CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003100090001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
croc:
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 64
OCI NO.0274/61
6 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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DOCUMENT NO.
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NO-CHANGE IN CLASS. D `~~ -?r"
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 April 1961
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet reply to Britain's note seems to reflect
a desire to arrive at a political settlement, and the ma-
jor questions to be settled now are the timing and loca-
tion of an international conference and the establishment
of a cease-fire. The Laotian Army, following the loss of
Tha Thom, has launched an offensive aimed at retaking Muong
Kassy, the initial phases of which apparently were
successful. However, reports of recent Soviet airdrop
activities suggest that threats to the government positions
may be developing in ang Vieng area south of Muong
Kassy.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Opposition to the UN in Katanga reached a new peak
following an incident on 3 April at Elisabethville air-
port between UN troops and a Katanga contingent. Both
sides later announced that "normal relations" had been re-
established, but further outbreaks could occur. Efforts
to bring about a reconciliation between Gizenga and the
Leopoldville regime are continuing, apparently with some
initial success. The impasse between the UN and Congolese
at the port of Matadi continues.
. . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The USSR's initial response to the new Western pro-
posals at the nuclear test ban talks suggests that
it is undecided on its,future course. Soviet delegate
Tsarapxin limited his remarks to acceptance of those
Western concessions that agreed with previous Soviet
positions. The US delegation believes that the USSR's
most likely tactic will be to protract the negotiations,
possibly pending developments in US-Soviet relations.
Foreign Minister Gromyko told Ambassador McCloy on 30
March that the Soviet proposal for a tripartite ad-
ministration of the control system was a "sticking
point" and admitted that the USSR desired a veto.
The head of the Polish UN delegation has told an
American official that the talks at Geneva would be
deadlocked until after negotiations on general dis-
armament had started and shown some signs of progress.
. . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Increased activity has been apparent in the past week
among anti-Castro groups both inside Cuba and in exile.
New outbreaks of guerrilla activity have occurred in
Oriente Province and near the border between Las Villas
and Matanzas provinces. A number of international
gatherings sponsored by Communist-front organizations
are planned in Cuba for the coming months, providing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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further opportunities for spreading Castro influence
elsewhere in the hemisphere. The Cuban complaint of
US "aggression" is shortly to be discussed in the UN
General Assembly's main political committee.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Although both sides have indicated that talks will
not begin at Evian on 7 April as scheduled, the door ap-
parently has not been closed completely on a negotiated
settlement. The rebels canceled plans for the talks
ostensibly because they objected to a recent public
statement by the French that they would consult with
other Algerian groups. The PAG is probably attempting
to force further concessions from the French, although
there are indications that the rebels' willingness to
negotiate may in fact have diminished. The French are
not expected to compromise on their basic position that
the PAG is not the sole spokesman for Algeria.
EAST GERMAN REGIME FAILS TO HALT REFUGEE FLOW. . . . . . . Page 12
Ulbricht's efforts to placate the populace, con-
ciliate the professional class, and bring the regime's
economic goals more into line with its resources have
not reduced the East German refugee flow to West Berlin.
More than 5,200 refugees reportedly arrived in West
Berlin over the Easter week end, and more than 30,000
fled during the first quarter of 1961, up from about
20,000 a year ago. These flights not only drain East
Germany's already short supply of manpower, but also
impair the regime's prestige. However, Khrushchev's
desire to avoid any Berlin incidents at this time pre-
vents Ulbricht from attempting to solve the problem
through the imposition of measures to bar East German
access to West Berlin.
BULGARIAN REGIME UNCOVERS PARTY OPPOSITION . . . . . . . . Page 13
Sofia has announced the "discovery" of an opposition
group within the party. This group opposes slavish ad-
herence to Soviet practices and advocates policies in
accord with Bulgaria's national interest. The regime
last winter had tried to suppress news of the opposition
groups, but rumors of its existence apparently forced the
official admission this month. An effort has been made
to implicate the Yugoslavs in the matter, probably in
part to distract attention from the internal causes for
opposition. The situation is under control, but serious
dissatisfaction is reported in the middle and lower
ranks of the party.
TITO' S AFRICAN TOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
During the first part of his two-month African tour--
which included visits to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea,
and Mali--President Tito apparently has had some success
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 April 1961
in his attempts to portray Yugoslavia as Africa's fore-
most champion in Europe. He has been attempting to
convince African leaders that they could profit by
Yugoslav policy and experience in solving their own
problems and has privately warned that neither the
Soviets nor the Chinese Communists can be trusted.
Now in Morocco, Tito plans to his tour with
trips to Tunisia and the UAR. 25X1
CAMEROUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The pro-Western government of the independent Repub-
lic of Cameroun, already beset by a Communist-influenced
terrorist campaign, fears that its survival is threatened
by the results of the recent plebiscite in the neighbor-
ing British Cameroons trust territory. The southern
part of the territory, a stronghold of elements hostile
to Cameroun's moderate Moslem President Ahmadou Ahidjo,
voted to join Cameroun, while the northern portion,
where Ahidjo would expect to find support from conserva-
tive co-religionists, chose to join Nigeria. Ahidjo,
with little apparent prospect of success, is pressing
in the UN--which supervised the votin for an annul-
ment of part or all of the results. 25X1
SENEGAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Senegal's pro-French President Leopold Senghor,
whose position has been weakening for some time because
of internal dissension and personal rivalries, faces
mounting opposition, especially on the part of younger
and more radical elements. There is increasing friction
between him and Premier Mamadou Dia. The premier's
apparent determination to press for an early decision
on a number of pending issues could precipitate a
political upheaval resulting in the President's en-
forced retirement.
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THE EICHMANN TRIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Israel expects the Adolf Eichmann trial not only to
remind the world of the extremes to which anti-Semitism
can be carried but also to link refugee Nazis with some
Arab rulers, particularly Nasir. Trial testimony may
embarrass prominent Israelis involved in wartime
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6 April 1961
negotiations.--with Eichmann for the release of interned
Jews. Communist propaganda will exploit any evidence
which establishes the connection of present West
German officials with the Nazi regime. Further re-
percussions from the trial may be felt during this
summer's election campaign in West Germany.
CHEN Y I IN INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
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Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi was partially suc-
cessful during his visit to Djakarta last week in estab-
lishing a new basis for amity in Sino-Indonesian rela-
tions. Resentful of Peiping's past belligerence, however,
the Indonesians slighted Chen on his arrival, restricted
his movements to the Djakarta area, and cut his visit
by two days. Nevertheless, Chen signed a friendship
treaty and cultural agreement with his hosts and re-
opened the question of Chinese economic aid. He also
joined with Foreign Minister Subandrio in a call for
a new Afro-Asian conference, a move which both have
long favored but which has been coolly received in
some other capitals in the area. 25X1
RECENT GROWTH OF THE INDIAN ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The Indian Army, which has received increasing at-
tention since the Sino-Indian border flare-up in 1959,
has been increased from 410,000 to 500,00
r- I
BRITAIN'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
Britain's growing difficulties in international
markets last year resulted in its largest balance-of-
payments deficit on current account in the four
deficit years since 1951, according to figures re-
leased in advance of the government's annual budget
message on 17 April. Speculation against the pound
last month resulted in a loss of $173,600,000 in
Britain's gold and dollar reserves. Pressures are grow-
ing for the government to depart from its current emphasis
on anti-inflationary fiscal policies in favor of measures
designed to stimulate economic growth.
CHANGES IN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
Alfons Gorbach, who will become chancellor of
Austria's People's party - Socialist government on 11
April, is reshuffling the cabinet in an effort to resolve
internal difficulties in his People's party and improve
its prospects in the parliamentary elections due in 1962
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play a more vigorous role than his predecessor, Julius
Raab. His four new ministerial appointments reflect
a desire to inject more youth and energy into the con-
6 April 1961
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moderate reform element in the party, and intends to
duct of national as well as party affairs,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The civil-military directorate that came to power on
25 January is trying to overcome the resistance of El
Salvador's powerful landowning class to a series of
moderate economic and social reform laws promulgated in
March. These reforms are not being implemented fast
enough to suit many young officers, and their pressure
is likely to bring about a reorganization of the cabinet
in the near future.
