CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003200080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 75
OCR NO.0284/61
15 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
F11 DECLASSIHED 25X1
CLASS. C{~;",NOED TO: TS S
NE} + REVIEVW D.':TE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DA T E:['O/3/g0
CONFIDENTIAL
DIA, State Department review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
LAOS
The talks among Boun Oum,
Souvanna Phouma, and Souphannou-
vong are scheduled to take place
in Zurich, probably this week
end. General Phoumi, who flew
to Europe last week to join
Boun Oum in the discussions and
to confer with Prince Sihanouk,
has stated that his aim will be
to secure a firm cease-fire and
agreement on a declaration of
neutrality and on the formation
of a coalition government. He
intends to insist that constitu-
tional procedures be followed
and believes that Souvanna, at
least, may try to reach a set-
tlement.
Phoumi says that he will
propose that the six Laotian
political parties, including the
Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and his
own followers, be,represented
in the government. He reported-
ly would be willing to give the
ministries of foreign affairs
and information to the NLHS or
to Souvanna's followers, but
will insist that he himself keep
the Ministry of National Secu-
rity and that a trusted associate
be given the Interior portfolio.
As Phoumi is undoubtedly
aware that his retention of the
security post would be rejected
by Souvanna and aouphantnouvong,
this demand may r~ptOsent a bar-
gaining position to keep these
strategic posts out of Pathet
Lao hands or a willingness to
let the talks fail by setting
unacceptable terms.
Talks at Namone
After several days of post-
ponement by the government side
on the ground of bad weather,
the political talks at Namone
were resumed on 14 June but were
immediately' bogged down over
NLHS demands that the Interna-
tional Control Commission (ICC)
no longer be allowed to attend
the sessions. This wrangling
appears to be a Pathet Lao tactic
to counter the proposal made to
the military subcommittee by
the Indian ICC representative
that it inspect the effective-
ness of the cease-fire at sites
to be designated by the opposing
sides.
The Pathet Lao position
has been that the ICC may in-
vestigate reports of clashes only
at the forward points of contact
between government and Kong Le -
Pathet Lao forces. This would
restrict ICC control to the area
of Route 13 north of Vietiane
and prevent cease-fire control
of actions against the govern-
ment's Meo units in Xieng Khouang
Province or government-held po-
sitions to the south.
The Military Situation
The situation in the Pa
song area has remained generally
quiet since the base fell on 6
June. Enemy troops apparently
are consolidating their posi-
tions and collecting intelligence
on the location of the Meo units
which withdrew from the area.
Government troops on 14 June
abandoned two posts halfway be-
tween Tha Thom and Pak Sane to
the south, after being subjected
to mortar fire. This area had
been the scene of occa-
sional guerrilla harass-
ment by Pathet Lao - Kong
Le forces since the 3 May
cease-fire.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
uong Houn'
ua raba
V ng.V-ee
1 amor
Dien Bien
Phu
Nam Bac
Sam eu
TH(AILAN[
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pr-l-
hanh Hoa
CAMBODIA
TONVKIN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Northeast of Luang Prabang,
government forces have been
carrying out operations against
enemy troops in the area who,
according to the regional gov-
ernment commander, had been in-
filtrating and regrouping to
gain a more favorable position
for a possible offensive.
Laotian Army sources have
also reported that the enemy
is establishing a redoubt for
materiel and troops about ten
miles north of the Plaine des
Jarres. An airfield capable
of handling twin-engined air-
craft is said to be under con-
struction there. Another such
redoubt is being established
in Sam Neua Province, about 15
miles east of Sam Neua town;
this one would be equipped with
barracks and an airfield.
Coup Rumors
In the absence of General
Phoumi and most other top gov-
ernment leaders from Vientiane,
rumors of possible coup attempts
have become current.
~ There are probably
numerous military officers in
Vientiane who dislike Phoumi
and may feel that a change in
government would somehow bring
an early end to the military
and political conflict in Laos.
The Geneva Conference
The Thai delegation to
the Geneva conference, which
walked out of the 12 June ses-
sion, apparently plans to boy-
cott conference proceedings un-
til it obtains some satisfaction
on the seating of the Laotian
government delegates or unless
instructed otherwise by Bangkok.
The delegation's position is a
measure of Thailand's dissatis-
faction and frustration over the
Geneva proceedings and the ev-
olution of the Laotian situation.
The Thais have questioned
the wisdom of holding the con-
ference at all rather than tak-
ing more forceful SEATO action,
and they are concerned over
what they believe to be French
and British willingness to al-
low Laos to slip into Communist
hands as well as over the move-
ment toward a coalition govern-
ment in Laos. Underlying these
considerations, in the view of
the American Embassy in Bangkok,
is Thai uncertainty as to ulti-
mate American intentions in con-
nection with Laos.
Bloc representatives at
Geneva still insist that there
has been no significant or un-
justifiable breach of the cease-
fire. They have continued to
press the position that the
ICC's authority to investigate
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any reported cease-fire viola-
tions rests solely on a unanimous
decision of the Laotian factions
negotiating at Namone.
The Communist aim is to
preclude any further discussion
on extension of the ICC's terms
of reference in Laos and thus
to reduce Western prospects for
achieving satisfactory control
measures in any political settle-
ment worked out at the confer-
ence. The Communists want no
restrictions which would inhibit
future activities of the Pathet
Lao,
On the cease-fire issue,
the Chinese have defended the
seizure of Pa Dong as having re-
moved a "powder keg" which might
have set off "over-all war,"
adding there was good reason to
believe the incident would prove
to be a positive step toward a
stable cease-fire. The Chinese
charged that the US had hoped,
by air-dropp.ng troops into Pa
Dong and other spots, to create
"disputed areas" calling for a
visit of the ICC. To draw at-
tention away from the Pa Dong
incident, Communist China and
North Vietnam have broadcast
Pathet Lao accounts of alleged
cease-fire violations by govern-
ment forces.
At the resumed Geneva con-
ference session on 12 June, Chi-
nese Communist Foreign Minister
Chen Yi rejected the Western-
backed French proposal for an
ICC with sweeping investigative
powers, saying his delegation
would never be a party to the
imposition of an "international
condominium" on Laos. Gromyko
in his 13 June speech charged
that the Western proposal would
make the ICC into a "superstate"
within Laos.
The Chinese maintain that
the Soviet proposals offer the
only basis for discussion, al-
though Chen Yi said that Peiping's
support for the Soviet proposals
did not rule out its acceptance
of "reasonable adjustments" of
them.
While bloc representa-
tives have insisted that ICC
operations must be conditional
on a decision reached by
the Laotian factions themselves,
they have taken pains in con-
versations with Western diplo-
mats to indicate their will-
ingness to discuss substan-
tive proposals for Laotian
neutrality. Pushkin, in an
8 June conversation with UK
and French delegates, attacked
the French draft ICC protocol
as an "occupation statute".
but did not reject the French
delegate's suggestion that
French and Soviet experts com-
pare respective texts.
Gromyko on 13 June called
upon the US delegation to
"translate into the language of
concrete agreements" the results
of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meet-
ing and reminded the conference
that the USSR had tabled its
proposals the day after the con-
ference opened.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BLOC COMMENT ON EAST-WEST
Moscow has continued to
stress the necessity of further
steps by the US and the Soviet
Union to take advantage of
the "inspiration" provided by
the meeting in Vienna between
the President and Khrushchev.
In the first high-level Soviet
comment on the talks since the
meeting ended, Soviet President
Brezhnev stated on 10 June at
a reception for Indonesian Pres-
ident Sukarno that the Vienna
meeting proved to be a great
event and a "first useful con-
tact" which should be followed
by further measures to relax
tension and reach agreed solu-
tions of international problems.
He pledged that the Soviet
Union would do everything to
justify the hopes aroused by
the talks in Vienna.
This theme has also been
echoed in Soviet press comment.
An Izvestia editorial asserted
that the Vienna meeting "should
only be a starting point for
new contacts, for fruitful dis-
cussion on outstanding inter-
national problems." It added
that the main task was, to "get
down to settling the difficult
but important problems" raised
in Vienna.
The USSR has now provided
its citizens with a fairly com-
plete picture of the proceedings
at Vienna by publishing the full
text of President Kennedy's re-
port to the nation and the com-
plete texts of the Soviet aide-
memoire on nuclear testing and
on Berlin and Germany, Thus
far there has been no editorial
comment in Pravda or Izvestia on
the Presider 's address. e
Soviet weekly Life Abroad, how-
ever, carried the text of the
speech and commented that while
the President repeated the
language of the communique about
the usefulness of the meeting,
he made some "incorrect inter-
pretations" and painted the
international situation in the
"darkest colors," as though
peaceful cooperation between
different systems were impos-
sible.
While Soviet propaganda
continues to emphasize that the
talks are being widely welcomed
by international opinion, some
Soviet commentaries charge that
the American press has begun a
campaign against further nego-
tiations with the USSR On the
other hand, TASS reported on
13 June- that "official circles
in Washington" regard four-power
talks on the Soviet proposals
on Germany as "inevitable," and
Moscow published a long summary
of Walter Lippmann's article
on the Vienna meeting under the
headline, "Discussions Are
Necessary."
The idea that the US and
the USSR should make an imme-
diate start on further nego-
tiations was carried forward in
an interview given by East Ger-
man-party leader Walter Ulbricht.
