CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003100030001-5
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 57
OCI NO.0268/61
23 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DA i E: ~~I1,AQ - REVIEWER:
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
CONGO
With a stronger mandate
from the Security Council, UN
Secretary General Hammarskjold
will probably move quickly to
try to dissociate Congolese
,armies from politics--a move he
believes is essential to any
settlement in the Congo. The
latest resolution on the Congo,
passed by the Security Council
on 21 February, authorized the
use of'force by UN troops if
necessary to avert civil war
in the country. This is the
first time UN troops have been
allowed to go beyond-mere self-
defensive measures, and the
council's action establishes a
precedent which many UN members
find disquieting. The Korean
action was not under the cen-
tralized control of the UN; the
first armed force employed by
the UN, the UN Emergency Force
in Gaza, is not authorized to
use force.
The resolution failed to
meet three key Western demands
but met many of the conditions
necessary to the UN operation
in the Congo. The resolution
failed to interdict the movement
of materiel as well as person-
nel into the Congo--which would
have been an obvious reference
to UAR and other clandestine
support of the Gizenga regime.
It also failed to specify the
UN secretary general as pri-
marily responsible for the UN
operation in the Congo. It made
no reference,moreover, to the
government of the Congo or to
Kasavubu as chief of state.
Since the Security Council
has again assumed the direction
of the UN effort in the Congo,
the possibility of a heated de-
bate on the issue at the resumed
General Assembly session has
lessened considerably.
The USSR's abstention from
voting on the resolution points
up the difficulty the Soviet
leaders face in their efforts
to achieve their objectives in
the Congo without at the same
time becoming isolated from the
"Afro-Asian position." Follow-
ing the vote, Soviet delegate
Zorin stated that the resolu-
tion, despite its "shortcomings,,,
can play a positive role in re-
storing peace to-the Congo, par-
ticularly those measures calling
for immediate removal of the
"Belgian aggressors."
While continuing its prop-
aganda attacks on Hammarskjold
and the UN Congo operation, Mos-
cow may find it necessary to
moderate the uncompromising de-
mands set forth in its 14 Feb-
ruary statement. The USSR can
be expected, however, to oppose
strongly any effort aimed at
strengthening Hammarskjold's
personal authority in dealing 25X1
with the situation.
Although Communist China
has formally recognized the
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Gizenga regime in Stanleyville,
the USSR has not. Repeated ex-
pressions of Soviet support for
his "legitimate government" are
probably designed to allow So-
viet leaders a free hand
in pressing for his partici-
pation in any proposed settle-
ment, without tying their
policy to a regime which is
beyond the reach of direct
Soviet support.
Communist China has used
Lumumba's death as the occasion
for its most strident propaganda
campaign of the year, holding
large rallies in Chinese cities
to express indignation over the
"monstrous crime" allegedly
engineered by US and Belgian
imperialists and "their agent"
Hammarskjold. Chinese pledges
of "utmost" support--presumably
only moral and financial--have
been coupled with expressions
of confidence in the ability of
the Congolese to win eventual
victory and give the impression
that Peiping intends to let oth-
ers carry on the fight. The
three Asian satellites have al-
so been loud in their condemna-
tion of Lumumba's "murder."
On 19 February, Peiping
expressed readiness to establish
diplomatic relations with Gi-
zenga. A joint communique of
20 February announced agreement
for an exchange of ambassadors.
Peiping is likely to accredit
an ambassador in another African
country to Stanleyville.
Although the Sudanese Gov-
ernment has continued to resist
UAR and bloc pressure to allow
supplies for Gizenga to transit
the Sudan, it appears that in-
ternal pressures are now forcing
the Abboud regime to take a
harder line in its relations
with the UN. On 16 February
the Supreme Council--the coun-
try's top ruling body--sent a
cable to Hammarskjold stating
that the UN had failed to achieve
its primary aims in the Congm,
and that unless immediate steps
were taken to solve the problem,
the Sudan would be forced to
withdraw its troops from the
UN Command.
The decision to send the
sharply worded cable was appar-
ently made as a result of public
reaction in the Sudan to Lu-
mumba's death. On 14 and 15
February, small but well-organ-
ized pro-Lumumba street demon-
strations took place in three
towns in the Sudan. The govern-
ment was concerned over the pos-
sibility that the internal Su-
danese opposition group, which
has recently been pressing for
a return to civilian government,
would use the Congo problem for
its own purposes. The cable,
which received wide publicity
in the Sudanese press, probably
does not presage any change
in the government's policy of
support for the UN, but is rath-
er an attempt to cater to public
opinion.
In Accra the foreign min-
isters of Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Morocco, and the UAR have reaf-
firmed their support for Gi-
zenga and called for the immedi-
ate withdrawal of all foreign
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diplomats from the Congo. They
re-endorsed Ghana President
Nkrumah's plan for reconstitut-
ing the UN force into an African
command and recommended a halt
to mobilization of Congolese
forces. They,talso proposed that
all foreign activities be con-
trolled by the UN and that a
neutral commission investigate
Lumumba's death.
The preliminary report of
the UN Conciliation Commission--
an 11-member body on which most
of the Asian and African nations
who have had troops in the Congo
are represented--was made pub-
lic on 19 February. It recom-
mends the establishment of a
broadly based Congolese govern-
ment, the removal of the army
from politics and its reorgan-
ization under a national defense
council, the release of polit-
ical'prisoners, and parliamen.
tary approval of the new gov-
ernment. Since its recommenda-
tions use the Ileo government
as a starting point for re-es-
tablishing a national regime,
the report is likely to be con-
genial to Kasavubu; however,
recent reports indicate that
Tshombd and his associates are
in no mood to accept any recon-
ciliation proposals, although
on 22 February he did announce
his agreement with UN officials
to stop troop movements in Ka-
tanga Province.
The reaction of the Gizenga
regime to the commission's rec-
ommendations probably will depend
on the dissidents' estimate of
their ability to resist con-
tinued economic, political, and
military pressure from a broad-
ly based Leopoldville govern-
ment. Gizenga's position appar-
ently is weakening: his troops,
particularly in the Stanleyville
area, are subject to little con-
trol from above; funds for pay-
ing them reportedly will run
out by the end of March; and his
lieutenant in Kivu Province,
Anicet Kashamura, apparently is
resisting Stanleyville's efforts
to subject him to closer control.
However, Gizenga has little to
hope for in a rapprochement with
Kasavubu, and he probably would
be reluctant to accept a polit-
ical solution imposed by the UN
unless assured of significant
influence in the Leopoldville
government.
Large-scale reprisals for
the death of Lumumba and his
nine supporters--two of them in
Katanga and seven in Albert
Kalonji's "South Kasai" state--
have so far not materialized.
However, some atrocities, appar-
ently on the part of undisci-
plined Congolese troops, were
committed in Kivu Province.
Scattered incidents have oc-
curred throughout the Congo out-
side of areas controlled by the
Tshomb4 regime.
In Leopoldville, Premier-
designate Ileo reportedly has
enlarged his proposed govern-
ment, following discussions with
former supporters of Lumumba.
The additions allegedly will in-
clude several Lumumbists, but
many of the appointees have not
been personally consulted. The
list contains names of individ-
uals generally regarded as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
moderate members of the Lumumba
faction; however, many of them
are currently working for Gi-
zenga in Stanleyville, Cairo,
and New York.
The army,
which retains its tribal loyal-
ties, reportedly is also angered
at the recent execution by the
South Kasai government of seven
Congolese, who came from sev-
eral tribal groups which are
represented in the army. Ileo'S
22 February denouncement of any
UN disarmament of Congolese for-
ces probably is a response to
these pressures.
The economic situation in
Leopoldville is deteriorating
rapidly, according to a recently
appointed UN economic adviser.
One of the last acts of Mobutu's
college of commissioners before
it disbanded on 9 February was
to abandon the austerity pro-
gram which had been developed
with
UN assistance. As a result,
the
government deficit for
Jan-
uary
rose to $18,000,000.
Stop-
gap
aid is being furnished
by
the
central bank of the Congo;
however, this policy is plac-
ing more money in circulation,
with a resulting inflationary
spiral. The UN official be-
lieves the only solution is a
$100,000,000 aid program under
UN control.
Economic conditions in oth-
er parts of the Congo are also
suffering from the po-
litical disintegration.
Republic of the Congo A US official who re-
cently visited Stanley-
ville expects the econ-
omy there to collapse
in six or eight weeks;
Katanga, the richest
area in the country,
is also running a
budgetary deficit.
Before he agreed
to limited cooperation
with UN authorities,
Tshombe reacted vig-
orously to the Security
Council's 21 February
resolution.-Charging
that the resolution
was a "declaration" of
war by the UN against
Katanga and the whole
former Belgian Congo,
he announced the mobi-
lization of the province's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
population to "defend their lives
and property menaced by the
United Nations." He said that
the UN would be responsible for
any bloodshed resulting from the
resolution.
This initial reaction appar-
ently was inspired by hard-line
mining interests which counseled
an immediate attack on UN forces.
Tshombd is reputed to believe
he is "fighting for his job and
his life" in the face of UN de-
termination to punish him for
the death of Lumumba.
la considerable
number of Africans adjudged loyal
to Tshombd have been armed in
order to thwart a possible at-
tempt by UN forces to disarm the
Katangans. Europeans may have
been similarly armed.
