumah in ef- fect accused the United States of failing "to take a positively decisive stand on the question of peace." At the same time, he SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Accra seems prepared to take greater advantage of edu- cational and training scholar- ships offered by the bloc and also to encourage close ties between cooperative organiza- tions in bloc countries and Ghana's government-controlled National Cooperative Council, which has been assigned a major role in the "transition to socialism." In these areas, a particularly prominent role is being played by East Germany, whose leaders have made Ghana one of the principal targets in their campaign for recogni- tion. So far Nkrumah's response to this effort has been wary, although he reportedly agreed last month, in a letter to Prime Minister Grotewohl, that diplo- matic relations should be established between the two countries "in due time." Political activity looking toward independence is increas- ing in the four British-con- trolled territories of East Africa--Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar. Tanganyika, the most advanced of the four, is scheduled to take a further stop toward independence next parts of the Central African Federation as well. Nyerere hopes to sell Brit- ish Colonial Secretary Macleod on the federation idea before the Tanganyika constitutional talks open. If he wins Macleod's support, he will ask for full internal autonomy for Tanganyika by January 1962 but delay his de- mands for independence until the other ter- ritories have reached a similar level and together with Tangan- yika can attain in- dependence as a unit. Otherwise, he plans to drive for full in- dependence for Tan- ganyika "sometime in 1961." Although the British may have some qualms about Nyerere's federation plans in March when a conference is to formulate a new constitution. Julius Nyerere, the territory's newly appointed African chief minister, is promoting the idea of federation of the four ter- ritories when they become inde- pendent which might include view of the problems they face elsewhere in the area, they are unlikely to oppose him outright, both because they tend to favor federation as enhancing East Africa's economic viability and because they are unwilling to undermine Nyerere's position SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 .. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 vis-a-vis Tanganyika's more ex- treme nationalists. In the other East African territories, progress toward self-government continues to be hampered by racial tension, trib- alism, quarrels among African politicians, and--in the case of Zanzibar--by growing Communist influence. Elections in both Kenya and Uganda are scheduled for next February. The politic-- cal scene in Uganda is compli- cated by the unwillingness on the part of traditional tribal rulers to participate in the protectorate's activities without guarantees that their position will be safe- guarded. As a protest,: rulers in the most im- portant province have persuaded voters there . hot ctq 7.regi'ster. In Kenya, where Africans are certain to dominate the legis- lative council as a result of the election, the principal African party--the Kenya Afri- can National Union (KANU)--is beset by personal and tribal jealousies. The auto- cratic behavior of KANU Secretary General Tom Mboya, who is a member of the Luo tribe, reportedly is resented by the other leaders, many of whom are of the Kikuyu tribe, the backbone of KANU support. The KANU lead- MIDDLE EAST Jordan-UAR King Husayn has replied to Nasir's diatribes of last week in Syria by making his most vio- lent personal attack on the UAR ers are likely to preserve a fa- cade of unity, however, since the party is under attack from both the white settlers and from the Kenya African Democratic Union, a rival group of minority Afri- can tribes. Zanzibar, whose elections are tentatively scheduled for January, is the scene of rising tensions between the more numerous Africans and the traditionally dominant Arab minority. In ad- dition, Communist influence is increasing, particularly among the Arab leaders of the Zanzibar Nationalist party, which may win an important place in the next legislature as a result of a split among the Africans. DEVELOPMENTS President. In a speech on 21 October, the King referred to Nasir as "dictator," "blood- thirsty," and "clown,"" and as "the red agent (who) has ridden On the bandwagon of Communism." SECRET r NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 19 PART I. Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Now SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 The virulence of Husayn's attack reflects not only his animosity toward Nasir but also the necessity for appeas- ing his Bedouin and Majalli tribal supporters in the Jordan.! nian Army, who are still incensed over the assassination of Prime Minister Majalli and pressing for some retaliatory action against the UAR. The speech probably was also intended to placate the Bedouin-Majalli faction for the failure to obtain any redress for Majalli's assas- sination through UN mediation in New York. Husayn's attempts to satis- fy his army supporters in his speeches have thwarted UN medi- atory efforts, however, accord- ing to UN representative Spinelli in Amman. Both Spinelli and Hammarskjold feel Nasir's moder- ate attitude toward Jordan in New York might well have led to a modus vivendi between the two countries. When Husayn arrived in New York, he too was prepared to make a moderate statement on his government's position, Spi- nelli said, but a last-minute plea from Amman for a more ex- treme statement in deference to the Bedouin-Majalli army faction resulted in the speech on 3 Oc- tober which antagonized Nasir and probably provoked his prop- aganda blasts in Syria. Spinelli stated Husayn had appeared contrite in talking to Hammarskjold the day after the General Assembly speech, and that Hammarskjold had told the King his speech had dissipated the initial atmosphere of con- ciliation. The UAR and Jorda- nian foreign ministers neverthe- less are quietly consulting in New York to see if any progress can be made in resolving impor- tant points in the dispute, such as the activities of Jordanian political exiles in Syria and the extradition by the UAR of the three alleged assassins of Majalli.. Spinelli indicated he had reason to believe the UAR may be ready to moderate its propaganda if Jordan will do likewise. He intends to suggest this to Husayn, but admits there is "little room for optimism" in the present situation. The continuation of Jor- danian-sponsored acts of ter- rorism in Syria promises to push UAR-Jordanian relations in- to a new, more critical phase. The 25 October bombings in Da- mascus, apparently instigated by Jordanian agents, are likely to be followed by further such acts. The UAR has widely puolicized the Damascus bombings, as well as earlier ones near the Jordanian border, in an ap- parent effort to stir up Syrian feeling against Husayn. Having adopted this tactic, it seems certain the UAR will feel compelled to retaliate in Jordan or risk the appearance of impotence. UAR involvement in the overthrow or assassina- tion of Husayn could bring direct Israeli military inter- vention in Jordan. Iraq Dissatisfaction with the Qasim regime continues to mount, and criticism is becoming more outspoken. Most Iraqi contacts of the American Embassy in Bagh- dad seem to feel that the regime is doomed; none, however, is willing to set a date for its demise. Qasim has lost