CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1999
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4.9 C f1119
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CURRENT
I AUT 25X1
DAT ! _ EV EWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OCI NO. 6089/60
15 December 1960
DOCUMENT. NO.
NO CHAN(E 1N GL~^SS.
1 DECLASS!FIFD
CLASS. CHANGED TS /f
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ONI EIA
State Department review completed
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. 58
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
Next Page (s) Next 4 Page,(s) In Doc
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
u
ment Denied
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET POLICIES FOLLOWING THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE
Private comments by top
Soviet leaders on the meeting
of world Communists in Moscow
point up the USSR's problem in
seeking to preserve at least a
semblance of bloc unity by
making concessions to the Chi-
nese without jeopardizing the
Soviet goal of arranging new
top-level negotiations with the
West. Soviet leaders have
stressed their "victory" over
the Chinese at the conference
and have minimized the impor-
tance of the attacks on the
United States contained in the
declaration issued following
the meeting.
This line was first estab-
lished in talks between Ambas-
sador Thompson and First Deputy
Premiers Mikoyan and Kosygin
on 6 December. Both Mikoyan
and Kosygin attempted to make
it': clear that the militant
tone of the declaration was a
concession to Peiping which
would not affect Soviet policy
toward the West.
This approach was continued
in subsequent remarks by Mikoyan
at a Kremlin reception on 8 De-
cember. He stressed to the
ambassador and Senator Cooper
the USSR's hope for an improve-
ment in US-Soviet relations.
In another conversation with
Senator Cooper, Mikoyan defended
the anti-American charges in
the declaration as based on
Marxist analysis, but he pointed
out that the Chinese Communists
had demonstrated their devotion
to peaceful coexistence by agree-
ing to the declaration and ex-
pressing their support in state-
ments since the meeting. The
only issue raised by Mikoyan
was whether the new American
administration would open the
way for increased trade, which
he stated would help improve
relations.
Sino-Soviet Relations
Soviet concern with pre-
serving the appearance of Sino-
Soviet unity that was laborious-
ly presented in the Moscow
declaration is reflected in re-
cent censorship actions.
American correspondents in Mos-
cow have told the US Embassy
that until the declaration was
agreed on, the censors allowed
them to speculate and report
freely on Soviet-Chinese dif-
ferences, but that censorship
since then has been extremely
strict and any reference to
these differences has been de-
leted.
Since the declaration was
issued, Chinese and Soviet edi-
torials have leaned heavily
on the theme of bloc unity, but
differences in emphasis betray
the underlying differences
which still exist and make it
clear that no real resolution
was achieved at the three-week
November meeting.
Soviet commentaries and
the published documents on the
conference continue to emphasize
peaceful coexistence and the
noninevitability of war as major
results. While branding US im-
perialism as the main opponent
of peace, the Soviet press
stresses that the shift in the
balance of forces in favor of
the socialist camp has created
SECRET
PART I nF TMMF:flTATT' TTTTTel VQM `e 1 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the opportunity for a success-
ful Struggle against a new war.
Chinese treatment of the
theme of bloc unity--which
reached its zenith in a 10 De-
cember People's Daily editorial
entitled.. a Closest Brothers,
The Greatest Friendship"--is_
reminiscent of earlier extrava-
gant paeans to Sino-Soviet
solidarity. According...to the
10 December editorial, Liu
Shao-chi's visit to the Soviet
Union consolidated and developed
still further the Peiping-Mos-
cow axis, writing a "brilliant"
page in the history of Sino-
Soviet friendship.
The Chinese encomiums to
friendship and unity are not
intended to imply uncritical
obeisance to Moscow's dictates.
The Chinese pronouncements ele-
vate Peiping to Moscow's level,as
China and the Soviet Union
are described as the two "big
powers" of the socialist camp--
powers';which have the biggest
responsibility for maintaining
bloc unity and for playing the
greatest role in preserving
peace.
Beneath the surface of
unity, the Chinese statements
suggest continuing divergences
over fundamental issues. Peace-
ful coexistence is given a mili-
tant ring in the Chinese tell-
ing, with the thesis on nonin-
evitability of war carefully
limited to world wars and..even,,then
made more conditional than the
Soviet version. Furthermore,
the Chinese state flatly that
they intend to pursue domestic
policies which have angered the
Soviets. On this point, Liu
told an audience in Moscow that
Peiping regards the communes as
"experiments for ourselves"
which have proved effective and
which the Chinese will firmly
adhere to in the future.
Satellite Comments
All the European satel-
lites except Albania have of"
fered commentaries which gen-
erally support the USSR. Some
of the statements and editorials
have sought to convey an impres-
sion of Soviet victory over
Peiping. Hungarian party First
Secretary Kadar, for example,
declared that the "prestige of
the Communist party of the So-
viet Union became: Stronger."
The Bulgarian and Czech parties
have held central committee
meetings to discuss the Moscow
conference, and plans have ap-
parently been made for similar
sessions in the other satellites.
The Bulgarian central com-
mittee meeting of 10 December
adopted a resolution supporting
the two documents signed in
Moscow, expressing confidence
in the work of the party's dele-
gation, and asserting that the
line of the Bulgarian party has
been consistently correct.
Kadar also emphasized the cor-
rectness of the Hungarian party's
policy. The final resolution of
the Czech plenary session, which
took place on 7 and 8 December,
expressed the same general points.
The East German party ple-
num has apparently been resched-
uled three times, most recently
for 14 December. The delay by
the East Germans and other par-
ties in holding central commit-
tee meetings probably indicates
that they are consideringrvery
carefully:hvwthey are to ex-
ploit the Moscow statements. It
may also reflect a disinclination
to schedule meetings before that
of the Soviet party central. com-
mittee, which had been set for
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of .13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
SECRET ~jj7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December but was postponed
at the last minute.
Editorials in the presses
of the three Asian Communist
regimes reflect little signifi-
cant change in attitude toward
Sino-Soviet relations. Mongo-
lia echoes Soviet views. North
Vietnam continues its balancing
act, accepting Soviet strategic
formulations on peaceful coexist-
ence but with due emphasis on
the Chinese position, particu-
larly on such matters as force-
ful revolutionary struggle in
underdeveloped areas, the sub-
ject of disarmament is avoided.
North Korea repeats most Soviet
dictums, including that on gen-
eral disarmament, but tends to
emphasize the more bellicose
aspects of the Moscow declara-
tion.
East-West Issues
The main result of the
Moscow meeting for Soviet for-
eign policy appears to have been
a compromise, granting Khru-
shchev a peridd of grace and a
relatively free hand to try to
demonstrate the effectiveness of
his policy in a further round
of negotiations with the West.
A member of the Polish UN dele-
gation interpreted the meeting
in this manner
At the UN, Soviet officials
have indicated continuing in-
terest in the new American ad-
ministration's attitude toward
establishing high-level contacts.
A member of the Soviet delega-
tion questioned a US official
last week on this point. He
hinted that the USSR was pre-
pared to resume disarmament
talks next spring and indicated
some flexibility on the Soviet
proposals to include five neu-
tral members in a new disarma-
ment committee. However, Mos-
cow's plan to convene a special
General Assembly session, to be
attended by the heads of govern-
ment, received a setback when
the UN Steering Committee voted
to recess the current session
from 20 December until early
March, thereby undercutting the
Soviet' proposal.
conference did not change Khru-
shchev's intention to resolve
the Berlin problem through an
early summit meeting. Both the
declaration and the Appeal to
People's of the World, published
on 11 December, included the de-
mand for a German peace treaty
and the creation of a free city
in West Berlin. According to
Western press dispatches from
Moscow, Khrushchev told several
foreign diplomats that the USSR
would welcome Western proposals
on Berlin which might offer a
way out of the impasse.
The 11 December "peace ap-
peal" also stressed the standard
propaganda themes on complete
and general disarmament, pro-
hibition of nuclear weapons and
cessation of testing, elimination
of foreign bases and withdrawal
of foreign troops, and the im-
mediate and unconditional aboli-
tion of colonialism. In general
the appeal continues the more
aggressive tone of the declara-
tion and singles out US "impe-
rialism" as the main enemy of
peaceful coexistence.
