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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 '` Ir- I TI'AL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE COPY NO. 64 OCI NO. 0280/61 18 May 1961 S 25X1 /'990 DATE: I 1$_R REVIEWER: N_.X'I R V E\.: . TE AUTH: HR 70--' DEC~.ASSIFI: D T DOCUMENT NO. NNO CHANGE_ IN C! ASS. C FIE TIAL State Department review completed RECORD Ai;Iiiv~ AGENCY Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 - Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY WEEKLY REVIEW LAOS The 14-nation Geneva Con- ference on Laos began on 16 May after several days' delay oc- casioned by a dispute over the seating of a delegation repre- senting the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao, which demanded an equal voice in the proceedings with the royal government and the so-called "government" of 3ouvanna Phouma. After a for- mula had been worked out among the great powers which permit- ted seating of all three group; the royal delegation received instructions from Vientiane to boycott the conference so long as the Pathet Lao group was seated or unless the legality of the Boun Oum government was explicitly affirmed by the con- ference. Vientiane's attitude may stem in part from General Phoumi~s bitterness over the trend of events. He told an American Em- bassy officer on 15 May that the United States "says one thing and does the other." He asserted that for months the United States took a strong position against allowing the International Con- trol Commission (ICC) to return to Laos, opposed any 14-nation conference, and stood firmly against Pathet Lao participation in the government. He said that he had recently told the King that he was forced to follow blindly the American line but he had no idea where it would lead. Communist Tactics Moscow's preconference tactics were designed to gain Western acceptance of the Pathet .Lao on a basis of equality with the Vientiane regime and the Sou- vanna Phouma group. Gromyko told Secretary Rusk that since no coalition government could be formed prior to the opening of the conference. it would be necessary to seat representa- tives of the "three existing forces" in Laos. Gromyko added if the US had any doubts about the reality of the Pathet Lao movement,"we had only to look at a map." The USSR has apparently now decided that it would be ad- vantageous to delay negotiations on a coalition government, al- Moscow may believe that its efforts to establish the equal- ity of the Pathet Lao represent- ation with those of the Vientiane government and Souvanna Phouma will improve the prospects of achieving a government heavily weighted in favor of the bloc. Soviet propaganda is depicting US agreement to equal represent- ation for all three groups as a "retreat." Soviet leaders prob- ably consider the cease-fire agreement--signed by all three Laotian factions--and the Vien- tiane government's agreement to meet at Namone in Communist-held territory to discuss political and military questions as other significant steps in the attempt to assert parity of the three sides. The Soviet Union is attempt- ing to turn to its own advantage whatever differences it has with Communist China. A series of cal- culated leaks in widely separated areas of the world in near-identical SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW PaLre 1 of 23' Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET - Muong' 1oun rabay~~ ' ....... A---.--.O S 1 Muong Soui Ban Po uj Khoun lame s Jurres Xleng Khou STATUTE MILES 200 SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 2 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY language have characterized both the US and Chinese posi- tions as "extreme" and picture the Soviet posture as one of reasonableness. Soviet spokes- men have hinted nevertheless that their government can con- Peiping's foreign minister, in his opening day speech at Geneva on 16 May, keynoted what will probably be a continual barrage of Chinese Communist at- tacks against the US alliance structure in Southeast Asia. Terming SEATO the "root of ten- sion" in the area, Chen Yi de- manded it be dissolved and con- demned US policy not only in Laos but in Thailand and South Vietnam as well. chairmen--the USSR and the UK-- asking that "urgent measures" be taken to prevent US "aggres- sion" in South Vietnam. An ed- itorial on 13 May in the offi- cial party journal Nhan Dan urged the participants in the present Geneva conference to consider the US role in South Vietnam. While these appeals may foreshadow a North Vietnam- ese effort to introduce this item on the Geneva agenda, Hanoi has not repeated this request in, subsequent propaganda. Southeast Asian Participants Laos' neighbors participat- ing in the conference--Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and 25X1 Burma--all take a serious view of the crisis, fearing an im- minent Communist takeover.~___1 Reflecting the "united front" which Soviet spokesmen had promised, Gromyko, in his more temperate and seemingly reasonable speech to the confer- ence on 17 May, also denounced SEATO's role in Laos. Claiming that inclusion of Laos in the SEATO treaty's "sphere of ac- tion" directly contravened the 1954 Geneva Agreements, Gromyko asserted that "this can no longer be tolerated." Together with the expected insistence on retention of a veto power over the activities of the ICC, the concerted Communist attack on SEATO set the tone for their future attempts at the conference. North Vietnam during the week also bitterly attacked US assistance for South Vietnam's war against Communist guerrillas. The North Vietnamese foreign minister on 12 May addressed a letter to the 1954 Geneva co- SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 3 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 SECRET Thailand is attending the conference with great reluctance and reservations. The Sarit re- gime has long advocated a mili- tary solution to the Laotian crisis, including SEATO inter- vention if necessary. Sarit's reported interest in an expan- sion of trade with the USSR is one of several recent indica- tions of a possible Thai drift toward neutralism stemming in part from dissatisfaction with American policy on Laos. The negotiations among the Boun Gum government, the Sou- vanna group, and the Pathet Lao began in Namone on 13 May. In the first session, cease-fire documents were signed formal- izing the de facto cessation of hostilities generally prevailing throughout the country. After two unproductive ses- sions devoted to agreeing on an agenda, the three groups on 17 May agreed to discuss at the next meeting, scheduled for the 19th, the possibility of forming a coalition government and es- tablishing a tripartite military group to help the ICC regulate the cease-fire. It was also agreed that Phoumi, Souvanna, and Pathet Lao leader Souphan- nouvong should meet as soon as possible, but no definite time or place was set. Despite this progress in narrowing down the agenda, negotiations on the for- mation of a coalition government and regulation of the cease-fire are likely to be protracted. 18 May 61 The Military. Situation The military situation has remained generally quiet during the past week, although scat- tered enemy artillery fire and guerrilla fire continue. A mixed Pathet Lao, Kong Le, and North Vietnamese force is continuing to exert pressure on an isolated Meo partisan garrison at Pa Dong, southwest of the town of Xieng Khouang. resuming the war." would "be held responsible for Both the Pathet Lao and Kong Le, now described as a brigadier general, have broad- cast statements taking note of the presence of South Vietnamese troops on Laotian soil. Kong Le warned that if they were not immediately withdrawn and if the Laotian Army attacked "liberated" areas along Route 9, the "US imperialists and their lackeys" SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 4 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET A force of some 3,600 army troops and marines led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy com- mander of South Korea's Second Army, seized Seoul on 16 May and deposed the government of Prime Minister Chang Myon. Pak's group professes friend- ship for the United States and a desire to eliminate official corruption and strengthen the national economy, after which it will purportedly return the government to civilian authority. Pak, a former officer in the Japanese Army, joined the South Korean Army in 1946. Two years later he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for Communist activities, but he was recalled to service at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. He is not known to have re-established his former Com- munist contacts. The revolutionary junta has declared martial law and named a temporary all-military cabinet. All major population centers are believed quiet, and the city of Taegu reportedly has been returned to civilian au- thority. In Seoul, leftist news- papermen reportedly have been arrested and all suspected Com- munists ordered taken into custody. Lt. Gen.Yi Han-lim, com- manding general of the First Army, which is deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea, is holding his men in position and has declared that he "and all his officers and men support the military revolution." Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.Chang To-yong has accepted the chairmanship of nak's Mili- tary Revolutionary Committee. Chang said he did so with the understanding that there would be no mass punishment or vio- 18 I' Ia y 61 lence against individuals, that a new cabinet would be formed composed of the best men avail- able, and that troops would be withdrawn from the capital city "at the earliest opportunity." He noted that the committee agreed to the last condition provided troops remained until the position of the United States toward the coup was clear. Following`.the-',takeover, Prime Minister Chang failed to rally any support for his administra- tion. On 18 May he announced the resignation of his government over Seoul radio. This action has provided a cloak of legality for the coup and opened the way for transitional measures within .a constitutional framework. With the cooperation of President Yun Po-sun, Lt. Gen. Chang appears to be working for a transfer of power to a nonparty government composed of civilians and some military officers. There is some indication that Pak Chong- hui,might agree to such an ar- rangement. Initial Communist propaganda reaction reflected a lack of first-hand information on the coup--North Korea, for example, announced the event some six hours after it had taken place and then was forced to rely on Seoul press statements as news sources. Subsequently, however, Pyongyang denounced the coup leaders as "flagrantly reaction- ary" in a statement expressing hope that things may yet develop to the Communists' advantage. While hailing Chang Myon's down- fall, the statement depicted South Korean troops as "deceived and misled" and urged them to take "internal problems firmly in their hands." Moscow and Peiping also have labeled the coup group reactionary. