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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 6D C,U%377 ;140AL CFFRG; CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. OCI NO.0283/61 8 June 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTNO. r NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^ -I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C~ 25X1 NEXT REVIEW DATE: /990 AUTH: HR 70-2 r -~ q / / DATE:-?Oj / tz State Dept. review completed 7TIAL 25X1 RECORDS CthT 11 IMMEOIAT JUB ' X Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 ~+?-. v. as A CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY T H E W E E K I N B R I E F LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The fall of Pa Dong, principal base of loyal Meo troops, will probably be followed by further efforts on the part of Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces to eliminate Meo positions inside their lines in Xieng Khouang Province. General Phoumi has arrived in Nice, where he expects to be joined by Boun Oum for possible talks with Souvanna Phouma and, Souphannouvong. At Geneva, where the con- ference is in indefinite recess following the fall of Pa Dong, Communist bloc spokesmen have sought to blame the West for lack of progress in the conference, and Soviet delegate Pushkin has reiterated the bloc stand that the issue of guarantees for Laotian neutrality must precede consideration of further ICC control of the cease-fire. SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF VIENNA MEETING . . . . . . Page 5 Soviet statements on the talks between the President and Khrushchev stress the frank and useful exchange of opinion and the "prime significance" of the decision to maintain contacts. This suggests that one of Khrushchev's aims in Vienna was to renew high-level talks with the US as a necessary prelude to negotiating outstanding issues. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 General "Ramfis" Trujillo has moved quickly to fill the vacuum created by the death of his father, the country's absolute ruler for 31 years. The government is making a strong effort to convince world opinion that it is respecting civil rights at home and is prepared to rejoin the inter-American community as a member in good standing. All indications are that the regime is in full control throughout the country few grounds for hope, however, that Ramfis will ease police state controls except temporarily for tactical purposes, or that President Balaguer has the courage of ability to act independently. CONTROVERSY IN BRAZIL OVER QUADROS POLICIES . . . . . . . Page 8 While President Quadros' gestures toward the Sino- Soviet bloc have hitherto aroused only limited concern within Brazil, a more extensive controversy now has arisen over several recent moves which verge on de facto recognition of East Germany. The secretary general of the Foreign Ministry has resigned, the press is sharply critical of the President, and at least a segment of the military appears restive. Tension has been heightened SECRET i Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY by Quadros? order for the arrest of Marshal Lott, de- feated candidate in the 1960 presidential campaign. The war minister opposes the arrest, but an attempt by the military to overthrow the administration is unlikely at this time. SOUTH KOREA . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui is consolidating his con- trol over South Korea's military regime. He reportedly will head the Standing Committee that is expected to exercise control in the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, while re- taining the largely titular posts of chairman of the Supreme Council and chief of cabinet, has been removed as army chief of staff, defense minister, and martial law commander. The regime remains hostile to any suggestion for an early return to civilian government. Prime Minister Amini's reform program now is pro- ceeding at a slow pace. Arrests for corruption are con- tinuing, but no trials have yet been held. The minister of agriculture is pushing land distribution, and the government has put pontrols on more than 200 luxury im- ports. A Foreign Ministry official has expressed con- cern over growing neutralist sentiment in Iran. Several members of the government are pressing for Iran's with- drawAlfrom CENTO; one cabinet minister has submitted his resignation over this issue. . Page 10 CONGO . a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11 Gizenga's reported willingness to attend a meeting of parliament in Leopoldville probably stems from mis- givings over his isolation from the mainstream of Congo events, as well as from doubts regarding long-term prospects for his regime. Negotiations between Leopoldville and Elisabethville concerning the terms under which Katanga would "rejoin" the Congo reportedly began in late May. CUBA . . . Cuba's nickel production, which has declined con- siderably since the expropriation last fall of US-owned processing facilities, probably will be expanded under a long-term Soviet technical assistance program for the Cuban nickel and cobalt industries, announced in Havana on 1 June. A recent speech by Che Guevara gives a new indication that all political groups in Cuba may soon be fused into a single "party of the masses" with Fidel Castro as its secretary general. Such a union has long SECRET ii . Page 12 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 June 1961 been an aim of the Cuban Communists. The government reportedly is taking further security measures following an increase in acts of sabotage. FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 Paris is showing concern over the upsurge of rebel terrorism in France and Algeria--particularly over the participation of Moslem deserters from the French Army-- and may retaliate by ending the unilateral one-month cease-fire it initiated on 20 May. The PAG has shown no inclination to call off the terrorism or to disavow it publicly. Little progress seems to have been made on substantive issues at the Evian negotiations. The French Government has announced a change in its four major military commands in Algeria, naming Lieutenant General Charles Ailleret as commander in chief. SOVIET-UAR RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Following up Khrushchev's criticism of Nasir in front of a UAR parliamentary delegation last month, Pravda has attacked two UAR government-controlled news- papers for anti-Soviet statements, and inflammatory Arabic broadcasts from Moscow have alleged UAR mis- treatment of local Communists. In response Nasir has launched an extensive propaganda campaign against the USSR and made two official requests that Moscow "correct" its broadcasts. Soviet leaders, long ir- ritated by Nasir's suppression of Syrian Communists, are apparently displeased by Cairo's recent move toward improving relations with the US, and by Nasir's initiative--together with Tito--in arranging a neutral- ist summit conference. Soviet economic aid and mili- tary deliveries to the UAR apparently have not been affected by the current exchange. Page 15 ANGOLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 Rebel activity continues in northern Angola; Portu- guese troops seem to have made no progress in gaining control of rural areas. Holden Roberto's Angolan People's Union (UPA)--with headquarters at Leopoldville--claims to have achieved notable military successes vairy is continuing between the UPA and the Communist- influenced Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-- based at Conakry. ZANZIBAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17 The emergence of the Communist-infiltrated Zanzibar Nationalist party(ZNP) 'as the most prominent political group in Zanzibar following legislative elections on 1 June has been accompanied by large-scale rioting between Arabs and Africans. The prestige and power of the Arab Sultan of this British protectorate is swiftly declining, and British policy, is under increasing attack by both Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Atabs and Africans. Before the election, ZNP leader All Muhsin denounced the presence of an American soace- vehicle tracking installation on the island. CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 Political considerations continue to have a strong influence on Peiping's trade policies, but domestic eco- nomic difficulties are such as to overshadow other factors in determining the direction and magnitude of Chinese foreign trade. The agricultural failures of the past two years have led to unprecedented grain im- ports from the West and to a severe reduction of China's export potential. The resultant cutback in imports of industrial goods and services, together with internal problems and the continued absence of Soviet technicians, has forced a slowdown of industrialization. The impact of this year's trade adjustments has fallen most heavily on the bloc, and Peiping still has not reached agreement on several important bloc trade protocols for 1961. Although Imports from both bloc and nonbloc sources have been cut to the minimum, Peiping is being forced to use its holdings of precious metals acid..foreiign, ax- SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20 Khrushchev recently cited figures on the expected attendance at the 22nd party congress this October which corroborate earlier indications that party membership has increased from 8,708,000 in 1959 to an all-time high of about 9,500,000. The expanded party membership and unprecedented size of the forthcoming congress are the result of Khrushchev's reliance on the party as the major instrument of control and his use of en- larged party forums as sounding boards. In view of recent exposes of incompetence and corruption in the party, however, the congress may stress higher stand- ards of admission in the new party rules and draw on they large number of candidate members to strengthen SOVIET GOOD-WILL MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA . . . . . . . . Page 21 The USSR is sending an eight-man mission including trade, cultural, and scientific representatives to visit a number of Latin American countries in late June or early July. Although the mission will concentrate on exploring the possibilities of increasing Soviet trade and cultural relations with Latin America, it probably will also urge the establishment of diplomatic rela- tions, particularly with Brazil and Ecuador. SECRET iv 25X1 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 June 1961 SPECIAL ARTICLES TAIWAN'S PROSPECTS FOR