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Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. 76 OCI NO. 0290/61 27 July 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT NO. NO CH LGE IN CLASS. ^ ^ BECLASSiFIED CLASS. C l',NGED TO: TS Soo I T FkV W BATE: AUTi: HR 70-2 25X1 DATE: I TA "7NT1AL25X1 State Dept. review completed -1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 (VIPJrtnrnuTIAI Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 July 1961 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Top Soviet leaders have shown an increased interest in sounding out Western views on Berlin and have taken the initiative in arranging for contacts with high-level Western officials. Ambassador Thompson feels that the Kremlin hopes to avoid a further rapid build-up of ten- sions. The ambassador also feels that before the Soviet party congress Khrushchev will take the initiative on securing agreement on a date for negotiations even if the talks commence after the party meeting. Initial So- viet reaction to the President's speech of 25 July concentrated on charges that the US was using the "so- called threat to Berlin" as a pretext for continuing NORTH AFRICA Page 1 ... Page 3 The Bizerte crisis may result in a change in Tunisia's foreign policy orientation. Tunisia is reintegrating it- self into the Arab world, and Asian-African as well as Sino-Soviet bloc support is likely to encourage anti- West tendencies which Bourguiba has heretofore held in check. The Bizerte aftermath threatens De Gaulle's Algerian policy and France's relations with its former territories in tropical Africa, and may give a new impetus to anti-Gaullist plotters. However, French- Algerian negotiations resumed on 20 July, CUBA . . . . . . . Page 7 The new "united party of Cuba's socialist revolution," announced by Fidel,Castro on 26 July as including all po- litical, military, and other organizations, will probably be controlled by the Popular Socialist (Communist) party, which is expected to maintain its hard core as a separate entity. Speeches by regime leaders during the 25-26 July celebrations followed familiar lines and held no surprises. Six MIGs were put on public display for the first time on 25 July. No serious Castro-inspired incidents occurred in other Latin American countries on the Cuban anniversary. CONGO . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . 0 . a . . . . . . Page 9 Gizenga's supporters at the parliamentary session in Leopoldville have shown considerable strength, although they are not assured of being able to form a government. Katanga's efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Gizenga and the Soviet bloc are unlikely to elicit a favorable response at this time. However, the American Consulate in Elisabethville believes that Katangan Interior Minister CONFIDENTIAL 'J i BR TEFS Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL 27 July 1961 Munongo, who-has assumed most of Tshomb 's powers, is con- cerned over the rebuffs Katanga has experienced from the West and is not bluffing in his overtures to the Gizengists LAOS . ? s . . . . . . . . . a . . . a . 6 . . . . . , . . Page 10 Formation of a coalition government still appears re- mote. Projected talks in Phnom Penh between Boun Oum and Souvanna Phouma probably will provide little impetus in view of Souphannouvong's boycott. At Geneva, the Communist bloc has taken the position that no agreement can be reached on questions involving internal aspects of Laotian security until a coalition Laotian delegation is formed. The military situation in Laos remains gen- erally quiet, but both sides continue to prepare for the possibility of resumed hostilities. EAST GERMAN REGIME SEEKS TO DETER REFUGEE FLIGHTS . . , , Page 13 The flow of refugees to West Berlin during July has reached the highest rate in recent years. A growing number of East Germans are escaping now in fear that their access to the West through Berlin will become more difficult in the near future. Between 1 and 26 July,. 22,758 persons were registered at the West Ber- lin refugee center. To counter this rise, the regime has resorted to additional police measures. FURTHER SOVIET ARMS AID FOR INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 As a result of negotiations held in Moscow in early June, Soviet military assistance commitments to Indonesia have been increased by more than $75,000,000, raising the total since mid-1960 to over $600,000,000. The increase is accounted for in part by the USSR's agree- ment to provide surface-to-air missiles to the Indone- sian Air Force and by a large rise in expenditures for training. Equipment contracted for earlier this year has begun arriving in Indonesia; two TU-16 jet medium bombers were ferried from the USSR in late June. A ship- ment of MIG-19 jet fighters along with other arms and equipment may be delivered by the end of this summer. BLOC ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AIR SERVICES . . . . Page 15 Aid for the establishment and operation of national commercial air services is becoming an increasingly im- portant part of the bloc's activities in West Africa. Soviet- and Czech-made aircraft will soon be the major carriers on air lines in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. SOUTH KOREA'S ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17 