He told Western journalists on
13 June that the "good beginning"
in Vienna should be followed by
a foreign ministers' conference
as well as negotiations between
East and West Germany, Reiter-
ating the Soviet aide-memoire's
language on Berlin and a German
peace treaty, Ulbricht stressed
that a conference should be ar-
ranged "without delay" and that
the proposals in the Soviet
memorandum could "no longer be
ignored or shelved."
On 14 June the East German
party central committee and
government issued a declaration
endorsing the Soviet aide-mem-
oire and calling for immediate
preparation of a peace confer-
ence and negotiations on the
German and Berlin problems.
Even prior to the Vienna meeting
the bloc had indicated its re-
ceptivity to a foreign ministers'
meeting on Berlin and had sought
to stimulate a US proposal for
such a conference.
Moscow has sought to step
up pressure on the West while
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the US prepares a reply to the
Soviet aide-memoire. At Geneva,
Foreign Minister Gromyko out-
lined to British Foreign Secre-
tary Lord Home the Soviet posi-
tion as set forth in the aide-
memoire. He stressed that
Khrushchev intended to sign a
separate peace treaty with East
Germany this autumn if no agree-
ment were reached with the West
and specified that by "autumn"
he meant "October." Although
Khrushchev has avoided setting
such a precise date and has
denied privately that the bloc
had a definite timetable, his
position has been that the USSR
would wait until after the So-
viet party congress, which opens
in mid-October.
On 8 June the Soviet For-
eign Ministry made oral pro-
tests to the three Western pow-
ers and Bonn over the alleged
"provocative" activities of
the Federal Republic in West
Berlin, and in particular
Bonn's plan, now discarded, to
convene a Bundesrat meeting in
Berlin on 16 June. In its aide-
memoire, Moscow had stated that
Berlin is ,now a place where
Bonn's revenge-seeking elements
are constantly maintaining ex-
treme tension and staging all
kinds of provocations," The
Soviet protests, therefore, were
probably intended to document
this case and highlight the ur-
gency of a settlement rather
than to force a showdown on the
pretext of a Bundesrat meeting.
Unlike Khrushchev's statement
last July that the bloc might
sign a separate treaty if the
Bundestag met in Berlin, the
recent notes made no specific
threat of countermeasures.
The Soviet notes were fol-
lowed by an East German Foreign
Ministry statement repeating
the charges against Bonn and
concluding that Bonn's provoca-
tion "underlined the necessity
for concluding a peace treaty
and normalizing the situation
in West Berlin."
Despite the Soviet campaign,
Bonn has announced that Chancel-
lor Adenauer will go to West
Berlin in early July for an in-
formal two-day visit--his first
to the city since January 1960.
This probably is intended to an-
swer West German Socialist cam-
paign accusations that he lacks
sympathy for Berlin.
NUCLEAR TEST TALKS
Soviet delegate Tsarapkin
at the Geneva test talks has
dropped all pretense of serious
interest in concluding an agree-
ment and is seeking to induce
the US and Britain to take the
initiative in terminating the
negotiations. He charged on
12 June that the West now is
interested only in ending the
talks and placing the blame on
the USSR.
At the same session Tsa-
rapkin formally introduced the
Soviet aide-memoire of 4 June
on nuclear testing which was
handed to the US at the con-
clusion of the President's
talks with Khrushchev in Vienna.
This memorandum proposed that,
in view of the failure to reach
an agreement on a test ban, the
powers take up the "cardinal
question" of general and complete
disarmament and settle the dis-
armament and nuclear test prob-
lems interdependently.
The Soviet memorandum stated
that the USSR would agree to
sign a general disarmament treaty
including Western proposals on
the cessation of nuclear test-
ing and implied that a test ban
could be part of the first stage
of such a treaty. Tsarapkin
contended that these proposals
demonstrated the USSR's flexi-
bility and "constructive approach"
and denied any intention of is-
suing an ultimatum. He stressed,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
however, that the West has the
choice of either signing a
test ban treaty on Soviet terms
or merging these talks with
negotiations on general disarma-
ment..
atomic weapons as well as their
tests and production," but, in
contrast to the statement is-
sued by the 1957 conference of
communist chiefs, it failed to
endorse a test ban alone.
The Soviet proposal is
clearly aimed at prolonging the
present uncontrolled moratorium
on testing. Moscow probably
also calculates that the opening
of bilateral Soviet-US disarma-
ment talks on 19 June and the
international conference on
general disarmament scheduled to
begin on 31 July in Geneva will
act as a brake on any US move
to resume nuclear weapons tests
this summer.
The Soviet move to termi-
nate separate negotiations on
the nuclear test issue by sub-
merging them in the complex
subject of general disarmament
probably springs from two main
considerations. Now that Khru-
shchev has restored top-level
contact with the US by his meet-
ing with the President, which he
believes will open the way for
negotiations on the key politi-
cal issues of Berlin and Ger-
many, he has no further inter-
est in keeping the test talks
alive as a means of promoting
an accommodation with Washing-
ton.
Another and probably more
important motivating factor is
Communist China's long-standing
opposition to a test ban with-
out the complete destruction
of all existing nuclear weapon
stockpiles--a condition which
Peiping insists on in order to
preclude a test ban agreement.
This issue seems to have played
a major role in the long and
bitter Sino-Soviet dispute last
year, and a commitment by Khru-
shchev to downgrade and eventu-
ally withdraw from separate
talks on nuclear testing may have
been an important element in
the behind-the-scenes compro-
mise worked out at the Moscow
meeting of Communist leaders
last November. The Moscow
Declaration called for "banning
...:Moscow's reduced'interest
in a test cessation treaty
was evident in the months fol-
lowing the Moscow conference,
Two weeks before the latest
round of talks opened at Geneva
last March, Khrushchev, in a
talk with Ambassador Thompson
at Novosibirsk, adopted a pes-
simistic: attitude toward the
possibility of an agreement and
minimized the importance of the
issue. Furthermore, Khrushchev
for the first time singled out
French tests as an obstacle to
agreement. When the talks re-
sumed, the Soviet delegation
followed. up Khrushchev's re-
marks and charged that French
testing was a serious impedi-
ment to agreement. In addi-
tion, the Soviets withdrew their
previous consent to a single
administrator and proposed to
substitute a three-member ad-
ministrative council with a
built-in Soviet veto.
After the Western powers
tabled a number of important
revisions in their position in
order to meet previous Soviet
objections, the Soviet delegate
refused to negotiate on the
details of implementation,
insisting on the standard gam-
bit of recording "agreement in
principle," despite important
unresolved points. Privately,
the Soviets took pains to em-
phasize that Moscow did not
intend to break off the talks,
and the French test in late
April passed with only routine
Soviet criticism.
Tsarapkin made no effort
to respond to the new Western
concessions on the main issues
before the conference, or to
offer serious counterproposals.
Instead, he virtually ignored
the Western position and began
to reiterate at great length
the new Soviet position. On
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 May the Soviets reverted to
the question of French testing,
warning in an official govern-
ment statement that further
testing would make a treaty
"impossible" and might compel
the USSR to resume its own
weapons-tests. In preparation
for the meeting between the
President and Khrushchev, Tsa-
rapkin delivered an 80-minute
review of the conference, which
suggested that the USSR was
prepared to maintain its posi-
tion during the Vienna talks.
The USSR's unyielding at-
titude was confirmed by Khru-
shchev's statements during the
Vienna talks and in the aide-
memoire to the US. The memo-
randum suggested three "funda-
mental issues" the USSR would
insist that the West accept.
On the question of a tempo-
rary moratorium on small under-
ground tests, the memorandum
reaffirmed that the Soviet
Government "is firmly convinced"
that at the expiration of the
moratorium, the three powers
should not automatically be
released from their commitment
to cease underground testing.
This argument is consistent
with the long-standing Soviet
insistence that any treaty must
ban "weapons tests of all kinds,
everywhere and for all time."
Its current position would have
the effect of extending the
ban on underground tests indefi-
nitely, regardless of whether
detection techniques could be
sufficiently improved during
the moratorium so as to con-
trol such tests effectively.
The memorandum also de-
scribed again the Soviet propos-
als for three inspections in
the USSR as "adequate guaran-
tees" against violations and
called for the US to adopt a
"realistic approach" to the
issue. Since the Soviets intro-
duced the quota of three inspec-
tions in July 1960, various
officials have hinted that the
specific number would be sub-
ject to bargaining. However,
when the US introduced a new
formula for calculating the
number of inspections which
could have the effect of scal-
ing down the number for the
USSR to a range of 12-20, the
Soviet delegation promptly re-
jected it as "unrealistic" and
called for a renunciation of
the "technical approach" to
inspections. He stated that
the crux of the matter was the
difference of approach and that
unless the Western delegations
were willing to solve this
phase of the problem on the
basis of a political compromise,
no agreement was in sight.
A major portion of the
Soviet aide-memoire was devoted
to the so-called "troika" pro-
posal for a three-member ad-
ministrative council. In the
same vein as Khrushch -'s re-
marks in 25X1
April, a memorandum declared
that "while there are neutral
states, there are not nor can
there be neutral men." The
memorandum replied to the West-
ern objection to a veto by
claiming that if the Soviet
inspection quota proposal is
agreed on, inspections will
proceed "without any voting."
On other questions on which
the executive will have to
make decisions, however, the
memorandum stated that the
tripartite proposals will pre-
vent "arbitrariness" in such
cases.
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko frankly admitted in a
conversation with Secretary
Rusk in Vienna on 3 June that
the USSR is seeking a veto.
