Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 2, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 16, 1961
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A003100020001-7.pdf2.74 MB
Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-009271 03100020001-7 CONFIDENTIAL 5; D r: T- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. 1180 OCI NO. 0267/61 16 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE eftwclmj~NUAL 25X1 bOCUMENTNO. . 9 xi NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 17 L DECLASSIFIED 25X1 State Department review completed CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIE'A' DATE: /4:2& Approved For Release 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A003rt900N0Q2-7 DATE: REVIEWER:- Approved Fo'r-Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927 003100020001-7 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For''Release 2005/0312J: &A-RDP79-00927A-603100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Laotian officials appear receptive to the US pro- posal for a neutral nations commission--made up of Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya. General Phoumi has announced his readiness to visit Phnom Penh in what is likely to be a fruitless effort to persuade Souvanna Phouma to return to Vientiane. There has been little change over the week in the military situation. In recent private talks with Western officials, Soviet Foreign Ministry representa- tives have indicated that Moscow's reply to the British proposal of 21 January regarding reactivation of the International Control Commission (ICC) will probably point out that any such commission must be preceded by an international conference to restore peace in Laos. Peiping has taken this position publicly. The bloc airlift into Laos continued throughout the week. 25X1 CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 Soviet technicians are en route to Havana to design the first two industrial projects to be built under the Soviet credit to Cuba, and steps are being taken to implement other bloc agreements. Castro's assertion in a 12 February speech that Cuba has the "right to en- courage revolution in Latin America" probably reflects his intention to increase propaganda and clandestine activities in the area. Nicaragua and Honduras are still in disagreement over how to proceed in implement- ing the recent arbitral award of a long-disputed area to Honduras, and public feeling on the issue is high in both countries. The interim civil-military govern- ment in El Salvador is slowly gaining popular accept- ance at home, and six Latin American countries have now recognized it. I I 25X1 Page 8 The uncompromising position set forth in the Soviet statement of 14 February seems to preclude any intention to negotiate a settlement of the Congo problem and sug- gests that Moscow hopes Lumumba's death will lead to the collapse of the present UN operation through the with- drawal of the remaining Afro-Asian contingents. The omis- sion from the statement. of a specific reference to the United States apparently is intended as a gesture of restraint. In the Congo, there have been only isolated SECRET THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100020001-7 Approved Forin4ease 200'& ETA-RDP79-00927A003100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 PART I (continued) incidents of African actions to avenge Lumumba's death. NOTES AND COMMENTS 25X1 AFTERMATH OF KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL TOUR . . . . . . . Page 1 Khrushchev has returned to Moscow from an 18-day tour of key agricultural areas, where he advanced detailed proposals for increasing Soviet agricultural production and made it clear that local leaders will be held directly responsible for carrying them out. Several personnel changes have already taken place; more changes will prob- ably occur as subordinates are made scapegoats for the failures of their chiefs. 25X1 ALBANIAN PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2 Albanian party leader Hoxha's opening address to the fourth party congress on 13 February stressed views at variance with those of the USSR. He claimed that the United States is preparing to unleash another world war, and blamed the United States, Greece, and Yugoslavia for a recent coup attempt which, in fact, probably was planned by pro-Soviet elements in the Albanian party. He also called for Chinese Communist participation in future summit talks, a proposal not mentioned by the USSR since last May. Hoxha may be planning an anti-Western show trial of those involved in the coup attempt--a move that Moscow would not'welcome at this time. 25X1 HUNGARY AFTER THE THREE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 Hungary has achieved or surpassed most of the goals of its Three-Year Plan (1958-60) and has overcome most of the effects on the distribution of the national income following the 1956 revolt, when investment needs were sac- rificed to make more consumer goods available. Neverthe- less, the continuing unfavorable balance of trade leaves Hungary in a difficult position this year, when payments on the bulk of foreign debts incurred after the revolt begin to fall due. Moreover, the rapid pace of agricul- tural socialization has created new problems for-the economy. 25X1 EAST GERMANY TRIES TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY TO WESTERN SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 Although a new interzonal trade agreement was signed in December, East Germany still is attempting to decrease SECRET ii Approved For Release 23NgCIRNRPP7u=v 0927A003100020001-7 Approved For R lease 2005/63/29891-RDP79-00927003100020001-7 1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 PART II (continued) its dependence on imports from the West while maintain- ing the total volume of trade at past levels. It will try to increase production of items now imported from the West, to develop substitutes, and to acquire within the bloc commodities that cannot be produced in East Germany. A complete reorientation of trade is unlikely without considerable assistance from the USSR, which so far has shown no willingness to provide such aid. 25X1 RECENT EAST GERMAN TACTICS ON BERLIN . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 The East Germans appear to be testing the extent to which they can avoid implementing the concessions they offered in December without impelling the West Germans to take countermeasures. The East Germans had promised to relax controls on West Germans traveling to East Ber- lin and to make technical concessions to facilitate com- mercial traffic between West Berlin and West Germany; this induced Bonn to reactivate the interzonal trade agreement on 29 December. While recent East German steps appear to be a tactical retreat, in response to an ultimatum by the West Germans, the Communist regime has not with- drawn its claim to the right to control the movement of West Germans into East Berlin--i.e., to sovereignty over East Berlin. Although Moscow presumably permits these East German probing actions, it has not openly involved itself and apparently does not wish to create a crisis over Berlin at this time. BURMESE ARMY SHAKE-UP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 The ouster by General Ne Win of 11 senior officers from their commands in Burma threatens at least temporarily to weaken the army's ability to maintain internal order and stability. These officers, removed because of their opposition to U Nu's government and its policies, SECRET iii Approved For Release ZM/0 QIL 00927A003100020001-7 25X1 25X1 A"pprov For lklease 200 8 "ARDP79-00927AOb3100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 PART II (continued) include several of the army's most experienced field commanders and capable administrators. Moreover, they were favorably disposed toward the West, and their removal may decrease Burma's receptivity to US mate- el and training assistance. Dissatisfaction with the policies of the government and the army command 25X1 persists within the army. LONDON SEEKING TO CONFEDERATE SINGAPORE AND BORNEO WITH MALAYA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... Page 10 London is promoting a confederation of Malaya, Singa- pore, and three British territories in Borneo--Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. Malaya is opposing the inclu- sion of Singapore because of its overwhelming Chinese majority and leftist orientation. The British may hope to win over Malaya by arguing that the presence of the 25X1 Borneo territories in the confederation would partially offset the harmful influence of Singapore. RHODE S IA -NYASALAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland may break up. over the issue of African representation in the government of Northern Rhodesia. African nationalists have threatened to institute widespread disorders if Britain does not allow them majority representation in the local legislature, while white leaders in Southern Rhodesia talk of secesssion if Britain gives in. Southern Rhodesian officials recently conceded that African political influence in their ter- ritory should be increased, but in return obtained from ' s white- Britain broadened powers for Southern Rhodesia settler government. SECRET iv Approved For Release _TMIJf3/ GI1 - 00927A003100020001-7 25X1 25X1 SECRET Approved For R Tease 2005/03/29: CIA-RDP79-00927A6b3100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 UNREST IN ANGOLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 The outlook in the Portuguese possession of Angola, scene of several outbreaks in the last two weeks, appears to be for increasing violence as anti-Portuguese and anti- white extremists, some of them Communist influenced, ac- nuire greater influence over the Angolan native popula- 25X1 FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 25X1 Gaulle hopes that his pending meeting with Tunis an President Bourguiba will help make the PAG easier to deal with. The rebels demand a face-to-face meeting with De Gaulle, and Bourguiba is likely to move cau- tiously so as not to jeopardize his moderating influence on them. PROSPECTS FOR ICELAND . Iceland's Conservative - Social Democratic coalition government has made progress during the past year in its program to overcome inflation and reduce the country's trade dependence on the Soviet bloc. The success of the program, however, is threatened by the Communist- dominated central trade union federation, which is seeking to foment labor unrest and bring about the government's downfall. In the protracted fishing limits dis ute with Britain, negotiations remain stalled. . Page 16 25X1 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA . . . . . . Page 1 Recognition by Cuba last year gave Communist China its first diplomatic ties with a country in the western hemisphere. Sharing Moscow's belief that