Tshombd's regime is now al-
most completely isolated inter-
nationally following its involve-
ment in the death of Lumumba;
Tshombd continues to refuse to
cooperate with the Ileo govern-
ment in Leopoldville by taking
the ministerial portfolios left
vacant for a Katanga representa-
tive.
Tshombd's agreement with
the UN apparently put at least
a temporary halt to his attempts
to continue offensive opera-
tions against Baluba tribal
supporters of Gizenga in north-
ern Katanga Province. Last
week a UN Nigerian patrol en-
countered a reconnaissance
unit of Katanga troops about
50 miles south of Manono,
capital of the Baluba "Lualaba
state," and was told by a Bel-
gian officer leading the unit
that he would capture Manono
as part of a general Katanga
offensive. Any offensive is
likely to be increasingly
harassed by the Balubas, who
have already made new incursions
into the area along the rail
line between Jadotville and
Kamina which was recently won
back by Tshombd.
This military action co-
incides with the establishment
of a "Communist Congolese
party" in Manono. The move
was probably made at the
initiative of Interior Minister
Yuma of the Baluba "Lualaba
state." Jason Sendwe, a lead-
ing anti-Communist Baluba leader
in Leopoldville, denied on
20 February that any such
"youth movement" had been
formed.
The Communist label would
seem to have considerable appeal
to organizations of Lumumba's
supporters, although this
appeal is likely to be les-
sened to some extent by the
party's tribal connections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Cambodia has rejected King
Savang's invitation to form a
neutral nations commission with
Burma and Malaya, thus blocking,
for the time being at least,
this effort to find an avenue
of approach to solving the
Laotian crisis other than reac-
tivation of the International
Control Commission (ICC) or an
international conference on Laos.
In a note handed to the Laotian
ambassador on 21 February, the
Cambodian Government stated that
it was rejecting the King's in-
vitation both because of its
"unilateral character" and be-
cause the establishment of such
a commission should be preceded
by an international conference
--presumably along the lines of
Prince Sihanouk's 14-nation pro-
posal of early January. Malaya
had previously accepted the in-
vitation; the Burmese have not
yet responded.
The USSR seems determined
to keep any East-West negotia-
tions for a Laotian settlement
within the framework of the
1954 Geneva agreements. The bloc
is undoubtedly convinced that
time is on its side and intends
to protract diplomatic exchanges
on Laos until Communist bloc
participation is assured in any
talks on Laos.
14-nation meeting as proposed by
Sihanouk. Pushkin warned that
the only alternative to a con-
ference was a prolongation and
an intensification of the war
in Laos.
Pushkin, who called in the
British ambassador on short no-
tice on 18 February, probably
to make his point prior to King
Savang's declaration of neutral-
ity, denounced the idea of a
neutral nations commission as
a move to shore up the authority
of the Boun Oum government and
to liquidate the machinery of
the Geneva agreements, particu-
larly the ICC. The Soviet offi-
cial, in reply to the British
proposal that the Indian chair-
man of the ICC could deal with
the King of Laos, pointed out
that the King did not have ex-
ecutive authority and asserted
that the only legitimate govern-
ment in Laos was represented by
Souvanna Phouma.
Pushkin suggested that the
USSR and Britain, as co-chair-
men of the Geneva Conference of
1954, make two proposals. The
first plan would be an invita-
tion to the US, Canada, Burma,
Thailand, and South Vietnam, to-
gether with other Geneva signa-
tories, to attend a new confer-
ence on Laos.
In replying to the British
proposal of 21 January, which
called for the reactivation of
the ICC in Laos, Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Pushkin in-
sisted that the present crisis
called for new terms of refer-
ence for ICC operations. Such
terms of reference could, accord-
ing to the Soviet reply, be es-
tablished only by a conference
of the Geneva participants or a
As a gesture of compromise
to the British, Pushkin then
said that the Geneva co-chair-
men might approach Prime Minis-
ter Nehru about convening the
ICC in New Delhi or some other
convenient place outside Laos
before the larger conference
took place. Although this os-
tensible concession was designed
to avoid outright rejection to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the British ICC proposal, Push-
kin stipulated that the commis-
sion could only discuss a re-
sumption of its activity in Laos
and that an international con-
ference would have to be con-
vened to furnish any new in-
struction for the ICC.
Communist China's Foreign
Minister Chen Yi became the
first bloc spokesman to comment
publicly on the neutral nations
proposal when, on 22 February,
he described it as "the start
of a new US scheme,... to conven-
iently perpetuate its aggression
and interferdnce." Moscow thus
far has not commented directly,
although it has rebroadcast the
statement by Pathet Lao leader
Souphannouvong rejecting the
proposal.
Souvanna Phouma meanwhile
has flown to Xieng Khouang and
possibly other territory con-
trolled by the Kong Le - Pathet
Lao forces, presumably to con-
duct his long-promised consul-
tations with officers and min-
isters "loyal to him." The
length of his stay and his pre-
cise intentions are unclear; in
all likelihood Souvanna hopes to
be able to return to Phnom Penh
so as to hold himself in readi-
ness for any call to form a gov-
ernment of national reconcilia-
tion in Laos. Souvanna has con-
sistently supported Sihanouk's
14-nation proposal as the best
of the various international ap-
proaches to the Laotian crisis.
According to bloc radio-
broadcasts, Souvanna arrived at
the Plaine des Jarres on 22 Feb-
ruary, where he was greeted by
Souphannouvong and Captain Kong
Le. Hanoi radio claimed that
Souvanna's arrival speech blamed
the United States for "hindering
the realization of the policy of
peace, neutrality, and national
harmony in Laos" and congratu-
lated "the government, army, and
Pathet Lao fighting units for
having liberated Xieng Khouang
and the Plaine des Jarres." Ac-
cording to Hanoi, Souvanna de-
scribed the neutral nations
proposal as "devoid of any prac-
tical value." Even if Souvanna's
visit to Xieng Khouang proves
of short duration, it will tend
to bolster the claim of the
Communist-supported shadow gov-
ernment there to be the "legal
government of Laos."
oumiha o ered to go to
Phnom Penh in an effort to in-
duce the former premier to re-
turn to Vientiane. Souvanna
reiterated his preference for
a government of national rec-
onciliation which would include
the Pathet Lao but indicated
that he would accept as an al-
ternative a nonpolitical govern-
ment headed by the King which
would be charged with preparing
for new elections.
The Boun Oum government
continues to be under pressure
to broaden its base whether Sou-
vanna returns or not. There are
abundant signs, however, that
it views with some distaste the
necessity of offering positions
to persons from regions of the
country other than the south
and who represent more moderate
tendencies than its present mem-
bers. Sisouk na Champassak,
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_'Lao Kay ~J
ien Bien
Phu
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Laos' UN delegate who has re-
turned to Vientiane to assist
in the search for means to ease
the crisis and improve the gov-
ernment's position, complains
that many of the ministers,
including Phoumi, are resisting
suggestions for expansion
of the cabinet, principally
for fear of losing their
jobs.
The military situation
appears to be fairly stabilized
at the moment, with a general
stalemate obtaining between
the government and the oppos-
ing Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
in Xieng Khouang Province, and
relative quiet prevailing else-
where in the country. Govern-
ment forces attempting to move
east on Route 7 toward the
Plaine des Jarres remain stalled
a few miles from the junction
with Vientiane - Luang Pra-
bang road by a combination of
strong enemy resistance and
heavy rains during the past few
days.
On the southern approach
to the Plaine des Jarres,
modest gains by the government
Anticipating West German
Chancellor Adenauer's talks
with British Prime Minister
Macmillan on 22 February, the
USSR on 17 February restated
its position on the German and
forces have been made possible
by what appears to be a calcu-
lated enemy withdrawal to tight-
en the defensive perimeter and
to minimize harassment by pro-
government Meo partisans who
are increasingly active in this
area.
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the Plaine des Jarres.area.
Aerial reconnaissance detected
two convoys moving westward
on Route 7 from Nong Het l
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Motor convoys are con-
tinuing to bring supplies to
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE WEST
Berlin questions in a memorandum
to Bonn. The memorandum was
delivered by Ambassador Smirnov,
who returned to Bonn with Khrur'.
shchev's reply to Adenauer's
letter of 18 October on repa-
triation of Germans in the USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The memorandum,, which prob-
ably foreshadows further diplo-
matic efforts to revive the
German and Berlin questions, was
apparently in response to Ade-
na.uer's attempts, acting through
the Austrian and Norwegian for-
eign ministers last fall, to
obtain clarification of the So-
viet position. It is probably
intended also as a reply to
Adenauer's conversation with
Smirnov in early January, be-
fore the ambassador returned to
Moscow, in which the chancellor
urged that disarmament be given
priority over the Berlin and
German problems in East-West
talks.
The Soviet memorandum
calls for negotiations on Berlin
without further delay. It re-
jects any consideration of the
"working in" period of the US
administration or the need to
await the West German elections,
citing these as a "train of de-
laying arguments."
As the first formal and
complete recapitulation of the
Soviet position since the Paris
summit, the memorandum reaffirms
standard proposals for a free
city in West Berlin and a Ger-
man peace treaty. It does not
insist on immediate implemen-
tation of the free city and re-
fers to a possible interim so-
lution with a fixed time limit.
This approach is similar to the
last Soviet proposal, made on
9 May, before the abortive
summit meeting. At that time
Moscow offered a two-year inter-
im solution, at the end of which
the four powers would be com-
mitted to establish a free city
and sign a peace treaty with
both German states.
