CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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c %R-T COPY NO. 77
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
OCI NO. 0281/61
25 May 1961
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 May 1961
THE WEEI.K i'IN BR IEF
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces, while observing a
cease-fire on most fronts, are continuing their attacks
against the government's Meo guerrilla bases, particu-
larly in the Pa Dong area. Intensified efforts to elimi-
nate these pockets of government forces are expected.
The talks at Namone remain deadlocked on most issues,
although there.-is agreement among the three groups to
"examine" a proposal for a unified delegation to Geneva
representing the "Kingdom of Laos" rather than any
Laotian "government." The conference at Geneva has done
little more than mark time during the past week. (Secret
Nof orn )
SOUTH KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
There are indications of a growing split in the Su-
preme Council for National Reconstruction between Maj.
Gen. Pak Chang-hui, architect of the 16 May coup, and
Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, titular head
of the.council. Chang is believed to favor an early re-
turn to civilian government rather than an indefinite
period of military rule. The new group lacks capable
administrators, particularly in the economic field, where
growing confusion has brought business activities almost
to a standstill. While there is no evidence of North
Korean military preparations to take advantage of the
unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group
could make South Korea increasingly susceptible to Com-
munist propaganda and subversion. (Confidential)
SOVIET NEWS TREATMENT OF KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV MEETING . . . Page 5
Moscow has given the planned meeting between the
President and Khrushchev a generally optimistic ap-
praisal but has refrained from editorial comment. Soviet
media describe it as an important and timely step which
could contribute to a relaxation of tensions and lead to
further high-level meetings. Moscow attempts to convey the
impression that the meeting is mainly the result of US
initiative and is a "sign" that forces in the US now
favor improving relations with the USSR. Soviet and
satellite commentaries have listed Germany, disarmament,
a nuclear test ban, Laos, and Cuba as possible topics.
Peiping has reported the initial TASS announcement of
the talks but has made no comment. (Confidential)
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Both French and Algerian delegations appear to have
been favorably impressed by the initial sessions of the
Evian negotiations, but the Algerians continue skeptical
of French willingness to relinquish direct and indirect
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 May 1961
authority throughout Algeria, including the Sahara. As
the talks proceed, the French Government may find that
its most pressing problem is the continuing activity of
right-wing extremists determined to stop Algerian inde-
pendence by any means; there are reports that some of
them may attempt to assassinate De Gaulle. (Secret)
Kasavubu and his supporters remain firm in their
decision to reconvene parliament in Leopoldville, al-
though Gizenga continues to demand that it meet in
Kamina. There are indications that Leopoldville is
negotiating with Tshombd1s successors to assure Katanga's
participation in a Congo federation as desired by
Kasavubu. Leopoldville probably believes that its
hand has been strengthened by its success in blocking
the return of UN representative Dayal. (Secret Noforn)
. Page 8
IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Prime Minister All Amini has made announcements
calculated to convince the public that his government
is efficient and frugal and is pushing reforms in the
public interest. Contrary to earlier indications, the
National Front apparently will remain in opposition to
Amini, as it has to every government since the collapse
of the Mossadeq regime in 1953. The government has
also denounced rumors of a military coup, and a govern-
ment spokesman has asserted that "the overwhelming
majority" of army officers are loyal, (Secret Noforn)
. Page 11
Castro's prisoners-for-tractors offer has attracted
unfavorable press comment in other Latin American coun-
tries, being viewed as similar to the Eichmann prisoners-
for-trucks offer of World War II. Castro was probably
influenced by this reaction in making his statement of
22 May insisting that the transaction, if consummated,
would represent "indemnification" of Cuba rather than
an exchange. The special Cuban "good-will mission,"
which has just visited Brazil on its tour of Latin
American countries, was reportedly "disappointed" by
its visit to Mexico but is likely to meet a more favor-
able reception from the Velasco government in Ecuador.
(Secret Noforn)
BRAZILIAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
President Quadros is vigorously seeking diplomatic
and cultural contacts with the new nations of Africa in
furtherance of Brazil's expanding role in world affairs.
He has set up an African scholarship program, is rapidly
establishing diplomatic and consular missions in the new
nations, and can no longer be expected to give Portugal
support for its policy in Africa. Brazil also is
interested in obtaining African cooperation in reaching
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 May 1961
pricing and marketing agreements for coffee and prob-
ably for other tropical products. (Secret)
EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The provisional government of El Salvador is con-
trolled by young army officers who are strongly anti-
Communist and apparently united in support of a program
of socio-economic reform. Members of the "14-family"
elite which has long dominated the country are de-
scribed as "stunned" by the pro-reform attitude of
their traditional allies, the army and the church. Some
senior officers, displaced or exiled after the coups of ]ast
October and January, are reported planning a return
to power but do not seem to have the military support
needed for success at this time. (Secret)
KOZLOV'S ILLNESS AND THE SUCCESSION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Party secretary Frol Kozlov,believed to be KhrushcheVs
choice as his successor, has been convalescing from a
heart attack since late April. Should Kozlov's illness
seriously curtail his activities after his expected re-
turn to duty in early June, political maneuvering among
Khrushchev's other lieutenants for the succession would
almost certainly be intensified. (Confidential)
SOVIET CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION TO INCREASE . . . . . . . Page 16
A change in Soviet economic policy favoring the
consumer is implied by Khrushchev's recent remark at
the British Fair in Moscow that the USSR's light industry
and heavy industry will develop at the same pace. Be-
cause the light industrial base is very small compared
with that of heavy industry, such a change can be ac-
complished by a relatively small shift of resources with-
out affecting industrial goals set forth in the Seven-
Year Plan (1959-65). Although Khrushchev's remarks
have not yet appeared in the Soviet press, a recent arti-
cle in the party journal denied that it is "bourgeois"
to improve the supply of consumer goods. (Confidential)
PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN USSR . . . . . . . . Page 17
Soviet economists, industrial and agricultural mana-
gers and technicians, and possibly even certain top
political leaders are in sharp disagreement over the ad-
ministration of important elements of the USSR's econ-
omy. Although it does not seem likely that these dis-
agreements will impede economic progress, Khrushchev
will probably make a strong effort to resolve the more
serious controversies before the convening of the 22nd
party congress in October. He will probably undertake
further organizational experimentations and shuffling
of personnel. (Secret Noforn)
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25 May 1961
EAST GERMAN CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
East Germany's campaign for de facto recognition has
recently scored some advances in the Middle East, West
Africa, and Brazil. The most notable was the UAR's grant
of consular status to the East German trade office in
Damascus, despite strong West German protests. While
Bonn has been able to deter formal diplomatic recognition
of the Ulbricht regime, it is finding it increasingly
difficult to prevent the establishment of East German
consulates and fears that the UAR's action may encourage
others to follow suit. Bonn is also greatly concerned
over the possibility that President Quadros may permit
a high-level East German visit to Brazil--a move which
Ulbricht would view as a major triumph. (Secret Noforn)
BLOC MILITARY AID TO THE UAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Political friction between Moscow and Cairo, which
flared up again recently, apparently has not affected the
bloc's military collaboration with the UAR. Financial
arrangements, UAR requests for more advanced weapons,
and Soviet delays in supplying spare parts and new
equipment have caused difficulties since 1958 but have
not prevented conclusion of new agreements, nor have
they altered the UAR's almost complete dependence on
the bloc for military supplies. Bloc military deliveries
this year--apparently in accordance with the new agree-
ments concluded in 1960--have included MIG-19s, T-54
tanks, and a variety of other items. (Secret Noforn)
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER CLASHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
The Pushtoonistan dispute between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which has been marked by sporadic clashes and
almost continuous propaganda warfare since 1947, has
flared up again. About 1,000 Afghan troops disguised as
tribesmen attacked Pakistani garrisons near the border
on 22 May, and Pakistani jets bombed dissident tribal
concentrations near the border. Each side probably wants
to avoid major hostilities, but will be under pressure to
take whatever action is necessary to avoid a loss of
prestige among the Pushtoon tribes on both sides of
the border. (Secret Noforn)
AFRICANS PLANNING GENERAL STRIKE IN SOUTH AFRICA . . . . . Page 23
The Communist-dominated National Action Council,
the most active nonwhite nationalist organization in
South Africa, has called for a three-day strike be-
ginning on 29 May. The leader of the movement says
that no violence is planned; tension is rising, how-
ever, in both the white and non-European communities.
The government is steadily increasing its security
precautions. (Secret Noforn)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 May 1961
DEVELOPMENTS IN SURINAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
Surinam (Dutch Guiana), which supplies about 20 per-
cent of the free world's bauxite, will seek a greater de-
gree of autonomy from the Netherlands in preliminary
talks opening in The Hague on 29 May. Local political
leaders believe greater autonomy would help Surinam gain 25x1
assistance from the United Nations and the West for the
economic and social development the country seeks.
Although Surinam has little common cultural background
with neighboring countries, its leaders maintain that it
must also strengthen ties with the Latin American re-
publics by seeking association with the Organization
of American States. (Confidential)
SPECIAL ARTICLES
NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
There are signs that a new Soviet constitution will
appear some time after the 22nd party congress next
October, replacing the 1936 "Stalin constitution" with
one intended to be associated with Khrushchev. Published
proposals foreshadow a document which will embody Khru-
shchev's assertion that the USSR is engaged in the "full-
scale" building of communism and which will be a reflec-
tion of the Communist party program now being drafted.