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 5 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET As the'first moves of Ir-a--- nian Prim9Minister All Amini's program~, to eradicate corruption, four general officers and 40 civilian officials have been arrested and 300 army officers, including 33 generals, have been retired. Th6ge arrested include General Haj Ali Xia, former chief of ifitelligence for the Supreme Commander's Staff; General Zarqam, former minister of finance; General Alavi Moqa- dam, a former minister of in- terior; and General Nevessi, head of the Fisheries Adminis- tration. These men have long been identified in the public mind with some of the more fla- grant abuses of position. The Shah told the'American ambassador on 13 May that he felt the charges of corruption against governmerltufficials were highly exaggerated but that arrests of those believed guilty were necessary to calm the situation. They would be tried and if found guilty would be punished. If they are found innocent, he said, the people's anger would be directed not against the Crown but against the minister of justice. The Shah stated that he would support Amini's programs but would not become a figure- head. The power id Iran has al- ways resided in the Crown, he said, and must continue to do so. Commenting on the rime minister, the Shah remarked that Amini now is relatively popular be- cause he has been dut of public office for some time. He added that this popularity would diminish as Aminj. failed to meet the demands of thdae now sup- porting him. Amini himself appears in- creasingly confident that he will be able to counteract any moves the Shah may make to at- tempt to retain power, and as- serts that the Shah is "fin- ished" as an absolute monarch. much of the public dissatis- 25X1 faction stems from the intrigues and business manipulations of the royal family. On 17 May the Shah left for an official visit to Norway with a party of 19. Except for the Queen, none of the royal family accompanied him, although the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, left the country a few days earlier. Princes Gholam Reza and Abdol Reza, together with Prime Minister Amini and Minister of Court Ala, have been appointed as a regency coun- cil until the Shah returns in about a week. SECRET is may 61 Page 6 o 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The rebel Provisional Al- gerian Government (PAG) is en- tering into formal negotiations with France on 20 May without having achieved the preliminary understanding it had sought. The PAG had hoped that the se- cret talks which have been going on since February would iden- tify areas of agreement on cer- tain major issues before the formal meetings ,o ened . Paris reportedly has not explained to the PAG whether it intends to use the negotiations to arrange a cease-fire and set conditions for a referendum or, as the rebels prefer, to nego- tiate an over-all statute for Algeria. Despite their "lip service" to a completely free referendum, the rebels would distrust its results in view of the presence of military forces and the difficulty of defining the different, choices. Presi- dent de Gaulle, moving beyond his previous references to ne- gotiating aYcease-fire and con- ditions for a referendum, sug- gested in;~a speech on 8 May the possibility of a joint French- PAG endorsement, prior to the referendum campaign, of an inde- pendent Algeria with close ties to France. The problem of Algerian sovereignty is expected to be- come troublesome at an early stage. The rebel negotiators will be under considerable pressure to accept nothing less than French recognition of their fun- damental right to exercise sov- ereignty over all of Algeria, including the Sahara,- and the areas of dense European coloniza- tion. Tunisian, Swiss, and other moderate advisers are recommend- ing to the PAG that it limit its demands and give priority to consolidating its political au- thority in the country. PAG Deputy Premier Belkacem Krim will head the well-balanced and competent rebel delegation at Evian. His serious illness in March now is thought to have been a major factor in the reb- els' refusal to begin formal talks on 7 April as originally planned. Krim commands the re- spect of the "military" faction, and his participation should im- prove prospects that the rebel fighters will abide by any agree- ment reached at Evian. De Gaulle has indicated that as soon as formal negotiations be- gin he will remove another rebel deputy premier, Mohammed Ben Bella, from his confinement in a military fortress. This move would be likely to facilitate the negotiations, since Ben Bella is both level-headed by tempera- ment and highly respected as an original leader of the rebellion. Meanwhile, sporadic vio- lence continues in both France and Algeria, and tight security precautions are being maintained. The technical ease with which plastic bombings can be carried out makes it extremely difficult for the police to catch the per- petrators, and in some instances there may be active police sym- pathy for the European extrem- ists. Grenade-throwing and knife-wielding Moslems are only slightly less difficult to ap- prehend. Large-scale demonstra- tions in support of the PAG have occurred recently in a number of Algerian cities, with as many as 2,500 Moslems partic- ipating in one instance. to the FLN." The problem is aggravated by the disruption of security:. services in the purges of high officials following the April military. revolt with the result- ing confusion and" lowered morale. Do Gaulle must -still Xac.e the fact that many army officers remain 25X1 bitterly opposed to any negotiated settlement "turning Algeria over SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 7 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY a merger of Cuba's Popular Socialist'.(Communist) party (PSP) and Castro's 26th of July Move- ment is expected to be completed sometime prior to this summer's celebrations of the Castro move- ment's eight anniversary. The 26th of July organization exists virtually in name only at pres- ent, and the Communist party has in fact exercised a consid- erable degree of control over all Cuban political, economic, and social institutions for some time. The Communists have here- tofore preferred to cultivate the impression that the PSP sup- ports the general revolutionary program of the Castro movement but remains separate from it. Party leaders have acknowledged, however, that the amalgamation of all existing Cuban political organizations in a single polit- ical party is a fundamental Com- munist goal and a prerequisite for the organization of the Cuban state along "socialist" lines. In a speech to members of Cuba's "literacy brigades" on 14 May, Castro reiterated his pledge to eradicate all illit- eracy from the country during the current revolutionary "year of education." He said that so far some 60,000 young Cubans were registered as teachers who would fight illiteracy in rural areas, but added that 100,000 such teachers were needed in order to win "as brilliant a victory over ignorance as our armed forces won over the mer- cenaries." He also said that the government plans to provide full scholarships for some 40,- 000 students in Havana alone, following the return of the Cuban literacy brigades to the capital in November. The gov- ernment's recent Wholesale ar- rests of suspected anti-Castro elements--many of whom have not been released yet--and the in- creased emphasis on the forma- tion of an elaborate informant network probably precludes'any sustained and effective internal opposition activity in the im- mediate future. Meanwhile, Cuba is contin- uing its policy of seeking to influence public opinion in the SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 8 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY hemisphere in its behalf. A number of students from other Latin American countries now are in Cuba, apparently without the approval of their govern- ments, A Cuban good-will mis- sion headed by Foreign Affairs Under Secretary Carlos Olivares plans to visit Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and other Latin American countries, The Cuban Government is continu- ing to court the support of the Velasco regime in Ecuador, al- ready the Latin American regime most favorably disposed toward Castro. The continuing arrival in Cuba of merchant ships from Sino-Soviet bloc countries since late last year indicates that the bloc intends to meet its scheduled deliveries to the Castro regime, Bloc and bloc- chartered vessels are constantly in Cuban waters, ages to Cuba and well over 400 dry-cargo vovaees in the other Sugar and petroleum re- quirements make up the bulk of the tonnage to be moved. Ful- filling the contracts to sup- ply more than 4,000,000 tons of petroleum and to buy 4,000,- 000 tons of sugar in 1961 will require roughly 300 tanker voy- directions CONGO Leaders of major Congolese political factions are trying to strengthen their positions in anticipation of a reconvening of parliament, The Coquilhat- ville meeting of the Leopold- ville regime and its allies has published a proposal for a con- stitutional revision to be dis- cussed by the legislators, and Kasavubu has called for a meet- ing of parliament when the conference is over. The constitutional proposals worked out at Coquilhatville envisage the creation of a "Confederation of the United States of the Congo," In an attempt to bridge the gap be- tween those Congolese who support a unitary state and those who favor a weak union of largely autonomous tribal units, the proposals would set up a cumbersome struc- ture which superimposes a strengthened central execu- tive on the tribal groupings approved in principle two months ago at Tananarive. The American Embassy in Leopold- ville comments that the draft constitution "tries to be all things to all men" and leaves many ambiguities to be decided later. SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Neither Gizenga nor the Katanga regime has participated in the Coquilhatville talks, and it is unlikely that any draft would be initially acceptable to both of them. Gizenga seems willing to consider a reconvening of par- liament--he had been assidu- ously cultivating uncommitted legislators--but he has rejected Kasavubu's terms. Reiterating his claim that he heads the "legitimate central government," Gizenga has announced his selec- tion of Kamina, in Katanga Province, as the locale for the meeting and has suggested