South Korea's military government is striving to over- come the dislocation of business and agriculture which CO !AL ii BRIEFS Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 a"nhli1f1 NT1A1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 July 1961 followed the 16 May coup. The political stability of the regime will continue, however, to be affected by the country's basic economic weakness. The regime, which until recently concentrated on the elimination of corruption and profiteering, is proposing a five-year development plan and a program of spending which appear beyond available resources. NATIONALIZATION IN THE UAR . Page 17 Five decrees issued by President Nasir on 23 July have all but eliminated private enterprise as an important economic force in Egypt and Syria. Almost 400 enter- prises--including all of the UAR's larger firms--were either nationalized outright or brought under effective government control. PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19 Portugal's continuing difficulties in Angola are em- phasized by its mid-July decision to raise troop strength there to double the number considered necessary in May. In Portuguese Guinea, armed clashes have recently occurred between Lisbon's troops and nationalist insurgent elements based in Senegal, which on 25 July severed diplomatic re- lations with Portugal. EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21 The heads of government of the six Common Market (EEC) countries who met in Bonn on 18 July sufficiently submerged basic differences over European political unity to announce a program to strengthen EEC politi- cal ties. The program is essentially a victory for De Gaulle's "confederal" approach--even though he has made some tactical concessions and the Benelux coun- tries in particular remain suspicious that he is under- cutting existing EEC institutions and weakening Con- tinental ties with NATO. Drafting of the proposed Euro- pean "statute," or constitution, a lengthy process at best, will be further complicated by Britain's expected application for EEC membership. BRITISH LABOR PARTY TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . Page 22 A substantial shift since last year in trade union voting on unilateral British nuclear disarmament assures endorsement of Gaitskell's pro-NATO policy at the Labor party conference this fall. This growing sentiment for Labor party unity comes at a time when Britain's wor- sening economic situation has brought the first sub- stantial decline in the Macmillan government's popular standing since the 1959 general elections BRIEFS Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL 27 July 1961 NEW AGRARIAN GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND . . . . . 0 . . . Page 23 Premier Miettunen's minority Agrarian government, formed after a reconvened parliament proved unable to agree on a coalition, contains six new members but will probably pursue the same policies as its predecessor, seeking to reassure the USSR of Finland's strict neutrality. The new cabinet is generally expected to serve until the mid-1962 parliamentary elections. SPECIAL ARTICLES LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The USSR's long-awaited 20-Year Plan for economic development apparently is to be published on 30 July as part of the new draft program of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. The plan will be hailed as the blueprint for catching up with the US economically and for carrying the USSR across the threshold of communism. It will try to provide for more systematic programing for long-range development and to correct economic in--- efficiencies attributed to the lack of continuity in previous planning practices. 25X1 TRENDS OF OPINION IN THE SOVIET YOUNGER GENERATION . . . . Page 4 Soviet youth as depicted in current Russian litera- ture in the main accepts the political and social system in which it finds itself but is unresponsive to the creed upon which the system is based. The philosophically minded seek a more satisfactory reason for existence than is offered in the slogans of the Communist party. Others are increasingly frank in demanding material benefits now, in place of the vague rewards of the Communist future. In an effort to deal with apathy to- ward Soviet slogans the regime has tried to increase discipline among the youth by raising requirements for labor training in the educational system' and Komsomol activity has been stepped up. But neither of these actions seems to have strengthened youth's allegiance to official party goals. INDIA'S FOOD SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 New Delhi's success in expanding annual production of food grains by more than 35 percent during the two five- year plans undertaken since 1951 will almost certainly strengthen the ruling Congress party's position in the nationwide elections scheduled for next winter. A build- up of reserve stocks under PL-480 imports from the TIAL BRIEFS Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 CO FIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 July 1961 United States and New Delhi's vigorous efforts to main- tain the upward trend in food production appear to have established some basis for stability in the food pic- ture. However, the vagaries of weather in any