the confidence of "most government officials, army officers, and the civilian SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET populace." Dissatisfaction largely arises from Qasim's con- stant vacillation, from deterio- rating economic conditions, and from recent instances of patron- age of the Communists. Plans for a 21 October demon- stration in Baghdad by anti- Communist religious leaders were thwarted when security forces arrested a number of members of the Islamic party, including one imam who had delivered a vicious personal attack on Qasim in a sermon. Evidence of economic dis- content lately has become ap- parent in the Iraqi press with numerous editorials discussing price increases and rising liv- ing costs. Demands voiced for an official investigation into the causes of this phenomenon apparently have forced the re- gime to seek refuge in the ap- pointment of a committee to "in- vestigate" the price situation. However, it is doubtful that this subterfuge will have much popular impact. Sudan Demonstrations and rioting took place on 23 October in Wadi Haifa, a Sudanese town on the Nile near the Egyptian border. This was in part a reaction of the local inhabitants to a visit by several members of the Suda- nese cabinet. The high-level delegation came to present the government's decision to resettle the more than 50,000 residents of the town and the surrounding area because the territory will become a reservoir when the UAR's Aswan High Dam is completed several years hence. The officials told them they are to be resettled at Khashm al-Girba, on the Atbara River in Kassala Province where a new dam and irrigation system is to be constructed. Most residents of Wadi Haifa, have previously indicated their oppo- sition to moving to this area, preferring either to resettle at,.WAdi al-Khowi on the Nile some 200 miles south of their present location, or on the Northern Gezira plain. The riots were serious enough to require the use of tear gas and police reinforce- ments. By 24 October, how- Al....drIa LIAR (EGYPT) w.a, Port suaxn; q, WADI EL KHOVt SUDAN GEZIRA ever, the situation in Wadi Haifa had been brought under control, and small sympathetic demonstrations by students in Khartoum had been quickly dissipated. SECRET NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY -27 '?October 1960 The Abboud military govern- ment has, nevertheless, blundered in its handling of the problem. Even if it now reconsiders its decision, it has added one more element to the various political and religious groups which are exerting pressure for a return to civilian rule. Qatar The Ruler of the small,.oil- producing Persian Gulf state of Qatar has abdicated as part of an attempt by key members of the ruling family to resolve a con- test between Sheik Ahmad al- Thani, the Ruler's son, and Sheik Khalifa Ibn Hamid, the Ruler's young nephew. The Ruler, in his seventies, no longer takes much interest in the government. Sheik Ahmad now has been named Ruler and Sheik Khalifa, heir apparent. This arrangement will prob- 25X1 ably not prove durable, especi- ally if- Sheik Knalira Is to be given control 25X1 over most of the government machinery. Concerned about growing unrest and popular re- sentment over the extent and flamboyance of expenditures by the more than 400 members of the ruling family, Khalifa hopes to undertake political reforms and a substantial economic de- velopment program. If opposition by Ahmad or other members of the ruling family blocks the insti- tution of such measures, the British, who are the ultimate arbiters of Qatar politics, may be confronted with traditional order. THE TURKISH POLITICAL TRIAL Turkey's mass political trial, which got off to a slug- gist start on 14 October, has failed either to gain momentum or capture popular enthusiasm. The military regime faces the problem of removing a constant threat to itself without alien- ating the Turkish people or seriously damagin" Turkish prestige abroad. Member} of the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) appear.. to feel that Turkey as a nation:. and they as its leaders are as much on trial as the members of'the regime they ousted on 27 May 1960. The primary attention thus far in the trial has been fo- cused on an Afghan hound sold by ex-President Bayar, an al- leged illegitimate child of ex-Premier Menderes, and the destructive anti-Greek riots of 1955. The CNU appears to have blundered in opening the long-heralded political trial with a charge of "dog thievery," with which it apparently in- tended to denigrate Bayar and Menderes personally. At the present rate, the trial, which involves about 500 defendants and required months of investigation and preparation, will last so long that the key defendants are more likely to meet death from old age than from the hangman's noose. As the trial drags on, friction will probably increase between the procedurally correct judges and the impatient military. Un- less publicity regarding the trial is handled more effective- ly, the entire venture may back- fire on the present regime. The CNU is showing sensi- tivity to foreign and domestic SECRET PART I I NOTES AND COMMPNTS u" ' 2 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY criticism. Farmers in the east- central province of Kutahya were reported to have set fire to the forests in the area to pro- test the possible execution of Menderes. Pro-Menderes elements in the tightly packed Istanbul slums are another potential dan- ger. Elements of the Third Army apparently either have been or soon will be moved into the Istanbul area from eastern Tur- key as a security precaution. The army may be expected to crush ruthlessly any group en- dangering domestic stability. The government has can- celed all leaves for the Turk- ish National Police for the duration of the trial. The police are reluctant to take forceful action against popular demonstrators because they bore the brunt of popular criticism growing out of the repression of demonstrations before the coup. None of the groups known to be critical of the trial ap- pears to have the potential for mounting a successful counter- coup. Nonetheless, subversive activity, including distribu- tion of leaflets.,. posters, and threatening letters, continues. Opposition to death sen- tences for political prisoners is increasing in Turkish polit- ical circles. Many Turks fear that such action would pave the way for future retaliation against both the CNU and the Republican Peoples' party and would damage the further development of Turk- ish democracy. They are also concerned over the effect on Turkey's prestige abroad. Meanwhile, economic stag- nation which has plagued the country since the coup appears to be easing somewhat with a par- tial renewal of public confidence and the prospects of a record wheat crop. Although domestic economic prospects appear bright- er, however, Turkey faces a significant cash deficit in its balance of payments, and Turk- ish officials are again sug- gesting the need for substantial foreign economic aid and a further rescheduling of foreign debt repayments. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Paae 13 of 19. Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY President Frondizi's steps to meet some of the Argentine Army's demands for changes among his advisers and policies have greatly eased the political crisis, but some time will be required to resolve the various complaints ranging from inef- ficiency in the state oil com- pany to pro-Peronista and Com- munist activities. Frondizi kept intact the economic team responsible for SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pane 15 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 *Am,, 14W SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY the US-backed stabilization program--despite demands for the replacement of Economy Mini- ster Alsogaray--but made some conciliatory changes in army appointments. War Secretary Larcher, special target of Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo Montero, was re- placed'by General Rosendo Fraga. A new chief of staff was also appointed. Frondizi established a high-level committee under the minister of defense to hear con- structive suggestions from the military on government policy. Following several meetings with Frondi21, this group announced that the armed forces support the economic stabilization pro- gram but are critical of its implementation. This was a dip- lomatically softened version of earlier army charges that the program was handicapped by in- efficiency, graft, and the polit-'. maneuvers of some off i- cials trying to woo Peronista electoral support for forth- coming elections. These charges were partly responsible for the dismissal of Arturo Sabato, executive di- rector of the state oil company (YPF). Sabatohad clashed with retired General Pedro Charpy, unofficial army representative on YPF's board of directors, over YPF's efficiency and poli- cies. Charpy also objected to YPF's plans to solicit offers from foreign oil companies to operate on a production-type contract basis in the south flank of the Comodoro Rivadavia area, which he maintained should be exploited by YPF itself. While the majority of the armed forces do not object to Frondizi's policy--begun in 1958--of per- mitting foreign companies to participate in oil development on a contract basis, Charpy's complaints over specific details helped spark the recent crisis. To expedite action on an- other major military concern-- Communist influence in labor, the universities, and in pro- vincial governments--Frondizi on 18 October established a special commission to investi- gate Communist activities. Since then, the police re- portedly have arrested more than 100 Communists in nation- wide raids, and the government is unofficially reported to have asked the USSR to reduce its dip- lomatic staff from 15 to four, the number Argentina has in Mos- cow. Personnel in the six Soviet- 25X1 bloc missions in Argentina total an estimated 200, including some 50 with diplomatic status. ANTIGOVERNMENT VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA As a result of antigovern- ment student disturbances in Caracas and several provincial cities of Venezuela between 19 and 26 October, the armed forces are on an alert status and President Betancourt's three- party coalition has come under severe strains. The leftist Democratic Republican Union (URD), long a dissatisfied com- ponent of the coalition, was partly involved in the out- breaks and has made no public condemnation of them. :[ts two remaining representativ(3s in the cabinet have resigned on orders of the party in order to leave the President free to reorganize the government." SECRET NwTr:R A Am rnuuwwTc --- , of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURREN' INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The student demonstrations were promoted by the Venezuelan Communists, the Marxist Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), and elements of the URD, all of which are pro-Castro and have reportedly received sizable subsidies from the Cuban regime and maintained close liaison with it. The meetings were called to protest the arrest of MIR leaders allegedly responsi- ble for a press article inciting the "popular masses" to over- throw Betancourt, These three factions have allied themselves closely in recent weeks, particularly in a sporadically violent struggle with Betancourt's Democratic Action party for control of organized labor, as well as in demonstrations of support for Castro, toward whom Betancourt is hostile. They will probably attempt to exploit the govern- ment's critical economic dif- ficulties, which include a high level of unemployment and a con- tinuing decline of foreign ex- change reserves, Early in September, pro- Castro URD Foreign Minister Arcaya resigned in protest against the governmeht's policy toward Cuba, but top URD leaders have subsequently given at least lip service to the necessity of maintaining the coalition. The party's growing dissatisfaction is reflected, however, in the two further resignations of URD ministers and URD demands for a new government which will carry out a "nationalist" policy and find solutions to the nation's economic problems. These moves suggest the possibility that the URD may be considering with- drawing from the government at all levels and aligning with the leftist and Communist opposi- tion, The armed forces, which for the most part are believed loyal to Betancourt, apparently favor strong action against agitators, and responsible moderate groups are demanding similar measures. This backing will strengthen 25X1 Betancourt's hand in dealing with any unrest from a possible breakup HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN FRICTIONS Recent intensification of chronic Nicaraguan-Honduran squabbles over Nicaraguan exile activities in Honduras has fur- ther increased bitterness over the century-old border dispute between those countries which now is before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court's decision in the case is expected before December and could well threaten the govern- ment in whichever country loses the dispute. Nicaraguan President Somoza, who has been a special target of Castro's hostility, has com- plained that Honduran President Villeda Morales is only paying lip service to the commitments he made under an OAS agreement in 1958 to control the activi- ties of Nicaraguan revolutionary SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pacrp 17 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 -SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October' 1960 groups. Somoza charges that Honduran expulsion of exiles is meaningless, since they are al- lowed to return, some of them directly from Cuba. Active prosecution and neutralization of the rebel groups by the Villeda government is apparent- ly deterred by two factors: financial inability to mount adequate army operations in the :roadless border area and fear that strong action might bring into open conflict the already feuding left and right wings of the ruling party, thus jeop- ardizing the constitutional government. Villeda evidently does not take seriously the Nicaraguan suggestion that Cuba might use the revolutionaries against his government, professing to believe that Honduras, as a friend of all progressive social movements, has nothing to fear from them. The embassy lees this attitude is based at least partly on Villeda's awareness of the pro- Castro and anti-Somoza attitudes of his party's important left wing. Somoza and Villeda both face considerable domestic op- position to their respective governments, and a clear-cut ICJ decision would pose a real threat to the administration of the losing country, although the disputed area is sparsely settled and largely undeveloped. Neither Nicaragua nor Honduras is polit- ically mature enough to accept serenely any adverse results of a juridical process, and the gov- ernment would be held responsi- 25X1 ble for a defeat. Honduras be- lieves the Somoza government is already using alarms over exile activity to divert attention from what the Villeda government is sure will be Nicaragua's "ab- ject defeat at The Hague," The six-man civilian-mili- tary junta that replaced Presi- dent Jose Maria Lemus early on 26 October in a bloodless coup sought immediately to secure the backing of the leftist ele- ments whose demonstrations last August and September critically weakened the Lemus administra- t e new government 25X1 will be friendly to the United States and that the military elements in the junta will main- tain control over the civilian member. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Puue 18 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY '27 October 1960 One of these civilian junta members; Dr. Fortin Magana, is known to have extreme leftist tendencies and has reportedly announced that all existing rec- ognized political parties, as well as the previously illegal Communist-front group, will be permitted to participate in elections due in 1962. Public reaction to the change of gov- ernment has been generally apathetic, although there has been some rejoicing in the streets, apparently over the release of all political pris- oners.. Junta members told news- men that exiles also would be permitted to return. Probably most of those being freed or al- lowed to return were pro-Castro or pro-Communist participants in the August and September dis- orders. Press reports that Lemus now is in Guatemala are unconfirmed. The ouster of Lemus prob- ably was engineered by followers of ex-President Oscar Osorio. Colonels Escamilla and Miguel Angel Castillo, a junta member, are reported to have held weekly meetings with Osorio for several weeks prior to the coup. Osorio, a retired army officer, appears to have strong backing in the armed forces, which began to consider ousting Lemus after he showed himself as a weak and inept executive in dealing with pro-Communist and pro- Castro demonstrators who threat- ened the government during Au- gust and September. ()sorio would almost certainly attempt to implement reforms to al- leviate the country's deep- seated social and economic prob- lems. While Osorio is known to be strongly anti-Communist, he might attempt to apply some radical reform measures. The US Embassy stated last month that as president he probably would not be as openly pro-US or as amenable to US suggestions as Lemus was. The Soviet news agency TASS commented almost immedi- ,tteiy, that Lemus lost au- thority among the people be- cause of "his complete sub- mission to the interests of the United States." The New China News Agency attributed the coup to "seething discon- tent" with Lemus for "fol- lowing the United States in' its 25X1 inter: vention ':in Cuba and suppres- sion of democratic forces at home. " SECRET PART IT NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 19 of 19 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY GARY .27 October 1960 PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES "Chairman Mao's thinking is the only correct thinking guiding the party, and if one separates oneself from it un- der any circumstances...mistakes are apt to occur." This eulogy to Mao in 1960 contrasts with the position taken in 1956 that "our party has always held that no political parties or indi- viduals are free from flaws... and our party abhors the deifi- cation of the individual." The 1956 statement was China's somewhat reluctant echo of the USSR's denigration of Stalin, but the gulf between the two pronouncements indicates the extent to which the cult of the individual has flourished of late in Communist China. This cult is not limited to the often repeated boast that Mao Tse-tung is the "world's greatest contempo- rary theoretician of Marxism- Leninism," but extends into the personal sphere as well. "Great, brilliant, wise, com- passionate, tender, and trust- worthy" are a few of the ad- jectives used to describe him. The physical prowess of the 67- year-old Mao is acclaimed in tales of how he swims the Yangtze River, and his person- al magnetism is extolled by visitors "thrilled" to meet him. His frugality and dis- dain for personal comfort are popular legends, according to the Peiping press. In short, Come lets go together To the golden bridge of happiness;... Sing, let's sing together, A paen of praise to Chairman Mao Tse-tung. --Tibetan song. We worship no god, nor temples build, Chairman Mao's love is greater manifold. Gods we destroy, and temples tear down, Better than gods we worship the One Man. Mountains may shake, earth may quake, And we are not afraid, But we dare not forget what the Chairman said. --Inner Mongolian song. the regime has portrayed Mao as an omniscient paragon of virtue--a perfect father-fig- ure. On the domestic front, this benevolent image of Mao has been intended in large part to en- courage popular loyalty to the regime and to arouse enthusiasm But during the 21 years since the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935, our party under the leadership of the central committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-Tung has not made any mistake in its line. - -Liu Shao-chi, September 1956 We defintely cannot take an attitude of compromise in dealing with the various thoughts, trends, and feelings which are opposed to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, no matter where such reactionary thoughts are found.... --Political Stud-u 12 October 1960 Failure to understand his thinking means failure to understand politics; to let politics take command actually means to let Mao Tse- tung assume command. --Creation. 1 February 1960 Now with my own eyes I saw his forehead, as he put out his hand and personally invited us inside. I shook hands with Chairman Mao, whose hands were soft with a tenderness that seemed ready to embrace me entirely. --Chinese Literature. September 1960 SECRET for the tremendous efforts and sacri- fices needed to carry out Communist pro- grams in China. Internationally, the Chinese Commu- nists have attempted to use Mao's reputa- tion to enhance their standing in the bloc. They have relied on his prestige as a Marxist theoretician to support their pre- tensions to ideolog- ical pre-eminence in the bloc and to but- tress their argu- ments in the dispute PART III PATTERNS Awn PERSPF["TTVES Parr? 1 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October .1.960 with the Soviet Union. The '2ussians have taken obvious um- brage at this shchev felt it necessary to at- tack Mao personally at the 9ucharest meeting last June, compared him to Stalin, and stated that Mao's theories are formulated without any contact with reality. The Chinese del- egate angrily retorted that Khru- shchev was the one out of touch with reality, and a revisionist as well. Before De-Stalihization Mao Tse-tung was one of the original founding members of the Chinese Communist party in 1921 and has been its un- disputed leader for the past 25 years. Nonetheless, his rise to power within the party entailed many setbacks and dis- appointments, including expul- sion from the party central committee at one time. When Mao won control in 1935 during the "Long March," the Commu- nists were on the run and at a low ebb in their power. Many of the claims now advanced for Mao rest simply on the fact that he built the party and its military machine into a force that eventually defeated the Nationalists. Since Mao was successful, he was "correct." Although Mao formally as- sumed the party chairmanship in 1938, the leadership cult did not develop until the early 1:940s. In discussing the edu- cation of party members