The current memorandum also
repeats the general threat to
conclude a separate peace treaty
with East Germany, either at the
end of the interim period or
in the event that West Germany
refuses to participate in the
peace settlement. It also re-
peats the Soviet claim that a
separate treaty would liquidate
the occupation of Berlin and
force the Western powers to
negotiate access to Berlin with
East Germany.
In dealing with the in-
terim solution, Moscow asserts
for the first time that Bonn
has no authority to participate
in negotiations on such a agree-
ment. This position is in di-
rect contrast to the previous
Soviet position and ignores the
fact that East and West Germany
participated as observers at the
Geneva foreign ministers' con-
ference in 1959, when discussions
covered an interim agreement.
It also contradicts the Soviet
note of 2 March 1959 proposing
that both German states partic-
ipate in negotiations "on the
question of a peace treaty with
Germany and of West Berlin."
The new gambit is probably
designed to elicit a West German
demand to take part in any dis-
cussions--in which case the
Soviets could inject the East
Germans--or to draw a West German
refusal, which the USSR would
represent as an acceptance of its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
position that West Germany has
no legal relationship to West
Berlin.
The remainder of the Soviet
memo reaffirms that unification
and a peace treaty are separate
issues and charges that West Ger-
man "revisionism" over border
questions necessitates the con-
clusion of a peace treaty. The
memo also indicates the USSR
will consider West German coun-
terproposals if they are based
on the "present situation,"
meaning the existence of two
Germanies.
German War Prisoners
Khrushchev's letter to
Adenauer dealt only with the
question of repatriation of Ger-
man nationals in the USSR. The
Soviet premier returned to Mos-
cow's position of early 1960 that
formal repatriation ended on'31
December 1959 and henceforth
would proceed only within
framework of Soviet law.
The repatriation of Germans
from the USSR has had consider-
able domestic significance in
West Germany. Nearly 10,000
German war prisoners were re-
released in 1955 and 1956 in con-
nection with the 1955 agreement
to establish diplomatic relations
between Bonn and Moscow, and
their return enhanced Adenauer's
prestige. On the basis of a
1958 agreement, about 13,000
Germans went from the USSR to
West Germany. Bonn claims,
however, that there are
still 10,000 eligible Germans
in the USSR seeking to
emigrate.
Khrushchev UN Visit Called Off
Khrushchev may have reversed
an earlier decision to attend the
UN General Assembly session,
which resumes on 7 March. Czech
diplomats have indicated that
Khrushchev would not return to
New York for the UN meeting.
Czech Deputy Foreign Minister
Nosek also gave the impression
in private conversations with
US officials that he would
not be going to the General
Assembly as planned Land
hinted that the bloc might
boycott the session unless the
issue of Hammarskjold's position
was settled to the bloc.',s sat-
isfaction. The absence of bloc
foreign ministers, who might
normally attend at least the
opening of the resumed session,
might be intended as such a
"boycott."
Developments in the Congo
may have influenced Khrushchev
to pass up the General Assembly.
The Soviet leader probably recog-
nized that his decision to ex-
ploit Lumumba's death to the
maximum and renew his attacks on
Hammarskjold will make a sharp
US-Soviet clash unavoidable, and
that his personal participation
in such a debate would undermine
the prospects of a meeting with
the President during the UN
session.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Khrushchev's apparent
turnabout does not seem to
foreclose the possibility of
further Soviet attempts to
initiate high-level discussions
with the US either bilaterally
or in a_broader framework.
Soviet propaganda has given
widespread treatment to the
recent exchange of telegrams
between the President and Khru-
shchev, and Radio Moscow quotes
"many journalists" who view the
telegrams as an opening for a
"comprehensive dialogue and as
evidence of the desire to find
a common language in order to
settle the essential problems
of our times." Moscow's cover-
age of the President's press
conference on 15 February also
concentrates on the subject of
US-Soviet relations and plays
down the opposing Soviet and
American position on the Congo.
The Soviet press has re-
frained from giving an anti-
American flavor to its treat-
ment of the Congo question and
has resorted to such euphemisms
as Belgium's "NATO allies" in
implicating the US in charges
against Belgium, Hammarskjold,
and the Congolese leaders.
Indirect criticism of the
US has been conveyed only in
reports of Ambassador Steven-
son's UN speeches and quota-
tions from foreign press
sources.
Moscow now may revert to
its proposal for a special Gen-
eral Assembly meeting on dis-
armament with the participation
of heads of government. Chief
Soviet UN delegate Zorin in
private talks with UN delega-
tions has mentioned such a
meeting, and Moscow probably
has been sounding out UN
opinion before deciding to
press the proposal.
High Cuban officials have
on several recent occasions pub-
licly expressed willingness to
resume "normal" relations with
the United States, although
these statements clearly imply
prior acceptance by the United
States of Cuba's ties with the
bloc. The controlled press and
radio contrast Cuba's "concilia-
tory gestures" with what they
interpret as increasing signs
of US intransigence.
The Castro regime is court-
ing the newly inaugurated Quadros
administration in Brazil, but
there are indications that
Quadros thus far prefers a neu-
tral position and that the Bra-
zilian military would strongly
oppose close ties with Cuba.
Cuban media have lauded Quadros
for his "independence" of the
US, and Fidel Castro on 16 Feb-
ruary spent several hours
with the departing Brazilian
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ambassador, Vasco Leitao da
Cunha--the first time in over
a year he is known to have
talked alone with a Western dip-
lomat. The ambassador, who left
later the same day to assume the
second most influential post in
Brazil's Foreign Ministry, told
the Brazilian press on his re-
turn home that "Fidel Castro
emphasized to me that Cuba can-
not withdraw from the American
community" and that Castro ex-
pects President Quadros to visit
Cuba shortly.
Le.i-t,ao da Cunha was one of
the more knowledgeable diplo-
mats during his nearly three
years in Havana, and it is doubt-
ful that he succumbed to Castro's
blandishments; his private re-
port to high Brazilian officials
will probably be pessimistic
concerning Cuban developments.
Quadros, who visited Cuba last
year as a presidential candidate,
is not known to have expressed
an intention to return.
Ecuador's attempts to pro-
mote an inter-American effort
to "conciliate US-Cuban differ-
ences" appear to have met with
little favorable response. Cuba
is encouraging the Ecuadorean
move as it would encourage any
Latin American move that could
be used to demonstrate "US in-
transigence." Castro's recent
threat to support antigovernment
groups in other Latin American
countries--in retaliation for
US aid to Cuban refugees--has
led to bitter anti-Castro reac-
tions elsewhere in the hemis-
phere and serves to undercut
Cuban efforts to appear desirous
of maintaining normal relations
with other hemisphere countries.
Cuba's recognition of
the Gizenga regime in the Congo
on 16 February was accompanied
by propaganda blasts at the
United States, as well as at
the UN and Belgium, equaled
in virulence only,-by Communist
China's.
Inside Cuba, government
forces continue to try to
liquidate anti-Castro guerrilla
forces in the Escambray Moun-
tains of Las Villas Province,
but there is still no indication
that the operations are nearing
success. It has been over six
months since the government
initiated this effort and nearly
two months since it announced
the launching of a "major of-
fensive."
DE GAULLE - BOURGUIBA MEETING
Preparations are continuing
for a meeting between De Gaulle
and Tunisian President Bourguiba
--now reportedly set for 27 Feb-
ruary--to discuss the Algerian
problem. There have been press
reports that official contacts
have already begun secretly be-
tween the French and the rebel
Provisional Algerian Government
(PAG):.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Tunisian Secretary of
State for Information Mohamed
Masmoudi has made two trips to
Paris, where he talked with
De Gaulle, Premier Debr6, Min-
ister for Algeria Joxe, .and
Foreign Minister Couve de Mur-
ville. Masmoudi, an admirer of
De Gaulle, returned to Tunis
after the first trip reportedly
convinced of De Gaulle's sincer-
ity in'_desiring.to negotiate a
settlement.
Masmoudi said the French
nevertheless would have to
pledge the release of impris-
oned rebel leader. Ben Bella
and suggest a date to begin
negotiations in order to con-
vince the rebels of the "purity"
of De Gaulle's intentions. Ac-
cording to Masmoudi, De Gaulle
said that "at a minimum" he
would permit Ben Bella to come
to Paris to talk with Bourguiba.
Masmoudi and Habib Bour-
guiba, Jr. , told an official of
the US Embassy in Rome on 17
February that members of the
PAG, following a meeting with
Tunisian ministers the previous
day, now are in full agreement
that Bourguiba should meet with
De Gaulle in the interests of
bringing about direct negotia-
tions.
the rebels are deliber-
ate y not displaying optimism
about Bourguiba's mission for
fear of raising peace hopes and
thus bringing about a slacken-
ing of effort by fighting units
in Algeria. They feel, moreover,
that crucial substantive prob-
lems will remain even if Bour-
guiba succeeds in bringing the
French and the Algerians to the
conference table.
Most French officials,
while voicing cautious optimism,
continue to stress that achiev-
ing a negotiated settlement
would be a long and difficult
process. Like the PAG officials,
the French usually take this
line--or even a more frankly
pessimistic one--when comment-
ing to domestic or foreign lead-
ers who are pressing for evi-
25X1
25X1
Bence of ress toward a set-
tlement. pro
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3INO-SOVIET TREATY ANNIVERSARY
The USSR and Communist China declared that the West is pre-
observed the 11th anniversary of paring for a new war.
the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty
on 14 February with strong pro-
testations of their "everlast-
ing and unbreakable" solidarity.