He said if there were no veto
aspects to the Soviet proposal,
it would make no sense. He
asserted that one-third repre-
sentation was the USSR's
"natural right," and that
while he did not describe it as
a demand, the USSR was very
firm on this point.
by OSI)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONGO
Negotiations among the
three major Congolese factions
over the reopening of parlia-
ment appear to be progressing.
Three emissaries from Stanley-
ville arrived in Leopoldville
on 12 June to discuss conditions
for the meeting, and Gizenga
has retreated from his earlier
insistence on Kaminaas the
site.
Gizenga's'conciliatory pos-
ture probably stems from doubts
concerning the long-term pros-
Kongolo
Nvunzu
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pects for his regime. American
officials recently in Stanley-
ville report that the rift be-
tween Gizenga's "central govern-
ment" and the provincial regime
has not been healed; Gizenga's
group has come increasingly
under the domination of Interior
Minister Gbenye, a frequently
irrational racist whose arbi-
trary actions have alienated
many other officials. Stanley-
ville is still having diffi-
culty getting the currency to
pay its troops, who are becoming
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increasingly restless. The
economy of the province is slow-
ing down, a third of the indus-
try reportedly is at a stand-
still, and hoarding of cash is
widespread.
Gizenga?s position in Kivu
Province apparently has weak-
ened. The assembly in Bukavu
has forced Adrien Omari, Gizen-
ga's hand-picked provincial
president, to remove most of
the extremist members of his
cabinet. The main factor in
the shift seems to have been
the success of the local UN
officials in neutralizing the
extremists, who were members of
a minority tribe and had relied
on police and army units to
stay in power. Gizenga has
sent a series of missions to Ki-
vu with the apparent intent of
buttressing his representatives
and reducing tribal friction,
but tension is high and the out-
come of the dispute is still
in doubt.
Despite the weakness of
his position, Gizenga apparently
hopes to try to drive a hard
bargain in the political nego-
tiations. He told his spokes-
man at the UN that the Stanley-
ville group should have parity
with the Kasavubu regime in the
cabinet and indicated that he
would be receptive to a vice
premiership.
Negotiations in Milan be-
tween Leopoldville and Elisa-
bethville representatives appar-
ently have resulted in agree-
ment on the desirability of an
early meeting of parliament,
provided that the UN guarantees
the security of all delegates.
Both Congolese and UN officials
reportedly are optimistic con-
cerning the possibilities for
a rapprochement. However,
Tshombe?s lieutenants have de-
manded that the Katanga presi-
dent be released before parlia-
ment meets, a condition Kasa-
vubu's representatives have so
far refused. Moreover, the
question of Katanga's financial
contribution to a federated
Congo state has not been de-
cided.
The announcement on 12 Jilne
of a $10,000,000 UN loan to the
Congo coincides with indications
of increasing economic unrest
in Leopoldville. The agreement
between the Kasavubu regime and
the UN stipulates that the Con-
golese must take measures to
put their economy on a sounder
footing; however, it is question-
able whether the government can
resist demands from government
employees and workers in pri-
vate industry for wage increases.
The presence of 50,000 un-
employed in the Leopoldville
area will reduce pressure for
pay boosts, but wildcat strikes
along the lines of those which
began on 12 June are likely to
occur with increasing frequency. 25X1
Leaders of the major Leopold-
ville union reportedly are going
ahead with plans to strike on
15 July unless their demands are
met.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM
FRANCE-ALGERIA
France's insistence on ad-
journing the Evian talks is
probably aimed mainly at getting
the provisional Algerian govern-
ment (PAG) down to serious bar-
gaining. There seems to have
been no narrowing of differences
and no substantive negotiations
in three weeks of meetings. The
adjournment has probably reduced
the immediate threat of moves by
die-hard proponents of a "French
Algeria," plotting to block a
settlement. Increased disquiet
among the Moslems in Algeria,
however, is indicated by a riot
involving a thousand Moslems in
an Algiers suburb on 14 June.
Louis Joxe, chief French
negotiator, described the ad-
journment as necessary "to al-
low time for reflection." The
two sides, he stated, were only
"marking time, clashing over
the same principles, continuing
sterile arguments which risked
souring the chances for agree-
ment." He said the two sides
were opposed on all essential
problems.
Joxe said Paris was deter-
mined to obtain workable guar-
antees for the French settler
community; he defended the
French position that the Sahara
was a separate question and of
concern to all Algeria's neigh-
bors, and rejected PAG claims
to represent all Algerians. Al-
geria's future, he stated, would
be determined by "all the Al-
gerian people." He added that
French efforts at a truce had
been clearly rebuffed and ter-
rorism and ambushes had in-
creased. Nevertheless, France
announced on 15 June that it
had extended the unilateral
cease-fire which has limited
French military activity in
Algeria since 20 May.
Chief PAG negotiator Bel-
kacem Krim, while averring that
he would not say anything to in-
terfere with a resumption of
negotiations, nevertheless con-
firmed in his review of the is-
sues the wide gap between the
two sides. Most of the PAG
team will return to Tunis to
await a French move, leaving
some members in Geneva to main-
tain contact. In Tunis, PAG
premier Ferbat Abbas has re-
leased a Khrushchev note--re-
ceived on the occasion of the
Moslem New Year (14 June)--ex-
pressing Soviet support for the
"just cause" of the Algerian
people.
Mohammed Boussouf, PAG
minister of armaments and a
"hard-liner," said in early June
that the talks were not going
well, charging that the French
"had laid ambushes at every cor-
ner." He stated that French
proposals for guarantees for the
French settlers would permit
interference in Algerian inter-
nal affairs. It was "impossi-
ble," he said, for the PAG to
abandon its claim to the Sahara,
adding that French retention of
military bases in Algeria "was
out of the question."
The impasse at Evian has
cheered the despondent anti -
De Gaulle elements in Algeria,
and the adjournment may dampen
rash efforts to prevent a set-
tlement. Prior to the adjourn-
ment, however, observers there
had warned of "widespread des-
peration" among the settlers and
of continued plotting by the
clandestine Secret Army Organ-
ization, led by the fugitive
insurgent generals, Salan and
Jouhaud. The plotters appar-
ently aim to provoke clashes
between Europeans and Moslems
to force the army to inter-
vene and restore order, pre-
cipitating another crisis be-
tween Paris and Algiers. De-
spite the quick collapse of
the April mutiny, the malaise
in the army is deep, and op-
position to De Gaulle's Al-
gerian policy has not abated.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
General Ramfis Trujillo,
head of the joint chiefs of
staff of the Dominican armed
forces, remains the dominant
figure in the regime. The Ameri-
can consul believes Ramfis may
be able to maintain control of
the armed forces for some time,
despite his great unpopularity
with many senior officers during
his father's lifetime.
Ramfis benefits from the
habit of mutual distrust purpose-
fully engendered among the offi-
cers by his father, by his con-
trol over promotions and finan-
cial favors, and by the still-
prevalent feeling that noncon-
formity leads to extermination.
The arrest of several high-rank-
ing officers for alleged com-
plicity in the dictator's assas-
sination and the probable deten-
tion of other officers considered
trustworthy by Ramfis may
have precluded for some time any
chance of a successful military
effort against Ramfis.
Major General Jose Rene
Roman has been jailed and re-
placed as secretary of state for
the armed forces by Maj. Gen.
Santos Melido Marte, who is de--
scribed by the American Consulate
as a poorly educated, strong-arm
thug, trusted by the Trujillo
family. The incumbent of this
office is constitutionally first
in line of succession to the
presidency when--as at present--
the vice presidency is vacant.
The American consul doubts
that Ramfis, even allowing for
an element of self-deception,
can seriously believe that he
and his family could survive a
significant dismantling of the
police state apparatus and at-
mosphere. Most politically
aware Dominicans would consider
it foolhardy to avail themselves
of any political liberties unless
concretely guaranteed against
subsequent Trujillo-type reprisals.
The regime can probably afford to
relax dictatorial controls tem-
porarily, since fear of the
Trujillo family, ingrained in the
population for a generation, is
itself an effective instrument of
control.
The late 25X1
dictator on occasion permitted
Communists and extremists to oper-
ate in order to "prove" that
political freedom existed. He
used the same device to show that
there was a danger of a Communist
takeover and, after making his
point with the foreign public,
either murdered, imprisoned, or
re-exiled his opponents. Ramfis
may be preparing to employ a
similar tactic in order to justi-
fy the strong police measures he
will eventually have to use to
remain in power.
The regime is clearly aware
of the importance to its survival
of regaining the status of a mem-
ber in good standing in the inter-
American community and of remov-
ing the diplomatic and economic
sanctions imposed by the OAS last
August and January . The concesions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
it has thus far made to inter-
national pressures, however,
have not seriously affected its
power to exercise dictatorial
control. They have, however,
impressed some foreign observers.
John Abbes, the symbol of
past police brutalities, and
some of those most prominently
associated with the anti-US,
anti - Catholic Church, and pro-
Castro line disseminated by Ra-
dio Caribe for the past year
have been given foreign assign-
ments, and some have already left
the country. So far, the OAS
subcommittee and foreign news-
men, who have been granted free
access to all parts of the coun-
try, have been unable to detect
violations of human rights com-
parable to those that took place
under the late dictator. How-
ever, a "great number" of politi-
cal prisoners are said to have
been transferred to four out-
lying towns so that they would
not be detected by the OAS group.