the Cuban example offers an opportunity for further gains in Latin America, Peiping is willing to accept the cost of siz- able economic assistance to Havana. China's strategy for the area as a whole is to expand trade, step up ex- changes of cultural and other nonofficial delegations, and increase its influence in local Communist parties. SECRET V Approved For Release BMW d -IMl -00927A003100020001-7 25X1 Approved For Fnelease 200 QR A-RDP79-OA927A0631.OA42000.1-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 PART III (continued) Peiping's expanding role in Latin America, however, has undoubtedly prompted second thoughts in Moscow, already in disagreement with the Chinese over correct tactics to be used in underdeveloped areas. SECRET vi THE WEEK IN BRIEF Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AN3100020001-7 SECRET 16 February 1961 King Savang is in Vientiane discussing with other Laotian leaders ways of broadening the Boun Oum government's popular appeal and to gain greater in- ternational support. The re- sults of these consultations will probably be ratified at a special cabinet meeting expected to be held shortly and to be presided over by the King. principal weakness, however, has been the preponderance of members from southern Laos. Wider repre- sentation would improve its com- petitive position with the Com- munist-supported shadow govern- ment in Xieng Khouang, which claims, apparently with Souvanna 's approval, to be acting in his be- half as the "lawful government." Among the moves reportedly under consideration are a reaf- firmation of Laos' neutrality and an announcement of readiness to negotiate with "enemies and rivals--even Souvanna Phouma." The government is apparently prepared to offer Souvanna an important position, possibly as foreign minister or as head of the King's Council. According to present plans, General Phoumi himself will go to Phnom Penh to convey the offer to Souvanna. Chances are probably less than even that 3ouvanna will join the Boun Oum government. Aside from his personal animos- ity toward Phounii, he apparent- ly remains persuaded that pros- pects are good for his fairly early return to Laos on his own terms as head of a coalition government of "national reconcil- iation." The consultations in Vien- tiane may result, however, in at least some broadening of the government. The Boun Oum govern- ment is generally undistinguished, and a few of its members have reputations for corruption. Its Laotian officials appear receptive to the U.3 proposal for the establishment of a neutral- nations commission made up of Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya. Little significant change in the military situation was reported during the past week. Government forces have moved only a few miles from the junc- tion of Routes 7 and 13 toward the Plaine des Jarres. The Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are pur- suing systematic tactics of de- lay which have all but stalled the government advance. Aerial observation near the head of the government column has disclosed three large craters on Route 7. The enemy has also felled large trees, engineered landslides in steep defiles, and made exten- sive use of land mines. Most of the casualties evacuated to Vien- tiane were wounded by mortar and artillery fragments and, more recently, by land mines. I 25X1 the Kong Le - Pathet 25X1 Lao forces have introduced light armored vehicles in the Plaines des Jarres area. Five small tracked vehicles similar to the SECRET PART I Approved For ReAAe WATE CI)iP b0927A0031000200fflqL$e 1 of 12 Approved For Retease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AV03100020001-7 SECRET 16 February 1961 25X1 Bren gun carrier allegedly ar- rived in the Plaines des Jarres on 11 February, and three light armored personnel carriers were also noted then. Aerial recon- naissance also reported the movement of light armored vehi- cles in the Plaines des Jarres, where the terrain favors the use of armor. SECRET %inuong aoui Phouf Khoun loin es Nang Ban Ta '??.., ha Thom Vie Viang . i Pak Sane PART I Approved For Re"41O69 : M-00927A003100020$a'* 2 of 12 Approved For Release 200!'EI'A-RDP79-00927Ae63100020001-7 16 February 1961 Aerial reconnaissance dur- ing the past week has also re- vealed that the pro-Communist forces have prepared defense positions on both the western and southern approaches to the Plaines des Jarres. Newly con- structed gun emplacements have also appeared, supplementing field fortifications constructed by the French in the Plaines des Jarres during the Indochina war. Little action has been re- ported in the Ban Ta Viang - Tha Thom area of southern Xieng Khouang Province; however, there are indications that the anti- government forces may be rein- forcing their blocking position at Ban Ta Viang. Sporadic harass- ment behind enemy lines in Xieng Khouang by progovernment Meo partisans continues to be reported. will be organized into an army attalion stationed at the village of Namtha; the remainder will be grouped into "village defense" units under army con- trol. They will be used in nrop- ping-up operations west of Muong Sai to support government forces in that town and to cut off Pathet Lao reinforcements from Phong Saly Province who might try to get south of that blocking position. Soviet Deputy Foreign Min- ister Sobolev informed the French ambassador in Moscow on 6 February that the USSR's re- ply to the British proposal of 21 January regarding reactivation of the International Control Com- mission (ICC) would point out that any such commission now would have to have both a polit- ical and military role; its tasks therefore could only be defined by a new international confer- ence. He said this was also the position of China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia. Since the US administration took office, Moscow has not of- ficially commented in its propa- ganda on recent proposals to reach an international solution in Laos. The line the bloc will probably take is reflected in Chinese pronouncements. Chou En- lai, in a letter sent to Cambo- dia's Prince Sihanouk on.11 Feb- ruary and broadcast by Peiping on 15 February, said China is against reactivating the ICC under "present conditions in Laos." Before the ICC could return, Chou said, an interna- tional conference must re-define its duties. During the past week, other bloc spokesmen have maintained their opposition to a reactivation of the ICC without first con- vening an international meet- ing. Polish officials in Warsaw and Moscow, in several SECRET PART I Approved For Release 2ttg/03h4T CIA-FW%%927AO03100020001-T~e 3 of 12 Approved For Rase 2005/O5149-RA?AlRDP79-00927AO3100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 conversations with Western ambassadors, have clearly stated this position, and a hi hranking ioviet di - lomat would not agree to the Brit- ish proposal. Soviet spokesmen in Moscow seem anxious to appear respon- sive to recent US statements that developments in Laos have a direct bearing on Soviet- American relations. Two senior Soviet journalists told a US Embassy official in Moscow that the USSR did not want an inter- national crisis at this time over Laos. They said that as far as Moscow is concerned the Laotian crisis could easily be solved by compromise, but added that Peiping had quite a dif- ferent attitude which -would make a general agreement diffi- cult. In view of the bloc's ap- parent intention to prolong diplomatic exchanges as long as possible, it is likely that Soviet leaders find it conven- ient to attribute this inac- tion to Chinese intransigence in talks with non-Communist dip- lomats. In the past Soviet spokesmen have alluded to Sino- Soviet differences over Laos in discussions with Western repre- sentatives, apparently hoping to exert pressure on the US ;to limit its military commitment in Laos. Bloc airlift operations between North Vietnam and Laos continued at normal levels throgghout the week. Some of the Soviet LI-2s continue shut- tle flights between Hanoi and Haiphong.;. Supplies are appar- ently arriving by sea at Hai phong. er. North Vietnamese authori- ties provided a list of ship arrivals and cargoes which in- dicated that some ships ar- rived empty and none contained military cargo, but the Indian ICC team chairman stated that the sound of trucks leaving the docks during this period had kept him awake every night. F__ I A group of six Soviet technicians left Moscow for Havana on 9 February to begin design work on the first two industrial projects the USSR will build under the $100,000,- 000 credit extended to Cuba a year ago. One of the plants will repair various types of machinery and equipment and SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 PART I Approved For Releag 2MY/ER/4TYCIA- P~-%927A00310002000?age 4 of 12 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A&03100020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUivIMARY 16 February 1961 produce spare parts for Cuba's deteriorating industrial estab- lishment. No date was announced for the start of construction. On the same day a group of 88 Cuban students sailed from Cuba aboard a Soviet ship for five years of technical studies in the USSR. Communist China, despite its own economic difficulties, is making a substantial effort to fulfill its commitments to Cuba. More than 30 Chinese- chartered merchant vessels are currently engaged in the Cuban trade. Most of these are being used to deliver the million tons of Cuban sugar Peiping promised to buy this year, but some are carrying Burmese rice and other commodities to Cuba. Fidel Castro's 12 February speech to members of Cuban tech- nical advisory councils--state-- created workers' committees re- sponsible for setting production norms in nationalized enter- prises--included vitriolic at- tacks on alleged United States aid to anti-Castro forces. Castro asserted, "As of today Cuba is going to declare that if the United States has the right to promote counterrevolu- tion in Cuba and Latin America, Cuba has the right to encour- age revolution in Latin Amer- ica." Castro's statement probably means continuance of Cuba's covert assistance to leftist and Communist dissident groups in other countries, and also a s-.ib- stantial increase in the amount and variety of its propaganda efforts throughout the hemisphere. The construction of a powerful radio transmitter in Havana Province--which Castro cited as a source of "worry" to the United States during his speech--should materially enhance the Cuban propaganda potential in this field. Overt attempts to overthrow other regimes would probably be discouraged by the failure in 1959 of several Cuban-based in- vasion attempts against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti and probably by a desire to avoid providing an excuse for open retaliation against Cuba by the Organization of American States. Castro devoted a consider- able portion of his speech to extolling the economic accomplish- ments of his government, and he contrasted the "success" of the Cuban economic system with the "failures" and "problems" of the US economy. He also said that the "most difficult" economic task remains to be met--that of industrialization. He related that government plans to tackle this problem include the designa- tion of 1962 as the "year of in- dustrial planning and develop- ment," and the announcement of a four-year industrialization plan early next year. The em- phasis which Castro gave to this subject may indicate an effort to pave the way for the eventual assumption of a new Ministry of Industry portfolio by economic SECRET PART I Approved For Rel e>2QM= /nE CI&- V0927A0031000200Bi,-e 5 of 12 Approved For Refease 2005/O3WfT-RDP79-00927AOU'3100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 tsar Che Guevara, who spoke at the same meeting. Despite Castro's assertion that Cuba has no economic prob- lems, a 7 February editorial by virulently outspoken Radio Mambi in Havana described "dis- content and a certain malaise in various segments of the pop- ulation" due to material short- ages and spare parts problems. Among the economic irritants de- scribed in the editorial were the lack of parts for repairing automobiles, appliances, and machinery, and the growth of a black market in such consumer goods as salt, soap, razor blades, pencils, toilet paper, and other articles. (roadblocks have been erected by the government on all roads leading into the city of Guantanamo. 