That Moscow intends to ad-
here to this more militant tone
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
I"'1 SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
may be reflected in a TASS
statement, also issued on 11
December, attacking the UK-US
agreement for an atomic-sub-
marine base in Scotland. Timed
to anticipate the NATO discus-
sions on establishing a nuclear
striking force, the statement
repeated previous accusations
against Prime Minister Macmil-
lan of bad faith in expressing
to Khrushchev a desire to re-
turn to the pre-summit atmos-
phere while at the same time
negotiating for US bases. TASS
also warned against the "naive"
view that the USSR would retal-
iate only against the submarine
and not against its home base,
Bonn-Soviet Trade Talks
On 12 December negotiations
between West Germany and the
USSR for a new trade agreement
collapsed after Bonn's demand
that West Berlin be included in
the agreement was categorically
rejected by the Soviet ambassa-
dor. During the talks the So-
viet negotiators had brushed
aside Bonn's attempt to include
Berlin---either by an exchange
of letters or by a unilateral
West German oral statement.-Only
at the last minute did West
Germany make the signing of the
agreement conditional on this demand.
West Berlin Mayor Brandt
and the opposition Social Demo-
crats have indicated strong
support: for the government's
position. Although Foreign
Minister Brentano stated on 12
December that the Federal Re-
public would continue to try to
reach agreement through diplo-
matic channels, another ministry
official predicted that the
treaty was "dead."
If no agreement is reached
by 31 December, when the present
pact expires, trade could con-
tinue on a reduced scale, but
the lack of an agreement would
probably increase the USSR's
difficulties in selling its
goods in the German market. The
three-year trade pact concluded
in 1958 did not specifically in-
clude West Berlin, but the USSR
has tacitly allowed the city's
trade to be treated as part of
the West German "currency area."
East - West German Trade Talks
In its exploratory nego-
tiations with East Germany on a
new interzonal trade agreement,
Bonn has also been insisting
that West Berlin and West Ger-
many be treated as one "currency
area," and the East Germans so
far have allowed the talks to
continue within this framework.
The East Germans proposed
on 12 December that the trade.
agreement and its annexes, ab-
rogated by Bonn, be reinstituted
--the first time the regime has
made such a proposal.
The East Germans have con-
currently intensified their de-
mands to raise the level of
negotiations. In editorials of
11 and 13 December, Neues
Deutschland charged that-Pest
e-rman representative Kurt Leo-
pold lacks authority to nego-
tiate and declared that he is
attempting to inject "political"
questions into the negotiations
--a reference to Bonn's
demand that the East Germans
formally disavow their re- 25X1
quirement that West Germans
secure passes to visit East
Berlin.
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST p-'e 4 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4 '
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A high-level Soviet trade
mission left for Havana on 12
December. Economic talks in
Moscow by the Cuban mission
headed by Che Guevara were in-
terrupted for the second time
on 13 December when Guevara left
the Soviet capital for his sched-
uled visit to East Germany. It
was announced that he would
return to continue negoti
tions. The American Embassy
in Moscow speculates that
the Cuban-Soviet economic talks
may have been too complicated
for Guevara's delegation or
that the meetings in Moscow
have been unable to achieve
agreement.
Talks were suspended
earlier when Guevara's.inission
left Moscow on 16 November for
negotiations in Communist China,
North Korea, North Vietnam, and
Mongolia. The Cuban mission
had returned to Moscow on 8 De-
cember after concluding major
trade and assistance agreements
in Peiping and trade and ex-
change agreements with the Asian
satellites.
The establishment of Cuban
diplomatic ties with North
Vietnam and Mongolia during
visits to those countries by a
portion of Guevara's mission
suggests that Cuba may accord
formal diplomatic recognition
to East Germany during the visit
there, leaving Albania the only
bloc country unrecognized by the
Castro regime. Recognition of
East Germany would probably pro-
voke a break in relations be
tween Cuba and the Federal
Republic.
On the domestic scene, the
Castro regime, faced with grow-
ing but still uncoordinated re-
sistance, is taking ever-stronger
measures to combat it. Six
Cubans were executed on 10 De-
cember on counterrevolutionary
charges, and more executions
are expected, The civilian
militia, although not invariably
reliable, now rivals the
regular armed forces as an
instrument for suppressing dis-
sident activity. It is composed
largely of the lowest income
groups, where loyalty to Castro
continues strongest. The Ameri-
can Embassy in Havana estimates
that at least 15,000 politi-
cal prisoners are now in
Cuban jails. They are arrested
arbitrarily, confined under
extremely harsh conditions,
and subjected to both men-
tal harassment and physical
brutalities.
The purging of the leathers
of the electrical workers'
union on 12 December will at
least temporarily suppress the
revolt of that union against
domination by the Communist-
controlled Confederation of
Cuban Workers. The electrical
workers' protest march on the
Presidential Palace on 9 Decem-
ber was a rare show of defiance
against Communist control, and
resentment will continue to
smolder among organized workers.
Thbanti-Communist leaders of
the electrical workers sought
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET INWV
asylum in various Latin Ameri-
can embassies on 13 December.
Members of the electrical work-
ers' union were evidently re-
sponsible for the bombings in
Havana power plants late last
month.
Che Guevara, speaking in
Moscow on 10 December, declared,
"Counterrevolutionary terror
will be met with equal terror."
In saying "Ve are not yet united
and organized into a single
party," he implied that the
regime will shortly seek to
fulfill this project. If
carried out, this device would
further strengthen police
state controls and increase
the scope of Communist entrench- 25X1
ment. At present, the Commu-
nists have the only organized
party in the country.
The riots in Algeria have
not dissuaded De Gaulle from
his plan for a national refer-
endum on 8 January and the cre-
ation of an interim Algerian
government with local autonomy.
He appears determined to punish
severely those responsible for
the disturbances; many have al-
ready been arrested, and army
commanders have made plain they
will put down any further dis-
orders. Activity in Algiers
and Oran is returning to normal,
although Moslem crowds in Al-
giers are still restive.
Except for rightists and
Communists, the French public
continues its support of De
Gaulle and seems willing to
await further word from him be-
fore taking a definite stand on
the Algerian rioting.
The clashes between Mos-
lems and Europeans may have pre-
eluded a solution based on co-
operative communities of Mos-
lems and Europeans in an Alge-
rian republic closely linked
with France--obviously De Gaulle's
preference.
The government was prepared
for trouble from Europeans upon
De Gaulle's arrival on 9 Decem-
ber, and acted firmly. By eve-
ning of 8 December extraordinary
measures had been taken, includ-
ing detention of known agitators,
searching of Europeans' cars,
and surveillance of airfields.
The security police had been
reinforced and ordered to fire
if necessary. During the first
day of the rioting, army units
began assisting the security
police.
The vehemence of the Mos-
lem demonstrations which began
on 10 December and especially
their pro-FLN flavor appear to
have surprised French officials.
There is no evidence that the
riots were fomented by the FLN,
but it seems clear that rebel
agents exploited the Moslem
mobs to their own ends once the
disturbances were under way.
The support shown for the FLN
will no doubt be used to under-
cut the long-standing French
position that the rebel govern-
ment represents only a small
minority of the Moslem population.
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 Of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
1%W4 *"0
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Neither the Moslem nor
European demonstrators had ef-
fective leadership, and the lack
of strong leaders to control
the two communities will make
reconciliation more difficult.
So far the Moslem reaction ap-
pears to be one of anger over
the severe measures taken a-
gainst their demonstrations by
troops which had confined them-
selves largely to passive de-
fense against the European.
rioters. Algerian Europeans
and pro-French Moslems may yet
make a last desperate effort
to erect a separate French-Al-
gerian republic.
The killing of
Moslems--at least 115
have died so far--
will enhance the pos-
sibility of a General
Assembly resolution
calling for UN inter-
vention in Algeria.
Supporters of the 22-
nation Afro-Asian draft
resolution calling for
a referendum in Algeria "organ-
ized, controlled, and supervised"
by the UN are confident that the
riots have increased general UN
support for their resolution.
French African states have met
strong resistance to their ef-
forts to modify this resolution,
and it is unlikely that they
will vote against it. The chair-
man of the Political Committee,
where the debate has been going
on for-two weeks, intends to
bring the issue to a vote before
the end of the week, and the full
8.ssembly may vote on it before
the 20 December recess.