given year will remain an uncertain factor, CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFS Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 I _ CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY WEEKLY REVIEW EAST-WEST RELATIONS Moscow appears to be mark- ing time on the Berlin question, probably pending a full assess- ment of the Western position as set forth in the President's speech of 25 July. The absence of high-level comment on the President's previous statement on Berlin at his press confer- ence of 19 July, together with the routine denunciations of the Western notes of 17 July, suggests that the Soviet leaders are carefully weighing their next move and their reply to the Western notes. The TASS report of the President's address adopted the line that the President had added "his share to the cam- paign of whipping up war hyste- ria." The speech was character- ized as "bellicose" and further proof that the US was using the "so-called threat to Berlin as a pretext to further the arms race." TASS emphasized that the President "admitted" that the US bad actually started the build-up of armaments "immediate- ly after inauguration." The TASS account reported all six defense measures outlined by the President, and devoted con- siderable attention to the Pres- ident's statements on negotia- tions. Top Soviet leaders have indicated an increased interest in sounding out Western repre- sentatives. President Brezhnev solicited the Norwegian ambas- sador's opinion on the general international situation and NATO policies in a recent interview. Presidium member Kozlov did likewise in a conversation with Ambassador Thompson. When the Berlin question was mentioned, however, the Soviet leaders did not pursue the matter. Appar- ently at Soviet urging, Italian Premier. Fanfani is to arrive in Moscow on 2 August. The Soviets 27 July 61 also took the initiative in in- viting Ambassador McCloy to visit Khrushchev on the Black Sea. The bloc position, as con- tained in a series of speeches and statements last week, con- tinues to feature the themes of readiness to negotiate but pre- paredness to deal with any West- ern military moves. Khrushchev, for the first time in recent weeks, passed up the Berlin is- sue in a speech honoring the visit of the Sudanese premier. However, in his greetings to the World Youth Forum, which opened in Moscow on 25 July, Khrushchev accused the West of creating a "hotbed of war" by refusing to conclude a peace treaty and re- solve the Berlin problem. Speaking at a Polish recep- tion on Poland's national day, Kozlov warned that the bloc had enough modern weapons "to re- buff a new march to the East." He emphasized that the USSR would like a joint solution of the Ger- man question with the Western powers, but cited Khrushchev to the effect that Moscow would not engage in endless talks. The Khrushchev-Brezhnev congratula- tory telegram stated that the Polish and Soviet people were fighting for the elimination of the remnants of the last war by "immediately signing a peace treaty with Germany." Polish party leader Gomulka echoed this line in a speech on 21 July and stated that the bloc would con- clude a separate peace treaty "toward the end of the year" if the West rejected "our out- stretched hand." East German politburo member Norden asserted that a peace treaty would be signed this year. Bulgarian Premier Yugov referred to the "earliest" conclusion of a peace treaty. The hardening of the Soviet propaganda line was also evident in an unusual attack on CONFIDENTIAL WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 PAKICInCAITIA1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY De Gaulle by a Pravda "observer" the by-line used to signify the endorsement of the top leader- ship. De Gaulle was accused of following in Adenauer's wake and playing the role of Musso- lini to Adenauer's Hitler. Despite the strident tone of Soviet and bloc statements and the continuing emphasis on the "war psychosis" in the US, the Soviet leaders probably hope to avoid a series of moves and countermoves which would force a further build-up of tensions. This is reflected in the con- tinued complaints by high Soviet officials that the West is de- liberately creating a crisis atmosphere, and distorting the Soviet position. Ambassador Thompson believes that before the party congress in October Khrushchev will move to bring about an agreement on negotia- tions, even if the date might be fixed for after the congress. He also believes that the acute political embarrassment of the refugee flow and the Soviet re- luctance-to sanction drastic measures against it will pro- vide further incentives for Khrushchev to initiate a move for negotiations. Information on Khrushchev's talks with Yugoslav Foreign Min- ister,P?povic earlier this month suggests that expectations of Western disunity over Berlin and pressures within the West for negotiations are among the principal considerations shaping Khrushch.ev's current stand. Khrushchev appeared confident of his Ability to settle the Berlin question on his terms, because of a conviction that "sensible Western statesmen" would not permit the issue to develop into a conflict. Khru- shche,v also seemed convinced that current US policy was being set by Adenauer and did not represent:"real" US interests and that