CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 COPY NO OCI NO.5489/60 17 November 1960 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Li I i DECLASSI iED CLASS. CHANGED" 1;7: -i'5 NEXT REVIEW VA's E: DATEZ(_! REVIEWER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ARMY review(s) completed. State Dept. review completed ,~o -aa as Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- :LNG THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- "'ION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS :PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY T H E : ,W :E E IK I N B R I E F OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST interests. lAL BLOC REACTION TO US ELECTION.... Page 1 The main themes conveyed in Moscow's reaction to the US election are that Senator Kennedy's victory opens the way for a new era in US-Soviet relations and that the Soviet Government will respond favorably,- to any new Ameri- can initiatives to improve the international situation. Moscow's reaction strongly suggests that the Soviet premier's present aim is to reduce the post-summit hos- tility and create a favorable atmosphere for a return to high-level negotiations. Khrushchev's desire to resume negotiations takes on added significance in view of the current discussions among world Communist leaders over Sino-Soviet differences. These arise in part from Pei-- ping':s, apprehensions that the USSR's detente strategy might lead to East-West agreements at the expense of Chinese CUBA AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN OUTBREAKS . . . , . . . . . Page 2 Recent outbreaks in three Central American republics are symptomatic of the acute political and social unrest in Latin America which is being effectively exploited by the Castro regime. The Cuban Government regards itself as the vanguard of the "anti-imperialist revolution" that will "inevitably" sweep all Latin American. Cuban propa- ganda and subversion have played a part in contributing to the unrest that led to the outbreaks in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, but there is as yet no reliable evidence that these developments are being closely directed from Cuba. These outbreaks, however, make these countries more vulnerable to further Cuban sub- version. FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De Gaulle's announcement that by mid-December he will set a date for a nationwide referendum to approve his Algerian policy indicates both his intention':to move decisively toward a solution and his recognition of the need for a demonstration of massive public support to counter anticipated attacks on his regime. Paris is reinforcing security forces in Algiers, where European settlers are described as bitter and "'spoiling for trouble." The rebel government, however, is likely to reject any further overtures prior to the UN debate on Algeria in December. . Page 5 tIONFIDEN L Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET ~Mw CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART I (cont inued) SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 The 10 November takeover of Luang Prabang by a group of officers sympathetic to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee has seriously weakened Premier Souvanna Phouma's poeition and given rise to increased tension which could lead to military clashes between the groups struggling for control. Souvanna shows no sign of being ready to resign or to contribute to formation of a new government including Phoumi elements. The agreement between the Souvanna government and the Pathet Lao announced on 16 November for the dispatch of a govern- ment good-will mission to Communist China and North Vietnam and the establishment of "friendly relations" with Peiping may reflect Souvanna's lessening ability to resist pressures from the left in the face of the erosion of his support from the right. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 The past week brought some improvement in the posi- tion of Colonel Mobutu's interim Congolese Government?with respect to pro-Lumumba elements in Leopoldville,.. New moves toward. a political settlement, however, are in abeyance pending a UN decision in New York concerning the seating of President Kasavubu's de?legat?ion andl:the dispatch of the 15-nation conciliation commission to the Congo. Supporters of Lumumba continue active in Orientale Province, and are attempting to gain the al- legiance of anti-Tshombe'tribesmen in Katanga. PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS BLOC ARMS AID TO THE ALGERIAN REBELS . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The Algerian rebels continue to assert that they have been assured of new military assistance from the bloc, particularly from Communist China. Since rebel Premier Abbas' visit to Moscow and Peiping in September, there has been increasing evidence that the rebels are expecting new deliveries of bloc arms through a third country.. Although Moscow and Peiping appear reluctant to state publicly their willingness to provide further arms aid, they are likely to attempt to supply at least light weapons and possibly some "technical per- SECRET THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART II (continued) USSR ANNOUNCES NEW GOLD VALUE FOR RUBLE . . . . . . . . . Page 2 The gold content of the new ruble--hitherto the only major unannounced feature of the pending general price and currency reform--was revealed by the Soviet Government on 14 November. The new ruble to be issued on 1 January 1961 will have a gold content of 0.987 gram, compared to the US dollar's 0.888 gram, and will thus theoretically have a foreign exchange value slightly higher than that of the dollar. The USSR is describing the reform as en- hancing the international prestige of its currency. The revaluation will have no direct bearing on domestic prices and will have no immediate practical effect on the USSR's trade and aid programs outside the bloc. BELGRADE MOVES TO ENHANCE ITS PRESTIGE:: WITH UNCOMMITTED .STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. ' . . Page 3 Since President Tito's recent visit to the UN, Yugo- slavia has increasingly demonstrated its independence of Soviet foreign policies. It has opposed Khrushchev's UN reorganization scheme, bloc proposals for Balkan accord, and Soviet plans for the convocation of a summit con- ference in the near future. Belgrade probably regards the emphasis on "neutralism" in its foreign policies-- hitherto in almost complete support of Soviet initia- tives--as a necessary adjunct to its efforts to increase its influence in the uncommitted countries. TURKISH POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 The elimination of the more radical members of the ruling Committee of National Union in Turkey re-emphasizes President Gursel's intention to return the government to civilian control. Col. Turkes, spokesman for the younger, more politically minded officers dismissed from the com- mittee, will probably remain asia..political figure and is likely to have the support of many of the more than 3,500 officers recently forced to retire. Page 5 In his efforts to remove any threats to his regime, Qasim has arrested a dozen or so Iraqi Communistr.includ- ing two central committee members, and several nationalist army officers. Qasim's sweeping demands for revisions in Iraq's concession agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company have led to an impasse in their negotiations,.. New anti- government demonstrations took place in the Sudan on the eve of Nasir's arrival on 15 November for a ten-da visit: extraordinary security precautions will continue. SECRET iii THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 PART II (continued) MAURITANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 Mauritania obtains its formal independence on 28 November, in the face of Moroccan claims to this Saharan territory and threats of "national mobilization" to en- force them. Mauritanian Premier Ould Daddah, anticipat- ing Moroccan-inspired subversion and military adventures such as occurred in late 1957 and early 1958, is reported to have asked for and received France?s commitment to maintain present defense arrangements in Mauritania. Morocco's efforts to obtain diplomatic support within the UN seem likely to fail. JAPANESE ELECTION . . . Page 8 In the Japanese general election on 20 November, Prime Minister Ikeda will be seeking both to confirm his leadership of the conservatives and to regain for the government the public support lost during the demon- strations last spring against the US-Japanese security treaty and former Prime Minister Kishi. The opposition Socialists are attempting to overcome adverse public reaction to their violent tactics last spring, and the moderate Democratic Socialists are trying to attract enough votes to survive as a political party. The Communists, with only one seat in the last Diet, are unlikely to win more than one or two additional seats. SOUTH VIETNAM . . . Page 9 President Diem is under pressure to punish the insti- gators of the abortive coup of 10-11 November staged by paratroop elements concerned over his ineffectiveness in dealing with Communist guerrilla warfare. It remains un- certaii whether he will now take the necessary steps to liberalize his regime s;llfffc-feit1q to rally popular support. The creation of a committee to ferret out "reb- els and communists" suggests that reprisals will be carried out against persons syppatheticto the coup. The attempted revolt apparently took the Vietnamese Communists by surprise; Communist propaganda has por- trayed it as a conflict between pro-American groups. AFRICAN MOVES FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS IN UN BODIES . . . . . Page 10 The African UN members, supported by the rest of the Afro-Asian bloc, have apparently decided on a major ef- fort to reallocate the existing elective seats on the UN Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. This African effortto gain seats now held by other regions--notably Western Europe and Latin American--prob- ably results from the rejection by the USSR of any attempt to increase the number of elective seats. The Africans, SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 PART II (continued) with this end in mind, succeeded in postponing the elec- PRO-CASTRO PARTY ELIMINATED FROM VENEZUELAN COALITION . . Page 11 By excluding the pro-Castro Democratic Republican Union (URD) from his three-party coalition, Venezuelan President Betancourt has probably consolidated his sup- port; among moderates and in the armed forces. The .URD now can be expected to ally openly with the Communists and other leftist opposition elementswhich provoked the antigovernment violence during late October. These groups will probably attempt to exploit Betancourt's critical economic difficulties and the widening rift in Cuban-Venezuelan relations. Recent actions by British Guiana's government leader Cheddi Jagan reflect the continued Communist orientation of the top leaders of the colony's governing People's Progressive party. In view of the continuing fragmenta- tion of the opposition, Jagan's remains the strongest political party, and he is expected to win the August 1961 elections which will be held under the new constitu- tion providing for full internal self-government. ITALIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 As a result of the local elections held throughout Italy on 6 and 7 November, the Christian Democrats in many municipalities will be under pressure to form alli- ances outside the pattern of the national coalition--in particular, with the Nenni Socialists. The Nenni Socialists' party directorate has hinted a willingness to form alliances with the Christian Democrats in some 150 city councils where the national coalition parties failed to win a Majority. Acceptance of such an offer in any sizable number of municipalities, however, would antagonize the Liberal party and other conservative ele- ments among Premier Fanfani's parliamentary supporters and thus risk disrupting his government. PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The questions of the authority of the UN secretary general and the personnel and functions of the Secretariat were brought into the foreground this fall by Khrushchev's bitter attacks on Hammarskjtld and proposals for reorganiz- ing the Secretariat. The Soviet leaders have long been SECRET v., . Page 12 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART III (continued) dissatisfied with the Secretariat's personnel setup and procedures and want more bloc nationals in key positions. The increasingly powerful Afro-Asian bloc, believing that equitable geographic distribution should be paramount in hiring UN civil servants, contends that the Western powers have too large a share in the UN administration. The Soviet bloc now holds only 84 of an assigned quota of 216 professional positions. In his efforts to correct this imbalance, Hammarskjold is hindered by a lack of qualified personnel in the bloc and underdeveloped coun- tries',and the refusal of bloc personnel to accept the lower professional positions. RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5 Changes being made in the system of industrial ad- ministration in the USSR reflect the regime's continued concern over the problem of how best to encourage much- needed local initiative while at the same time directing it toward achieving national economic,-and political goals. These changes, involving both organizations and planning techniques, are designed to provide some operational lee- way at the local level within a system of central control. SOUTH KOREANS LOOK TO CHANG GOVERNMENT FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 The South Koreans look to Prime Minister Chang for progress under democracy, but he is faced with acute prob- lems of inflation and corruption; the burden of supporting a 600,000-man defense establishment carries in train grave economic ills. Moreover, the country suffers from poverty of natural resources, overpopulation, and a shortage of managerial and technical skills. Following the fall of the Rhee government, North Korea has urgently propagandized the economic benefits of unification and disparaged foreign aid as incapable of bringing prosperity to South Korea. SECRET vi THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST The main themes conveyed in Moscow's reaction to the USP election are that Senator Ken- nedy's victory opens the way to a new era in US-Soviet relations and that the' Soviet-Government will respond favorably to any new American initiatives to improve the international sit- uation. Khrushchev lost no time in sending President-elect Kennedy a congratulatory mes- sage which set the Soviet line, since echoed by virtually all Soviet commentators, by express- ing the hope that US-Soviet re- lations "will again follow the line along which they were de- veloping in Franklin Roosevelt's time." Khrushchev declared that the USSR is ready to "develop