DE GAULLE's ALGERIAN TOUR
9-13 December 1960
I I , _.____j
15 DECEMBER 1960
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
De Gpulle's decision to
return -to Paris ahead of sched-
ule may have been based on a
belief that his continued pres-
ence in Algeria would only en-
courage further clashes between
Moslems and Europeans. He was
warmly received by the Moslem
population in the towns he vis-
ited, but there was consider-
able evidence of hostility from
the Europeans. Paris officially
explains the riots as the work
of a "minority of fanatics"
and not representative of true
Moslem feeling. However, a
sense of shock is evident in
Pro-Lumumba forces in
Stanleyville have not carried
out their threat to execute
European hostages if Lumumba is
not released by Mobutu. They
have stepped up efforts to ob-
tain foreign aid, however, and
on 13 December proclaimed the
Stanleyville regime, nominally
headed by former Vice Premier
Gizenga, the "lawful government
of the Congo." The proclama-
tion of the Gizenga government
may be followed by its "recog-
nition" by certain Asian and
African states.
The Soviet Union continues
to demand the release and re-
instatement of Lumumba. Fol-
lowing Gizenga's proclamation,
Radio Moscow reported that the
vice premier had assumed re-
sponsibility and moved the seat
of government to Stanleyville.
The USSR may contend that the
Stanleyville regime is the
legitimate government ruling in
the name of the jailed Lumumba
in order. to justify any moves to ex-
tend material support to anti-
Mobutu forces, in Orientale Prov-
ince.
metropolitan France over the
violence of the Moslem demon-
strations.
French security forces .
have rounded up known rightist
supporters to prevent trouble
in France following De Gaulle's
In the Security Council on
14 December, USSR delegate Zorin
vetoed a Western resolution
calling for humane treatment of
all prisoners held in the Congo,
after the council had reje2ted
a Soviet resolution demanding
Lumumba's freedom.
The announcement on 12 De-
cember that Morocco will with-
draw its 3,200-man contingent
SECRET
25X1
25X1
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
from the UN Command poses the threat that the 20,000-man UNforce may be reduced by as much as one third. The UAR announced earlier that it will call back its 500-man battalion, and In-donesia has indicated that itwill pull out its 1,150-man contingent. Guinea is expected to withdraw its 600-man battal-
from Leopoldville and Thysville
in the past week to unknown loca-
tions near Orientals Province.
Within the province, Congolese
Army units and dissident militia
are each believed to number be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 men. Al-
though the loyalties of the army
units are not clear, most are
believed loyal to Mobutu, and
pose a major threat
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO gimehe dissident re-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
In Leopoldville,
Mobutu has hedged his
i. ,q, ~"? ' R I E N T A L E lake A 16e, earlier announcement
that he would continue
E Q [! A T E L R l Stanleyvill UGANDA his interim government
.Coquilhatville into 1961, and report-
CONGO 1 t.lEdwa,d 71
edly is agreeable to
~ a e
r-'l4; s?L ?~~: K , V U v,l/ev reconvening parliament
I_a4r
L--N nf r du~ Bukavu UAND ,,
URUNDI and establishing a
Kin
new civil government
Brazzaville 'PortFranoq~ui in January. Mobutu
oldville
P o D V I L1-E K A I- -= onto has added however
M , ,
at iTh soil e ANGANYIKA
~Uluabourg akwan9a-.1 Albertville 7~9 y,ko that such a step would
Luputta, be possible only if
rl1[ -.`, Manono "most' of the Congo's
Ka iina?
scattered parliament
` Luanda
can be gathered in
Leopoldville, and if
Atta?tr~ A N G O L-~A
the government that
lisabethville
(CeaH
emerges is satisfactory
to President Kasavubu
15 DECEMBER 111110 and himself.
31503
ion, and the coup in Ethiopia
raises the possibility that the
1,900-man Ethiopian contingent
may be called home.
Mobutu, meanwhile, is under
pressure from his commissioners
to undertake military operations
against Stanleyville. Several
hundred Congolese Army troops
are believed to have been moved
In a character-
istic example of conflicting
political initiatives, President
Kasavubu advised Ambassador
Timberlake on 12 December that
he plans to call a round-table
conference of Congolese political
parties in late December rather
than of parliament. Kasavubu
stated that he expected that such
a meeting would agree on a gov-
ernment acceptable to "provincial
leaders"; Ambassador Timberlake
SECRET
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST PasrP. 9 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
*40 14W
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
observed that he himself was not
so optimistic.
Although pro-Lumumba senti-
ment has receded in Leopoldville
following the imprisonment of
Lumumba, there is no general
agreement among various politi-
cal factions on a new premier.
It appears doubtful whether any
arrangement will be satisfac. 25X1
tory to Mobutu unless it
guarantees him a large
measure of power.
The military situation in
the Vientiane area is fluid
following the attempt, begun on
13 December, by forces loyal to
General Phoumi to wrest control
of the capital from Captain Kong
Le's forces. As of 15 December,
Phoumi's troops appeared to con-
trol the center of the town,
but their further progress is
hampered by artillery and mor-
tar fire delivered by the
slowly retreating defenders.
The city apparently suffered ex-
tensive damage and numerous
casualties--preponderantly
civilian.
The key airfield, a few
miles to the northwest of down-
town Vientiane, is apparently
still under Kong Le's control,
although it has reportedly been
neutralized by artillery fire.
An attack on the airfield by
Phoumi's troops may be in
progress. Prior to 13 December,
Soviet IL-14 transport aircraft
brought in 105-mm. howitzers,
120-mm. mortars, and possibly
some antiaircraft guns to
bolster Kong Le's firepower.
Reports that North Vietnamese
gunners were also brought in
are unconfirmed.
If finally dislodged from
Vientiane and the airfield,
Kong Le and his forces will
presumably link up with Com-
munist Pathet Lao guerrilla
units, whibh are reported in
considerable strength in the
province of Vientiane. Such
a combination would pose a
formidable guerrilla threat to
the capital. The vulnerability
of Phoumi's troops was demon-
strated on the morning of 14
December when a sudden counter-
attack by Kong Le swept them
out of downtown Vientiane. Near
panic is reported to have seized
Phoumi's forces, although they
were rallied later in the day
and re-entered the town.
SECRET
PART I n' TMVVn T A"V TMPPDVQT Den- 10 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
iiiw
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
which is strongly
rightist in coloration.
r -,, s 'fir
SARAVANE
SOUTH
. attaveu VIETNAM
SAK T7"OPEI
King Savang on 12 December
signed a royal ordinance ousting
the government of Premier
Souvanna Phouma, who had pre-
viously fled to Phnom Penh
with six of his cabinet minis-
ters.. The King's action
followed a National Assembly
vote of no confidence registered
in Savannakhet, headquarters
of Phoumi's Revolutionary Com-
mittee. Souvanna's ouster paved
the way for formation of a
provisional government under
Prince Boun Oum, coleader of
the Revolutionary Committee
along with Phoumi. Phoumi is
deputy premier and minister of
defense in the new government,
Although provi-
sional in nature, the
Boun Oum government
has a strong claim to
legality since it has
the King's official
sanction; however, ap-
proval by a National
Assembly vote would
strengthen its inter-
national credentials.
Quinim Pholsena,
one of the two Souvanna
government members who
remained in Vientiane
after Souvanna's flight,
has publicly refused to
recognize the legality
of the new regime and
has called upon all
Laotians, over the
Pathet Lao radio, to
rally behind the Sou-
vanna government,
which he claims is
still the legal one.
Souvanna has remained 25X1
silent on the issue
in Phnom Penh, but can
be expected to come
under strong leftist pressure
to take a stand similar to
Quinim's. Whether he would
openly defy the King is prob-
lematical, however.
The Pathet Lao high command
issued an order of the day on
13 December calling upon its
regular units and "people's
forces" to commence country-
wide guerrilla warfare against
the "traitorous" Phoumi, group
and its American and Thai sup-
porters. Thus, even if Phoumi
takes Vientiane and establishes
the Boun Oum government there,
the outlook is for intensified
Pathet Lao guerrilla harassment
throughout Laos.