The constitution may create a new office of "President
of the USSR" to give Khrushchev not only the formal
rank of chief of state but constitutional sanction
for his de facto powers. (Secret)
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WEEKLY REVIEW
The Boun Oum government
apparently is determined to boy-
cott the Geneva conference on
Laos unless it is recognized as
the legal government. Its po-
sition has been fortified by
expressions of support from King
Savang and the National Assem-
bly and probably reflects Vien-
tiane's awareness that virtual-
ly the sole bargaining asset
it retains is the validity of
its claim to constitutional
authority. Vientiane is at-
tempting to have representatives
of five pro-government political
parties seated at the conference
on a par with the delegations of
Souvanna Phouma and the Neo Lao
Hak Sat. This maneuver seems
certain to fail.
Vientiane does not view
its stand on the Geneva talks
as in any way affected by the
conduct of its negotiations in
Laos with representatives of
Souvanna and the Pathet Lao.
Aware that the government's
concessions at the Namone truce
site have appeared contradic-
tory, General Phoumi has ex-
plained that his strategy has
been to appear willing to meet
the opposition's demands for
political talks in hopes of
securing agreement on definite
guidelines for the cease-fire.
At the meeting on 24 May, the
negotiators reportedly agreed
to "examine" the question of
forming a unified delegation
to Geneva, representing the
"Kingdom of Laos" rather than
any Laotian "government."
Members of the government
team at Namone have privately
complained that they are under
a psychological disadvantage
because of Vientiane's weak
military position and because
of restrictive and often con-
fusing directives handed them
by Phoumi. The Neo Lao Hak
Sat representatives have as-
sumed the air of victors dealing
with the vanquished, and even
Souvanna's political represent-
ative, Pheng Phongsavan, has
confided to the government del-
egation that "it's not as easy
as you think to keep a position
of independence when you are
surrounded day and night by
these fellows." Despite this
and other evidence of friction
between the Souvanna and Pathet
Lao political factions, there ap-
pears to be no indication of any
serious rupture on the enemy side.
The International Control
Commission (ICC) in the present
circumstances remains ineffec-
tive. The Communists hold that
the ICC cannot regulate the
cease-fire until military terms
of reference have been estab-
lished by the three Laotian
parties. French Ambassador
Falaize recently commented that
the ICC had been thrown into
Laos without adequate prepara-
tion and facilities to fulfill
its mission. He pointed out
that ICC representatives are
under restrictions in visiting
the rebel headquarters at
Xieng Kbouang.
Although the military sit-
uation continues quiet through-
out most of the country, some
skirmishing continues. The
primary target of Kong Le -
Pathet Lao activity remains
the Meo elements of the Laotian
army; Meo headquarters at Pa
Dong southwest of the Plaine
des Jarres continues to be un-
der artillery fire, and intensi-
fied efforts to wipe out Meo
pockets of resistance are ex-
pected.
In south-central Laos,
Laotian army sources continue
to report a build-up of several
thousand enemy troops along
Route 9 between Tchepone and
Savannakhet. Although these
reports are unverified and
probably are exaggerated, re-
cent Communist charges of
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attacks by Laotian and South
Vietnamese forces in the Tchepone
area could be used to provide
justification for a renewed
Communist offensive there.
South Vietnam still has a small
number of troops in defensive
positions along Route 9 a few
miles inside Laos. A recent
Saigon report states that about
1,000 North Vietnamese and
Patnet Lao forces in the Tchepone
area have begun "aggressive re-
connaissance" eastward toward the
South Vietnamese border, where
some Laotian troops are position-
ed along with the South Vietnam-
ese.
General Phoumi met with
Premier Sarit in northeastern
Thailand on 19 May during a
trip to southern Laos, and is
said to have sought assurances
from him concerning American
intentions regarding a political
settlement in Laos. Phoumi was
reported recently to feel iso-
lated and puzzled by the Ameri-
can position on Laos, and to
have undertaken his trip south-
ward partly for the purpose of
preparing the transfer of the
Laotian Government in the event
of a new enemy drive against
Vientiane or Luang Prabang.
During 'the opening
round of the Geneva, Confer-
ence, Communist bloc! spokes-
men have concentrated their ef-
forts on securing Western ap
proval of the position that the
1954 Geneva agreements must form
the basis for any negotiated set=tlement on Laos. The Communists'
insistence on this point reflects
their determination to achieve
a settlement which effectively
removes Laos from SEATO protec-
tion, prevents the establishment
of any form of international ma-
chinery or neutral nations com-
mission to supervise Laotian eco-
nomic relations, and retains a
bloc veto power over the activi-
ties of the ICC in Laos.
The Communists have main-
tained that the SEATO "umbrella"
protocol for Laos violates the
declaration of Laotian neutral-
ity made in 1954 and have in-
sisted that the permanent con-
25 May 61
trol mechanism in Laos should
be the ICC, as established in
the 1954 Geneva accords.
Gromyko has indicated to
Secretary Rusk that the veto
provisions in the Soviet pro-
posals on the ICC are not nego-
tiable. Gromyko has also at-
tempted to play down reported
cease-fire violations by the
Pathet Lao, while continuing to
assert the parity of the Pathet
Lao delegation at Geneva with
Souvanna and Vientiane repre-
sentatives. In response to a
Thai request of 23"May that
representatives of Laotian
parties supporting the Boun
Oum government be seated at
the conference on a rotational
basis, Gromyko asserted that
there was an understanding that
only the "three forces" would
be seated.
In his speech of 17 May,
the Soviet foreign minister
carefully drew a distinction
between Laotian internal and
international questions and con-
tended that the conference
should not take up such ques-
tions as a coalition government
in Laos, the holding of elec-
tions, and the reorganization
of the army. By keeping these
questions out of the conference
deliberations, at least for the
time being, the Communists
hope to blame Vientiane for
any delay informing a coali-
tion government but at the same
time to stress the Pathet Lao's
willingness to discuss a future
Laotian government.
Bloc representatives at the
conference have made it clear
that they could not accept any
control of economic aid to
Laos. Polish Foreign Minister
Rapacki called upon Laos to
engage in economic relations
on a bilateral basis, maintain-
ing that international control
would constitute interference
in Laotian internal policy.
The USSR, Czechoslovakia, Com-
munist China, and North Vietnam
have set up resident missions
in northern Laos which could
serve to implement the bilateral
economic agreements Souvanna
Phouma has already concluded with
the bloc. (SECRET NOFORN)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOUTH KOREA
The Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction, the
military group which has control
of the government in South Korea,
is continuing to consolidate its
position and to neutralize pos-
sible sources of opposition.
However, there are indications
that coup strongman Maj. Gen.
Pak Chong-hui is becoming in-
creasingly displeased with Army
Chief of Staff'Lt. Gen. Chang
To-yong, who is believed to
favor a relatively early return
to civilian government. Should
Chang be forced out of the ruling
,junta, the regime would probably
be strongly influenced by junior
officers who desire an abrupt
break with the past and an in-
definite period of military
rule.
The retention of President
Yun Po-sun as chief of state
has given the insurgent govern-
ment a semblance of constitu-
tionality. Government ministries
have been reopened and a new
all-military cabinet appointed.
However, administrative and
technical talent is scarce, and
most of those who qualify for
important positions are tainted
by association with either the
Chang Myon or Rhee administra-
tions.
The shortage of capable
senior personnel is particularly
apparent in the economic field.
The regime has taken stopgap
measures to prevent a serious
dislocation of the economy, but
there are indications of busi-
ness stagnation. Bank of Korea
officials report that mounting
administrative confusion is im-
peding economic activity.
The new government is com-
mitted to improve living condi-
tions. Unless it can fulfill
its economic promises, it prob-
ably will experience the same
public antipathy as the Chang
administration.
Apprehension is developing
among educated civilians over
the repressive tactics of the
military rulers. Political
parties and organizations have
been ordered abolished, and most
members of the former adminis-
tration have been placed under
house arrest or imprisoned. A
nationwide roundup of all left-
ists and suspected Communists
is under way. According to
local press reports, between
3,000 and 4,000 persons, many
of them probably hoodlums and
criminals, have been seized.
Strict press and radio censor-
ship has been imposed, and many
persons are reportedly listening
to Communist broadcasts from
Pyongyang for news of events in
South Korea.
Asian Communists, whose
cautious initial reaction to the
coup suggested a lack of first-
hand information, have now taken
the measure of Seoul's new lead-
ers, and hostile propaganda has
mounted steadily during the past
week. Peiping's People's baily
charged in an editorial of 21
May that the US stage-managed
the coup to maintain its "colo-
nial rule."
Speaking at a rally of
200,000 in Pyongyang on 20 May,
North Korean Vice Premier Kim
I1 called on the South Korean
population to smash the coup;
Pyongyang earlier had urged all
South Korean military personnel
to resist the coup leaders. The
North Koreans have used the dis-
turbed situation to renew their
call for reunification, claiming
that only by joining with the
"self-sufficient" economy of
the North can South Korea solve
its economic problems..