in 1939, for example, party theoretician Liu Shao-chi wrote: "The term collective leadership and demo- cratic centralism means that leadership is not an individual matter; on the contrary, the leaders are bound by policies that have been derived by demo- cratic methods." Liu did not extol Mao's virtues at all in that article. At the seventh party con- gress in 1945, however, Liu-- influenced in part by the So- viet glorification of Stalin-- set forth the authoritative view of Mao as China's counter- part of the great Stalin: "Our party, and this is very impor- tant, is one that now has its own great leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung.... He has pointed out to the Chinese people, sunk in deep misery, the only clear, sure road to complete! and thor- oughgoing liberation, the Mao Tse-tung road." The revised party statutes which Liu presented to the con- gress paid tribute to Mao's al- leged contribution to Marxist theory: "The Chinese Communist party takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the com- bined principles derived from the practical experiences of the Communist revolution--the thought of Mao Tse-tong--as the guiding principles of all its work...." If Mao was thus elevated to the Marxist pantheon, the Chinese were still careful to keep him on a level Subordinate to Stalin. Until the Soviet dictator's death in 1953, the claims pressed for Mao were carefully hedged and for the most part unpublicized beyond the domestic scene. A People's Daily editorial of 7 March1953 eulogizing Stalin put Mao in the role of the Soviet dictator's disciple: "The Chinese revolu- tion achieved victory under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse- tung, following the guidance of Comrade Stalin." After Stalin's death, the new leaders in the Kremlin, per- haps still unsure themselves or hoping to cement the Sino-Soviet alliance, apparently thought it expedient to make some gestures to flatter the Chinese ego. Be- tween May and December 1953, several reviews of Mao's works appearing in Pravda and Izvestia asserted that Mao iad maU_e__fra- valuable contribution to the SECRET PART TTT PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES :Page 2 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMMtY .,27 October 1960 treasure chest of Marxism- Leninism." The reviewers point- ed out, however, that the value of Mao's contributions on Marx- ism lies'in their application to the Chinese scene, and that it would be profitable for revolu- tionaries in colonial and semi- colonial countries to study his work; they did not concede that his work had universal signif- icance. The cult of Mao in China flourished after Stalin's death. Thus 1hrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the "cult of per- sonality" at the Soviet 20th party congress in February 1956 came as a bombshell to the Chi- nese Communists. Peiping's response was carefully thought out. A Peo- ple's Daily editorial of 4 pri 1956, entitled "On the Historical Experience Concern- ing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," did not echo the emotional tone of Khrushchev's denunciation. Instead, it es- sayed a dispassionate discus- sion of Stalin's errors and concluded that, his mistakes notwithstanding, Stalin had made a great contribution to Marxism-Leninism and that his writings would continue to be studied in China. The Chinese were evidently embarrassed by the parallels many would have drawn between Stalin and Mao; it was deemed necessary to congratulate the Soviet party for correcting its mistakes but to imply that Peiping had not fallen into similar errors, inasmuch as the Chinese Communist party relied "on the wisdom of the masses of the people." Peiping did little that really detracted from Mao Tse- tung's stature in the subse- quent period, although it made some show of stress on "collec- tive leadership." At the eighth party congress, which met in September 1956, the allusion to "the thought of Mao Tse-tung" was removed from the party stat- utes. Nonetheless, speeches at the congress were filled with laudatory references to the party chairman, and Teng Hsiao- ping, who presented the new party statutes, stated, "Marx- ism has never denied the role of outstanding individuals or the role of leaders within the party." In at least one respect, de-Stalinization was apparently responsible for a significant modification in Mao's own con- cept of his role as a leader; he appeared to think it more necessary than ever to project the image of a leader whose ear was always attuned to "the wisdom of the masses," From his assumption of power in 1949 through 1956, Mao apparently had made only ten trips outside Peiping, but in 1957 alone he made 13 trips to the hinter- land, and from 1958 to date he has made even more inspection tours away from the capital. So far this year, Mao has spent less than half his time in Pei- ping. Between 1956 and early 1958, Peiping's propaganda or- gans continued to treat Mao deferentially, although in a more muted tone than before de-Stalinization. The prop- aganda was not entirely suc- cessful in creating the in- tended public image of Mao. The party leaders were clearly shocked by the anti-Mao senti- ments voiced by a few fool- hardy intellectuals during the "hundred flowers" campaign in 1957. According to the Com- munist press, criticisms of the Chinese leader included such statements as "Chairman Mao loves to be great and meritorious," "meets only those who seek to please him," is "hot-tempered," "impetuous," and "reckless," and "assumes the air of a benevolent god." SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Paap 3 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMgy 27 October .1960 There is probably some truth in these charges; how- ever, the infrequency of purg- es among senior Chinese Commu- nist leaders over the past 25 years suggests that Mao does not suffer from the paranoia which plagued Stalin. Great Leap Forward In 1958, Communist China inaugurated sweeping economic and social changes which were hailed as harbingers of a utopia: the "great leap for- ward" was begun, and most of the rural Chinese were reorgan- ized into communes. Peiping's aggressive, brash efforts were probably predicated on the leaders' grim realization of the tremendous problems which China faced in attempting to transform itself quickly into a modern, industrialized na- tion. Desperate measures seemed called for, and, in an effort to obtain a maximum ef- fort from the people, the re- gime began to rely heavily on "Maoism"--the term used by Pei- ping to designate the theoret- ical writings of Mao as well as his personal qualities as a leader. An example of the treat- ment accorded the party chair- man in this period is the speech Liu Shao-chi made in May 1958 before the second session of the eighth party congress. Liu credited Mao personally with the speed-up of the First Five- Year Plan, the proposals in the draft program for agricultural development, and for progress in general. As Liu saw it, Mao- ism was basic to future economic development; achievements would come more easily because of "the practical experience gained in the people's. struggle and of the development of MaoTse-tung's thinking in the past few years." In June 1958 the regime launched w major program to pro- mote the study of Mao's works. Millions of persons spent sev- eral hours a week attempting to understand Maoism. The party apparently had two objectives: to rebuild confidence among those whose faith was shaken during the antirightist campaign of 1957-58 and to