the most friendly relations be- tween the Soviet and the Ameri- can peoples, between the govern- ments of the USSR and the United States." Although he did not call for a new summit meeting, Khrushchev reaffirmed the USSR's readiness to continue efforts to solve such a "press- ing problem as disarmament, to settle the German issue through the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty, and to reach agreement on other questions whose solution could bring about the easing and improve- ment of the entire international situation." He added, "Any steps in this direction will always meet with the understand- ing and support of the Soviet Government." The Soviet press prominently published Kennedy's reply on 11 Novem- ber. Soviet propaganda sees the election results as a repudia- tion of the present administra- tion's policies. Izvestia con- tended on 11 Novem ear that there now are real prospects for changes in US foreign policy. This commentary said the results showed that the American people want an improvement in US-So- viet relations, that Khrushchev's message to the President-elect underscores a similar Soviet de- sire, and that "certain circles" in countries allied to the United States favor revisions in US policy but want Washington to take the initiative. Moscow refrained from pre- dicting the course the new ad- ministration will follow, but the tone and text of Khrushchev's message, together with the fre- quent invocation of Roosevelt's name, provide Soviet readers with a generally hopeful note. Moscow radio on 12 November noted that the Soviet people "were more or less satisfied" to learn that Senator Kennedy was elected and observed that any change in US policy would be greeted by "Russians in the street as the promise of good times." Moscow recalled Soviet indignation over the U-2 incident and subsequent events and assert- ed that these actions made it impossible to "have any dealings with the Americans." It noted that the new administration will not be committed to "the old policy of brinkmanship." Moscow's reaction strongly suggests that Khrushchev's present SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page I of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 IN&W SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY intention is to reduce the post-summit level of hostility toward the West and create a favorable atmosphere for a re- turn to high-level negotiations after the new administration is installed. Khrushchev's desire to resume negotiations takes on added significance, in view of the current discus- sions among world Communist leaders over Sino-Soviet dif- ferences. These arise in part from Peiping's apprehensions that the USSR's detente strategy might lead to East-West agree- ments at the expense of Chinese interests. Moscow's treatment of the election further underscores Khrushchev's determination to defend and maintain his "peace- ful coexistence" strategy and to reject any concessions to Chinese Communist demands which would imply even a partial re- pudiation of his policy toward the West over the past three years. Bloc Reaction Peiping agrees with Moscow that the election results sig- nified a popular rejection of past "cold war" policies, but, unlike Moscow, the Chinese see no possibility that the new administration will bring any slackening of US "aggressive policies." Chinese propaganda immediately branded the Presi- dent-elect as just another "tool of monopoly capital," and pre- dicted that he would continue the "aggressive and reactionary" policies of the present admin- istration while making greater use of taxation to "increase military spending and extend war preparations." North Korea and North Viet- nam have closely followed the Chinese lead. Mongolia, on the other hand, "warmly greets" Khrushchev's message to Kennedy and has endorsed Moscow's wait- and-see approach to the new administration. East European propagandists are less reluctant than Moscow to criticize Kennedy and ex- press doubts regarding future policy changes. Only Albania, 25X1 however, seems to side fully with Peiping's uncompromising position. CUBA AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN OUTBREAKS Recent outbreaks in Central America are symptomatic of the acute political and social un- rest in Latin America which is being effectively exploited by the Castro regime. The Cuban Government regards itself as the vanguard of the "anti-im- perialist" revolution that will "inevitably" sweep all Latin America. Cuban subversion ranges from intensive propaganda, sup- ported by a Castro-subsidized world news agency having close working ties with Sino-Soviet bloc propaganda agencies, to SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 financial support tendered Communist- oriented student and labor groups by Cuban diplomatic missions. When, as in the case of the unsuccessful Cuban-backed revolu- tion in the Dominican. Republic in mid-1959, the Cuban leaders consider a country ripe for revolution, they provide covert military aid and direction to Commu- nist or Communist- controlled revolu- tionary groups. 17 November 1960 While Cuban progaganda and sub- version have %.clearly played a part in con- tributing to the un- rest that led to the recent outbreaks in El Salvador, Guate- SECRET I BRITIS HONDI, AS Puerto Barr i~`~~ ``Managua mala, and Nicaragua, it does not appear that these develop- ments are being closely di- rected from Cuba. These out- breaks, however, increase the vulnerability of these coun- tries to further Cuban subver- sion. Leftists continue to en- trench themselves in the gov- ernment since the 26 October coup in El Salvador. The three civilians in the six-man junta and several cabinet members suspected of being Communist sympathizers have been filling government posts at all levels with suspected Communists, par- ticularly in the ministries of labor and ,justice. The re- gime's information and prop- aganda network appears to have been largely taken over by this COSTA `'l` ?San Jose 'v'; R I C A element. Communist-front labor and political organizations are calling for a purge of the army and reportedly are planning the distribution of arms so "the people" can resist any attempt by the military to seize full control of the government. Although Castro agents are not known to have been involved in the coup, it is clear that the cultivation of Salvadoran leftists earlier this year by the Cuban Embassy contributed to the present leftist resur- gence. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 _ SECRET Although there is no evi- dence available to support gov- ernment claims of direct Cuban involvement in the revolt, Cuban propaganda and subversion probably contributed to the unrest that helped prompt it. Guatemalan Government charges of a Cuban-Communist conspiracy tend to help ensure the loyalty of Guatemalan military lead- ers, on whom Ydigoras depends for the survival of his re- gime. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY .SUMMARY Nicaragua The rebel attacks of 11 November bloodier were than stronger most of and the nu- merous rebel actions against the Somoza government of Nic- aragua in the past 18 months. The government declared martial law. The rebels apparently included conservatives as well as some leftists who had been in Cuba earlier this year. However, the chief of the US Army mission in Costa Rica, who was present at the Nicaraguan border area during the fighting, found no evidence that Cubans were involved or that Cuban weapons were used. The revolt launched on 13 November by disaffected Guate- malan Army officers apparently took the Communists by surprise. However, by 15 November they were actively seeking to cap- italize on it. Demonstrations against the government in the capital that evening, apparent- ly organized by the Communists, were dispersed by the police, but new manifestations were promised nightly "until the government falls." Communists are also re- ported infiltrating insurgent ranks and, in the city of Puerto Barrios, where Commu- nists are relatively strong, they may be among the civilians to whom arms were distributed during the three days the city was held by insurgents. The government's position in the capital is weakened by the with- drawal of troops to' fight else- where. Honduras was not in- volved in the early November outbreaks,: but the Cuban Em- bassy there is assiduously cultivating Communist-'oriented student and labor groups, and President Villeda Morales is faced with strong leftist influence within his own Liberal party. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY De Gaulle seems to be pre- paring, under increasing domes- tic and international pressures, to move decisively regarding the Algerian problem. His announce- ment that by mid-December he will set a date for a nationwide ref- erendum to approve his policy indicates both his intention to offset mounting opposition and his recognition of the need for a demonstration of massive pub- lic support. Paris is reinforc- ing security forces in Algiers, where European settlers are dew scribed as bitter and "spoiling for trouble." The rebel gov- ernment, however, is likely to reject any further overtures prior to the UN debate on Al- geria in December. Time limitations call for adroitness. The constitution requires that a referendum be formally proposed by the govern- ment or parliament and author- ized by the President while parliament is in session; the present session closes 16 Decem- ber. A parliamentary debate on Algeria is scheduled for 6 De- cember. The UN will take up the problem early in December. De Gaulle must also cope with the rightists' war of nerves: extreme leader Tixier-Vignan- court has publicly announced that a "government of the French Province of Algeria" is being formed and will start function- ing as soon as De Gaulle installs an "Algerian executive." In the meantime, De Gaulle is attempting to neutralize possible fomenters of unrest. He has been calling in cabinet ministers individually, re- portedly to ask them to state unequivocally whether they will back him and to resign if they 25X1 disapprove.. What appear to be pulse-taking missions to the army in Algeria have been com- pleted by Minister of Armed Forces Messmer and Chief of the National Defense Staff General Ely. The army has reportedly been most concerned over indica- tions that De Gaulle might de- clare a unilateral cease-fire-- an action he hinted at on 4 No- vember--at least in selected areas. De Gaulle's efforts to calm army fears are further com- plicated by the attitude of France's ranking soldier, Marshal Juin, who has publicly dissoci- ated himself from De Gaulle's Al- gerian policy following the 4 November speech. Support for Juin has been publicly expressed by retired Generals Saian and'. Guillaume. The government's continuing reinforcement of security po- lice in Algiers and a few SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY other centers, together with the sudden expulsion of several extreme rightists, suggests that Paris may be planning some move which the settlers can be ex- pected to meet with violence. The European community is re- ported to be "bitter and de- pressed." Some journalists now add it "seems full of insurrec- tionary ginger and spoiling for trouble" with or without backing from sympathetic army and metro- politan rightist elements. How- ever, the major settler organi-- zation, the French Algerian Front (FAF), has urged its followers to "clench fists and wait"; it took no part in the Armistice Day rioting by young toughs in Algiers over De Gaulle's 4 No- vember address, The Provisional Algerian Government (PGAR), whose plenary session in Tunis ended on 10 No- vember, has rejected the propos- als made in De Gaulle's speech. The rebel minister of informa- tion has told the American Em- bassy in Tunis that Although the speech was "intelligent," it was not specific on the guarantees The takeover on 10 November of the royal capital of Luang Prabang by a group of officers sympathetic to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Com- mittee has seriously weakened Premier Souvanna Phouma's posi- tion and given rise to increased tension which could lead to mili- tary clashes between the groups struggling for control of Laos. The officers, led by Third In- fantry Battalion commander Major Bountheng, took advantage of concerning the implementation of self-determination. The PGAR, he said, has lost confidence in bilateral. negotiations, and re- quires UN supervision of any settlement. It now appears vir- tually certain that the PGAR will reject any French overtures, at least until after the UN General Assembly takes a stand. Current efforts by French Community states to mediate are not likely to be successful. De Gaulle received Presidents Senghor of Senegal, Houphouet- Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Youlou of the Congo Republic cordially, but these emissaries reportedly made no specific pro- posals. "dangerous." Another Community delegation headed by Senegalese Premier Dia met in Tunis on 16 November with rebel premier Ferhat Abbas and several "ministers" of the PGAR. However, a rebel spokesman had previously indicated that this group would be received for "fra- 25X1 ternal discussion," but not for mediation, which he described as the absence from Luang Prabang of Armed Forces Commander Gen- eral Ouane and First Military Region Commander Col. Houmpany to stage their coup. With the subsequent capitulation to the Phoumi group of both Ouane and Houmpany, the First Military Region now appears to be fairly solidly in the Phoumi camp. This development reduces Souvanna's military backing to essentially the Fifth Military SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 w SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Region, with headquarters in Vientiane. Even this command is badly split over such issues as whether to collaborate with the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao in measures against Phoumi and the degree of support to give Souvanna in his efforts to hang on. The key to the situ- ation in Vientiane is probably Col. Kouprasith, the Fifth Mili- tary Region commander, who has given some indication that he might move to secure the city against the Pathet Lao and those paratroop and other elements still responsive to Captain Kong Le. Whether he has the temerity to undertake such action or the military power to be successful is questionable, however. Despite the Luang Prabang reverse, Souvanna shows no sign ;BURMA,/ pared to give in by resigning or lending himself to maneuvers for a new government of national union which would include the Phoumi group. He has announced that his government will no longer recognize as valid the acts of the King on the ground that he is the capitve of the Phoumi forces. He has also warned that his forces will attempt to retake Luang Prabang so as "to free the King." Although staff officers in Vietiane are alleged to be en- gaged in preliminary planning for such a venture, Souvanna's threat probably