While there is no evidence
of North Korean military prepara-
tions to take advantage of the
unsettled situation, dissension
within the coup group could
make South Korea increasingly
susceptible to Communist propa-
ganda and subversion. (CONFI-
DENTIAL)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET NEWS TREATMENT OF
KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV MEETING
Since the announcement on
19 May that the President and
Khrushchev would meet in Vienna
on 3 and 4 June, Soviet prop-
aganda has made the meeting a
major topic of comment. The
talks between the two leaders
are generally portrayed as of
great. importance and a timely
step which could contribute to
the relaxation of tension. A
keynote of propaganda is the
standard theme that the US and
the USSR, as the two great pow-
ers, bear a major responsibility
for securing peace. In the
only high-level comment thus
far, First Deputy Premier Mi-
koyan remarked at a reception
for a British Trade Fair dele-
gation that the talks would be
important even if confined to
an exchange of views.
The Soviet press has
avoided any direct editorial
comment but has used quotations
from the foreign press to con-
vey a generally optimistic ap-
praisal. The President's 22
May remarks to a group of So-
viet journalists were reported
in a favorable light in the
Soviet press on 23 May. Mos-
cow has attempted to create
the impression that the meeting
was dictated by US public dis-
appointment with American for-
eign policy. In a widely broad-
cast commentary on 19 May, Mos-
cow claimed that agreement on
the meeting is a "sign that
there are forces in the US"
which are working for an im-
provement in Soviet-American
relations and a relaxation of
tension.
A broadcast to domestic
audiences on 21 May states that
"one would like to believe"
that the United States under
President Kennedy "merely
swerved onto the senseless
road" of the previous adminis-
25 May 61
tration and now has chosen the
"correct road of peaceful solu-
tion of disputed problems." Al-
though Moscow has reported that
the meeting was arranged through
diplomatic channels and an
exchange of messages, Presi-
dential Press Secretary Salinger
is quoted by the Soviet press
as saying that the US took the
initiative in the President's
letter of 22 February.
Soviet propagandists have
carefully avoided predicting
any outcome. but have suggested
that further high-level meet-
ings may be arranged. The New
York Times is quoted for the
v ei Tat although the talks
would be of a limited nature,
they could bring decisive re-
sults. Some Soviet broadcasts
adopt a hopeful note by point-
ing out that there are no in-
surmountable obstacles to im-
proving US-Soviet relations and
that the USSR intends to "do
everthing to make the meeting
a success."
American press reports
from Geneva were also published
in Moscow in support of the
view that the meeting in Vienna
could lead to diplomatic talks
and a summit meeting on East-
West questions. In this con-
nection, and editorial in the
Soviet weekly New Times specu-
lated that the Vienna meeting
could lead to further talks
at the "highest level." An
East German propagandist stated
on 19 May that the meeting could
be considered a success if it
served as only a starting point
for future negotiations.
Both Mikoyan and Soviet
Ambassador Menshikov, however,
evaded a reply to journalists'
questions whether the USSR was
planning for a series of meet-
ings. Soviet diplomats in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Geneva, nevertheless, have in-
spired press speculation that
one result of the meeting could
be an invitation to the Presi-
dent to visit the USSR.
Moscow has made no attempt
to outline a specific agenda
for the meeting and has echoed
the initial announcement that
the meeting would be an exchange
of views rather than a negotia-
tion. Some hint of the subjects
which the bloc expects to be
covered is contained in pub-
lication of foreign press re-
ports speculating that the
Vienna talks could "lift the
nuclear-test--ban negotiations
from the current impasse." A
Hungarian broadcast states that
the meeting might have a favor-
able effect on the negotiations
over Laos in Geneva.
An East German broadcast
on 19 May listed disarmament
as the primary topic, in addi-
tion to Laos, Cuba, and the
German question, An East Ger-
man politburo member in a
speech on 22 May also expressed
hope that at the meeting Pres-
ident Kennedy would "recognize
the need for a peace settlement
with both German states." The
West German press reports that
in an interview a "well-in-
formed Soviet official in New
York described Berlin as the
main subject for the talks in
Vienna.
Peiping promptly reported
the TASS announcement of the
meeting but has made no comment
thus far.
Background
Soviet interest in a high-
level meeting with the US was
evident before the inauguration
last January, In December,
Soviet officials made it clear
that Khrushchev desired an
early meeting with the Presi-
dent, either bilaterally or in
a conclave of the heads of gov-
ernment at the UN General As-
sembly. These overtures were
supported by public statements
from Khrushchev and Foreign
Minister Gromyko expressing
hope for an improvement in US-
Soviet relations.
Soviet diplomats were
also intent on determining in
advance what gestures would
be most conducive to promot-
ing an early meeting, and the
main purpose of the prompt re-
lease of the RB-47 crew mem-
bers was to remove possible
obstacles to a resumption of
high-level negotiations. In
mid-January both Khrushchev
and presidium member Suslov
reaffirmed the Soviet policy
of maintaining contacts with
Western leaders.
Although Moscow continued
attempts to gain an invita-
tion for Khrushchev to meet
with the President during the
UN General Assembly session,
the Soviet leaders by late
February had apparently con-
cluded that this campaign had
failed. When the idea of
a meeting was raised by Am-
bassador Thompson in his con-
versation with Khrushchev on
9 March, however, Khrushchev
was receptive. Although nego-
tiations were suspended by the
US because of developments
over Laos and Cuba, Foreign
Minister Gromyko revived the
idea of a meeting when he called
in Ambassador Thompson on 4 May.
Subsequently, Khrushchev again
raised the question of a meet-
ing in his letter to the Presi-
dent of 12 May delivered by Am-
bassador Mensbikov on 16 May.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRANCE-ALGERIA
Both French and rebel del-
egations appear to have been
favorably impressed by their
first meeting at Evian and have
settled into working sessions,
being held on alternate days.
The preliminary statements on
20 May reveal general agreement
that Algeria's future status
should be settled through self-
determination, but beyond that
the emphasis of the two sides
differed, with the French stress-
ing an early cease-fire and the
rebel provisional Algerian gov-
ernment ;(PAG) claiming sover-
eignty over all of Algeria in-
cluding the Sahara.
Paris took the initiative
on 20 May by announcing a one-
month unilateral cease-fire,
the transfer of PAG Vice Premier
Mohammed Ben Bella and four other
imprisoned rebel ministers to
enforced residence nearer Paris,
and plans to release some 6,000
rebel prisoners. This produced
a strongly negative reaction
among the rebels which, although
later toned down, revealed a
sensitivity and suspicion of
French motives that will prob-
ably be characteristic of the
PAG attitude throughout the
negotiations.
The 22 May edition of El
Moujahid, the official rebel
organ, attacks the unilateral
nature of the French action
stating,"It was expected that
the cease-fire would be subjected
to an agreement by both parties
during negotiations." The PAG
on 23 May reportedly also re-
quested that Ben Bella and the
other rebel leaders held in
France be permitted to take part
in the Evian talks.
The US Embassy in Tunis
reports a consensus among ob-
servers there following the de-
parture of the PAG delegation
that the rbbels desire a peace-
ful settlement and will be rea-
sonable if their doubts that the
French are prepared to relin-
quish direct and indirect au-
thority'throughout Algeria can
be dissipated. Many sources,
some within the PAG, continue
to indicate that the rebels will
adamantly maintain that the
Sahara must be completely Al-
gerian, but that,once this status
is acknowledged, they are pre-
pared to offer major concessions
concerning economic relations
with France and guarantees for
the European settlers.
Paris has from time to time
put forward the idea of admin-
istering the Sahara through an
association of the contiguous
countries, a solution which has
considerable appeal in Tunisia
and Morocco. Tunisian President
Bourguiba's public support of
the French cease-fire announce-
ment and his call to the PAG to
make a good-will gesture of their
own has angered the rebels. The
PAG feels Tunisia is not giving
it unconditional support in the
negotiations at Evian.
In announcing the cease-
fire the French commander in
chief in Algeria, General Gam-
biez, heralded the "contagious
repercussions of peace," Small-
scale rebel offensives and ter-
rorist attacks have continued,
but the French unilateral truce
apparently has been well accepted
by the great majority of Moslems
and enhanced De Gaulle's prestige
among them. The rebels evident-
ly fear that if they acknowledge
a cease-fire, they will have
serious difficulty in regaining
the lost momentum of their
campaign.
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At this stage, rebel ter-
orism may present a less serious
problem for the French Govern-
ment than the continuing activ-
ity of right-wing extremists in
France. There is reason to be-
lieve that the networks of
plotters conspiring against De
Gaulle and his policies have
not yet been fully exposed.
Bombings have continued in
France and have even been
stepped up in Algeria; distri-
bution of threatening letters
and pamphlets put out by right-
ist extremists goes on. Such
activity may be further stimu-
lated by the trial of the insur-
gent generals which opens on 29
May. Discontent within the army
is still widespread. As the
Evian negotiations proceed, the
frustration of the rightist ex?-
tremists may prompt some of them
to make an assassination at-
tempt on De Gaulle as a last
desperate effort to prevent A1?-
gerian independence.
Soviet Attitudes
Soviet news media, while
welcoming the start of negotia-
tions, have cautioned that the
French stand will determine
The government in Leopold-
ville has remained firm in its
decision to reconvene parlia-
ment there, although the Stan-
leyville regime continues to
demand that it meet at Kamina.
Kasavubu appears to regard Gi-
zenga's claim to represent the
25 May 61
whether the Algerian problem
will be solved by "peaceful
means or otherwise." Bloc com-
mentators predict that the talks
will be "difficult and tense."