The special OAS subcommittee
arrived in the Dominican Repub-
lic on 7 June to investigate
whether conditions there and the
character and policies of the
government point to the expan-
sion, maintenance, or termina-
tion of the OAS sanctions. j.'ith-
in only a few days the Latin
American members of the subcom-
mittee--special ambassadors of
Panama, Colombia, and Uruguay--
were already anxious to leave
and decided to depart on 15 June
despite their inability to secure
written assurances from the
Dominican government that the
subcommittee would be free to
return at any time. All appeared
persuaded of the good inten-
tions of the Dominican Govern-
ment and willing to rely on the
Dominican foreign minister's
oral assurances that the group
could return.
The Uruguayan ambassador
led the other three in legalistic
arguments to the effect that the
group's continued presence in
the Dominican Republic would
constitute unwarranted interven-
tion in internal Dominican affairs.
The Colombian representative said
he felt the group had finished its
assignment and could return to
the Dominican Republic only if
given new instructions. The
Panamanian, who is chairman, sup-
ported his Latin American col-
leagues fully.
Ambassador Drew, the US mem-
ber of the OAS group, reported
on 12 June that the presence of
the subcommittee had been having
an increasingly beneficial effect
in the country and expressed fear
that its early departure would
dishearten the opposition and lead
the Trujillo group to revert to
repressive measures. The Amer-
ican consul concurred and noted
that the dissidents had only
recently begun to show some con-
fidence in the OAS group and that
many were then ready to take con-
siderable personal risks to testi-
fy before the subcommittee. He
fears that the departure of the
OAS group will cause the dissi-
dents to feel abandoned and lead
them to seek support from extrem-
ist groups.
Although few of the dissi-
dents have much confidence in
?resident Balaguer some of them
would probably accept a transi-
tion government under him if the
Trujillo family were removed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Venezuela is alone in
pressing strongly for increased
OAS sanctions up to and includ-
ing military action to bring
down the Trujillo heirs, but
other OAS members are much less
adamant. For instance, Argentine
Foreign Minister Mugica told
members of Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson's party on 7 June
that Argentina would oppose any
further OAS sanctions against
the Dominican Republic other
than of an economic nature.
Mugica, who gave the impression
that Argentina had little in-
formation on the Dominican
situation, added that his govern-
ment would take a "dim view"
Poland has agreed to con-
struct two shipyards in Cuba,
according to Radio Havana on 8
June, One is to be a shipbuild-
ing facility at Mariel, about 20
miles west of Havana, and the
other a ship repair yard in the
Casa Blanca area of Havana Bay.
The shipbuilding installation
is scheduled for completion in
1970, but ship construction is
expected to be under way by
1965, the report said.
The two facilities will
create employment for 8,000
of armed intervention there
in almost any circumstances.
Mugica expressed concern
that Venezuelan President
Betancourt might "get too far
ahead of the procession," a
view also expressed by Colombian
President Lleras. In Uruguay,
Ambassador Stevenson found
"almost complete lack on inter-
est" in the Dominican situation
among members of the majority
party.
Venezuelan President Betan-
court continues to press for
positive OAS action
IOn 15
June, Venezuelan Foreign Minis-
ter Falcon was quoted in the
press as saying that Venezuela
may withdraw from the OAS if
sanctions imposed on the Domini-
can Government are terminated.
Cuban workers and be able to ac-
commodate vessels up to 10,000
tons. Cuba has sought Polish
assistance in shipyard construc-
tion since the visit to Havana
in June 1960 of a commercial
delegation from Warsaw. Com-
pletion of the proposed ship-
yards will greatly increase
Cuba's limited ship construction
and repair capabilities.
The Castro regime, which has
a number of Cuban Air Force per-
sonnel undergoing flight train-
ing in the bloc, is
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planning to select an additional
200 Cubans for pilot training--
also presumably in the bloc.
About 3,500 Cubans between the
ages of 18 to 24 are to be
given medical examinations for
this purpose, and the govern-
ment hopes that 40 to 45 of the
expected trainees will graduate
as pilots, with the remainder
assigned as members of flight
crews. There are no reliable es-
timates of the number of person-
nel in Cuba's air force, but the
number of trained flight crews
known to be available is small.
Recent developments in the
field of Cuban education demon-
strate the Castro regime's de-
termination to "remake" Cuba
by generally emulating the ed-
ucational system of bloc coun-
tries. A cabinet decision of
6 June formalized the nation-
alization of all Cuban private
schools; many private religious
schools had in fact been taken
over by the government at the
time of the mid-April landings.
On 10 June, Education Min-
ister Armando Hart reported on
the cultural agreements reached
with bloc countries on his re-
cent tour. He said that "within
a brief period," technical in-
structors from various bloc
countries would come to Cuba--
the first 20 of them Polish
professors scheduled to arrive
on 20 July--and that Czechoslo-
vakia would establish before the
end of the year a "house of cul-
ture" in Havana "which will pro-
vide great help to teaching in
our country." Almost simultane-
ousrly., Castro announced that
1,100 Cuban scholarships would
be made available to foreign
students in the next schoolyear.
The campaign to force out
"counterrevolutionary" foreign
priests and nuns continues. A
press report of 13 June stated
that virtually all remaining
Spanish clergy in Camaguey
Province would leave Cuba short-
ly, and that some 30 priests in
the Havana area--mostly Jesuits
--had been ordered to leave
within 48 hours.
According to information
made available to the US Embassy
SECRET
the purpose of the re
25X1
cent good-will" mission of Cuban
Foreign Affairs Under Secretary
Carlos Olivares to Mexico, Brazil,
and Eucador was to ask those
governments to offer their good
offices in reducing Cuban-US
differences. Olivares reportedly
was reluctant to accept the sug-
gestion of Mexican President
Lopez Mateos that the six-nation
good-offices committee set up
by the OAS foreign ministers
last August be used for this
purpose. According to the
report, all three presidents
consulted by Olivares basically
accepted the original Cuban
suggestion.
..,All South American leaders
consulted thus far by Ambassador
Stevenson regarding inter-Amer-
ican policy on Cuba agree that
a common policy must be devised
first on economic, social, and
political problems of the hem-
isphere. Argentine President
Frondizi reiterated his earlier
proposal that a meeting of the
presidents of the US, Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, and possibly
Chile take place to agree on
strategy prior to the mid-July
meeting of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council in
Montevideo. If such a meeting
proves impossible, Frondizi
proposes to travel through Lat-
in America and undertake lead-
ership of an anti-Communist cam-
paign, provided that what he
terms the political risk to
himself is reduced by US aid
in promoting Argentina's eco-
nomic developement.
Brazilian President Quadros,
however, reportedly opposes
Frondizi's summit proposals and
bid for a leadership role. He
told Ambassador Stevenson that
US-Cuban differences ought to
be negotiable, presumably
through the good offices of Bra-
zil and other South American
governments. Uruguayan Foreign
Minister Martinez also opposed
Frondizi's suggestion of a sum-
mit meeting; he also said that
Uruguay might find it difficult
to agree to anything beyond eco-
nomic action against Cuba if
it were to be discussed in an
OAS foreign ministers' meeting.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTION
The leftist government of
Victor Paz Estenssoro,under cover
of a government-fabricated "Com-
munist coup," has cracked down
on Communist influence in labor
--particularly in the tin mines,
on which the Bolivian economy
depends. Two key figures under
arrest are Irineo Pimentel and
Federico Escobar, who have for
some years been in the forefront
of labor agitation, strikes,
slowdowns, and featherbedding
at Bolivia's largest tin mine.
The Soviet press--which rarely
provides Bolivian news--on 9
June reported Communist party
protests over these arrests.
Paz on 11 June met with
members of the politically pow-
erful Miners' Federation and ap-
parently discussed the possible
release of the labor leaders.
The acting head of the federa-
tion told newsmen that the Pres-
ident had flatly refused "to
give in one millimeter." Paz
is insisting that those arrested
will not be released until after
the expiration of the 90-day
state of siege declared on 7
June.
In his move against the
Communists, President Paz may
have been influenced in part by
his apparent ambition to crack
down on all opposition forces
and to re-establish the person-
al dominance of Bolivian poli-
tics which he exerted during
his first term of office from
1952 to 1956. Earlier in his
present term--which began last
August--Paz ordered the arrest
of many rightist-opponents, the
top Communist, and the two
leaders of the badly split
Trotskyite party. Trotskyite
strength is only slightly less
than that of the orthodox Com-
munists in Bolivia.
Paz probably anticipated
also that the arrests this month
would facilitate implementation
on the US-sponsored mine re-
habilitation program, scheduled
to get under way shortly. West
Germany and the Inter-American
Development Bank are cooperating
with the US Government in the
program. Labor indiscipline in
the mines has been a factor in
the steady decline of tin pro-
duction and thus in the decrease
in foreign exchange earnings.
Paz has been anxious for the econ-
omy to begin providing greater
material benefits because he
would like to stem the dis-
illusionment of recent years
with the social and economic
revolution of 1952.
At the time when plans for
the fabricated "coup" were being
made, Bolivian officials stated'
that such a move would facili-
tate compliance with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund's re-
quirement that Bolivia decree
a 50-percent increase in the
domestic price for the 68-
octane grade of gasoline. Rev-
enue at the present price--13
cents per gallon--does not cover
the national oil company's
production costs. Paz appar-
ently feared Communist ex-
ploitation of such an increase,
since drivers of trucks, buses,
and taxis--which use this grade
--have in the past exerted con-
siderable political strength.