Page 25
SPECIAL ARTICLES
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THE TWO-CHINAS ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Chinese Communists are laying increasing stress
on their opposition to settling the Taiwan problem on the
basis of a two-Chinas concept. This issue not only plays
a decisive part in Communist China's attitude toward the
UN but is also a critical element in other areas of
foreign policy. Peiping insists, for example, that Japan
must reject the two-Chinas formula before there can be
any considerable expansion of Sino-Japanese trade. The
Chinese Nationalist leadership is equally opposed to
any de jure separation of Taiwan from the mainland, but
has on a few occasions demonstrated some tactical
flexibility on the issue.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
The Soviet reply on 1 April
to the British proposals on Laos,
while accepting the UK sugges-
tion for a joint appeal by the
Geneva co-chairmen for a cease-
fire in Laos, did not advance
the USSR's position in any es-
sential respect beyond that
stated in its aide-memoire of
18 February to the UK proposing
the immediate convening of the
ICC and an international con-
ference. However, the Soviet
note did propose the "inter-
ested parties" of Laos should
hold negotiations on questions
connected with a cease-fire.
This suggestion provides fur-
ther evidence that the bloc
will seek to avoid any commit-
ments on a formal cessation of
hostilities prior to a confer-
ence.
The Soviet note implicitly
rejected the Western position
that a conference cannot be
held until the effectiveness
of a cease-fire is verified by
both the Geneva co-chairmen and
the International Control Com-
mission (ICC). Moscow said that
the ICC should call a meeting
as soon as possible in New
Delhi and present its report to
the co-chairmen. However, it
failed to spell out the author-
ity and functions of the pro-
posed ICC meeting.
The Soviet note did stip-
ulate that the renewal of the
ICC should in no way impede the
convocation of a conference.
This formula suggests that the
bloc would seek to restrict the
ICC to a fruitless debate,
at least during the period
before an international confer-
ence.
The Asian Communists
Chines Communist; Foreign
Minister Chen Yi, speaking to
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newsmen in Djakarta on 2 April,
was quoted by Western press
services as saying that Peiping
is prepared to respond to any
intervention by SEATO forces by
introducing Chinese troops, if
requested by the "legal govern-
ment of Souvanna Phouma." The
timing of this threat, following
on the heels of the Soviet note
to the UK, suggests that Pei-
ping's immediate intention
is to create a sense of ur-
gency and generate further pres-
sure on non-Communist govern-
ments to accept bloc terms on
Laos.
On 5 April, after waiting
three days, Peiping broadcast
its own version of Chen Yi's
press conference and quoted
him as saying that if SEATO in-
tervened and if a request were
received from the Souvanna gov-
ernment, China would "not remain
idle." In both the Peiping and
Western press versions of the
Djakarta interview, Chen re-
called the Chinese entry into
the Korean war when the US,
"menacing China's security, car-
ried the fighting to the Yalu
River." While this Peiping
broadcast has made Chen Yi's
warning more ambiguous, it un-
derscores Communist China's de-
termination to present its in-
terests as vitally linked to
Laotian developments.
Moscow, in broadcasting
Chen Yi's remarks, quoted him
as saying Peiping "will not
remain indifferent" to SEATO
intervention but omitted
reference to the Korean war
or to Nationalist irregulars in
Laos.
Chen Yi used his Djakarta
press conference to allege that
a threat is posed by the Na-
tionalist troops, and Peiping
has increased its propaganda
attention to this issue over
the past week. On 31 March,
Peiping claimed for the first
time that the irregulars have
conducted raids into Chinese
territory from Laos.
Communist China, North
Vietnam, and the Pathet Lao
have all indicated their en-
dorsement of the Soviet pro-
posals on Laos.
Pathet leader Souphannou-
vong, in a 1 April statement,
and 3ouvanna Phouma's Xieng
Khouang "representative" Quinim
Pholsena, in a statement of 2
April, both demanded the with-
drawal of "US, Thai, South Viet-
namese, and Chinese Nationalist
military personnel." The emphasis
on this withdrawal suggests it
is a point which may be used to
prolong any cease-fire negotia-
tions that may be held.
Laotian Government spokes-
men, meanwhile, have indicated
satisfaction over progress in
East-West discussions on Laos,
as well as a readiness to nego-
tiate with Souvanna Phouma and
the Pathet Lao toward the pos-
sible formation of a govern-
ment of national unity. The
danger of a panic appeal for
assistance from SEATO has been
reduced by Vientiane's reassur-
ance that the great powers are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
moving toward achieving a cease-
fire. Laotian spokesmen have
expressed readiness to accede
to a cease-fire, although Vien-
tiane had previously declared
that the Soviet airlift must
end and North Vietnamese troops
must be withdrawn before it
takes effect.
The Boun Oum government,
however, is still concerned
over the possibility that pro-
Communist forces will take ad-
vantage of any transitional
period before a final settle-
ment to seize control through-
out the country.
Souvanna Phouma in turn,
during his recent talks with
British officials, professed
concern over a possible improve-
ment in Phoumi's position in
any interim before the conven-
ing of an international con-
ference. Although Souvanna, in
outlining his views on the
composition of a transitional
government in Laos, seemed to
appreciate the desirability of
restricting "leftist" ministers
to minor posts, the British
found him overconfident on the
prospect of holding early elec-
tions. British officials told
the American Embassy in London
that despite the risks, they
regard him as the only Laotian
offering promise toward a polit-
ical settlement and a neutral
Laos.
Souvanna now is in Paris
and will visit Belgrade, Warsaw,
Moscow, and Peiping before re-
turning to Phnom Penh.
The Military Situation
Laotian government troops
on 5 April launched a combined
air-ground offensive aimed at
the recapture of Muong Kassy,
about 20 miles south of the Phou
Khoun road junction on Route
13. The action involves a si-
multaneous drive toward the
town by paratroop and infantry
elements airlifted to a point
just north of Muong Kassy and
by government forces positioned
south of the town. The initial
phase of this operation appar-
ently took the enemy by sur-
prise, and continued success
would provide a much-needed 25X1
boost to government morale.
A developing threat to the
government forces south of Muong 25X1
Kassy may be indicated by re-
ports of Soviet air drops possi-
The fall on 31 March of
Tha Thom, the government's main
base south of the Plaine des
Jarres, was a serious psycho-
logical blow to the government
troops. They fled in disorder
under intensive artillery fire
from heights overlooking the
town and have withdrawn south-
ward to Pak Sane. Meo guer-
rillas, who have been effective-
ly harassing the Pathet Lao
north of Tha Thom, now are in
a more isolated position and
have come under increased enemy
pressure.
Army officers in Luang
Prabang have also been concerned
over unconfirmed reports of Kong
Le - Pathet Lao flanking move-
ments around government troops
blocking the southern approach
to the city on Route 13 and of
troops moving toward the city
from the Nam Bac area to the
north.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UN efforts to reach an
agreement with the Congolese on
the question of UN troops in
the lower Congo region remain
stalemated. In Katanga, Moise
Tshombe's military effort
against Baluba tribesmen
threatens to involve the UN in
a clash there.
UN-Congolese relations in
Leopoldville have improved dur-
ing Rajeshwar Dayal's absence
in New York, but the Congolese
still oppose the re-entry of
UN troops into the Matadi area.
Hammarskjold remains adamant
that his troops must return to
the port eventually; however,
he is attempting a moderate ap-
proach to the issue.
On 3 April he told Ameri-
can and British officials in
New York that he would propose
to the Congolese that a force
limited for the time being to
100 Nigerian police be sent to
Matadi. He planned to ask for
an early answer and stated that
if no favorable reply were re-
ceived, he would bring the matter
before the Security Council.
President Kasavubu follow-
ing his recent visit to the
lower Congo has reiterated his
opposition, asserting that the
return of UN troops to the port
would inflame the civilian pop-
ulation as well as possibly pro-
voke disorders on the part of
Congolese armed forces.
In a 3 April speech to the
Indian Parliament, Nehru took
note of the "campaign against
Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal" and made
public his opposition to the
replacement of Dayal t'either
now or in the immediate future."
He implied that India's willing-
ness to maintain troops in the
Congo would be partly conditioned
by the UN's position on Dayal.
Meanwhile, in a move de-
signed to placate opposition
to Belgium in the UN, Brussels
has announced that it is ready
to comply with the Security
Council resolution of 21 Feb-
ruary calling for the withdrawal
of Belgian personnel from the
Congo. It continues to insist,
however, that it has no direct
control over most of the Bel-
gian military and civilian "ad-
visers" in the Congo.
Exploratory discussions on
a rapprochement between Leopold-
ville and the Gizenga regime in
Stanleyville were begun when
Leopoldville Provincial Presi-
dent Kamitatu--with the bless-
ing of Kasa'ubu's government--
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visited Gizenga on 3-4 April.
Kamitatu told an American of-
ficial on his return that he
believed Gizenga would accept
a subordinate ministerial posi-
tion under virtually any promi-
nent personality, provided the
government was approved by par-
liament. Further discussions
between Leopoldville officials
and Gizenga reportedly are to
take place this week.