A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY . The Taiwan government took a series of measures dur- ing the past year in an, effort to encourage investment and achieve self-sustaining economic growth. Industrial development, based on Taiwan's substantial supply of cheap, competent labor, has been inhibited by persist- ent budgetary deficits caused largely by defense spending, which accounts for half the government's total annual outlay. The industrialization problem is becoming more acute because of the rapid popula- tion increase and rising food consumption. Experts are in agreement that last year marked Taiwan's transition from a rice-surplus to a rice-deficit area. MISSILES IN SURFACE FORCES OF THE SOVIET NAVY . . The. development of missile weapons has led the USSR to make broad changes in the navy's surface forces and to introduce a number of new classes of ships. These ships apparently are designed primarily to attack surface targets rather than aircraft and thus, in terms of mis- sions and equipment, are significantly different from their Western counterparts. Several factors, including air defense weaknesses on missile ships, indicate that the units completed thus far are intended to operate mainly in areas where they can be protected and sup- ported by land-based aircraft. SECRET v Page 5 Page 9 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY WEEKLY REVIEW LAOS The fall of the Meo strong- hold at Pa Fong, which has been the primary target of Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces since the 3 May cease-fire proclamation in Laos, will probably be fol- lowed by efforts to wipe out all loyal Meo pockets of re- sistance in Xieng Khouang Prov- ince. The base, which has long been subject to artillery fire and probing attacks, came under heavy bombardment and by the afternoon of 6 June was pene- trated by enemy forces. Fight- ing continued into that night, when government troops began to withdraw. They are regrouping at positions several miles south and west of Pa Dong, with headquarters about seven-miles southwest of that village. Gov- ernment losses in the action are not yet fully known. A 5 June statement broad- cast by the Pathet Lao radio and attributed to the National Military Committee, on which both Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces are represented, had de- nounced the proposal that In- ternational Control Commission (ICC) observers be established at Pa Dong. The statement called for "destruction of the bandits" which the Pathet Lao, strongly supported by bloc propaganda, claims have been dropped into the Pa Dong area since the cease-fire was pro- claimed. It declared that an ICC presence in southwestern Xieng Khouang Province would be "illegal" and that the safety of an observer team could not be guaranteed. This sharp reaction re- -flects the importance the Pathet Lao attaches to the elimination of Meo units behind its lines. These tribal forces, a part of the regular Laotian army, are Vientiane's most aggressive fighters and their continued existence would enable Vien- tiane to claim enclaves in Xieng Khouang Province in any negotiations for a settle- ment. Laotian Leaders in Europe General Phoumi left Vien- tiane on 6 June for Nice, where he expects to be joined by Pre- mier Boun Oum for possible talks with Souvanna Phouma and Sou- phannouvong under the sponsor- ship of Sihanouk. Souvanna and Souphannouvong left Xieng Khouang for Geneva on 2 June traveling by way of Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow. It seems unlikely that such talks would result in any early reconciliation of the widely divergent posi- tions. Outlining his strategy for the proposed meeting to Ambas- sador Brown in Vientiane SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Lao Kay Lai Chaus Phong Saly Dien Bien h u B U R\M A N~m:fiia's ?... P Pa. ?Muong- t Dong Ban "..Tha Thom Ta Viang: k Sane Kam Keu INDONESIA SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Muong Sai: 'Nam Bac': Muong Houn? Luang Prabang ;...,..A...... L S Muong Sou -s+~ hana Page 2 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY before his. departure, Phoumi stated that he would insist on reaching agreement on a cease- fire and on the type of guaran- tees necessary for Laotian neu- trality before agreeing to dis- cuss the formation of a govern- ment of national unity. Phoumi added that the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) would have to be repre- sented in any such government or "there could be no peace in Laos." Phoumi also hopes that Souvanna, away from the Pathet Lao influence in Xieng Khouang, may prove more flexible and that he will be able to sound him out alone on his views of a genuine- ly neutral and independent Laos. Phoumi is inclined to give some substance to reports of friction between Souvanna and the NLHS. On his departure for Ge- neva Souvanna told Western news- men who interviewed him at the Plaine des Jarres airfield that he wants neutralism, not Com- munism, for Laos and that he had so informed Communist lead- ers abroad. Despite ostensible control of the Plaine des Jarres by Kong Le forces, the newsmen felt that an attempt had been made to conceal preponderant Communist influence in the area during their presence. The Namone Talks The tripartite talks at Namone have made no further headway, and the meeting sched- uled for 5 June was canceled. The 7 June session led only to agreement in principle by the military subcommittee that ICC observers could be permitted at unspecified points, a device to paper over failure to agree on how extensive ICC observa- tion should be. The NLHS and Souvanna delegates appear to be stalling, and little of substance is likely to take place until the outcome of the anticipated meeting be- tween Laotian leaders in Europe is known. Minor skirmishing has con- tinued in scattered areas of Laos; the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces remain in a position to resume large-scale attacks should negotiations break down. The Geneva Conference The conference on Laos at Geneva now is in indefinite re- cess following the fall of Pa Don g . Communist bloc spokesmen at Geneva this past week blamed the US and its allies for hold- ing up the progress of the con- ference and accused the West of blocking any substantive dis- cussion of the 17 May Soviet proposals for a Laotian settle- ment. On 5 June Soviet dele- gate Pushkin reiterated the bloc's position that the con- ference must begin negotiations on the question of Laotian SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 3 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY neutrality guarantees before considering further controls for the ICC in Laos. He called upon the Western delegations to "advance your own proposals" if the Soviet draft documents are "unsuitable." Pushkin said the French delegation had precluded any meaningful discussion of its 23 May draft proposals when it added that a draft protocol dealing with the ICC would be submitted later to the confer- ence. The French draft protocol, which was proposed on 6 June, would broaden the investigatory powers of the ICC and will al- most certainly be rejected by the bloc as constituting un- warranted interference in Lao- tian internal affairs. Peiping has already said as much and has called the proposal "a big step backward" from the 1954 Geneva agreements. The Chinese maintain that the two Soviet proposals should be the only items for conference consid- eration. In his speech of 5 June, Pushkin once again made it clear that any on-the-spot investiga- tion of cease-fire violations by the ICC will have to be based on an "understanding" between it and the contending factions in Laos. Soviet insistence on this point and Moscow's con- tinued reluctance to reach agree- ment with the UK on the question of further instructions to be sent to the ICC reflects the desire to gain time for the fur- ther consolidation of Pathet Lao forces in the Xieng Khouang area, thereby strengthening the Communists' hand in negotiating a political settlement. The bloc delegations also realize that any agreement to increase the ICC's authority at this time would strengthen the Western powers' insistence on effective control machinery as an essential part of a politi- cal settlement. Pushkin charged that the 'Vestern position on instructions to the ICC is really designed to "predeter- mine" the powers of the com- mission even before "all as- pects of the Laotian problem have been discussed." SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 4 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF VIENNA MEETING Soviet statements on the talks between the President and Khrushchev stress the frank and useful exchange of opinion and the "prime significance" of the decision to maintain contacts. Soviet spokesmen and bloc propa- ganda have implied that further meetings between the President and Khrushchev as well as new high-level negotiations will be arranged. This line had been dictated by Moscow's pre-conference theme that further talks would prob- ably be necessary, since the Vienna meeting was only to ex- change opinions and important problems could not be solved in two days. Khrushchev took this position in his arrival state- ment, and Soviet editorial com- ments in Pravda have carefully pointed out that the talks were not expected to be negotiations with specific settlement in mind. Since the conclusion of the talks Moscow has adopted the line that the results have opened the way for a lessening of in- ternational tensions, provided the US draws the proper conclu- sion. A broadcast to Soviet audiences on 4 June asserted that the "matter now rests with the other side." Khrushchev in his departure speech on 5 June also implied that the effect on specific issues would depend on the US. A Pravda editorial on 7 June emphasized that the So- viet people expect the talks to be followed by "concrete deeds" and pledged that the Soviet Union would do its part. Pravda articles by special correspond- ents in Vienna gave the impres- sion that the talks had been useful, that they disappointed the "cold warriors," and that they went off better than ex- pected. Thus far, Soviet press com- ments have carefully avoided any discussion or evaluation of the substantive results or an as- sessment of the President. Khru- shchev, however, was impressed by the President's intelligence, understanding of problems, and firmness. At one point Khrushchev used the word "tough." Soviet officials in Vienna have been taking a sim- ilar line in talks with Western correspondents. The Soviet propaganda pic- ture suggests that