does not have much substance, inasmuch as he lacks: the forces to attack Luang Prabang and at the same time maintain the security of Vien- tiane against either the Pathet Lao or Phoumi's forces. Numerous rumors of impending military action are current in Vientiane as the result of the Luang Prabang coup. Reports of an imminent attack on Vien- tiane by Phoumi can probably be discounted and may have been deliberately circulated by Savannakhet in order to tie down SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 fCREr CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Vientiane forces and thus help to prevent any attempt to liber- ate Luang Prabang. There is some indication that the Second Paratroop Battalion and associ- ated Vientiane and Pathet Lao forces may resume their offen- sive against Phoumi elements on the road between Pak Sane and Thakhek, The American Embassy in Vientiane is concerned over yet another possibility: that the Pathet Lao, which is re- ported in some strength in Vietiane Province, will move to take over control of the capital. Former Premier Phoui Sananikone has held several talks with King Savang in Luang Prabang on ways to break the po- litical. logjam and permit forma- tion of a new government to re- place the narrowly based Souvanna government. Phoui has indicated two possible approaches to the problem. One would involve a summons by the King to Souvanna, Phoumi, and Phoui to come to Luang Prabang to work out a new government. Under this formula, Phoui would retain Souvanna temporarily but would strengthen his government by taking over the Interior Minis- try himself and allotting the Defense Ministry to Phoumi. An alternative approach suggested to Phoui would be to stimulate an assembly no-confi- dence vote against Souvanna. The King indicated to Phoui that he had little hope that further talks with Souvanna would be pro- ductive, but on the other hand made it clear that he would not step in to resolve the crisis until Souvanna had been removed by other means. General Phoumi went to Luang Prabang on 14 November. and tried to persuade the King to approve a new government based on the Savannakhet group, The King refused to sanction this move, claiming he could only act within the limits of the constitution. The political impasse thus continues, with Souvanna refusing to step down, with Phoumi clearly holding out for a rightist government he can dominate, and with Phoui jockeying for some middle-of- the-road solution in which he would stand a good chance of re- turning to power. Vientiane radio announced on 16 November that agreement has been reached between the Souvanna government and the Pathet Lao on the dispatch of a government good-will mission to Communist China and North Vietnam, the establishment of postal relations with North Vietnam, and the establishment of "friendly relations" with Communist China. Souvanna had previously insisted that re- lations with Peiping must await Communist China's admission to the United Nations; his apparent agreement to drop this condi- tion may reflect his lessening ability to resist pressure from the left in the face of the SE (WET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INT:3REST Page 8 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 erosion of his support from the right. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY There is some possibility, however, that he has deliberate- ly advanced the timetable in ~.r SECRET The past week brought some improvement in the position of Congolese Army chief Mobutu's interim government with respect to pro-Lumumba elements in Leo- poldville. New moves toward a political settlement, however, are in abeyance pending a UN decision in New York concerning the seating of President Kasavu- bu's delegation and the dispatch of the 15-nation conciliation commission to the Congo. The departure for New York of senior UN representative Dayal on 3 November appears to have led to a thaw in relations between Mobutu and the UN Com- mand. In contrast to Dayal, who made no ef- fort to disguise his dislike for Mobutu, acting UN chief Rikhye appears to have suc- ceeded in maintaining correct relations with all major political factions. The UN Command secured the release of the pro-Lumumba president of Leopold- ville Province on 13 November, three days after his arrest by Mobutu in a dispute over security respon- sibilities in the capi- =: L~cBol1 Lobito implementing his concept of neutrality as a means of elicit- 25X1 ing bloc diplomatic and propa- ganda support in his struggle to stay in power. tal. Although this incident re- flects Mobutu's vacillation, there are indications that he has lately consolidated his control over the army. The loyalty of the army re- mains ephemeral, but this group is unlikely to turn against Mo- butu as long as he is able to obtain money from the government to meet payroll and other re- quirements. UN officials have expressed apprehension at the THE CONUU gran i qu opbia~;iie SECRET OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 lkft~ SECRET 17 November 1960 army's fiscal practices, which have included the reissue of worn bank notes retired from circulation and the use of threats to force local banks to issue drafts to meet its needs. Lumumba, although still un- der house arrest, has urged in a letter to the President of the UN General Assembly that a referendum be held in the Congo concerning the adoption of "presidential" government, with such a referendum to be followed by the direct election of a president. Lumumba's proposal suggests that he regards his status as the Congo's best known politician as his princi- pal political asset. Although he is rumored to be purchasing the loyalty of various Congo legislators, the Chamber of Deputies is regarded at present as almost evenly divided between pro- and anti-Lumumba elements. In Katanga, President Tshombd continues threatened by tribal warfare in the northern part of his domain, and has lately been criticized within his government for his policies. Pro-Lumumba elements contin- ue active in Orientale Province and have attempted to capitalize on Tshombe's difficulties by se- curing the allegiance of the dis- sident Baluba tribesmen in Katan- ga. In late October, in an effort to split Tshombe's political domain, Baluba spokesmen in Orientale Province announced the creation of a "Baluba Prov- ince'' in northern Katanga. SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE; INTEREST Page 10 of 10 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 NOTES AND COMMENTS BLOC ARMSTAID TO THE.ALGERIAN REBELS Since the visit to Mos- cow and Peiping in September by Ferhat Abbas, premier of the Algerian rebel government, there has been increasing evidence that the rebels are expecting new deliveries of bloc arms. An announcement by Tunisian Presi- dent Bourguiba and semiofficial leaks in Morocco and the UAR during recent weeks reveal the intention of those governments to allow transshipments through their territories. However, be- cause of improved French secu- ., rity including electrified bar- riers along both the eastern and Western frontiers, it would be extremely difficult to smug- gle the arms. into Algeria. Ab- bas said that, although the rebels want arms, they have no need for volunteers. 1 The bloc is likely to supply at least small quantities of light arms and ammunition and possibly some "technical personnel," and Mos- cow is also expected to give strong diplomatic and propagan- da support to the rebels' pro- posal for a UN-supervised ref- erendum in Algeria. Iraqi Pre- mier Qasim earlier this month publicly thanked the Peiping government for the $12,000,000 in aid it has thus far given the FLN and claimed such assist- ance was continuing. ,SECRET Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a talk with French Ambassador Dejean on 5 November, maintained that France, rather than the USSR, has shifted its policy on Algeria. Gromyko re- peated Khrushchev's observation in New York that the USSR, in extending de facto recogniton to the rebel regime, had only gone as far ad De Gaulle on the question of recognizing the pro- visional Algerian government. Soviet assurances of this type appear primarily designed to mollify the French and to avoid provoking an open break with Paris while retaining for the USSR a 'free hand to aid the rebels. The Soviet Union, in col- lusion with Czechoslovakia, is believed to have supplied sizable amounts of arms to the FLN in 25X1 1957 and 1958. The weapons-- largely WOrld War II models of Czech origin--apparently were purchased by Egypt and Syria and then transshipped to the rebels via Libya and Tunisia through supply channels main- tained by Cairo. The total amount of this aid is unknown. The first Chinese offers were made in late 1958 and early 1959, but it is not known whether d.11 the aid promised reached the rebels. An Algerian.rebel mis- sion visiting China in April 1960, presumably discussed new shipments of arms. Czechoslovakia has on oc- casion dealt directly with the PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY rebels. Rebel delegations have discussed relatively small pur- chases of arms in Prague, and Czech representatives have met with FLN members in Morocco to negotiate arms sales. Some Czech Shipments of arms have been intercepted en route to Morocco by the French, the most recent in April 1959. The gold content of the ruble--hitherto the only major unannounced feature of the general price and currency re- form planned for 1 January 1961 --was revealed by the Soviet Government early this week. The new ruble, to be issued on that date, will theoretically have a foreign exchange value of slightly more than one US dollar. The new, "heavy" ruble is to be assigned a gold content of 0.987 gram. This contrasts with the present ruble gold content of 0.222 gram and the US dollar gold content of 0.888; thus, on the basis of gold pari- ties, one new ruble will be the equivalent of $1.11. On 1 January 1961 prices and wages within the USSR ar to be cut to one tenth of their present levels and rubles ex- changed at the rate of ten old for one new, thus maintaining the same relative domestic price structure and the same relative consumer purchasing power. value to ten times its present level, the regime will establish a more realistic average ruble- dollar ratio which in effect depreciates the ruble in terms of Western currencies. The artificiality of the present official exchange rate (4 to 1) has been implied by the existing ratio,?of 'ten rubles to one dollar for tourists. As of 1 January, the separate tourist rate will be eliminated, and tourist travel to the USSR will thus become somewhat more expensive. The USSR is describing the reform as enhancing the inter- national prestige of its currency. The gold content assigned to the ruble indicates that the USSR will try to gain whatever propaganda advantage it can from issuing a currency with a greater unit value than that of the US dollar. There will be, however, no immediate practical effect on the USSR's trade and aid programs outside the Soviet bloc, which will be simply re- computed on the basis of the new gold valuation. The assignment of a higher gold content for the ruble has no direct bearing on domestic prices, which for the most part are politically determined. However, by raising the official value of the ruble to nearly five times the present level in com- parison to the dollar but at the same time increasing the internal The new, more realistic measure of the relative pur- chasing power of the ruble in terms of the dollar and other Western currencies may lead the European satellites to revalue their own currencies accordingly, as part of a long-term effort to create a foreign trade pattern which makes an optimum contribu- tion to economic growth. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 SECRET BELGRADE MOVES TO ENHANCE ITS PRESTIGE WITH UNCOMMITTED STATES Since President Tito's recent visit to the UN, Yugo- slavia has increasingly dem- onstrated its independence of Soviet foreign policies, appar- ently to benefit its relations with the uncommitted states. For the two years prior to the UN session, Belgrade has de+ scribed almost every Soviet initiative in international af- fairs as likely to ease world. tensions. Yugoslavia's new tactic is probably intended in part to counter any impression gained from Khrushchev's remarks in New York that Belgrade slavish- ly adheres to Soviet policies. In his homecoming speech at Belgrade on 12 October, Tito specifically denied that Yugo- slavia was "riding the tail" of the USSR and voiced his oppo sition to Khrushchev's plan to reorganize the-UN., While Tito was en routehome`from New York, Vice President Kardelj in effect backed away a step further from support for bloc schemes for a Balkan accord by linking them with broader international prob- lems. On 29 October, Tito ex- pressed his opposition to any summit conference in the near future, even with neutralist participation. Although Yugoslavia still supports Moscow on certain im- portant issues, such as coloni- alism and disarmament, the USSR has been annoyed by the dissi- pation of over-all Yugoslav support. In mid-October, Moscow publicly attacked Belgrade for not voting with the bloc in the UN on a procedural resolution concerning disarmament. Soviet diplomats in Belgrade have also privately expressed disappoint- ment at Tito's failure to support Khrushchev's UN reorganization scheme. ly.. strengthened Tito's deter- minAtion to adhere to an uncom- mitted course. Khrushchev prob- ably intended to use Tito to enlist neutral support for the bloc's maneuvers, but a Yugoslav official reported that the meet- ing was "not as friendly and agreeable" as Khrushchev later indicated, and that Khrushchev viewed Tito as a competitor for the uncommitted countries.. Tito apparently refused to collaborate with Khrushchev, realizing that the Soviet leader, mindful of the Sino-Soviet dispute, would be loath to make any meaningful con- cessions to Yugoslav views or interests. Probably the greatest sin- gle factor responsible for Yugo- slavia's new emphasis on "neu- tralism" was Tito's extensive collaboration in New York with the Leaders of uncommitted coun- tries. Tito regarded the com- bined efforts of the neutralists to "ease international tensions" as the one bright spot in a generally depressing UN session. Although he denied on 29 October that the uncommitted countries would form a third bloc, he claimed that "there is a new force in the world ...which has more united views on inter- national problems" than either the Western or Eastern alliances. A guide to future Yugoslav in- tentions is Tito's urging that uncommitted states confer more often, cooperate more closely, and act in concert more fre- quently. The West remains the chief villain in Yugoslav propaganda, but to a lesser degree than in the past. The West was accused of being the major precipitator of tension at the General Assem- bly session. The USSR shared the blame, however, and the Belgrade 25X1 press