25X1 A blackout has been imposed on news of the progress of the campaign again anti-Castro forces active in the Sierra Escambray area in central Cuba. Govern- ment spokesmen have maintained that the regime will not issue a communique until "mopping-up operations" are completed and total victory is assured. Re- ports of heavy fighting and rumors of victories by each side are continuing to circulate throughout Cuba, and several re- ports.indicate.a,growing number of casualties among-both gov- ernment and. counterrevolutionary forces. Unconfirmed reports that a large anti-Castro force has landed in northeastern Oriente Province are circulating in the area 25X( 25X1 A group of leading Arab Communists, who were among the 1,000 visitors participating in the commemoration Of the second anniversary of the Cuban revolu- tion last month, reported that Cuban Communist leaders described the alliance between the Castro regime and the Communists' Pop- ular Socialist party (PSP) as "exceedingly close." The Cubans also told the Arabs that the PSP is, with Castro's consent, in majority control of all the "or- ganizations which direct the masses," and they maintained that the Cuban revolution will play the same role in Latin America as the Russian and Com- munist Chinese revolutions did in Europe and Asia. Nicaragua-Honduras Nicaragua and Honduras still are in disagreement over implementation of the November 1960 arbitral award of a long disputed territory to Honduras. Honduran President Villeda Mor- ales is under strong domestic pressure to move his forces quickly into the area--part of which has been occupied by Nic- araguan troops for more than 50 years. Nicaraguan President Somoza, while stating his gov- ernment's intention to abide by the award, is insisting that it be implemented in an orderly fashion, that the rights of the SECRET PART I Approved For ReleQge l ' 3T/MF-CI igAY-T0927A0031000200ftWe 6 of 12 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0M100020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 few thousand persons in the area be protected, and that those desiring Nicaraguan citizenship be resettled in Nicaragua. Somoza also insists that certain portions of the border, not clearly delineated in the origi- nal 1906 award upheld by the International Court last Novem- ber, be definitively settled be- fore implementation. On 9 February, the Nicara- guan Government received a Hon- duran note declaring, in effect, that the only way the award can be implemented is for Nicara- guan authorities to withdraw from the area immediately. The Nicaraguan foreign minister in- terpreted this as an indirect termination by Honduras of dis- cussions on the issue. The for- eign minister has said, however, that if Honduras should succumb to political pressures and move troops into the area, Nicaragua would expel them. On 15 February, Nicaragua announced that it would request the Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS to settle the issue. Popular emotions on the is- sue are high in both countries and restrained only temporarily in Nicaragua by restrictions on some civil liberties. Opposi- tion groups are exploiting the issue, and neither President can ignore popular sentiment without endangering the stabil- ity of his regime. The situa- tion is further aggravated by the long-standing antagonisms between the two countries and by the numerous and continuing forays into Nicaragua by Nicara- guan guerrilla bands from Hon- duras, some of which have been assisted by Honduran officials. The new civil-military di- rectorate seems to be gaining acceptance from the Salvadoran public--including the non-Com- munist students who had gen- erally opposed the new regime. The oligarchy of wealthy land- owners and businessmen appears to be adjusting its extremely conservative outlook in response to a direct government request to support the social and eco- nomic reforms necessary to avert an eventual triumph of Commu- nism. The armed forces have is- sued a declaration of support signed by virtually all officers. The local Communist party is reported to have issued se- cret instructions to concentrate on infiltrating the army, im- proving discipline in clandes- tine activities, and organizing the "revolutionary front," and to avoid the use of violence until directives and material aid are received from "abroad." 11 1 25X1 a Communist-led 25X1 general strike would not succeed while the key Communist labor officials remain in exile. The main threat to stabil- ity for the next several months appears to be the possibility that the army-dominated direc- torate may continue to exercise control without holding elections SECRET PART I Approved For ReIQk'se125 : dIDk n00927A003100020dNgje 7 of 12 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AOOS100020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 and may fail to carry out its promises of needed social and agrarian reforms. Honduras, Argentina, Mex- ico, and Chile have recognized the new regime, bringing to six the number of Latin American countries which have done so. Venezuela, which had not rec- ognized the previous junta, has indicated that it will wait until elections are held before deciding. Moscow's massive campaign protesting Lumumba's death re- flects the Soviet leaders' con- fidence that this has provided an unprecedented opportunity to exploit their militant anti- colonialist line and underscores the USSR's support for extrem- ist, anti-Western forces through- out Asia and Africa. The Soviet Government's statement of 14 February confidently predicted that Lumumba's death "will a- waken to life fresh forces of the national liberation move- ment in the Congo and in all Africa." The USSR's intention to exploit Lumumba's death to the maximum provides further evidence that Khrushchev is not prepared to forego taking ad- vantage of such opportunities to advance Soviet influence and prestige in the Afro-Asian world in order to avoid offending the Western powers. However, the Soviet Govern- ment's statement did not mention the United States by name and instead placed responsibility for Lumumba's death on the "colonialists, and above all Belgian colonialists," Soviet propaganda has not directly implicated the US in its condemnation of "colonialists." This has been the pattern of Soviet coverage of the Congo since the US administration took office. The omission of spe- cific references to the US ap- parently is intended as a ges- ture of restraint toward Wash- ington. Expressions of shock and regret by President Kennedy and Ambassador Stevenson were reported factually without comment by TASS. Khrushchev's cordial mes- sage of 15 February in reply to President Kennedy's congratula- tions on the launching of the Soviet Venus rocket probably was intended as a sign that the USSR hopes to prevent reaction to events In tr' Porgo from ob- .i-ructing :an improvement in US-Soviet relations. 'Khrushchev welcomed the President's offer of cooperation in the explora- tion of space and other tasks, and stressed that a disarmament agreement would create favorable conditions for solving these "noble tasks." In contrast to Soviet re- straint, Peiping's statement on 14 February specifically condemned the United States along with Belgium for this "vile and cruel attack" against the "cause of national inde- pendence of the Congolese and all African peoples." The extreme demands made in the Soviet statement seem de- signed to block any Western- backed UN action to deal with the Congo crisis. It demanded: (1) Condemnation of the "actions of Belgium" as an "in- ternational crime." It called for "appropriate sanctions" against the "aggressor." SECRET 25X1 PART I Approved For Release ZUU5703129 IA=1 DP7 Q0927A0031000200OWe 8 of 12 Approved For Rdfehse 2005/ 1'UAT-RDP79-00927A00 100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 (2) Arrest and trial of Tshomb6 and Mobutu, disarmament of their forces, and removal of all Belgian troops and personnel from the Congo. (3) Termination of the UN operation in one month and the withdrawal. of "all foreign troops" from the Congo. (4) The dismissal of Ham- marskjold. Moscow served served notice that it will not maintain any relations with him and will not recognize him as an "official of the UN." (5) Assistance to the "legitimate government of the Congo led by acting Prime Min- ister Antoine Gizenga." The USSR declared that it is ready to "render all possible assist- ance and support to the Congo- lese people and its legitimate government." This uncompromising position seems to preclude any Soviet in- tention to negotiate a settle- ment of the Congo crisis. The Soviet leaders apparently hope Lumumba's death will lead to the collapse of the present UN operation through the with- drawal of the remaining Afro- Asian contingents--most immedi- ately those of Morocco, Ghana, and Indonesia. Moscow would vigorously exploit any move to introduce Western troops into the Congo as an attempt to reimpose colonial rule. The Soviet leaders, moreover, would probably believe that direct Western intervention would make it extremely difficult or im- possible for the West to marshal moderate Afro-Asian governments in support of a new approach for a Congo settlement. In addition to the attempt to discredit and terminate the UN operation, Moscow is seizing