Discussions in late March
between the military represent-
atives of Leopoldville's Gen-
eral Mobutu and Stanleyville
commander Lundula reportedly
were cordial and may lead to a
meeting of the principals at
Lisala about 10 April. The
military leaders, who believe
that the UN may intend to dis-
arm all Congolese armed units,
fear that the Congo Confeder-
ation plan proposed at the
Tananarive conference would
fragment the military forces
along with the political dis-
memberment of the Congo.
The Gizenga regime is
still complaining about the
failute of bloc and African
states to furnish sup-
plies.
Katanga is now the scene
of greatest tension. Tshombe's
forces, led by about 60 South
Africans, have captured Manono,
their first goal in reasserting
Tshombe's authority over dis-
sident areas of north Katanga.
They apparently have also moved
on to Kabalo. The UN Command,
endeavoring to enforce its
previously proclaimed cease-
fire, has moved Indian troops
into Katanga at Kamina in the
face of Tshombe's threats that
their presence could mean "war."
Hammarskjold told the General
Assembly on 5 April that the
entire Indian contingent of
4,700 troops would be stationed
in Katanga. Most of the con-
tingent, which is being sent
by sea, is scheduled to land at
Dar es Salaam this week end.
It will then be airlifted to
Kamina.
Elisabethville is tense,
largely because of fear that
Indian troops may be landed
there. On 3 April there were
disorders at the airport
against Swedish troops after
Katanga government officials
had aroused the populace to ac-
tion against the UN. The next
day, local and UN officials
reached an agreement to per-
mit joint control of the air-
port by Katanga and Swedish
troops. The UN agreed to give
Tshombe's government notice
of anticipated movement of UN
troops into Katanga.
On 5 April, however,
Irish troops were sent to
reinforce the Swedish forces
at Elisabethville without ad-
vance notice. Renewed dis-
orders may occur at any time
if reports of the imminent
arrival of the Indian troops
gain public circulation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The USSR's initial re-
sponse to the Western proposals
at the nuclear test ban confer-
ence suggests that Moscow is
still undecided as to its future
course of action. After having
previously indicated that a re-
ply would be forthcoming after
the Easter recess, chief Soviet
delegate Tsarapkin on 4 April
limited his remarks to accept-
ance "in principle" of those
Western concessions that accept-
ed previous Soviet positions.
He stated that Soviet special-
ists were still studying other
portions of the new Western
plan. Although Tsarapkin adopt-
ed a more positive tone than he
has used in his informal com-
ments outside the conference,
his statement represented no
change in existing Soviet posi-
tions.
The Soviet delegate ac-
cepted 1) the American and Brit-
ish proposals for a permanent
ban on testing in outer space;
2) the Western offer to permit
Soviet technicians to inspect
nuclear devices to be used in
both the research program for
improving detection methods
and in explosions for peaceful
purposes; and 3) Western agree-
ment to a veto over the total
budget.
Tsarapkin showed no flexi-
bility on those aspects of the
proposals where the West was
not fully in accord with Mos-
cow. He maintained the Soviet
position that there should be
one-for-one parity in nuclear
detonations for the peaceful
uses program. He also stated
that the USSR continued to in-
sist on a veto over individual
portions of the budget and
charged the West with incon-
sistency in agreeing to the
right of an over-all veto with-
out allowing a veto on specific
items. He concluded by describ-
ing his acceptance as a'"posi-
tive step." On the following
day Tsarapkin again pressed
the Western delegations to re-
cord the conference's agree-
ment in principle to the points
accepted by the Soviet dele-
gation.
Although Tsarapkin failed
to reiterate the Soviet proposal
for a tripartite administration
of the control system, Foreign
Minister Gromyko told Ambassa-
dor McCloy on 30 March that
this was a "sticking point"
for the USSR and admitted that
Moscow desired a veto. Gromyko
said that while Moscow would
make a serious study of the
American proposals, he was not
impressed thus far. As an ex-
ample, he stated that the USSR
did not consider Western reduc-
tion in proposed control posts
in the USSR from 21 to 19 an
important gesture.
In a subsequent conversa-
tion with an American official
on 3 April, the head of the
Polish UN delegation, who par-
ticipated in the McCloy-Gromyko
talks, stated that he had re-
ceived the impression from
Gromyko afterward that the test
ban negotiations would be
"locked " with no real progress
until alter the talks on general
disarmament had started and
shown some signs of advance.
The Pole said he believes the
USSR is not completely aware
of the serious negative effect
a failure at Geneva would have
on the US attitude toward
general disarmament.
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Prior to Tsarapkin's re-
marks on 4 April, the US dele-
gation had been inclined to be-
lieve that the USSR would pre-
fer to have the West take any
action in breaking off the con-
ference and that the most likely
Soviet tactic would be to pro-
tract the negotiations. This
would have the advantages for
Moscow of prolonging the cur-
rent uncontrolled moratorium,
of providing opportunities for
underlying US and British di-
vergences to emerge if pres-
sure mounted in the US for re-
newed testing, and of giving
the USSR some justification
for refusing nuclear weapons
to the Chinese Communists.
The delegation, however,
believes that, in view of the
forthcoming general disarmament
talks, the next French test
may be used as a possible pre-
text for a Soviet move to termi-
nate the talks--on the grounds
that a test ban in itself would
not contribute to disarmament--
and to propose a merger of a
test ban with other disarmament
plans, There are no current
signs that the USSR intends to
withdraw, but both the American
and British delegations are in-
creasingly inclined to believe
Anti-Castro Groups
Increased activity has been
apparent in the past week among
anti-Castro groups both inside
Cuba and in exile. Holy Week
was the occasion for new popular
that prospects for reaching a
quick agreement on an accept.
able basis are not bright.
Soviet propaganda commen-
tary on the talks dropped off
during the Easter recess. After
their resumption, however,
Pravda published the text of
fi aapkin's interview with CBS
correspondent Schorr on 23
March in which the Soviet dele-
gate termed the main Western
proposals unacceptable. In an
interview with the East German
news service on 30 March, Tsar-
apkin described the Western
concessions as "much ado about
nothing."
a treaty invalid.
Referring to the US offer
of parity representation on the
control commission, Tsarapkin
said that consent to the prin-
ciple of parity "was linked
with so many conditions that in
practice very likely nothing
will be left of it." He claimed
that on all other essential
points except those which ac-
cepted known Soviet positions,
the US was "simply adhering to
its old point of view, which
is unacceptable to the Soviet
Union." Tsarapkin also charged
that continuation of French test-
ing 25X1
would directly endanger the
the conference and would render
demonstrations against the gov-
ernment in Havana and elsewhere
on the island as the Roman
Catholic Church, although rela-
tively weak in Cuba, came in-
creasingly to be identified among
some segments of the opposition as a
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rallying point for the anti-
Castro, anti-Communist cause.
Where, particularly in Oriente
Province and near the Las Villas
- Matanzas border
25X1
25X1
The guerrilla bands in the
Escambray Mountains continue ac-
tive
New outbreaks of guerrilla
activity have occurred else-
The Communists continue to
use Cuba as a base for spreading
their influence elsewhere in
the hemisphere. Preparations
are under way for holding a
meeting of the executive com-
mittee of the Communist-front
International Students'Union in
Cuba next month.
An "international volun-
teer labor camp" for youths is
scheduled for Cuba in June. A
conference of Latin American
Women is to be held possibly
this month in Brazil to prepare
for a World Congress of Women
in Cuba later this year under
Communist-front auspices. In-
vitations are going but to a
number of countries, in Latin
America as well as the Sino-
Soviet bloc, for representatives
to participate in May Day cele-
brations in Cuba.
These various gatherings
in Cuba will provide further
opportunities for liaison among
Latin American and bloc Commu-
nist leaders and for spreading
Castro influence among suscep-
tible groups from other countries.
Cuban Minister of Educa-
tion Armando Hart, now traveling
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in several bloc countries, con-
cluded a five-year cultural
agreement with the East German
regime on 29 March providing
for the exchange of cultural
groups, TV programs, and "in-
formative material." Although
East Germany remains the only
bloc country with which Cuba
does not yet have formal diplo-
matic relations, recent East
Berlin broadcasts have reported
the arrival there of a Cuban
"mission," apparently permanent,
which was greeted by officials
of the East German Foreign Min-
istry.
Municipal officials of
Moscow and Peiping are current-
ly touring Cuba, returning the
recent visits by the former
Havana municipal councilor.