inculcate en- thusiasm for the new leap-for- ward program. An attempt to personalize the lofty figure of Mao was also made. A spate of articles on the theme "I knew Chairman Mao when..." appeared in the press. Most of these reminiscences, written by soldiers who had ac- companied the party chairman on the Long March or before, were filled with tales of his kind- ness and consideration. They all included such statements as, "I felt in him the love of a father." Peiping's drive in 1958 for unparalleled progress fell short of its objectives. Al- though much economic headway had been made, there was con- siderable popular discontent with the communes, which had been organized too hastily. Furthermore, the regime's gran- diose scheme to double its iron and steel output by establish- ing "backyard" furnaces in the communes failed miserably. In December 1958 Mao Tse- tung announced his decision to retire as chief of state and in- dicated that he wished to de- vote his time to writing and study and to his duties as par- ty chairman. Tempting though it may be to link Mao's resig- nation from the government to the failure of programs closely associated with his name, there is no evidence that his author- ity had been challenged or that his control over the party had slipped. It is true, on the other hand, that the emphasis on both Maoism and the adulation of Mao SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTTVES patrp 4 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY 27 October 1960 as an individual slackened dur- ing the period of consolidation and review in early 1959. Pre- mier Chou En-lai made a major address before the National People's Congress in April, for example, in which he mentioned Mao only three times. In a sim- ilar speech in May 1958, Liu Shao-chi had invoked the lead- er's name 21 times. Feature articles in People's Daily ap- peared without any ref-erence to the party chairman. During the first half of 1059, statistical teams at- tempted to verify the inflated production claims for the pre- vious year. The survey of the statistical teams showed that these claims had been grossly overstated. It became obvious to all that the 1959 economic goals were completely unrealis- tic, and the regime had to de- termine whether it would con- tinue to operate on the basis of false claims or confess its errors. To do the first would have entailed maintaining an almost impossible fiction and made further planning extremely difficult. The decision to admit the exaggeration of production fig- ures and targets was made in early August 1959. The central committee did not concede that Mao had made errors in princi- ple; and fiercely castigated those who had. been "viciously slandering and attacking... our great leap forward and people's commune movement..., They have suffered ignominious defeat." In this defensive tone the cen- tral committee went on to af- firm: "The wisdom and the might of the masses is unlim- ited. Enlightened and led by the party and Mao Tse-tung, this wisdom and might have be- come irresistible,,.," The thesis that the party and Mao had been right all the time was necessary unless there was to be a major purge among the leaders. Presumably Mao was too strong to challenge, or at least too many of the other top leaders had jointly authored the extremist policies, The image of Mao the omniscient was again invoked to inspire the doubters and the shaken. Shortly afterward, at the tenth anniversary of the Chi- nese Communist regime on 1 Oc- tober 1959, extravagant claims were put forward of Peiping's achievements. It was in this period that the first sweeping assertion was made of Mao's universal significance, when central committee member Liu Lan-tao termed him "the most prominent Marxist-Leninist rev- olutionary, politician, and theorist among all living con- temporaries." Of greater importance, by autumn of 1959 several disputes had developed with Moscow over Chinese domestic programs and bloc strategy. The controversy gave added impetus to the Chi- nese effort to portray Mao as the legitimate heir to Lenin, It was deemed essential to show that the Chinese, not the Zus- sians, were the orthodox Marx- ists: Peiping counted heavily on Mao's prestige as a theoreti- cian to lend authority to its arguments. Present Image A mass movement 'to study theory, launched by the party in December 1959, has continued to the present, Mao's thought is portrayed as a development and perfection of Marxism, and the people are told how fortu- nate they are to live in the "era of Mao Tse-tung." Maoism seems almost to have replaced Marxism in emphasis. Ideolog- ical articles always give a nod to Marx and Lenin, but they make it clear that Mao's inter- pretations are what count, be- cause he deals with practical- ities and the present: "Maoism is the key to Marxism." SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES T3nsr,- 5 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Claims for Mao as a Marx- ist theorist are closely inter- woven with assertions concern- ing his ability as a military strategist. The latter claims were spotlighted in August 1960 when the revolutionary Military Museum was formally opened in Peiping. According to an arti- cle in the regime's English- language edition of Peking Re- view, the museum epitom zed_ ' e correct political and mil- itary thinking of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, our great, respected, and beloved leader." Appropri- ately enough, the motto over the entrance, in eight-foot gold letters, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" is in Mao's calligraphy and is the title of one of his books. Additional emphasis was placed on the military aspects of Mao's thought with the Octo- ber 1960 publication of the fourth volume of his Selected Works, which deals wi Ee UH'Inese civil war and revolu- tion. The commentary and re- views of the book use Mao's analysis of the civil war to defend Peiping's position in the present Sino-Soviet dispute. To do this, they first en- deavor to demonstrate that Mao's writings have the stature of the other Marxist scriptures. This demonstration is accomplished mainly by fiat: "The Mao Tse- tung ideology is Marxism-Lenin- ism in its fullest developed form in the era of the socialist revolution by the proletariat"; i.e., Mao is the greatest theo- rist since Lenin. Such asser- tions do not sit well with the Soviet Union. Maoism has reached such heights in Communist China that it seems a permanent part of the political landscape--to re- main as long as Mao does, and perhaps longer. After the par- ty chairman's death or polit- ical demise, especially if his successor wants to improve re- lations with the USSR, it is possible that a re-evaluation will take place, as in the case of Stalin. If the successor wishes to maintain present Chi- nese positions against Moscow, however, he will have no choice but to retain "Maoism," Peiping's pretensions to ideological lead- ership will depend heavily on 25X1 the acceptance of Mao in the Communist pantheon. As the UN General Assem- bly moves toward consideration of the Algerian issue, the con- tending forces remain stalemated, although the pressures on them are apparently becoming more in- tense. The rebels continue un- der severe French military pres- sure, but have received addi- tional backing in recent ap- proaches to Moscow and Peiping, and are almost certain to have substantial Afro-Asian support in the General Assembly for their effort "to international- ize" the conflict, De Gaulle's 195 offer of so : --C33"tL:''imLriaCion ;?emains France's official position, but there appears to be a growing diversity of French views. Pop- ular opinion now seems to be swinging in favor of political negotiations with the rebels and even toward eventual inde- pendence for Algeria, but army sentiment is still adamant a- gainst such negotiations, and rightist leaders have in the past few months become more in- clined to challenge De Gaulle directly on this issue. Despite the apparently hopeful evolution of negoti- ating positions on each side since Do Gaulle came to power, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pare 6 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET, CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 J SOUDAN N O Gas field ? Oil field Oil pipeline /~ om Bechar Hassi Messuoud I Colomb J Arrew ~yr /'~24" Oi peline t l 'G e izane ran V zap peel ne 15,000 ALN ` 24" pipeline auggour> B'r Ro)ane 0 6 pipeline ?