Both sides also showed a desire
to submerge those unresolved
issues which were openly argued
prior to the Moscow conference
of world Communists last
November.
Peiping and Moscow normally
use the annual celebration as a
major occasion for affirming
their friendship and for demon-
strating their solidarity against
the West. Both have gone to
considerable lengths this year
to create a picture of harmony
which masks the true state of
their relationship.
Moscow gave the celebration
much more than normal attention,
larding its commentary with
extravagant expressions of
friendship and going out of its
way to accommodate Chinese views.
Speaking at the Chinese Embassy
reception in Moscow on 13 Feb-
ruary, presidium member Suslov
placed unusually strong emphasis
on Soviet government and popular
support for Peiping's "libera-
tion" of Taiwan. In addition,
Suslov made a rare allusion to
Moscow's 1958 declaration that
an attack on China would be
regarded as an attack on the
USSR.
Each side showed some dis-
position to seek common ground
and tailored certain statements
specifically for home audiences
of the opposite side. Speaking
in Peiping, the Soviet ambas-
sador offered a rare endorsement
of the Chinese communes as a
means to overcome natural calam-
ities. Writing for the holiday
issue of Pravda, the president
of the Chinese Sino-Soviet
Friendship Association echoed
Soviet formulations on the de-
structive power of nuclear war
and declared that wars (not
merely world wars) can be pre-
vented by the united action of
the Communists. Both sides
Peiping's interest in dis-
playing cooperativeness at this
time may be reinforced by its
current economic difficulties.
Preliminary talks on trade and
economic relations between the
two nations now are beginning in
Peiping, several months after the
usual start of the annual nego-
tiations. The delay reflects
both Chinese economic problems
and the uncertainties resulting
from the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The discussions are likely to be
especially arduous as a result of
the deterioration in Sino-Soviet
economic relations which began in
mid-1960 when Moscow abruptly
withdrew its technicians from
China.
Developments since then indi-
cate that a new stage has been
reached in economic relations.
Peiping now may be moving to
reduce its heavy dependence on
the Soviet Union and the rest of
the bloc. China's foreign minis-
ter, however, recently expressed
confidence that the current
talks will lead to a new agree-
ment on "mutual assistance and
cooperation."
Strong discontent with
each other's views continues,
however. Whereas Khrushchev
personally attended the Chinese
reception in Moscow, Mao Tse-
tung and his two top lieuten-
ants, who played the major role
in the dispute, did not go to
the Soviet reception in Peiping.
The Chinese kept up their subtle
pressure for a greater role in
policy formulation by empha-
sizing that Sino-Soviet unity
is the "cornerstone" of the
unity of the whole socialist
camp. Communist China offered
only limited endorsement of such
cardinal Soviet policies as
peaceful coexistence and dis-
armament and again promised to
"defend" the Moscow declaration--
a promise replete with possi-
bilities for a renewal of the
polemics at a later date.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM ARY
BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO AFRICA
Soviet President Brezhnev
has completed a 12-day visit
to Africa during which he
carried forwardthe USSR's effort
to identify itself with the
extremist, anti-Western views
of the leaders of Guinea and
Ghana. The high level of the
delegation accompanying Brezh-
nev suggests that Moscow in-
tended a review of all phases
of Soviet-Guinean relations,
with emphasis on future areas
of economic and political co-
operation, particularly with
regard to the Congo.
In view of the haste with
which the trip was scheduled
and the last-minute addition
of Ghana to the itinerary, it
may have been planned to count-
er growing indications in late
January and early February of
new Western attempts to find a
compromise formula to stabilize
the Congo situation.
TASS announced on 2 Feb-
ruary that a Soviet party dele-
gation would pay an official
visit to Guinea at the invita-
tion of President Tourd "in the
second half of February." The
group was to be headed by Brezh-
nev and to include the deputy
ministers of foreign affairs,
culture, and foreign trade, the
deputy chairman of the State
Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations, and the heads of the
First and Second African Depart-
ments of the Foreign Ministry.
Four days later, however, it
was announced that the schedule
had been moved up and that the
visit would begin on the 9th
and last for three days.
Rabat originally was to be
merely a stopover, but the stay
was extended to 36 hours on
short notice. Then, although
it had already been announced
that Brezhnev would leave for
Moscow on 16 February, he went
instead to Ghana for three days.
The stop in Morocco coin-
cided with the arrival of 14
gift Soviet MIG aircraft. An
agreement providing for large-
scale Soviet economic aid,
possibly including a $120,000,-
000 credit, reportedly was
initialed by Brezhnev and Crown
Prince Moulay Hassan. In the
past Morocco has rebuffed Soviet
offers to provide economic as-
sistance.
Commercial and cultural
exchanges were also discussed,
and Brezhnev invited Crown
Prince Moulay Hassan to visit
the USSR for the May Day cele-
brations. Brezhnev reportedly
praised the King for convening
the recent Casablanca confer-
ence and for his personal role
in its deliberations. The con-
ference, attended by radical
African heads of state, adopted
extreme anti-Western positions
regarding the Congo and Algeria
and endorsed other Soviet posi-
tions.
The close cooperation be-
tween the USSR and Guinea was
underscored during Brezhnev's
visit. In his speeches, President
Sekou Toure.praised the Soviet
Union as the "unselfish friend
and stanch champion" of newly
independent countries and op-
pressed peoples.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The joint communiqud
signed on 15 February stated
that the two countries had
reached full agreement on major
international problems, includ-
ing the liquidation of colonial-
ism, the need for general and
complete disarmament, self-
determination for Algeria, and
the prohibition of military
bases on foreign territories.
They pledged "firm and unquali-
fied support for the legal
Congolese Government of Gizenga,'
and placed total responsibility
for Lumumba's death on ':'Bel-
.gium, its allies, and the UN
Secretary General."
Although no announcement
has been made concerning eco-
nomic aid, the extent of Soviet
participation in construction
of Guinea's Konkourd Dam was
almost certainly discussed.
Soviet and Czech survey teams
have been in Guinea for several
weeks, and Tourd has previously
stated that the USSR is pre-
pared to extend the necessary
credits for the project.
Brezhnev's last-minute de-
cision to visit Ghana was ap-
parently at President Nkrumah's
request. The Ghanaian leader
may have wished to discuss in
more detail the wide range of
development projects, specified
in a December 1960 protocol,
to be carried out by the USSR
over the next several years.
He may also have hoped to
sound out Brezhnev on the
possibility of substituting
Soviet for Western aid in
connection with the $350,-
000,000 Volta project now
in the final stages of nego-
tiation with a Western con-
sortium.
The USSR's swiftness in
protesting the 9 February
"attack" by a French jet
fighter on the IL-18 carry-
ing Brezhnev to Morocco,
and the publicity given
the incident by Soviet news
media, underlined Moscow's
efforts to heighten anti-
French feeling among Afri-
cans. The Soviet leaders
probably hoped it would
also point up the inter-
nationalimplications of the
Algerian war and stiffen
the attitude of the rebel
government in anticipated
negotiations with France.
Moscow promptly published
on 12 February a Guinean
protest to France which
charged the French Govern-
ment with "abiding hostility
to any international detente
and the.policy of cooperation."
Khrushchev is expected to
make his long-awaited African
tour this year; he has accepted
invitations to the UAR, Morocco,
Guinea, Ghana, Togo, Liberia,
and Ethiopia. Travel plans of
several of the African leaders
appear to preclude a visit ear-
lier than midyear. While in
Guinea, Brezhnev noted that
Khrushchev would visit that
country "as soon as possible."
Brezhnev's visit provided key
African leaders with the personal
high-level attention that has be-
Macy.
come a hallmark of Soviet diplo-
23 Feb 61
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BELGIAN DIFFICULTIES IN RUANDA-URUNDI
Belgium's plan to lead its
trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi
to independence as two separate
states received a setback in
late January when leaders of
the provisional government of
Ruanda--the northern state--de-
clared it an "independent re-
public." This action reflects
the determination of one tribal
group to maintain its present
power and to exclude from the
government the former ruling
tribe ousted in late 1959 with
Belgian collusion.
Until 1955 Belgium had fol-
lowed a policy in Ruanda of sup-
porting the traditional Tutsi
aristocracy over the more numer-
ous but more backward Hutu tribe.
Belgium thereafter gradually
withdrew its support of the
Tutsi and their Mwamis (kings)
--who had become less respon-
sive to advice from Brussels--
and encouraged the serflike
Hutus to demand an end to Tutsi
domination. Tension between
the rival tribes mounted until
late 1959, when the Hutus, in-
spired by the Belgians, began
a year-long insurrection. After
deposing the Tutsi Mwami and
forcing nearly half the Tutsi
population into exile, the
Hutus in October 1960 estab-
lished a provisional government
in Kigali, the Ruanda capital.
The Hutu leaders were more
interested in persecuting the
remaining Tutsis and in secur-
ing their newly won positions
of power than in developing a
responsible government. The
Belgians, mindful of the Hutus'
administrative inexperience and
seeking to present at least a
facade of national unity to the
UN, sought to induce some of the
more moderate Tutsis to reassume
an active political role.