SECRET
PHONG
NAMTHA ~~"~?l~ `'
*--" LUANG PRABANG % SAM NEUA {'_ong Pawn
Luang
Preban
g ~.?, ~V?~.
~
/
XIENG .. ?"~+
assy `` a ~,
MMOUAN
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 11 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Communist bloc appears
intent on maintaining tension
in Laos. At the very least, the
bloc probably hopes to heighten
international apprehensions and
build pressure for a negotiated
settlement which would permit Neo
Lao Hak Sat representation in
the government. The bloc contin-
ues its political support of
Souvanna Phouma as the "legiti-
mate" government.
Moscow has stepped up its
charges of US intervention, and
in a 13 Decembernote officially
charged the United States with
direct "interference" in Laos.
The note listed military
equipment allegedly furnished
the Phoumi forces. It recalled
US participation in the 1954
Geneva Conference on Indochina
and labeled American interven-
tion in Laos a glaring viola-
tion of the Geneva declarations.
The USSR is apparently
laying the groundwork for an
attempt to re-establish the
International Control Commission
(ICC) in Laos on the basis that
the United States is fomenting
civil warfare, and possibly at
the same time to stimulate an
appeal for UN consideration of
the crisis.
(Prime Minister Nehru,
according to a press dispatch
from Bombay, has suggested that
the reconvening of the ICC in
Laos "might be helpful" in the
present situation,
The Soviet press has not
yet published any reports of
Soviet military equipment being
airlifted into Vientiane, but
Moscow will probably continue
supplying military aid for pro-
leftist forces. First Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, in
handing the Soviet note to
Ambassador Thompson, argued that
it was perfectly natural for
the USSR to furnish supplies to
the legal government of Laos.
Vietnam."
Peiping, in the most recent
of a long series of official
bloc protests, on 14 December
termed the situation very grave
and warned that it will "do
its utmost to uphold the Geneva
agreements and check US imperi-
alist interference." On the
same day, Hanoi lodged a formal
protest with the ICC against
"armed intervention" by South
Vietnam in Laos and again charged 25X1
the US with creating a "direct
threat to the security of North
The group of security and I late in the day. With these
Imperial Bodyguard officers which
staged a coup against the regime
of Emperor Haile Selassie on 14
December quickly seized control
of Addis Ababa but was not able
to extend its power outside the
city. By 15 December the armed
forces chief of staff, General
Merid, had called up four bat-
talions of army troops from out-
lying areas,.expected',to arrive
augmenting the three battalions
presently in Addis Ababa, he
hopes to concentrate forces
superior to the 5,000 Bodyguard
troops and bring about the dis-
sidents' surrender. Loyal air
force units were being prepared
for possible action against Addis
Ababa.
Failing a peaceful solution,
Merid proposes to use overwhelming
SECRET
PART I n' Tartfa'T%TAmz+ Txrmt+ntcm _ l of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
TSET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
force. Meanwhile, in Addis
Ababa, students are demonstrat-
ing in support of the coup,
and there are reportedly mixed
feelings among the general pop-
ulace.
Haile Selassie was flying
back from Brazil on 15 December
and was expected to land at
some provincial city--possibly
Asmara or Harar--to rally sup-
port against the government
proclaimed in the name of Crown
Prince Asfa Wossen. Before he
left Brazil, the Emperor indi-
cated that he would not accept
the new government.
The coup leaders--Director
of Security Lt. Col. Workeneh
Gabeyhou and Brig. Gen. Men-
ghistou. Neway, the commanding
general. of the Bodyguard--were
able to round up most of
Ethiopia's government,
officials and have
apparently secured
the cooperation of
the crown prince, al-
though he may be act-
ing under duress.
They have proclaimed
a constitutional mon-
archy--known to be
favored by the crown
prince--and have
promised to speed up
the modernization of
the country's feudal
society.
The crown prince,
who had had little
opportunity to exer-
cise administrative
power and who does not have a
strong popular following, has
announced his willingness to
serve as a salaried head of
state. Haile Selassie has been
the only personage drawing sup-
port from all important elements
of the Ethiopian population,
with its strong regional and
ethnic divisive tendencies.
The Bodyguard is the best
equipped military force in
Ethiopia and, in view of its
concentration in Addis Ababa,
the most able to exert an in-
fluence on the political scene.
It has recently been affected
by considerable dissension
over low pay and concern that
Ethiopia was drifting into
close relations with the bloc.
The army of some 25,000 men is
scattered throughout the empire,
and some of its best units in
the Addis Ababa and Harar areas
have been depleted to furnish
Ethiopia's 2,600-man contingent
in the Congo.
Both the Bodyguard and the
army suffer from factionalism.
Many of the younger officers
who have received training in
foreign or Ethiopian military
schools favor speedy democrati-
zation of the nation; the older 25X1
men remain loyal to Ethiopia's
powerful regional chieftains
and imperial traditions.
SECRET
PART I l+T+ TfI1lT14\T N.f.T, T - 13 of 13
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
11W SECRET
?-&t XErNT -INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Y -
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET PARTY MEETING POSTPONED
The decision to postpone
from 13 December "to January"
the Soviet party central com-
mittee plenum on agriculture
was apparently a sudden one.
A broadcast to Australia and
New Zealand on 9 December just
three hours before the TASS an-
nouncement of the postponement
had discussed the plenum and
stated that it would meet in
Moscow on the 13th.
Moscow has not advanced an
explanation for the postpone-
ment, but it came shortly after
the conclusion of the prolonged
bloc conference of Communist
parties, which wrestled with
the problem of Sino-Soviet dif-
ferences, and at a time when
Khrushchev was reported ill
with the flu.
The bloc meeting lasted
longer than Moscow expected,
and this apparently necessitat-
ed the rescheduling of several
events previously planned for
late November and early Decem-
ber. A nationwide health con-
ference was postponed from 24
November to 6-9 December, a
cellulose and paper industry con-
ference was changed from 29 No-
vember to 17 January, and the
Armenian 40th anniversary cele-
bration was postponed from 29
November to a later date so
that--according to a Moscow rumor
--Khrushrhev could participate.
The bloc conference ended
on 2 December, and Khrushchev
apparently was taken ill on the
2nd or 3rd. He has not appeared
in public since, but he received
Chinese President Liu Shao-chi
on the 7th and UAR Deputy Pre-
mier General Amir the day fol-
lowing, both at his house in'
Moscow.
With the December schedule
already tight, Khrushchev may
not have recovered fast enough
from his illness to prepare
adequately for the plenum and
may have chosen to postpone it
to January rather than reschedule
other events planned for Decem-
ber--the USSR Supreme Soviet is
to meet on the 20th and the
Russian Republic (RSFSR) Soviet
on the 25th. Khrushchev's
decision to postpone the meet-
ing might also have been influ-
enced by indecision or even dis-
agreement among the top party
leaders on policies proposed
for consideration at the plenum.
The plenum was called to
discuss the agricultural situa-
tion and consider plans for im-
proving it--a particularly
thorny problem in view of the
poor showing in agricultural pro-
duction for the second successive
year. Several articles have ap-
peared recently in the Soviet
press upholding the validity of
basic Soviet agricultural policy
but sharply criticizing administra-
tive officials for neglect and
errors in carrying out that policy.
Agriculture Minister Matskevich
has been attacked in a manner
suggesting that he has been
singled out to be the principal
scapegoat and that the plenum
would consider proposals for re- 25X1
organizing his ministry and form-
ing new agencies for agricultural
administration.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
w
SECRET
15 December 1960
YUGOSLAVIA AND WESTERN EUROPE
rYJP7_ Yo T .INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY -BTJMMARY
Although the' chief pre-
oe, upation..a&fYugoslav foreign
lzolicyis to improve Belgr tide's
ties `with the uncommitted states,
Tito has also made significant
progress,.in bettering relations
with the Western European coun-
tries.
Foreign Minister Popovic's
visit to Vienna from 24 to 26
November resolved virtually
every problem which has disturbed
Yugoslav-Austrian relations
since the Austrian state treaty
was signed. Austrian Chancellor
Raab is expected to return the
visit in February or March.