upon Lumumba's death as a pre- text for reviving charges against Hammarskjold--now described as a "miserable lackey of the colo- nialists." Moscow's violent at- tack on the secretary general reflects the frustration the Soviet leaders have felt since Lumumba was overthrown and bloc missions were expelled from the Congo last September. The Soviets selected Hammarskjold as the scapegoat for these setbacks. Moscow's demand for his dismissal does not appear to foreshadow any more drastic ac- tion such as a Soviet-led bloc withdrawal from the UN. This latest statement only makes more explicit the position Khrushchev took last fall before the Gen- eral Assembly when he warned that Hammarskjold's failure to resign would lead the USSR to draw the "necessary conclusions" and threatened to withhold Soviet cooperation with any of his decisions. Hammarskjold is unlikely to resign as long as he believes he has the support of a majority of UN members, particularly the smaller powers. Withdrawal of recognition of Hammarskjold as the secretary general by the USSR will make UN operations more difficult but not impos- sible. The USSR will have to conduct usual business with the UN Secretariat, the staff of which is predominantly loyal to Hammarskjold. The USSR vetoed SECRET PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 9 of 12 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100020001-7 Approved For Refease 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AON100020001-7 SECRET 16 February 1961 the reappointment of his prede- cessor, Trygve Lie, in Cetober 1950, linking him to the UN ac- tion in Korea. The General As- sembly later that year e-_-..tended Lie's appointment for three years. The Soviet bloc responded by of- ficially ignoring Lie as secre- tary general for the ensuing two years. This pressure final- ly forced him to resign in 1)5'. According to a high offi- cial in the UN Secretariat, Hammarskjold has already ordered the UN force to occupy airfields and other communication centers and to set up military control points in areas of Congolese military action. The UN Command reportedly has been ordered to stop all forces engaged in of- fensive action but to use force only if force is used against it. Execution of these orders will primarily affect Mobutu's operations in Equateur Province and Tshombd's offensive in northern !?'atanga. The UN com- mand is now attempting to establish a 50-mile-wide neu- tral zone on the border of Equateur and Orientale Provinces. however, the small size of the UN units, coupled with the equiv- ocal nature of the directives themselves, will render effec- tive UN control difficult. Hammarskjold's order to UN forces reflects a heightened sense of urgency as a result of 1umumba's death, Neutralist nations reportedly believe that the Security Council should pass an emergency resolution urging that all possible measures be taken to avoid civil war and calling for the cessation of Belgian and other foreign interference. Lumumba's death has aroused a general world-wide reactioii against Katanga and through as- sociation, Belgium and the Kasa- vubu government. Belgian in- stallations-in several capitals, including Moscow, Belgrade, Warsaw, Cairo, Khartoum, and Dakar were attacked by mobs. GL .5 February, East Germany, Yu- goslavia, Guinea, and Ghana recognized Gizenga, and other bloc and some neutralist states will probably follow suit. The controlled UAR press has re- ported to Nasir "will fully recognize" Gizenga's regime as "a lawful and national gov- ernment." Even in some of the rloderate Wrench-speaking states which were represented at the recent Brazzaville Conference, there is reported to be criticism of the Kasavubu government. Prime Minister Nehru of India sent a strongly worded statement to 1 ammarskjold de- manding vigorous and prompt action to punish Lumumba's killers and to stop external aid to Tshombe and Mobutu, who, he said, shared responsibility for Lumumba's death. He offered to send troops to the Congo pro- vided that the UN operation there becomes "effective." Earli- er he stated that the goal of the UN Command should be to encourage a "unified, independent, sovereign Congo republic" and that it should take military action if necessary to attain this goal. Ghana's Nkrumah sent an "ultimatum" stating that Ghanaian forces would be withdrawn from the Congo if all Congolese troops had not been "completely dis- armed" in one month's t i::ie . SECRET PART I Approved For Re as4''Mb*6&E? : Wi W-00927A003100020100'I 10 of 12 Approved For Refease 2005/0;g3Itg DP79-00927AN",TT00020001-7 In the Congo, although the official Katangan version of Lumumba's death is not accepted, there has not been any loud outcry. On 15 February there were minor attacks on Belgians at scattered points in the Con- go. The American consul in Elisabethville believes that it is most likely that the de- posed premier died in mid-Jan- uary as a result of a miscal- culation on the part of his captors of the amount 16 February 1961 However, he was prepared to increase the Ghanaian troop contingent of 1,900 men to accomplish this objective. Representatives of Nigeria, a leader of moderate Afro-Asian opinion, have stated that if Hammarskjold moves rapidly to take over temporary control of the Congo, Nigeria would in- crease its military commitment to the UN force. Otherwise, they said the Nigerian units would be withdrawn. Sekou Tourd of Guinea ac- ;:used Hammarskjold of personal responsibility for Lumumba's murder. The Ethiopian demanded that Hammarskjold bring those responsible for Lumumba's death immediately to justice. Republic of the Congo of physical punishment r? Leopoldville ?Thysville Kindu ? Lodje CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Kongolo Albertville he could endure. The investigating UN team .--Ethiopian General Iyassu and Swiss Suret6 official Knecht--has made little progress against the solid op- position by Katanga authorities. on 12 February Mobutu's force was to begin a "peaceful pene- tration" of areas held by Gizenga's troops, and most of his mili- tary equipment has ar- rived in Equateur Prov- ince by barge from Leopoldville, Mobutu's plan to "win back Stan- leyville" apparently re- lies more heavily on disaffection among his opponents than on mili- tary operations. SECRET Hammarskjold reportedly sees these communications as a "letting off of steam." He apparently believes that these African and Asian leaders will realize the limited military potential and narrow mandate of the UN force and will moderate their positions. r 11 of 12 PART I Approved For Rel a $i' i1WE Cfk-" T00927AO031000200gf Approved For Ruse 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0Q'00020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 In northern Katanga, Tshomb6ls operation against opposing tribal groups has so far met little resistance from Baluba forces, and the Katangan troops are advancing up the rail line from -Luena toward Bukama. 25X1 SECRET PART I Approved For Rele& ig#,#HgECI 'TV6ff9?-~0927A0031000200efFe 12 of 12 Approved For Release 2005tW,4WgIA-RDP79-00927A003"f00020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 AFTER;4ATH OF KHRUCHSHEV'S AGRICULTURAL TOUR Khrushchev's 18-day tour of key Soviet agricultural areas has left party leaders throughout the country keenly aware of their personal stakes in the future of Soviet farming. Khrushchev advanced detailed proposals for increasing agri- cultural production in each area he visited, and made it clear that local leaders will be held directly responsible for carrying them out. Several personnel changes have already taken place; more will probably be made as responsible officials seek to shift the onus for past failures onto their subordi- nates. Khrushchev returned to the Kremlin on 12 February after a swing through the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, Georgia, and Voronezh Oblast. His proposed visit to the New Lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia has not yet taken place, however, and there is no indication when he intends to visit this area. Khrushchev's speeches during the tour were generally more moderate in tone than his re- marks at the January central committee plenum. In the main, he kept his criticisms general and left the recitation of specific shortcomings to the principal party chief in each area. Local leaders have been prompt to seek scapegoats. Im- mediately after Khrushchev left the Ukraine, members of the Lepublic's party presidium went to several oblasts, where they "explained" the work of the plenum at which they had been forced to admit their own poor records of leadership. In Odessa and Lvov, Ukrainian party boss Nikolay P,)dgorny-- a particular target af Khru- shchev's ire in January--super- vised the replacement of the oblast first secretaries. A similar shake-up took place in Armenia shortly after Khrushchev's address in Tbilisi on 7 February. A plenum of the Armenian central committee elected ;v1ger ir1elkonyan, a former deputy minister of agri- culture, to the central com- mittee secretariat and bureau, apparently to replace B. Ye. Sarkisov, who was responsible for party supervision of agri- culture in Armenia. Personnel changes have also been made in areas not included on Khrushchev's itinerary. The oblast party chiefs in Smolensk and Kirov (RSFSR) and in aviary (Turkmen Republic) have been fired, and unconfirmed re- ports indicate that a major shake-up of the Kirghiz party leadership has resulted in the ouster of six members of the republic central committee and the dismissal from the party of central committee member Alukhambet Isayev. The latter's fraudulent activities were ex- posed at the January central committee plenum when Khru- shchev demanded to know why he had been removed as first sec- retary in Tyan Shan Oblast last summer only to gain subsequent appointment as republic internal affairs minister. The flurry of personnel shifts seems likely to continue, and Khrushchev is likely to re- main personally attentive to SECRET PART I I Approved For ReleNW454k D29 i MS79-00927A00310002PQWe7 1 of 17 Approved For Release 2005~IT4-RDP79=00927A003fb0020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 agricultural affairs, at least until the next harvest. The situation was summed up at the recent meeting in Tbilisi by party presidium candidate Vasily Mzhavanadze: "We know that Nikita '3ergeyevich will tell us the bitter truth to our faces and will perhaps again criticize us very Justly and deservedly." 