Alternatively, Paz may have
thought that action against the
Communists would lessen interna-
tional pressure to raise gasoline
prices . 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NEUTRALIST CONFERENCE
The meeting of representa-
tives from 20 "nonaligned" na-
tions began on 5 June and dragged
on four days past its expected
termination date; the final
communique was issued on 13
June. The delay was caused by
heated arguments over the make-
up of the meeting and of the
later heads-of-government con-
ference, for which the Cairo
sessions were to prepare. Agree-
ment was reached on Yugoslavia
as the site for a 1 September
"summit" meeting, but the ques-
tion of who will attend appears
to have been left unresolved,
particularly with regard to
Gizenga's Congo regime and an
Indian proposal that some Euro-
pean neutrals be invited. The
communique states merely that
invitations will be addressed
after further consultations are
held "through diplomatic chan-
nels."
The participants at Cairo--
invited by Nasir, Tito, and
Sukarno--were Afghanistan, Bur-
ma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India,
Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal,
Saudi Arabia, the Somali Repub-
lic, Sudan, and Yemen, along
with the representatives of
the three sponsors. Mexico,
Venezuela, and Brazil declined
their invitations, disappointing
the sponsors' hopes of extending
their neutralist concept to
Latin America; Brazil, however,
did send an "observer." A
delegation from the provisional
Algerian government (PAG) was
seated only after Ghanaian
insistence on the acceptance of
both the PAG and the Gizenga
representatives was overruled
in committee meetings.
India opposed inviting a
Stanleyville delegation largely
because its presence would
probably have conflicted with
New Delhi's support for the UN
effort in the Congo. It was
for this reason that New Delhi
was critical of the meetings
earlier this year of the so-
called "Casablanca powers."
The Indian representative, al---
though he eventually agreed on
the seating of the Algerian,
was instrumental with the help
of the Burmese and Cambodian
delegates in shelving at least
temporarily the Ghana-Guinea-
Mali proposal for seating
Gizenga's representative.
Cuba's Raul Roa assailed
India's moderate stand and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
accused the meeting's delegates
of "surrendering to India" and
giving in to Western"imperial-
ist" influence exerted 'through
India,, Yugoslavia, and fbe UAR,.
Throughout the meeting the Cuban
and Ceylonese, delegates--the
latter-acting without official
approval from Colombo--promoted
extremist views including a
move to have the summit confer-
ence propose .the adwissiou of
Communist China to the United
Nationa, a move that was shouted
down: Vj--the- other" delegates .
Ghana's disruptive perform-
ance_..wai?d,almost c_ertai}ily con-
ditib.ned,'iA Part -by Nkrumah's
pique- over not having teen in
vited,,.to,share sponsorship of
the projgox. The:failure to
seat Gtzenga s delegate appears
to havf. &roi sed, at Least
amo'ng'=the Gtianai*ns.:, ?latout
Negro antagoni'sms tgwa"fT North
Africans.
Bitter debate marked com-
mittee efforts to-define the
criteria of nonalignment--which
are to be used for determining
invitation$ to the summit meet-
ing. The-communique did not
list any criteria, -suggest,iing
no agreement was reached.
The major public result of
the Cairo meeting was a proposed
agenda for the conference in
Yugoslavia. Among the topics
mentioned are: "liquidation
of imperialism and neo-imperi-
ali5m,';' disarmament and nu-
clear-testing, racial discrim-
ination, the role and organiza-
tion of the United Nations,
and a general exchange of views
on the international situation.
These would seem primarily_.to
reflect Indian ~desir. es ., .
The Sino-Soviet bloc has
not yet publicly commented on
the proposed summit meeting.
TASS factually reported the
preparatory meeting of,what
it termed "so-called non-
committed states." Its dis-
patch said that the question
of defining the term "un-
committed countries" took
longer than expected and that
the Indian delegation, in par-
ticular, had insisted that the
definition not be excessively
binding on the participants.
.The government-controlled
Cairo press has alleged that
Moscow's propaganda attacks Of
the past two weeks against LIAR
treatment of local Communists 25X1
are.alrtributable in part to the
convenin of the neutralist con-
f r.ence .
Tito views his association
with the uncommitted states as
a means of commanding more at-
tention for his domestic and
foreign policies and.of,str.ength-
ening his hand for future deal-
ings with the bloc and the West.
He probably feels these ends will
be even further served by hosting
the 1 September conference....
Belgrade actively lobbied to
be chosen as the conference's
locale; Nasir's agreement was
probably secured in advance of
the preparatory conference.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The dominant position of
Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, the
generally acknowledged leader
of the South Korean military
junta, is emphasized by his as-
sumption on 9 June of the chair-
manship of the standing committee
of the ruling Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction (SCNR).
In addition to the chairman, the
standing committee is composed
of the heads of the seven commit-
tees covering the general areas
of government administration and
appears likely to become the
focal point of power within the
SCNR.
There is considerable
evidence, however, that Pak's
authority is circumscribed by
factional divisions within the
junta. Recent voting patterns
in the 32-member Supreme Council
reveal three primary groupings,
with most junior officers looking
to Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil for
leadership. Kim is the intelli-
gence and security boss for the
regime but is not a member of
the Supreme Council. As SCNR
members are presently identified,
Pak is supported by 15, Kim by
10, and SCNR chairman Lt. Gen.
Chang To-yong by 5. Kim has
reportedly been associated with
Pak since the earliest stages
of the coup, but recent informa-
tion has raised some question
as to his loyalty to Pak.
There have been indications
that the regime will adopt a
harsher policy toward high offi-
cials of the former government.
.Pak recently publicly charged a
number of former ministers with
Communist activities. On 9 June
he informed the US army attache
that the junior officers were
pushing for a mass purge of
senior generals. He implied
that he could restrain them, but
conceded that additional arrests
of senior officers would be
forthcoming.
A number of former senior
officers--such as retired
General Chong Il-kwon, ambas-
sador-designate to the United
States--reportedly will be
given diplomatic assignments to
keep them out of the country.
One exception, however, is re-
tired Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan,
who is studying in the United
States and has been named
minister of defense to succeed
Acting Minister Sin Ung-kyun.
Song is credited with having
avoided large-scale bloodshed
when he was army chief of staff
at the time of Rhee's ouster
last year. He is noted for
his efforts to combat military
corruption and, although he was
personally loyal to Rhee, is
believed largely to have stayed
out of politics.
The public at large remains
generally passive toward the
regime, but American observers
see growing apprehension among
educated urban elements. To
develop support, the junta has
announced the establishment of
a nationwide national front
movement designed to "inspire
the nation with fresh spirit,
encourage new life, and strength-
en anti-Communist ideology."
A mass rally held in Seoul on 1.2
June was scheduled to attract
some 100,000 persons. However,
a crowd of only 30,000 attended
reports.
--mostly teen-age students and
housemaids, according to press
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO NORTH KOREA
During his visit to North
Korea from 30 May to 6 June,
Soviet First Deputy Premier A.
N. Kosygin assured his hosts
that they could count on "the
most active" support of the USSR
in their political and economic
undertakings. The emphasis
given this theme suggests that
the primary purpose of the trip
was to reinforce Moscow's posi-
tion in North Korea.
Last fall, North Korean
editorial comment echoed the
Chinese position in the argument
over international Communist
strategy. Kim Il-sung did not
attend the November conference
in Moscow, and the North Korean
delegation reportedly supported
China on a variety of issues in
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Like Communist China, North
Korea has unfulfilled territorial
ambitions, and North Korean lead-
ers undoubtedly have sought ex-
pressions of support from high-
ranking Soviet personalities
for Pyongyang's reunification
campaign. Kosygin's visit
probably was intended to serve
in the place of a trip by Khru-
shchev, scheduled for early
October 1960 but then indefinite-
ly, postponed.
Reflecting the tacit agree-
ment reached in Moscow in Novem-
ber to avoid the public airing
of controversial issues of the
Sino-Soviet dispute, both Kosy-
gin and the North Koreans stressed
bloc unity. According to
the final report on the visit
broadcast by Pyongyang--no com-
muniqu6 was issued--only through
intrabloc consultation could
"united effective action" hold
the imperialists in check.
North Korea gave minimum en-
dorsement to the Kennedy-Khru-
shchev meeting in Vienna, citing
it as proof of the USSR's efforts
at relaxing international
tensions,
While Kosygin's trip may
have been arranged before the
coup in South Korea, he readily
exploited events there. The
final report drew attention to
the "recent fascist military
coup" and called it a "grave
hindrance" to Korean reunifica-
tion aimed at "maintaining the
colonial rule which faces bank-
ruptcy in South Korea." On
several occasions, Kosygin
warned the coup leaders against
any "march to the north" and,
in the final report, he pledged
the USSR to render any assist-
ance to North Korea "in defending
its socialist gains." Kosygin
also promised Moscow's un-
swerving support for North
Korea's reunification program
as outlined by Kim Il-sung last
August--withdrawal of US forces
in the South, a North-South con-
federation with each retaining
its sovereignty, and general
elections free from any inter-
national supervision.
Accompanying Kosygin on
his trip to North Korea was Ivan
Arkhipov, Moscow's top negotia-
tor for its long-term economic
programs with bloc countries.
His presence suggests that
economic topics figured in the
discussions with government and
party leaders. Moscow may be
contemplating further economic
assistance to North Korea,
although no announcement was
made to this effect. However,
speeches by both sides emphasized
the importance and relationship
of economic development in the
USSR and North Korea. Kosygin
stated that the Soviets are
"closely following and rejoicing
over" the economic progress
North Korea has made, and he
assured his hosts that they
could count on Moscow's "unself-
ish friendship" in the future.