Moscow has long maintained
that only direct talks between
the rebels and the French on a
basis of equality can restore
peace to Algeria. In March,
following the announcement that
talks would be held, the Soviet
ambassador in Paris sought out
De Gaulle to express Khrushchev's
hope for a peaceful settlement.
At the same time, Soviet First
Deputy Premier Kosygin tried to
stiffen the rebels' resistance
to any compromise with France,
advising them to demand recog-
nition as the sole represent-
atives of Algeria.
While there are advantages
for the USSR in a continu-
ation of the rebellion, So-
viet leaders at the present
time are probably inclined
to support a settlement, pro-
vided the rebels can emerge
from the negotiations in
fujJ? coptrol of an Inde-
pendent Algeria, with'limited,
if any, ties with France. (SECRET)
legal government as ruling out
any compromise. The Leopold-
ville radio has said the Congo
crisis is "in its final stages"
and has warned that "no delaying
tactics will prevent. . .the
convocation of parliament" by
Kasavubu.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In contrast, there are in-
dications that Leopoldville may
be negotiating with Tshombe's
successors to assure Katanga's
participation in parliament. The
Munongo triumvirate in Katanga
reportedly has indicated that
it is prepared to accept a Congo
federation as proposed by Kasa-
vubu. A Congolese politician
has informed Ambassador Timber-
lake that the Kasavubu govern-
ment has received a proposal
from Munongo and is drafting a
counterproposal.
Leopoldville probably feels
that its success in blocking
the return of UN representative
Dayal to the Congo has strength-
ened its hand. Hammarskjold
informed US officials on 22 May
that Dayal would not be
returned to Leopoldville be-
cause of the latest expressions
of Congolese hostility toward
him. Hammarskjold stated
that Nehru had been informed
and had agreed to recall
Dayal.
The Stanleyville regime--
confronted with the political
threat of a rapprochement be-
tween Leopoldville and Elisa-
bethville and with deteriorat-
ing economic conditions in
Orientale Province--has moved
to bolster its military position.
According to press reports,
troops from Stanleyville have
appeared in force in Kasai Prov-
ince. There is no firm in-
formation that Gizenga plans
any major offensive action.
Reports of military activ-
ity in Kasai appear to have led
Kasavubu to place Albert Kalonji
under surveillance in Coquil-
hatville. A UN report has al-
leged that aggressive movements
by Kalonji's Kasai army against
tribal opponents followed a
build-up financed by a Belgian
mining company. Ghanaian UN
troops, which recently were
withdrawn from southern Kasai,
have been ordered back into the
area.
Indian Charge Rahman in
Leopoldville, who on his own
initiative has labored actively
on Gizenga's behalf, stated re-
cently that he did not believe
Gizenga had enough votes in
parliament to become premier.
Rahman speculated that if Gizen-
ga persisted in seeking the pre-
miership he would merely weaken
the "nationalist" position and
pave the way for a dictatorship
by some member of the present
Leopoldville government.
Relations between the UN
and Katanga authorities have
continued strained as a result
of UN moves to retain control,
by force if necessary, of key
areas in northern Katanga. Al-
though Munongo threatened armed
resistance if the UN moved to
take over airfields at Albert-
ville and Nyunzu, he confined
himself to a formal protest
of the UN action and appeared
anxious to avoid a serious
rupture with the UN Command.
(SECRET NOFORN)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Cuban Government is
giving maximum propaganda,cover-
age to Castro's offer to ex-
change most of the 1,200 cap-
tured insurgents for 500 heavy
tractors. The government-con-
trolled press and radio have re-
peatedly heralded the "generos-
ity" and the "self-confidence"
of the Cuban regime in making
such an offer. One Havana radio
commentator said the proposal
was the "true socialist" solu-
tion to the problem of what to
do with the anti-Castro rebels.
Private organizations in
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uru-
guay have announced fund-rais-
ing drives to help pay for the
tractors.
The two-pronged Cuban dip-
lomatic delegation touring Latin
America on a special "good-will
mission" may be seeking support
for a new association of Latin
American states to supplant the
present Organization of American
States (OAS)
Castro's statement of 22
May threatening to withdraw the
offer unless it were recognized
that the 500 tractors constitut-
ed "indemnification" for the
material losses Cuba suffered
during the landings rather than
an exchange is in conflict with
Castro's original wording of
the proposal. On 17 May, in a
speech commemorating the second
anniversary of Cuba's agrarian
reform program, he said that if
"imperialism" wanted the freedom
of the captured Cubans, "let it
exchange tractors and machinery
for them.... We will exchange
all except murderers for 500
bulldozers...."
By now demanding the trac-
tors as "indemnification," Castro
probably hopes to further as-
sociate the landings with the
US Government i,n the eyes of the
world and to avoid further com-
parison of his proposal to Adolf
Eichmann's prisoners-for-trucks
offer during World War II. The
press in Argentina, Bolivia, El
Salvador, Panama, Uruguay, and
other Latin American countries
was quick to draw such a parallel.
reported on 18 May that the main
group of Cuban emissaries, led
by Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos
Olivares, was "disappointed"
with the results of their talks
with Mexican President Lopez
Mateos and Foreign Minister Tello,
On its arrival in Rio de
Janeiro on 20 May, the Olivares
group reportedly assured Brazil-
ian officials that.'.Cuba would
not attempt to "export" its rev-
olution, that its government
was not Communist, and that it
desired to remain within the
inter-American system. The
Olivares party saw President
Quadros on 24 May before going
on to Ecuador.
The second group of Cuban
emissaries, in talks on 19 May
with Costa Rican President
Echandi and Foreign Minister
Vargas, took a.similar line and
sought unsuccessfully to promote
a rapprochement between the two
countries, according to a reli-
able report. Echandi and Var-
gas maintained the previously
announced Costa Rican position
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that any further executions in
Cuba would cause San Jose to
break relations with Havana,
the report said.
Latin American and Sino-
Soviet bloc delegates are attend-
ing the meetings of the Commu-
nist-controlled International
Union of Students, which opened
in Havana on 23 May. The work of
the congress will include an
"international student work
camp" from 2 to 4 June, during
which period a school is to be
constructed in the Vedado area
of Havana, and will culminate
in an "international seminar on
illiteracy" from 6 to 8 June.
This seminar will afford Castro
a further opportunity to publi-
cize his regime's plans to elim-
inate illiteracy from Cuba this
year.
The Cuban Government's or-
ders that public works employees
in three of Cuba's six provinces
be mobilized to cut sugar cane
suggest that this year's harvest
is lagging behind the planned
production schedule. Agrarian
reform director Antonio Nunez
Jimenez and other regime leaders
recently announced that sugar
production had already surpassed
6,000,000 tons this year, and
they anticipated a total crop
of "more than 7,000,000 tons e"
Although a good crop appears as-
sured for this year, the damage
done to young plants by inex-
perienced harvesters may be re-
flected in a smaller crop in'
1962.
Soviet propaganda on Cuba,
which has decreased steadily
over the past several weeks, has
dropped more sharply since the
announcement on 19 May of the
forthcoming meeting between
Khrushchev and President Kennedy.
Soviet broadcasts indicated con-
cern late last week over the
possibility of a US move against
Cuba, and the USSR expressed
this concern privately to at
least one Latin American country.
On 16 and 18 May, Moscow re-
peated American press reports
that the US was preparing "new
aggressive plans" against Cuba,
and a commentary on 17 May re-
peated Khrushchev's criticism
of the US Naval Base at
Guantanamo.
Soviet Ambassador Menshikov
sought out Venezuelan Ambas-
sador Mayobre in Washington on
18 May and told him that any
aggressive move toward Cuba
would "complicate the situa-
tion" seriously. He added that
the problem of Cuba should
be settled peacefully and that
the principle of "Self-determi-
nation" for Cuba.should be
respected. (SECRET NOFORN)
BRAZILIAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
Brazil has long been in-
terested in Africa, having at
one time elaborated a plan for
a South Atlantic Pact including
France as the chief colonial
power in western Africa. More
recently, but prior to Presi-
dent Quadros' inauguration last
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
January, a key Foreign Ministry formation program, small librar-
official told a US Embassy rep- ies, films on Brazil, and Brazil-
resentative that Brazil is unique- ian observers will be sent to
ly suited to exert influence in Africa. A new cultural radio pro-
Africa by virtue of its geograph-
ic position, its traditions of
political democracy and racial
equality, and its struggle
against economic underdevelop-
ment. Such a policy also accords
with Brazil's desire to be con-
sidered a world power.
A vigorous African policy,
however, began only under Quadros.
While cutting back other over-
seas expenditures on grounds of
economy, he is expanding the
government's African activities,
beginning with the rapid estab-
lishment of diplomatic and con-
sular missions in most of the
African countries,
In mid-April he appointed
as ambassador to Ghana a jour-
nalist who is said to be Brazil's
first Negro ambassador. Presi-
dent Youlou of Congo (Brazza-
ville) is expectpd to visit
Brazil shortly,
raz s delegation
voted wit a minority which
supported Cameroun's attempt
to void the results of the UN-
supervised plebiscite held in
British Cameroons last Febru-
ary.
A program of scholarships
for Africans has been announced
and is expected to begin in Oc-
tober. Twenty scholarships are
to be granted in 1961 and the
number is to be increased to
100 in 1964. In mid-April Presi-
dent Quadros recommended the
creation of a Brazilian informa-
tion center in Africa, with head-
quarters in Dakar. Under the in-
gram in foreign languages is to
be broadcast to Africa and the
Near East as well as Europe and
America.