that the area's security be guaran- teed by troops from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the UAR, Sudan, Togo, and India. Of these states, only India and Ghana have troops in the country at present. Kasavubu probably would resist the dispatch to the Congo of contingents from such radical supporters of Gizenga as Guinea, Mali, or the UAR, and Leopoldville radio has announced that "no delaying tactics will prevent" the re- opening of the legislature. It is questionable whether the Ileo government nominated by Kasavubu would be approved in a reconvened parliament. Voting patterns will be determined large- ly by tribal loyalties, bribery, and the whim of the individual legislator, and several members of both houses are unknown quan- tities. Gizenga's strength in both houses probably has increased somewhat since early April, when it was estimated he had 16 sup- porters in the 83-member Senate and 25 in the 137-member Chamber of Deputies. However, the num- ber of Ileo's nominal supporters probably remains somewhat larger. The issue would ultimately be decided by the presently uncom- mitted legislators. In an apparent effort to put an end to divergent atti- tudes in Stanleyville, Gizenga arrested several moderates in his "central government" and in the Orientale provincial regime. In addition to some of the ablest civilian officials, those arrested include two offi- cers from Gizenga's armed forces who had been involved in the recent negotiations with Leopold- ville military leaders. One of the officers was subsequently released. Although there has been no reaction to the arrests in Stanleyville so far, sympathy for the moderates' conciliatory attitude toward Leopoldville re- portedly was widespread, and op- position to Gizenga might in- crease both among the populace and within the army. In Katanga, the Elisabeth- ville regime is ingratiating it- self with the UN, apparently because officials there fear an attack from Leopoldville. The ruling triumvirate, headed by Interior Minister Munongo, has also agreed to disband Katanga's white mercenary army units. SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 SECRE Munongo probably feels that in addition to removing a source of friction between his regime and the UN, the disbandment of the "White legion" removes a potential source of armed opposition. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak informed the American ambassador on 16 May that Congo- lese Foreign Minister Bomboko had written Brussels to request the withdrawal of most of the Belgian advisers in Katanga. Spaak said a list of such ad- visers who should be withdrawn at once is being made up and would be communicated to Elisa- bethville and Leopoldville. He added that this policy would create an adverse reaction with- in Belgium, but he stated his belief that those who wanted to 25X1 maintain the Belgian predomi- nance in the Congo were com- pletely wrong. MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS The UAR military exercise which began on 9 May is still in progress, but no large-scale troop movements have been ob- served. Israel pegan routine unit-scale..spring maneu- vers of its own about a month earlier than usual. Maneuvers involving three brigades are to be held beginning about the first of June, and the call..-up of reserves to partic- ipate in them may already have begun. exercise and the political sit- uation in Jordan. If the UAR moved to seize control of Jor- dan either by force or clandes- tine action, the Israeli Govern- ment would consider military intervention--at least the oc- eupatibn?-of Jordan's west bank. King Husayn's hold on power has been weakened by the adverse reaction among almost all Jordanians to his plan to wed an Englishwoman about 25 May. The Israeli Government has been somewhat concerned both about the scope of the UAR SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 11 of 23 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY UAR press and radio have made no concentrated effort to exploit Husayn's marriage plan. Indeed, Cairo newspapers are speculating-`Fthat a meeting be- tween Nasir and Husayn may be Iraq The most significant of several changes announced on 14 May in the Iraqi cabinet was the replacement of the leftist minis- ter of guidance, Faysal al-Samir. This post has been taken over by Minister of Education Ismail Arif, who is expected to purge the Guidance Ministry of pro-Commu- nist elements, much as he has already purged the Education Min- istry. The government has pre- viously acted to suppress the activities of Iraqi Communist- front groups one after another; the most recent instance was an order by Military Governor Abdi that the offices of the Iraqi Peace Partisans be closed. The three new cabinet ap- pointees are colorless, second- string technicians; no first- raters appear to be willing to accept cabinet appointments because of Qasim's erratic personality and the widespread public disillusionment with his regime. 25X1 UAR-USSR Over the last two weeks, the UAR press and radio have played down criticism of the United States and made some ob- lique criticisms of the Commu- nist bloc. Communist China has bought almost 5,000,000 tons of grain for delivery in 1961 and has expressed its intent to buy an additional 5,000,000 tons--from Canada--for delivery during 1962 and"1963; Of the three-year total, worth $600,000,000, about 500,000 tons are presently in- tended for re-export to cover Chinese commitments to Albania, Cuba, and Ceylon. The latest purchase of 750,000 tons of wheat from Aus- tralia brings the total from that country for delivery in 1961 to 2,150,000 tons, and further SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 12 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM19ARI long-term contracts are still under discussion. Of the 7,000,- 000 tons of grain to be pur- chased from Canada, just over 2,000,000 tons will be delivered this year. In the 1960-61 food year, it is estimated that China had roughly 115,000,000 tons of grain available for consumption as food. Communist China in 1961 will for the first time become a net importer of food, and food ex- ports will be down sharply from the usual levels. As a result, it has cut other imports dras- tically to compensate for reduced export capabilities and to pay for food imports. In addition, China is selling silver bullion and obtaining short-term credits from the grain sellers and from Hong Kong banks to restrict the drain on its limited supply of foreign exchange. There is no evidence of gold sales by the Chinese, but these would be al- most impossible to detect if the USSR were marketing the gold for them. Canada has apparently agreed to allow the Chinese to pay 25 percent down and the remainder in nine months follow- ing each shipment of grain; Aus- tralia has also given credits of up to a year for the most recent grain purchases. Aid extended by the USSR has not been generous consider- ing the seriousness of China's present difficulties. In the Sino-Soviet trade protocol signed on 7 April the Soviets announced a loan of 500,000 tons of sugar to China and deferral of repay- ment of China's short-term cred- its from the USSR, a factor which should ease somewhat the problem of financing the current grain purchases. There is no evidence that the Soviets have loaned China foreign exchange to fi- nance these purchases. Although the trade protocol did not in- clude foodstuffs among the com- modities which China would ship to the USSR, it is possible that China will continue to,export some food, but with a minimum of publicity. Food shortages in China are especially severe now--the last month before the summer harvest--and reports of serious malnutrition are being received from many parts of the country. The decline of already low nutri- tional standards is contributing to a rising incidence of disease and to a general debilitation of the population. As a consequence, the efficiency and morale of the labor force is probably at the lowest level since the Communists consolidated their power in the early 1950s, a factor which will retard economic recovery. The continued drought in North China, probable reductions in wheat acreage, an apparently heavy winter kill, and a recent late-season cold wave damaging to crops in several provinces have dimmed prospects for an early harvest. While the heavy emphasis on bad weather in the Chinese press is a convenient means of shifting blame for the food shortages away from the re- gime's policies, evidence of con- tinued poor growing weather has been confirmed by weather mon- itoring services of the US Gov- ernment. Chinese agriculture has also suffered, however, from inept organizational changes and general mismanagement. Although Peiping has re- treated from the extremes of the leap forward and has practically abandoned the commune, the govern- ment faces a major task in re- building the morale of the peas- 25X1 ant and obtaining the where- withal to offer incentives for (Prepared by ORR) renewed effort. SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 13 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET The rate of conversion of Soviet collective farms (kol- khozes) to state farms (sov- khozes) was sharply stepped up dur- ing 1960 and 1961, despite in- dications during the preceding two years that the USSR intended to proceed slowly in this field. While this would appear to in- dicate a change in Moscow's at- titude toward state farms in the development of socialized agriculture, articles in au- thoritative journals have re- cently reaffirmed Khrushchev's 1958-1959 position that the two types of farm organization will continue to exist side by side for some time to come and have criticized local officials for "indiscriminate" conversions. It is believed, therefore, that the future status of the collective farm system, long a key practical and ideological issue, apparently continues to be disputed at high levels with- in the regime. The problem of merging collective and state farm property into a uniform Communist property is to be in- cluded in the new party program which Khrushchev will present to the 22nd party congress in October. In 1960, after two years of a relative lull in conver- sions, the number of state farms increased from 6,500 to 7,400, according to Soviet statistics, while the number of collective farms declined. Although col- lective farms remain the dom- inant institution in Soviet ag- riculture--accounting for about 60 percent of the total sown acreage in 1960--they are rapid- ly disappearing in certain areas of the country. In Tselina (New Lands) Kray, for example, the number of collective 'arms decreased from 412 to .L7 in BACKGROUND State farms differ from collective fames in four ways: (1) the collective-rather than the state--nominally owns all of the farm's