Soviet assistance in the
form of grants and credits
amounted to a total of about
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$690,000,000 by 1960, of which
$647,000,000 was in the form of
or has since been converted to
outright grants. The latest
Soviet assistance--a deferment
of repayment on existing credit
--came in November 1960, shortly
after Communist China had given
the North Koreans a $105,000,000
loan, bringing its total finan-
cial assistance to them to about
$400,000,000.
Bloc aid played a major
role in restoring the North
Korean economy after the Korean
war. Since 1957, however, the
country has relied increasingly
on its own resources to finance
its economic development programs.
Gross national product is esti-
mated to have approximately
doubled between 1956 and 1959,
and North Korea's reliance on
bloc aid has accordingly dropped
from 34 percent of budget revenue
in 1954 to only 3 percent in 1959
and 1960.
With economic development
a key element in the North's
reunification proposals and the
step-up in Chinese assistance,
Korea may be becoming a testing
ground not only for East-West
but also for Sino-Soviet eco-
nomic competition.
SOVIET WITHDRAWAL HIGHLIGHTS ALBANIA'S
Moscow's efforts to isolate
Albania from the Soviet bloc
and Soviet-oriented Communist
parties took a more direct
turn during the last three
weeks when Moscow began what may
become a total withdrawal of its
military personnel from Albania.
The Soviet reaction probably was
prompted in part by Albania's
oven hostility toward and
harassment of bloc personnel in
Albania, and by the implicitly
anti-Soviet trial recently staged
in Tirana. Despite the implied
Soviet threat that Albania may
be excluded from participation
in bloc affairs, continued
Chinese Communist economic and
moral support would enable it
to resist Soviet pressures.
The USSR apparently has put
into operation plans to pull
out of its Vlone base. Eight
of the 12 Soviet W-class sub-
marines that have been stationed
at Vlone left there
There
is no indication that any re-
placements are en route to Vlone.
Three of the four submarines
remaining at Vlone are report-
f lag.
The USSR, in addition to
its apparent withdrawal from
Vlone, may also be planning
to reduce the size of its mili-
tary, diplomatic, and technical
missions assigned to Albania.
The US Embassy in Moscow re-
ported that the Albanian mili-
tary attache left for home at
the end of May, possibly after
having been expelled. It also
has received reports that the
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Soviet military attache and his
staff left Tirana on 31 May, and
that Albanian students in the
USSR have gone home. According
to another embassy source, four
Soviet generals left Tirana for
Moscow on'28 May.
Albanian hostility toward
and harassment of Soviet per-
sonnel in Albania probably con-
tributed to the Soviet decision
to reduce, if not withdraw, its
personnel. Since the first of
the year there have been several
unconfirmed reports that Alba-
nian security police have had
the Soviet Embassy under con-
stant surveillance and were
shadowing everyone entering or
leaving the premises. Two minor
Albanian Foreign Ministry offi-
cials reportedly were executed
on 3 May for passing secret doc-
uments to Soviet Embassy offi-
cials. Reports of Albanian
harassment of the base at Vlone
are unconfirmed; one alleged
that the Albanians had turned
back a provisions train.
The pull-out of Soviet
technicians who have assisted
Albanian economic development
under arrangements with the
bloc's Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CEMA) would be
consonant with Communist China's
replacement of the USSR as Al-
bania's major economic supporter.
Under the wide-ranging Sino-Al-
banian economic agreement signed
in April, China is scheduled to
send an unspecified number of
technicians to Albania. To
what extent this has already
been implemented is unclear,
although reports of the last
six months suggest a gradual in-
crease in the number of Chinese
personnel and a decrease in So-
viet personnel.
Some of the satellites
and at least one European Com-
munist party are following
Moscow's lead.
nist party,
n
April decrine an invitation to 25X1
an Albanian trade union meeting
and postponed indefinitely a
joint "peace partisans" meeting
which was to be held in Italy.
Albanian relations with Poland
remain frigid--contacts on the
official level have been almost
nonexistent since the departure
of the Polish ambassadorin March.
There are also indications
that within the last six months
Czechoslovakia has withdrawn
a promised credit for develop-
ing the nickel extraction in-
dustry in Albania, apparently
because the Albanians wanted
facilities to process the ore
themselves. The Chinese re-
portedly have promised to build
a processing plant for the Al-
banians under their recent
trade and aid agreement.
The satellites, however,
are not uniformly implementing
pressure tactics on Albania.
The 15-27 May show trial in Al-
bania was ignored by Soviet
propaganda media, and the satel-
lites generally observed the
same silence. However, a Bul-
garian trade union paper on 28
May praised the sentences re-
ceived by the Albanian "trai-
tors." During the first days
of the trial, East Germany's
news agency reportedly carried
a short item on the trial. Com-
munist China broke its silence
on 1 June, and on 2 June. pub-
lished a long report in People's
Daily. According to an Al-
banian survey, several other
Chinese Communist papers
and Peiping radio reported
"parts" of the court ver-
dict.
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The Chinese Communists have
had relative freedom of action
in Nepal since King Mahendra
ousted Prime Minister Koirala
and took direct control of the
government six months ago. They
have increased their political
and economic pressure on the
kingdom and have sought to cap-
italize on Mahendra's suspicions
of India and his growing politi-
cal and economic difficulties.
In an effort to work out
a program for utilizing its aid,
Peiping has dispatched an eco-
nomic delegation to Katmandu. Ac-
cording to the Chinese ambassa-
dor, the delegation has net with
the King and other high Nepali
officials and is scheduled
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMIARY
to remain in Katmandu for "some
time." The Chinese are report-
edly urging that Nepal allow
them to start construction of
a road from Katmandu to the
Tibetan border, where it would
connect with a Chinese road in-
side Tibet.
Such a project would bring
into Nepal large numbers of
Chinese technicians and workers
who would almost certainly be
used as a subversive and prop-
aganda force. In Peiping's
view, the road would offer
long-range possibilities for
reducing Nepal's economic de-
pendence on India.
The Chinese Communist Em-
bassy in Katmandu now makes lit-
tle effort `to conceal its
financial and propaganda sup-
port of elements within the Nepali
Communist party who reportedly
visit the embassy on a regular
basis. The Chinese have also
advanced funds to newspapers
in Nepal willing to print ma-
terial favorable to China. Pei-
ping is allegedly promoting the
road project through one such
newspaper.
Peiping continues to take
a conciliatory attitude in its
boundary dispute with Nepal.
Joint survey teams are in the
border area preparatory to an-
other meeting of the boundary
commission, scheuled for July
in Katamandu.
In the past, the Chinese
were more circumspect in chal-
lenging New Delhi's influence
in Nepal, but their increasing
activities there probably re-
flect declining concern about
Indian sensibilities. Peiping
appears to have nearly written
off chances of normalizing its
strained relations with New
Delhi--although the Chinese will
he careful to avoid an open
break. The Sino-Indian boundary
dispute continues deadlocked,
and Peiping is showing increased
displeasure over what it regards
as India's drift toward foreign
policy alignment with the West.
The Chinese viewpoint was
outlined to a bloc diplomat in
Geneva recently by Foreign Min-
ister Chen Yi. Chen denounced
Nehru's "determination" to speak
for the Indian bourgeoisie and
charged that New Delhi was
afraid that China's "enormous"
economic achievements would se-
duce the "impoverished" Indian
masses. Chinese diplomats in
New Delhi have echoed Chen's
statements, asserting that US
and Indian foreign policy now
is "virtually identical." Chi-
nese propaganda has also focused
more heavily on India's growing
economic alignment with the US
and the West.
The Chinese estimate of
chances for improved relations
with India has apparently been
hardened by what they regard
as growing Soviet criticism of
New Delhi's foreign policy.
Chen told the bloc diplomat at
Geneva that the Soviet press
had started to "unmask" India's
attempts to gain support for its
policies from Moscow. Peiping
has probably also been influenced
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by the strong public stand New
Delhi has adopted against pro-
Peiping Chinese residents in
India. During the past few
months, Indian authorities
The situation within the
Turkish leadership remains un-
clear. Sources available to
the American mission in Ankara
have presented conflicting
versions of the motivating
forces behind personnel shifts
which occurred last week.
A major struggle appears
to be shaping up, however, which
involves both a split between
the senior and junior members
of the Committee of National
Union (CNU) and a contest be-
tween major elements of the
armed forces. The four CNU
generals--Gursel, Ozdilek, Ulay,
and Madanoglu--with the support
of some members of the General
Staff and apparently the army
are aligned against a group of
younger officers on the CNU
who are organizing a new group
called the "Forces of Solidar-
ity" and are supported by the
Turkish Air Force under the
command of Lt. Gen. Irfan Tansel.
Some members of the CNU,
the navy, and the gendarmerie
apparently are still neutral.
The crisis erupted on 2 June
when an army faction tried to
oust Tansel from his command
but was blocked by the "Forces
of Solidarity" group. During
an emergency session of the
CNU on 9 June, jet aircraft
made several low passes over
Ankara.
Subsequently Madanoglu,
who had attained considerable
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have forcibly deported sev-
eral Chinese agitators and
initiated similar action
against a number of others.
prominence on the CNU, was re-
moved from command of the
Ankara garrison and announced
his resignation from the CNU.
The resignation has been re-
jected, but Madanoglu has in-
sisted publicly that he is
"through'" his actual status
is unclear. An undetermined
number of high-level military
changes are under way, apparently
including some members of the
General Staff, the staff officers
of the air force, and possibly
the ground forces commander and
the minister of defense. Some
members of the CNU may also
be purged. The publicity given
the changes and the flow of
rumors have alarmed Turkish
civilians, who fear-more trouble.