US interests in Berlin are mainly a matter of prestige. He also assured Popovic that 31 December was not a deadline, and the USSR would be willing to continue negotiations, pro- vided the talks were not dragged out "indefinitely." The stress on negotiations continues to appear in Soviet propaganda and in unofficial statements. Pravda urged on 21 July that the issues be resolved at the negotiating table. ~ A So- viet Foreign Ministry official, in a conversation with a US Embassy officer, also implied that there was room for a com- promise settlement. He stated that the question of the bound- aries of Germany was more im- portant than the question of Berlin, although a decision was needed on the latter. He re- ferred to the northern, south- ern, and eastern boundaries, presumably meaning Western ac- ceptance of the Oder-Neisse line and the Czech frontiers. In anticipation of the neutralist conference in Bel- grade in September, the Soviet charge in Djakarta on 24 July presented the Soviet position on Berlin to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. This move is consistent with Moscow's attempt to influence Yugoslav opinion during the visit of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic earlier this month . 25X1 27 July 61 CONFIDENTIAL Y Page 2 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY NORTH AFRICA Bizerte President Bourguiba ap- parently will seek another meet- ing of the UN Security Council to charge that France has failed to comply with the council's 22 July resolution urging an immediate cease-fire at Bizerte and the withdrawal of forces to positions held before hostil- ities began on 19 July. Before the tenuous truce was effected on Sunday, French forces had secured all access routes to their base complex. A formal cease-fire has yet to be ar- ranged because the French base commander and the Tunisian pro- vincial governor, who have been charged with securing an agree- ment, have not agreed on a site for the meeting. France is re- ported to have suggested a "neutral spot" outside Bizerte for the meeting. Bourguiba may have in- tended to forestall a similar move by the USSR when he stated on 25 July that he wanted an- other meeting of the Security Council. An American UN offi- cial had a hint on 24 July from Georgy Arkadyev, highest rank- ing Soviet national in the Secretariat, that the USSR might call for another council meeting. This official estimates that if the French do not comply promptly with the council reso- lution, there will be a further meeting on 28 July "and a special General Assembly session next week." Hammarskjold, who arrived in Tunis on 24 July at Bour- guiba's invitation, is reported hopeful that he can persuade both the Tunisians and the French to conform to the reso- lution, in which case "it would not be too difficult for the parties to reach a negotiating posture." Negotiations, however, would be complicated both by fears of reprisals by the siz- able French colony in Bizerte and by Tunisian action in de- taining and expelling French citizens and seizing French properties throughout Tunisia. Bourguiba on 25 July re- newed his demands that France evacuate the base and reit- erated his appeal for foreign volunteers, citing a need for guerrilla fighters, technicians, and arms to augment his crippled army. The return of the 3,100 Tunisian troops from the Congo will boost morale, but Bour- guiba feels a need for something more than pledges of solidarity and is seeking at least a token international force. There is still no evidence that Tunisia is soliciting Sino- Soviet bloc assistance, despite the fact that Tunisian officials --including Ambassador Habib 25X1 Bourguiba, Jr., in Washington? have hinted that Tunisia mi ht turn to the Soviet Union. The Bizerte crisis and Bourguiba's feeling that the West betrayed him at this junc- ture are expected to be reflect- ed in a modification of his policy of pro-Western nonalign- ment, 'and anti-Western tenden- cies which Bourguiba has here- tofore held in check are likely to emerge. Although he has sought to remain aloof from Middle Eastern entanglements and has quarreled bitterly with Nasir, he is now committed to resume full membership in the Arab League and to re-establish diplomatic relations with the UAR. Renewal of these ties, however, is not likely to elim- inate wholly the suspicion with which Arab leaders generally re- gard'Bourguiba and his aspirations &A-r-11 &AWINOr CONFIDENTIAL 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 3 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 (/'1RIPlma'av-s?