productive assets other than land--such as machinery and tools; (2) the state farm receives its capital directly from the state budget, the collective largely from the profits of its own operation; (3) the collec- tive farmer's wages are more dependent on the suc- cess of the crop than are those of the state farmer; (4) collective farm produce is sold both at collec- tive farm markets and state stores, whereas state farm produce is sold only at state stores. the first two months of 1961, while state farms increased from 506 to 682. The sown acreage, number of cattle, and number of workers in the state sector in- creased sharply at the expense of the collective sector. The Seven-Year Plan adopted in January 1959 had provided for only modest increases in invest- ment in state agriculture, but in 1960 state investment rose 20 percent. The state farms in 1960 exceeded the level of their share in the delivery of grain and milk to the government planned for 1965, while collec- tive investment declined. Communist doctrine has usually argued that large-scale state-owned farms are more ef- ficient than collective farms and closer to the Communist ideological ideal of a single form of "all-national" property. Sovkhozes became the dominant form in the New Lands opened by Khrushchev in 1954, and begin- ning in 1956 he has repeatedly urged that rings of specialized state farms be set up around cities to supply them with milk and vegetables. Throughout the USSR, conversions of kolkhozes to sovkhozes reached a peak in 1957, but were virtually halted in 1958-1959 after the bumper crop of 1958. Khrushchev strengthened the collective farms in 1958 by SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 14 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 USSR: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SOWN AREA SECRET 0 collective farms state farms private plots * also includes other state agricultural enterprises--about 2% of total acreage In the last decade there has been a sharp decline in the number of collective farms through consolidations and conversions to state farms. (units, end of year) 1950 1 953 1958 1959 1960 Collective Farms 121,400 91 ,20 0 67,700 54,600 45,100 State Farms 4,988 4 ,85 7 6,002 6,496 7,386 turning farm machinery over to them. His speech to the 21st party congress in 1959 and the Seven-Year Plan adopted at that congress envisaged a mixed ag- ricultural system in which kol- .khozes would continue in "peace- ful competition" with sovkhozes for some time to come and would be raised gradually to the level of "all-national" property. Disappointing harvests in 1959 and 1960, however, made it difficult for weak kolkhozes to pay for the machinery trans- ferred to them in 1958 and to provide the peasant with suf- ficient incentives. Some econ- omists began to argue that conversion to state farms was the best solution to the prob- lem of economically backward kolkhozes. Local officials, apparently with support at least as high as the agricultural min- istries of some republics, be- gan to speed up the pace of conversions to state farms. The recent establishment in a number of republics of state farms ministries indicates that this renewed emphasis on state farms was probably directed from the center. Since the fall of 1960, however, articles have again appeared in party and economic journals arguing that the time has not yet'come for an all-out conversion drive. They point out that the kolkhozes can still contribute significantly to in- creased agricultural output and that massive conversions would require heavy state investment. The first secretary of the Georg- ian Communist party and others have recently condemned local officials for converting kol- khozes into state farms in 25X1 order to shift to the state the burden of improving agricultural production. (Prepared jointly wi SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page L5 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 - SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The long-awaited trial of persons allegedly involved in a plot to overthrow the Hoxha re- gime opened in Tirana on 15 May. Ten conspirators have pleaded guilty to six charges, including involvement in a plot, armed re- volt, and passing information to foreign powers. They are ac- cused of serving the US, Greek, and Yugoslav intelligence serv- ices, but in actuality the plot uncovered late last summer prob- ably was inspired and organized by the USSR in an attempt to remove the Albanian leaders who have aligned their country with Communist China. Thus the trial is an expression of Hoxha's de- fiance of Moscow. Although reports have claimed that as many as 250 individuals in the party, government, and military were implicated in the plot, only the ten are being tried. Terri Sejko, said to be leader of the plot, is the prin- cipal defendant. Until his ar- rest, he held the rank of vice admiral and was deputy commander of the Albanian Navy. The only other prominent de- fendants are Tahir Demi, quietly ousted last fall as chairman of the Elbasan district People's Council, and Halim Xhelo, who was an important figure in the internal security apparatus un- til 1957, when he was apprehended attempting to flee to Greece, Xhelo, for unknown reasons, was spared arrest at that time and subsequently has served as head of the army sports office. The regime is now using the attempted flight to try to lend credibility to its charges of Greek involve- ment in the alleged plots. Two of the other defendants are known to have held responsi- ble party or security jobs in the early 1950s in the Konispol area adjacent to the Greek bor- der where many of the activities of the conspirators allegedly took place. The two most prom- inent figures removed from their party positions last fall, Liri Belishova and Koco'Tashko, are not among the defendants. Three others have a military back- ground. The Conspiracy Details of the plot have not yet been fully developed in the testimony, but the general outlines are clear. The first two defendants, Tahir Demi and .Nasho Gerxho, claimed that as far back as 1951 the Greeks and the Yugoslavs had been working with their leader, Sejko, and others who had subsequently fled Albania, including a one-time party central committee member, General Panayot Plaku (who fled in 1957). The conspiratorial group allegedly had sought for years to work within the Alba- nian Workers (Communist) party against the Hoxha regime and in favor of the Yugoslav "revision- ists." Those charged were said to have argued in 1956 that the Hoxha regime was not implementing the bloc's policy of friendship toward Tito. Demi also testified that Sejko was responsible in 1958 for passing to the Greeks in- formation about the Albanian Navy and that Sejko had plans to involve the navy in an inter- national incident which would give Athens and Belgrade an excuse to condemn Albania be- fore the United Nations. The most important task of the group, however, according to the testimony, was to encourage dissidence among the people SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET in the hopes that an armed up- rising scheduled for September- October 1960 would have popular support. The US, Greece, and Yugoslavia allegedly were to in- tervene with armed forces to aid the insurrection. When the prose- cution inquired as to what pro- gram the conspirators intended to follow if their uprising were successful, Demi said that the "dregs" of the Albanian people --presumably "revisionist" and anti-Communist exiles in Yugo- slavia and in the West--would run the country, and that Gen- eral Panayot Plaku would most likely head the government. Regime Intentions The trial is intended to ,justify once again to the Alba- nian people the regime's foreign policy which has provided the common ground for its support of Communist China in the Sino-So- viet dispute. The Hoxha regime has always manipulated the peo- ple's fears of potential Yugo- slav and Greek aggression to justify the need for its harsh internal system, little changed since Stalin's days. The major--although implicit --theme of the trial, however, appears primarily to be anti-So- viet. By tracing the conspiracy back to 1951, the regime is in effect demonstrating that its assessment of Tito's Yugoslavia has been correct all along, while Khrushchev was in error in his rapprochement with Tito in 1955- 57, his denunciation in 1956 of the 1948 Cominform Resolution outlawing Yugoslavia, and his decision to pursue "peaceful co- existence" with non-Communist states. The indictment, for ex- ample, attempts to show that the US, Greece, and Yugoslavia "at no time have... interrupted their 18 May 61 SEC. hostile activities in the politi- cal, ideological,or military fields." The testimony implies that the conspiracy's pro-Yugoslav activities in 1956--essentially in harmony with bloc policy at the time--were traitorous. In this regard, Taho Sejko, then editor of the leading regime daily paper, Zeri i Popullit, has been linked in the testimony with the conspirators. By so doing, the regime is implying that the expressions of Albania's limited de-Stalinization that appeared in the press at that time did not reflect the "true" position of the regime. The trial is also an ex- pression of Hoxha's continued defiance of the Soviet bloc on another account, There is reason to believe that Moscow warned the Albanians in February against holding any anti-Yugo- slav trials. Neither Moscow nor its satellites have ever referred to the conspiracy. Impact of the Trial The trial will not only serve to widen the fissure be- tween Tirana and Moscow, it probably will also result in a severing of Albanian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations. Yugo- slavia, according to the Al- banian radio, threatened in late March to "review" its relations with Tirana if Alba- nia held a trial. While Pei- ping might then break its ties with Yugoslavia, Moscow and its satellites probably would not follow suit. Thus, the facade of bloc unity--as es- tablished at the November con- ference of Communist leaders-- would be overtly disrupted. T Page 17 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY A delegation led by Nan Han-then, head of Communist Chi- na's international trade pro- motion committee, is on a tour of several South American coun- tries. Nan scored his first success last week when President Quadros agreed to the establish- ment of a "nonofficial" Chinese Communist trade office in Bra- zil. This will be Peiping's first permanent representation on the South American continent. Nan has held out the promise of substantial trade between the two countries, and Brazil has agreed to send an economic dele- gation to Peiping in the near future. However, Chinese Communist trade with Latin American coun- tries has--with the exception