gave its readers a reason- ably clear picture of Khrushchev's Tito's meetings with Khrushchev in New York apparent- excesses, SECRET PART II NGTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET The reorganization of the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) in Turkey to elimi- nate the more extremist members emphasizes the new political alignments being formed, as well as the problems the CNU faces in providing a transition to civilian government. President Gursel's dismiss- al of 14 CNU members was the culmination of several weeks of growing dissent within the com- mittee. The officers dismissed have been proponents of pro- longed military control of the government and a wider range of reform activities. At least some of them favored a more neutral foreign policy and per- haps an eventual rapprochement with the USSR. The most prominent is Col. Alpaslan Turkes, spokesman for the younger, more politically minded officers in the CNU. He apparently had arranged to have his followers appointed to posts in the Istanbul police department; all of them now have been removed. Although press reports indicate that Turkes and his followers are being scattered among Turkish diplomatic missions abroad, he will probably remain as a po- litical figure, and is likely to have the support of some of the 3,500-4,000 officers who were retired earlier. Gursel, in announcing the dismissals, repeated his pledge to hold elections in October 1961 and announced that a con- stituent :assembly would be formed shortly to function as a lower house until the elec- tions, with the CNU acting as a senate.. The reorganization is generally seen also as im- proving relations between the CNU and the former opposition Republican Peoples party (RPP). The suppression of the for- mer ruling Democratic party (DP), however, has created a vacuum in the Turkish political struc- ture that cannot adequately be filled by either the RPP or the Republican Peoples Nation party (RPNP). The DP during its few years in power drew a wide fol- lowing, especially in the prov- inces. Although now leaderless, the DP organization still. pro- vides the backbone of a potential- ly powerful party. There is considerable senti- ment in political circles to al- low the party rank and file to reorganize under another name in order to avoid the formation of splinter parties--a situation which could lead to political stagnation under the system of proportional representation pro- posed for the next election. Fail- ing this, however, many former DP members would probably be attracted to any new party that promised ef- fective opposition to the RPP. Another complicating factor is the ambition of Kasim Gulek, once secretary general of the RPP, who is bitterly opposing the party's long-time leader,Ismet Inonu. Any move by Gulek to un- seat Inonu could split the RPP and add to the confusion in the elections. Turkes probably would consider joining forces with Gulek if the latter controlled the RPP. Turkes' strong dislike for Inonu, however, would rule out any collaboration with the RPP as long as Inonu is in charge. Although the military com- mittee at present is committed to return the government to civilian control, it may feel forced to extend its tenure if the political alignments become too chaotic to assure a sta civilian government. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of`15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Iraq Iraqi Communists have suf- fered additional, blows. following the -harsh ,repression--of the Com- munist-inspired demonstrations of 5-7 November. Apparently in reaction to criticism of the gov- ernment in the Communist press, the Qasim regime has jailed 11 prominent Communists, including one central committee member. Included in the roundup were publishers and editors of four Communist-line papers, tWvo judges of the infamous "People's Court," and several lawyers. Several other Communists have been placed under house arrest, in- cluding another central commit- tee member, Abd al-Qadir Ismail al-Bustani. A cabinet shake-up on 15 No- vember has resulted in a further Communist loss of face; pro-Com- munist Naziha Dulaymi, some time ago demoted to the position of minister of state, now has been ousted entirely. Additlnms'to the cabinet appear to be civilian technicians--possibly a further sign that many nationalist po- litical leaders are unwilling to associate themselves with a re- gime they regard as slipping. Qasim's policy still ap- pears to be to strike out at any group which might threaten his position as "sole leader." While moving against the Communists last week, his regime also ar- rested a number of nationalist army officers.. Fourteen other nationalist officers were re- tired on 8 November. Protracted negotiations between the Iraqi Government and the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (TPC) have reached an impasse. Earlier this month the company reluctantly agreed to meet Qasim's harsh terms for surrendering much of its con- cession area. Qasim, however, now has sharply increased his demands, and the IPC doubts the government is interested in any agreement. Qasim may even go so far as to try to secure his terms by legislation, including "nation- alizing" more than 90 percent of the company's present concession area. He has led the Iraqi pub- lic to believe that the IPC would soon have to accede to the gov- ernment's position. In a speech on 12 November, Qasim declared that he had entered into "violent" negotiations with the company and would announce the results in a few days' time, along with his plans for future demands. Sudan Extraordinary security pre- cautions are in effect in Khar- toum and other parts of the Sudan where UAR President Nasir is to go during his 15-25 November state visit. The Abboud mili- tary regime is trying to prevent new demonstrations by strong political opposition groups, as well as to protect Nasir against a possible assassination at- tempt, either by disgruntled Sudanese nationals or by agents slipped in from other Arab states. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET *uw CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Public manifestations of opposition to the military re- gime have occurred sporadically for more than three weeks. Siz- able demonstrations took place in Khartoum and other Sudanese towns the day before Nasir ar- rived. Led by Sudanese students, these latest displays of opposi- tion apparently had the support of the Sudanese Communist party as well as the larger Umma and National Unionist parties. In the field of foreign re- lations, the Abboud government, for the first time in its two years of rule, appears receptive to offers of aid from the Sino- Soviet bloc countries. A Soviet gift of five armored personnel carriers has already been deliv- ered; the regime is expected to display them in the 17 November anniversary parade. Sudanese officials, despite a comprehensive US program to assist the Sudan in radio commu- nications, have accepted in prin- ciple a Chinese Communist offer of two 50-kilowatt, short-wave radio transmitters. The Chinese have demonstrated a capability to furnish effective aid in this field. Private Sudanese buyers are negotiating with a Soviet mis- sion for the purchase, on govern- ment account, of 100,000 tons of wheat. This, however, is within 25X1 the framework of the Soviet- Sudanese trade agreement ~~ Morocco's attempt to find support within the United Nations for its claims to Mauritania, the French West African republic which formally celebrates its independence on 28 November, ap- pears doomed to failure. Even the last-ditch effort of dis- patching four high-level diplo- matic teams to world capitals seems futile. While most Arab League members back Morocco halfheartedly, Tunisia and the newly independent African states will recognize Mauritanian in- dependence and probably will support Mauritania's application for UN membership. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania will be the last of 11 French-administered African territories to achieve independ- ence within the French Community this year. Some 600,000 persons --500,000 of whom are nomadic Maures ethnically kin to the tribes of southern Morocco--pop- ulate the new state's 418,000 square miles of Sahara Desert. The government of Premier Mokhtar Ould Daddah at present is large- ly dependent on French financial sudsidies, but hopes to be able to balance its budget by 1964, when completion of railway and port facilities will enable the area to begin exporting iron and other mineral ores. Some Mauritanian officials dream of as-yet-undiscovered SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET subsoil riches in such vast quantities that Mauritania will become a new Kuwait. Dissat- isfaction with the Ould Daddah regime seems to be centered in the northern, Mo- roccan-oriented area, where rich iron ore deposits are located, while Senegal and Mali provide other poles of economic and ethnic attraction. Immediately after Morocco achieved in- dependence in March 1956, right-wing na- tionalist leader Allal el-Fassi began a largely one-man campaign to reincor- SPANISH SAHARA MAURITANIA uakchott porate into Morocco Saharan areas including western Algeria, Span- ish Sahara, Ifni, and Mauritania. The King assumed leadership of this effort early in 1958 when he declared recovery of Mauri- tania a national policy objective. The issue has since proved use- ful as a means of diverting pop- ular attention from more critical local Moroccan problems, but finds little support among the leftist opposition. In 1957 a group of 254 Mauritanian leaders formally pledged loyalty to King Mohamed V. Some of them now occupy prominent Moroccan diplomatic and governmental posts. This group of emigres maintains con- tact with political groups in Mauritania, particularly the re- cently suppressed pro-Moroccan Nahda party, whose strength is centered in the important trad- ing oasis of Atar. Moroccan leaders have hinted that if Rabat does not obtain satisfaction at the UN it will resort to more drastic action and will retaliate against gov- ernments which fail to support Morocco. Allal el-Fassi on 1 November threatened war, and on 3 November the King declared that Morocco had "entered into a phase of national mobilization for the return of Mauritania to its country of origin." Anticipating Moroccan-in- spired subversion and military adventures--such as occurred in late 1957 and early 1958--Pre- mier Ould Daddah is reported to have asked and received France's commitment to maintain its present defense arrange- ments In Mauritania after in- dependenceThe Mauritanian Government has implicitly accused Morocco of assas- sinating the mayor of Atar on 8 November and antici- pates other incidents of terrorism and sabotage. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pace 7 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET lwi CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 JAPANESE ELECTION In the Japanese general election on 20 November, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda will be seeking a popular mandate for his conservative government to end the chaotic period marked by the ratification of the US- Japanese security treaty and the violent fall of the Kishi government last spring. At stake are all 467 seats in the House of Representatives, the lower and more powerful chamber of the Diet. Leaders of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) hope to halt the gradual decline in conservative repre- sentation since 1952 by winning about 300 seats. A decline be- low the present level of 283 seats would dim Ikeda's pros- pects for long tenure as prime minister. An LDP victory would prob- ably be interpreted as a vote for Ikeda's program of continued prosperity and economic growth, improved welfare benefits, and tax reductions rather than as overwhelming popular support for continuation of Japan's alliance with the United States. Ikeda, pressed by the Japanese Socialist party (JSP) after the mid-October assassination of its chairman, Inejiro Asanuma, into making neutralism rather than domestic economic issues the major subject of campaign debate, has forthrightly ex- plained and defended Japan's dependence on the United States for defense and on the non- Communist world for trade. He has rejected the "ide- alistic neutralism" of the So- cialists as an "idle dream" leading to a disruption of the balance of power in the Far East which would be contrary to Japan's national interest. However, local questions and personalities and domestic eco- nomic issues are expected to be more decisive factors in influ- encing voters than foreign pol- icy. Almost as important as an LDP victory for the future stability of the government and for Ikeda's tenure is the com- petition among factions within the LDP itself. A substantial increase in conservative rep- resentation will enhance Ikeda's prestige and discourage dis- sident faction leaders from at- tacking, the prime minister and his program. However, faction leaders are attempting in the election to increase the size of their Diet following for the eventual struggle to succeed Ikeda as party president and prime minister. Even if Ikeda emerges from the election with the strongest single faction, he will have to form an alliance with other faction leaders to control the LDP and the Diet. Observers see three party leaders emerging as major contenders to succeed PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE JAPANESE DIET 'VACANCIES 19 INDEPENDENTS 2_ HOUSE QE. ET'11.E$ENTATIYES LOWER HOUSE Ikeda--Kishi's brother, former Finance Minister Eisaku Sato, who now is probably the leading contender; Takeo Miki, state minister for economic planning in the second Kishi cabinet, who represents the "liberal" wing of the party; and former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama, a new major contender. SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 8 of, 1.5 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY An important underlying is- sue may be the public's reaction to the JSP's reliance on mass tactics of violence last spring, although the influence of this will be difficult to determine unless there is a major in- crease in the conservative vote. The ability of the moder- ate Democratic Socialist party to maintain its present Diet strength may determine whether it can continue as a separate political party. The Communists, with only one seat in the last Diet, are concentrating their efforts in campaigning for five seats representing dis- tricts where they have run well in the past, but Japanese com- mentators consider it unlikely that the Communists will win more than one or two additional seats. South Vietnamese President Diem continues to face serious political problems following suppression of the 10-11 Novem- ber coup attempt by paratroop elements. He may feel an in- creased need to reorganize and liberalize his government, pos- sibily with some urging from loyal military officers who came to his rescue. These of- ficers undoubtedly share the concern of the coup leaders over the spread of Communist guerrilla warfare and the ad- verse effect of Diem's harsh political, social, and economic measures on popular resistance to the Communists. Committee Against Rebels and Communists" to ferret out traitorous elements, together with reports of civilian ar- rests and the temporary suspen- sion of newspapers which printed rebel communiques, may foreshadow a campaign of repression which could lead to further unrest in Saigon. No retribution is planned against the paratroop ranks, which are considered by Diem to have been "duped"; the re- ,sponsible paratroop... lead- ers haver , sought . asylera. in Cambodia, and this may bring about a flare-up in South Viet- nam's already strained relations with its neutralist neighbor. An official spokesman has announced that government changes will be made. There remains, however, considerable uncertainty over Diem's willingness to carry out sweeping reforms or to relax his authoritarian rule, which now operates through a clique of family and political favorites in the pervasive Can Lao organi- zation. Diem is reported under pressure from the latter group to punish the coup instigators severely and to crush all known and potential political opponents. The formation of a "People's Most of the loyal units sent to Saigon from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Military Re- gions have returned to antiguer- rilla operations. There has been no significant Vietnamese Communist exploitation of the coup incident, either in Saigon or in areas of guerrilla con- centration from which troops were diverted. Although the Communist regime in North Viet- nam has been urging stepped-up guerrilla terrorism in the South, the attempted revolt apparently took the Communists by surprise. The revolt, however, will en- courage Hanoi in its assessment SECRET PART I I NfTF+,'S ANTI f!fMMFNT4 'D--- 9 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 `"' SECRET `' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY bS ' II ~Ple~ku ^\ ul Nhon ~,~, ?