One of the most receptive
of the African states to Brazil-
ian overtures thus far is Senegal.
Quadros has agreed to send a
lecturer to Dakar and proposed
studies for the eventual appoint-
ment of lecturers in Rabat and
Accra as well as the arrangement
of a number of lectures by
Brazilian scholars in other parts
of Africa.
Brazil's new interest in
Africa has forced some compromise
in its traditional policy of
support for Portugal as a colo-
nial power. The Brazilian foreign
minister stated in mid-April
that Brazil's vote in the United
Nations on any resolution con-
demning Portugal's Angola policy
would be "conditioned" by "anti-
colonialism," and "we cannot as-
sure that our vote will not be given
against Portugal."
Another factor in Brazil's
relations with Africa is the
economic problem posed by com-
petition in sales of coffee and
other tropical products. Brazil
has carry-over coffee stocks
equal to world consumption for
an entire year, and the next
crop is expected to increase
stocks by almost a third. Bra-
zilian interest in the Africans
therefore probably stems in part
from concern over Africa's ris-
ing coffee production, which may
exceed one fifth of the world's
total in 1960/61. (SECRET)
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El Salvador's provisional
government is controlled by army
officers who are anti-Communist
and appear firmly committed to
the government's socio-economic
reform program. The government
continues to voice its intention
to return power to an elected
government before the end of the
year, but the military have set
no election date and are unlike-
ly to relinquish control until
the reform program seems assured.
Communist gains. Changes made
in the government last month as
a result of pressure by young
officers reduced the ruling
civilian-military directorate
to three members and reshuffled
the cabinet, eliminating some of-
ficials not wholly in support of
the reform program. The Ameri-
can Embassy considers the new
cabinet officers capable and
amenable to guidance and support
by the United States.
With a population of over
2,500,000 in an area about the
size of New Jersey, El Salvador
is the most densely populated
country on the American conti-
nents. Over 90 percent of the
people are mestizos, with In-
dian racial characteristics
,predominant. It is primarily
an agricultural country, and
about 80 percent of export in-
come normally comes from coffee.
Economic and political relation-
ships in the countryside have
changed little since early co-
lonial times, and the ascendancy
of the "coffee barons" had not
until recently been challenged.
The gulf between the ex-
tremely wealthy "14 families"
and the impoverished majority
is probably greater in El Sal-
vador than in any other Latin
American country; the country's
three-month experience with a
Communist-influenced regime,
which was overthrown by present
government leaders in January,
jolted many Salvadorans into a
recognition that reforms must
be implemented quickly to stem
The government is taking
steps to overcome the resistance
of the wealthy to the regime's
first reforms--a reduction in
rents for low-income housing and
a paid day of rest on Sundays
for agricultural workers. The
Catholic hierarchy now feels
that reforms are long overdue;
a church official has described
the upper classes as "stunned"
by the reversal of the historic
position of the army and the
church, their traditional allies,
Another discontented element
is a group of displaced or exiled
officers who had enjoyed senior
status prior to the coups of
last October and January and
who evidently are now plotting
a return to power. One of their
represen ves
I sa
l on 18 May a
pans are well under way for a
coup, but he admitted that the
plot leaders do not have the
support of the strategic garri-
sons in the capital. It is un-
likely that this faction has the
capability of mounting a success-
ful coup at this time. (SECRET)
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KOZLOV'S ILLNESS AND.THE SUCCESSION
Party secretary Frol Kozlov,
Khrushchev's apparent choice as
his eventual successor, may now
be at a disadvantage as a re-
sult of illness. Any serious
curtailment of Kozlov's activi-
ties would necessitate the re-
distribution of some of his
present administrative responsi-
bilities among Khrushchev's
other lieutenants and would
bring the succession problem
once again to the forefront of
Moscow politics.
Khrushchev admitted to
Ambassador Thompson on 23 May
that Kozlov had suffered a fair-
ly serious heart attack. An
earlier report, attributed to
a Soviet Foreign Ministry offi-
cial, revealed that Kozlov had
been convalescing from his at-
tack since 22 April. Khrushchev
stated that the doctors were
going to permit Kozlov to return
to work about 5 June, but he
did not indicate whether or not
Kozlov's recovery was expected
to be complete.
Kozlov took a leading part
in the:: celebration honoring
astronaut Gagarin on 14 April
and attended an African recep-
tion on 17 April, but he has
not been identified in public
since. Although his portrait
was prominently displayed near
Khrushchev's in connection with
the May Day celebration, he was
not present at the parade.
Mikhail Suslov, the other lead-
ing party secretary, was the
ranking party official at sever-
al Moscow functions during the
latter part of Khrushchev's
vacation in April.
There has been considerable
evidence since 1959 that Khru-
shchev, concerned with the prob-
lem of an orderly transfer of
power on his death or retirement,
has picked Kozlov as his suc-
cessor. In a conversation with
Averell Harriman in June 1959,
Khrushchev ridttculed the sug-
gestion that Kirichenko, then
party second-in-command, would
succeed him, and stated that
he (Khrushchev) and Mikoyan had
chosen Kozlov to carry on after
them. At that time Kozlov was
one of the first deputy chair-
men of the USSR Council of Min-
isters, as well as a member. of
the party presidium.
Kirichenko was ousted from
the party secretariat in Janu-
ary 1960, and several months lat-
er Kozlov was shifted over from
the Council of Ministers to take
his place. This move suggested
that Khrushchev was serious
about establishing Kozlov as
his successor, particularly
since the secretariat post is
a key vantage point for
gaining control of the pro-
fessional party machine.
Since his appointment to
the secretariat, Kozlov has
been acting as party second-
in-command, supervising party
organization and personnel af-
fairs,.and filling in for
Khrushchev during his many ab-
sences. He recently presided
over the removal of the top
party leaders in the Armenian
and Tadzhik republics. He is
the only presidium member,
other than Khrushchev, slated
to give a major address at the
party congress in October.
Khrushchev, by his own ad-
mission, is jealous of his prerog-
atives as party boss and has
not been willing to delegate
sufficient authority to Kozlov
to assure his ultimate assump-
tion of supreme power in the
Soviet Union. His backing of
Koziov, however, has probably
tended to restrain political
maneuvering among other party
leaders. Should Kozlov's activ-
ities be restricted for an
extended period, such maneuver-
ing would undoubtedly be intensi-
fied. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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SOVIET CONSUMER GOODS PRODUCTION TO INCREASE
A modest but significant
change of Soviet economic policy
favoring the consumer is implied
by Khrushchev's remark on 20 May
at the British Fair in Moscow
that the USSR's light industry
and heavy industry will develop
at the same pace. Because the
light industrial base is very
small compared with that of
heavy industry, which has sub-
stantially surpassed its pro-
duction goals for the past two
years, such a change can be
accomplished with a relatively
small shift of resources. A
shift of just 2 percent of total
industrial investment, for ex-
ample, would raise investment
in light and food industries
about 25 percent.
Khrushchev's remarks on
growth rates made clear that
the change would be limited to
the relationship between the
annual growth rates planned
for "Group A" (which in Soviet
jargon stands for-the means of
production) and for "Group B"
(consumer goods).
The Khrusncnev regime, while
emphasizing the rapid development
of heavy industry, has often
favored modest improvements in
consumer welfare to provide the
material incentives deemed neces-
sary for growth in labor produc-
tivity, to improve the foreign
image of the Soviet citizen's
lot, and to influence favorably
the attitude of the populace to-
ward the regime.
Economic policy since World
War II has consistently provided
the consumer with an annual in-
crease in the quantity of manu-
factured goods, but this increase
has not kept pace with the over-
all annual growth in the output
of industry. During the Malenkov
era the annual rates of growth
in the two branches of industry
were nearly equalized. The
general discussions surrounding
the removal of Malenkov, however,
implied that the correct approach
to consumer welfare was through
a build-up of agriculture, along
with a high priority for heavy
industry. Only when this was
accomplished would consumer goods
INDEXES OF GROWTH OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
1950 = 100
300
200
100
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Note: As of 1 January 1960, industries manufacturing only producer goods (goods referred to in Soviet
jargon as Group A) accounted for 49.8 percent of total capital assets in Soviet industry; industries
turning out only consumer goods (Group B) for 8.7 percent. The remaining industries produce goods in
both categories, but mainly producer goods and military equipment.
610524 UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
25 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW
TOTAL INDUSTRY
-
PR
ODUCER GOOD
S
(GROUP Al o
CONSU
MER GOODS
(GROUP B)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
be emphasized. Since 1954,
under Khrushchev's aegis, the
spread--favoring heavy industry
--has grown relatively large,
although it has narrowed slight-
ly during the last two years.
The shift apparently is to
be accomplished by reducing over-
fulfillment in heavy industry,
with the biggest share of'shifted
resources probably to be assigned
to agriculture. The regime
announced last December that it
considered that the overfulfill-
ment of plans of heavy industry
warranted some reallocation of
resources toward fulfilling
"public demand." At the central
committee plenum in January,
Khrushchev claimed that 11.3
billion (new) rubles of output
in excess of plan had been pro-
duced by industry, making possi-
ble additional appropriations
to consumer branches. He la-
beled the 2.5-3.0 billion (new)
ruble increase in the investment
for textile and footwear indus-
try, announced last May, insuf-
ficient, but stressed that fur-
ther support for the consumer
goods industry depended on
additional investment in agri-
culture.