of Cuba--been small, and neither the visit nor the trade office is likely to lead to any great expansion of Sino-Brazilian trade. Peiping's objective therefore is probably more po- litical than economic. It has found the signing of trade agreements or the opening of trade offices to be a useful wedge in establishing political relations. The initial diplo- matic recognition of Peiping in the Middle East (by the UAR) and in North Africa (by Morocco) followed this pattern. Such tactics have not al- ways worked, however, largely because of the intrusion of the "two Chinas" issue, as in Japan in 1958 and Lebanon in 1960. Han reiterated to the Brazilians Peiping's willingness to estab- lish diplomatic relations if Brazil breaks its ties with the Chinese Nationalist Government. The Quadros administration has been making strong efforts since its inauguration last January to expand economic re- lations with both Communist and non-Communist countries, and Quadros has made equivocal state- ments as to his alignment with the United States. Peiping is not likely to gain early recogni- tion, however, since Quadros ap- parently prefers to space out his announcements of dramatic changes in foreign policy. He has indicated that the re-es- tablishment of relations with the USSR will precede the estab- lishment of relations with Com- munist China. Nan's group, nevertheless, hopes to repeat its Brazilian suc- cess in other parts of South America. It has accepted an in- vitation to Uruguay from an un- official trade promotion organ- ization, and it apparently will then visit Argentina, which re- cently sold China 20,000 tons of grain. The Chilean foreign minister also has agreed to an unofficial visit by the Chinese. SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 .of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOMALI REPUBLIC LOOKS TO SOVIET UNION FOR AID Prime Minister Abdirascid, in response to an invitation from the Soviet good-will mis- sion which visited the Somali Republic last month, will head a large delegation to the USSR for a visit beginning next week. Abdirascid, a moderate who is considered friendly to the West, was initially reluctant to make the trip but apparently concluded that the prestige aspects would improve his government's chance of winning a clear-cut victory in the referendum next month to approve the country's first constitution. The referendum would in effect extend the gov- ernment's term in office for five years. The government is meeting vigorous opposition from the Communist-oriented Great Somalia League (GSL) as well as from the dominant party in the northern region--former- ly British Somaliland. The Soviet delegation traveled extensively during its nine-day stay and was particu- larly active in Somalia's north- ern region, where political leaders organized an unusually warm welcome. This action was more a reflection of hostility to Abdirascid and the govern- ment-supported referendum than of real friendship for the So- viet visitors. The leader of the delegation nevertheless took advantage of the friendly atmosphere and announced that Moscow would give "full consid- eration" to development projects in the area and expressed an interest in opening a consulate in Hargeisa, the regional cap- ital. Moreover, he curried the favor of two Somali minis- ters from the northern region-- both of whom have consistently opposed the prime _ministeres policies--by inviting them as well to visit the Soviet Union. The Abdirascid delegation-- which will include high-ranking officials in the ministries of agriculture, education, health, and foreign affairs, and perhaps the army commander--can be ex- pected to follow up the prelim- inary agreements enumerated in a joint communique issued at Moga- discio on 9 April at the conclu- sion of the Soviet visit. The communique called for the early signature of cultural and trade agreements between the two coun- tries and stated that Moscow would "examine favorably" a Somali request for a long-term development loan. The Soviet delegation delivered a letter from Abdirascid to Khrushchev in which the Somali leader re- quested assistance in the con- struction of ports, dams, and an international airport, the development of processing in- dustries and an information service, and the construction and equipping of hospitals and schools, The US Embassy in Mogadiscio estimates the cost of Abdira- scid's "shopping list" at be- tween $50,000,000 and $100,000,- 000. Although the USSR prob- ably will agree to conclude gen- eral economic and cultural agree- ments, it is not likely to re- spond with aid of the magnitude requested by Abdirascid or to offer arms--particularly in view of its commitments in Ethiopia. The most likely aid offer will be a modest line of credit under which individual projects will be negotiated. The prospects for trade between the two countries are limited by the Somali Republic's weak SECRET 18 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 19 oaf ' 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET weak export potential. The banana crop--the country's lead- ing export--is largely committed by trade agreements with Italy and the UAR at premium prices. After the Somali Republic became independent last July, Moscow, Prague, and Peiping promptly established embassies in Mogadiscio. Albania,Bulgaria, and Hungary also arranged last year to set up diplomatic mis- sions, but their representa- tives have not'yet arrived. Two Czech technical experts are in Hargeisa to study the progress of technical education in the country. Last February Prague reportedly offered to build, equip, and staff a technical school in the republic at a cost of about $1,400,000. A meeting in Cairo to pre- pare for the heads-of-state con- ference sponsored by Tito and Nasir will probably be held in early June. Representatives from some twenty "nonaligned" countries are expected to at- tend, The preliminary inquiries contained in a joint note from the Yugoslav and UAR leaders to 17 Afro-Asian and four Latin American nations last April have received generally favorable responses. The delegates in Cairo will consider the agenda, time, and place for the "'neu- tralist summit" meeting. Little difficulty on se- lecting the time and place is expected, The conference will probably be held sometime prior to the next United Nations Gen- eral Assembly session in Sep- tember; Belgrade is the likely site. The agenda and the ques- tion of what constitutes non- alignment will probably stir long discussions, however, and could do much to prevent the establishment of the solid neu- tralist front which Tito and Nasir hope to achieve. Asian meeting. Premier Khrushchev prob- ably has strong reservations over Tito's prominent role; although Yugoslavia and the USSR agree on many current international issues, Belgrade has used its prestige to promote among the uncommitted states its own type of "socialism"--declared "revi- sionist" by the bloc. Peiping, which is omitted from the guest list, doubtless will regard the conference as a setback to its hopes for the early convention of a second Bandung-type Afro- SECRET May 61 Page 20 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Francois Duvalier on 22 May begins a new six-year term as President of Haiti as the re- sult of the elections on 30 April in which all legislative candidates were Duvalier fol- lowers and Duvalier's name ap- peared at the top of all ballots. Duvalier still has two years remaining in the term to which he was elected in October 1957, and the generally apathetic elec- torate was not aware that it was voting for a president. However, Haitian newspapers an- nounced on 9 May that Duvalier was "re-elected" by more than 1,321,000 votes; the total vote in the 1957 presidential elec- tions was about 940,000. On 7 April a presidential decree dissolving the old bi- cameral legislature was an- nounced, following a press cam- paign justifying the action on a constitutional technicality. An electoral law pre-dating the 1957 constitution by several months provided that the terms of office of lower house members were to expire in April 1961, while members of the upper house --elected under the same law-- apparently were to remain in of- fice until 1963. Last month's election was decreed ostensibly for the sole purpose of choosing a new 58-member unicameral legis- lature, as specified by the 1957 constitution. Duvalier may claim that his second term will be the first to which he was elected under the 1957 constitution, since it was officially adopted two months after he took office. The last three elected Haitian presidents were ousted by combined public and military action after they tried to extend their terms beyond their constitutional length, but they made their attempts closer to the :-erld of their legal terms than has Duvalier. 18 May 61 Haiti, with a population of about 3,500,000, is one of the poorest of the Latin American coun- tries; its per capita gross national product was about $65 in 1959, one of the lowest in Latin Am- erica. US grant aid in 1960 totaled ~D'11,500,000. Haiti has an illiteracy rate of 90 percent--highest in the hemisphere. Haitian history is marked by alternating periods of dictatorship and anarchy; the complete collapse of governmental authority in 1915 led to 19 years of occupation by the itS Marines. The present regime, which assumed power in 1957 after the fall of five governments during the previous year, has favored Haiti's black masses against the small mulatto elite. Duvalier, who assumed the presidency following a year of intense political instability, has governed with a mixture of paternalism and despotism char- acteristic of other strong Hai- tian presidents. Army Chief of Staff Merceron apparently acquiesces in Duvalier's con- tinued rule, but the rest of the 4,700-man army is largely apathet- ic. Its loyalty and military effectiveness are open to question, largely because of the President's creation of his own civilian militia as a polit- ical counterweight to the regu- lar armed forces and because of his policy of weakening and dividing the army leadership. Well aware of Haiti's military weakness and its geographic vulnerability to intervention from either Cuba or the Domini- can Republic, Duvalier has pursued a policy of extreme caution regarding any involvement in Caribbean disputes. Duvalier's position has im- proved since the collapse in early March of a four-month student strike which constituted the most troublesome threat to his regime since its inaugura-.'. tion, and it is unlikely that the President's maneuver to gain re-election will stimulate im- mediate action by his poorly organized oppositiOn. However, this year's unfavorable harvest prospects for coffee--Haiti's chief foreign exchange earner-- could weaken the country's al- ready poor economic position and encourage plotting against the government. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 23 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL ARTICLES DE GAULLE AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY French foreign policy un- der the Fifth Republic is con- ditioned by De Gaulle's long- range historical perspective, which emphasizes national armed force and traditional diplomacy and has as a firm aim restoring France to the status of a world power. This has provided con- sistency and direction in the formulation of policy but has complicated France's relations with its allies. At the same time, however, De Gaulle has shown a pragmatic willingness to adjust his tactical position when necessary. Over-All East-West Relations De Gaulle sees the West's relations with the Communist bloc in terms of a continuing geopolitical struggle between historic national entities; thus giving little weight to ideologies, he has termed Com- munism a transient phenomenon in the history of Russia. Prior to the 1960 summit conference there were definite indications that De Gaulle hoped for prog- ress toward an East-West de- tente. He maintained that co- operation between East and West was possible and would be es- pecially beneficial if begun in the field of joint aid to under- developed countries.. Khrushchev's visit to France in March 1960 apparently reinforced De Gaulle's belief that the Soviet premier was an able and moderate man g?iiding his country away from the aggressive policies of the past. The ensuing summit failure did not touch De Gaulle's basic contention that a detente is in the nature of things. Two weeks later he opened a press confer- ence with the observations: "Man, limited by his nature, is infinite in his desires. The world is thus full of oppos- ing forces.... Competition of efforts is the condition of life. Our country finds itself confronted today with this law of the species, as it has been for 2,000 years." Although ob- viously disappointed, De Gaulle said that France "took note of the outcome with composure," and added, "What was necessary yesterday will still be neces- sary tomorrow." He also as- serted that the methodical steps of traditional diplomacy are more valuable than the "tumul- tuous exchanges of public speeches." De Gaulle's propensity to view the evolution of East-West relations in an extremely long- range context and his willing- ness to present his concepts publicly have resulted in state- ments that others have inter- preted as demonstrating less than complete devotion to the Western alliance. Harking back to the French-Russian alliances during the two World Wars, for example, he has averred: "There has never been, between the French people and the Russian people, at any time, any natural opposition, any litigation of a political nature." De Gaulle speaks deliber- ately of "Russia" rather than the Soviet Union and ignores the iron curtain with his definition of "Europe" as extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." As a result of these views, French SECRET 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Pace 1 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY policy on several specific East-West issues--such as dis- armament and a divided Germany --reflects concern for particu- lar national interests more than regard for the over-all East- West balance. Although De Gaulle often alludes to this long perspective in the same paragraph with, for instance, a castigation of cur- rent Soviet penetration in Af- rica, he seems to have no dif- ficulty keeping the two separate in his own mind. More impor- tant, his immediate tactics in matters of specific East-West differences are formulated on the basis of what exists today, rather than what may be tomorrow, regardless of how valid he may feel his concept of tomorrow is. Bilateral relations between France and the Soviet Union il- lustrate De Gaulle's pragmatism. In general he has kept relations cool and correct. Even Khru- shchev's visit resulted in only a routine communique and in the Soviet premier's diplomatic un- derstatement that on major is- sues French and Soviet views did not "fully coincide." Both equally correct. Although De Gaulle has said publicly that he believes the best interests of those countries lie in close ties with Western Europe in some sort of economic union, present relations are limited largely to cultural exchanges and a small, stagnant trade pattern. The emergence of Communist China as a major power appears to fascinate the French, and there is among them a strong be- lief, shared by De Gaulle, that a deterioration of Soviet-Chi- nese relations is inevitable. De Gaulle has publicly called attention to the "yellow multi- tude which cannot be kept within its limits" and which "must one day spread into the expanses around it." Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry has more re- cently cautioned against basing Western policy on intrabloc dif- ferences. France does not recognize the Peiping government and has made no move to expand relations beyond permitting occasional un- official visits by left-wing political figures and some stu- dent exchanges. Paris has pri- vately admitted that the ques- tion of Chinese representation sides have deliberately restrains in the UN is under study, but their propaganda during periods a Foreign Ministry spokesman re- of East-West tension. Paris, cently stated that the China despite its standing general threat to break diplomatic rela- tions with the governments rec- ognizing the rebel Provisional Algerian Government (PAG), moved quickly to minimize the conse- quences of Khrushchev's de facto recognition of the PAG last year Trade with the USSR since De Gaulle came to power has re- mained relatively constant at only 5 percent of total French foreign trade, even though the Soviet Union has repeatedly sought to step up its purchases of French industrial products. French relations with the European satellites have been problem was of paramount con- cern to the US, and that France would follow the lead of the US on it. Almost every major policy decision taken under De Gaulle has included the ultimate ob- jective of strengthening France's role in the Western alliance. This aim is reflected in a series of decisions over the last three years dating from his initial moves to impose political sta- bility, through the highly suc- cessful program to strengthen and expand the French economy, to the continuing progress toward SECRET 18 May Si SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 2 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY an Algerian solution and ulti- mately "complete decolonization." The earnestness with which De Gaulle views France's place as one of the three Western nations with world-wide responsibilities and his persistent pressure to build France to a position of power commensurate with this image have produced numerous in- stances of French intransigence and pique on matters of free world policy. The drive for recognition and treatment as a full partner of the US and Britain has been most pronounced in De Gaulle Is demands for closer tripartite coordination of global policy and strategy and in his reluc- tance to see what he considers great-power responsibilities fall, either by default or de- sign, to other organizations or states. Although French sug- gestions that tripartite co- ordination be formalized in a permanent secretariat have been muted in recent months, the de- mands for continuous coordina- tion--both before and after West- ern policy has been formed--are reiterated regularly in public and private policy statements by all levels of the :French Gov- ernment. Whatever De Gaulle's de- sires for France throughout the world, it is on Europe that his greatest hopes are centered. Since the end of World War II he has called for a strong Eu- rope capable of playing a role as the "third force" in the world and at the same time of directing the power of Germany into constructive channels that would not threaten France. This double goal for France and Europe has led De Gaulle, despite his repugnance for supranational in- stitutions, to push ahead rapid- ly with the integration of the European economy. He has also urged regular political consul- tations among the six members of the European Economic Com- munity. De Gaulle regards close po- litical and economic relations between France and West Germany as the basis for a strong Europe. Although he has given firm sup- port to West Germany in the face of bloc threats to West Berlin, there are indications that in order to assure West Germany's firm attachment to the present European and Atlantic alliances, De Gaulle would pre- fer to see the division of Ger- many maintained, even if this meant recognition of the East German regime and a changed status for West Berlin. The NATO Alliance In his conceptual frame- work of world power formations, De Gaulle considers NATO in its present- form outmoded and unable to cope with the diverse nature of the Soviet threat. He would like to see the Western military alliance extended in order to prevent the free world from be- ing "outflanked" in Africa and the Middle East, and he appar- ently envisages that basic pol- icy decisions in such an alliance would be made by the three Western great powers--the US speaking for the western hemis- phere, the UK speaking for the Commonwealth, and France speak- ing for a politically coordinated Europe and a bloc of friendly African states. De Gaulle's continued op- position to the integration of French forces in NATO reflects his feeling that NATO no longer offers adequate protection for French interests in the light of changed international power relationships and increased de- structiveness of nuclear weapons. There is widespread belief at the highest levels in Paris that the US would not use its strategic weapons against the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe, and there is an even more intense belief that the Soviet Union is SECRET 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 3 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY operating under this assumption. Consequently, De Gaulle argues that even a limited French de- terrent force could inflict suf- ficient damage on the Soviet Un- ion to cause the Soviets to pause before striking Europe. and would probably prefer to see Communist China, with its recognized military strength, added to the group rather than have the doors opened to neu- tral nations in either a voting or nonvoting capacity. De Gaulle has therefore concentrated much of his program for modernizing the French mil- itary establishment on building a national nuclear striking force. Despite widespread po- litical opposition, much of it on economic grounds, be has pressed ahead with the develop- ment of nuclear