Meanwhile, the UN--with
the anticolonial Africans and
Asians interested in the cir-
cumstances surrounding the
ousting of the Mwami, still the
legal chief of state--recommended
in December that legislative
elections promised by Belgium
for January be postponed, and
the General Assembly dispatched
a fact-finding commission to
the trust territory. Preliminary
comment by a member of the com-
mission indicates that the re-
port--to be submitted to the
General Assembly's resumed session
next month. -will be very critical
of Belgium's administration.
The increased UN activity
brought a further deterioration
of relations between the rival
tribes. In addition to lessen-
ing Tutsi enthusiasm for co-
operation with the Hutus, it
encouraged less moderate Tutsi
elements in exile to prepare for
the "liberation" of Ruanda.
The Hutu leaders, con-
vinced that the UN resolution
will strengthen the Tutsis, de-
clared Ruanda. an "independent
republic," although still under
the guidance of the UN and Bel-
gium, and announced a new gov-
ernment which excluded even
token Tutsi participation.
Brussels responded by is-
suing a statement on 1 Febru-
ary which implied de facto rec-
ognition of the Hutu govern-
ment. The statement also reiter-
ated Belgium's responsibility
to the UN for administering the
trusteeship and urged tripar-
tite discussions with the UN
and the Ruanda regime on the
current situation and on grant-
ing complete independence next
year. An official in Brussels
told the American ambassador on
9 February, however, that Bel-
gium may "throw up its hands"
in Ruanda and present the whole
problem to the General Assembly
at its resumed session in March.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE t"EEICLY SUMMARY
TANGANYIKA TO SEEK INDEPENDENCE THIS FALL
Julius Nyerere, chief minis-
ter of Tanganyika, made a strong
effort to persuade Br?.tish Colo-
nial Secretary Macleod to desg-
nate 1 October as the date for
the independence of this East
African trust territory during
the 27-30 March constitutional
conference with British offi-
cials in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere,
a moderate nationalist consid-
ered the ablest native leader
in East Africa, probably hopes
this move will undercut the grow-
ing popularity of the rival--and
increasingly extremist--African
National Congress (ANC) and oth-
er dissident minorities, which
are expected to form a single
opposition party within the next
six weeks.
London has already promised
early independence for Tanganyika
but would be reluctant to set an
early date because of the polit-
ical situation in Britain and
in its other African territories;
London may give its consent, how-
ever, if convinced by Nyerere
that this move is necessary to
preserve his position.
Nyerere's action also re-
flects a change of tactics. He
has been promoting the estab-
lishment of an East African fed-
eration, which would include
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda.
Heretofore, he had urged that
the federation include terri-
tories which had achieved only
internal autonomy, on the ground
that newly independent states
would be reluctant to surrender
the prestige of national sover-
eignty. He had indicated a
willingness to delay Tanganyika's
independence until other pro=
spective member territories had
reached a similar level of self-
government.
This position has been
heavily attacked by Nyerere's
opponents. The ANC, which has
not hitherto been a serious com-
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petitor to Nyerere's Tanganyika
African National. Union (TANU),
may soon develop into a danger-
ous opposition movement. ANC
President Mtemvu, who polled a
meager 67 votes against his
TANU opponent's 7,500 in last
August's legislative elections,
was, by December, attracting
audiences numbering several
thousand.
These potential ANC support-
ers reacted enthusiastically to
Mtemvu's charges that TANU had
failed to keep its campaign prom-
ises to provide abundant jobs,
"Africanize" the civil service
rapidly, and expand educational
opportunities in the territory.
These and similar attacks made
by ANC leaders have caused a
considerable amount of criticism
from leaders in the Tanganyika
Federation of Labor--hitherto
an arm of TANU--and even from
some TANU members of the Legisla-
tive Council. Furthermore, when
Mtemvu returns from a current
fund-raising trip to Moscow and
Peiping, he probably will launch
colorful and well-planned mem-
bership campaigns while renewing
attacks against Nyerere's admin-
istration.
Nyerere may also be forced
to modify his pro-Western orien-
tation in order to refute op-
position charges that he is an
American tool as well as to pla-
cate some important leaders of
his party who have long disagreed
with what they identify as the
US position on the Congo. Many
of his lieutenants are openly
contending that Katangan Presi-
dent Tshomb6 is an "American
creation." In a press conference
on 16 February, an ANC spokesman
announced a day of mourning for
Lumumba and requested the Tangan-
yika Government to close both
the Belgian and American consu-
lates in the country and to deny
the use of Dar es Salaam's port
facilities to these countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
North Vietnam's admission
of failure to fulfill agricul-
tural goals belies its claim
to have successfully completed
its Three-Year Plan (1958-60).
Rice output in 1960 was report-
edly, 4,470,000 tons--only 80
percent of the revised goal--
compared with a claimed 5,190,000
tons in 1959 and 4,580,000 tons
in 1958. However, total food
production in 1960 is believed
to have been about the same in
1960 as in 1958.
Last year's drop in rice
output probably was the result
mainly of natural calamities.
The stepped-up socialization
drive may also have affected
the harvest; the regime claims
that 85 percent of the peasants
now are in agricultural coopera-
tives.
Demands on agriculture--
to meet the needs of a rapidly
growing population as well as
to supply raw materials for
local industry and for export--
have grown steadily. Reluctant
to call attention to last year's
poor crop, the government has
blamed deficiencies in manage-
ment and distribution for the
food problems. State procure-
ment agents apparently have not
picked up the state's full quota
of rice, and as a result, illegal
sales, speculation, and hoarding
continue. Rations of rice ap-
parently have been cut in both
rural and urban areas.
For the period 1958-60, the
regime has claimed an annual
average increase of 17 percent
in the gross value of output by
light industry, including food
processing. In heavy industry,
still relatively small in North
Vietnam, value of output was
reportedly three times higher
in 1960 than in 1957.
Agriculture and light in-
dustry will receive continued
attention in the Five-Year Plan
(1961-65), and initial steps
will be taken to develop heavy
industry, beginning with electric
power, metallurgy, and machine
building. Original targets
called for an average annual in-
crease of 20 percent in the
gross value of industrial out-
put and 10 percent in agricul-
tural output.
Recently announced targets
for 1961 are even more optimistic,
calling for an increase over 1960
of 29 percent in industry and
nearly 29 percent in agriculture.
Production of rice is to be
raised from 4,470,000 tons in
1960 to 5,563,000 tons this
year. The achievement of such
a sharp jump seems highly un-
likely, especially since even
greater gains are planned for
other sectors of agriculture;
industrial crops are to increase
63 percent,. livestock 44 percent,
and fishery production;.20 percent.
China on 31 January extend-
ed an additional credit of
$157,000,000 in support of North
Vietnam's Five-Year Plan, boost-
ing total bloc aid since 1955 to
about $882,000,000. The new
credit will be used to build or
expand 28 enterprises in the
fields of metallurgy, power
generating, light industry, and
railways. The minister of light
industry stated recently that
the new agreement will create
more favorable conditions for
the production of consumer goods
"to ameliorate the people's
conditions."
Since domestic resources
are inadequate, goals for the
Five-Year Plan appear overly
optimistic, and the scheduled
progress in agriculture and light
industry can be achieved only if
bloc aid continues. Emphasis on
heavy industry may increase, but
significant gains will depend on
obtaining additional bloc aid.
Prepared by ORR)
23 Feb 61
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WEEKLY REVIEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PRO-COMMUNIST "PEACE" CONFERENCE TO MEET IN MEXICO
The "Latin American Con-
ference on National Sovereignty,
Economic Emancipation, and Peace"
scheduled for Mexico City from
5 to 8 March, is a Communist-
backed event designed to promote
anti-US and pro-Castro sentiment.
Sponsored principally by former
Mexican President Lazaro Carden-
as, a Stalin Peace Prize winner
and high official of the Commu-
nist-dominated World Peace Coun-
cil, the conference is expected
to draw a large number of left-
ist and Communist delegates from
most of the 20 Latin American
countries, Asia, Africa, and the
Sino-Soviet bloc.
The World Peace Council, its
Mexican affiliate, and the Cuban
Government appear to be the main
organizational and financial
backers of the conference. Lead-
ing figures in addition to Car-
denas include Vicente Lombardo,
head of the Communist regional
labor organization, the Cuban
ambassador to Mexico, and a
number of Mexican ,and other
Latin American 'leftists pri-
marily connected with"the "peace"
movement in the hemisphere.
The Mexican Government is
neither obstructing nor openly
supporting the event, probably
in deference to Cardenas' po-
litical prestige and influence,
especially among radical ele-
ments. Nevertheless, if violent
anti-American demonstrations
CHILE'S CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS'
The Chilean congressional
elections of 5 March are being
fought mainly on issues .con-
nected with President Alessan-
dri's efforts to cope with in-
flation along the lines of the
US-backed stabilization program.
should be instigated by the
Mexican leftist student groups
which have been asked to par-
ticipate, the government would
probably intervene promptly to
maintain order.