25X1 There were no indications during the first three days of the fourth congress of the Albanian Workers (Communist) party that. Tirana intends to abandon its pro-Chinese at- titudes in favor of a pro-Soviet orientation. In a belligerent opening address on 13 February, party leader Enver Hoxha called for Chinese participation in any summit talks, an issue not raised by the USSR since Khrushchev's speech of 28 May 1960, immediately after the breakdown of the Paris summit meeting. Hoxha said President Kennedy was continuing his predecessor's plans to initiate a third world war. He also claimed that the United States, Greece, and Yugoslavia had collaborated with Albanian "traitors" some months ago to overthrow his regime. The level of bloc dele- gations is comparable to those sent to the last Albanian congress in 1956, but is lower than delegations to other sat- ellite congresses in the last two years. Those from Commu- nist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia are led by presidium or polit- buro members, but most are headed merely by central com- mittee members. Every dele- gation contains ideological, propaganda, or party discipline specialists, and several in- clude participants in last No- vember's conference of Communist parties in Moscow. Petr Pospelov, candidate presidium member, heads the Soviet dele- gation, as he did in 1956. The ideological specialists in the Soviet and European sa- tellite delegations are probably working in private to sway the Albanian leadership from its pro-Chinese course. An anti- West, anti-Yugoslav, pro-Chi- nese propaganda line preceded the congress and has been main- tained since the meeting began. This, along with Hoxha's charge of Western complicity in the coup attempt, has committed his re- gime to policies at variance with those of Moscow. More- over, his statement that some of the coup participants, along with evidence of their activi- ties, are in the "hands of the people's justice" suggests that he intends to stage an anti- Western show trial sometime soon. Such a trial would inevitably have overtones offensive to' Moscow. Contrary to Hoxha's conten- tion, the abortive coup attempt --which occurred last summer-- was probably planned by pro- Soviet elements in the Albanian party and military forces, SECRET PART II Approved For ReleaseNM%3/Zg": CIA= 7~00927A003100020001-7 ~e 2 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/039CRK DP79-00927AO03100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 possibly at Soviet instigation, to force a change in the pro- Chinese Hoxha leadership, One district party leader and two district government chiefs were removed sometime between July and September. In early September, politburo member Liri Belishova and Auditing Commis- sion chief Koco Tashko were relieved of their posts. Accord- ing to various reports, between 200 and 500 party members in all were removed during this period. Close Albanian-Chinese re- lations were underscored by the arrival in Albania on 9 February of a Chinese "friendship" dele- gation that is now touring Al- bania making speeches and re- ceiving wide attention in the Albanian press. Continued Chi- nese Communist support for the Albanian party was strongly im- plied in the speech of Chinese Presidium member Li Hsien-nien to the congress on its second day. 25X1 Hungary has achieved or surpassed most of the goals of the Three-Year Plan (1958-60). It has almost overcome the ef- fects of emergency measures taken after the 1956 revolt on the distribution of national in- come, has improved its ability to produce industrial exports, and has started modernizing its industrial plant and production techniques without returning to the excessive pace of industri- alization of the early 1950s. However, economic plans for 1960 --which were above the Three- Year Plan targets for that year --were not fully met, and plan- ners have set the investment target for 1961 at a level be- low the average for 1959-60. HUNGARY NATIONAL INCOME AND CONSUMPTION, 1955 - 1960 (1955=100) P1\0 N 1957 195$ 1959 'PRELIMINARY The Three-Year Plan re- placed the 1956-60 Five-Year Plan, , which was abandoned fol- lowing the revolt. During late 1956 and early 1957, national income was below the 1955 level, and investments were cut to a minimum to make more consumer goods available. During 1958-60 the relationship between nation- al income and consumption vir- tually returned to that of 1955. However, the growth rate for national income fell last year. During the Three-Year Plan, national income rose 20 percent rather than the planned 13, investments exceeded targets, real income of consumers in- creased only moderately, and gross industrial production ex- panded 40 percent, well above the scheduled 22 percent. Heavy industry's share of total indus- trial output rose to about the same level as before the revolt. Agricultural production, however, increased less than the planned 12 percent. The socialized sector of agriculture has increased from 31 to 87 percent of arable land since the end of 1958, and the regime considers this the prime SECRET PART II NOWT AN/9 : I ? C811A P9-00927AO0310002000~ P 3 of 17 Approved For Release /03 Approved For ReIAa'&e 2005/0,$ Rg DP79-00927AO0100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 HUNGARY: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 1957 AND 1960 (1957: 100) 1957 11.0% accomplishment of the plan period. However, most immediate economic results of this reor- ganization have not been favor- able. Workers--especially the younger ones--have been trans- ferring from agriculture to in- dustry in excessively large num- bers, causing a disproportionate growth of the industrial labor force and depriving agriculture of needed manpower. The regime has been forced to increase agricultural investments at the expense of other economic sec- tors; its plans to reduce agri- cultural investments in 1961 will conflict with the continued need to support collectivization with purchases of machinery and the construction of farm build- ings. Prospects are poor for a substantial growth of agricul- tural production in the next few years. The outlook for the con- sumer in 1961 is further dark- ened by the regime's efforts to tighten labor norms in industry. Agricultural weaknesses have contributed to the regime's greatest problem--foreign trade. Hungary was able to move from a $194,500,000 deficit in 1957 to a $50,000,000 surplus in 1958, but exports have risen much less than imports during the past two years, with a resultant unfavorable trade balance. This year, repayments begin to come due on the principal debts owed other bloc countries; Hungary's indebtedness following the 1956 revolt totaled $382,000,000. Unless the Soviet Union grants a postponement of the main debt payments, the regime will have to generate an export surplus in 1961, a move which might re- quire domestic austerit measures. (Pre- pared by ORR) 25X1 The East Germans were ill I as rolled steel, chemicals, prepared for Bonn's announcement last September that the inter- zonal trade agreement would be abrogated as of the end of 1960. They apparently had taken few precautionary measures to devel- op alternate sources of supply, in spite of their dependence on West Germany for such products chemical equ,Lpment, and a variety of machinery components. In emergency steps to mini- mize disruption of production schedules, the East Germans tried to increase domestic pro- duction of items imported from West Germany, conserve existing SECRET PART I I Approved For Release-205/3129D CIA-F~~~0927A003100020001 7-"ge 4 of 17 Approved For Reloerse 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00r11 90020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 supplies, and find substitute products or immediate alternate sources of supply. Special commissions and working groups were set up to investigate the effects of a cessation of interzonal trade and to find other sources on a long-term basis. Since the reinstatement of the trade pact on 30 December, East Germany has continued its attempt to decrease its depend- ence on the West for essential imports while maintaining the volume of trade at past levels. Stressing that the achievement of independence from Western imports remains a major po- litical goal, the State Planning Commission has decreed that any attempt to procure imports from the West in preference to sub- situtes available from CEMA countries would be considered a "breach of long-range policy de- cisions taken at the highest party levels." Industrial and foreign trade planners have been in- structed to "achieve independ- ence" from Western supplies by 1962. Wherever possible, do- mestic production of vital ma- terials will be increased, con- struction and manufacturing in- dustries will use raw materials produced domestically or avail- able within'the bloc, and in- dustry will begin immediately to transform industrial stand- ards from the DIN (German) the GOST (Soviet); system. Conservation of mate- rials will continue to be stressed, and domestic products will be substituted for imports wherever feasible. Stockpiling of vital materials not produced in sufficient amounts within the bloc would also appear neces- sary. East Germany's program to reduce its dependence on Western supplies apparently was not So- viet inspired but no doubt has Ioscow's approval. Reduction of vulnerability to Western economic sanctions would in- crease the bloc's ability to implement diplomatic and stra- tegic moves affecting Berlin. There is some question, however, concerning Soviet will- ingness to absorb the cost of this program. The Soviets re- portedly agreed initially to increase their own shipments of needed supplies to East Germany if those from West Germany were cut off. Now that interzonal trade has been re-established, however, Moscow has retracted its offer, at least for some commodities, and apparently does not plan any major adjust-- &ents in its economic plans or in those of other C1 1A countries in order to accommodate East Germany. Some Soviet aid per- haps can be expected to result from negotiations now under way in Moscow, but it is unlikely that it will be of the scope originally anticipated by East German planning officials. East Ge.rmany's success in pursuing its new trade policy toward the West will depend on now efficiently it expands its domestic production and uses available raw.materials, as well as on its ability to adjust its trade with both the West and the bloc without disrupting the plans of other bloc coun- tries. East Germany undoubted- ly can reduce its dependence on certain of its West German im- ports,, but it is unlikely that the,measures instituted thus far will adequately reduce de- pendence on such important com- modities as steel. (Prepared by ORA) 25X1 SECRET PART I I Approved For Release 3 ' ')M/ ItIfi-QVM5nT6b927A003100020001-7pal'e 5 of 17 Approved For Rel~ase 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0031)0020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 East Germany's recent ac- tions indicate that it is test- ing West Germany's willingness to take countermeasures to force the regime to carry out its promise to the West Germans to relax controls on the Berlin sector border and make certain technical concessions