weapons and de- livery systems primarily to pro- vide Western Europe with its own deterrent. In an effort to reduce the time lag in his program and lighten the economic burden, De Gaulle is likely to continue to seek outside help, particularly from the United States. His argument for aid will probably concentrate increasingly on the need to improve Western Europe's nuclear defense, rather than stating simply that France de- serves the aid because it has qualified as a nuclear power. France's desire to narrow the gap between itself and those powers possessing a nuclear de- terrent has colored its posi- tion on disarmament. De Gaulle opposes a nuclear test ban agree- ment which, given the present state of French nuclear weapons technology, would weigh more heavily against France than the other nuclear powers. Paris' main substantive contribution to disarmament talks--calling for the control and eventual elimination of vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons--is also aimed, at least in part, at reducing the superiority of the US and USSR in a field in which France is notoriously de- ficient. France opposes enlarging the ten-nation disarmament group De Gaulle continues to re- gard the world outside of Europe and the US in terms of spheres of influence or--as the French recently labeled them--"zones of primary responsibility." This has led France to guard jealous- ly what it considers its pre- eminent role in Southeast Asia, large parts of Africa, and to a lesser extent the Middle East. France has acknowledged the primary US interest in the Far East and Latin America, al- though it has shown some inter- est in strengthening cultural and economic relations with sev- eral Latin American states. De Gaulle has maintained an ex- tremely close relationship with Israel, considering that state the best bulwark for stability in the Middle East, while at- tempting to retain some influence in the Arab states formerly under French control. France's effort to interest Tunisia and Morocco in joining Algeria in a united Maghreb has as one of its aims the preservation of French interests in North Africa--par- ticularly the Sahara. France has recently crit- icized US diplomatic initiatives in Laos and the Congo. In both cases the objection has been that action was taken in an area of French responsibility without sufficient prior coordination. Paris prefers a neutral Laos as defined in the 1954 Geneva Ac- cords, which granted France a primary advisory role in the na- tion, and would probably welcome the return of Souvanna Phouma as bead of a new government. A Foreign Ministry sbokesman has remarked that any Laotian policy SECRET 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 4 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY would have one strike against it, in De Gaulle's view, if it were not the product of advance coordination with France. French policy in the Congo illustrates two other aspects of De Gaulle's long-term view of international relations. Paris has steadfastly opposed UN in- tervention on the legal grounds that the situation there is an internal affair of the Congolese Government, and on the practical grounds that the UN is ineffec- tive at maintaining peace in the world. Keeping peace, De Gaulle feels, is the responsibility of the great powers and not the UN, which he described last month as carrying with it "the global incoherence of its tumultuous and rowdy meetings." France's Congo policy also demonstrated Paris' continuing concern to preserve its influ- ence in the newly independent states of former French Africa and at the same time to limit a US-Soviet rivalry that would further entangle the new states in the cold war. After breaking drastically with Guinea in 1958 when that country chose inde- pendence rather than membership in the French Community, De Gaulle has acquiesced in most demands of the new African states including outright independence. Direct French economic aid to the African states in 1960 is estimated at $200,000,000, and De Gaulle proudly claims that, per capita, France spends more on economic aid than any other country in the world. France has military agree- ments with most of the African states--involving French aid for local defense forces and in most cases base rights for France-- and is encouraging those states to form a more cohesive polit- ical bloc which would be useful to France as a moderating in- fluence in Africa. This effort is aimed at building close, in- formal ties with Africa and pro- tecting the French "zone of re- sponsibility" against incursions by other nations or internation- al organizations. De Gaulle and Diplomacy France's foreign policy is clearly De Gaulle's foreign pol- icy. The Quay d'Orsay has had little role in the creation of policy, and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville seems to have been chosen for his post pri- marily because he is a loyal Gaullist and a highly competent administrator with little in- terest in pushing his own views. The Foreign Ministry has at times been ignorant of decisions on aspects of government policy, especially when De Gaulle has allowed the French military es- tablishment to act independent- ly in fields bordering on for- eign policy. Nuclear aid to Israel and the military recon- naissance flights over Libya in connection with the Algerian war apparently caught the minis- try by surprise. ing De Gaulle's goals for France. De Gaulle has made exten- sive use of quiet but astute personal diplomacy, particular- ly with European and African heads of states, to create an atmosphere of good will which has eased the way to acceptance of many of his policies. His personal magnetism has plainly overawed some and has convinced others of his sincerity and real- ism. The ability to project his views effectively on a personal basis, plus the centralization of foreign policy decision-mak- ing in his hands, has thus far resulted in the increasingly consistent application through- out the world of a French diplo- macy firmly aimed at achiev- SECRET 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 5 of 10- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY Periodic efforts to break the near stalemate among the Italian political parties have focused on the attempts of Pietro Nenni and other Italian Socialists to move the party away from its earlier alignment with the Communists to positive support for the governing Chris- tian Democrats. Successive postwar elections have brought the Communist vote close to a quarter of the electorate, while that of the four center parties now amounts to little over half. The Socialists currently poll nearly 15 percent of the popu- lar vote; if the party switched its support to the Christian Democrats and carried most of its electoral following with it, the result would be the res- toration of some real flexibil- ity in parliamentary government. The Socialist party has played a key role, in Italian politics since the late 19th century. The Communists split with the party' in 1921, and Nenni successfully resisted re- unification with them in 1934 but concluded a unity-of-action pact. This pact was reaffirmed in 1944 but formally abrogated by the Socialists in 1956. Moves toward Socialist - Christian Democratic coopera- tion have been under way for over half a dozen years but still face formidable obstacles. There are, of course, policy differences between the two par- ties, and strongly placed groups in each are working to prevent any understanding. Severance of the surviving ties with the Communists, moreover, would pre- sent operating difficulties for the Socialist party; Socialists are still allied with the Com- munists in some 2,000 of Italy's nearly 8,000 local governments, as well as in a number of siza- ble consumer cooperatives, and these relationships are frequent- ly important for financing the Socialist party organization. The association of Social- ists and Communists in the CGIL, Italy's largest labor confedera- tion, is a greater problem. So- cialist officials in the CGIL wield no real power, and many of them have long resented Com- munist domination of the organ- ization. With company unions and unorganized workers increas- ing in number, however, trade unionism as such is at present on the defensive in Italy, and the division of the major non- Communist unions into two con- federations provides no attrac- tive alternative to the CGIL for the Socialists. Socialist labor leaders fear that the chief result of any split in the CGIL at.this time would be a net loss in labor's industrial bargaining power and its ability to bring pressure on the government. So- cialist political leaders fear that such a break would also lose the party votes unless coun- terbalanced by pro-labor moves on the part of the government. Nenni, who is now 70 and generally conceded to be one of the country's shrewdest politi- cians, apparently had decided as early as 1951. that Continued association with the Communists would never restore his party to leadership of the Italian left or put him back into the cab- inet. He also seems to have be- come progressively disenchanted with Soviet Communism. Following the death of Sta- lin, Nenni began to extricate his party from its ties With the Italian Communists and later to move toward association with the Christian Democrats. This delicate operation was received with skepticism by the Christian Democrats--first as to Nenni's sincerity and later as to his ability to carry his party with him. The move has been active- ly opposed not only by the Com- munists but also by right-wing SECRET 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Paee 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY forces both inside and outside the Christian Democratic par- ty--partly because of its ef- fect on the balance of power in Italy. Nenni's basic problem is to demonstrate to the Chris- tian Democrats his party's good faith and to get from them--in return for parliamen- tary support--a quid pro quo substantial enough to persuade the bulk of his following that it would be profitable to leave the Communists. Many party stalwarts are acutely aware of what has happened to Giuseppe Saragat's Democratic Socialist party since it.formed an alli- ance with the Christian Demo- crats in 1947, Saragat took more than half the Socialist deputies with him when he split with Nenni over continued coopera- tion with the Communists in 1947. Now,, however, he con- trols less than a fifth as many as Nenni's party--partly be- cause Nenni held on to the par- ty name and most of the party machinery, and partly because Saragat proved unable to push through reform measures as a minister in the Christian Demo- crat - dominated government. DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE IN ITALIAN (PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE) 1948 1953 1956 1958 1960 PARLIAMENTARY PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTARY PROVINCIAL Christian Democrats 48.5 40.0 38.9 42.3 Democratic Socialists 7.1 4.5 7.5 4.7 Liberals 2.8*** 3.0 4.2 3.4 Republicans 2.5 i. 6 1.3 1.4 Total Center 0 9 49-1 51.9 51:8 Communists 22.6 23.1 Nenni Socialists 12.7 35.2* 14.7 Total Left 3 0 W._3 35 22 7, 88 vmers 6.1 2.9 2.0 *Communists and Nenni Socialists ran together. **Neo-Fascists and Monarchists ran together. ***Liberals and Monarchists ran together. 