The Economy
The recent visit to Vene-
zuela by the Soviet ambassador
to Mexico was followed by re-
ports that Moscow is seek-
ing to have Venezuela resume at
least a portion of its petroleum
exports to Cuba. Although the
Soviet Union has considerably
expanded its tanker fleet since
it began providing Cuba with all
its petroleum needs in mid-1960,
a resumption of Venezuelan oil
shipments to Cuba would relieve
the USSR of at least a portion
of an expensive burden.
The Cuban refineries were
built to process Venezuelan
crude, and have not operated as
efficiently with the Soviet
product, which has a relatively
high sulfur content. In addi-
tion, the "lighter" Soviet crude
does not provide the quantities
of fuel oil required by Cuba,
which necessitates large addi-
tional imports of fuel oil.
It is unlikely that Venezuela
will soon resume its traditional
exports to Cuba. In any event,
Venezuela's insistence on cash
payment for its oil sales would
require Moscow either to pro-
vide Cuba with the neces-
sary foreign exchange or to
reimburse Caracas for its ex-
ports to Cuba under some sort
of triangular trade arrange-
ment.
Cuban sugar production ap-
pears to be prodeeding at a
normal rate despite frequent
fires in the canefields. Che
Guevara, in his 28 March speech,
implied that production had al-
ready nearly reached the 4,000,-
000 tons which the Sino-Soviet
bloc is committed to buy. This
quantity, about two thirds of
the total expected crop, will
be sold or bartered to the bloc
at a premium price of four cents
per pound. The remainder--the
"sacrifice crop" for which the
workers are to receive lower
wages--is to be sold on the
free world market. Morocco,
Japan, and Chile have already
contracted for Cuban sugar at
prices equal to or slightly
below those prevailing in the
world market.
At the UN
Cuba's complaint of US
"aggression and acts of inter-
vention" may be discussed in
the UN General Assembly's main
political committee as early as
10 April. Certain members of
the Afro-Asian bloc are reported
planning to present a resolu-
tion highly critical of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
United States. The Mexican
and Ecuadorean UN delegates be-
lieve that it would be prefer-
able for the Latin American
.members to submit their own pro-
posal "calling for peaceful
settlement" and citing UN Char-
ter provisions --o1.a.ting to use
of regional organizations for
settlement of disputes. Such a
resolution, particularly if
it had Latin American sponsor-
3hip, V,11ould command wide support
in the 99-member General As-
sembly,
For some weeks Cuba's pub-
lic position has been that it
is willing and anxious to engage
in bilateral discussions with
the US, provided such discus-
sions are "on a basis of equal-
ity and with an open agenda,"
but that the present attitude
of the US Government would make
any such discussions at this time
"useless.'
FRANCE-ALGERIA
The rebel provisional Al-
gerian government (PAG) has
modified its 31 March announce-
ment that it would cancel the
negotiations scheduled to begin
t Evian on 7 April, apparently
in an effort not to close the
door completely on a negotiated
settlement. However, the FAG
has announced that its repre-
sentatives will not arrive on
schedule, and it appears deter-
mined to force further conces-
sions from the French.
The French cabinet on 6
April issued a communique stat-
ing that the Evian talks would
not open on schedule because of
the attitude of the insurgents,
Officials of the Ministry for
Algerian Affairs apparently feel
that the rebels' 31 March an-
nouncement was an attempt to
exploit Joxe's speech in order
to rush the French into taking
a firm position on the issue of
the exclusive right of the PAG
to represent Algeria in negotia-
tions. France has repeated its
willingness to talk to the rebels
on the same terms they agreed
to in March, but it is not ex-
pected to compromise its funda-
mental position that the PAG
alone cannot decide the future
of Algeria.
The PAG position is out-
wardly a reaction to French Min-
ister for Algeria Joxe's confir-
mation on 30 March that prior to
and during the Evian talks France
would consult with other Algeri-
an groups--including the Algeri-
an National Movement (MNA). The
PAG considers that any sugges-
tion that the French would deal
with the rival MNA on the same
basis as with its representatives
would undermine the PAG claim
to be the sole spokesmen for the
Algerian people: The PAG lead-
ers undoubtedly feel that if
they went to Evian under these
circumstances they would be dis-
credited both internationally
and in the eyes of the rebel
fighting forces.
-1 el ministers Boussouf
and Yazid told the US ambassador
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in Tunis on 3 April that the
PAG considered Joxe's statement
symptomatic of basic French un-
willingness to negotiate "sin-
cerely" or "realistically."
Boussouf and Yazid, who stressed
that they were authorized to
speak for the PAG, pointed out
that the rebels had been aware
since 27 March of Paris' inten-
tion to consult the MNA and had
warned the French publicly and
privately that any such consulta-
tions would have to be completed
before the Evian talks to avoid
confusing them.
There are indications that
the PAG resolve to seek a nego-
tiated settlement may have di-
minished. The US embassies in
Tunis and Paris feel the PAG
may have a genuine fear of being
tricked or outmaneuvered. How-
ever, Tunisian Secretary of
State for Information Masmoudi
asserted on 3 April that the PAG
was delaying negotiations be-
cause rebelvice premier Belkacem
Krim's illness had prevented
agreement on the composition of
the Algerian delegation.
Tunisian President Bourguiba
told the US ambassador on 3 April
that the PAG leaders were not
following his advice to avoid
excessive caution. Bourguiba
further stated his opinion that
Cairo and Moscow were playing
on every fear and suspicion of
the PAG. He thinks the rebel
leaders are concerned over the
complexities of assuming power
in Algeria, and are not yet
ready to take sufficient
risks to crystallize independ-
ence.
Party leader Ulbricht's re-
cent "liberalizing" measures to
placate the East German populace
and bring economic goals more in
line with reality have not had
the desired effect of reducing
the refugee flow through West
Berlin. More than 5,200 East
Germans reportedly fled to West
Berlin over the Easter week end,
in addition to the 30,000 who
had escaped during the first
three months of the year; ap-
proximately 20,000 fled in the
first three months of 1960.
Among the escapees are
more than 5,500 young men of
military age who presumably are
seeking better job opportunities.
Intellectuals and professional
men also continue to escape in
large numbers. The West-East
flow--returning defectors as
well as some West German emi-
grants--was at one time an im-
portant countervailing influence
but appears to have dropped
sharply over the last 18 months.
At the 12th plenum of the
Socialist Unity party Z'SED")- end-
ing on 19 March, Ulbricht at-
tempted to take a middle-of-the-
road position on the refugee
question, apportioning blame for
the flights almost equally be-
tween harsh "sectarian" prac-
tices by East German officials
and "recruitment by the slave
trade, systematically directed
from Bonn." Ulbricht is ob-
viously confronted by a problem:
Khrushchev wishes to avoid any
incidents resulting from an im-
position of harsher East German
security measures to bar access
to West Berlin, yet Ulbricht
must curtail the flights, which
not only seriously cut into the
already short supply of East
German manpower but also impair
the regime's prestige drastical-
ly. He must also consider the
potentially explosive effect on
an already discontented populace
if the Berlin escape hatch is
closed.
While there has been no di-
rect evidence that party leaders
are criticizing Ulbricht's liber-
alization policies, the mounting
intensity of his attacks on
"sectarians" suggest that mid-
dle-level party officials are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
becoming increasingly outspoken
in demanding harsher measures
to prevent escapes.
Tpresent Soviet
policies would not permit clos-
ing the sector borders, al-
though Ulbricht had repeatedly
asked Moscow for permission to
do so. Instead, the SED was
using the "soft" approach to
eliminate some of the grievances
of elements most prone to defect,
while placing ultimate hope in
Moscow's ability to pressure
the Western powers into accept-
ing the "free city" proposal for
West Berlin.
The decision of the 12th
plenum to impose rigorous economy
measures and close out the air-
craft industry in order to di-
vert its manpower and production
facilities to other uses may in-
crease the refugee flow. Ap-
prehensive lest these new meas-
ures make life even more diffi-
cult, already dissatisfied
workers may be prompted to
leave the country.
The entire regime, from
Ulbricht down, is intensifying
its attack on "sectarian" prac-
tices by local officials in
order to reduce worker unrest.
In the present atmosphere, how-
ever, any attempt by the regime
to enforce the provision of
EAST GERMAN REFUGEE~?{A0k41"
IN 'iM 95T BERLIN IN 1 6
DOING
JAN 10
17
24
31
FEB 7
14
21
28
MAR 7
14
21
28
REFUGEE I L 1, F TO WEST BERLIN
talrlou lM AN WEST *04ANY '
TOTAL 1956 - 1960
1,088,008
WEST B
OTAL 195
ERLIN
6 - 1960
528,
546
TOTAL
APPROXIMATELY
30,000
1960
6 APRIL 1%1
25X1
25X1
the new labor code, permit-
ting it to transfer workers
arbitrarily from one part: of
East Germany to another, would
25X1
be likely to aggravate already
existing discontent.