~\ ?EI Gassi /Tunis`'(f_ (. TUNISIA 110,000 u ALN ekhire Zuara - _; Gulf ofSldr~ Tripoli --\ V-Tdle! P 0 L I T R E; N A I C A ? Edjele Fields F E Z Z A N ---Gas pipeline under construction Electrified barrier TT Railroad NIGER both French and rebel positions have hardened since the failure of preliminary talks at Melun in June. The rebel leaders have steadfastly rejected a cease-fire without prior polit- ical guarantees for the future of their movement, and De Gaulle has held to his stand that fight- ing must cease before political terms can be discussed. Military Situation The approximately 440,000 French military forces in Al- geria--of which about one quar- ter are Moslems--confront ap- proximately 15,000 rebels dis- persed in small units. An es- timated 10,000 other rebel soldiers are in Tunisia and 6,000 in Morocco, but the elec- trified barriers which the French constructed along both borders have made it-increas- ingly difficult for rebel re- inforcements and supplies to enter Algeria. ;decent military action has been mostly limited to minor local operations. The French claim the level of ter- rorist acts in Algeria has dropped one third in the past year, but the rebels will prob- ably continue ambushes, assas- sinations, and grenade attacks to discourage the emergence of a Moslem "third force" willing to cooperate with France. Vic- tims are far more frequently Moslems than Europeans. The rebel underground terrorist organization in France on 23 October renewed its attacks on the French police, apparently as a demonstration of its abil- ity to "carry the war into France itself." The Melun negotiations were broken off primarily be- cause of rebel demands to be treated as representatives of a government, and the Provi- sional Algerian Government (PGAR) has not modified its conditions since then. It has, however, intensified its ef- forts to internationalize the SECRET 6,000 ALN (Gas) MOROCCO ?~ Hassi R' Mel b PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES na. da 7 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU'MEY 27 October 1960 conflict. Premier Ferhat Abbas' recent trip to Peiping's Na- tional Day celebrations and two stopovers in Moscow on his first visit to the Communist bloc were designed to show the West that the rebels are in earnest when they say they will accept Communist aid if neces- sary in their fight for inde- pendence. Abbas and his group, like a previous rebel delegation to Peiping last spring, were accorded an enthusiastic recep- tion and had several conferences with top Chinese officials. A joint communique of 5 October affirmed Peiping's intention to give "total assistance and its support to the Algerian people in pursuit and intensification of its armed struggle." The USSR, which previously maintained a "neutral" stand so as not to alienate De Gaulle, has dropped its cautious atti- tude toward the PGAR. Abbas held talks with high Soviet of- ficials in Moscow both en route to and returning from his visit to Peiping. Khrushchev, at his own initiative, met with mem- bers of the Algerian rebel "delegation" while in New York, and on 7 October extended de facto recognition to the PGAR. Tunisia and Morocco are support- ing the rebels' at- tempts "to interna- tionalize" the war, partly through ef- forts to get the UN more directly in- volved. Leaders of both countries see in the UN's Congo operations a prece- dent they feel could be useful in solving the Algerian problem. Tunisian President Bourgui- ba's vague proposal of "union" between his government and the rebels' regime was appar- ently offered as a means either of jarring De Gaulle into some further proposals or of provok- ing French incursions into Tu- nisian territory which would permit a new appeal to the UN for protection. In addition, Bourguiba has recently said that he would facilitate the passage of arms and volunteers from any source to help in the liberation of Algeria. Morocco, anxious not to seem less pro-PGAR than Tunisia, has magnified several recent violations of its terri- tory by French troops in Al- geria and has publicly consid- ered various means of retalia- tion. While no change has been made in the official French policy favoring self--determi- nation for Algeria, there has been a considerable modifica- tion of French opinions on the subject of Algeria. De Gaulle's constant' repetition of the self-determination and "Algeri- an Algeria" themes--sometimes on occasions which seemed The future of Algeria rests with the Algerians, not as thrust upon them by machine gun and knife, but according to the wishes which they will freely express through universal suffrage.... The three arrangements which it is possible to conceive of will be the object of the consultation. One of these would be secession, where some believe independence would reside, France would then leave the Algerians, who would have expressed their wish to become separated from her. They would organize, without her, the territory in which they live, the resources which they have at their call, the government which they desire.... Or else, out-and-out identification with France, such as is implied in the equality of rights.... Or else, the government of Algeria by Algerians, backed up by French help and in narrow relationship with her, for economy, teaching, defense, and foreign relations. --Television address, 16 Sept 1959 We wanted to solve the Algerian problem in a manner now well known in every household in the world. First of all, we wanted the fighting and assassinations to come to an end. We want the cooling-off period to follow. We want everyone to return home. We want the people to renew contacts with one another. We want them to look the situation in the face, which is to say, to see the necessity of developing Algeria. Later, when this necessity is understood, the Algerians will decide their own. destiny. I am sure that they will decide in favor of an Algerian Algeria in close union with France. That makes good sense both for them and for us. --Speech in Normandy, 7 July 1960 SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 .. ..SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October 1960 propitious for spelling out further steps--has disappointed many who had pinned their hopes on a bold new move to settle the question. The mounting frustration in France over the Algerian issue has combined with discontent on economic and other issues to bring De Gaulle under the heaviest po- litical attack since he came to power. The spectacular trial in September of the "Jeanson net- work" of French supporters of the Algerian rebels has been seized on by leftist, liberal, and clerical groups