610501 9 40.3 5.7 4.0 1.3 51.3 14.4 38.9 2.9 8.8 party may throw some former Monarchist deputies Saragat's way, but at the cost of alien- ating certain Democratic Social- ist voters, at least in the north. In any case, Saragat's party is regarded by Italian So- cialist party leaders as an ex- ample of the consequences of a move too far, too soon, to the right. At present Nenni must cope with several factions within the party. His efforts to make the party completely independent are strongly opposed by a left- wing group led by Tullio Vecch- ietti and including many pro- Communists. Nenni is supported on most issues by a group led by Riccardo Lombardi, while a small faction under Lelio Basso tries to play a balance-of-pow- er role. Nenni controls most of the party organization, but the left-wing faction obtains funds from Communist sources and is usually better financed than he is. Much of Saragat's labor following--except for a few white-collar workers--went back to Nenni soon after the break, and others followed later. Since official Socialist reunifica- tion negotiations collapsed in 1956, five of Saragat's deputies and several of his party's pro- vincial federations have gone over to Nenni, and it appears that reunification is taking place at the grass roots. In the 1960 provincial elections the Saragat Social- ists scored some slight gains. The collapse of the Monarchist Nenni's own position now is somewhat strengthened by the So- cialists' participation with the Christian Democrats in the governments of certain large cities, including Milan, Genoa, and Florence. This develop- ment, which came about early this year as a result of the local elections last November, should in time help the party's fi- nances as well as its prestige. SECRET 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 7 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ITALY DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS ON KEY CITY COUNCILS FOLLOWING LOCAL ELECTIONS Of 6 NOVEMBER 1960 CHRISTE eN DEMOCRATIC NENNI DEMOCRATS SOCIALISTS LIBERALS REPUBLICANS COMMUNISTS SOCIALISTS NEO-FASCISTS MONARCHISTS OTHERS Rome (80 seats) 21 Milan (80 seats) 25 Turin (80 seats) 27 Genoa (80 seats) 27 Venice (60 seats) 23 Florence (60 seats) 22 Naples (80 seats) 21 Palermo (60 seats) 24 SECRET 17 17 5 20 12 2 22 17 4 14 13 3 4 3 -- 20 8 3 19 5 3 30 9 /4 5 5 Nevertheless, at the time of the Socialist party congress, from 15 to 18 March, the full impact of these local alliances bad not been felt by those doubting the policy of collab- orating with the ruling party. At this congress Nenni, who is usually a master of ambiguity, took an unusually direct and vigorous line against collabora- tion with the Communists. He obtained approval of the idea of Socialist parliamentary sup- port for a "center-left govern- ment with a concrete program," but with only 55 percent of the congress behind him. Nenni therefore must move carefully because of his slim majority and the continued strength of the left wing-- which now has six representa- tives among the 21. members on the new party directorate. As Italy's "Mr. Socialism," Nenni appreciates that his faction must hang on to the Italian So- cialist party and that any split must be initiated by the left wing. In view of the rough treatment given him during the congress, Nenni probably wants to see the most extreme of his opponents leave the party,al- though some of these would try to stay and make as much trou- ble as possible. That the Socialist voters generally approve Nenni's grad- ual moves to the right is sug- gested by the over-all increase in the Socialist vote from 1953 to 1960. Estimates as to how much of the party's electorate is behind Nenni range from 55 to 75 percent. It is clear, however, that this support is in the long run conditional. on obtaining from a Christian Demo- cratic government some of the reform measures his party ad- vocates. Sub-leaders in the party would probably want a few polit- ical plums such as Jobs in the government holding company IRI or in the Fund for Development of the South, as well as inclu- sion of Socialist representa- tives in government missions abroad. Some of these conces- sions would, for varied reasons, arouse opposition in the Christian Democratic party. Nenni faces a major problem in gaining the cooperation of the Christian Democrats. In most domestic policies the Socialist position is close to that of the Christian Democrats' majority left wing, led by Premier Fan- fani and party secretary Moro, the principal advocates of co- operation. Like this group, the Socialists urge controls on se- curities and exchange, as well as agricultural reform, nation- alization of nuclear energy, and the tightening up of the Italian tax system. SECRET 18 May r'" Q1 t'OT AT AnnMT("T M10 T1. S of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY To the Socialists the most important Christian Democratic platform planks would probably be: nationalization of energy --beginning with atomic energy --which was included in the program of the 1958 Fanfani government; establishment of geographic regions as provided by the constitution; and a school bill involving greater separation of church and state. To narrow the wide area of disagreement between the two parties on school reform, Nenni has in recent months been toning down the Socialists' traditional anticlerical posi- tion. At least in local and regional politics, moreover, familiar considerations of mu- tual self-interest can evident- ly go far to overcome ideolog- ical differences--as is seen in the capital of Rieti Prov- ince, near Rome, where left- wing Socialists and right-wing Christian Democrats are col- laborating in this small city government. It is in this field of domestic reform, however, that Fanfani's progressive program is most susceptible to the veto of the influential Christian Democratic right-wing minority, supported by the conservative Liberal party, on whose votes the government's thin majority depends. It was in order to rid himself of this built-in veto--which has resulted in inaction on many legislative reforms and hence feeds the Communist popular vote--that Fanfani in April 1960 sought to form a center-left govern- ment dependent on the Social- ists' large parliamentary vote. This effort was blocked by the right-wing Christian Democrats. In the vote of confidence given Fanfani's mi- nority government the follow- ing August, the Socialists ab- stained--for the first time in 13 years on a ballot of this nature--rather than join the Communists in opposi- tion. In the sphere of foreign policy, the Nenni Socialists --like Saragat's Democratic Socialists earlier--originally opposed NATO but now accept it as a fact of life. In 1956, Italy's ratification of the European Common Market treaties was actively opposed by the Communists, while the Socialists merely abstained. On a number of more recent questions, rang- ing from the May 1960 summit conference to last month's mil- itary insurrection in Algeria, the Socialist position has differed sharply from the Com- munist. At the same time, the party maintains an official po- sition of neutrality between the US and USSR--although at the March congress Nenni pub- licly attacked the subordina- tion of Italian Communism to Soviet foreign policy. The position of the Roman Catholic Church has been a strong factor in blocking co- operation between the Christian Democrats and Nenni. Now the church itself appears somewhat more flexible toward local col- laboration. Even Genoa's die- hard Cardinal Siri seems to have accepted the Socialist - Christian Democratic govern- ment in his city as preferable to the alternative--a Socialist- COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 1- DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS 17 (PSDI) INDEPENDENT LEFT 1 87 NENNI (PSI) SECRET VOTE CONFIRMING FANFANI GOVERNMENT 5 AUGUST 1960 Q SUPPORT ABSTAIN OPPOSITION -VALDOSTAN UNION (UVD) - LIBERALS(PLI) .,-:~.,~~, ;N_NEO FASCISTS(MSI ...... J MONARCHIST 25X1 25X1 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 9 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Communist administration. It is not clear, however, whether the Vatican would try to block collaboration at the national level by withdrawing support from the Christian Democrats with the idea of backing a new, right-wing, Catholic party. Powerful forces on both left and right see their posi- tions threatened by Socialist - Christian Democratic collabora- tion, and the area of maneuver open to Nenni and Moro in their efforts to bring it about is at present limited. Both the rightist and the Communist op- ponents of such an alliance evidently hope to keep the sit- uation frozen till the 1963 na- tional elections. Knowing that Nenni's tactics require legis- lative issues on which his par- ty following will be willing to give the government parlia- mentary support, rightists both inside and outside the Christian Democratic party will probably try various expedients to keep such legislation bottled up in committee. There is, on the other hand, considerable dissatis- SECRET faction among left-center ele- ments--Democratic Socialists, Republicans, and right-wing Christian Democrats--with Pre- mier Fanfani's present minor- ity government. It is little more than a holding operation pledged to resign if any of the four divergent center par- ties withdraws its parliamen- tary support. The successes achieved to date by the pol- icy of Socialist - Christian Democratic alliances in city governments are encouraging further such moves in local or provincial administrations --particularly the regional government of Sicily--where political stalemate has long persisted. If, as seems likely, the government lasts until fall, pressures may then build up for a new try at an avowedly reformist national government of the left-center relying on external support in parlia- ment from Socialist party deputies. The likelihood of such an attempt may be de- termined by the outcome of current negotiations for new governments in Sicily, Rome, Venice, and the province of Milan. 18 May 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 10 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3 C ' . NTIMC [+r. nnC'T C` L`GD L` T Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200040001-3