^ m a Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Estimated Ground Force Strength in Bizerte 1400-1600 Total Regular Tunisian Ground Forces 21,500 Air and Navy 2,500 (insignificant capability) T U N I S I A ? Infantry Paratroops Armored Reconnaissance ? Anti-aircraft (automatic weapons) Transportation Ef] Company rl~ Battalion rL~ Regiment 2 Marine Infantry 3 Marine Infantry 2 Foreign Legion 3 Foreign Legion 9 Chasseurs 356 Mobile Gendarmes IDENTIAL 8 Hussard 2,500 estimated) (Ground Forces Reinforcements 20 July to date- 2,900 estimated) French Naval Forces 1 Aircraft carrier ("Arromanches") I Light anti-aircraft cruiser ("Colbert") 1 Cruiser ("De Grasse") 2 Destroyers 5 Patrol craft 21 Mine sweepers 2 Auxiliary vessels Total shore personnel 1,200 French Air Forces 2 Squadrons Jet Fighters (24 Mystere IV-A) 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 4 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY to become a leading Arab and African statesman. Algerian Support Leaders of the provisional Algerian government (PAG) have made strong public statements condemning the "French aggres- sion" against Tunisia, pledged Algerian solidarity with their Tunisian brothers, and imple- mented their 21 July offer of men and equipment to assist Bour uiba. These PAG moves are, how- ever, designed more to display solidarity and to establsh a future bargaining position against Bourguiba's Saharan claims than to indicate a real intent to become embroiled in Bourguiba's struggle with the PAG leaders m pr o-r knowledge of Bourguiba's inten- tions in forcing the Bizerte issue and privately are opposed to his actions and apparently not too displeased with the "thrashing" given him by the French. Repercussions in France Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on 24 July called the situation at Bizerte "very serious." He noted some French officials feel that the "con- trived" origin of the affair was not adequately reflected in the UN debate and that the image of a small country as the victim of aggression was allowed to blur Tunisian re- sponsibility. Moreover, the airlift repatriation of Tu- nisian troops from the Congo in UN-chartered American planes appears to Paris as an example of France's friends' helping another country in an operation against France. In addition to the dangers of renewed hostilities and to the rising international crit- icism of France's position, the Bizerte affair threatens to undermine De Gaulle's Al- gerian policy and France's close relations with its for- mer colonies in tropical Africa. The US Embassy in Paris be- lieves that domestic opinion is bound to question the futil- ity of negotiating- with the Algerians and to wonder about the value of a regime whose policy leads it into this sort of contradiction. Bourguiba's action has in effect forced De Gaulle to depart, at least temporarily, from his decoloni- zation policy, which has been seriously criticized by army and civilian rightist opposi- tion elements. Meanwhile, there are fur- ther indications of the extent of military and rightist op- position to De Gaulle. In- terior Minister Roger Frey told Ambassador Gavin on 19 July that he regarded the army as "the most serious problem" confronting France. This state- ment was made prior to the CONFIDENTIAL 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 5 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 )CL AG I NNW* CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Bizerte episode, which the em- bassy believes has probably in- creased the number of officers willing to listen to rightist plotters who argue that Bour- guiba, a supposedly "good" Arab, has demonstrated the essential untrustworthiness of Arabs in general and the danger of rely- ing on any agreements with them, particularly with the PAG. The French-Algerian Talks The talks between the French and Algerians which resumed at Lugrin on 20 July, though ob- scured by the clash over Bizerte, have continued despite initial fears that the Bizerte issue might provoke one side or the other to call another recess. Both sides, after some initial sparring, have apparently agreed on an agenda and a method of work. This agreement almost certainly is due to France's willingness to discuss the Sahara issue--it was discussed on 25 July and is scheduled to be continued on 27 July--which heretofore it has refused to do, maintaining that the Sahara was a question apart from any Algerian settlement. It is still not clear just how far the French are willing to go to meet the PAG demand for recognition of the terri- torial integrity of Algeria: including the Sahara, but the PAG has consistently held that once this was recognized, it saw no major obstacles to a fairly rapid settlement. According to the PAG, France has indicated a willing- ness to discuss the economic and joint exploitation of the Sahara to which the PAG had agreed, although it indicated it wanted to discuss the Saharan issue within the con- text of the question of Al- gerian sovereignty and terri- torial integrity. The PAG has reportedly regarded the French threat to exclude the Sahara from an Algerian settle- ment as a greater threat than partition and has indicated that it realized it must bargain to obtain sovereignty. The PAG maintains that "something can be worked out" on the question of guarantees for European settlers, but it in turn must have firm guarantees in the transition period and during a referendum, including curbs on the French Army and the "ultras," which it fears may again try to thwart De Gaulle. It adds that a de facto halt in PAG military and terroristic operations may be possible "if an agreement is in sight." SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 6 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Algerian rebel leaders say the threat to partition northern Algeria is a bluff which the French know could never be car- ried out. This ostensible dis- missal of partition is probably more bluster than real convic- tion, suggesting that while the PAG will continue to stand firm on Algerian control of