~OfIR Cau 17 NOVEMBER 1960 ioo that unsettled conditions in South Vietnam are favorable to its strategy of eventually top- pling Diem through a combination of guerrilla terrorism and po- litical support to anti-Diem elements. Communist bloc propaganda attributes failure of the coup to the insurgents' inability to "win sup- port of the people" and to exploit the "tremendous dissatis- faction" with Diem. North Vietnam has depicted the coup as merely a conflict be- tween pro-US groups; Moscow has charged that Diem was saved by "active US inter- vention," but ~ sug- gests that during' the initial " stages, American officials' hoped :to use the insurgents to force Diem to liberalize his government. In portraying the coup as pro-US, the Communists may hope to play on Presi- 25X1 dent Diem's suspicions and reservations about US atti- tudes. AFRICAN MOVES FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS IN UN BODIES The African UN members, supported by the rest of the Afro-Asian bloc, have apparently decided on a major effort to reallocate the elective seats on the UN Security Council and the Economic and Social Council so as to permit election of one of their number. Resolutions to enlarge these bodies now are before the Special Political Committee, and the Africans will probably seek amendments reallocating the seats until such time as the membership of the two councils can be increased. Since it is unlikely that these amendments will get the necessary two- thirds majority in the assembly, the Africans will then support their own candidates for the elective seats despite the gen- eral practice of supporting the candidates informally designated by their respective regions. It is for this reason that the Afri- cans engineered the postponement of the elections, which had been scheduled for 11 November. The consensus of assembly discussions over the years has clearly favored increasing the elective membership of the two UN councils. Adamant Soviet opposition to any enlargement until Peiping is given China's UN seat has, however, prevented SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 10 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY any definitive action during the past four sessions. During the current discussions in the as-~ sembly's Special Political Com- mittee, the USSR's opposition led to another impasse and re- sulted in the African move for reallocation. The present regional as- signment of the six elective seats on the Security Council reflect the power distribution in the UN as it was in 1945. One seat each is, by "gentler men's agreement," assigned to the Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Common- wealth; two are assigned to Latin America. Elections are held for three vacancies each year for a two-year term. Portugal is the Western European candidate this year, Chile the Latin American, and the UAR the Middle Eastern. Portugal is already in serious trouble because of strong Afro- Asian objections to Lisbon's colonial policies. The Latin American seat is also a target because the area is already represented on the council. The_! UAR's candidacy seems to be the only assured one at this time. PRO-CASTRO PARTY ELIMINATED FROM VENEZUELAN COALITION By excluding the pro-Castro Democratic Republican Union (URD) from his three-party coa- lition, Venezuelan President Betancourt has probably consol- idated' his support among mod- erates and in the armed forces. The URD now can be expected to ally openly with the Communists and the leftist opposition which provoked the antigovernment vio- lence of 19-28 October--the major test of Betancourt's sta- bility thus far. The breakup of the coalition, which had ruled since Betancourt's inau- guration in February 1959, was foreshadowed by the URD's crit- icism of the regime and demands for its leftist reorientation following the recent unrest. Top URD leaders even seemed to condone expressions of discontent. .The new cabinet to be ap- pointed shortly will be composed of representatives of Betancourt's Democratic Action party, the moderate Christian Democratic COPEI, and independents. With The 18-member Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has 13 elective seats, since by tradi- tion the five permanent members of the Security Council are re- elected to ECOSOC when their three-year terms expire. The elective seats are presently distributed as follows: four to Latin America, one to the Commonwealth, three to Western Europe, two to Eastern Europe, and three to the Afro-Asian area. Six seats are up for election this year; France's and China's "permanent" seats, two Latin American seats, and one each for Western Europe and the Afro-Asian area. The African drive for real- located seats jeopardizes Taipei's chances for re-election because of the Chiang regime's tenuous position in the UN. Belgium, the Western European candidate, may lose votes because of its recent actions in the Congo and the ;.widespread anticolonial feeling. The Latin American seats are vulnerable because there are two of them u SECRET PART II nrnm~e iewn r'nM?JrVmq Uaaro 11 of Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 RET the cooperation of COPEI, }3etancourt will retain control of the Congress and be freed from the pressures of the ul- tranationalistic URD on his moderate leftist policies. Although the new government may face increased subversive activ- ity and political obstructionism, its programs presumably can be more clearly and decisively de- fined, a factor which could serve to restore the c,-)nfidence of businessmen and the public in its stability and intentions. The reinforced political opposition can be expected to concentrate its attacks on the government's serious economic difficulties. These include depressed business conditions, an unbalanced budget, ineffective implementation of social reforms, high unemployment, and a long-- range decline of foreign ex- change reserves which forced the imposition of exchange controls on 8 November and could lead shortly to a devaluation of the bolivar, the nation's monetary unit. The opposition, which has maintained close liaison with Havana may also attempt to exploit the widening rift in Venezuela's relations with the regime of Fidel Castro, who apparently still holds considerable appeal rally of an estimated 125,000 to 150,000 people in Caracas on 1 November, at which the crowd jeered references to the Cuban Government and its leaders and once called for the "firing squad" for Castro. Moreover, recent sharp attacks on Betancourt by the controlled Cuban press and radio, in which he has been variously styled as "a lackey,{ "a cheap politician," and "a stupid fool," may prove counterproductive for the promoters of the Castro cause in Venezuela. Iecent actions by British Guinana's government leader Cheddi Jagan and his wife Janet reflect the continued Communist orientation of the colony's governing People's Progressive party (PPP). In view of the continued fragmentation of for Venezuela's influential radical groups. The pro-Castro elements suffered a setback, however, from a massive progovernment opposition groups, the PPP is expected to win the August 1961 election--the first under the new constitution providing for full internal self-government. Both Jagans have visited Cuba in recent months. In August `R i PART I T NY ,% G Mn / l1TRUT Mm C r_ -1 79 n f IS Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 ,.r, SECRET %so CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Cheddi Jagan received a Cuban offer of a $5,000,000 loan at 2-percent interest for develop- ment of timber resources, plus an additional sum for future hydroelectric development. Cheddi Jagan now is in the' US on a private trip seeking funds both for his party and the Gui- anese economy and may revisit Cuba on his way home. The PPP has maintained contacts by vis- its and correspondence with foreign Communist parties, and East Germany is providing six technical scholarships for Gui- anese students. As minister of trade and industry, Jagan is seeking for- eign experts, including Commu- nists,for the civil service; he would like to increase So- viet bloc trade and has threat- ened repeatedly to seek a So- viet development loan if unsat- isfied with Western finan- cial offers. While publicly disclaiming the Communist label, the PPP's weekly newspaper follows a standard Communist line. Local concern over Commun- ism has increased, but has not yet coalesced into an effective opposition movement. The PPP remains the strongest political party but faces a serious poten- tial threat in indications that its principal financial backers, the East Indian businessmen, now may support a new "third force" in the process of forma- tion because of dissatisfaction with Jagan's equivocal position on business. The British, knowing that only the top PPP leaders are Communists, are not greatly concerned and are prepared to proceed with their plan for re- moving their control after Au- gust 1961 except for defense, foreign affairs, and possibly the police. Full independence would be constitutionally possi- ble as early as the end of 1962. London, nevertheless, views Ja- gan as a "woolly-minded Marxist idealist" naively taken in by the Castro line, and is con- cerned that, with greater au thority after August 1961,he might facilitate Castro's ef- forts for Communist intrusion into Latin America. The British are, however, not exercising their constitu- tional powers to require Jagan to refuse the Cuban loan; they are skeptical that it will ever be implemented because of tech- nical difficulties. They pre- fer not to antagonize him and to rely on the influence of the governor to ensure reasonably good government. Jagan, in an effort to ensure funds for economic development and the grant of wider constitutional powers, has maintained coopera- tive relationships with both American and British officials. The local elections held throughout Italy on 6 and 7 November gave a slim vote of confidence to Premier Fanfani's Christian Democratic (CD) minor- ity government and its four center party supporters. The Christian Democrats, however, now are confronted with choosing partners in municipal adminin- istrations, and this may pre- cipitate a national cabinet crisis. The Nenni Socialist party's central committee, meeting on SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pace 13 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 24 November, may ap- prove the party di- rectorate's suggestion that the party collab- orate with the Chris- tian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Repub- licans; in some 150 city councils where the government coa- lition failed to win a majority. Accept- ance of such an offer in any sizable number of municipalities, however, would antag- onize the Liberal par- ty and other conserva- tive elements among DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE IN ITALIAN ELECTIONS (PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE) 1956 PROVINCIAL 1958 PARLIAMENTARY 1960 PROVINCIAL Christian Democrats 38.9 42.3 40.3 Democratic Socialists 7.5 4.7 5.7 .Liberals 4.2 3.4 4.0 Republicans 1.3 1.4 1.3 Total Center 51.9 51.8 51.3 Communists 23.1 24.5 Nenni Socialists 35.2* 14.7 14.4 Total Left 35.2 37.8 38.9 Neo-Fascists 4.6 5 9 Monarchists 10.9** 4.7 . 2.9 9.3 8.8 1.1 1.0 *Communists and Nenni Socialists ran together. **Neo-Fascists and Monarchists ran together. Premier Fanfani's parliamentary supporters and thus risk dis- rupting his government. Fanfani would prefer to draw the So- cialists'further away from the ITALY NEW DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS ON KEY CITY COUNCIL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC DEMOCRATS SOCIALISTS LIBERALS REPUBLICANS COMMUNISTS RORIe (AS .e.te) 26 3 3 19 D31Lin (80 Beata) 25 a 8 - - 17 ?arinn 71'0 eeat.l 27 a 6 1 20 Oemoa (SO .eats) 27 6 2 1 22 Veen (80 ..ate) 23 4 2 -- 14 Treace (66 Beat.) 12 4 3 -- 20 N.p1e lib e..te) 21 1 1 19 PaleOnso (60 .onto) 24 2 2.. 