Khrushchev's aim in Vienna was to justify the value of renewed high-level talks with the US as a necessary prelude to negotiating outstand- ing issues, particularly Germany. This was suggested by a Pravda editorial while the talks were in progress. Pravda asserted, in a somewhat defensive tone, that "the necessity of meetings of this kind now beginning in Vienna is understandable to everyone who soundly evaluates the balance of powers in the in- ternational~arena." The editorial also claimed that public opinion showed an "overwhelming major- ity of mankind approved the re- newal of contacts at the summit between the leading statesmen of the West and East." The Soviet propaganda line, particularly for domestic con- sumption, suggests that Khru- shchev is committed to a favor- able appraisal of the meeting, when he reports publicly. On 25 May, for example, at a public lecture in Moscow the speaker left the impression that the meeting would be a success and that US-Soviet relations, after interruptions, were about to re- turn to the atmosphere before U-2. Chinese Communist Reaction Peiping has reported the final communique but has not issued any original comment on the outcome of the Vienna talks. The Chinese have, however, re- printed summaries of foreign commentaries on the Vienna meet- ing which presumably express Chinese views. One such article --entitled, "Summit Welcome, But Struggle Is the Main Thing" --makes the Chinese point that the US is always "forced" into summit meetings and after- ward acts in its "old ag- gressive way . " 25X1 SECRET Page 5 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC The composition of the Dominican Government has remained essentially the same following the assassination on 30 May of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, absolute ruler of his country since August 1930. Gen- eral "Ramfis" Trujillo, the dictator's 32-year-old son who returned from Europe immediate- ly after his father's death, was named head of the joint chiefs of staff of the Dominican armed forces on 1 June. The ap- pointment was unanimously ap- proved by the rubber-stamp Con- gress. Indications are that the regime is in full control throughout the country. Ramfis'appointment to the highest armed forces post places him in a position of power compar- able to that of his late father. However, he does not have the respect of numerous older of- ficers, who resent his youth, his rashness, and has reputation as an international playboy. Ramfis will almost certainly have to rely on continued force to maintain his position. His clique of personal supporters, who also share his hatred of the United States, include some of the most radical and ruthless elements in the regime. American Consul Dearborn, after a conversation with Presi- dent Balaguer on 4 June, com- mented that the President is "showing some spunk" but is still far from being an independent agent. Although Balaguer seemed to be sincere in expressing his desire to create democratic con- ditions in the country, he ap- peared uncertain whether Ramfis would permit him to do so. The consul believes the President may ask for US military support if his program is obstructed. Balaguer, had threatened to resign rather than accede to a request from "the armed forces" to expel Roman Catholic bishops Reilly and Panal. Ramfis, other members of the Trujillo family, and close associates probably realize that they stand to lose everything if they permit a significant de- gree of free opposition. There are few grounds for hope that Balaguer has the courage or ability to assume any role other than his accustomed one as a lackey for those exercising real power. Government leaders are mak- ing A strong effort to convince international opinion that the regime no longer merits the police state label. The pres- ence of American newsmen has served as a brake on police ex- cesses that terrorized the dis- sidents immediately after the assassination. Some of those arrested have apparently been released. The presidential decree of 6 June canceling the army commission of John Abbes is clearly designed to dissociate pres'ent leaders from this hated symbol of police brutality. It is too soon to know whether this move has any real signifi- cance; last year Abbes was re- placed as head of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) for similar reasons, but he continued as de facto head of the organ- ization and was most recently observed in SIM headquarters on 2 June. Indications of loyalty to the Trujillo family have been observed among low-income groups in the capital as well as in the countryside, where units of a peasant militia were observed on 4 June performing patrol duties with considerable enthu- siasm. It is among the usually inarticulate lower classes that the "father image" of the late dictator had its greatest strength. Middle-class elements with at least some formal educa- tion, from which future Domini- can governments will have to draw '.their personnel; are SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 6 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET believed to be largely anti- Trujillo. Ramfis Trujillo is known to harbor deep resentments against the United States, and if he and other government lead- ers fail in their current effort to obtain at least passive US support, he is likely to resume his earlier efforts to reach an accommodation with the Soviet bloc and in any other way avail- able to him to try to undercut US influence. Communist-Cuban Exploitation Communists and pro-Castro groups among the thousands of Dominican exiles abroad are al- ready seeking to exploit the dictator's death and may well obtain covert assistance from the Castro regime. On 2 June, leaders of the Dominican People's Socialist (Communist) party in Cuba issued a statement warning of an impend- ing "imperialist maneuver" de- signed to prevent the Dominican people from establishing an "in- dependent and democratic" re- gime. The statement was trans- mitted the next day in English by the official Czechoslovak news agency. In response to a request for comment on the assassination, Raul Castro said that Cuba should "do no more than listen, look, and keep quiet." He also implied that the US Government had been involved in the assassination because Trujillo had outlived his usefulness to "imperialism," which wished to use Dominican territory as x base against the Cuban revolution. He termed "ridiculous" several reports that he was preparing a Cuban expedi- tionary force to invade the Do- minican Republic. Other Cuban coverage of the Trujillo death has been extensive and similar in content to the younger Cas- tro's remarks. Proposed Inter-American Action Venezuelan President Betan- court, in a conversation of more than four hours with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson on 4 June, urged a series of OAS actions "up to and including possible collective military action" to bring down the Dominican regime. The prec- edent thus established, he said, could later be employed in Cuba. With respect to the Cuban plan, he proposed an OAS foreign min- isters' meeting after the inter- American economic conference in Uruguay in July, The OAS con- ferees would give the Castro re- gime 90 days to dissociate it- self from the Sino-Soviet bloc, observe civil liberties, and hold free elections. If Castro SECRET Page 7 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY did not comply, the foreign min- isters would again convene to apply the same sanctions against Castro that had been imposed against the Dominican regime. The American ambassador in Bogota, after lengthy conversa- tions with Colombian President Lleras Camargo and his foreign minister, reported on 5 June that Colombian leaders had hoped that the extermination of Tru- jillo would be followed by a pop- ular, democratically oriented uprising, and were disappointed when such a movement failed to develop. Colombian leaders doubt that Ram'f:s will change the old order and feel that Balaguer is not a promising liberal leader. Bogota apparently prefers to assess the internal Dominican situation further before decid- ing on any action to be taken. CONTROVERSY IN BRAZIL OVER QUADROS POLICIES President Quadros of Brazil Secretary General Leitao has made repeated gestures to- da Cunha, an old-line Foreign ward the.Sino-Soviet bloc since Ministry official, has resigned, his inauguration in January. stating that he planned a year's These gestures and his policy leave of absence from the dip- toward Cuba have been criticized lomatic service. Afonso Arinos by the clergy, a prominent state also threatened to resign but governor, some newspapers, and apparently consented to stay some of the military, but the on; he told the press that the public has not seemed concerned. exact terms of "the document" Brazilian conservatives have in- were unknown but that "it is sisted that he was expanding not a diplomatic agreement,be- diplomatic and commercial rela- cause Dantas has no authority tions with the bloc merely to to conclude agreements." conciliate the country's lef L- ists and-Communists and that The resignation of Leitao his basic conservative orienta- da Cunha has aroused public con- tion was indicated by his do- troversy in Brazil, with edi- mestic economic austerity pro- torial reaction predominantly gram. in his support and critical of Dantas and Quadros. A group Quadros' policy toward East of military officers--although Germany, however, has caused primarily discontented with considerable, concern in the Igor- 'Quadros' mil.itary'appointments eign Ministry, because several and his economic austerity pro- of his moves seemed to verge on gram rather than his foreign de facto recognition. Quadros policy--is taking advantage of on 24 May-ifistructed Foreign the , controversy to present griev- Minister Afonso Arinos to invite ances to Quadros at this time. the East German trade minister to visit Brazil. Joao D.:zntas, Discontent among these of- Quadros' crony and emissary, has fice,rs--who appear to be men been visiting Eastern Europe who held high posts under the to expand commercial relations previous administration--has there. The Brazilian Foreign been heightened by Quadros' or- Ministry had apparently assured der for the arrest of Marshal West Germany of a friendly Bra- Lott, defeated candidate in the zilian policy, but public an- 1960 presidential campaign, for nouncement that Dantas had signed making a political statement. a trade agreement with East Ger- They undoubtedly feel that Lott, many has undercut this policy. as titular bead of the opposition, SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 8 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY should be permitted greater lee- way in making political comment than other military figures. The war minister is resisting Quadros' arrest order, but,an attempt by the:military to over- throw Quadros is unlikely at this time. The controversy may lead Quadros'to greater caution but is not likely to produce a sub- stantial modification in his foreign policy. In an effort to confuse the issue he may step up the investigation of foreign news agencies which he initiated in late May through his leftist minister of justice. As gover- nor of Sao Paulo Quadros in- stituted numerous legal actions against journalists and news- papers critical of him and his administration. Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, the architect of last month'e military coup in South Korea, appears to be moving cautiously to consolidate his control of the ruling junta. He reportedly will become chairman of the seven-man Standing Committee that is likely to emerge as the focal point of power in the unwieldy 32-member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). Pak's intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, has seized government dossiers containing information compromising poten- tial opponents, including SCNR chairman Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong. On 6 May the Supreme Coun- cil announced that Chang had re- signed as army chief of staff, defense minister, and martial law commander but would continue as chairman of the Supreme Coun- cil and chief of cabinet. The latter posts have little real power. The regime also announced on 6 May that retired Lt. Gen. Sin Ung-kyun, former vice-min- ister of defense and onetime am- bassador to Turkey, and Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o would succeed Chang as defense minister and army chief of staff respectively. Both are regarded as generally competent. Prior approval was obtained from the UN commander for Kim's appointment. The Supreme Council on 6 June promulgated the law of Emergency Measures of National Reconstruction, which "legalizes" its usurpation of power and in effect suspends these provisions of the present constitution dealing with civil rights and the ousted National Assembly. The regime is consid- 25X1 ering the eventual adoption of a new constitution providing for a strong executive patterned on that of the French Fifth Republic. most respected newspaper, were summarily arrested on 4 June for headlining President Yun Po-sun's "hopes for an early transfer of At the same time, spokesmen for the regime have vigorously denounced public speculation on the timing of a return to civil- ian government. The managing editor and one reporter of Tonga Ilbo, South Korea's largest power" and implying that the President believed a return to cibilian authority was desirable prior to the opening of the 16th UN General Assembly in September. The incident indicates the re- gime's hypersensitivity to the timing of such action and pro- vides further evidence that the junta's limited relaxation of martial law and censorship is lar el? window dressing. 25X1 SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Prime Minister Amini is continuing his efforts to put his reform program into effect, although at a somewhat slower pace. He and Minister of Agri- culture Arsanjani have elabo rated on their basic program of eliminating corruption, dis- tributing land, and improving the economic situation. Amini is reported to be greatly en- couraged by the Shah's support, and he hopes, by frequent consul- tations with him, to sustain the Shah's determination to carry on with reforms. In a speech to provincial agricultural directors on 3 June, Arsanjani said the hold- ings of the big landlords would not be confiscated but would be paid for in government bonds. He added, "After these people have engaged in other pursuits, they will realize they are being useful to themselves as well as to the country." The landowners will probably view payment in bonds as the equivalent of ex- propriation, however, as there is no bond market in Iran and little faith in the economic future of the country. In a new effort to halt the drain on foreign exchange, the government instructed banks that no letters of credit would be issued for over 200 luxury im- ports, including passenger cars, radios, refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, and alcoholic beverages. Amini an- nounced that this would save'the country $50,000,000 a year. Arrests for corruption are continuing, but at a slower pace and with lesser known officials. Thirteen former officials now are under arrest; none has yet been tried. An under secretary of the Foreign Ministry has told the American ambassador that he is concerned over the growing neutralist sentiment in Iran and that members of Amini's government are pressing him to withdraw from CENTO. The Shah and Amini, however, appear united on maintaining Iran's membership; Amini has publicly expressed his support for the organization. yet. Minister of Mines and In- dustries Gholam All Farivar, who is also director general of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Society in Iran, has submitted his resignation, saying that he believes Iran must be neu- tral and withdraw from CENTO. Prime Minister Amini has not accepted the resignation as SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 22" Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ,'SVMMARY Gizenga's reported willing- ness to attend a meeting of parliament in Leopoldville sug- gests that major Congolese fac- tions are favorably disposed in principle toward a federa- tion as outlined at the'Coquil- hatville conference, Negotia- tions between Elisabethville and Leopoldville concerning the terms under which Katan- ga would "rejoin" the Congo reportedly began in late May. Gizenga's decision prob- ably stemmed from misgivings over his isolation from the mainstream of events in the Congo, as well as from doubts regarding long-term prospects for his regime. Although he still claims to represent the legal Congolese government, the refusal of the Kivu provin- cial assembly to give a vote of confidence to his hand- picked provincial president was a serious setback. In addition, Gizenga continues to have difficulty controlling his troops. The American Embassy has observed that Gizenga, by at- tending parliament, probably could sow dissension in the ranks of the moderates, but that it is a moot question whether he could gain power for himself. `'Gizenga's concilia- tory posture, however, may be designed in part to gain time and impress his troops with his dediration': to a`.. united'. Congo. ,. Leopoldville Premier Ileo has advised foreign diplomats that only President Kasavubu is empowered to call parlia- ment into session, and that parliament must meet in Leo- poldville. He added that the Leopoldville government planned to obtain, through the UN, foreign specialists to prepare a new constitu- tion based on agreements reached at Coquilhatville on a 20-state federation. Ilco stated that the new consti- tution would be submitted to the populace for ratification by referendum; he added, how- ever, that the present parlia- ment would continue even after the adoption of a new con- stitution, since the country was too unsettled for new elec- tions. The situation in Kivu Province remains unclear. Oppo- sition to the provisional gov- ernment of Adrien Omari by local Bashi tribesmen appears to have resulted in clashes with pro- Gizenga troops in which at least 100 Bashis died. SECRET Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY CUBA A Cuban-Soviet agreement providing for long-term mate- rial and technical aid from the USSR to the Cuban nickel and cobalt industries was signed in Havana on 1 June. Minis- ter of Industries Che Guevara announced that the Soviet aid, which he said would total about $100,000,000, was aimed at making Cuba the world's second largest nickel producer. Most of the aid is expected to go to the facilities at Nicaro, owned by the US Government but expropriated by the Castro regime in October 1960. Cuba has one of the largest proven nickel reserves in the world. Its 1959 production was esti- mated at 19,000 tons. Produc- tion declined considerably, however, after the Nicaro fa- cilities were seized. Although the USSR is at present the world's second largest nickel producer--after Canada--the development of the Cuban nickel industry would en- able the bloc to reduce its present substantial nickel im- ports from other countries. Cu- ban nickel oxide already is be- ing shipped to several bloc countries, including the Soviet Union and Communist China. During a television talk on 4 June, Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro expounded on the growing role of the "Boards of Coordination, Execution, and Inspection" (JUCEI) in planning and regimenting Cuban economic activities on the provincial level. He stressed the impor- tance of the JUCEI groups in "building socialism" by serving as the intermediaries between "top planning for the whole na- tion" and the groups which ex- ecute such plans. Revealing that some Cubans have reacted nega- tively to the new organizations, Castro berated "those still in Cuba who think they know it all and do not want to be inspected or supervised." Minister of Industries Che Guevara told a re- 25X1 cent student meeting in Havana that "real unity" of all Cuban revolutionary organizations al- ready exists and "the only thing lacking is the formation of the party with Fidel Castro as its secretary general." The union of all political parties and "revolutionary mass organiza- tions" has long been an aim of the Communists' Popular Socialist party (PSP), the only organized political party in Cuba, and would give the regime the mass- based political organization it now lacks. Long-time PSP leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez recently observed that the new united party--which clearly would be controlled by the Communists-- would be formed by 26 July of this year, the eighth anniver- sary of the Castro movement's fight to gain power in Cuba. The Castro regime is re- portedly stepping up arrests and repression in the wake of what appears to be an increase in sabotage and other opposi- tion activities within Cuba, according to refugees who left the island recently. The ref- ugees assert that bomb explosions are heard nightly in the capi- tal once again, and sabotage of sugar mills and public buildings has been reported in other parts of the island, The