(Concurred in by ORR
BULGARIAN REGIME UNCOVERS PARTY OPPOSITION
Sofia has announced the
discovery of an opposition group
within the party. The regime
had tried to suppress news of
the opposition elements--uncov-
ered last winter--but widespread
rumors apparently forced the
official admission this month.
The situation is under control,
but dissatisfaction in the mid-
dle and lower ranks of the party
and among the people has been
described by a knowledgeable
source as the most serious since
the abortive "leap forward" pro-
gram in 1959.
The appearance of opposi-
tion activities in the hitherto
quiescent party may have been
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facilitated by a belief that
the ambiguous outcome of the
international Communist meeting
in Moscow last fall permits the
expression of divergent--even
Titoist--views.
The extent of support from
outside the party is not known.
The US Legation has noted re-
cent efforts by the Bulgarian
authorities to impose further
restrictions on contacts between
some Western legations and Bul-
garian citizens, a move which
may have been intended to pre-
vent word of the opposition
groups from leaking out.
An editorial in the April
issue of the party's monthly,
Party Life, confirms rumors
that have reached Western diplo-
mats in Sofia that Dobri Terpe-
shev and Yonko Panov--former
leaders ousted for "revisionist"
sympathies--were ringleaders.
These two, plus Nikola Kufard-
zhiev--probably the secretary
of the Central Council of Trade
Unions--allegedly organized
"faithless and distrustful"
party members who "gloat over
difficulties" and who have "sold
themselves to foreign agents."
Although the editorial did
not identify the "foreign agents,"
rumors have linked the group
with Vladimir Sindjelic, second
secretary of the Yugoslav Lega-
tion who was declared persona
non grata on 7 March. At that
time, Sofia publicly charged him
with having attempted to make
contacts with Bulgarian citizens
and with denouncing the Bulgarian
regime and its policies.
By suggesting that the
Yugoslavs are behind the opposi-
tion groups, the regime may be
attempting to play down internal
causes of dissension. The re-
gime's overly ambitious economic
policies of 1959-60 have left
the regime vulnerable to charges
of unrealistic planning. In ad-
dition, several programs adopted
in connection with the "leap
forward"--such as the sweeping
administrative reorganization
and rapid merging of collective
farms--have been accompanied by
many new problems.
The US Legation has noted
a sense of urgency in several
measures taken since the first
of the year to deal with agri-
cultural problems. This urgency
may reflect efforts to fore-
stall further criticism from
opposition elements. A full-
dress party central committee
meeting will convene on 12
April to consider all aspects
of agricultural problems and
planning.
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TITO'S AFRICAN TOUR
During the first part of'
his two-month tour of Africa--
which included visits to Ghana,
Togo, Liberia, Guinea, and Mali
--Yugoslav President Tito ap-
parently has had some success in
his attempts to portray his coun-
try as Africa's foremost cham-
pionin Europe.
tic policy toward Africa, de-
sired to use the trip as a er-
sonnal fact-finding tour.
25X1
Tito, who apparently in-
tends to develop a more realis-
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The Yugoslav President has
been well received at all his
stops; Ghana and Guinea were the
high spots. His short visit to
Mali--arranged after the tour
was already in progress--was
also successful. The communiques
Tito signed with the leaders 'of
these three states played up the
themes often espoused by Bel-
grade, such as anticolonialism,
the UN's failure in the Congo,
and aid without strings for un-
derdeveloped states.
Tito held a press confer-
ence on 26 March in Conakry,
Guinea, which revealed that he
had discussed questions of do-
mestic policies with some lead-
ers and believes the area is
ready to adopt some Yugoslav
ideas. He stated that "the
goal" of the African peoples is
"socialist development" but
that "leading figures in these
countries do not believe that
socialism can be attained in
the classical manner, according
to a rigid mold"--i.e., as en-
visioned by the Soviet bloc.
"There is a tendency among the
people in these countries to
follow our example in many
things," Tito claimed. In his
speeches, Tito has consistently
pictured Yugoslavia as a coun-
try which has successfully met
many of the problems now faced
by Africa, and he has offered
aid, including financial.
While in Togo, Tito told
Prime Minister Olympio that
neither the Soviets nor the
Chinese Communists are to be
trusted, according to Western
diplomats. "You can do business
better with the Americans than
with the Russians," Tito said.
CAMEROUN
The Republic of Cameroun
is pressing in the UN for an-
nulment of the plebiscite held
last February in the northern
sector of the British trust ter-
ritory of Cameroons, which opted
for union with Nigeria. This
effort by Cameroun is motivated
largely by the southern sector's
simultaneous vote in favor of
joining the Republic. President
Ahidjo's moderate regime has
drawn its main support from
the conservative Moslem rulers
of the backward northern party
of Cameroun.
It now is confronted with
the prospect of stronger opposi-
tion from more radically in-
clined political,-elements com-
mon to the more modernized
southern areas of both the Re-
public and the British Cameroons.
Cameroun, a country of some 3,-
200,000 people, now must absorb
an additional 300,000 Bamileke
tribesmen living on both sides
of the border whose restiveness
in recent years bas.been ex-.
of the Cameroun People's Union
(UPC), a Communist-influenced
nationalist organization.
In addition, a new and pow-
erful personal rival to Ahidjo
has been .projected into Cameroun
politics in the person of South-
ern Cameroons Premier Foncha,
who campaigned much more vigor-
ously for "reunification" than
did the Cameroun government.
Foncha's prestige and bargaining
position have been boosted sig-
nificantly by the unexpectedly
large majority--about 70 per-
cent--for union with Cameroun.
Backed by a National As-
sembly resolution, Ahidjo's gov-
ernment has instructed its dele-
gation to the resumed UN Gener-
al Assembly session to contest
the plebiscite results in North-
ern Cameroons and to seek an-
other vote there--or even in
both sectors. As the basis for
its Case, Cameroun is charging
irregularities by British admin-
istrators before and during the
ploited by the terrorist wing plebiscite. Assured the full
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gime's charges of electoral ir-
regularities.
WEST<
ERN
REGION
NORTHERN REGION
NORTHERN
Kaduna CAMEROONS
I
*Enugu
ASTERN
REGION
backing of its chief patron,
France, and of the 11 other
moderate former French African
territories, the Ahidjo regime
now is campaigning vigorously
for additional support, indicat-
ing that Cameroun will count
its friends on this basis.
A majority of UN members
are expected to support the UN
plebiscite commissioner's re-
port, which will almost certain-
ly not sustain the Ahidjo re-
A continuation of Cameroun's
inflexible attitude seems cer-
tain to impose a severe strain
on its relations with Nigeria.
Northern Nigerian leaders, whose
influence predominates in the
federal coalition government,
have publicly stated their vital
interest in Northern Cameroons,
which had been administered as
part of Nigeria's Northern Re-
gion prior to last October. The
Communist bloc's failure so far
to exploit the issue apparent-
ly stems from an appreciation
of this Nigerian sensitivity.
Ahidjo's anxieties have
been compounded by an apprecia-
tion of the many thorny practi-
cal problems--legal, linguistic,
monetary, administrative, and
security--involved in the at-
tempt to federate British South-
ern Cameroons with the French-
speaking Republic. Already
hard pressed to maintain order,
he is particularly concerned
over the possibility that in-
ternational pressures might
force the British to surrender
their responsibilities in the
southern sector before he can
find replacements for their ad-
ministrative and security per-
sonnel. Such a development
would invite new UPC-inspired
disorders and probably lead to 25X1
pressure for direct assumption
of these responsibilities by the
UN "itself.
The stability of the
Senegalese Government, headed
by pro-French President Leopold
Senghor,is impaired by internal
dissension and personal rival-
ries. Within the Senegalese
Progressive Union (UPS), which
{ REPUBLIC
controls all the seats in the
National Assembly and all im-
portant government posts, Pre-
mier Mamadou Dia and others
who formerly cooperated with
the President have increasingly
been in conflict with him. Dia
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
apparently pushed through
Senegal's recent recognition
of Communist China and North
Vietnam in the face of Senghor's
desire to temporize.
Other elements of the UPS,
particularly many younger mem-
bers whose outlook has much in
common with that of the militant
nationalists of Mali and Guinea,
want to relax, if not discard,
Senegal's close ties with France
(Senegal is one of only six
states retaining formal member-
ship in the French Community).
They object to the President's
indiscriminate placement of
friends and relatives on the
public payroll and his efforts
to clip the wings of Valdiodio
N'Diaye, ambitious young inte-
rior minister and acting defense
minister.