The joint communique issued
at the end of Popovic's visit
pledged Austria to return various
securities and bank deposits
taken from Yugoslavia during
World War II and to honor the
Austrian State Treaty in the
treatment of its Slovene minor-
ity. Yugoslavia has insisted
that the Slovenes in Austria
were not enjoying rights guaran-
teed under the state treaty.
The communique: also called
for increased trade between the
two countries and--in an ap-
parent attempt by Austria-to
take advantage of Yugoslav good
will in the uncommitted states
--for cooperation in trade with
third countries.
Vienna has agreed to grant
credits, probably around $7,000,-
000, for an economic reform
which will allow Yugoslavia to
bring its trade practices into
closer accord with those of
Western Europe. Belgrade a-
greed to drop its claim for
social security payments for
Yugoslavs forced to work in
Austria during World War II, but
it refused to consider Vienna's
claims for Austrian property
nationalized by Belgrade after
the war.
Popovic's visit to Rome
from 2 to 4 December was devoted
primarily to discussion of broad
international issues; relations
between the two states are
already good. Italy reaffirmed
its adherence to the agreement
on Trieste. The two countries
also discussed trade; Italy is
one of Yugoslavia's chief trad-
ing partners. Rome reaffirmed
its intention to support Yugo-
slavia's economic reform with
a $35,000,000 loan. Italian
Foreign Minister Segni has ac-
cepted an invitation to visit
Yugoslavia, but no date has
been set.
Although Belgrade has been
displeased with Western Europe's
generally unenthusiastic re-
sponse to its plea for support
for its economic reform, its re-
lations with other Western
European states, except for West
Germany and France, are general-
ly satisfactory.
Despite negotiations in the
last year, Yugoslavia and West
Germany have not re-established
diplomatic relations, which were
broken off by Bonn in 1957 be-
cause Yugoslavia recognized East
Germany. Bonn has indicated it
will support the Yugoslav reform
but it tried in early December
to get in return a Yugoslav
pledge not to sign a separate
peace treaty with East Germany.
Belgrade alleges it has already
met this condition, although
Popovic's remarks in Vienna in-
dicate Belgrade is not yet ready
to commit itself on the issue.
Relations with France are
troubled by Yugoslavia's sup-
port for the Algerian rebellion.
Algerian wounded have convalesced
in Yugoslavia, and the Algerian
provisional government has an
unofficial representative in Bel-
grade. In the last year, French
warships have stopped two Yugo-
slav merchantmen in international
waters, and a Yugoslav Foreign
Ministry spokesman implied on 9
December that Belgrade gives the
Algerian provisional govern-
ment de facto recognition.
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Anti-US sentiment and pres-
sures for establishment of re-
lations with the Sino-Soviet
bloc are building up in Ecuador
as a result of the 7 December
declaration by the guarantor
nations to the 1942 Rio Pro-
tocol, which provides for a
definitive settlement of the
140-year-old border dispute
with Peru and grants a favor-
able award of territory to the
latter. The guarantor nations
are the US, Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile, and the declaration,
which was in response to Ecua-
dor's provocative campaign to
denounce the treaty as null
and void, upholds its
validity.
Demonstrations
against the US Embas-
sy in Quito and the
consulate general in
Guayaquil began on
9 December and were
followed by addition-
al violence against
US installations in
these and other cities
on 12-13 December--
including insults to
the US flag. The
later unrest may be
connected with a re-
ported plan of the
small but influential
Ecuadorean Communist
party for full ex-
ploitation of the
anti-US sentiment and
strong nationalistic
declaration--not merely by Com-
munists but also by top govern-
ment officials. The Ecuadorean
Government is directly en-
couraging these outbreaks by
inflammatory public statements,
particularly those of the pro-
Castro, anti-US minister of
government, Manuel Araujo, who
controls the police and is
responsible for the maintenance
of order.
The Velasco regime is also
resorting to a variety of ex-
tremist threats designed to
neutralize the guarantor dec-
laration and win official and
Disputed area claimed by Ecuador and ceded to Peru
by the 1942 Rio do Janeiro Protocol
ECUADOR - PERU BOUNDARY DISPUTE
%1-
feelings generated by the bor-
der issue.
While the other guarantor
powers expressed grave concern
over President Velasco's fre-
quent denunciation of the pro-
tocol since he took office
last September and insisted on
a firm guarantor position up-
holding it, the United States
has been primarily blamed fortthe
popular support for its cause
in the hemisphere. These
threats include the establish-
ment of closer ties with Cuba
and diplomatic relations with
the USSR and China and withdrawal
from the Organization of Ameri-
can States. Foreign Minister
Chiriboga advised the US am-
bassador on 10 December that
the declaration has crystallized
the efforts of Araujo, Vice
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
--CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY-SUMMARY
15 December 1960
President Carlos Arosemena,and
other cabinet members to "elim-
inate excessive dependence on
the US" and seek relations with
the USSR and China.
In a 10 December public
statement timed to reinforce
such threats, Chiriboga an-
nounced that Czechoslovakia
would reopen its legation in
Quito, which was closed by
Eduador's previous government
in 1957. Araujo has publicly
advocated the acquisition of
Soviet military and other aid
if necessary "to defend our
country."
The Ecuadorean armed forces,
who realize Peru's marked mili-
tary superiority and are po-
litically hostile to Arau,jo
and friendly toward the US, rep-
resent a potentially moderating
influence on Velasco. Velasco
has publicly renounced war as
a means of settling the border
dispute. In Peru, where off 1-
cial and public opinion was
elated over the guarantor dec-
laration, the army is sending
reinforcements to the border,
including 12 tanks, and the
navy has stationed major fleet
elements off the northern coast
--probably as a precaution
against the outbreak of fighting.__.,
CANADA'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
Faced with the prospect of
a severe economic recession
this winter, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker has recalled Parlia-
ment two months early to take
remedial action.
.Unemployment, which has
already climbed to almost 7 per-
cent of the labor force, will
probably reach a postwar high
of 10 percent during the winter.
The main factor in the unemploy-
ment increase is the failure
of manufacturing industries,
which employ 27 percent of
Canada's workers, to develop at
the same rate as have the miner.
als and other raw materials
industries:
Government officials pri-
vately admit that there is no
hope this year of achieving the
previously estimated balanced
budget and a 6-percent increase
in gross national product. Dec
spite an 8-percent increase in
Canada's export trade in the
first nine months of this year,
the balance-of-payments deficit
is expected to be even higher
than last year's record $1.46
billion.
The economic downturn has
already had sharp political re-
percussions. The American Em-
bassy in Ottawa sees Diefenbaker
as "obsessed" with restoring his
government's rapidly declining
popularity and with countering
the Liberal.,opposition's telling
charge that the Conservatives
have totally failed in their
pledge to broaden Canada's in-
dustrial base and to lessen its
economic dependence on the US.
Diefenbaker's proposals at
the opening session of Parlia-
ment on 17 November--establishing
a productivity council and stag-
ing an all-out export promotion
campaign--will have little im-
mediate effect on either the
economic slump or the govern-
ment's standing. The prime
minister also stated that the
government was considering legis-
lative measures to obtain greater
participation by Canadians in
the ownership and control of
Canadian industry and resources,
but he has not yet offered spe-
cific proposals. During the
last. year especially, Canadian
public opinion has become in-
creasingly vocal over alleged
SECRET
PART II 1 NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
SECRET
American economic, military,
and cultural domination.
In the event Diefenbaker
decides to call a general elec-
tion next spring before the Con-
servatives' popularity falls
further, he may campaign on a
platform which has even stronger
anti-American overtones than in
the 1957 elections. Minister
of Trade and Commerce Hees' re-
mark after his 9 December meet-
ing with the Cuban trade mission
--"they're wonderful customers"
--reflects the government's
current penchant for playing
up its differences with the
United States.
Prime Minister Ikeda has
temporarily succeeded in unify
ing his party by including rep-
resentatives of all major
factions in the cabinet formed
on 8 December. Opponents with-
in his conservative Liberal-
Democratic party (LDP), however,
consider that formation of the
new cabinet ends the period
of relative truce under what
was commonly considered a "care-
taker" government formed in
July and now are
waiting for Ikeda to
make a misstep which
could lead to his
ouster.