Cuban Ministry of Communications, in what may be a related move, had intercepted and censored US mail released to the naval base at Guantanamo on 1 June. SECRET Page 12 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The announcement on 7 June of the transfer of G-2, the Cuban secret police organization --henceforth to be known as the Department of State Securi~ ty--to a new Ministry of the Interior, headed by G-2 chief Ramiro Valdes, may presage a further expansion of the Cas- tro regime's efficient securi- ty- apparatus. The part of the Cuban good- will mission to Latin America led by special envoy Ramon Aja Castro is apparently about to conclude its talks with leaders of other hemisphere governments. That portion of the mission led by Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Olivares re- turned to Cuba on 2 June after talking with high government officials in Mexico, Brazil, and Ecuador. The chief pur- pose of the mission appears to have been to convince Latin American governments with which Cuba still maintains diplomatic relations that the Castro re- gime poses no threat to the inter-American system. De- tails of the discussions, de- scribed as "successful" in the Cuban press, remain unclear, but the emissaries reportedly were received coldly by some governments, including those of Panama, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Continuing incidents of Al- gerian terrorism during the Evian talks may lead Paris to declare an end to its unilateral one-month cease-fire announced on 20 May. The rebels, who denounced the French cease-fire as a psychological trick and stated that it was a matter for negotiation following political guarantees, has shown no incli- nation to call off terrorism or to disavow it publicly. The French delegation at Evian may formally demand that the Pro- visional Algerian Government (PAG) do so as a condition for continuing the talks. Paris is particularly con- cerned about the reliability of Moslems in the French Army fol- lowing a sharp increase in Mos- lem desertions during the cease- fire period. Some deserters joined rebel terrorists in a recent attack on a French army post in Algeria, and others were involved in a five-hour battle between Moslems and po- lice in downtown Paris on 5 June. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 13 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Police. are reported screening ship--and pledged "respect for Moslems in metropolitan France, the culture, religion, language, including those in army units, and personal status" of Euro- in an Attempt to weed out Al- peans who elect to become gerian nationalists, citizens of an independent Al- The PAG may be willing to break off the Evian talks over the Sahara issue. Paris set up a separate administration in 1958 for the Sahara, and: France maintains that De Gaulle's self- determination offer applies only to the Algerian departments. The PAG has consistently main- tained that Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara must be recog- nized as a first step in reach- ing any agreed solution. On 2 June the spokesman for the PAG delegation declared: "The Algerian people have not fought for seven years to agree today to the amputation of four fifths of Algeria's ter- ritory," The PAG appears to have strong backing from all its factions on this point. By standing firm, it may seek to avoid internal dissension over the concessions it is willing to consider on other issues. The PAG showed a degree of conciliation in the . a June session dealing with guaran- tees for the European minority in Algeria.. It reportedly promised v, 6-hoice ship--rul ing ~ out the 17rench concept o -.'L" dual citizexi- geria and "a place for Euro- peans who choose to be for- eigners." Direct talks between De Gaulle and PAG premier Ferhat Abbas are being rumored as a step to prevent a breakdown of the contact between the two sides. De Gaulle, however, has previously insisted that a personal meeting could only follow an Algerian agree- ment to stop the fighting. The French Government on 7 June announced a change of per- sonnel in the four major mili- tary commands in Algeria and named Lt. Gen. Charles Ailleret to replace Gen. Fernand Gambiez as commander in chief. Ailleret has been shifted in quick succes- I sion since the April generals revolt from his division command at Bone to the command of the Constantine corps and then to the 1 post of assistant to Gambiez. Although the outgoing gen- erals were loyal to De Gaulle during the insurrection, most of them were held prisoner by the insurrectibnists,and the govern- ment probably feels their in- 25X1 ability to take firm action at the time has cost them the respect of the forces in Algeria. SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 14 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOVIET-UAR RELATIONS The current propaganda ex- change between the USSR and the UAR appears to have had its origin in Khrushchev's criti- cism of Nasir expressed to a visiting UAR delegation in early May. The Soviet premier attacked the UAR for claiming to be a socialist state but at the same time jailing Communists, and asserted that Nasir did not un- derstand "anything about social- ism or Communism." A few oblique criticisms of the Communist bloc appeared in the Cairo press soon after Khrushchev's reported remarks. The UAR also publicized the official protest made to Soviet Ambassador Yerofeyev in Cairo on 22 May regarding claims by Moscow's Arabic radiobroadcasts that the UAR is mistreating lo- cal Communists. Moscow respond- ed with a Pravda article on 31 May attacking two UAR govern- ment-controlled newspapers for "slanderous statements" against the Soviet Union and socialism and, in an implicit threat of economic reprisals, warned Cairo not to "cut down the tree which gives you shade." The present full-scale radio and press campaign from Cairo and Damascus began on 4 June, following repeated Soviet propaganda attacks against the UAR's handling of local Commu- nists. A second protest was presented to the director of Moscow radio's Arabic service by the UAR press attache on 5 June. Cairo has flatly denied Moscow's persistent charges that Lebanese Communist Al-Hilu was arrested several months ago and subsequently died in a UAR prison. Another Arab Communist --Riyad al-Turk--alleged by Moscow to have died in prison, was paraded before a press con- ference in Damascus on 5 June, and the Cairo press--which calls him the "Lazarus of Communism" --commented he had received better treatment than the "in- mates of Siberia." The Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram reportedly has sent a radiophoto of Al-Turk to Pravda and challenged Moscow to print it. A1-Jumhuriya, Cairo's official newspaper, has set the tone of the UAR anti-Soviet campaign, claiming that the USSR is "pushing its nose into our affairs" and adding that if Soviet leaders believe they can impose their views on the UAR because of the UAR-USSR trade agreements, "they feed on de- lusions." The UAR propaganda campaign will probably be given another boost by the report from Syria on 7 June that security author- ities have discovered a large Communist cell in Damascus and have confiscated a printing press, typewriters,. and publications. According to the Damascus press, the documents found will "expose Communism to the ugliest scandal since the establishment of the Communist regime in Russia in 1917." Nasir's treatment of local Communists has been an irritant to Moscow since his suppression of the Syrian Communist party following the UAR merger in 1958. The dispute reached a peak during 1959 when Khrushchev and Nasir engaged in a public exchange of recriminations over Arab Communism, and the close political cooperation which had previously existed between SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 15 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY the two was never fully re- stored. Soviet leaders apparently are also displeased by Cairo's recent moves toward improv- ing relations with the West, particularly the US, and by Nasir's initiative--together with Tito--in arranging a neu- tralist summit conference. Soviet news media have not commented on the projected neutralist heads- of-government meeting or on the preparatory confer- ence which opened in Cairo on 5 June. The US Embassy in Cairo believes that the Nasir-Tito cooperation not only may have produced,:genuine irritation on the part of Khrushchev but may also be subjecting him to crit- icism from Communist theoreti- cians--particularly in China and the Arab world--who have never accepted his thesis that the bloc should collaborate with bourgeois nationalists and non- Communist revolutions. The revival of Soviet-UAR polemics during the past month does not appear to have af- fected economic and military collaboration between the two countries. Major new arms agree- ments have included T-54 tanks, artillery, military vehicles, and MIG-19 supersonic jet fighters. Rebel activity in northern Angola shows no sign of abating. Although the Portuguese press continues to claim that Lisbon's forces have inflicted heavy losses on the terrotists, Portuguese control seems re- stricted to the major towns. The 16,000 troops in the province seems to have made no progress in regaining con- trol of rural areas. The rebels continue to sabo- tage the few transportation routes. Holden Roberto and other leaders of the Angolan People's Union (UPA) claim that the SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Portuguese base at Toto is in rebel hands; this assertion has not been confirmed by any other source, however. The UPA does not have tight. control over the nationalist bands, and members frequently participate in attacks for only a short time before dropping out of sight or fleeing to the Congo. Most of the 10,000-odd Angolan refugees in the Congo seem motivated more by anti- Portuguese sentiment than by allegiance to the UPA or its rival, the Communist-influenced Popular Movement for the Libeyra- tion of Angola (MPLA)--based at Conakry (Guinea). Tension apparently contin- ues between these organization, although there have been reports of increasing cooperation. UPA leaders have been under pressure to cooperate with the MPLA, and an MPLA official recently claimed that an accord had been reached. '-ZAN2I BAR The emergence of the Com- munist-infiltrated Zanzibar Nationalist party (ZNP) as the most important single political element in Zanzibar following legislative elections on 1 June has been accompanied by large- scale rioting between Arabs and Africans. The prestige