These elements are also
dissatisfied with Senghor's
refusal to permit a merger of
the UPS and the only legal
opposition party, the small,
leftist African Regroupment
party (PRA-Senegal), which is
popular among student, youth,
and some labor groups. The
President has recently subjected
this party to pressures which
have weakened its organization
and capabilities.
A belief also appears to
be growing within the regime
that Senghor's removal would
facilitate a rapprochement with
neighboring Mali, whose leaders
have been enforcing a costly
economic blockade against Sene-
;al since last August, when
Senegal abruptly pulled out of
its federation with Mali. Sen-
ghor's devout Catholicism and
his French wife do not strength-
en his position among his over-
whelmingly Moslem countrymen.
Last month, in Dia's ab-
sence, Senghor permitted the
legislature to vote itself a
substantial retroactive salary
increase. Viewing this as an
inadmissible blow to his auster-
ity program, Dia fought hard in
party councils for nullification
of the assembly's action and
even threatened to resign. In
the end, he and his followers,
including major labor elements,
decided not to force a minis-
terial crisis on the eve of the
ceremonies held this week com-
memorating Senegal's independ-
ence.
With the celebrations over,
Dia now is expected to resume
his fight, pushing vigorously
on both the salary question and
other issues. These include
a cabinet reshuf f le over which
Dia and Senghor have long been
at odds. Dia could thereby
precipitate a major political
upheaval, including a concerted
move to force Senghor's retire-
ment. Any successor regime
would almost certainly be anti-
French and more inclined toward
the radical African bloc.
Senegal has a small, ac-
tive group of Communists and
fellow-travelers drawn from an
elite influenced by the French
left. These extremists are not
now in a position to bid for
power independently, but they
influence large segments of the
urban population. They are in-
cluded within the leadership of
PRA-Senegal and the Communist-
line African Independence party,
which was banned by the govern-
ment last July.
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Israel views the trial of
Adolf Eichmann, to begin in
Jerusalem on 11 April, as much
more than an act of retribution
against one of Jewry's chief
persecutors under the Nazis.
The dispute over the legality
of Eichmann's seizure and trial
has already provided Ben-Gurion
with an occasion for emphasizing
Jewish nationalism and Israel's
claim to be the spokesman for
world Jewry. The prime minister
has also made clear that he ex-
pects the trial to establish a
link between the Nazis and some
Arab rulers, both during and
since the war. The principal
target almost certainly will be
UAR President Nasir
BenGurion
also hopes the trial will "edu-
cate" young Israelis and remind
the world of the results of ex-
treme anti-Semitism.
There are indications, how-
ever, that Israeli anticipation
of these propaganda benefits is
tempered by uneasiness. Eich-
mann's West German lawyer ap-
parently intends to reopen the
international controversy over
Israeli jurisdiction by charg-
ing that Eichmann was forcibly
abducted from Argentina and not
extradited. Evidence may be
introduced into the trial about
wartime bargaining between
Zionists and Eichmann for the
release of Jewish prisoners--
in exchange for trucks and
other war materiel. This could
reflect adversely on certain
prominent Israelis who took in
the negotiations and revive
passions in Israel over allega-
tions that Hungarian Jews were
sacrificed in favor of other
Jews as part of an abortive
deal. Former Prime Minister
Moshe Sharett is most frequent-
ly mentioned as one who might
suffer from such revelations.
Testimony about this inci-
dent might also involve the
British Government, which during
the war arrested the negotiating
intermediary and put pressure
on Zionist authorities to re-
ject Eichmann's offer. London
is prepared to rebut criticism
of its role by citing its strong
suspicions of the intermediary
as well as the Nazi interests he
served in seeking vital war
materiel, allegedly for use on
Germany's eastern front.
The Soviet bloc undoubtedly
views the trial as an opportunity
to discredit the West German
Government by repeating standard
charges of the Nazi background
of high-level officials in Bonn.
East Germany has sent a notori-
ous West Berlin Communist lawyer
to Israel with "evidence" impli-
cating present West German of-
ficials as Nazi functionaries
and showing the Ulbricht regime
as the "good" German state. it
probably also will attempt to
send delegations of East German
victims to Jerusalem to support
its case.
West Germany fears that the
trial will lead to an increase
in anti-German resentment in the
Western world, and particularly
that it will add to German-
American frictions. There is
also concern in Bonn that alle-
gations might come out during
the trial against leading mem-
bers of the Bonn government,
especially Adenauer's aide Hans
Globke, who helped draft the
Nuremberg racial laws. Adenauer's
party is concerned that these
charges might be harmful in the
September national election.
The Greek Government is
expecting the subject of the
moving of 20,000 Jews from
northern Greece to extermination
camps in Poland, and Globke's
implication therein, to be
raised at the trial. Eichmann's
personal fate, meanwhile, will
be determined by his formal
prosecution for 15 crimes, 12 of 25X1
which could draw the death
penalty.
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CHEN 1I IN INDONBtaIA
The visit did, however,
give a further boost to these
relations, which have been
slowly improving since last
summer. The Indonesian press
was unanimously friendly, ap-
parently at the direction of
President Sukarno. In an at-
tempt to convince the Indone-
siansof China's desire to renew
old ties, Chen announced that
Peiping was ready to resume its
economic aid program, suspended
since the summer of 1959 when
the dispute over Overseas Chi-
nese in Indonesia erupted. Chi-
nese economic and military aid
up to that time had reached
$48,000,000, but Djakarta never
officially accepted a $30,000,-
000 Chinese credit offered just
before the break. An Indonesian
industrial mission is to visit
China later this month, provid-
ing an opportunity to discuss
the details of a renewal.
The joint communique is-
sued at the end of Chen's visit
spelled out again China's sup-
port for Indonesia's "recovery
of" West New Guinea and Indo-
nesia's ;support for China's
"recovery of" Taiwan and "right"
to a seat in the United Nations.
A new friendship treaty and a
Chen used his visit to com-
ment on a,number of other issues
in China's foreign policy, both
in his discussion with Indone-
sian officials and in a free-
sWinging press interview. He took
particular pains to emphasize
Communist China's community of
interests with the Afro-Asian
nations and made an implied dig
at the USSR. He was widely quoted
in the local press--and did not
later. deny it--as having sug-
gested that the Western powers,
as well as the USSR, had domi
nated'the international scene for
a number of years but had proved
incapable of solving world prob-
lems. He told his hosts that
if Communist China and Indonesia
were to get together with the
Afro-Asian nations, world ten-
tions could be overcome.
In this vein, Chen joined
with Subandrio in a call for a
second Afro-Asian conference to
take up the work of the one held
in Bandung, Indonesia, six years
ago. Djakarta has favored the
convening of another such con-
ference for a number of years,
as has Peiping. The idea, how-
ever, has not been equally popu-
lar in other important capitals,
notably New Delhi.
Indonesian officials who
talked with Chen were impressed
with the "tough" tone he adopted
toward the US. Just two weeks
before, he had assumed a con-
ciliatory tone in a discussion
with in 25X1
Peiping, in that conversation
Chen had binteo that Peiping
might have some desire for better
relations with the US. At a
press conterenee, however, Chen
is reported to have said he saw
"no hope" for improved relations
with the US "if the present
hard-Moiled tfS policy is not
changed." lie emphasized, as he did
in the earlier Conversation, that
the US first must withdraw the
Seventh Fleet and other forces
from the`aitvan area and stop
Supporti# Chiang Kai-shek.
SECRET
Chen Yi sucdeeded,ih re-
storing a measure of wino-Indo-
nesian cordiality during his
well-publicized visit to Dja-
karta from 28 March to 2 April,
but his visit was not a Com-
plete success. Indonesian
Foreign Minister Subandrio,
still smarting from the arrogant
treatment he received when he
visited Peiping in 1959, omitted
the normal welcoming remarks
when Chen arrived--an action
interpreted by the US Embassy
as a calculated snub. In addi-
tion, the Indonesian Government
restricted Chen's movements to
the immediate area of Djakarta
and cut his stay by several days.
It must also have been apparent
to Chen that his visit did not
completely dispel Indonesian
suspicions of Peiping-'s motives
or restore Sino-Indonesian re-
lations to the cordial state of'
several years ago.
cultna'al agreement were also
signed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Indian Army has been
gradually increased in size
from 410,000 to an estimated
500,000 men as part of New
Delhi's efforts to strengthen
its defensive capabilities
since the Sino-Indian border
dispute flared up in 1959.
A portion of the increase--
about 23,000--is made up of units 25X1
formerly included in the separate
X1
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25X1 r r of State, Forces .