Political mis-
management of the
selection of the
speaker of the House
of Representatives
delayed Ikeda's re-
election two days,
diminished his pres-
tige, and set the
stage for maneuvering
against him.
Ikeda has re-
tained strong incum-
bents in five important minis-
tries--Foreign Minister Zentaro
Kosaka, Finance Minister Mikio
Mizuta, Education Minister Masuo
Araki, Labor Minister Hirohide
Ishida, and Minister for Econom=
ic Planning Hisatune Sakomizu--
and has appointed experienced
bureaucrats rather than pro-
fessional politicians to most
other cabinet posts. However,no
faction leaders have been in-
cluded in the new cabinet, which
leaves them free to maneuver
against Ikeda and to avoid ac-
ceptance of responsibility for
any mistakes his government may
make.
In a press conference on
9 December, Ikeda rejected the
contention of opposition Social-
ists that new US economic pro-
grams for improving the inter-
national position of the dollar
SECRET
PART II NnTFC ANn onumpmrpC Do- 5 of 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
would necessitate immediate re-
sumption of trade with Communist
China and said that, if there
were need to "refresh" Japan's
foreign policy, he preferred to
"place as much emphasis on re-
lations with West European and
Afro-Asian nations as on those
with the US." On 12 December,
in his government's first policy
speech, Ikeda also promised to
take the "necessary counter-
measures" to US dollar-protec-
tion measures but saw no neces-
sity to alter his party's eco-
nomic policies or pro-Western
orientation.
This apparent confidence
in the political correctness
of LDP policies may not be too
deep, however. Post mortems
on the 20 November election re-
veal concern~among LDP leaders
over the long-range implications
of the continued increase of the
lestist popular vote and over 25X1
the apparent effectiveness of
the Socialist campaign for neu-
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 6 of 8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
CASTRO'S IMPACT IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
The influence of Fidel
Castro in Latin American coun-
tries other than his own tends
to divide into two contrasting
categories. The governing cir-
cles and most of the press in
these countries have been grow-
ingly disturbed by his foreign
policy attitudes and his disre-
petrified status quo--a symbol
in some respects made more at-
tractive by the same character-
istics that disturb more sophis-
ticated observers. His popular
image bears some similarity to
that within Brazil of President
Getulio Vargas, "father of the
poor," whose suicide in 1954 pro-
gard of established legal pro-
cedures, and they have largely
given up their earlier favorable
view of him.
Among the underprivileged
masses and the students, how-
ever, he has become a symbol of
action against the seemingly
voked a surge of anti-
US emotionalism there.
Castro as Political
Leader
For politically
sophisticated elements
throughout Latin Amer-
ica, the view of Fidel
Castro as an idealist
who ousted a tyrant
has been replaced by
one of a crude and
foolish person who
disregards his Latin
heritage to derive
strength from the USSR.
Political leaders in
the executive branches
have been increasingly
willing to make public
criticisms of the Castro
regime, although most
leftist party leaders
--frequently in the
legislatures--have con-
tinued to endorse
Fidel.
Many Latin Amer-
ican leaders, even
some of moderate left-
ist orientation, were
alienated by Cuba's
wholesale, public ex-
ecutions, by the disregard of
Cuban official visitors for for-
malities such as visas and gun
permits, by Cuba's use of Soviet
missile rattling, and by its by-
passing of the Organization of
American States. Closer iden-
tification between Cuban and
other subversive activity was
SECRET
PART II-'Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4 e 1 of 9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
also a major factor in Cuba's
alienation of Latin American
political leaders and was in-
fluential in the adoption -of an
anti-Castro editorial position
by the majority of the area's
significant press.
Castro as Political Symbol
For the underprivileged
and for the students, Castro
has become a symbol of rapid
social and economic reform.
Many remember that 28 years
elapsed between the beginning
of the Mexican revolution in
1910 and the expropriation in
1938 of the foreign oil com-
panies, while Castro's exten-
sive expropriations have taken
less than two years. Castro's
image as a savior of the Cuban
masses and as an apostle of so-
cial and economic reform is not
tarnished among the poor by his
disregard for due process of
law, because they have commonly
regarded the law as an instru-
ment used by the rulers of a
country to maintain and extend
their'prerogatives.
The appeal is strongest in
each country among those who
feel that only a revolution
against all who have wealth and
power holds any real promise
for them, although other ele-
ments are also attracted. The
appeal to less vocal Latin
Americans is perhaps reflected
in the three most recent pres-
idential, elections in the area--
in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil
--where the victors are appar-
ently more sympathetic to Fidel
Castro than their predecessors.
Cuba and weaker in the more dis-
tant countries--among non-Com-
munists as well as among Commu-
nists,
Revolutionary Traditions
In Mexico and Bolivia, which
have had sweeping social revolu-
tions of their own, many tend to
respond to Castro in terms of
their own national experience.
In Mexico particularly, many na-
tionalistic and left-wing ele-
ments--high and low, educated
and illiterate--see the Cuban
revolution as the most recent
application of the ideals and
principles of the Mexican rev-
olution of 1910. They support
it and minimize its shortcom-
ings for this reason. Support
of Castro and attacks on US
treatment of him by former Pres-
ident Cardenas--who presided
over the expropriation of for-
eign oil companies in Mexico in
1938--are influential in Mexico.
Castro also symbolizes in-
tractable opposition to the
United States. Many feel that
Latin Americans for too long
have accommodated themselves
to the power status of the
United States.. Castro there-
fore is welcomed by those of
long-standing anti-US persua-
sion, and his appeal is gen-
erally stronger in countries
close to the United States and
The Lopez government's im-
plementation of agr .ri,qanrrOfQ'rw$,
nationalization of the electri-
cal industry, and other na.t ion-
alistic programs had their
origins in Mexico's 1910 rev-
olution,and the stepped-up im-
plementation of these programs
may satisfy some of Mexico's
leftist-nationalistic pride and
aspirations. The government may
also, however, be forced to
SECRET
PART lIT DATTVOJ ATTn DTi.RCURPTTV1 gone 2 :ff 9
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
quicken its schedule somewhat
to keep ahead of Cardenas and
of internal pressures height-
ened by the Cuban revolution.
Castro influence in Bolivia
--where the Cuban regime is
emotionally identified with
Bolivia's 1952 revolution--fo-
cuses on the strong push which
has been increasingly evident
over the past three months for
Soviet economic aid. Some .Boliv-
ians, have come to believe that
Soviet aid may provide a gen-
uine alternative for the US aid
on which the country has been
heavily dependent. Bolivia's
net foreign exchange earnings
.came to only about $43,000,000
in 1959, and neither the low-
grade tin mines nor the small
petroleum fields promise any
dramatic production increases
which would permit economic
progress without foreign aid.
Castro's Expropriations
Castro's expropriation of
American property has not in
itself alienated the sympathy
of most Latin Americans. In
Uruguay, President-designate
Haedo recently said
publicly that the ac-
tion is justified.
Two governments have
even suggested that
it was model behav-
ior. Ecuadorean
President Velasco
recently stated to
some of his job-seek-
ing political follow-
ers, "Castro governs
because he had cap-
ital.. .and has ex-
propriated it.... I
admire Castro but...
our country hasn't
attracted capital.
With tumult we won't
gain anything." The
statement suggested
to American officials
in Quito a new slant
on Velasco's ostensi-
bly "welcome" policy
for foreign invest-
ment.
Bolivian President Paz told
the American ambassador on 3 No-
vember that when people talk to
him openly of the possibility of
a "Castro-type" government he
points out to them that Bolivia
is not Cuba, that whereas Amer-
ican property in Cuba amounted
to over a billion dollars, there
is no more than $6,000,000 worth
in Bolivia. Financing of Boliv-
ia's revolutionary reforms has
been perhaps the major preoccu-
pation of its leaders since they
seized power in 1952.
Revolutionary Activity
Pro-Castro propaganda and
subversion contributed to the
unrest that led to revolutionary
outbreaks in five countries in
the past two months, although
direct Cuban involvement is dif-
ficult to prove. Pro-Castro
forces were the chief instiga-
tors of violence only in Ven-
ezuela. In other countries,
pro-Cuban elements have been
involved in activities which
have posed a somewhat longer
term threat to governmental
stability.