to facil- itate trade between West Berlin and West Germany. The East Ger- man promise was instrumental in inducing Bonn to agree on 29 De- cember to reactivate the inter- zonal trade agreement for 1361. Bonn had abrogated the pact fol- lowing East Germany's harassing actions against West Berlin last September. The East German negotiator in interzonal trade talks held on 8 February to discuss the im- plementation of the 23 December agreement read a long state- ment to the effect that the re- gime was not then in a position to carry out its undertakings, claiming that the Federal Re- public had violated its promise to maintain complete secrecy on the concessions. As a result, the talks were broken off. on 1-' February, however, they re- sumed, and the East German ne- gotiator took a somewhat more conciliatory attitude, saying that the Communist regime would soon carry out its commitment to permit the sealing of trucks moving between West Berlin and West Germany. Two days later, the East German negotiator claimed that the regime had implemented cer- tain concessions, relating to trade traffic, that it intended to carry out the others, and that it was studying the matter of border controls. The West German negotiator, not satis- fied with this statement on bor- der controls, demanded a satis- factory proposal by midnight. Later that day, East Berlin po- lice announced that new regula- tions would go into force at midnight to "satisfy and facili- tate" the issuance of passes to West Germans to enter East Ber- lin. While the regime probably will claim that this police meas- ure fulfills its promise to ease controls, the regulations ex- pressly reassert the validity of the 8 September decree de- manding that West Germans secure passes. This decree violates the quadripartite status of Ber- lin. The East Germans, moreover, are refusing to conclude long- -term contracts with West German :firms, which require revocable shipping licenses. Bonn had counted on this licensing pro- cedure as a means to hold East Germany to its commitments. The USSR does not appear to be interested in creating a major crisis over Berlin at this time, but probably is not averse to allowing East Germany to maintain a degree of pressure on the issue. East Germany's tactics suggest that it believes it can maneuver the West Germans into continuing trade, despite the Communist regime's failure to carry out its promises. The East Germans may have estimated --and informed Moscow--that Bonn would be reluctant to take dras- tic countermeasures to hold them to their commitments. The East German action in barring a number of high West German Evangelical churchmen from attending religious services in East Berlin on 12 February prob- ably was an attempt to demon- strate publicly the regime's claim to "sovereignty" over the Soviet sector, as well as a fur- ther step in its long-term pol- icy of separating the Evangelical congregations in East Germany from their leaders in West Berlin and West Germany. The Communist regime indicated earlier that it SECRET PA tT I I Approved For ReleasN(2 03AD : 6 ' T9-00927AO0310002000N e 6 of 17 Approved For Relpne 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0031)0020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 would not permit the Evangelical Church to hold meetings of its synod in East Berlin, as had been done in the past, but would permit religious services on 12 February. On 9 February party boss Ulbricht delivered a scorch- ing attack on the "NATO politi- cians" in the Evangelical Church, declaring that they had "no business in the capital of the German Democratic Republic." The Communist government does not appear to have made any attempt to prevent East German ecclesiastics from attending the synod in West Berlin nor did East German police bar Bishop Otto Dibelius of Berlin-Branden- burg from attending the reli- gious services in East Berlin. Dibelius has long been a target of abuse and legal proceedings are pending against him in East Berlin courts for "advocating resistance to the state power." In view of the East Ger- man actions, Bonn is consider- ing reinstating its boycott of the Leipzig Fair to be held 5-14 March. The West German cabinet was scheduled to con- sider the matter at a 16 Febru- ary meeting. 25X1 SECRET PAST I I Approved For Releas G99?/041? : WAfffftu%-00927A00310002000f ge 7 of 17 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For Rel ase 2005/0SECR TRDP79-00927A003100020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 General Ne Win's order in early February ousting 11 senior officers from their commands appears to have thwarted any early army coup against Prime Minister Nu's government in Bur- ma. In addition, Ne Win's ac- tion underscored his personal dominance of Burma's career of- ficer corps and his determina- tion that his subordinates sup- port his policies fully. His immediate motive was to ensure the completion of the Sino- Burmese border demarcation proj- ect, which he believes is con- tingent on Nu's remaining pre- mier. The ousted officers made up the core of the army's ex- perienced field commanders and administrators. They opposed Ne Win's original decision to return the government to civil- ian control in 1960 and contin- ued openly critical of his non- intervention with Nu's inept domestic administration and cur- rent rapprochement with Peiping. Through former army train- ing director Brigadier Maung Maung, the officers had pressed Ne Win for an extension of the American military aid program, despite the general's known ir- ritation with the number of American personnel with the Bur- mese Army and his fear that they might become a source of embar- rassment in Burma's relations with Communist China. Although these leading critics of Ne Win's policies have now been removed from their influential posts, many of their The command shake-up, how- ever, probably will have an ad- verse effect on the countrv'q political stability. It has weakened the army as the one disciplined base of political power and may undermine its morale and efficiency against the insurgent forces in the country. SECRET PART I I Approved For Release ZUU5/v31Z9 ~ Ri7T99-00927A0031000200(p1a e 9 of 17 Approved For Relelt-e 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0031h0020001-7 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 25X1 supporters are still in.the army, and probably will continue quiet agitation for more active army influence with the government. LONDON SEEKING TO CONFEDERATE SINGAPORE AND BORNEO WITH MALAYA London is promoting a con- federation linking Singapore and the Federation of Malaya with Britain's three Borneo ter- ritories--North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei. One purpose of Com- monwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys' visit to Malaya last month apparently was to urge support for this project. Although there has been some favorable response through- out the area, Malayan Prime Minister Rahman has reiterated his adamant opposition to the inclusion of Singapore in such a union. Malays outnumber the Chinese in the Federation of Malaya, but would be in a slight minority in a confederation in- cluding Singapore. Rabman is also concerned about the leftist inclinations of the Singapore Chinese. The British plan apparently envisages that Malaya would POPULATION OF MALAYSIA to from 1957 census excepting 1960 figures for Singapore) (square Em les) MALAY CHINESE INDIAN INDIGENOUS I TRIBES OTHER TOTAL MALAYA 50,690 3,126,706 2,332,936 695,985 ---- 123,136 6,278,763 SINGAPORE 224 227,300 1,230,700 137,800 ---- 38,300 1,634,100 SARAWAK 47,500 148,567 197.723 (Included in "Other") 282,835 9,237 638,362 NORTH BORNEO 29,388 22,750 97,248 (1ncluded in "Other") 268,498 12,330 400,826 BRUNEI 2,226 36,576 14,183 (Included in "Other" 17,915 5,972 74646 ' 130,028 3,561,899 3,872,790 833,785 569,248 ,975 188,975 9,026,697 PART II NOTES AND CO9MENTS Page 10 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A00100020001-7 1.._ SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 31600 'NORTH ?O BORNEO Celebes sea assulne--at least outwardly--the authority now exercised by the British in all but Malaya in the fields of defense, foreign relations, and internal security. Each of the states, which would otherwise be autonomous, would be represented in the Malayan parliament, but not on a popu- lation basis. In the formative years, the British would pre- sumably expect to exercise con- siderable influence in an advi- sory capacity. Britain probably would also step up the political de- velopment of the Borneo terri- tories. The colony of Sarawak now is the most politically ad- vanced and has rudimentary rep- resentative institutions already in operation; the colony of North Borneo is the most back- ward and is only beginning lim- ited self-government. Brunei, a British protectorate, is in the initial stages of developing representative insti- tutions, although its sultan retains almost absolute power over internal affairs. Such a grouping has been under con- sideration for many years in order to free Britain of responsi- bility and ensure a means for eventual independence for the underpopulated and culturally fragmented Borneo territories. The British are addi- tionally concerned about the future of Singapore as a semi- autonomous state and now apparently feel that it should be in- cluded in a regional grouping. Last October the British reportedly tried to con- vince Malayan Deputy Prime Min- ister Razak that merger of Sing- apore with Malaya was essential in order to bolster Singapore's economic prospects and to im- prove its chances of long-range political stability. Personal relations between Rahman and Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew have im- proved recently, and some high Malayan officials have reported- ly become sympathetic toward a grouping including Singapore. By supporting Malaya's interest in a link with the Borneo terri- tories, the British may hope at the meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in March to per- suade Rahman to agree that the presence of the Borneo terri- tories in a confederation would partially offset the influence of Singapore. SECRET 25X1 Pty :IT I I Approved For Release 9o): CIA=9DP7-00927A0031000200C f ige 11 o:f 17 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For Release 2005/0$W)WRDP79-00927AO03 h00020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 RHODESIA-NYASALAND The two separate constitu- tional conferences recently held between British cabinet ministers and representatives of political factions from both Northern and Southern. Rhodesia may arouse racial conflicts in central Africa and possibly lead white-controlled Southern Rho- desia to attempt to secede. Colonial Secre- tary Macleod's pro- posals, presented to the Northern Rho- desian conference in London on 14 February, were