The tentative agenda of
the conference will include such
topics as anti-imperialism, anti-
colonialism, defense of national
resources, and disarmament, as
well as support of the Cuban
revolution. These subjects
coincide precisely with those
advocated by Latin American
Communist delegates who proposed
a "People's Congress" for Latin
America at special sessions in
Moscow in early 1959 at the
time of the 21st Soviet party
congress. As then projected,
the congress was to be sponsored
overtly by prominent leftist
figures in the area--including
Cardenas--with Communist partic-
ipation camouflaged. It was
to be in support of the Cuban
revolution and national economic
resources, and designed to spread
anti-US sentiment. in the hemisphere.
impact.
tation may give the conference
a substantial anti-US propaganda
The Mexican peace conference
seems to be the fruition of sev-
eral Communist efforts to con-
vene a "people's congress," which
was originally set for April 195q
the height of Castro's prestige
in Latin America. Cardenas' repu-
Popular resentment of some of his
austerity measures is expected to
result in minor losses by the
Conservative and Liberal parties,
which support Alessandri, but
to leave pro-Alessandri parties
still in control of both houses.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
The US replaced Great Britain as the largest direct investor
in Chile during World War II, and direct US investments now ac-
count for approximately 70 percent of total foreign investments
in Chile. About two thirds of 0 investments are in the mining
industry, primarily copper-the country's principal export and
primary source of government revenue and foreign exchange. Only
in Canada does' the US have a greater investment in mining. Pub-
lic utilities, manufacturing, and trade are, in that order, the
next most important areas of direct US investment. In 1958 such
Leftist parties have tried to
push closer relations with the
bloc as a remedy for the coun-
try's economic difficulties.
The increasing number of visit-
ing bloc delegations in recent
months--Chile has no diplomatic
relations with the bloc--may
in part be an attempt to embar-
rass the government. A Hungari-
an mission, in talks with offi-
cials in Santiago, has tried
to exploit Brazilian President
Quadros' statements on expand-
ing relations with the bloc,
and has pointed to the US bal-
ance-of-payments and unemploy-
ment problems.
The Communist party, legal-
ized since the last congres-
sional elections, will be ableto
campaign openly for the first
SECRET
particularly the militant So-
cialist party,whose pronouncements
usually parallel the Communist
line--and may lead to heightened
tensions within the Popular Ac-
tion Front (FRAP), the coalition
of far-left parties dominated by
the Communists and the Social-
ists.
The FRAP candidates are
expected to poll about 25 per-
cent of the popular vote. If,
in addition, left-wing ele-
ments in the middle-of-the-road
Christian Democratic and Radi-
cal parties become significant-
ly stronger, there will bp
growing pressure on Alessandri
to modify his conservative do-
mestic and foreign policies.
time since 1947. It
now controls six seats
in the Chamber of Deputies,
and some observers ex-
pect it will double that
number and acquire two
of three seats in the
Senate. Any gains prob-
ably would be at the
expense of other left-
ist parties, however--
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
COMMUNIST CHINA'S NATURAL RESOURCES
Since 1953, Communist
China has been making a deter-
mined effort--organized under
several five-year plans--to ex-
ploit its natural resources to
the maximum. Before the Com-
munists came to power in 1949,
these resources were for the
most part developed by the ex-
igencies of circumstance--the
pressure of population in the
case of agriculture, and for-
eign interest in the case of
industry--rather than by de-
sign. This resulted in a high
degree of development of agri-
cultural resources but very
little of industrial resources.
The regime began a pro-
gram in 1952 to locate and
evaluate its natural resources,
but it will be many years before
potential reserves can be fully
proved. Thus, with few excep-
tions, current production is
based on the intensive exploi-
tation of resources known to
exist before 1949. For these
reasons, Western estimates of
Chinese reserves are based on
proved reserves plus potential
reserves where these are likely
to be proved within the next
five or ten years.
Reserves of iron ore are
believed to be over 10 billion
tons. While the iron content
of much of the ore is low, as
in the USSR, there is as yet no
indication that this will pre-
vent China from becoming one of
the largest steel producers in
the world.
Deposits of.coking coal
are also large, and, like those
of iron ore, sufficiently well
distributed to permit the es-
tablishment of large iron and
steel centers in various re-
gions. The three most important
sites are at Anshan in the
northeast and the two now un-
der construction at Wuhan, in
Central China, and Paotou in
the north.
China also has enough of
the alloying element manganese
to support a large expansion
of the 1960 steel output of
18,000 ,000 tons. Potential re-
serves are estimated at 300,-.
000,000 tons, compared with
proved reserves of 2.2 billion
tons in the USSR and only
negligible amounts in the US.
Chinese deposits, if proved,
would constitute the world's
third largest--after the USSR
and India.
Copper reserves are esti-
mated at 10,000,000 to 20,000,-
000 tons, substantially below
the 32,500,000 tons in the US
and 35,000,000 tons in the USSR
but probably adequate for Chi-
na's needs. Domestic produc-
tion of copper has been inssuf-
ficient so far, but this is
attributable more to bottlenecks
in processing than to a lack of
ore.
I
COMMUNIST
I
UNITED STATES
USSR
CHINA
METALS
(million metric tons)
Manganese
300
negligible
2,200
Copper
10-20
32.5
35
Bauxite
500**
50
600
Tin
1.9
0
0.5
Iron Ore
10
38
(billion metric tons)
POWER SOURCES
(billion metric tons)
Coal
1,500***
1,700
8,700
Crude Oil
1.2***
4.3
3.4
Hydroelectric Potential
270-320
90
197
(million kilowatts)
LAND
(thousand square miles)
Total Area
3,725
3,023
8,648
Cultivated Area
432
625
849
Sawn Area
579 - 617****
594
752
Forests
386
1,000
2,868
* Available figures not calculated on a comparable basis.
** Made up of shale and clay.
**? Potential as opposed to proved.
**** Areas of multiple croppings are counted more than once,
resulting in a total figure higher than that for cultivated land.
10214 23 FEBRUARY 1961
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, WEEKLY SUMMARY
Reserves of aluminum ore,
consisting of aluminous shale,
clay, and diaspore, are esti-
mated at 500,000,000 tons. China
has no bauxite--a superior
source of aluminum--whereas the
US has bauxite reserves of 50,-
000,000 tons and the USSR 600,-
000,000 tons. Chinese reserves
of aluminum ore are, however,
considered ample both for future
industrial development and for
export.
China is believed to have
proved tin reserves of 1,900,-
000 tons; the USSR has 500,000
tons, and the US none. Chinese
production, estimated at 34,000
tons in 1959, has changed the Com-
munist bloc from a tin-deficit
to a tin-surplus area.
Reserves of many other
metals are also large. China
has the world's largest deposits
Yemen o~ 1'U.NEN
of tungsten, the world's sec-
ond largest deposits of molyb-
denum, and reserves of anti-
mony, magnesium, and mercury
which are more than ample for
current and future needs. It
also has rich deposits of rare
metals, such as beryllium,
columbite, and tantalite, and
may have important reserves of
those minerals essential to
the production of fissionable
materials, notably uranium.
China's only mineral ore
deficiency is in chromium and
nickel, While these are impor-
tant alloying materials, the
need to import them does not
significantly reduce China's
over-all resource position.
Energy
China has abundant high-
quality coal. The Communists
cnorhdsenn_._ ` !? ~..
rsalogm Fe
sAS1N
kanour ~?, ' f
o\` pl? M.SNfjU= l.+eUNA
A.1`1
~...,~ / ..J,'P K
SELECTED RESOURCE SITES
Hydroelectric fatuity Fe Iron-ore deposit
Mn Manganese deposit
Gen-id Al Alumina deposit
Coalfield Cu Copper deposit
SII in deposit
W Tungsten deposit
21 r6dil CY 1961
- Al Cu
Hu no ?sap F('
ING
pE1Q
Pso t'
AN
LU
cn'.n&tu
Cu sI
K.e rAla?
~
Cu
~nm n.
VIE2tdAM
~f THAILAND % S ~.,1
SECRET
0 200. 400 all.
00n.5n
no 400
O
c.~ C,morcada.
nao ~ r.?
WY6 aY A \
11(~Q{0R-~g
00 ~"~,`-?5E L~~
on.t: l
H ?ei v. ti o.nan??
23 Feb 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 2 of 10
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
have estimated their reserves
at 1.5 trillion tons, about
44.2 billion tons of which are
probably by Western standards,
"proved." At the 1959 produc-
tion rate--almost 350,000,000
tons--such proved reserves
would support production for
more than 100 years.
Over 80 percent of China's
coal is bituminous, which is
well suited to industrial and
other heating applications. Al-
though coking coal constitutes
a relatively small proportion of
total reserves, there is enough
to support a large expansion of
the iron and steel industry.
The abundance of coal is
made more important by defi-
ciencies in petroleum and fire-
wood. Mgreover, about 85 per-
cent of China's output of elec-
tric power in 1959 was from
thermal plants which burn coal.
Railroads, the main form of
modern transportation in China,
also depend on coal.
Proved reserves of natural
crude oil are believed to be
only 130,000,000 tons, although
potential reserves may be as
high as 1.2 billion tons. How-
ever, such a potential, if
proved, would sustain an annual
crude production over 25 years
of only about 40 to 50 million
tons. This is approximately 10
to 15 times that of 1960, but
only a fraction of present out-
put in the US and USSR.
China does have large re-
serves of oil shale which could
probably yield as much as 15
billion tons of oil. However,
technical problems and high
costs make it economically un-
feasible to exploit the shale
resources to this extent.
Communist China has had to
import almost half its petroleum
supply and will probably con-
tinue to be dependent on for-
eign suppliers, although to a
lesser degree, for many years
to come. Development costs and
the remote location of known
reserves, whatever their real
potential, will probably pre-
vent domestic production from
keeping pace with the increased
demand for petroleum generated
by industrialization.