In Peru, for instance, in
mid-October 600 Indians with
El Salvador: The six-man civilian-military junta that replaced
Salvadoran President Lemus on 26 October in a bloodless
coup sought immediately to secure the backing of the pro-
Castro and pro-Communist elements whose demonstrations last
August and September critically weakened the Lemus adminis-
tration.
Nicaragua: Pro-Castro elements cooperated with other opposi-
t groups, including conservatives, in the unsuccessful
rebel effort of 11-12 November. Cuban involvement in some
of the numerous previous rebel incursions into Nicaragua
has been more direct. Weapons were supplied by Cuba to the
rebel force that was preparing to invade Nicaragua from
Costa Rica in June 1959 but which was routed by Costa Rican
forces.
Guatemala: The Cuban example apparently has almost no appeal
except among Communist and pro-Communist groups. These
groups were surprised by the army revolt of 13 November,
although they subsequently sought to capitalize on the up-
rising.
Venezuela: A major faction of the pro-Castro Democratic Re-
p= ican Union party, which withdrew from the governing
coalition in mid-November, has been associated with
Communist-leftist groups in promoting the extensive rioting
of 19-28 October and 25 November - 2 December against the
moderately leftist regime of President Betancourt.
Argentina: Pro-Castro propaganda has been used for virulent
acks on the government by the Communists and the out-
lawed Peronistas who carried out the short-lived rebel
attacks in two provinces on 30 November. While the Peron-
istas are reported divided on the Cuban question, a number
of important Peronista leaders are living in Havana and
left-wing Peronistas are cooperating with Trotskyite Com-
munists and left-wing Socialists in pro-Cuban activity.
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of .9
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
...SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
116,000 head of cattle--appar-
ently inspired by a call from
the Leninist Committee of Cerro
de Pasco for a Cuban-type up-
rising--invaded land in the high
Andes owned by one of the larg-
est US investors in Peru. At a
French-owned mine a principal
labor agitator has let his
beard grow and the workers have
somewhat deified him.
The labor agi-
tator is being called "Fidel
by his followers and asserts he
will become a second Castro.
These incidents illustrate the
pressures contributing to a fu-
ture revolution in Peru, where
traditional social structures
have probably changed less than
in any other Latin American
country.
Communist Exploitation
Castro's appeal to the
masses and his intractable
opposition to the United States
have made him a political sym-
bol of particular usefulness
to Latin American Communists
in other countries, and they
have played a key role in
rallying diverse elements to
the Castro banner. They have
supplied propaganda media,
helped organize and support
pro-Castro groups, and have
contributed to the staging of
pro-Castro rallies by leftist
political leaders and intel-
lectuals.
In Chile and Brazil, Com-
munist-linked groups have ap-
parently been led by the Cuban
example to adopt more revolu-
tionary positions. During vio-
lent Chilean demonstrations in
Santiago in early November,
left-wing Socialist leader Clo-
tario Blest called for eventual
revolution, saying, "Santiago
will be the Sierra Maestra of
Chile." Brazilian Communist
peasant leader. Francisco
Juliao is organizing the des-
titute peasants of Brazil's
northeast plantation area with
appeals such as: "The example
of Cuba is here. We Want a
pacific solution for your prob-
lems but if we cannot Dave it,
we will come here to ash, you to
seize weapons and make''arev-
olution,"
The Communist association
has, however, been responsible
for losses as well as gains for
Castro's influence in other
countries. In Costa Rica, Peru,
and Venezuela, for example,mass-
supported revolutionary political
parties have developed an anti-
Communism among their member-
ship through ten and fifteen
years' struggle with local Com-
munists in the labor movement.
Members of these parties were
among the most enthusiastic of
Castro's supporters immediately
after his overthrow of the
Batista dictatorship, but the
Cuban Government's subsequent
rapid identification with the
aims and methods of the Soviet
bloc and international Commu-
nism has alienated them. Only
a minority defector wing of
each party has retained pro
Castro sympathy.
Other Exploitation of Castro
In several countries po-
litical leaders who are not
sympathetic to the Castro re-
gime are nevertheless support-
ing pro-Castro elements because
some part of the Cuban program
is attractive.
In Peru, the reactionary
anti-US wing of the oligarchy,
which has for many years pro-
vided covert support to Peru's
relatively ineffectual Commu-
nist party in order to under-
cut the anti-Communist Apra
party's social reform program,
has welcomed the formation of
Rebel Apra, a pro-Castro group
led by expelled members of the
Apra party. The readtionary-
leftist alliance has cooperated
in prolonged attacks on American
oil companies, forced the resig-
nation of a well liked and ef-
fective key cabinet member, and
cut into popular support for
both Apra and the government's
own conservative party.
In Colombia, Liberal Al-
fonso Lopez, son of a pro-labor
president of the 19308; took a
strong pro-Castro stand in his
effort of recent years to form
SECRET
PART III PA'.170E'RNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 9
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
his political movement with a
program of social reform. Lopez
has become disillusioned with
the Castro regime, but pro-Castro
sentiment is still strong among
his followers. This group is
the only significant protest
movement--other than the Commu-
nist party--in Colombia.
In Brazil, President-elect
Janio Quadros made extensive
use of the Cuban situation dur-
ing his election campaign. In
an attempt to refute Communist
allegations that he is a "Wall
Street lackey," Quadros visited
Castro in March of this year.
Shortly before the Inter-Amer-
ican Foreign Ministers' meeting
on Cuba in August, Quadros an-
nounced,"I am with those who
are courageous enough to say
that Fidel Castro deserves our
confidence and our,friendship.
Pro-Castro sentiment also
enters into Latin American re-
lations with the United States.
Both Ecuador and the Dominican
Republic have threatened to have
closer relations with Castro or
to emulate his regime as a tac-
tic in recent negotiations. Ecua-
dorean President Velasco seeks
to upset a treaty commitment on
the Ecuadorean-Peruvian boundary
and is pushing for US support with'
suggestions that Otherwise pro-
Castro forces would become power-
ful within Ecuador, and Ecuadorean-
Cuban diplomacy will be coordi-
nated. Dominican dictator Tru-
jillo insists that a pro-Castro
regime will be the only alter-
native to his own rule. Other
countries such as Venezuela
have spoken of the specter of
Castro influence in an effort
to gain US financial aid.
THE USSR AND THE ALGERIAN REBELLION
Moscow's attitude toward
the Algerian rebellion has been
closely related to the Soviet
policy line toward Paris, be-
cause of France's key position
in NATO and Moscow's apparent
belief that some of the historic
factors which worked to bring
about Franco-Russian cooperation
in the past might again be used
to reach a measure of agreement
at the expense of Germany and
France's Western allies. In
late 1959, following a long
period of fence-straddling on
Algeria, Khrushchev, speaking
to the Supreme- Soviet on 31 Oc-
tober, cautiously endorsed De
Gaulle's proposals for settling
the rebellion.
The Soviet premier took
this step with full knowledge
that it would not be well re-
ceived by the Afro-Asian, es
pecially Arab, countries which
the USSR has assiduously culti-
vated.
Soviet Campaign for Summit
Moscow's attitude toward
the Algerian question at that
time was almost completely sub-
ordinated to preparations for
a summit meeting.
Not only was De Gaulle's
attendance at a top-level ses-
sion of concern from Moscow's
point of view, but Khrushchev
and his advisers also hoped that
De Gaulle's determination to
restore France's "grandeur"
might bring about an understand-
ing on some issues involving
SECRET
PART III DAVrvmr01TC A n DVVQDWrT'Tt't'Q T%_ _e 5 of 9
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1960
Berlin and the status
of Germany, and pos-
sibly induce the French
to take the lead among
the Western powers in
accepting the satel-
lite regimes as per-
manent features in East-
ern Europe. Khrushchev
tried to woo the
French President by
agreeing to defer a
summit meeting until
after he had paid a
visit to France and
by hinting to him dur-
ing the visit that the
USSR was willing to
make further conces-
sions on disarmament
and Berlin.