Significant increases in
the output of consumer goods
could be obtained at a relatively
small cost to heavy industry.
The 1961 plan schedules an in-
crease of 9.5 percent in the
output of "Group "A" industries
and 6.9 percent in those of
"Group "B". Because of overful-
fillment in "Group "A" industries
during the last two years, how-
ever, the over-all increase in
that group could be reduced by
over one percent annually with-
out jeopardizing Seven-Year
Plan goals,
The new approach has appar-
ently already created the need
for doctrinal justification.
A recent article in the party
journal"Kommunist, which restated
Khrushchev s call at the January
plenum for a balanced economic
development, declared basically
wrong those "theoreticians" who
claim that a uniform development
of the national economy--which
includes "paramount" concern
for the people and the improve-
ment of the supply of consumer
goods--is a "petit bourgeois"
approach to the "building of
communism."
Khrushchev's remarks have
not yet appeared in the Soviet
press, and there is no confirma-
tion of a Western press report
that the change has already taken
place. The formal announcement
of the change may be reserved
for presentation at the 22nd
party congress in October for
incorporation into the economic
program adopted at that time,
(CONFIDENTIAL) (Prepared by ORR)
PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN USSR
Soviet economists, indus-
trial and agricultural managers
and technicians, and possibly
even certain top political lead-
ers are in sharp disagreement
over the administration of im-
portant elements of the USSR's
,economy. Although it does not
seem likely that these disagree-
ments will impede economic prog-
ress, Khrushchev will probably
make a strong effort to resolve
the more serious controversies
25 May 61
before the convening of the 22nd
party congress in October. He
will probably undertake further
organizational experimentations
and shuffling of personnel.
The rapid growth of the
economy in both size and com-
plexity, the 1957 economic re-
organization which led to the
creation of numerous state eco-
nomic committees and over 100 ter-
ritorial economic administrations,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and the concomitant increase in
economic responsibility at the
republic level increased the
amount of.overlapping authority
and created-considerable juris-
dictional confusion and jealousy.
A recent report alleges
that an "intense feeling of ani-
mosity" exists among various
Soviet economic. organizations.
They reproach each other for
neglect of leadership, excessive
consumption of raw materials,
falling pr.oduct.ion, and statis-
tical falsification. Soviet
industrial officials, according
to the report, have told their
Hungarian counterparts that, they
are "seriously worried" that
there will be an extensive
economic purge. The report
states, however, that neither
the wave of criticism nor the
anticipated purge is politically
motivated but that both appear
to be based on "considerations
of economic efficiency and ef-
fective industrial management."
while others advocate complete
decentralization.
The program for technologi-
cal improvement appears still
to be hampered by lack of de-
cisiveness and possibly contro-
versy among its administrators.
Automation chief A. I. Kostousov
admitted in Pravda on 5 May
that the quarterly plan for in-
troducing new technology had
not been met and laid the blame
on lack of precise planning
methods and lack of coordination
among plants producing the
needed equipment. The plenums
on technology in.1959 and 1960
had both issued comprehensive
instructions and orders to
study and solve these problems.
The maintenance of an ef-
ficient industrial supply system
has long been a challenge to
Soviet planners; both the 1959
and 1960 central committee
plenums on industrial technology
called on responsible agencies
to seek better planning and
administrative arrangements for
supply, An article in the 10
March 1961 issue of the party
journal Kommunist on problems
which have arisen in this sphere
reaffirmed the supply principle
enunciated in Khrushchev's
1957 industrial reorganization
--centralized distribution of
the major material resources
but decentralization of most
supply activities to encourage
local initiative.
The article discussed cur-
rent shortcomings with unusual
frankness and admitted that
"sharp arguments are now going
on over organizational ques-
tions." Some think that supply
must be completely centralized,
Despite the recent agri-
cultural reorganization, dif-
ferences over the future of
agricultural organization con-
tinue to be manifest. In 1958,
when the state-owned Machine-
Tractor Stations were abolished
and collective farms were al-
lowed to own farm equipment,
Khrushchev said that collective
and state farms were to continue
side by side until the two farms
gradually merged at some time
in the future. Yet, recently,
state farms have been undergoing
a rapid growth at the expense
of collective farms, and their
share in the delivery of grain
and milk to the government ex-
ceeded the level planned for
1965. An article in the April
issue of Problems of Economics
called for further study of the
question, indicating that the re-
gime has not yet elaborated its
point of view on all aspects of
agricultural organization. (SE-
CRET NOFORN) (Prepared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY-
EAST GERMAN CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION
East Germany has recently
gained some further degree of
de facto recogniton in the Mid-
dle East, Africa,and Brazil.
It has not yet, however, induced
any country outside the Soviet
bloc--except Yugoslavia--to
risk West German retaliation
by granting de jure recogni-
tion.
Closely following the an-
nouncement on 22 April that
Ceylon had authorized an East
German trade mission in Colombo,
the UAR announced that it would
permit the East German trade of-
fice in Damascus to assume con-
sular status. This move pre-
ceded the opening of negotia-
tions between the UAR and West
Germany in Bonn concerning West
German aid, notably on the
Euphrates Dam project. When
the West German ambassador in
Cairo protested that Nasir had
expressly promised in 1959 not
to raise the Damascus office to
consular status, the UAR presi-
dential affairs minister denied
that such a promise had been
given and maintained that the
move was "routine" and involved
no change in the UAR's policy
of granting formal recognition
only to Bonn.
Although a West German For-
eign Ministry official main-
tains that Nasir in fact gave
such an assurance in 1959 and
should have informed Bonn be-
fore breaking the agreement,
he stated that there was little
possibility of effective West
German countermeasures. In
the same year, the UAR had ex-
plained that the establishment
of the East German Consulate
General in Cairo did not con-
stitute diplomatic recognition.
Because a West German severance
of diplomatic ties with Cairo
would only lead to Nasir's rec-
ognition of the Ulbricht re-
gime, Bonn will have to remain
content with the UAR's explana-
tion.
Bonn realizes, however,
that its tacit acquiescence in
the elevation of the Damascus
mission may tempt Lebanon and
Iraq to grant consular status
to the East German trade mis-
sions in Beirut and Baghdad.
It may, therefore, refuse to
undertake any new aid commit-
ments to the UAR. Cairo has
announced that the UAR nego-
tiator will not leave for Bonn
as planned.
In West Africa, East Ger-
many is attempting to establish
a foothold in Mali, while con-
tinuing to extend its influence
in Ghana and Guinea. Under a
trade agreement announced on
19 April, East German officials
are arriving to staff a trade
mission in Bamako, the Mali cap-
ital, while two newspapermen
have taken positions in the Mali
Information Ministry, presumably
under the technical assistance
agreement signed earlier this
year.
Mali's foreign minister
told the West German ambassador
that Bamako would not permit the
trade mission to assume diplo-
matic prerogatives nor would
Mali establish its own mission
in East Berlin. The US Embassy
in Bamako nevertheless reports
that the East Germans, with
the support of the Czech ambas-
sador, who is dean of the dip-
lomatic corps there, are making
a determined effort to present
their mission as a diplomatic
establishment.
In Brazil, the Ulbricht
regime is taking advantage of
President Janio Quadros' inten-
tion of widening his contacts
with bloc countries to urge a
major expansion of East German -
Brazilian trade, which last
year totaled nearly $20,000,-
000. The East Germans have
relatively little to give Bra-
zil in comparison with the
aid that Bonn is presently
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
considering--$50,000,000 in a
new aid fund plus about the same
amount in guarantees for ex-
ports from West Germany. The
East Germans, however, will play
up their increased contacts with
Brazilian officials as de facto
recognition; if Quadros goes
through with his announced in-
tention of inviting a high
East German official to Bra-
silia, the East Germans would
consider they had scored a
triumph.
Bonn, seriously concerned,
hopes to induce Quadros not to
permit such a visit. The West
Germans also have attempted to
persuade Quadros to cancel a
visit to East Germany by Bra-
zil's roving ambassador, Joao
Dantas.
East Germany, with the
founding of the Bamako mission,
now has 30 trade missions in
nonbloc countries. Those in
Cairo, Djakarta, and Rangoon
have been recognized as con-
sulates general by the host
countries but with diplomatic
recognition expressly withheld.
In addition, it has agreements
for missions in Ceylon and Cam-
bodia and reportedly is angling
for offices in Tunisia and Mo-
rocco. At least eight of these
missions--those in NATO coun-
tries and Sweden--represent the
East German Chamber of Foreign
Trade, ostensibly a nongovern-
ment organization; the others
represent the East German For-
eign Trade Ministry, but are
recognized as technical, not
diplomatic, establishments.
(SECRET NOFORN)
BLOC MILITARY AID TO THE UAR
Political friction between
Moscow and Cairo, which flared
up again recently, apparently
has not affected the bloc's mil-
itary collaboration with the
UAR. Financial arrangements,
requests for advanced weapons,
and Soviet delays in supplying
spare parts and new equipment
have caused difficulties since
1958 but have not prevented
eventual conclusion of new
agreements, nor have they al-
tered the UAR's almost complete
dependence on the bloc for mil-
itary supplies. Recent deliver-
ies of advanced jet fighters,
tanks, and other military end
25 May 61
items suggest a normal rela-
tionship. Cairo is aware of
its vulnerability to Soviet
pressure in the military sphere,
but so far Moscow appears to
have avoided using pressure to
further its political objectives.