The technical potential of
China's water-power resources--
the maximum amount of power
technically exploitable regard-
less of cost--is estimated to
be between 270,000,000 and
320,000,000 kilowatts, compared
with about 90,000,000 in the US
and 197,000,000 in the USSR.
However, many of the locations
of water-powered potential are
far removed from present or fu-
ture major centers of industry
and population. Under present
plans, hydroelectric plants
are to provide about a third of
China's generating capacity by
the end of 1967. Even then,
only about 5 percent of the
country's technical potential
would have been exploited.
Hydroelectric projects
now under construction include
the plants at Sanmen, on the
Yellow River (with a planned
capacity of 1,100,000 kilo-
watts); at Liuchia, also on the
Yellow River (1,050,000 kilo-
watts); at Tanchiangkou, on the
Han River (900,000 kilowatts);
and at Chienchi, on the Min
River (1,200,000 kilowatts).
These projects are part of the
regime's long-range plan to
develop new industrial centers.
They are also an integral part
of the water conservancy program,
which it is hoped will both mod-
erate the ravages of China's
recurrent floods and provide ex-
tensive irrigation facilities.
Agricultural Resources
China's agricultural re-
sources, although extensive,
are small in relation to the
demands they must meet. In
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CUR .ENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
addition to feeding and cloth-
ing an enormous population--
700,000,000 at the end of 1960--
they must provide export goods
to finance the imports of ma-
chinery and equipment necessary
for industrialization. The ex-
tent to which these needs are
met depends predominantly on
the degree to which yields from
land presently under cultiva-
tion can be increased,and to a
lesser extent on the degree to
which new agricultural re-
sources can be developed.
With a population more
than 3.5 times that of the US,
Communist China has a culti-
vated land area--about 430,000
square miles,or 12 percent of
total land area--equal to only
about two thirds that of the
US and one half that of the
USSR. Moreover, the Chinese
population is growing more
rapidly than either the Amer-
ican or the Soviet. Because
of extensive multiple cropping,
however, total crop acreage
(about 600,000 square miles),
as distinct from cultivated
land, is roughly equal to that
in the US and about 80 percent
of that in the USSt.
Cultivation of farmland
on the China mainland is more
intensive than anywhere except
Japan and Taiwan. Multiple
cropping, extensive irrigation,
and maximum use of natural fer-
tilizers combine to offset lack
of machinery and chemical fer-
tilizer and to maintain yields
well in line with the world
average. Cultivated land is
concentrated in the eastern
one third of the country, the
western part being generally
too mountainous and arid. Al-
though China farms only about
12 percent of its total land
area, there is little potential
for any appreciable increase in
cultivated area.
It will thus be difficult
for the Chinese to increase
agricultural output rapidly
and cheaply. Attempts to en-
large cultivated area through
reclamation and additional
double-cropping have so far
failed to justify the high cost.
Increases in agricultural pro-
duction, a factor vital to the
industrialization program, must
come mainly from better seed
and the application of addi-
tional labor, water, chemical
fertilizer, and, in selected
areas, agricultural machinery.
Climatic conditions are
another key factor. Fluctua-
tions in the amount and distri-
bution of rainfall are frequent,
particularly in central and
northern China, and droughts
anC floods periodically cause
serious crop losses. Success
in applying modern technology
to lessen the effects of
drought, floods, and other na-
tural calamities will be an im-
portant determinant of China's
economic growth. Crop losses
from calamaties in 1960 aggra-
vated an already precarious
food situation and were an im-
portant factor behind a cut-
back in industrial expansion
in 1961.
Agriculture thus consti-
tutes the most important weak-
ness in the country's resource
pattern and will remain so for
a long time. Since the coun-
try's farmland has just begun
to feel the impact of modern
technology, there is every pos-
sibility for increasing agri-
cultural output sufficiently to
maintain economic growth, but
time and money are needed.
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The Communist-dominated
General Labor Confederation
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNIIARY
THE ITALIAN CO:vIiv1UN IST PARTY
The Communist party (PCI)
still commands the support of
about one in every four Italian
voters, many of whom vote for
the Communists as a means of
protest against the government.
The improvement since World
War II in Italy's standard
of living has not overcome
the maldistribution of wealth
and unemployment which the
Commmunists exploit. The Com-
munists have also profited
from the instability of Italian
cabinets in recent years
and from the government's
failure to reflect in any
considerable measure the
voting trends to the left.
The party's immediate aim
is to block the threat of
political isolation implicit
in attempts by its former
supporter, Socialist leader
Pietro Nenni, to bring his
party into an alliance with
the center parties.
Present Standing
Communist party member-
ship claims have declined from
2,000,000 in 1954 to less than
1,800,000 in 1358-60. Some
estimates put it as low as 1,-
400,000 as of April 1960. The
Communist party vote has consist-
ently, been strong in central
and northern Italy, and in the
late 1960s the party expanded
its efforts in the south. In
the nationwide voting for pro-
vincial councils last year,
however, the south showed
a loss of about one percent
despite a slight national
gain for the Communists
over 1958. Although there
was some retrenchment in
its press program during the
slump following the Hungarian
revolution, the party's
daily Unita maintains a
circulation comparable to
that of Italy's largest in-
dependent newspaper.
Since Giuseppe Saragat
split the Socialists in 1947
(IN PERCENT)
CONSTITUENT CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES LOCAL PROVINCIAL
ASSEMBLY 1946 1948 1953 1958
COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) 19.0 31.0 22.6 22.7
SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI)20.7 12.7 14.2
COUNCILS 1960
24.5
14.4
the Communists have been the
second-largest political ele-
ment in Italy. They have im-
proved their voting per-
centages steadily despite ad-
verse. foreign and domestic
developments. Their electoral
success is particularly remark-
able because it has been ac-
companied by a fall-off in the
strength of the party's labor
arm and the defection of Pietro
Nenni, leader of the Italian
Socialist party.
(CGIL) has more
members than Italy's
two major free
unions combined,
and the number of
CGIL offices manned
by Communists is
far out of pro-
portion to the
number of Commu-
nists among about
1,500,000 members. In shop
steward elections, nearly
50 percent of industrial
labor supports the CGIL can-
didates; however, these in-
clude Socialists as well as
Communists.
Like the other parties,
the Communists in recent years
have had difficulty in recruit-
ing youths; the Communist youth
federation, the FGCI, has de-
clined in membership from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
450,000 in 1954 to
200,000 in 1960. The
women's group, the
UDI, has also fallen
off. Joint Socialist-
Communist organiza-
tions such as the
"Committee for Re-
birth of the South"
have been abandoned
by the Socialists and
have largely col-
lapsed, although the
Socialists continue
to participate in im-
portant organizations
such as the CGIL and
the national associa-
tion of resistance
fighters (ANPI), as well as in
consumer and other cooperatives
that are dominated by the Com-
munists.
At the same time an influx
of postwar Communists into the
PCI central committee and as of-
ficers of provincial party fed-
erations has reduced the organ-
ization's dynamism by bringing
in persons without experience
of party discipline under
stress. It can be expected to
result in fractionalization
over controversial issues such
as Moscow's policies, the par-
ty's handling of the Nenni So-
cialist defection, and Commu-
nist cooperation with rightists--
as occurred in the Sicilian re-
gional government.
bitter polemics.
Togliatti's deputy,
Luigi Longo, a hero
of the anti-Fascist
resistance and more
blindly responsive to
Aoscow than is Togli-
atti, is perhaps more
often mentioned as a
possible successor.
Should the Soviets
revert to the hard
line, deputy Pietrc
Secchia, a hard-core
revolutionary, might
emerge as a contender.
Thus far Togliat-
ti has successfully
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Prominent Communist deputy
Giancarlo Pajetta is reported
to have become involved during
the past two weeks in an intra-
party disagreement regarding
relations with Nenni. A mem-
ber of the party directorate,
Pajetta had been mentioned as
a possibility to succeed party
Secretary Palmiro Togliatti--
now 68--although he does not
appear to have the necessary
party-wide support.
Giorgio Amendola, also a
deputy of and directorate mem-
ber, might be a successor pre-
ferred as having a more flexible
approach than Pajetta and bet-
ter past relations with Nenni,
although in recent years Nenni
and Amendola have carried on
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SECRET:. ..
played off potential rivals,
and his eventual successor may
be a dark horse.
Sources of Weakness
Once it had lost its bid
for political power in the im-
mediate postwar years, the PCI
had to work under increasingly
difficult conditions. Italy's
economic situation improved;
the party was obliged to ad-
here to the unpopular Soviet
cold-war line; and financial
contributions from Moscow were
declining.
The situation was aggra-
vated by the line taken by
Khrushchev's policy at the
Soviet party congress in 1956.
The Italian party was disrupted
and disoriented and lost such
prominent and capable members
as Antonio Giolitti, its in-
tellectual spokesman, and Eu-
genio Reale, diplomat and former
party treasurer. At the same
time Pietro Nenni publicly at-
tacked the basic systems of
both Soviet and Italian Com-
munism.
The most severe blow to
PCI prestige was probably the
break with the Italian Socialist
party. Since Nenni announced
the end of the unity-of-action
pact with the Communists:in 1956,
the two parties have engaged in
a continuous controversy, al-
though Communists and Socialists
continued closely identified in
the CGIL, cooperatives, and
over 1,000 local governing
bodies. On the vote confirming
Fanfani's government in August
1960, the Socialists for the
first time in 13 years abstained
in preference to joining the
Communists in the opposition.