For the moment at least
Tansel and his supporters appear.
to have the upper hand. Tansel
himself has made this claim
in an interview with the American
air attache. He has said, however,
that the CNU will continue to
function as in the past except
that it will have no say in
military matters. He also
assured the attache that elections
will be held as "soon as possi-
ble," but he did not commit
himself to the 29 October dead-
line previously announced by
Gursel. The younger officers
on the CNU who are aligned with
Tansel are understood not to
favor early elections. These
officers also favor death sen-
tences for leaders of the former
regime and the continuation of
military influence on the govern-
ment even after elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The French Government's
restrictive wage policy led last
month to a flurry of short strikes
which were halted only by a
threat to draft strikers and an
offer of limited concessions to
public-service employees. The
congress early this month of
the Communist-led CGT re-empha-
sized strike agitation, and the
free unions face the prospect
of increased Communist pressure
for joint action which could
force the government either to
bow to union demands or crack
down on strikers.
Although the government
has discussed wage issues with
free-union leaders, it is firmly
committed to an anti-inflation-
ary policy. In March, Premier
Debr6 asked the French employers'
association to hold wage in-
creases during 1961 to 4 per-
cent--in line with an anticipated
5-percent increase in the gross
national product. Moreover,
under the government's special
powers assumed because of the
Algiers insurrection, individual
cabinet members are granted the
right to requisition striking
personnel in key nationalized
industries.
The major trade unions in France are the Communiet-
controlled General Confederation of labor (COP),, which
has an estimated membership of 950,000; the French
Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), with some
500,000 members; and the Socialist-oriented Workers'
Force (FO), with an estimated 430,000 members. Only
about 20 percent of the 12,500,000 organisable French
wage earners belong to unions.
tions. The CGT and CFTC rail-
road federations called a 24-
hour strike on 9 May, and on 1.8
May the FO joined them in a 32-
hour rail strike which shut down
most of the Paris public trans-
portation system and rail traffic
throughout the country. However,
a "truce" between the government
and unions averted a 24-hour
strike of 1,000,000 civil serv-
ants which had been called for
6 June.
chile the CGT congress
stressed its intent to press
hard for more and longer strikes
in an effort to disrupt the De
Gaulle government, two factors
oblige it to exercise some cau-
tion: its desire for unity of
action at the national level
prevents it from outbidding the
free unions too openly, and
the responsiveness of the in-
dividual worker to De Gaulle's
pleas for republican unity re-
stricts what the CGT can ask
its own members to do.
The leaders of all three
major confederations have ob-
jected strenuously to both of
these moves as restrictions on
labor's right to bargain with
private employers on the wage
issue and to strike for their
demands. They deny government
claims that the working class
has profited equitably from the
economic advances France has
made in recent years, and they
insist that long-postponed wage
boosts be granted immediately
rather than spread over the
next 18 months, as the government
has offered.
Strikes ranging from two
hours to a full day were con-
ducted in the metalworking in-
dustry on 4 T7 ay with the backing
of the three r-H or confedera-
The free-union leadership
is in a particularly difficult
position in the present situa-
tion. CFTC and FO leaders face
the constant dilemma of whether
to cooperate with the CGT at
the risk of compromising their
public image as a non-Communist
alternative or to take the
chance that their followers
will remain loyal while the CGT
alone carries the fight for
higher wages and improved work-
ing conditions. They now must
also consider the fear, which
the generals' revolt in April
re-emphasized, that widespread
strike activity in cooperation
with the CGT would give army
extremists an excuse for a coup
to block a popular front. F_
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Communists and their
Progressive party allies have
won a tactical victory in Ice-
land's three-week-old strikes
by establishing a pattern for
settlement calling for a pay
raise and other benefits which
together amount to a 10- to 15-
percent wage increase for the
current year and a smaller in-
crease in 1962. The wage set-
tlement agreed to by the coop-
erative societies, which are
controlled largely by the Pro-
gressives, undercuts earlier
proposals by employer groups
which would have kept the wage
increases to more manageable
proportions. Since other em-
ployers now will probably feel
compelled to follow the formula
agreed to by the cooperatives,
the economic stabilization pro-
gram of Prime Minister Thors'
Conservative - Social Democratic
government will suffer a sharp
setback.
The immediate cause of the
labor strife--which has idled
about a third of the membership
of the Communist-dominated cen-
tral labor federation--is the
dispute over new wage contracts.
However, the primary aim of the
Communists and Progressives is
political. By demanding wage
increases beyond what the econ-
omy can afford, they hope to
weaken the economic stabiliza-
tion program to which the govern-
ment's future is closely linked
and to consolidate their grip
on organized labor. They prob-
ably, believe that if they can
force the government to capitu-
ulate on the wage issue, they
will be in a strong position to
gain re-entry into the govern-
ment by offering a period of
labor peace.
The government is general-
ly expected to react by devalu-
ing the monetary unit to counter
the unfavorable impact on the
economy of the projected wage
increases. The krona was last
devalued in February 1960 as
part of the government's over-
all program of economic reform.
Government officials be-
lieve devaluation would impress
on the public the irresponsible
economic policies advocated by
the opposition and meet the chal-
lenge posed in the new wage con-
tracts which permit renunciation
on 30 days' notice if the cur-
rency is devalued or prices
rise above a certain level.
Some government officials re-
portedly favor resorting to
devaluation as many times as
necessary after successive
strikes to show that the Commu-
nists and Progressives are seek-
ing to destroy the economy in
order to bring about the fall
of the government.
Operations at the US-manned
NATO base at Keflavik have not
been seriously affected by the
walkout, but Icelandic contrac-
tors involved in construction
work on the base have lacked the
services of some skilled workmen,
and base officials have been in- 25X1
formally advised not to off-load
military cargo in strike-bound
Reykjavik harbor.
PROBLEMS OF MAURITANIA'S ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
UN membership for Mauri-
tania was vetoed last December
by the Soviets in a move which
tied its admission to Mongolia's
in a "package deal." However,
Mauritania is strongly supported
by 11 generally pro-Western
French African states which
threaten to oppose the West on
many UN issues if the applica-
tion is again turned down. Most
of them have asserted that if
Nationalist China vetoes Mon-
golian membership and thereby
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
excludes Mauritania as well,
they will break relations with
Taipei and vote for Peiping's
admission to the UN.
The USSR's veto was an at-
tempt to curry favor with Mo-
rocco at a time when Moscow was
negotiating an arms deal with
that country. Morocco claims
the former French territory
and attempted to delay its inde-
pendence. The USSR has con-
sistently proposed Mongolia
for UN membership and has linked
its admission to other coun-
tries in the past. After the
veto, the 15th General Assembly
passed a resolution sponsored
by the 11 African states endors-
ing both Mauritania and Mongolia
for UN membership. The Security
Council will probably meet on
this question shortly before
the opening of the 16th General
Assembly next September.
Nationalist China considers
Mongolia a part of the Chinese
mainland, and Foreign Minister
Shen Chang-huan said on 5 June
that his government "would not
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15 June'61 WEEKLY REVIEW
fail to act to defeat Outer
Mongolia's admission, no matter
what the cost." Taipei vetoed
Mongolia's admission in 1955,
thereby precipitating the So-
viet veto of Japan and causing
considerable resentment among
UN members.
Taipei's sensitivity and
recent press attacks accusing
the US of a retreat on the
Mongolia issue reflect the Na-
tionalists' determination to
demonstrate independence of the
US on anything considered to
be "two Chinas." Ambassador
Drumright believes that if
the US, following a vote to
admit Outer Mongolia to the
UN, sends a representative to
Ulan Bator, a crisis will arise
in US-Nationalist relations
which will do serious damage
to the American economic and
military program on Taiwan and
probably lead inevitably to
Nationalist withdrawal from
the United Nations.
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Latin American Communists
have concentrated their efforts
since early 1959 on support of
the Castro regime, and Castro's
pronouncement on 1 May that Cuba
has become a "socialist" re-
public is widely regarded as
public acknowledgment of the
extent of Communist and Sino-
Soviet bloc control over that
country. The Cuban revolution
has provided regional Commu-
nists with a dynamic issue to
promote their own and bloc ob-
jectives, including disruption
of the Organization of American
States (OAS), more favorable
governmental attitudes toward
relations with the bloc, closer
ties with non-Communist leftist-
nationalist groups, and the
undermining of US prestige.
Pro-Cuban organizations
have sprung up in almost all
Latin American countries and
are largely Communist inspired
or directed. The Communists,
partly through the vehicle of
the Cuban revolution, probably
have also enhanced their position
with non-Communist political,
student, and intellectual groups.
Bloc diplomatic, economic, mili-
tary, and propaganda support of
Castro has served as an illus-
tration of what may be expected
from closer ties with the bloc,
and the USSR has shown its abili
ty to meet large-scale commit-
ments in the area.
Prior to Castro's victory
in Cuba, the regional Communist
movement had no dependable base
free of possible government
suppression or interference for
effectively co-ordinating Com-
munist and Communist-front activ-
ities, a key objective long
stressed by Moscow. During the
past two years Havana has pro-
vided such a headquarters, offer-
ing the opportunity for close
support and guidance from the
Soviet, Chinese, and other bloc
diplomatic missions there.