described by British officials as attempting to achieve "parity" between Af- ricans and whites in a legislature elected by a broadened fran- chise. A Common- wealth Relations Of- fice official indi- cated that the pro- immediate threat of African- instigated disorders, the feder- al government on 12 February called up the territorial re- serves in Northern Rhodesia and assigned them to likely trouble spots in the urban areas. In another round of nego- tiations at Salisbury, Common- BACKGROUND The semi-independent Federation was formed in 1953 from the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia and the British protec- torates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, still administered by British governors. London supported federation in order to prevent the spread of South African racial doctrines into Central Africa and to facilitate area economic planning. The Africans, strongly opposed the imposition of a white-controlled federal goverment. Nyasaland will have an elected African majority in its. legislature after elections this year, similar changes are being considered for Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesian African. have been accorded minority representation under new constitu- tional proposals. The white settlers, who have been politically and econdnnically dominant, constitute less than 4 percent of the population of 8,- 430,000. The Federation's economy is the second most developed in. Africa; copper mining in Northern Rhodesia is the most important posals are not intended to pro- duce an African majority at pres- ent. The British could pre- sumably arrange this later either through nominated mem- bers or by lowering the fran- chise qualifications. These proposals--which Lon- don is apparently unprepared to modify--are not expected to satisfy either the Africans or white settlers, but the British hope for acceptance as the best available solution. African leaders have in- sisted on a majority of Afri- can-elected members in both the legislative and executive coun- cils and have threatened vio- lence if their demands are not met. On the other hand, Federa- tion Prime Minister Welensky had asserted earlier that South- ern Rhodesia would leave the Federation if London insisted on an African majority in Northern Rhodesia. To meet the wealth Relations Secretary Sandys and Southern Rhodesian officials, including African representatives, reached an agreement which has been sup- ported so far by all factions except extremist groups among both settlers and Africans. The agreement, which is subject to British parliamentary approv- al and a Southern Rhodesian referendum in June, in general expands African political in- fluence while increasing South- ern Rhodesia's powers of self- government. The Salisbury conference agreed on a bill of rights in the Southern Rhodesian consti- tution, a dual electoral roll system by which, in essence, 70,000 white voters will elect 50 representatives and some 50,- OUv Africans will elect 15 re- presentatives, and a constitu- tional council to safeguard civil rights with the power to delay discriminatory legislation for six months. SECRET 25X1 PART I I N % 0 ft : ElA= PNTT9-00927AO031000200(TT'Pe 13 of 17 Approved For Release Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400020001-7 SECRET 16 February 1961 British officials in London have confirmed that, in return for Southern Rhodesian accept- ance of these pro-African pro- visions, the agreement envisages surrender by London of its re- serve powers to veto Southern Rhodesian legislation on African affairs. This has been one of London's major means for in- fluencing Southern Rhodesia. Although Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Whitehead has stated publicly that the fran- chise agreement will result in control of the government by white voters "for all time," the opposition segregationist Dominion party has refused to agree to the proposals and has threatened to advocate seces- sion. There is also some dis- satisfaction in African circles over the limited gains made at the conference, and the posi- tion of moderate Joshua Nkomo, leader of the National Democrat- ic party, may be weakened by extremist agitation. The Rhodesian conferences may also provoke political strains in British Conservative party policy on Africa. Some parlia- mentary elements already resent Colonial Secretary Macleod's al- leged "sellout" of the white minorities, and Macleod is re- portedly irritated by Sandys' successful competition with him in resolving African colo- nial problems. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CONGO GABONt SOUTH-WEST AFRICA 16 !?E8RUARY 1061 BECHUANALAND q ? !,ES s?. // 25X1 25X1 25X1 Portugal's overseas prov- ince of Angola has been the scene of several outbreaks in the last two weeks, and offi- cials there expect further dis- orders. Security controls, par- ticularly over Africans, have been tightened in Luanda, the capital. a 150-man com- pany of paratroopers has been airlifted from Portugal. Re- ports of incipient unrest have come also from Mozambique, Portugal's East African pos- session. The focus of the Angolan disturbances was Luanda, where some 40 persons were killed in clashes beginning on 4 February. In addition, there reportedly have been outbreaks in north- central Angola. The demon- strators in Luanda apparently were organized according to a pre-arranged plan; on 4 February they made coordinated attacks on three different points, and the attackers on 10 February wore a uniform of blue shirts, khaki trousers, and white belts. The motivation of the dem- onstrators and the extent of their contacts outside Angola are unclear. F7 I 25X1 FEDERATION if OF RHODESI~. Yom. 1 ./X.ND ? Salisbury SECRET PART II Approved For Relea 5/NP9 C@ B1M-00927A003100012@W-$4 of 17 Approved For ReYfase 2005/URDP79-00927A003'400020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 ere is no evidence of links between the Luanda action and any nationalist movements abroad. However, Roberto Holden--also known as Jose Gilmore--a moder- ate, anti-Communist Angolan ex- ile who heads the Union of the Angolan People (UPA), recently stated that the violence had been fomented by the Communist- supported African Front for the Independence of Portuguese Colonies in Africa (FRAIN) based at Conakry. Holden apparently believes that the outlook is for increasing violence as anti- Portuguese and anti-white Af- rican extremists acquire great- er influence over the Angolan native population. FRANCE-ALGERIA SECRET 25X1 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100020001 7 ? Approved For Release 2005/OS J 1 RDP79-00927A003400020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 De Gaulle apparently be- lieves that his talk with Tu- nisian President Bourguiba, which has been arranged for later this month, will help pre- pare for French-PAG talks. De Gaulle recognizes Bourguiba is greatly concerned over the growing influence of radical African and Communist forces on the Algerian rebel leader- ship. Members of the PAG continue to indicate a desire for a ne- gotiated settlement, and insist. that they have a mandate to negotiate for the Algerian people. They are said to have agreed unanimously during their January meeting that they would not recognize or deal with any interim Algerian government set up unilaterally by Paris but nevertheless realize that nego- tiations with Paris cannot give them immediate control over Al- geria. Rebel "deputy premier and foreign minister" Belkacem Krim reportedly persuaded the con- ference of foreign ministers of the Arab states which ended in Baghdad on 3 February not to es- tablish a boycott or sever dip- lomatic relations with France. He is said to have emphasized that only De Gaulle could solve the Algerian problem, and that he must be given time to do this. The PAG will resent any in- timation that Bourguiba's talks with De Gaulle will involve substantive negotiations. The rebel "minister of information" has complained that the PAG was not consulted about De Gaulle's invitation to Bourguiba, and an- other PAG representative told a member of the American Embassy in Tunis on 9 February that while Bourguiba has "every right to go to Paris," there can be no substitute for direct nego- tiations. 25X1 Bourguiba's 25X1 intention in seeing De Gaulle is to strengthen the position of moderate elements in the PAG, but that the mission could have the opposite effect.. Bourguiba himself is grati- fied that De Gaulle has picked him as a go-between rather than his rival. for influence in the Maghreb, Moroccan King Mohamed V. At the same time, Bourguiba probably fears jeopardizing his future influence in Africa should his visit not lead to early French-Algerian negotia- tions. PROSPECTS FOR ICELAND Shortly after assuming of- fice in November 1959, Iceland's Conservative - Social Democratic government instituted a far- reaching economic stabilization program to overcome persistent inflation and the related prob- lems of a chronic trade deficit and a shortage of foreign ex- change. Since parliamentary ap- proval of the program last Feb- ruary, much progress has been made toward achieving a stable economy and reducing Iceland's trade dependence on the Soviet bloc. Following Reykjavik's relaxation of restrictions on trade with the West, bloc trade dropped from 34 percent of Iceland's SECRET 25X1 PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Pa a 16 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003100020001 7 Approved For Relsse 2005/0?&DP79-00927A003'4.00020001-7 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 February 1961 total trade to 25 percent in the first half of 1960. The ul- timate success of the program depends heavily on its contin- ued tacit acceptance by the rank and file of organized labor. The Communist-dominated central trade union federation, whose affiliates have been work- ing without wage contracts since September 1059 and thus could strike at any time, has hesi- tated to call politically moti- vated strikes because of the opposition of most workers. In recent weeks, however, there have been indications that the Communists are actively encour- aging member unions to seek un- realistic wage increases in order to breach the government's wage policy and frustrate the effective working of the pro- gram. Success in this attempt would probably force a reorgan- ization of the government. Cer- tain elements in the coalition might be willing to consider bringing Communists into the cabinet if such a solution would guarantee labor peace. The government is also under attack by the Communists and the Progressives for opening negotia- tions with Britain last October on the long-standing fishinglim- its dispute. The talks are dead- locked over technical points and Iceland's determination to reserve its right to extend control over fishing into areas even beyond the disputed 12-mile limit. Lon- don is trying to reach an agree- ment this month; in a recent note it warned Iceland that failure to do so could lead to a recurrence of armed clashes when the spring fishing season opens. Communists and certain na- tionalist groups demand that the government terminate the talks, hoping thus to strain relations between the two NATO allies and discredit Iceland's membership in the alliance. Although unsuccess- ful in their continuing efforts to arouse public opinion over the once-popular issue of the Keflavik air base and the American forces stationed there, these groups are seeking tc embroil the US in the dispute by demanding that the defense force "protect" Iceland from incursions by British fishing and patrol craft. 