25X1
Despite the sharp deteri-
oration in Britain's balance of
payments on current account last
year, the Macmillan government
seems likely to continue its
present economic policies based
on restraining inflationary
trends and maintaining inter-
national confidence in the pound
sterling.
Figures published on 29
March show-that last year Brit-
ain suffered its largest bal-
ance of payments deficit on cur-
rent account in the four deficit
years since the Conservatives
came to power in 1951. Exports
increased by 6 percent on the
basis of higher sales in West
Germany, with European Free
Trade Association partners, and
that New Delhi can affort to
maintain its commitment to the
UN Emergency Force in Gaza--
about 1,200 troops--while at
the same time making nearly
5,500 troops and technicians
available to the UN for service
in the Congo.
The army's increased size
has strained its logistic capa-
bilities, its training facili-
ties, its officer corps, and its
materiel situation. However, it
is only because of this increase
Eastern Europe, helping to off-
set a 10-percent decline in
sales to the United States.
This modest rise was overshad-
owed, however, by a 14-percent
rise in imports, which offi-
cials attribute to an unusual-
ly high build-up of inventories.
Despite this deficit, and
despite large payments to the
International Monetary Fund and
on United States and Canadian
loans, Britain's gold and dol-
lar reserves increased $495,-
600,000 to a total of $3,231,-
200,000,primarily because of
an influx of capital resulting
from the weakness of the dol-
lar in the last six months of
last year. Many British econ-
omists fear that a recovery in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the US economy this year will
sharply reverse the flow. In-
ternational awareness of Brit-
ain's economic weakness brought
sharp speculation against the
pound when West Germany and the
Netherlands revalued their cur-
rencies in early March; this
speculation brought a fall of
$173,600,000 in the gold and
dollar reserves in that month.
The annual budget to be
presented on 17 April will in-
dicate whether the government
is sufficiently concerned to
de-emphasize monetary and cred-
it restrictions to control do-
mestic inflation, and to under-
take a major revision in Brit-
ain's tax system to stimulate
economic growth. With general
elections some three years away,
the Macmillan government's op-
portunity for invoking unpopular
measures is as great as it will
ever be, but the new budget
seems likely to continue along
previous lines--emphasizing de-
fense of the pound, and possi-
bly reinforcing some of last
fall's modest measures to stim-
ulate exports.
Last year's 26-percent
rise in exports to the Soviet
bloc will encourage further ef-
forts in that direction and more
pressure for relaxation of COCOM
restrictions. Since trade with
the Common Market area has also
been on the rise, the government
will probably see no reason to 25X1
step up its cautious exploration
of some eventual association
with the Common Market.
CHANGES IN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT
Alfons Gorbach, who be-
comes chancellor of Austria's
People's party - Socialist
government on 11 April, is re-
placing half of the eight
People's party ministers in an
apparent effort to resolve dif-
ficulties within the party and
improve its prospects in the
parliamentary elections due in
1962 or 1963. The party lost
several seats in 1959.
25X1
which may pose new difficulties
for the already strained coali-
tion.
Gorbach was picked by Raab
because of his reputation as a
A 62-year-old conservative,
Gorbach leads the moderate re-
form element in the party, and
his four ministerial appoint-
ments reflect a desire to inject
more youth and energy into the
conduct of national as well as
party affairs. Gorbach has
announced his intention to play
a more vigorous role in govern-
ment'affairs than his predeces-
sor, Julius Raab--a policy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMM: HY.
shrewd, tough negotiator in party
affairs and his good relations
with the Socialist leaders in
the coalition. He has wide-
spread connections in business
circles and maintains contacts
with neo-Nazi groups for purposes
of political expediency. He is
said not to be an advocate of a
representative form of govern-
ment but to prefer the rule of
an intellectual elite undisturbed
by interference from the masses.
Ludwig Steiner, the new
state secretary in the Foreign
Ministry, at 39 is one of the
promising new generation of
Austrian diplomats. As Raab's
private secretary for five
years he gained a detailed knowl-
edge of the inner workings of
the government and is said to
share Raab's views on having
good relations with the USSR
and following a policy of strict
neutrality which will not of-
fend the Soviets. Steiner, a
native of South Tirol, is expect-
ed to follow a more flexible
South Tirolean policy than his
predecessor, whose involvement
with Austrian extremists caused
the Italian Government to bar
him from Italian territory in
December 1959.
Karl Scheinzler, 37, re-
places Defense Minister Graf,
who had offended the neutralists
in the government and was un-
popular with many officers.
Scheinzler has made a reputation
as a dynamic and talented or-
ganizer in areas where the party
was becoming moribund, but is
vulnerable to Socialist charges
of being an ex-Nazi since he
received his education and
training in that party and
served in a German regiment
during the war.
per Austria.
Fifty-year-old Josef Klaus,
governor of Salzburg since 1949,
will become finance minister, re-
placing a technician who had held
the post since Reinhard Kamitz
became president of the Austrian
National Bank in June 1960. If
Klaus makes good in this diffi-
cult position, he may become a
strong contender to succeed
Gorbach after the next parliamen-
tary elections. The post of
state secretary in the Interior
Ministry goes to a mediocre but 25X1
industrious party hack named Otto
Kranzlayer, a 50-year-old lawyer from Up-
The Salvadoran Government
is trying to overcome the re-
sistence of El Salvador's power-
ful landowning class to the pro-
gram of moderate social and
economic reforms launched last
month. These reforms include a
forced reduction of rent for
low-income housing and a paid
day of rest on Sundays for agri-
cultural workers.
Coffee growers, reacting
against the Sunday rest law,
have dismissed large numbers of
workers in some areas, and the
Communists are reported working
to exploit the resulting peasant
unrest. The government has
warned violators of the new laws
that the reforms are in line
with recommendations agreed to
by 18 Latin American governments
last year and that the army
would be on the peasants'
side in the event of any
"social explosion."
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Apparently the reforms are
still not being implemented fast
enough to suit a young officer
group. These officers are
aware of the demands for social
change in the rural areas--
where visiting US officials re-
cently reported wide interest
in President Kennedy's Latin
American "Alliance for Progress."
They insist that some cabinet
members are too much under the
obstructive influence of wealthy
Landowners.
The US Embassy has been
told that pressure from this
group is prompting a cabinet
reorganization in which the
heads of all ministries except
labor and public works are to
be replaced in the near future.
The changes would be aimed
at more energetic implementation
of the reform program rather
than any radical shift in the
government's political orienta-
tion. There is a possibility,
however, that the plantation
owners and prominent businessmen
may resort to bribery and sub-.
sidized violence in their ef-
forts to frustrate the reforms.
There are also some reports
that the pressures for political
change may even lead to reorgan-
ization of the five-man civil-
military directorate that came
to power on 25 January. If this
happens, Col. Anibal Portillo,
its senior military member,
may emerge as a new strong man.
Col. Portillo said on 21
March that approval of an elec-
tion law was imminent, but that
congressional elections would
be postponed beyond earlier es-
timates to August. Apparently
the directorate is delaying in
carrying out its pledge of early
elections until'a party sympa-
thetic to its reform program
becomes strong enough to win
over the party followings of
former Presidents Lemus and
Osorio. Once seated, the leg-
islature is to elect a provi-
sional president to finish Le-
must unexpired term ending in
September 1962.
Meanwhile, there is danger
of friction with neighboring
Honduras. Many Salvadorans
regard President Villeda
Morales as too tolerant of
pro-Communist activity and of
Salvadoran Communist exiles
in particular, and some mil-
itary and other elements
in the directorate are re-
ported to have promised
"support" to the Honduran
Army in an effort to oust
Villeda.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE TWO-CHINAS ISSUE
Although Communist China's
opposition to a two-Chinas for-
mula is clear-cut and long--
standing, Peiping faces a dilem-
ma in fashioning a policy that
will prevent a freezing of the
present de facto separa
tio
n of
Taiwan from the mainland.
Its
military aggressiveness
in
1958,
by raising
the specter
of
gen-
eral war,
crystallized
two-Chinas
sentiment throughout.theworld.
On the other hand, the indef-
inite- postponement of a military
showdown risks a continued harden-
ing of the situation and invites
growing international pressures
for a settlement on the basis
of the long-established status
quo. Thus, from Peiping's point
of view, there are cogent rea-
sons for shifting policies from
time to time in order to keep
the situation in flux.