and power of the Arab Sultan of this British protectorate is swiftly declining, and Britain itself is being increasingly criticized by both Arabs and Africans. - j . VlI M.I.Ch.I ~a?NO o R.aO~eo J. a. Pant. t NGOLA E. C., lIIno~ The elections were a rerun of balloting last January which had resulted in a virtual stale- mate between the ZNP--which rep- resents the ruling Arab minority --and the Afro-Shirazi party, spokesman for newly articulate elements among the 80 percent of the island's population which is of African descent. The balance of power was held by the Zanzi- bar and Pemba People's party (ZPPP), which split its support after its leader sold out to the SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Pace 17 of 22 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ZNP. The ZPPP cooperated in the elections with the ZNP, al- though their platforms differed; the two parties now control 13 seats in the 23 member legisla- ture. As a:.result, Sheik Muhamed Shamte, leader of the ZPPP, has been named chief minister of the coalition government, but ZNP president All Muhsin, named min- ister of education, will domi- nate it. Chinese Communists have given money to the ZNP and have arranged a large number of free trips to Peiping for party offi- cials. Soviet infiltration ef- forts reportedly have been less direct and apparently aimed pri- marily at youth organizations, with offers of scholarships in the USSR. The victory of the Arab ZNP, despite the rapidly grow- ing political awareness and strength of the Africans, was due in large measure to the ZNP's superior organization. Under- lying racial hostility between the two groups, sharpened by political frictions, seems like- ly to affect the protectorate's political situation more seri- ously as time goes on. The Arab mniznor ity--some 50,000 in Zanzi- bar's population of 300,000-- fears that its dominant position will soon disappear; the new Arab Sultan, a man who lacks his predecessor's prestige, has already been subjected to Afri- can ridicule. All Muhsin, who has public- ly supported Communism, is not likely to cooperate more than a bare minimum with the British or to support moves toward forma- tion of a federation of East African territories. Prior to the elections, All Muhsin strong- lyy criticized the placing of an American space-vehicle tracking station on Zanzibar and the es- tablishment of an American con- sulate. He recently asserted his determination to oppose the tracking station "unless America can convince Russia and China of the innocence of the project." He has condemned alleged pro- African interference by Kenva and Tanganyika politicians in' the election and stated that Zanzibar would become an independent re- public before he would discuss any possible federation with the East African states. He has also 25X1 announced that he would not recom- mend Zanzibar's remaining in the Commonwealth. CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE DEVELOPMENTS Political considerations continue to have a strong influ- ence on Communist China's poli- cies, but domestic economic dif- ficulties are such as to over- shadow other factors in deter- mining the direction and magni- tude of its foreign trade. The agricultural failures of the past two years have led to un- precedented grain imports from the West and to a severe reduc- tion of China's export potential. The resultant cutback in im- ports of industrial goods and services, together with internal problems and the continued ab- sence of Soviet technicians, has forced a slowdown of industriali- zation. Although imports from both bloc and nonbloc sources have been cut to the minimum, Peiping is being forced to use its hold- ings of precious metals and for- eign exchange. The over-all level of imports this year de- pends primarily on the availa- bility of export products, but also on the possibilities for securing foreign credits. About two thirds of China's trade has been with bloc coun- tries in recent years, and the impact of current adjustments necessarily falls most heavily on the bloc. Trade negotiations with bloc countries have dragged on since early '1961,' and: agreements SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY still have not been reached with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. The crucial Sino-Soviet talks on economic and tech- nical cooperation have been in progress since February, first in Peiping and now in Moscow; there are recent indi- cations that they may be nearing completion. Agreements already concluded with the bloc seem to be largely in- terim arrangements devised to keep goods moving while both sides assess long-term posi- tions. The Sino-Soviet agreement to extend over five years the repayment of Peiping's short- term trade debt to the USSR removed a major obstacle to this year's trade, but'unless Moscow is also willing to grant new credits, the Chi- nese must depend even more than before on the country's uncertain harvests to fi- nance imports of industrial equipment. The bloc apparently has made some effort to accommodate to Chinese economic difficul- ties,, but, despite protesta- tions to the contrary, the relationship continues to be more businesslike than fra- ternal. In all probability Peiping will continue to rely on bloc trade as the mainstay of its foreign eco- nomic relations, but basic strains in the Sino-Soviet re- lationship probably will limit the role of Soviet aid. Outside the bloc, Chi- nese trade has dropped abrupt- ly from the high level main- tained during the first half of 1960, In response to its agricultural crisis, Pei- ping's purchasing in the West has centered on food grains, plus such essential commodi, ties as fertilizer and cot- ton. Current Chinese trade probes in Latin America and Japan are largely political- ly inspired, but they also reflect China's search for new markets and sources of badly needed foodstuffs and raw materials throughout the world. The Chinese are employing a variety of, means to cope, with the payments problem arising from their' purchases in the West.'Credit facili- ties granted by Hong Itong banks and Canadian and Aus- tralian grain suppliers have eased the task of paying for food purchases. In addition, the Chinese have sold increasing quantities of silver in West European mar- kets, and probably have sold gold as well. These efforts have been offset in part by the reduction in foreign currency earnings caused by a sharp drop in exports to Hong Kong and Ma- laya. SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 19 of 22 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP Khrushchev recently cited figures on the expected attend- ance at the 22nd party congress this October which corroborate earlier indications that party membership has increased from 8,708,000 in 1959 to an all- time high of about 9,500,000. The party is becoming somewhat more of a mass organization, despite Lenin's concept of the revolutionary party as a pro- fessional elite. Party member- ship has increased from 3.2 per- cent of the total population in 1959 to 4.4 percent--the highest ever. The marked increase in mem- bership, which began in 1956, is probably the result of Khru- shchev's style of leadership: his upgrading of the party as the major instrument of control and his cultivation of mass sup- port by drawing more people into active participation in the re- gime's programs. However, it would not be surprising if the congress stressed higher standards of admission in the new party rules and took steps to replace older cadres with candidate members of the party. Comparable peri- ods of rapid expansion in party membership in the past have been followed by a stricter admis- sions policy and often by a purge of members whose ideolog- ical, political, technical, or personal qualifications were deemed inadequate. Since 1958, Khrushchev has been stressing the need for young, technically trained cadres, and the increase in the number of nonvoting dele- gates expected at the 22nd con- gress indicates that the candi- date members number about two million--three' times the number at the time of congress in 1959. Following his revela- tions of incompetence and cor- ruption within the party at the January central committee plenum on agriculture, Khrushchev has spearheaded another drive to im- prove the quality of the coun- try's agricultural leadership. In a recent conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khru- shchev said the 22nd party con- gress would be attended by 4,000 voting and 1,000 nonvoting dele- gates as well as 1,000 visitors. The number of voting delegates expected is more than double that at any of the three pre- ceding congresses, and the number of nonvoting delegates has in- creased tenfold. Whereas pre- viously one voting delegate was elected for every 5,000 or 6,000 full party members, now he will represent 2,000 party members, with the same ratio of nonvot- ing delegates to candidate mem- bers. A new conference hall with a seating capacity of over 6,000 is scheduled to be com- pleted in time for the meeting. EXPANSION OF SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY PARTY MEMBERSHIP PARTY MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION 4---200 - - NO FIGURES 000- -300 ORTAINANtE wwn _0p 0000 8 June 61 SECRET Page 20 of. 