De Gaulle's re-
fusal to respond--and
particularly the French
rejection of Soviet
suggestions for even
ICELAND'-
DEN
Q c
IREL D UN TED
t,{{~ BELGIUM
t'Q r15 . U\X
SECRET
Rabat
MOROCCO
.,.,. - Electrified barrier
31552
minor concessions in the final
communique--appears to have
been a turning point for Khru-
shchev.
The failure to get down to
serious talks at Paris in mid-
May and De Gaulle's strong sup-
port of President Eisenhower
during the U-2 episode evapo-
rated any remaining hopes So-
viet policy-makers may have had
of weaning De Gaulle away from
the US and UK and thus publicly
freed Khrushchev's hands on the
Algerian issue.
Algerians Seek Soviet Support
Moscow's policy switch was
also prompted by a change in
the attitude of the Provisional
Government of Algeria (PGAR) to-
ward Communist bloc countries
.w.
IT0W
SRAEL
Cairo.
UAR
(EGYPTI
SAUDI
ARABIA
in the period immediately after
the abortive summit meeting.
The failure of the talks between
the French Government and the
rebels at Melun in June, after
repeated efforts to overcome
mutually contradictory conditions
for holding negotiations, led the
rebel regime to conclude that un-
less further pressure could be
brought to bear, bilateral nego-
tiations with De Gaulle offered
practically no prospect of set-
tling the rebellion except on
French terms.
In an interview in October,
PGAR Premier Ferhat Abbas summed
up the situation, "We no longer
believe in negotiations with the
French Government. All our ef-
forts to achieve good will have
failed,... It was Melun which
forced us (to go to the United
Nations), for we have noted that
there is an unbridgeable divide
between France and ourselves."
The PGAR then decided that
its best course lay in "inter-
nationalizing" the rebellion by
seeking direct intervention by
the United Nations and by openly
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4 6 of" 9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
soliciting bloc support. Soviet
leaders apparently calculated
that, pending a new summit
drive which probably would not
gather much momentum until sev-
eral months after the new US
administration had taken office,
they could score significant
gains by abandoning their cau-
tious attitude toward the PGAR.
At the same time, they pre-
sumably were well aware that in
extending recognition and prom-
ises of support to the PGAR,
they would make compromise be-
tween Paris and the rebels--al-
ready a difficult task--even
more difficult, since these
moves would tend to strengthen
the PGAR's determination to hold
out for recognition by France
as the sole spokesman for all
Moslem Algerians and for safe-
guarding of future elections in
Algeria from manipulation by
the French Army.
Signs of a Soviet shift
soon began to appear. On 10
July a Pravda "Observer" arti-
cle implied--albeit in moderate
language--that De Gaulle was
guilty of hypocrisy, since he
was talking much but doing lit-
tle to settle the rebellion,
This was followed in early Au-
gust by a public appeal from
Khrushchev asking De Gaulle to
spare a condemned rebel and by
increasingly tough Soviet propa-
ganda treatment of the French
President's policy on Algeria.
Moscow's shift was capped by
Khrushchev's public declaration
of 7 October--several days after
he talked at his request with
members of the Algerian UN
"delegation" in New York--that
the USSR had extended de facto
recognition to the PGAR.
Soviet policy-makers were
reasonably sure that this step
would not lead to an open rup-
ture with France.
Khrushchev also tried to
soften the impact by pointing
out publicly that the French
had actually taken the lead in
giving de facto recognition
to the PGAR by negotiating with
the Algerians at Melun. In
late November he observed to
Dejean that the USSR had in the
past shown great restraint on
the Algerian question and, while
bitterly disappointed over De
Gaulle's support of the US atti-
tude at the abortive summit
meeting, still desired to have
good relations.
Other Policy Factors
In taking advantage of the
hiatus between summit campaigns
to move on Algeria, Khrushchev
was able to provide a dramatic
backdrop to his strong anticolo-
nial line at the UN General As-
sembly. The move presumably also
helped Moscow in its efforts to
undercut Chinese Communist criti-
cisms that the USSR had failed
to give adequate support to the
"national liberation movement."
Communist China had immediately
recognized the PGAR following its
establishment in September 1958.
In late 1959 when Khrushchev
endorsed De Gaulle's proposals
on Algeria, Peiping remained
silent in line with its efforts
to discourage negotiations be-
tween the PGAR and Paris.
Moscow's changed stance has
no doubt also been welcomed by
leaders of the French Communist
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003000050001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
party (PCF), since it enables
them to appeal for unity of
action to the non-Communist
French left, which favors a
peaceful. settlement of the re-
bellion. While reportedly
forewarned, French Communists
seemed to have been caught off
guard in late 1959 when Khru-
shchev came out with his cau-
tious endorsement of De Gaulle's
proposals, and several days
later they apparently executed
a belated and unbecoming about-
face.
Over the past summer the
PCF and its various front groups
have moved toward a pro-Alge-
rian position; in August the PCF
politburo--foreshadowing Mos-
cow's own extension of de facto
recognition to the PGAR--pub-
licly declared that the PGAR
is the valid representative of
"all the Algerians against whom
France is fighting."
In September the PCF ap-
pealed to French youth, peace,
and other groups to join in mass
protests against the government's
Algerian policy and to call for
Algerian independence. French
Communist leaders feel that the
growing opposition inside France
to continuation of military
operations will give them an is-
sue to rally opposition elements,
but they have refrained from
moves which would give the gov-,
ernment a pretext for cracking
down on the PCF.
Soviet Backing of Rebel Regime
,The USSR's political sup-
port of the Algerians is taking
the form of pro-Algerian propa-
ganda and presumably will in-
clude strong diplomatic support
at the United Nations in sup-
port of the Algerian proposal
for a UN-supervised referendum.
Moscow will, however, probably
stop short of actions which
would seriously risk the pros-
pect of French retaliation--
such as formal recognition of
the PGAR and an exchange of
diplomatic missions. Any So-
viet military aid to the rebels
will undoubtedly also be limited
by the USSR's political objec-
tives.
A likely form of military
aid would be for the USSR, either
directly or through one of the
East European countries, to con-
sign relatively small amounts of
light arms and ammunition to co-
operating Arab governments for
them to arrange final delivery
to the rebel formations inside
Algeria. The operational arrange-
ments for the movement of this
equipment from the bloc to such
Arab intermediaries as the UAR,
Libya, Morocco, or Tunisia would
probably be kept confidential
in order to avoid interception
by the French.
As an alternative, "cover"
for shipment to North Africa
might be provided by military
shipments under formal agree-
ments with the cooperating Arab
states such as the Soviet-UAR
arms deals or the recently an-
nounced Soviet-Moroccan arms
agreement.
The precise types and
quantities of bloc weapons to
be supplied would also be af-
fected by such obstacles as the
electrified barriers which
have all but stopped the flow
of the arms.into Algeria from
Tunisia and Morocco, and by lim-
itations imposed by the rebels"
need to transport and service
much equipment in the face of
French military pressures.
While Rabat and Tunis can
be expected to cooperate in
transshipment of bloc arms to
Algeria, they would probably re-
fuse to allow regular Algerian
military formations equipped with
bloc aircraft or armor to be
built up on their territories.
Such units would require
SECRET
PART I I ? r...,_,,.,
Approved For Release 200 --7^/10/23 :-CA ---RDP -_~7_9_-00____927A003000050001-4 'e 8 of 9
 SECRET
extensive logistical support
from the bloc, including consid-
erable numbers of bloc technical
personnel, and would provide an
open invitation to the French
forces in Algeria to retaliate
militarily.
The USSR might also make
available "technical personnel"
for the purpose of servicing
rebel military equipment. In-
asmuch as the presence of So-
viet personnel in Algeria--
short of large numbers of thinly
disguised "volunteers" in reg-
ular military units--could not
turn the military tide against
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
llfto~ %W
SECRET
France, such assistance would
probably involve relatively
small numbers of military tech-
nicians, rather than personnel
for combat.
Some publicity for Soviet
military help to the Algerians
would be necessary to enable the
USSR to gain credit among the
African and Asian countries.
Moscow could be expected to be
circumspect, however, about
taking responsibility for mili-
tary aid through admissions by
Soviet officials or by the of-
ficial Soviet press and radio.
PART III PATTRRiTS ANT] DT RSUTa OTTVES va aa 9 Of 9
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4
t
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03000050001-4