9 NEN NI SOCIALISTS NEO - FASCISTS 11 12 17 5 12 2 17 4 13 3 8 3 5 3 4 5 Communists by means of local alliances--all the more because Communist electoral gains in November brought the combined Socialist-Communist vote to nearly 39 percent. The Democratic Socialists and the Republicans have already approved the Socialist director- ate's proposal. Fanfani,,however, must keep in mind the attitude of his party's third partner, the conservative Liberal party, which might threaten to withdraw from the national coalition in pro- test and in any event would ex- ert strong pressure on the Chris- tian Democratic right wing. The right wing, in turn, will urge further local alliances with the neo-Fascists, who are already allied with the Christian Demo- crats in the Sicilian regional government and in Rome and oth- er cities on the mainland. The implications of these maneuvers . MONARCHISTS OTHERS for r the stability of the national govern- 2 may not become -- 1' apparent before the Nenni Socialists hold their congress, ex- pected in January or February 1961. The Socialists made a strong show- ing in major cities, and Nenni may hope to be able to point to widespread local alliances with the Christian Democrats to coun- ter. criticism of his failure to match the Communists"' over-all electoral gains. His party's left wing will argue for a re- turn to a close rapprochement with the Communists, although resentment over Socialist losses to the Communists may have some- what reduced the influence of the left wing within the party. Whether or not a broad pattern of Nenni Socialist - Christian Democratic local al- liances does evolve, Fanfani may have to deal with a more SECRET PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pate 14 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET independent attitude on the part of the Democratic Social- ists. This party may exploit its slight but unexpected elec- toral gains over 1958 to urge local alliances with the Nenni Socialists, while at the same time pressing Nenni for a more forthright national stand against the Communists. SECRET PART I I vnm-pc "n rnUUrW +c 'D--- 15 of. 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT The questions of the au- thority of the UN secretary: general and the personnel and functions of the Secretariat were brought into the fore- ground this fall by Khrushchev's bitter attacks on Hammarskjold and by his demand that the secretary general's office be replaced by a three-man "collec- tive executive body" composed of representatives of the West, the Communist bloc, and the neu- tral nations. Soviet leaders have long been dissatisfied with the Secretariat's person- nel setup and procedures; they feel the Western powers, par- ticularly the US, have a pre- dominant voice in the UN admin- istration. The campaign by Moscow to get Soviet bloc nationals into key policy-making positions in the Secretariat has been based on the premise that equitable geographic distribution should be the paramount consideration in hiring UN civil servants. It has had the support of the Asian, and more recently. African mem- bers, which have long held the view that they were inadequately represented. These members tend to subordinate all other criteria for employment on the Secretari- at. Khrushchev's original pro- posal of 23 September to replace the secretary general with a triumvirate is regarded by prac- tically all UN members as un- realistic because it would re- quire an amendment to the Charter--which in turn is sub- ject to approval by the Security Council and to parliamentary ratification by a majority of member states. However, the USSR's suggestion may have led to Ghana's proposal of 30 Sep- tember urging the creation of an advisory group of under secretaries representing the current distribution of power in the General Assembly. The Afro-Asian bloc would probably be susceptible to the argument that the USSR must be given some concession to its point of view and may regard Ghana's proposal as a practical solu- tion. Creation of such an ad- visory group would, however, give the Russians power to hamper--if not actually to con- trol--the Secretariat's opera- tions. It would also introduce political considerations on a level just under the secretary general and thus prejudice the independent mediation functions of the office as they have e- volved during the seven years under Hammarskjo~d. Office of Secretary General Since he assumed office in April 1953, Hammarskjold has in- creased the powers and prestige of the office of the secretary general beyond those contemplat- ed in the UN Charter. His skill as a negotiator and mediator has led UN members increasingly to call on him to help settle international disputes; standing as something approach- ing an independent force in world affairs has risen stead- ily. Hammarskjold has further expanded the power of his of- fice by stationing high-ranking UN officials responsible only to him in various trouble spots. The three "UN ambassadors" to date are all Western Europeans: Pier Spinelli (Italian) Ln Jordan, Adrian Pelt (Dutch) in Guinea, and Eduard Zeliweger (Swiss) in Laos. There are 21 Swiss em- ployed at the professional lev- el, although Switzerland is not a member of the UN. However, Hammarskjold has employed other SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 _.`CRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY nationalities on his ad hoc investigatory commissions, no- tably Rajeshwar Dayal of India, who now is chief of UN opera- tions in the Congo and was also one of three chiefs of the UN observer group in Lebanon in 1958. In making these appoint- ments, Hammarskjold has avoided naming nationals from countries directly involved in the specific dispute and has picked indi- viduals dedicated to the principle of "quiet diplomacy." The precedent that no national of the five permanent mem- bers of the UN Secu- rity Council be ap- pointed to these ad hoc commissions has long been established. Two of Hammar- skjo:ld's closest ad- visers are American citizens: Dr. Ralph Bunche, under secre- tary for special political af- fairs, and Andrew Cordier, ex- ecutive assistant to the secre- tary general. Both men have been with Hammarskjold since 1953 and have often been as- signed to complete negotiations which the Secretary general be- gan. Their most recent assign- ment outside New York was in the Congo this summer? Cordier, in addition, has at times been Hammarskjold's chief contact with the American UN delegation, A third long- standing adviser of Hammarskjold's is Philippe de Seynes of France, under sec- retary in charge of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. De Seynes has recently been ne- gotiating with Brus- sels about the Congo's frozen assets. The highest-rank- ing Soviet national in the Secretariat is Georgy Petrovich Arkadyev, un- der secretary in charge of the Department of Political and Security Affairs. Arkadyev's assistant is H. A. Wieschoff of the United States. Wieschoff-- who formerly handled trustee- ship and dependent-area affairs --is apparently involved with UN planning for the Congo at this time and has also been used as a contact with the American delegation regarding Congo affairs, IT PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES b9 ue 2 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU 17 November 1960 In addition to the New York headquarters, there is a European office at Geneva, di- rected by Italy's Spinelli. Geneva is also the headquarters for the Economic Commission for Europe, headed by Sakari Tuo- mioja (Finnish), and the offices of the High Commissioner for Refugees, of which Auguste Lindt OFFICE OF CONFERENCE SERVICES Hoo (China) THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT SECRETARY GENERAL Hammarskjold (Sweden) r 1 L EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR UN CHILDREN'S FUND DIRECTOR, UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST LIQUIDATOR, UN KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY COMMANDER, UN EMERGENCY FORCE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITYCOUNCIL AFFAIRS Arkadyev (USSR) OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS Stavropoulos (Greece) DEPARTMENT OF TRUSTEESHIP AND INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES Protitch (Yugoslavia) OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION Katzin (South Africa) OFFICE OF GENERAL SERVICES Vaughan (US) Accra Athens Belgrade Bogota Buenos Aires Cairo Copenhagen D(akarta The Hague Kabul Karachi London Manila Mexico City Moscow New Delhi Paris Prague Rangoon Rio de Janeiro Rome Sydney Tehran Tokyo Washington ~t tttoS~d'v'3 rii to t" ?"s'uc'h `e 'tha?` :ip elIJ lop lent tt n Nunpa /. _.. SECRET MARY (Swiss) is the chief. The sec- retary general has also set up small field offices for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and the Eco- nomic Commission for Africa (ECA)--none of which is headed by a Soviet national. OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER Turner (New Zealand) DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS De Scynes (France) COMMISSIONER FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE Heurtematte (Panama) SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST SECRETARIAT OF THE UN PENSION COMMITTEE AND THE JOINT STAFF PENSION BOARD STAFFS OF SPECIAL MISSIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR SECURITY COUNCIL' Conciliation Commission for Palestine Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine Representative for India and Pakistan Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan Advisory Council for Somaliland Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea OFFICE OF PERSONNEL Hamilton (Britain) UNDER SECRETARIES FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS Bunche (US) Narasimhan (India) EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL Cordier (US) EUROPEAN OFFICE AT GENEVA SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE SECRETARIAT OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pace 3 of 25 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET fessional people for long-term UN assignments. 17 November 1960 Geographic Distribution According to the UN Char- ter, "the paramount considera- tion" in employing the staff of the UN Secretariat is to secure the highest standards of effi- ciency, competence, and integ- DESIRABLE DISTRIBUTION NUMBER ON STAFF 31 AUG. S9 NUMBER ON STAFF 31 AUG. '60 AFRICA 27 35 43 ASIA AND FAR EAST 177 201 211 EASTERN EUROPE 216 68 84 WESTERN EUROPE 299 355 380 LATIN AMERICA 77 101 108 MIDDLE EAST 24 39 41 NORTH AMERICA 388 291 294 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The conduct of Soviet na- tionals on the Secretariat has been one factor making it diffi- cult for Hammarskjold to cor- rect the imbalance, RATIO TO DESIRABLE NUMBER 1959 1960 130% 114% 31% 118% 131% 163% 75% 159% 119% 39% 120% 140% 171% 76% Soviet nationals who are hired often delay their arrival at UN headquarters for more than two weeks by reporting first to the Soviet UN mission in New York. UN employees from the USSR do not stay in their jobs for more than three the admission of 17 new Afro-lstan members this fait. 17.NOVEMBER 1960 rity,. Due regard must, however, be paid to the importance of re- cruiting on a wide geographical basis. The General Assembly ex- ercises control over and gives direction to the administrative and financial processes of the Secretariat through its Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee, Western Europe and Latin America have more professional positions within the Secretariat than their assigned quotas al- low, while the Soviet bloc is underrepresented, The Asian and African members as a bloc were over the UN quotas as of August 1960, but many countries within this grouping are not represented. The Afro-Asians point out, moreover, that the quotas, although revised peri- odically, do not reflect the present power distribution in the General Assembly. .Revision along these lines would give them many more UN staff posi- tions. The present imbalance--a result of the unavailability of qualified applicants from some areas at the time the UN was founded--has been aggravated as the newly independent states have joined the international body. These same states, how- ever, can seldom spare their relatively few educated pro- SECRET years, and they often resign without notice while on home leave. There have also been cases in which Soviet nation- als have used UN assignments as a cover for espionage. Many Soviet bloc applicants cannot meet minimum language require- ments for higher UN jobs, but they refuse to accept positions at the lower professional lev- els, Remedial Measures .Hammarskjold has made some progress in his program to re- organize the Secretariat to meet some of the demands of the Asian, Guillaume Georges-Picot - Former UNrepresenta- tive of France; former UN under secretary for social affairs. Francisco Urrutia - Former UN representative of Colombia. A. A. Fomin - USSR Foreign Ministry; former UN representative of the USSR. Omar Loutfi - UN representative of the UAR. Sir Harold Parker - Member, International Civil Service Advisory Board; former chief civil serv- ant in the British Defense Ministry. Alex Quaison-Sackey - UN representative of Ghana. C. S. Venkatachar - India's chief representative to Canada. Dr. Herman B. Wells - President, University of Indiana; former member of the US delegation at the UN. PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page,4 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY African, and Communist states for more professional positions. The number of Soviet bloc per- sonnel in such positions in- creased from 68 to 84 in one year--although it is still far below the assigned quota of 216. To aid the secretary general, the 1959 General Assembly ses- sion recommended that he ap- point a "committee of experts" to advise him on ways and means of revamping the Secretariat. An eight-member body was ap- pointed by Hammarskjold in August 1960 and is expected to submit a report to the 1961 General Assembly session. The USSR--presumably to offset the antagonism of many Afro-Asian members to its at- tacks on the secretary gener- al--announced on 4 November that it would leave to the com- mittee of, experts its demands for a :'broad. . reorganization of the Secretariat. Hammarskjold and his com- mittee will probably continue the reorganization program, and the secretary general will probably retain his present personal "cabinet" until the end of his term in April 1963. RECENT CHANGES IN SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATION AND PLANNING Changes being made in the system of industrial adminis- tration in the USSR reflect the regime's continued concern over the problem of finding the most effective way of achieving its economic goals and at the same time encouraging local initia- tive. These changes, involv- ing both organizations and planning techniques, are de- signed to provide some opera- tional leeway at the local level within a system of cen- tral control. Since the industrial re- organization of 1957, the boundaries of the territories administered by some of the original 105 Councils of Na- tional Economy (sovnarkhozy) have been realigned. Some sovnarkhozy have been merged and others divided, but the present system of 102 sov- narkhozy preserves the orig- inal pattern of a large num- ber of economic-administrative units covering all but about one fifth of the total Soviet industrial activity. The for- mal line of command for opera- tional decisions continues to flow from the USSR Council of Ministers through the republic councils of ministers to the sovnarkhozy, although an addi- tional line of command for cer- tain activities has been added with the creation of super-sov- narkhozy in three republics. Various other organization- al changes affect the planning, coordination, and control of industrial activity. At this point the regime appears rea- sonably satisfied with the ter- ritorial