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET The unprecedented size of this congress will ensure that it, like the expanded central committee plenums in recent years, will be more than ever a sounding board for proclamations by Khrushchev and his lieuten- ants, rather than the top policy- making body described in the party rules. By increasing the representation at the congress and the number of guests--who, as in the past, will include foreign Communist leaders-- Khrushchev may hope to spur flagging ideological fervor at the grass-roots level and mag- nify his own image as the ideo- logical arbiter of the Communist movement. In accord with this trend toward increased participation, the congress will probably enlarge the size of the new central committee which it is to elect. As a result of current shake-ups and earlier attrition, less than 50 per- cent of the central commit- tee members elected in 1956 are expected to retain their positions. SOVIET GOOD-WILL MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA A Soviet delegation is scheduled to visit a number of Latin American countries in late June or early July. Moscow began in late April to organize the mission and in- spired reports in the Western press that First Deputy premier Kosygin would head it. Sub- sequently, however, it was re- vealed that the mission would be headed by Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary Mikhail Georgadze, a minor official who has no standing in the top leadership. The eight-man mission, which will include trade, cul- tural, and scientific represent- atives, probably will visit Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador and possibly Mexico, Uruguay, and Cuba. They will concentrate on exploring the possibilities of increasing So- viet trade and cultural relations with these countries butwill also probably discuss prospects for establishing diplomatic rela- tions, particularly with Brazil and Ecuador. Khrushchev told the head of the Brazilian trade delega- tion in Moscow in early May that the USSR and Brazil should re- store diplomatic relations and that such a move would provide a strong stimulus to the expan- sion of trade. During an "un- official" trip to Ecuador and Venezuela last March, Soviet Ambassador to Mexico Bazykin sought to establish diplomatic relations with both countries; he told the press that the USSR considered that relations with Ecuador already existed, lacking only an exchange of am- bassadors. Since that time pro-US Ecuadorean Foreign Min- ister Chiriboga has resigned, and the USSR may feel that this clears the way for President Velasco to establish diplomatic ties. Moscow is apparently hav- ing more success in obtaining visas this time than in March; Bazykin managed to visit only two of the six countries of his original itinerary. As of late May, Colombia and apparently Venezuela had rejected the mis- sion; Brazil had accepted; Boliv- ia was apparently willing to accept reluctantly; and Ecu- ador was waiting to see what the others would do. Chile agreed to permit the entry of the mission but stipulated that it would not be received of ficially. Among the other Latin Am- erican nations, Cuba and pos- sibly Mexico, Uruguay, and Ar- gentina--the only Latin Ameri- can countries with resident So- viet diplomats--would be respon- sive to a Soviet request for visas. SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 21 of 22 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Western newsmen in Moscow told the American Embassy in early May that Mexico had already agreed and Uruguay was likely to accepts but there has been no confirmation of these re- ports. A high official of the Peruvian Foreign Ministry stated recently that his gov- ernment had not been approached by the Soviets but would reject the visit. The Soviet press has been paying increasing attention to Latin America and has been featuring material supporting the Soviet thesis that the Latin American populations are becoming increasingly impatient with "exploitation by US monopolists." Soviet propaganda has recently contended that there has been a surge of anti-US feeling in Latin America which proves the correctness of the assertion in last December's Moscow Dec- laration that "a front of ac- tive struggle against imperial- ism has opened in Latin America." SECRET 8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 22 of 22 25X1 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 While agriculture's future contribution to the economy will decline in relative terms, Taipei hopes that at least for several more years, increases in output will offset rising food consump- tion. Taiwan's population is growing at a rate of 3.5 percent per year--faster than that of any other Asian state except Singapore. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY TAIWAN'S PROSPECTS FOR A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY The Chinese Nationalist Government initiated a series of economic reforms during the past year to strengthen the nation's economic base. The reforms fulfill some of the provisions of the 19-point Accelerated Economic Growth Program adopted about a year and a half ago. While per- formance on the "19 Points" falls short in certain im- portant respects, actions taken to encourage investment and achieve self-sustaining economic growth within a decade are not likely to be reversed as long as they do not conflict with the defense effort. Economic growth over the past ten years has proceeded at a faster pace in Taiwan than in most underdeveloped countries. Progress has been made possible by American economic aid,averag- ing 10 percent of Taiwan's an- nual gross national product (GNP). Furthermore, extensive US military assistance has en- abled the Nationalists to modernize their 600,000-man armed forces. Agriculture A large share of the eco- nomic growth has occurred in agriculture, which accounts for about 30 percent of GNP, and in related processing industries. Since practically all arable land is cultivated, there is little room for expanding crop acreage. Agricultural produc- tion rose only 1.5 percent in each of the past two years. Future growth will require larger yields through greater irrigation and improved tech- niques, more productive seed strains, and more intensive application of fertilizers. Up to four crops a year can be grown on the same land if opti- mum practices are employed. SECRET Industrial production rose in 1960 to some 3.5 times the 1950 level. The industrial sector, including mining, manu- facturing, and electric power, now accounts for about 30 per- cent of GNP. Because of a paucity of natural resources other than coal, limestone, and water power, Taiwan's attractiveness to investors, like Hong Kong's, depends on its utilization of an abundant supply of cheap and capable local labor. Approxi- mately 25 percent of the labor COMPARISON OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT Average Annual (dollars per capita) Growth Rate 1951 1959 350 / r 210. r 108 TAIWAN 3.7% 91 C. i 66 74 INDIA 1.4% 55 Note: Dollar figures for Communist China were obtained by applying official exchange rates. If comparative price levels of the United States and Communist China were taken into account, per capita GNP in the latter in 1959 would be roughly $120. 6105268 8 June 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 5 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID, 1951-1959 (millions of dollars) official character, including IBRD loans but excluding equipment. Ford Foundation aid in- JAPAN 705 force is considered skilled, with wages lower than Hong Kong's and considerably' less than Japan's. In addition, there is a relatively large reservoir of technical and managerial skills. From 1953 to 1960, total income on Taiwan increased at an average rate of 6 to 8 per- cent per year, or about half that amount on a per capita basis. Gross investment rose to 21 percent of GNP in 1960, a high figure compared with the rest of non-Communist Asia. Taiwan's exports have made slower progress than national income, and the trade gap has actually widened since the early 1950s. Last year, exports of $162,000,000 paid for only 60 percent of imports; US aid ac- counted for the remaining $113,- 000,000. The less favorable trade picture obscures the significant gains last year in exports of in- dustrial goods. The value of textiles alone increased from $3,000,000 in 1959 to $21,000,- 000 in 1960. Exports as a whole failed to make greater headway because rice declined as a major export item. Unfavorable weather --a typhoon in late 1959 and a severe drought last year--was the most immediate cause, but population growth has become an important factor and will as- sume increasing importance in future years. Taiwan in 1960 became a rice-deficit rather than a rice-surplus area. Sugar will probably remain Taiwan's chief export for some time to come, but there must be wide-scale industrialization ac- companied by large increases of industrial exports if the Na- tionalists are to balance their trade, much less achieve a self- sustaining economic growth. Rapid population growth makes the problem particularly acute, since food will have to become a major import item. The greatest single obstacle to industrialization, apart from the military threat, is the gov- ernment's persistent budgetary deficit. It is estimated that the central government's over- all budget deficit this year will be $20,000,000, not a particularly large amount com- pared with other countries but large enough to retard the eco- nomic development program. The biggest problem is de- fense spending, which currently consumes about 13 percent of GNP and 50 percent of central and provincial government ex- penditures. In the "19 Points," the Chinese Nationalists pledged to keep defense spending at the fiscal 1959-60 level in real terms, but some observers ques- tion whether this limit has been maintained. In any case, future military actions such as occurred during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 would bring on a fresh round of in- flationary military spending. The willingness of invest- ors to put their money in produc- tion enterprises and the incen- tive for individual saving rest in large part on the govern- ment's willingness to maintain reasonably stable prices-- something the Chiang govern- ment has not done. In 1960 SECRET TAIWAN 855 INDIA 2,575 8 June 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Pave 6 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY the government did act to check soaring prices by tightening credit, but the ensuing squeeze on private businessmen resulted in stabilization at the cost of economic growth. Toward the end of 1960 and in the early months of 1961, there were signs of a lag in new investment which aroused fears of a slowdown in economic growth in 1961. Imports of capital goods tapered off and a large portion of US credits available for industrial development in 1960 went unutilized. Credit controls moreover would have lost much of their effective- ness, had not the United States allowed the proceeds of economic aid to accumulate in the banks instead of being spent. Most of the 19-percent rise in the cost of living last year resulted from the decline in rice production, due partly to the government's unrealistically low prices to the farmers. If the government had drawn on its ample foreign exchange reserves to import rice and other grains, there probably would have been no food shortages. Inasmuch as the authorities plan to stabi- lize the price of rice through increased imports in 1961, a selective relaxation of credit controls would serve to revive interest in new investment. Apart from budgetary prob- lems, the Chinese Nationalists have yet to deal seriously with problems of rapid population growth; of changing consumption habits to permit imports of cheaper grains in exchange for higher priced