the Sahara,) the threat of partition is prob- ably exerting pressure on it to modify its position on other. issues, The PAG DOW reportedly in- tends to hold a meeting of the 62-member National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) in Tripoli in the first or second week of August regardless of the state of the talks, The CNRA meeting would require the attend- ance of most of the PAG awe oti- ~atino team. CUBA Fidel Castro's speech, in which he announced the amalga- mation of Cuban political, mil- itary, labor, and other reg ime- c;ontroll.ed organs into a single "'united party of Cuba's social- 1st revolution," featured the -two-day celebrations of his 26 July anniversary, He declared that the unity drive had started some months ago and still has not been finally con- :?uded, The speeches of Castro and other regime leaders fol- lowed familiar lines and con-- 7-a fined no surprises. The crowds assembled to hear the speeches on 26 July, estimated by the press to number 200,000, were smaller than those on some simi- lar occasions in the past. The new "unified" political organization has long been ad- vocated by Cuba's Popular So- cialist (Communist) party (PSP), which has been the only effec- tive Politic,-i party in exist- ence during Castro' s two and one- ha If years in fl'oWer The PSP wi.II probably control the new mass organizatic,rn, and will probably a:is" maintain its rel- atively small hard core as a separate entity. The celebrations, which :lea Lured on 25 July the first public display of six of Cuba's newly acquired MIG jet aircraft, were publicly termed Cuba's "first socialist 2Gth of July" and were dominated by expres- sions of support from the Sino- Soviet bloc..? Guest of honor Yuri Gagar;tn publicly pledged the "armed help of the Soviet people" in Cuba's "fight to-r., freedom and independence." There was no development on 26 July to justify the fears SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW"' Page 7 -r Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 - -MURE I' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY that bad been expressed in world and taught it the path several other Latin American of its redemption." countries that pro-Castro agitators would use the Cuban anniversary to cause disturb- Although many foreign gov- ances elsewhere in the hemisphere. ernments sent specially accred- There were, in fact, well pub- ited delegations to Havana for licized anti-Castro demonstra- the 26 July events, there is tions among Mexican students evidence that some Western na- and in Panama. tions refused to send represen- tativeas In addition to the pres- ence in Cuba of Yuri Gagarin and special delegations from several bloc countries, the bloc's observation of the an- niversary was made evident through messages of congratu- lation' to Castro from Khru- shchev, Chou En-lai, and other Sino-Soviet leaders. The mes- sages contained the customary assurances of "'friendship" with Cuba and included stereotyped pledges of "assistance" to the Cubans in the event of "im- perialist aggression." Cuban propaganda media reacted enthusiastically to the visit of Gagarin and other indications of Soviet "soli" darity" with Cuba, One Havana broadcast stated. "We cannot forget that our victory of to- day and all victories of the Cuban revolution are the fruit and the genuine product of the great international revolution which started in October, which caused Russia to become the cradle of socialism, and which elevated the proletariat of the Hundreds of Castro sym- pathizers and representatives of pro-Communist labor and po- litical organizations from other Latin American countries were brought to Havana at Cuban expense to take art in the celebration 25X1 at least some of the ne ega es will remain in Cuba SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 8 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Recent information from Leopoldville confirms that Gi- zenga's forces are making a strong showing at the current session of parliament, although they are not assured of being able to form a government. The past week has been highlighted by efforts by the Katanga lead- ership to break out of their political isolation by means of a rapprochement with Gizenga and the Soviet bloc. The American charge in Leo- poldville reports that the situ- ation in parliament is extreme- ly fluid. A Gizengist has been elected president of the lower house., but a moderate has been chosen as head of'the Senate. Although the Stanleyville group has demonstrated considerable strength, there are indications of rivalry between Gizenga and the head of his parliamentary delegation, Christophe Gbenye. The senior UN representa- tive, Sture Linner, has stated that he is concerned about the security situation in Leopold- ville, in that General Mobutu on 25 July had demanded virtual operational control of Leopold- ville airport. Linner fears that if things do not develop as Mobutu desires, he will en- deavor to block the return of Gizenga's deputies to Stanley- ville. The American Consulate in Elisabethville has characterized Katanga strong man Munongo as "hot bluffing" in his threat to deal with the Gizengists and the Soviets, even though any such rapprochement would be against his personal convictions. The reaction in Elisabethville to Munongo's demarche reportedly was one of regret that Western and UN pressures had pushed the Katangans to such extremes. 