to express opposition to the army's meth- ods of conducting the war. Calls for peace negotiations--in some cases even on the rebels' terms --have been issued by the prin- cipal labor unions and the for- merly pro - De Gaulle Socialist party. Teachers' associations and the Catholic hierarchy have expressed concern for the youths compelled to participate in the war, and a "manifesto" by a group of leading intellectuals goes so far as to proclaim the right of soldiers to desert a wrong cause. Rightist leaders have countered with appeals for the maintenance of French Algeria and to patriotism--as in the case of the manifesto of 200 writers, teachers, and French Academy members includin Marshal Juin. On balance, De Gaulle's campaign has succeeded in win- ning broad popular support for his self-determination policy. Most Frenchmen would probably accept a carefully handled French initiative leading to political negotiations with the rebels or even to Algerian in- dependence. Such a move, however, would depend on the army, which has probably been the principal single force limiting ;De Gaulle's freedom to solve the Algerian problem. The majority of the officer corps appears to be com- ing around to the idea that Al- gerian independence is inevitable. These officers would not acqui- esce in any negotiated settle- ment requiring the army's with- drawal from Algeria, however, until they were certain that European settlers and ;pro-French Moslems were in no danger.from rebel elements. The army is further con- cerned to have at least the ap- pearance of a victory over the rebels. Although a number of "activists" wish to overturn De Gaulle, they could not drag the remainder into an overt move against him unless he af- forded a clear-cut pretext which could be interpreted by them as a "sellout"' to the rebels, Progress in Algeria Paris can point to some progress within Algeria itself, where official French policy in- sists that the solution of the problem requires the Moslem and European communities to work to- gether to build a modern econ- omy and political structure. Two-thirds of all elective of- fices have been reserved for Moslems in parliamentary and local elections held since 1958. The rebels failed to intimidate Moslem candidates, but many of these candidates were not rep- resentative of Moslem opinion. In September, Parris con- vened meetings of commissions appointed from among Algerian elected officials to study SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY various aspects of the Algerian administration. Their effective- ness is doubtful thus far, but they at least constitute a prec- edent for French consultations with a cross-section of Algerian Moslems on nonpolitical issues. Meanwhile, a gradual upward trend is apparent in the Algeri- an economy. Although the five- year $4.3 billion Constantine Plan for Algerian economic de- velopment announced by De Gaulle in October 1958 has not yet been formalized, some new indus- trial investment has been attracted. Pro- duction and exports of Saharan petroleum have been stepped up with the completion of two 24-inch pipe- lines between the oil fields and the Med- iterranean, and pe- troleum exports now are approaching an annual rate of 6,000,000 tons. Ma- jor progress has also been made on con- struction of the pipeline from the Bassi R'mel natural gas fields which will ultimately supply Algiers and Oran with cheap power for in- dustrial develop- ment. The French delegation will take no part in the proceedings at the UN on Algeria, and De Gaulle's slighting references to the UN in his speeches this fall were probably designed to condition the French public to a setback on the Algerian issue. in that body. Paris can be ex- pected to refuse to take cog- nizance of any UN resolution, and will probably issue strong protests to all allies of France which fail to vote against "out- side interference" in the Al- gerian problem. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION ON ALGERIA 1955 1959 01025 A UN General Assembly 10th session inscribed question of Algeria on its agenda. France walked out of Assem- bly. Assembly later decided not to consider the question further. 11th session adopted unanimously conciliatory resolution expressing hope that a "peaceful, democratic, and just solution will be found." and Tunisia and expressing wish for a solution through "pourparlers." 12th session adopted moderate resolution tak- ing note of the offerof good offices by Morocco people to independence" and urged negotia- 13th session failed by one vote to adopt reso- lution which recognized "right of Algerian 14th session failed by one vote to adopt reso- lution urging "pourparlers" take place looking toward a peaceful solution based on the right of self-determination. The focus of attention on the Algerian problem in the next few weeks will be in the UN General Assembly, where the Political Committee is expected to begin debate on the Algerian item about mid-November. The increase in UN members with an anticolonial bias, plus the USSR's injection of an appeal for the end of all colonial re- gimes, makes it almost certain that this session will pass a resolution on Algeria that goes far beyond the 1956 and 1957 ex- pressions of hope that a solu- tion might be found through negotiations. With the support of the African states belonging to the French Community, a resolution calling for a UN-conducted ref- erendum in Algeria might receive the necessary two-thirds major- ity. An active campaign by other members of the Afro-Asian bloc--such as Tunisia, the UAR, India, and Ghana--has already begun to influence some of these French Community states, although counterpressures may be exerted as a result of the meeting of the French-speaking African states at Abidjan called by Ivory Coast Premier Houph- ouet-Boigny on 24 October. SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page. 10 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 October.1960 The special weakness of France's position in the UN this year is that, unless pro- French Houphouet-Boigny can devise some suitable plan at the Abidjan meeting, there will probably be no moderating in- fluence on the Algerian issue from Asian or African UN mem- bers, Unless such a moderat- ing influence soon develops, it is doubtful that a resolu- tion mild enough to be accept- able to France's allies will be proposed. There is a possibility that an anti-French UN vote, particularly if a resolution calls for the UN's physical presence in Algeria in any form, might produce a new solidarity in France behind another govern- ment attempt to solve the Alge- rian problem as an "internal" question, French press specu- lation is running to predictions of a move to resume negotiations with the rebels--possibly even before the UN debate--or, if such negotiations fail, to mateI r srl.izd, of new steps by the French to create institutions for self- government along "Algerian Al- geria" lines. In line with the latter pos- sibility, Premier Debre has hinted that if the military sit- uation is basically unchanged by spring, the government may take the initiative to assure great- er local representation in ad- ministration. In either of these cases, one motive would be to build up a responsible Moslem group which might ultimately be able to treat with the rebels, SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 11 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927A002900090001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3 Approved For Release 2008/11/07: CIA-RDP79-00927AO02900090001-3