At the moment Communist
shelling of the offshore islands
is desultory, and there apparent-
ly has been no important aug-
mentation of Communist forces
in the area. Although Peiping
now and then refers to its
"right" to take Taiwan by force
if necessary, references to the
"Liberate Taiwan" theme have
been rare recently. Present
policy is described by Peiping
as "mainly using peaceful means
to enlighten the Taiwan authori-
ties with a sense of national
duty." Assuming an attitude
of enduring patience, Chinese
Communist spokesmen have pro-
fessed a readiness to wait as
long as 30 years for Taiwan's
"liberation." "Time is our
good ally," says Mao Tse-tung.
Lest the decline in mili-
tary activity be taken as Com-
munist acquiescence in the exist-
ing situation, Peiping con-
stantly emphasizes its opposition
to the two-Chinas concept. Pre-
mier Chou En-lai and Foreign
Minister Chen Yi spelled out the
Chinese position in some detail
in press interviews last Novem-
ber. Chen told a group of visit-
ing journalists that there would
never be any change in Peiping's
stand that Taiwan is an inaliena-
ble part of China. Chou told
w u
succeed only in "tying things
up in knots."
Peiping also has branded
as "unacceptable" such proposals
as'UN-trusteeshtp for o r. demili-
tarization. of Tai,an..or refer-
ring the matter to the UN or
the International Court of
Justice. It has, moreover,
refused to separate the problem
of the offshore islands from
the issue of Taiwan, insisting
that all "must be liberated as
a whole."
Concern Over Foreign Attitudes
Peiping feels especially
menaced by the prospect of
American backing for the two-
Chinas concept.
Peiping has demonstrat-
e serious concern about the
attitudes of other countries as
well. It has, for example, de-
manded that Tokyo stop promoting
"two Chinas" as one of the pre-
requisites for both private
trade and government-to-govern-
ment relations with Japan.
Hoping to whet the Japanese ap-
petite for commerce, the Chi-
nese relented slightly in early
1959 and permitted a resumption
of limited private trade. In
all other respects Peiping has
held fast to its conditions.
As recently as 2 April, Chen Yi
warned the Japanese not to fol-
low a two-Chinas policy.
In contrast to its atti-
tude toward Japan, Peiping has
not demanded that other coun-
tries sever relations with Tai-
pei prior to signing government-
level trade agreements. it
signed pacts with Egypt and
Cuba while those countries still
maintained relations with Tai-
wan. When Peiping signed agree-
ments with these governments,
however, it felt they were
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moving toward recognition, which,
in fact, they were. In the case
of Lebanon, Peiping found that
it had misjudged Beirut's in-
tentions toward Taiwan. A
trade office opened by Peiping
in Beirut in 1956 was closed in
1960 because Lebanon had con-
tinued to maintain its rela-
tions with the Nationalists.
International Organizations
Peiping is willing to enter
into bilateral negotiations with
the Chinese Nationalists which
could be represented as parleys
between opposing sides in a
civil conflict and would not
prejudice the Communist position
on the two-Chinas issue. The
regime, however, is adamant in
its refusal to participate in
a forum--such as the UN--which
accepts the Nationalists as rep-
resentatives of a sovereign
nation. It would be a "total
miscalculation," said Foreign
Minister Chen Yi, to think that
Peiping would exchange Taiwan
for a seat in the UN.
Chou En-lai also made clear
Peiping's categorical rejection
of any possible compromise on
25X1 the issue.
25X1 Chou affirmed
a i e so-called Taiwan
clique is to appear in the UN
under whatever form, in what-
ever name, we will definitely
refuse to sit together with
them."
this blow to Taipei's inter-
national standing will gravely
impair the Nationalists' morale
and make them more vulnerable
to "unification" overtures from
Peiping.
In recent months
Peiping
may have come to feel
that
the
issue of UN membership
can
be
directly linked not merely
to
the ouster of Taipei,
but
also
to the elimination of
all
inter-
national guarantees to
the
Chi-
nese Nationalists. Although
there has as yet been no con-
firmation from official sources
in Peiping, Foreign Minister
Chen Yi has been quoted in
Hungary's party newspaper as
saying that it will not be pos-
sible for Communist China to
take a seat in the UN until the
United States ends its "occupa-
tion" of Taiwan and withdraws
its armed forces from the Taiwan
area.
This new condition may
have been advanced in order to
discourage further UN efforts
to work out a two-Chinas com-
promise. It is quite possible,
however, that the reported stif-
fening of Peiping's terms does
not represent a final position.
Chou En-lai hinted at a com-
promise acce table to Peiping
ithe must orma - 5X1
y agree to withdraw its forces,
but that the specific steps and
timing could be matters for
"subsequent discussion."
On this point, Peiping
seems to have grown progressive-
ly more adamant over the years.
In November 1950, Communist
China accepted an invitation to
participate in the UN debates
on Korea. In 1955, however,
it refused another UN invita-
tion to participate in a Se-
curity Council debate over the
Taiwan Strait crisis. The Chi-
nese would almost certainly
also refuse any such invitation
today.
The Communist estimate
seems to be that obduracy--even
if it delays Peiping's entry
in the UN for years--will pay
off eventually in the expulsion
of the Nationalists, and that
The Chinese Communist re-
fusal to sit down alongside
Chiang's representatives ex-
tends to all international
bodies. The regime withdrew,
for example, from the Inter-
national Law Association, the
International Astronomical Union,
and other organizations that
accepted Nationalist represent-
atives. Objecting to Taipei's
participation in Olympic games,
Peiping has refused to permit
a runner to carry the Olympic
torch VhrpUgh China en route
to the 1964 games in Tokyo.
The Soviet Position
Although the Soviet Union
has always supported Communist
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
China's opposition to a two-
Chinas solution, it does not re-
fuse to take part in international
activities which also involve
Nationalist participation. The
USSR's walkout from the Security
Council in 1950 over the ques-
tion of Nationalist China's
presence resulted in a Soviet
diplomatic defeat on the North
Korean problem. Since then,
the USSR has found it the better
part of wisdom to bear with the
existing situation.
Mali,. Taipei withdrew its embassy
as soon as the government rec-
ognized Peiping. In the case
of Senegal, some elements in
the Nationalist government are
opposed to withdrawing, hoping
that Taipei's continued presence
there will forestall the estab-
lishment of a Chinese Communist
diplomatic mission. If such a
mission is established, however,
the Nationalists apparently will
sever diplomatic relations with
Senegal.
While the Chinese Communists
must recognize that it is es-
sential for the Soviet Union
to continue to participate in
international bodies where Na-
tionalist China is also repre-
sented, they probably would
prefer stronger support from
Moscow on this question.
For example, Soviet propa-
ganda on the occasion of the
Olympic Committee's decision
to allow Taiwan to participate
in the 1960 games at Rome was
typical of the Soviet treatment
usually accorded the issue.
Peiping blasted that decision
in broadcasts to Taiwan and
elsewhere, but Moscow merely
reported it in a matter of fact
way, taking account of neither
the issue nor Peiping's dis-
pleasure.
The Nationalist Position
Taipei shares Communist
China's distaste for a two-
Chinas solution, but for tacti-
cal reasons has compromised its
position at least twice in the
recent past. In October 1958,
Chiang agreed with the United
States to renounce the use of
force as a means of retaking
the mainland. In 1960 he re-
luctantly allowed a team to
participate in the Rome Olympics
under the designation "Republic
of China (Taiwan)," despite the
implication that the athletes
represented only part of China,
Currently, Taipei is faced
with a dilemma in Senegal, where
the government has recognized
both the Chinese Nationalists
and the Chinese Communists. In
The Nationalist position
is in part based on apprehen-
sion that two-Chinas proposals
have given encouragement to
Taiwanese separatism and would,
if implemented, lead to eventual
domination of the government by
Taiwanese. The native Taiwanese,
who comprise 86 percent of the
island's population, are by and
large in sympathy with some
variant of a two-Chinas solution.
Kao Yu-shu, a leader of the
Taiwanese opposition to Chiang
Kai-shek, recently told the
American Embassy that virtually
all of the Taiwanese favor either
an independent Taiwan or some
sort of neutralized status.
The Chinese Communists have
persistently attempted to ex-
ploit the repugnance to Taipei
of a two-Chinas solution, hoping
to promote friction between the
Nationalists and their American 25X1
allies. In the stream of Chi-
nese Comm
to Taiwan
I (Peiping
Charges that the United States
is scheming to make its "occupa-
tion" of Taiwan permanent by
promoting international accept-
ance of Taiwan's status as an
independent political entity--
perhaps under Taiwanese leader-
ship. The Communist press in
Hong Kong was recently advised
to play up Chiang Kai-shek's
opposition to a permanent sepa-
ration of Taiwan from the main-
land and thus point up the com-
munity of interests between
Peiping and Taipei on the issue.
25X1
SECRET
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