In November 1960 the Socialists
for the first time presented
provincial election slates in
competition with Communist lists.
The prospect of PCI politi-
cal isolation sharpened in early
1961 when the Christian Democrats
accepted Socialist collabora-
tion in forming municipal gov-
ernments in the key cities of
Milan and Genoa.
Sources of Strength
Despite these blows, the
Italian Communist party leader-
ship probably views the future
with some optimism. Rumors
that Togliatti is about to be
replaced have died down during
the past year, and his position
in international Communism is
relatively high. After some
initial hesitation over Khru-
shchev's criticism of Stalin
he quickly stepped into line,
and now is firmly behind Mos-
cow in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
although friction on the issue
continues within the party.
He may anticipate that
Soviet foreign policy will
create less difficulty for the
Italian party than was usually
the case in the 1950s, but even
if he is called on to defend a
new switch, he probably hopes
to rely heavily on the increased
prestige the USSR has derived.
in recent years. The Soviets'
success in orbiting the first
space satellite in the fall of
1957 and their more recent Venus
probe offer dramatic opportuni-
ties for Italian Communist ex-
ploitation.
The Italian Communist
party, besides being accepted
as a respectable political
group, has heavily penetrated
the Italian cultural field.
Furthermore, the party retains
its wartime prestige as leader
of the anti-Fascist resistence,
and it was natural for the So-
cialists and members of the
center parties to join the Com-
munists in the anti-Fascist
rallies which precipitated the
downfall of Premier Tambroni
in mid-1960. While politically
motivated strikes called by
the Communists no longer at-
tract the mass response Com-
munist agitators were able to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
elicit just after the
war, the riots this
summer showed that
issues such as anti-
Fascism can still
elicit joint action
with the Communists.
In the spring of 1960
ITALY
RIOTRIRUTION OF BRATS ON IMY CITY COUNCIU
FOUOWIIW EOCM RE SLOWS OF 4 NOYFMI9 IMO
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MINI
DEMOCRATS SOCIALISTS LIBERALS REPUBLICANS COMMUNISTS SOCIALISTS NRO?FASCISTS MONARCHRT OTIW
Home (80 .eats) 28 3 3 1 19 11 12 3 --
Mt1an (80 seat.) 25 8 6 -- 17 17 6 2
Turin (80 .eats) 27 8 6 1 20 12 2 2
Genoa (80 seat.) 27 6 3 1 22 17 4
Venice (60 seat.) 23 4 2 -- 14 13 3
Florence (60 seats) 22 4 3 -- 20 8 3
Naples (80 seats) 21 1 1 -- 19 5 3 30
Palermo (60 seats) 24 2 2 -- 9 4 5 5
the Communists were Rzo=.
able to exploit dis-
orders between civilians and
government paratroops in Pisa
and Leghorn.
A rash of short strikes
later in 1960 indicates a new
urgency in labor's demands.
Management no longer discrimi-
nates against the Communists
in order to secure US-backed
contracts for manufacture of
military materials, and recent
shop steward elections have
again given the CGIL strong
support. On genuine economic
issues the Christian Democratic
and Social Democratic labor
unions participate in strike
activity with the CGIL, as in
the December walkout of metal-
workers.
Moreover, Italy's basic
socio-economic ills, which the
Communists have long decried,
are still to be cured. The
disparity in wealth between
north and south has not been
overcome and maldistribution of
wealth between social classes
is still great. While the in-
dustrial north has a per capita
income comparable to that of
France, the national average is
pulled down drastically by large
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 1
( REPUBLICANS (PRI)
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS 177- -
PSDII
~
poverty-stricken areas in the
south, where, in contrast with
the national trend, the latest
figures show income down and
unemployment up; economic condi-
tions in the south closely re-
semble those of Greece and
Portugal. Even allowing for
the reported one-third reduction
of unemployment in the past
two years, some 5 percent of
the labor force of 20,000,000
is still jobless, and many
others are underemployed..
Then, too, improvement of
the economy has created a "rev-
olution of expectations" which
helps the Communists. In the
November local elections, al-
though they lost in the de-
pressed south where they had
earlier shown brief gains, the
Communists recouped in the
prosperous area--central and
northern Italy--where they had
earlier been losing ground.
Despite the impact of the
Hungarian revolt on Italian
opinion, large numbers of voters
in Italy are willing to express
their dissatisfaction with their
own government in a protest vote
for the extreme left.
Government Policy
VOTE CONFIRMING
FANFAN I GOVERNMENT
5 AUGUST 1960
SUPPORT
ABSTAIN
OPPOSITION
SOUTH TYROLEANS(SVP)
N-VALDOSTAN UNION (UVD)
5-INDEPEND'T MONARCHISTS
-NEO-FASCISTS(MSU
MONARCHIST
The domination
of the national govern-
ment by one party
during virtually all
of the postwar period
gives the Communists
an increasingly ef-
fective issue. In ad-
dition to charges of
legislative inaction,
they have been able to
cite such specific
cases of official
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
corruption as the Montesi scan-
dal of 1953 and the Giuffre
financial swindle in 1959--
both of which allegedly in-
volved Christian Democratic
cabinet members--as well as
the current uproar over con-
tracts for the new Rome airport
at Fiumicino. The Communists
have astutely soft-pedaled the
issue of clericalism, stressing
rather the cynicism and general
malaise which has developed in
Italy during the Christian Demo-
crats' monopoly of power.
The Christian Democrats
probably realize that as a
matter of practical politics,
their ability to keep their own
party together, derives in some
degree from their posture as de-
fenders of Italy from the largest
Communist group outside the Sino-
Soviet bloc. Possibly for this
reason, they have failed to take
effective action against the
Communists in some areas--where
it would seem to have been pos-
sible--such as curtailing East-
West trade
n addition the
minor parties supporting the
government are reluctant to
urge legal measures which, al-
though designed to curb the
Communist party, might never-
theless threaten their own
civil liberties.
More important, the in-
ability of a government sup-
ported by groups of diver-
gent economic ideology to agree
on needed socio-economic re-
forms has resulted in a series
of short-lived cabinets and
the narrowing of the center
parties' parliamentary major-
ity to less than 2 percent.
The Christian Democrats' power-
ful right-wing minority last
year prevented the party from
forming a viable reformist gov-
ernment with a broadened major-
ity based on Socialist parlia-
mentary support. Such tactics
threaten to drive the Socialists
back into the opposition with
the Communists.
The failure of Italian
governments to reflect the
national voting trend to the
left also swells Communist
support. Last summer the
Christian Democratic Tambroni
government's reliance--despite
the disapproval of all other
parties--on neo-Fascist parlia-
mentary support permitted the
Communists to achieve solidarity
with the democratic parties in
anti-Fascist demonstrations,
which in some cases the Com-
munists turned into bloody
riots. The situation gave them
an opportunity to attempt a re-
newal of Communist-Socialist
cooperation which would put a
roadblock in the way of a rap-
prochement between the Socialists
and the Christian Democrats.
The Socialist - Christian
Democratic coalition in the
Milan and Genoa city govern-
ments has reportedly led PCI
leaders to disagree over whether
a more flexible attitude should
be adopted toward the Socialists
in order to avoid eventual iso-
lation on the national level.
The immediate Communist objec-
tive is to stymie Nenni's at-
temptto win broad Socialist
backing for a move toward rap-
prochement with the Christian
Democrats following the So-
cialists' March congress.
Communist mass appeal and
voting strength depend princi-
pally on factors outside the
party: the state of the
world's prosperity, the cold
war, Communist ideological
turns, and the domestic polit-
ical and particularly the eco-
nomic policies of the Italian
Government. In the short run,
formation of a rightist govern-
ment would push the moderate
left--even including left-wing
Christian Democrats--toward
joining ranks with the Communists
in a kind of popular front,. In
the long run, an authoritarian
government which deferred elec-
tions indefinitely would face
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the threat of disturbances pos-
sibly leading to civil war.
Some political leaders apparent-
ly continue to fear that former
premiers Tambroni or Scelba or
some other rightist leader will
return to power and espouse
such methods.
Formation of a Socialist-
supported government which would
undertake basic socio-economic
reforms is obviously feared by
Communist strategists. Even
under such a government, how-
ever, the damage to party for-
tunes would probably be gradual.
The poverty in some areas is
still sufficiently intense and
the appetite for consumer ameni-
ties has been sufficiently whet-
ted elsewhere to keep the Italian
populace vulnerable to class-
war propaganda.
The party's propaganda
machine has shown itself adept
at magnifying the effect of
even a mild recession like that
of 1958, and at the same time
attributing all economic gains
to Communist pressure on the
business and political com-
munities. The habit of protest-
voting is deeply ingrained in
Italy, and if the PCI becomes
the only opposition party on
the left it will probably be
able to draw the protest vote
until the Socialist--or some
other--party emerges as a
democratic alternative to
Christian Democratic govern-
ment.
If, on the other hand, an
Italian government with a
parliamentary majority en-
larged by Socialist support
should fail to act on socio-
economic reforms, Nenni's party
could be expected to suffer a
fate similar to that of Demo-
cratic Socialist Saragat. When
Saragat split away from Nenni
in 1947, he took more than half
the Socialist deputies with him
but--as a result of his inabil-
ity to influence the govern-
ment's social policies--he now
controls less than one fifth
as many as Nenn:i. This time,
the lost deputies would go to
the Communists.
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