Unconfirmed reportsI 5X1
5X1
indicate
that
as many as
52 MIG-
19s
have
been
delivered
to the
UAR
since
the
first shipment
last
January. Most of them have
reportedly been assembled and
tested. Although this number
is considerably more than can
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
be corroborated by other sources,
it is close to the quantity
originally requested by the UAR
in 1958. Initially Moscow re-
jected this request, but talks
throughout 1960 may have re-
sulted in its revival. These
aircraft are said to be equipped
to carry air-to-air missiles
which reportedly have also been
delivered.
There is no evidence that
Moscow has yet agreed to supply
the more advanced MIG-21 jet
-f.after to the UAR, although
;afro reportedly requested such
aircraft last year. Indonesia
is the only nonbloc country to
have been promised eventual de-
livery of MIG-21s.
Other arms supplied under
new agreements include T-54
medium tanks--perhaps as many
as 120--additional self-propelled
assault guns, artillery, and a
wide variety of other military
items, such as early-warning
and fire-control radar, engi-
neering equipment, repair shops,
and motor vehicles. A contract
reportedly was signed recently
for 10 YAK-24 helicopters, and
rumors persist that three more
submarines will be delivered
under new naval agreements.
About 20 UAR pilots re-
turned from the USSR early this
year after six months of train-
ing on MIG-19s. Another 20
probably have returned by now,
and more have been sent to the
Soviet Union. The first two
groups are probably participat-
ing in flight instruction ac-
tivities on the MIG-19s in the
UAR.
At present there is only
sketchy information on the value
of the new bloc arms pacts with
the UAR. From 1955 to 1960 the
bloc delivered more than $700,-
000,000 worth of arms to both
regions of the UAR. Substantial
discounts--often two thirds of
the value--were granted on this
materiel, and the bloc accorded
extremely favorable repayment
terms. Incomplete information
suggests the MIG-19 contracts
alone are worth more than $25,-
000,000 and the total value of
new equipment to be delivered
may well run to over $100,000,-
000. Price reductions and re-
payment provisions may not be
as generous as in previous agree-
ments; discounts on the new
equipment probably amount to
about one third the quoted price.
A trend toward more "busi-
nesslike" terms has been evi-
dent in Soviet-UAR military re-
lations since 1958, perhaps re-
flecting political friction but
also as a result of Cairo's re-
quests for more advanced materiel.
(SECRET NOFORN) (Prepared by
ORR)
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER CLASHES
The Pushtoonistan dispute
between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, which has been marked by
sporadic clashes and almost con-
tinuous propaganda warfare since
1947, has taken a new and dan-
gerous turn with the introduc-
tion of regular Afghan troops
disguised as tribesmen into Af-?
ghan operations in Pakistan.
25 May 61
Kabul has consistently de-
manded that the Pushtoon tribes
living on the Pakistani side of
the border be given the right
of self-determination. Paki-
stan has just as consistently
rejected these demands as in-
terference in its internal af-
fairs. The most recent signifi-
cant clash prior to last week
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
occurred in September, when a
force of Afghan tribal irreg-
ulars was driven from the Ba-
jaur area with heavy losses.
Since then Kabul has been try-
ing to regain some of its pres-
tige among the tribes by in-
creasing its support to dissi-
dent tribal elements in Paki-
stan.
Afghan special forces, num-
bering about 1,000, attacked
several Pakistani garrisons
near the border on 20 May, Co-
operating with local tribesmen
armed by Afghan agents, they
employed heavy infantry weapons,
including mortars and machine
guns.
Kabul had been planning
for several months to use some
of its regular units espe-
cially equipped for guerrilla
operations, The Afghan Army
uniform factory in Kabul manu-
factured 10,000 sets of tribal-
type clothing, apparently for
use by Afghan troops disguised
as tribal irregulars. Kabul,
however, has denied that its
forces were directly involved
in the attacks.
Following the latest at-
tacks, Pakistani Air Force jets
began bombing hostile concentra-
tions near the border. Paki-
stani officials have indicated
privately that they are pre-
pared to bomb artillery posi-
tions in Afghanistan if the
Afghans fire into Pakistani
territory,
Rawalpindi continues con-
fident of its ability to handle
the situation,
says pans remain un-
changed to withdraw from Bajaur
some of the troops which were
stationed there last fall.
4w AREA OF BORDER INCIDENT I'
PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA
OF GREATEST FRICTION
25 MAY 1961
31752
Both sides probably want
to avoid the outbreak of major
hostilities. Neither side, how-
ever, can afford a serious
loss of prestige among the
Pushtoon tribes living on both
sides of the border, and a
major victory by either side
could bring stronger action
by the defeated party.
This latest clash may
lead to new criticism of the
United States by both Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, President
Ayub has complained that Ameri-
can inquiries about the use
of US-supplied arms in the
tribal area made the Afghans 25x1
"bolder," The Afghans, on the 25:i
other hand, have frequently 25x1
complained that US military as-
sistance to Pakistan is used to
"suppress the freedom-loving
Pushtoon tribesmen," (SECRET
NOFORN)
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25 May 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 2 2 of 25
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;I tiranu m .li.purei
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AFRICANS PLANNING GENERAL STRIKE IN SOUTH AFRICA
The South African Govern-
ment is steadily inzreasing its
security precautions in an ef-
fort to head off nonwhite demon-
strations at the end of this
month. The National Action
Council (NAC), a Communist-
dominated group which gained the
initiative among nonwhite na-
tionalists late in March, has
called a three-day stay-home
strike beginning on 29 May to
protest South Africa's acces-
sion to republic status on 31
May. Nelson Mandela, leader of
the NAC, has denied that demon-
strations are planned during
the strike; he reportedly as-
serted, however, that intimida-
tion would be used to enforce
it in some areas. Tension is
rising in both the white and
the non-European communities,
and even a trivial incident
could provoke a violent out-
break.
The NAC was formed to imple-
ment a strike call which had
been made by the Communist-con-
trolled "all-rin"African confer-
ence held in Natal Province
late in March. Mandela, a
probable Communist who had been
under government restriction
orders until just before the
conference, is believed to have
been responsible for much of
the NAC's success in seizing
the initiative from anti-Commu-
nist groups such as the Pan-
Africanist Congress and the
largely white Liberal party,
An able organizer who re-
portedly has ample funds at his
disposal, he seems to have re-
vitalized the "Congress move-
ment," the Communist-dominated
multiracial group which had been
moribund since the banning last
year of the African National,
its principal component. The
NAC reportedly has begun a house-
to-house campaign to drum up
support for the strike call,
and it plans to intensify its
efforts during the coming weekend.
Mandela claims to have the
support of most of the country's
coloreds Ypersons of mixed blood)
and Indians. These two com-
munities, which are an impor-
tant economic factor in western
Cape Province and Natal re-
spectively, apparently are split
on the question of cooperation
with the Africans. Sentiment
in favor of cooperation seems
to be running stronger than it
did in the outbreaks last year.
Mandela allegedly hopes
violence can be avoided, since
peaceful demonstrations would
increase the NAC's aura of
respectability. He is said to
have admitted, however, that a
fifth of his followers favor
violent action. He believes
that the presence of large
numbers of security forces will
inhibit demonstrations in the
larger cities but that disturb-
ances in the towns are more
likely.
The government has been
conducting a series of police
raids since late April in an
effort to break up the organiza-
tion behind the strike call and
to intimidate the nonwhite pop-
ulation. In mid-May it called
up several units of reserves
and militia, rounded up more
than two thousand Africans on
trivial charges, and banned all
meetings until the end of June,
Foreign Minister Louw told the
American ambassador recently
that the government hopes these
measures will avert an incident
like the one at Sharpeville last
spring; however, he expressed
concern over the security
situation in the country.
(SECRET NOFORN)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN SURINAM
At preliminary talks sched-
uled to begin in The Hague on 29
May, the Netherlands and Suri-
nam will discuss possible modi-
fication of the Realm Statute
of 1954 with a view to giving
Surinam a greater degree of
independence, Final proposals
worked out at these discussions
will be submitted to a full
round-table conference to be
held later.
Surinam (Dutch Guiana) is
a sparsely populated, underde-
veloped territory about the
size of Illinois. The majority
of its 300,000 people are of
Asian extraction (Hindustanis,
Javanese, and Chinese), and the
rest predominantly African
("Creoles") and European ; nearly
D MI CAN
HAITI REPUBLIC
all live in the narrow fertile
strip of coastal plain. Suri-
nam and the six islands of the
Netherlands Antilles comprise
the overseas realm of the King-
dom of the Netherlands; the
1954 Realm Statute formalized
the internal self-government
already in effect in both ter-
ritories but reserved foreign
affairs and defense matters
to The Hague.
.Bauxite, mined by a sub-
sidiary of ALCOA and by a Dutch
firm, accounts for about 80 per-
cent of the value of Surinam's
exports, Surinam exported 3,600,-
000 tons of bauxite in 1960;
it provides about 20 percent
of the free world's supply.
V(1~% IS. (U.S., U.K.)
PUERTO Saint Moarten(Neth., Fr.)
RICO o (N ethJ Sala. ~~'
(U.S.) Saint E...N.e
(Neth.) ?. c. Antigua
(U.K.)