25X1 SECRET PART II Approved For Relea'( 3/(A'.Cf~9-00927A003100020001age 17 of 17 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0M100020001-7 SECRET 16 February 1961 CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA Recognition by Cuba last year gave Communist China its first diplomatic ties with any country in the western hemi- sphere. Believing that the Cuban example offers an opportunity for further gains in Latin Amer- ica, Peiping is willing to ac- cept the cost of sizable econom- ic assistance to the Cubans. Its strategy for the area as a whole combines a reliance on "people's diplomacy" with an expansion of Chinese influence in Latin Amer- ican Communist parties. The ob- jective is to win political rec- ognition and encourage revolu- tionary action. Following the US decision last summer to stop buying Cuban sugar, the Chinese agreed to take 500,000 tons annually for the next five years, more than twice their previous yearly pur- chases from nonbloc sources. Al- though sugar is in short supply in China, it is a low-priority import, and Peiping's willing- ness to forego the purchase of more urgently needed commodities underscored its determination to use Cuba as the wedge to expand its influence in the whole area. This motive has also been demon- strated by the willingness to ship rice to Cuba at a time when China is experiencing severe food shortages and making sub- stantial purchases of food grains outside the Communist bloc. When Che Guevara visited China last November, Peiping of- fered him a $60,000,000 interest- free loan--at the time the larg- est single credit extended by China to a nonbloc country. The Chinese also agreed to pay a higher price per pound of sugar than agreed to last summer and to double their sugar purchases to a million tons in 1961. The Cubans have given lavish pub- licity to China's beneficence. During Guevara's visit the Chinese far surpassed their usu- al great hospitality for offi- cial visitors. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai had "intimate" talks with him, and the Chinese ambassador-designate to Cuba es- corted him on a tour of the country. In an exchange of speeches with Guevara, Chou congratulated Cuba on its "face-to-face strug- gle against heinous US imperial- ism." Chou stated that while Latin America faces a "complex and arduous" task in freeing it- self from the United States, Cuba's success stands as proof that the situation is "extremely favorable." For his part, Guevara amplified earlier statements by Cubans that their revolution had drawn on Chinese experience, say- ing the Chinese example "revealed a new road for the Americas:'.' Guevara expressed admiration for China's communes and other social innovations and forecast that Latin Americans would adopt "one of these methods or something similar" when they achieved their "liberation." Guidance to Communist Parties The Chinese did not assume a role in influencing Latin Amer- ican Communist parties until after the 21st Soviet party congress in January 1959. At that congress, Soviet officials, concerned that publicity over Moscow's domina- tion of the Communist movement had hampered the activities of Communist parties, told the Lat- ins to play down their subordina=- tion to Moscow. Moscow's decision to dis- guise its role was Peiping's op- portunity. Delegates to the So- viet congress from 12 Latin Amer- ican parties traveled on to Pei- ping at Chinese expense in March 1959. Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao- chi conferred with them, impress- ing on them the suitability of SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 3 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0T'3100020001-7 SECRET 16 February 1961 Chinese revolutionary tactics to their problems. The Chinese opened a school for Latin American Communists in Peiping in August 1959, China's most ambitious undertaking in training foreign Communists. The 25X1 Ground for dissension between China and the Soviet Union is thus being developed in Latin America. During the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow last November, the effectiveness of Chinese proselytizing was shown when some of the Latin American parties reportedly supported the Chinese against the Soviet party members on many of the issues being debated. If Moscow had in- deed earlier encouraged Peiping's desire for a greater role in Lat- in America, the disagreements be- tween the two countries--includ- ing the dispute over the proper tactics to be followed in under- developed areas--have since un- doubtedly occasioned second thoughts within the Kremlin. At the outset, the USSR seemed to encourage Peiping's desire for a greater role in Latin America. The Soviet ambas- sador in Tokyo, for example, sug- gested to Latin American diplo- mats there in 1959 that they visit China and offered to make the arrangements. Peiping seems to have had some success in convincing Latin American Communists of the use- fulness of Chinese experience. 25X1 (Younger, more rad- ical members of the Cuban Commu- nist party reportedly are turn- ing toward Peiping for inspira- tion, although the more moderate 25X1 group continues to rely on direc- tion from Moscow. Trade agreements with Cuba provide for an exchange of as much as $180,000,000 in 1961-- far in excess of China's past trade with all of Latin America. As a rule, imports from Latin America have been limited to a single commodity from any one country; Chinese purchases have thus assumed in some countries greater importance than the com- paratively modest levels of total trade would suggest. In 1958 China--which purchased almost 100,000 tons--was the largest single buyer of sugar from Brazil, and in the first four months of last year it was the largest bloc purchaser of wool tops from Uru- guay--$2,600,000 worth. Peiping's strategy is to use trade as an opening for gov- ernment-to-government economic agreements--in effect de facto recognition. To date, however, Cuba is the only Latin American country that has signed a trade and payments agreement with Com- munist China, and, barring polit- ical changes in other Latin Amer- ican countries, there are no im- mediate prospects for others. People's Diplomacy In 1959, 402 Latin Americans traveled to Communist China, with SECRET PART I I I Approved For Ref 03%: % F gPR-2 VE'S A003100020Wage 2 of 3 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0O 100020001-7 the Chinese paying all or part of their expenses. This number --three and one-half times the total for each of the two preced- ing years--was probably at least equaled in 1960. Latin American visitors to China have included parliamentary groups from Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and Costa Rica. 16 February 1961 25X1 25X1 An equal effort is made to carry Peiping's message to those who cannot make the trip. The "people's diplomacy" offensive in South America was launched in 1956 with the dispatch of a Pei- ping Opera group to Brazil, Uru- guay, Argentina, and China. Sub- sequent travelers, including "friendship teams" of dancers, journalists, and acrobats, have been well received by the local populations, although they en- counter considerable governmental suspicion. The first group of journal- ists, led by an officer from the propaganda department of the Chi- nese Communist party, organized a local friendship association in Uruguay and attempted to hire a local news reporter for the New China News Agency (NCNA). A sec- ond group last year was even more aggressive--particularly in Chile, where it made political state- ments attacking the US and cul- tivated contacts with labor lead- ers and leftist political leaders. Friendship organizations promoted by the Chinese now op- erate in ten Latin American coun- tries, and last March an over-all China - Latin America Friendship Association was formed in Peiping to improve area-wide coordina- tion. Peiping uses the friend- ship organizations as channels for getting propaganda material into countries where free entr is prohibited. SECRET Peiping contributes to the treasuries of these organizations from the earnings of its song-and- dance troupes. The Colombian Friendship Association got the proceeds of the Peiping Opera company's performances in Bogota last May. Propaganda Peiping each week broadcasts 21 hours of Spanish-language pro- grams to Latin America and half as much in Portuguese. It also publishes a Spanish-language edi- tion of the propaganda magazine China Reconstructs. To pick up items of inter- est for its radio programs, the official NCNA--working through the local Communist parties--is establishing a network of corre- spondents in Latin America; it has recruited correspondents in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. The Chinese also employ Latin Americans in the Peiping headquarters of NCNA and the Foreign Languages Press. The Havana office of NCNA is the center for Peiping's propagan- da activities in Latin America. After its establishment in June 1959, the Havana office quickly established close relations with Castro's new Prensa Latina news agency In November 1959 the Chinese Communists began publication of a Chinese-language newspaper in Cuba, intended primarily for the island's 30,000 Overseas Chinese but directed also to the 65,000 Chinese elsewhere in Latin Amer- ica. Peiping has long competed with Taipei for the allegiance of Overseas Chinese living throughout the world. Peiping's propaganda pictures the US as the villain in Latin ' Amer- ica, intent on plunder and eager to support dictators. Peiping alleges that a common "subjugation to im- perialist aggression and oppres- sion" makes the Chinese comrades- in-arms of the Latin Americans in the fight against US imperialism. Pei- ping's propaganda portrays the Lat- in Americans as being in the "front line" of the anti-US struggle of un- derdeveloped countries and points to Cuba as proof that their efflrts can succeed. SECRET Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page :3 of 3 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7 Approved For Release 2005/03/29 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03100020001-7