economic structure as a workable, basic administra- tive arrangement, but its in- herent shortcomings, as in the past, will probably continue to call for innovations and refine- ments. Background The creation of the sov- narkhozy to administer industry along territorial lines was a radical departure from the func- tional ministerial pattern of the Stalin period. Under that system, industrial management was plagued by departmental barriers and a dearth of local SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 5 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY initiative, This led adjacent enterprises of different minis- tries to take circuitous routes through channels to Moscow in order to carry out the simplest transactions with each other. There were irrational transpor- tation hauls between distant plants of the same industrial ministry and often duplication of facilities among the vari- ous ministries. The sovnarkhoz system eased many of these difficul- ties but created problems of its own--recognized by Khru- shchev even prior to the reor- ganizat:ions--which'havethus far defied easy solution. From the outset, the leaders were confronted with the need to counteract rrlocalist" inclina- tions among regional administra- tions. Some sovnarkhozy tended to place regional interests ahead of the national plan; they failed, for example, to honor deliveries outside their own jurisdictions and sought to develop areas of self-suffi- ciency even when it was clearly uneconomical to do so. The regime also has been faced with the problem that im- position of institutional safe- guards against such "distortions" EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL PLANNING APPARATUS ASSIGNMENT OF SELECTED PLANNING FUNCTIONS AMONG THE PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS TIME PERIOD LONG-RANGE PLANNING CURRENT PLANNING SUPPLY ALLOCATION LABOR AND WAGE MATTERS TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS PRIOR TO 1948 USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; Ministries Ministries USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan State Committee for USSR Gosplan State Committee for 1948 Material-Technical New Technology Supply (Gossnab); (Gostekhnika); Ministries Ministries USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan Gossnab USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; State Committee for Ministries 1951 Food and Industrial Supply (Gosprodsnab); Ministries 1953 ' USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; S (AFTER STALIN Ministries Ministries DEATH) USSR Gosplan State Commission for Gosekonomkomissiya; State Committee for State Committee for Current Planning Ministries Labor and Wages; New Technology 1955 (Gosekonom - USSR Gosplan (Gostekhnika); komissiya) Ministries USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; State Committee for USSR Gosplan; 1957 Directorates of Labor and Wages; State Scientific- (AFTER THE Supply and Sales USSR Gosplan Technical REORGANIZATION) of the abolished Committee; ministries merged Retained ministries into USSR Gosplan (BEFORE MID-APRIL 1960) USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan USSR Gosplan; State Committee for USSR Gosplan; Main Administra- Labor and Wages; State Scientific- (AFTER MID-APRIL 1960) tions of Inter- USSR Gosplan Technical USSR State Scientific republic Supply Committee; 1959-1960 Economic Council State committees for (Gosekonomsovet) specialized technol- ogies replacing the temporarily retained ministries NOTE: USSR Gosplan (now the State Planning Committee) has been officially called by other names at different times since World War II, but it has always been popularly referred to as "Gosplan." SECRET PART I'T 7f f1TrIT'15 TG1 A%Tn nt1001r1 1'rTX7VQ n-?e 6 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 ' Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 -%Ww SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY of the national interests might defeat one of the primary goals of the reorganization itself-- the encouragement of local ini- tiative. The regime has thus sought in its subsequent altera- tions of the structure to find the best operational solution. Republic Sovnarkhozy Concern over localism, re- inforced by a fear of disrupt- ing the flow of supplies to industrial enterprises, led to a considerable expansion in the duties of USSR Gosplan--the State Planning Committee--at the time of the reorganiza- tion in 1957. In 1958, the responsibil- ity for coordinating intersov- narkhoz supply and distribution tasks within each republic was transferred from USSR Gosplan to the republic gosplans. This move left the superior body with the burden of interrepub- lic supply and distribution tasks and its traditional plan- ning activities. Planning and supply problems, however, con- tinued to be the subject of much criticism in the Soviet press throughout 1959 and 1960. coordinating the work of the lesser sovnarkhozy, supervising plan fulfillment and the ful- fillment of delivery contracts, and ensuring the proper use of materials, monetary funds, and labor. The republic sovnarkhozy, which can issue decrees and directives themselves, may be more effective than were the republic gosplans which, as staff organizations, could act only through the republic coun- cils of ministers. Nevertheless, the preservation of a direct line of command from the repub- lic councils of ministers to the regional sovnarkhozy, along- side the new line of command from republic to regional sov- narkhozy, may create operational confusion and uncertainty. The staffing of the new bodies has not been announced. Appointment of RSFSR Deputy Premier Vasily Ryabakov to the chairmanship of the RSFSR super- sovnarkhoz, and a similar ap- pointment in Kazakh, however, suggest that a high level of skill and authority will be sought in the new councils. A new attack was made on these problems in mid-1960 in the four republics having more than one sovnarkhozy." within their boundaries--the Russian, Kazakh, Ukrainian, and Uzbek-- where the burden of handling intersovnarkhot relations was overtaxing existing republic organizations. In the Uzbek Republic, the difficulties were overcome by simply merging its five sovnarkhozy into a single republic sovnarkhoz, In the remaining three republics, super-sovnarkhozy were created at the republic level under the Council of Ministers. By this move, the republic gosplans were relieved of the time-consuming tasks of monitor- ing regional sovnarkhozy opera- tions and were allowed to con- centrate on their planning re- sponsibilities. The republic sovnarkhozy were charged with In April of this year, long- range planning functions were taken from USSR Gosplan and given to the State Scientific Economic Council (Gosekonom- sovet). This move stripped USSR Gosplan of all its former broad responsibilities except for short-term planning at the national level and for dealing with operational questions which arise in connection with plan fulfillment. Gosekonomsovet, together with the union republic minis- ters and departments, is to elaborate long-range--15 to 20 year--economic plans, as well as five-to-seven-year plans. USSR Gosplan's "summary" sec- tions (such as National Eco- nomic Plan, Balances and Materi- al-Technical Supply, and Labor and Wages) are to be trans- ferred to Gosekonomsovet, while SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 revealed which would rearrange the 13 basic economic zones for- merly employed in regional plan- ning into 16 new economic re- gions, and would establish Eco- nomic Councils for the Planning and Coordination of the Work of the Sovnarkhozy in 14 of these regions. This plan was appar- ently conceived about the same time the republic-level sovnar- khozy were created. Although creation of the republic sovnarkhozy, with their territorial sections, may be as far as the regime will go at present toward meeting the need for coordinating economic activ- ity in the large regions, forma- tion of the suggested additional councils cannot be ruled out. The plan stressed that creation of the republic sovnarkhozy was a step toward solving operation- al problems,, but noted that other organs were also needed to Coordinate adjacent sovnarkhozy. SECRET Gosplan retains only those sec- tions--primarily industrial branches--needed for its short- term planning functions. Planning departments which formerly dealt with only one main planning agency at the national level, Gosplan, now must deal with two planning agencies--an arrangement which is likely to be more complicated than the old one. Planning, Coordination Councils The possibility of achiev- ing more effective planning and coordination of economic activ- ity by creating national eco- nomic regions--each of which would generally contain several sovnarkhozy--was actively dis- cussed at the time of the 1957 industrial reorganization and has been a frequent topic in the Soviet press since that time. In mid-1960 a plan was PROPOSED ECONOMIC-GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS BoundaryLof area administered by Councils of National Economy Boundary of proposed Economic-Geographic Region (16 regions) BULB Underlining designates regions proposed to have Coordinating and PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTTVF 'D,,: -- 8 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET 1.r CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY `SvwR `. 17 November 1960 development. The republic sov- na..rkhozy, oriented toward opera- tional problems of impletaenting current plans, probably are not ideally suited to handling prob- lems of long-term patterns of industrial development. The 14 coordinating and planning councils would:-am- ine in detail- for. Iann;j g . organs--proposals such as those for the development of comple- rentary industries in adjacent sovnarkhozy within each large region and for the correct dis- tribution of capital investment to attain the desired patterns of specialization. The coun- cils presumably would work closely with the long-term plan- ning agency, Gosekonomsovet, and an official of the latter has indicated that the councils will be subordinated to his or- ganization. Results The changes made and con- templated will make the indi- vidual sovnarkhoz responsible for administering programs de- vised by a larger number of staffs than-in the past. Such operational decisions as are made by the sovnarkhozy in the implementation of these pro- grams will be subject to addi- tional review. Planning agen- cies, now free to devote more attention to basic planning c'problems, may be more resistant to, sovna;xkhoz deviations and may even produce plans less susceptible to improvisations from below. To the extent that greater coordination of activity in ad- jacent sovnarkhozy leads to more specialized patterns of indus- trial development, the opportuni- ties for the individual sovnarkhoz to influence its own course of development are reduced. To the extent that the planning and monitoring of intersovnarkhoz supply relationships are im- proved,.default on intersovnar- ?' khoz+'dve?liiver,y contracts may be reduced. Thus sovnarkhozy would have fewer excuses for justify- ing uneconomical development of local sources, less reluctance to shop around in adjacent sov- narkhozy, and less reason for maintaining stockpiles-as cush- ions against erratic supply flows. The regime apparently is gambling that these measures will restrict the undesirable exercise of local initiative. in the pursuit of local inter- ests without great sacrifice ofcsuch gains as may have been achieved in stimulating that 25X1 initiative in the Implementa- tion of the national plan. SOUTH KOREANS LOOK TO CHANG GOVERNMENT FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS "Today the South Korean people are in an indescrib- ably wretched plight. Workers' wages are less than one third their min- imum living e,pensdg: , Millions of unemployed and semi-unemployed are on the verge of starva- tion,.and hundreds of. thousands of child beg- gars are tramping the streets." So. Said North Korean Pre- mier Kim Il-sung in a "Libera- tion Day" address in Pyongyang on 14 August in which he called. for an interim North-South,fed eration and a "supreme national committee" of representatives from both sides to work out a program of economic and cultural cooperation. Without such co- operation, Kim asserted, talk of overcoming South Korea's "economic catastrophe', was only "empty phrasemongering." The North Korean premier told his listeners that attempts to de- velop the South Korean economy through foreign aid would fur- ther weaken the economy, ''!' kthd;Gh has already been devastated SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pake 9 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 because of its subjugation by American monopoly capital." Kim's address repeats a theme recurrent in North Korean propaganda since the fall of the Rhee government--the sug- gestion that North Korean heavy industry can be wedded to South Korean light industry and agri- culture to create a viable economy, He claims that full- scale economic cooperation be- tween the North and South would make it possible to achieve economic independence at the same levels of living as pre- vail in the rest of Asia. There is enough substance to this North Korean propaganda line to make it attractive to some South Korean listeners. Although the grievances which drove the students into the streets were political rather than economic and the revolu- tion a conservative rather than a radical one, the South Korean people clearly expect more of the new government than an end to despotism. Since April, the Koreans have become more aware of the efforts in other Asian countries to raise living standards, and their ambitions are reinforced by the realiza- tion that for the first time since independence they may be in a position to do something about it. The public's distrust of Communism engendered by bitter personal experiences during the Korean war has provided the Chang government with an initially strong bulwark a- gainst neutralist or leftist pressures. Nevertheless, a prolonged inability of con- servative leaders to demon- strate reasonable progress toward a better life under the democratic system could foster neutralist or totalitarian movements. Immediate Background The Chang government is starting out in an atmosphere charged with recriminations against the supporters of for- mer President Rhee, These un- fortunately include most of the influenatial businessmen on whom the country must depend for a large share of its economic de- velopment. It is widely acknowledged by both foreigners and Koreans that no Korean businessman could make an honest living during the Rhee era because of the mul- tiplicity of economic controls administered by corrupt offi- cials and politicians. Prime Minister Chang and other Rhee foes are consequently inclined to take a lenient attitude to- ward businessmen and to settle for payment of back taxes and fines. The public, however, is pressing