Since early 1959 a number
of pro-Communist regional meet-
ings have been held in Havana,
attended by bloc representatives
as well as Latin American Com-
munist leaders. These include
celebrations of May Day and the
anniversary of the Cuban Revolu-
tion; a Latin American youth
congress last July and August;
the National Congress of the
Cuban Popular Socialist (Com-
munist) party last August; and
the Conference of Latin American
Plantation Workers in March of
this year. The Communist Inter-
national Union of Students held
a conference in Cuba this month,
which included a meeting of the
organization's executive com-
mittee.
A pro-Communist Latin
American women's congress and
a conference of Latin American
workers, now scheduled for
Havana in mid-1961, are being
sponsored by Cuban leaders.
The purpose of the latter meet-
ing is to organize a new re-
gional labor organization, a
priority objective of area Com-
munists which was agreed upon at
special sessions in Moscow in
early 1959 at the time of the
21st Soviet party congress.
Havana in addition has be-
come a focal point of transit
for Communists and pro-Communists
traveling to the bloc and appar-
ently is being used to some ex-
tent as a Communist political in-
doctrination and training center
for the hemisphere. Cuba has also
become a base for instructing
Communists and leftists in para-
military tactics and a potential
source of clandestine arms ship-
ments to opposition groups in
other Latin American countries.
Exploitation of Castro Issue
In a number of countries in
the area, Communists have in-
creased their political associa-
tion with non-Communist elements
and have probably strengthened
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their already strong influence
among student organizations by
using the Castro issue. The
Venezuelan Communist party has
allied closely with the Marxist
Leftist Revolutionary Movement
--a defector wing of President
Betancourt's Democratic Action
party--and with the leftist
Democratic Republican Union,
not only to propagandize Castro's
but also in an effort to
o
4,000 M
163 000 S *
MEXICO
The party does not meet
minimum legal membership
requirements to enter candidates
undermine the incumbent govern-
ment. Similarly in Peru, the
Communists have joined in pro-
Cuban agitation with the 'rebel
APRA party--a defector faction
of Peru's large, non-Communist
APRA--and with the Marxist So-
cial Progressive Movement.
The Castro issue in Ecua-
dor has been a catalyst for the
collaboration of the Ecuadorean
Latin America's Bloc Diplomatic Missions
and Communist Parties
25
000 M*
?????
,
Unknown S *
?00000
CUBA
Unknown S
BR. HONDURAS
^r~ 400 M
300 M
2,500- .IMP S
RICA
EL SALVADOR
2 500 S
GUATEMALA/
1,000 M*
i Uown
1,100 M ~ :t nkn
NgNLRAe
S ~~~~~111111''111111//
A
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
`Less than 100M
'HAITI '900S
35,000M
100,000 S BRITISH
150 SURINAM
300 7,500 M, l( FRENCH
12,000 S
ECUADOR
Bloc Diplomatic and Consular Missions
prior to 1958
Bloc Diplomatic Mission or relations
established since 1958
0 Bloc Consular Mission
established since 1958
Communist Parties
Legal status
Q Illegal status
M Estimated membership
S Estimated sympathizers
* Denotes increase since 1959
15 JUNE 1961
31781
SECRET
r 22,000 M
10,000 M* 150,000 S
PERU BRAZIL
5,000M*
5,500 S * '1,
BOLIVIA i
3,000M ? ?,
5 000 S\
.PARAGUAY 0
i 1 t
rr
18,000-25,000 M.
90,000 Sly 80,000 M
l
5,200 M*
34,000 S
URUGUAY
CHILE? 120,000 S
ARGENTINA
? 1
Communist political activities barred
since 1959, but party technically
retains legal personality
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist party, a pro-Communist
youth organization, and a left-
ist segment of President Velas-
Co's heterogeneous following
led by his pro-Communist friend
and former minister of govern-
ment, Manuel Araujo. The Cuban
revolution and Castro have also
facilitated or intensified in
varying degrees the cooperation
between Communists and non-Com-
munist parties--or factions
within such parties--in Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica,
Colombia, Panama, and Bolivia.
The numerous Communist-
backed pro-Cuban organizations
throughout Latin America have
provided the Communists an op-
portunity to work with a broad
segment of the political spec-
trum, including intellectuals
and labor and student groups as
well as political party repre-
sentatives. The widespread
Communist-supported student
demonstrations for Castro after
the April insurgent landing in
Cuba were a dramatic recent
illustration of Communist ex-
ploitation of the Cuban issue.
On other occasions Commu-
nist-front organizations have
held international meetings de-
voted largely to promoting pop-
ular support for the Castro re-
gime. Two such meetings were
convened in Mexico City this
spring--the Latin American
Peace Congress and the Confer-
ence of Women of Mexico and Cen-
tral America--both partly fi-
nanced by the Cuban Government.
The Agrarian Reform Issue
Castro's confiscatory
agrarian reform program has
been useful to Latin American
Communists in their increasing
efforts to control peasant
groups and promote rural un-
rest. Communists and their
collaborators in Ecuador, Bra-
SECRET
zil, El Salvador, Colombia,
Guatemala, Venezuela, and Chile
have recently demanded radical
reform measures, in many in-
stances recommending Castro's
methods. In Ecuador and Chile,
the Communists organized peas-
ant congresses--the first known
meetings of their kind in these
countries--to call for radical
agrarian reform.
The prominent Brazilian
pro-Communist, Francisco Juliao,
leader of the Peasant Leagues
concentrated in northeastern
Brazil, has invited Castro to
the "First Peasant Congress"
for that region, now scheduled
for September--a gathering
which is likely to be Communist
dominated and attended by bloc
representatives. Juliao an-
nounced after his recent trip
to Cuba that members of the
leagues would soon travel to
Cuba to study the agrarian re-
form there.
At the Havana Conference
of Latin American Plantation
Workers, in March, President Dor-
ticos advised the Communist-
leftist delegates in attendance
to "follow the Cuban example
on agrarian reform" in their
countries. Similar advice was
given at the Latin American
Peace Congress in Mexico City
during the same month.
All the Sino-Soviet bloc
nations except East Germany
now have diplomatic relations
with Cuba, thus far the only
Latin American country which
has actually exchanged--or
agreed to exchange-=diplomatic
missions with Communist China,
the Asian satellites, and Al-
bania. Since 1959, there has
also been a marked increase in
bloc relations--both diplomatic
and commercial--with the other
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Latin American nations. The
bloc's substantial economic sup-
port of Cuba has probably con-
tributed to a more favorable at-
titude in other hemisphere coun-
tries toward trade relations
with the bloc.
Bloc countries continue to
press the argument--as Khrushchev
did to a Brazilian trade mission
in Moscow in early May--that
trade would be greatly stimulat-
ed by the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations. The Soviet
ambassador to Mexico apparently
raised this subject on "unoffi-
cial" visits to Ecuador and Vene-
zuela in March, and Chile re-
portedly was similarly approached
by Soviet, Polish, Czech, and
Hungarian trade missions over
the past eight months.
The subject probably will
also be introduced by the Soviet
good-will mission now seeking
visas to visit several Latin
countries. In Bolivia, various
bloc economic overtures extended
since 1958 have generated strong
leftist pressure--and an approv-
ing resolution by congress--for
an exchange of diplomatic mis-
sions with the USSR.
In two Latin American coun-
tries, however, there has been
recent concern over the activi-
ties of bloc diplomatic missions.
Argentina in January ordered the
six bloc diplomatic missions in
Buenos Aires to reduce their
disproportionately large staffs.
Uruguay, which has become in-
creasingly displeased by the ex-
tent to which its capital is
being used as a center for bloc
propagc?da and subversive activ-
ities nor all of South A.,:erica,
may be considering a similar move
against the five Soviet bloc
missions in Montevideo. Uruguay
expelled the first secretary of
the Soviet Legation and the
Cuban ambassador in January for
"interference in domestic af-
fairs."
Since the visit of Deputy
Premier Mikoyan to Mexico and
Cuba,in late 1959 and early
1960, official travel between
the bloc and Latin America has
been at a relatively high level.
while much of this exchange ac-
tivity has centered on Cuba,
bloc missions sometimes have
gone on from there to travel
elsewhere in the area.. For ex-
ample a Chinese Communist trade
delegation, which recently spent
about six weeks in Cuba, ob-
tained visas to visit Brazil,
Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.
Earlier this year Czech Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hajek visited Ecuador, Chile,
Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico as
well as Cuba.
Official Latin American
travel to the bloc, much of
which has been at Soviet initia-
tive, has similarly increased
in recent months. The visitors
include not only high govern-
ment officials but a number of
trade and parliamentary missions
which have scheduled or already
completed trips.
The vice president and a
parliamentary delegation of
Ecuador recently accepted an in-
vitation to visit Moscow. The
Brazilian vice president, a
frequent collaborator with Com-
munist groups, traveled to Mos-
cow and Prague in late 1960 and
is planning a visit to Peiping
in June; two Brazilian economic
missions toured the USSR and
other bloc countries in April
and May. The Venezuelan minis-
ter of mines and hydrocarbons
has indicated his acceptance of
a Soviet invitation to Moscow
in July.
The future progress of the
Communist movement in Latin
America will be considerably
influenced by the fate of the
Castro regime in Cuba. As long
as Castro remains in power,
Cuba will provide the Communists
with a base for training leaders,
coordinating their activities,
and subverting other countries.
Any success of Castro which can
be attributed to bloc support
will tend to improve the
present favorable climate for
extending bloc relations with
other Latin American countries.
Cuba already depends on the bloc
as its chief source of supply and
as the market for at least two
thirds of its exports. 25X1
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