rice; of provid- ing more adequate banking fa- cilities; and of cutting red tape for investors. Most ob- servers feel that government enterprises, which account for about 40 percent of all indus- trial activity on Taiwan, should for the most part be turned over to provide investors who could put them on a more profit- able, basis. Progress A number of Nationalist leaders know what must be done and have cooperated enthusias- tically with American officials to provide a healthier invest- ment climate. Foremost among these is Premier Chen Cheng, who has worked hard to hold down military spending and em- phasize economic development, often over strong opposition. Chen recently hit hard at stodgy bureaucratic attitudes, declaring, "If there are more people who still believe in the saying 'the more I do, the more mistakes I make; the less I do, the less mistakes I make; and if I do nothing, I make no mis- takes,' then I want to state emphatically that unless we change our concepts radically, we cannot even maintain our present economic status. We might as well forget about ac- celerated economic growth." Chen failed last year to prevent the Legislative Yuan CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT RATES AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 1951 -1959 COMMUNIST TAIWAN CHINA Aggregate of consumption and investment exceeded 100 percent where there was a net inflow of resources. Con- sumption and investment rates were fairly stable over the period except in Communist China, where annual con- sumption declined from 90% in 1951 to 68% in 1959 and investment rates rose from 11% in 1951 to 31% in 1959. SECRET 25X1 B JUNE 1961 8 June 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 7 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY from approving what he consid- ered an excessively high pay increase for civil servants, but he recently denied the cus- tomary one-month bonus at the lunar New Year. Other leaders who recog- nize the need for a bold at- tack on Taiwan's economic prob- lems are Minister of Finance C. K. Yen; K. Y. Yin, vice chairman of the Council for US Aid, chairman of the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Com- mission, and chairman of the board of the Bank of Taiwan; and K. T. Li, secretary general of the Council of US Aid and head of the Industrial develop- ment and Investment Committee. This committee already has achieved many things: (1) re- vision of the Investment Law in 1959 and enactment of the Investment Incentive Act in 1960, which among other things provides for tax holidays for new productive enterprises, reduction of corporate income taxes from 33 percent to 18 percent, and reduction of per- sonal income taxes to a maximum of 40 percent; (2) simplifica- tion of entry and exit proce- dures and post-entry security checks; (3) passage of regula- tions permitting the orderly discharge of surplus employees; (4) simplification of quisition procedures for plant sites; and (5) steamlining of licensing and administrative procedures. Outlook So far, investor response has been discouraging; the only significant investment since the inception of the program has been by an American firm for the manufacture of antibiotics. Another American firm recently decided to produce pharmaceuti- cals on Taiwan, however, and PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF SELECTED ITEMS IN 1959 INDIA TAIWAN COMMUNIST CHINA JAPAN UNITED STATES Crude Steel 12 33 44 396 1,062 ,(Ibs.) Coal 245 73 1,135 1,126 4,790 (lbs.) Crude Oil .08 Neg .42 .03 15 (barrels) Electric Power 42 296 61 1,030 4,800 (KWH) Cement 36 218 40 411 757 (Ibs.) Paper, machine- 1.5 18 5.6 52 169 made (Ibs. ) Chemical .6 11 1.3 31 89 Fertilizers - (lbs.) Cotton Cloth 16 16 12 33 54 (linear yards) Grain, incl. 463 549 621 524 2,317 tubers (Ibs. ) Note: The relatively favorable figure for Communist China in the last category is offset by the fact that grains and tubers account for a much larger part of the people's d+ut than in the other countries. Moreover, there were probably large net exports. many inquiries are being re- ceived from abroad. Self-sustaining growth with- .in a decade is not an impossi- bility for Taiwan, even at the present level of defense ex- penditures. In practice, per- formance is likely to fall be- low this mark. The process of obtaining large-scale investment will be a lengthy one, in view of the military situation and the government's past failures. The key to success is prob- ably Chiang's attitude toward fiscal responsibility. While he embraces the idea of economic development, he does not follow fiscal problems closely, nor has he always backed his premier in holding down expenditures. More important than balancing the budget, in Chiang's mind, is returning to the mainland and looking after his troops, includ- ing thousands of ineffective soldiers. SECRET 8 June 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 8 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET Despite a relatively late start, the surface forces of the Soviet Navy have made consider- able progress in missile devel- opment, particularly with sur- face-to-surface weapons. Ap- parently presaging the develop- ment of missile ships, Soviet naval doctrine underwent broad changes in 1955 which were soon reflected in official and semi- official pronouncements on the role of naval ships and in a re- direction of naval construction programs. The Soviet press in 1956 began. giving considerable publicity to the role of mis- siles in naval warfare, and the first Soviet guided-missile ship was commissioned in 1958. Destroyers destroyers, designated the Krupnyy class. The first of these were completed at the Black Sea port of Nikolaev in 1958. Six are probably oper- ational: two in the Northern Sea Fleet, three in the Baltic, and one in the Pacific. Two-- possibly four--are under con- struction. This destroyer is 454 feet long and displaces 4,130 tons. It has two Kildin-type launch- ers, one forward and one aft, and is believed to carry 18 short-range missiles of the sur- face-to-surface cruise type. The Krupnyy, generally a ship of advanced design, is the first destroyer in any navy with a main battery consisting solely of missiles. This first missile ship, a Kildin-class destroyer, was built in the Black Sea. Four such ships are believed operational: two in the Black Sea, one in the Baltic, and one in the Pacific. This class has the hull of a Kotlin-class destroyer and other similar characteristics: a length of 415 feet, a maximum speed of about 38 knots, and an endurance of about 5,500 miles at 18 knots. It differs from the Kotlin mainly in having a single large launcher mounted on the stern, a missile-handling deckhouse just forward of the launchers, and missile- associated electronic equip- ment. It is estimated to carry eight surface-to-surface cruise- type guided missiles with maximum effective ranges of about 110 miles. Concurrent with construc- tion of the Kildin-class de- stroyer, Soviet engineers and shipbuilders designed and started construction on larger KILDIN-'25X1 GUIDED-M..,uif DESTROYER SECRET 8 June 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 9 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 The Krupnyy may be succeed- ed by yet another class of mis- sile-equipped destroyer. A new class of ships, designated Kynda, is under construction at the Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad. Two units observed have charac- teristics of a destroyer, but may be larger than the Krupnyy. Soviet destroyers equipped with guided missiles differ from those of the West in that they are designed to provide a sur- face-to-surface missile-attack capability rather than serve as antiaircraft screening units. Their primary mission probably is to oppose carrier strike forces, but their relatively weak shipboard antiaircraft de- fense suggests that most such Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY and Komar-class motor patrol KOMAR-CLASS boats, were first sighted in MISSILE-CARRYING Leningrad in 1959. Units of MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT the larger, ( PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ) the Osa, have four large, above-deck, missile- carrying structures, all of them probably launchers. Osa-class boats displace about 200 tons, are about 140 feet long, and have a maximum speed of about 32 knots. Komar-class units, a later development, are "P-6" torpedo boats with torpedo tubes removed and two launchers added. They displace about 60 tons, are 83 feet long, and have a top speed of about 45 knots. At least 20 guided-missile motorboats are deployed in the close to the mainland, where they could be supported by land-based aviation. Secondary missions may include shore bombardment, sup- port for ground forces, and deep support for amphibious landings. operations would be conducted Baltic, with others probably in the Black Sea and Pacific fleets. Little is known about the missile systems used on these boats. Cruisers Despite speculation that operational cruisers of the So- viet fleet are being or soon will be equipped with missile systems, there is little evidence of this. The one exception is a Black Sea cruiser which report- edly has a missile-launching installation, possibly for test purposes. If the USSR adds other missile cruisers to its navy, it is more likely to convert existing cruisers than to build new ones. Cruiser construction was halted in 1956, and at least four partially completed Sverd- lov cruiser hulls were scrapped in 1960. Motorboats Two unusual, small, mis- sile-carrying units, the Osa- The USSR currently has a number of types of sea=borne sur- face-to-surface missiles and may have one surface-to-air type in development; most, if not all, of these missiles are radar guided. The known surface-to- surface missiles are cruise types and appear to have been developed specifically for naval use. There is no evidence that ballistic types are carried on any naval surface unit, although adaptations of some ground-force weapons could probably be in- stalled easily. Cruise-type missiles are primarily intended for use against mobile targets, although they could also be used for short bombard- ment. The range of destroyer- launched missiles frequently can be extended beyond the radar horizon of the destroyer 25X1 --about 30 miles--through the use of airplane or helicop- ter radar tracking. SECRET 8 June 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 10 of 10 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0 c Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03200070001-0