for ex post facto legislation covering irregu- larities committed during the Rhee era, and there are indi- cations that jail sentences for contributors to Rhee's political machine may be stipulated. Ex- cessive reprisals against busi- nessmen would hamper the new government's plans for economic development. The leading example of "large-scale tax evaders" is Yi Pyong-chol, who received a bill for about $6,000,000 in back taxes and fines. Yi's in- terests include wine, tire, and textile manufacturing, canning, sugar refining, processing of marine and mineral products, banking, insurance,aand invest- ments. Chong Jae-ho, a poor second, was assessed $2,000,000 for taxes in connection with his extensive activities in the export-import and textile fields, Immediate Problems Prime Minister Chang's budget address on 30 September advocated increased farm cred- its, diversification of crops, livestock raising, and sericul- ture; development of electric power, public works, and marine SECRET PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES nn,a= 10 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY resources; plans to achieve rapid economic growth with em-,? phasis on small business enter- prises; establishment of a realistic exchange rate; and a broad welfare program. Multiple Exchange Rates South Korea's most serious immediate need is the replace- ment of its complicated system of multiple exchange rates by a single realistic rate; the present system has served more to maximize dollar earnings from US aid and UN forces' ex- penditures than to promote in- ternational trade. Beslides dis- couraging exports and distort- ing industrial development, tie system has exerted a depressing influence on the production of cotton and certain types of grain by making it cheaper to import competing items. Balance-of-Payments Deficit A second problem.confront- ing the Chang government is the country's enormous balance-of- payments deficit. While the deficit is closely related to the unrealistic exchange rate, it is also caused by other fac- tors. The shrinkage in rice exports, for example, stems not only from high prices but from the fact that Koreans now are eating more rice. Before World War II one third of the caloric intake of the Korean diet was derived from rice. In recent .years rice has provided nearly half of the caloric intake. Korea has been able to afford more rice because of the avail- ability of foreign aid to cover its bal- ance-of-payments def- icit. In 1959, export receipts of $20,000,- 000 paid for less than 10 percent of Korea's commodity imports--a pattern which has ex- nancod by US aid and earnings 'from the spending of UN ;forces statio4ed in Korea. Korea has always been a deficit nation in international trade, although its trade gaps were smaller before World War II. Prewar exports from both North and South Korea averaged approx- imately $236.,000,000 against $303,'000,000 average imports, leaving a trade gap of only $67,000,000. Of these amounts, however, what is now South Korea accounted for only an estimated 20 percent of exports and 10 per- cent of imports. Rice, marine products, and minerals were the chief prewar exports, most of which went to Japan; Japan in turn supplied 90 percent of Korea's imports. After the war, the Rhee govern- ment attempted to free Korea of dependence on Japanese trade, but it failed to develop ade- quate substitutes because of ill-considered trade practices and inability to promote mar- kets elsewhere. When Rhee in 1959 placed an embargo on trade with Japan in an attempt to gain political concessions, it was South Korea which suffered most. The Chang government has taken its first step to revive trade by seeking a reconciliation with Japan, its only important pros- pective customer for rice and other products. Another problem is the bur- den of supporting a defense es- tablishment of 600,000 men in (MILLION DOLLARS) COMMERCIAL isted since 1945. The ESTIMATED balance of Korean im- 1997.39 AVERAGE 01107 C ports has been fi-- 1956 19 13 SECRET PART I9?,f 1Amr rvVQ A1Un t7T,'T?S'.DF'f'TTVFC Pas+rP 11 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 17 November 1960 the ground, navy, and air forc- es without resorting to currency inflation. In recent years, de- fense has averaged roughly one third of the government's budg- et. While the prime minister would like to see a 100,000-man SOUTH KOREAN BUDGET 000 EXPENDITURES DEFICIT (BEFORE ADJUSTMENT FOR U S. AID) REVENUES 39 188 91 1954 1956 1959 1960 "AS APPROVED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY reduction of the armed forces, the Communist threat and the problem of creating civilian jobs in a depressed economy has led Chang to settle for a 30,000-man decrease to be a- chieved through normal attri- tion. The government must ac- cordingly find some other way of balancing the budget and meeting popular demands for so- cial and economic progress. This problem has been eased by the United States' contribution, totaling $308 billion in eco- nomic and. military aid from 1945 to mid-1960. In 1961 American-.financed imports are expected to generate nearly half of the national govern- ment's revenues and a large portion of South Korea's con- sumer goods and capital re- quirements. Inflation Despite such assistance, the Korean Government has at times resorted to inflation to close the budgetary gap. The result has been an inflation- ary spiral, offset only partly by bumper crops which caused wholesale grain prices to plum- met in 1958 and 1959 while other SECRET prices rose, Prices today are about 70 percent higher than in 1955. Money and credit have been relatively better controlled during the past year. Recently the Seoul wholesale price index showed a decline as the fall harvest began to flow into the market. On 14 October the in- dex was only 10 percent above the July-December 1959 average, A battle inside the Chang gov- ernment seems to be shaping up, however, between Minister of Commerce and Industry Chu Yo- han, who advocates inflation to speed economic development if capital cannot be obtained by other means, and Finance Minister Kim Yong-son. Each claims to be the top economic minister in the government. The usual effects of in- flation, which discourages sav- ings and stimulates consumption and speculative activities, are doubly severe in South Korea with its essentially private- enterprise economy. In 1959, consumption amounted to nearly 93 percent of gross national product (GNP) which, without US aid in financing imports, would have left little for investment. Even allowing for the addi- tional goods and services avail- able through foreign aid, econ- omists calculate that gross in- vestment--investment before depreciation--in South Korea in 1959 amounted to only 12 percent of GNP. Net investment should total at least 15 percent of GNP for a nation to achieve an PART I I I PATTERNS AND PERSPF('TTvFs T,_ __ "I ? Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUN annual growth rate of 5 per- cent. Without large-scale in- jections of American aid, South Korea's domestic investment is insufficient to maintain even the present level of living, given the current annual popu- lation increase of well over 2 percent. Korea's growth rate, at its 9,7 percent in 1957, economic peak of when Amer- ican aid had maximum impact, declined to 405 percent in 1959; the slowing growth rate directly reflects a decline in US aid. Longer Term Problems Whatever short-run efforts are made to improve the economy, South Korea's poverty of basic resources remains a fundamental hindrance. Most of Korea's pre- war heavy industry lies in Com- munist North Korea, and that in- dustry which was in the South, including light industry, was mostly destroyed during the Korean war o Aside from mod- erate quantities of iron ore, graphite, tungsten, bismuth, and anthracite coal, there are few known mineral reserves of commercial importance. Forest resources have been depleted, Agriculture Agriculture, which fur- nishes a livelihood for about 70 percent of the population and produces 83 percent of the nation's food requirements, is the mainstay of the economy. South Korea has A higher percen-. tage of arable land than most of Asia, but it ranks fifth among the nations of the world in population density. More- over crop yields can increase significantly only if agricul- ture is given vigorous govern- ment encouragement, with im- proved irrigation methods and seeds, increased use of chemical fertilizers and insecticides, and more efficient farming tech- niques. Disease is a major threat to Korean crops. Many farmers SOUTH KOREAN EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (MILLION DOLLARS IN 1958 PRICES) 1955 1957 ' 1958 1959 (EST) TOTAL CONSUMPTION GROSS INVESTMENT NET IMPORTS 1,807 253 -160 1,961 334 -220 2,095 300 -170 2,330 313 -263 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1,900 2,075 2,225 2,380 PER CAPITA GNP (DOLLARS) 89 93 98 101 GNP GROWTH RATE 4% 10% 7% 5% have lost as much as 30 percent of their vegetable crops and 50 percent of their tomatoes because of plant diseases. There are al- most no trained Korean plant pathologists, or, much official interest in this field. To lessen its balance-of- payments deficit, South Korea might be able to earn substan- tial foreign exchange by re- stricting domestic consumption of high-priced rice and trad- ing the surplus to other coun- tries for cheaper grains, as it was forced to do before World War II. Foreign demand for the type of rice raised in Korea is declining, however, and the country's export potential will only be improved if the Chang government succeeds in shifting rice acreage to cotton, soybeans, and oilseeds and emphasizes live- stock raising for export. There is also an export market for Korean fish products, provided present low production can be raised through such means as government extension of credit, marketing assistance, and en- couragement of joint ventures with Japan, Industry The principal role of South Korea's small industry to date has been to supply scarce con- sumer items to the domestic mar- ket and thereby reduce imports. Shortages of capital, managerial talent,,and competent technicians to staff even existing plants are largely responsible for the feeble gains scored by the industrial sector in 1959. Moreover, poor SECRET PART I 17 41 A nnf99 TTl 9T t1 A 9T11 T1TT [,TIT, c nv r~vTrv 13 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET W 17 November 1960 planning resulted in the appear- ance of large excess capacity in many areas--83 percent in flour milling, 80 percent in sugar refining, 72 percent in raw-silk processing, 61 percent in worsted-yarn manufacturing, 40 percent in electric power, 39 percent in cotton cloth, and 22 percent in cotton-yarn manu- facturing. A comprehensive long-range industrial development plan is being drawn up with American assistance, and the Chang gov- ernment has proposed capital expenditures over an undeter- mined period of $810,000,000 of which the United States would be asked to contribute more than half. A more important source of capital may prove to be private investment, given sound fiscal reforms and a AMERICAN AID TO SOUTH KOREA (ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS IN MILLION DOLLARS) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY TOTAL AID,1945-1960 = ;3,803,000,000 US FISCAL YEARS IC11945.58VEI 1959 MILITARY ASSISTANCE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PL-480 SALES TECHNICAL COOPERATION OTHER 164 7 2,035 46 6 222 2,820 24 7 209 IN: ADDITION, DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUND COMMITMENTS, OF WHICH LITTLE HAS MEN DISBURSED, TOTALED $7,000,000 IN 1959 AND $12,000,000 IN 1960. 01107 E 17 NOVEMBER 1960 reasonable application of the Foreign Investment Law, which Chang has promised. With en- couragement, Korean light in- dustrial products might become competitive in the world mar- ket. The Koreans by and large are hard working but they have lacked dynamic and aggressive leadership in the economic field. There is some question whether Prime Minister Chang possesses sufficient drive to propel his nation toward eco- nomic viability, although he is universally acknowledged to be sincere, honest, and polit- ically capable. Last month, Chang weathered the first chal- lenge to his leadership by the "old guard" of his Democratic party, and he now commands a shaky majority in the National Assembly. Chang's demonstrated political skill in handling his opponents enhances prospects that his government may be able to carry out its program. North vs. South How does South Korea's per- formance compare with North Korea's today? Making allow- ances for exaggeration in North Korea's statistical claims, 1959 per capita .,GNP-.is ,11Notth Korea probably slightly exceeded South Korea's $100. North Ko- rea's smaller population-- 9,000,000 against South Korea's 23,000,000, greater natural re- sources per capita, emphasis on heavy industry at the cost of sharply reduced living stand- ards, and greater Communist bloc aid per capita to.North Korea from 1954 to 1958 probably ac- count for the higher per capita GNP in North Korea today. If standards of living alone are compared, however, the South Koreans are better off because of their present high consump- tion rate. The Communist bloc's aid to Pyongyang has apparently de- clined greatly in recent years-- from 35 percent of North Korean GNP in 1954 to about 3 percent in 1959 and slightly less in 1960. The annual growth rate of the North Korean economy has only moderately declined, how- ever, from about 18 percent im- mediately after the Korean war to about 15 percent today. North Korea's ambitious seven-year plan, which starts next year, is reportedly aimed at raising per capita output of basic industrial commodities substantially above 1959 Jap- anese levels to approximately the Soviet 1958 level, with em- phasis also being placed on in- creased consumption. The challenge of the Com- munist north is thus a formidable SECRET 4 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 14 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY one and, under present condi, tions, will in time conspicu- ously widen the gap in the rel- ative economic'potentials of the two Koreas. If South Korean Government policies do not bring about marked economic progress, there may be renewed agitation by revolutionary elements led by university students, who played a key role in overthrow- ing the Rhee government. While the Chang government and its successors probably cannot hope to overtake North Korea economically on a per., capita basis, they may be able to satisfy the South Korean peo- ple to a reasonable degree if they make efficient use of their resources and if foreign aid continues at substantial levels. Fortunately, the present atmos- phere in Seoul for a serious at- tack on the nation's ills is more favorable than at any time since independence, SECRET PART I I T PATTERNR ANn PF.R.rVRrTTVRR Pn vca 15 of 15 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000010001-9