Guadeloupe,
(Fr.( }
Grenada
(U.K.)
Topagq r
iU KI
TRINIDAD
Netherlands Territories in the Western Hemisphere
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The territory's political
activity is dominated by a small
minority of professional and
businessmen varied in their
racial origins but largely Dutch
in educational background and
general orientation. They de-
sire expansion and diversifi-
cation of the economy to reduce
the present excessive dependence
on bauxite mining, and they
believe that to obtain greater
technical and financial assist-
ance from both the United Nations
and the West, their country
first must be recognized as an
international entity.
These men feel that under
the present arrangement, the
Dutch Foreign Ministry does not
adequately represent Surinam's
interests--particularly in re-
gard to securing aid for such
high-priority programs as the
development of hydroelectric
power and the expansion of the
transportation network to open
up the untapped timber and min-
eral resources of the interior.
They want independent represen-
tation in several key countries
in the western hemisphere as
well as at the United Nations.
Although Surinam has pros-
pered during the past several
years as demand has increased
for its bauxite, timber, and
food products, its political
leaders are dissatisfied with
the pace of its development.
They maintain that more rapid
and varied development is nec-
essary to meet the growing pres-
sure for social services such
as housing--which is admittedly
inadequate--and to provide em-
ployment for the increasing
number of Surinamers being
trained in the Netherlands.
Minister-president Emanuels,
who will head Surinam's delega-
tion, intends to use the oppor-
tunity to confer with German
and French officials regarding
their countries' possible par-
ticipation in development plans.
The desire for greater
autonomy has also been stimu-
lated in recent years by the
declining prestige of the colo-
nial powers, the rapid emergence
of independent states in Africa,
and the progress of the British
West Indies and neighboring
British Guiana toward independ-
ence. The "Creoles" are the
dominant party in the pro-
Western, tripartite coali-
tion they formed with the Hindu-
stani and Catholic parties and
are the most outspoken on the
question of greater independ-
ence. Some signs of racial
friction are appearing,
largely as a result of the
growing economic and political
power of the Hindustanis, who
already control much of Sur-
inam's local economy. Fear-
ing domination by the Asians,
the "Creoles" tend increasingly
to identify their aspirations
with those of the newly in-
dependent, uncommitted Af-
rican states and to look to
them for leadership.
In contrast to the polit-
ical situation in neighboring
British Guiana, leftist ele-
ments have wielded little
influence. As long as the
government's economic and so-
cial development programs pro-
ceed, the future of Surinam's
small leftist party will remain
uncertain.
Although neither racially
nor culturally a Latin country,
Surinam recognizes it must devel-
op closer ties with the neigh-
boring republics. The first
step would be to seek associa-
tion with the OAS. So far, how-
ever, Surinam has felt relatively
detached from Latin American
developments. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
There are several indica-
tions that a new Soviet consti-
tution will appear sometime
after the 22nd party congress
next October. Proposals for
changes in the existing law in-
dicate that the new constitution
will be based on Khrushchev's
assertions that the Soviet Un-
ion has begun the "full-scale
building of a Communist society."
The document may also provide
for the establishment of the of-
fice of "President of the USSR."
Background
The present Soviet consti-
tution is chiefly a description
of the state apparatus and a
record of past achievements
which needs periodic updating
in accord with economic and so-
cial change.
There have been three con-
stitutions since the revolution.
The first, adopted in 1918, ex-
propriated private property and
disenfranchised Russia's proper-
tied classes and set forth the
new system of government by
commissars and soviets. The
second appeared in 1924, follow-
ing the extension of Red power
into the Ukraine, Belorussia,
and the Transcaucasus, and the
consequent birth of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics.
It recognized the division of
the world into "two camps of
socialism and capitalism," but
otherwise limited itself to
describing the new state ad-
ministrative machinery. This
instrument was superseded in
1936 by the present constitution,
which was framed in keeping
with Stalin's dictum that, "in
the main," socialism had been
built in the Soviet Union.
Like his predecessor, Khru-
shchev evidently wants the
achievements of his administra-
tion embodied in the highest law
of the land. He first broached
the question of revising the con-
stitution at the 21st party con-
gress in 1959, but the subject
apparently was not raised again
for several months. Rumors of
impending change began to circu-
late in Moscow on the eve of the
central committee plenum last
spring, and on 3 May 1960 Khru-
shchev acknowledged that the
plenum would consider "constitu-
tional questions." He stated
that it had again become neces-
sary to bring the constitution
into line with the new situation
in Soviet economic and social
life, but added that the Commu-
nist party would first "work
out the lines of future devel-
opment."
Responsibility for draft-
ing the basic provisions of the
new law evidently has been as-
signed to P. S. Romashkin, di-
rector of the Institute of Law
of the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences, and work on the project
probably started last summer.
In July, Romashkin advanced de-
tailed proposals for changes,
and his recommendations were
published last fall in the top
legal journal, Soviet State and
Law. In January -Ml-, Romashl n
stated that his institute's sec-
tor of state law was "seriously
working out" questions of changes
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and additions to the constitu-
tion, and assumed that "this
work will be expanded following
the adoption of the party pro-
gram at the 22nd congress."
The Forthcoming Constitution
The earlier Soviet consti-
tutions contain no references
to the advent of Communism. In-
deed, in 1936, Stalin stated
flatly that the constitution
had to be limited to a descrip-
tionof past achievements, since
it was impossible for a basic
law to talk about events which
had not yet come to pass. The
Communist party has received
similar treatment. It was not
mentioned at all in the first
two constitutions, and was cited
only once in that of 1936.
If Romashkin's proposals
are adopted, however, the forth-
coming constitution will be
uniquely "communist" in nature.
It will, for the first time, ex-
plicitly commit the Soviet Un-
ion to continue on a communist
course. Taking its cue from the
party program now being revised
under Khrushchev's direction, it
will also lay down guidelines
for the future.
Romashkin insists on in-
cluding "a clear statement of
the prospects of development of
the Soviet state which will re-
flect the determination of
the entire people to build
communism." He further thinks
that the party's leading role
in Soviet life should be men-
tioned much more often and that
references should be made to
such harbingers of the future
as the strength of the'world so-
cialist movement, the growth of
the brigades of Communist labor,
and the eventual "withering
away of the state."
A constitution of this
type would certainly be touted
as a significant milestone in
the development of Marxism-
Leninism. Its appearance after
the 22nd congress, and the con-
comitant boasting of Soviet
superiority and praise for the
party first secretary, would
provide all the more opportu-
nity to link the Khrushchev
name with the "building of com-
munism." Like the "Stalin con-
stitution" of 1936, the forth-
coming document might also bear
the name of its chief inspirer.
Possible Soviet Presidency
While there is little evi-
dence that a move to create a
"President of the USSR" is con-
templated, rumors to this ef-
fect were making the rounds in
Moscow last May. A presidency
was subsequently established in
Rumania. Czechoslovakia and East
Germany have retained the office,
and there have been reports that
other European satellites intend
to set up the office as they too
"complete the transition to so-
cialism."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A presidency could be
formed simply by conferring the
title on the chairman of the
presidium of the Supreme So
viet,who is titular head of the
state. However, there are
no easily discernible advan-
tages in tacking a new label
onto a job which is already es-
sentially ceremonial.
The future president of
the USSR--if there is to be one
--is much more likely to step
into a position of real power
and prestige. He would pre-
sumably enjoy authority at
least equal to that of his sat-
ellite. counterparts, and in
large measure his office would
probably be modeled after the
Czechoslovak and Rumanian presi-
dencies.
The new constitution might,
then, assign to a Soviet presi-
dent certain functions now re-
served to the Supreme Soviet
presidium and ceremonially ex-
ercised by its chairman. These
include formal representation
of the state, negotiation and
ratification of treaties, and
the power to nominate and re-
call the premier and individual
members of the government.
Other provisions could be copied
from the Czechs, whose president
has the right to preside over
meetings of the government, is
commander in chief of the armed
forces, and "exercises powers
not expressed in the constitu-
tion."
25 May 61
The key qualification for
the office would not be embodied
in the law, however. It is cer-
tainly no accident in Czechoslo-
vakia and Rumania that the presi-
dent is also first secretary of
the party; in the Communist sys-
tem, the party chief is the ulti-
mate source of political authori-
ty. In the USSR, however, he has
never ruled by right of law, and
the creation of a Soviet presi-
dency like that of the two satel-
lites would give constitutional
sanction to the powers he has al-
ways exercised in fact. Making
the president (i.e., party first
secretary) technically responsi-
ble to the legislature--which is
fundamentally powerless--would
maintain the fiction that the
Supreme Soviet is the nation's
"highest organ of state authori-
ty. ,"
This kind of job would seem
made to order for Khrushchev. He
might see some propaganda advan-
tage to having his powers legal-
ized, and there are certainly no
indications that he would object
to more prestige. His "election"
to the presidency would also put
an end to any contention about
who is really head of the Soviet
state. While this question is of
little actual consequence, it has
nevertheless proved irritating in
the conduct of foreign relations;
in 1959, for example, Khrushchev
had to visit this country as
"chief of state"--for which there
is no Soviet constitutional pro-
vision--in order to be on a pro-
tocol par with the US President.
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OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES
Published during week of 17-23 May 1961
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C I TIAIC
~ E T.--
sEenr?r
CONFUDIVINTIAL
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