'There is, however, no information to confirm Munongo's claim of 24 July that Gizenga has replied favorably to a Katangan bid for a rapprochement, or that the USSR had offered "peaceful aid" to Katanga. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has quoted the Soviet ambassador to Brussels as assuring him that the USSR would never support Tshombe or Munongo, and that it was con- tinuing its unequivocal support of Gizenga. Tshombe's exact status in Elisabethville remains unclear. Although the British consul has stated that he saw him on 22 July, at which time his health seemed improved, Tshombe has not made a public appearance since 11 July. The British con- sul quoted Tshombe and Munongo as reaffirming Katanga's willing- ness to attend parliament after a preliminary "summit" confer- ence. While Tshombe's and Munongo's remarks suggest that they are in basic accord on policy matters, the Belgian con- sul general believes Tshombe has been stripped of consider- able powers. There continue to be reports of unrest in the Katangan army. Reports concerning Gizen- ga's possible attendance at parliament are contradictory. An American Embassy officer who visited Stanleyville reports that Gizenga's illness appears real, but that the Yugoslav, UAR, and Soviet charges have all urged him to lead his par- liamentary delegation in Leo- poldville. Gizenga may be con- cerned about maintaining the security of his Stanleyville stronghold in the face of con- tinuing friction with the Orien- tale and Kivu provincial govern- ments~and unrest in his army. For- eign Minister Spaak believes that unless Gizenga is satisfied with the "Gizengist" coloration of the new Congo government, he will simply continue his separa- tist regime in Stanleyville. The past week has brought a considerable bolstering of the pro-Gizenga diplomatic SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Tom Li j-A , I.J 1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY contingent in Stanleyville. A chartered aircraft, flying in from Cairo, brought three Czech diplomats to reinforce the Czech Embassy in Stanley- The factions led by Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Sou- phannouvong have drifted further apart since last month when they reached agreement in principle at Zurich to form a coalition government. A new factor in the situation is the split that has at least temporarily devel- oped between Souvanna and Sou- phannouvong over procedures for implementing a coalition. Souvanna, who returned to Phnom Penh from Paris on 22 July, has invited Boun Oum and Sou- phannouvong to meet with him there to arrange the division of portfolios and designation of a premier preparatory to go- ing to Luang Prabang to receive royal approval. Boun Oum ac- cepted, but Souphannouvong is opposed to going to Phnom Penh on the grounds that since agree- ment in principle already ex- ists, representatives Of the three leaders can handle the de- tails at Namone. Souvanna's stated reason for preferring Phnom Penh as a discussion site --his health--has some basis, since he is recovering from what apparently was a fairly serious operation performed during his recent stay in France. Souvanna appears somewhat dismayed by this new show of Souphannouvong's intransigence, which last March forced him to reverse an agreement reached with General Phoumi in Phnom Penh on the outlines for reach- ing a reconciliation in Laos. Souvanna undoubtedly is also disturbed by indications that his political lieutenants are coming increasingly under Com- munist influence. Souvanna has instructed Quinim Pholsena, his freewheel- ing representative at Geneva, to conduct himself in a neu- tral manner. He is making ar- rangements with Air Laos and the French to acquire his own plane and pilot to lessen the dependence of his re- gime on Communist bloc trans- port. He is also in the proc- ess of organizing. his own po- litical party in Xieng Khouang, which will compete for sup- port with the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party. Nev- ertheless, his ability to take a meaningful independent stand is problematical. Despite the Vientiane government's readiness to meet with Souvanna in Phnom Penh, it apparently is not yet reconciled to having him become premier. SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY General Phoumi, who displays much more confidence now than at the time of the Zurich con- ference, apparently is in no Lao Kay ' Phong Saly- m od to make concessions. Tliiere seems to be little coor- dination imp Vientiane on what strategy to adopt in the talks NAMTHA , ??ti"r ^-... Mu?Ang Sai Nam Bac' I.'4: Sam eua Luang Prabayrg%))...... ... \~ w . .per. ,MuangSouL Arp_ e^ Phou houn; Muong assy Va gyreng f 1 moni TH(AI L A N SECRET CAMBODIA 27 July 6l WEEKLY REVIEW 11 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 ,%NW SECRET -Name CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY with Souvanna, which are still contemplated despite Souphan- nouvong's negative attitude.. Phoumi, confronted by conflict- ing power interests in his own ranks, has remarked that he is having more trouble working out a position with his own govern- ment than he expects to have with Souvanna. King Savang arrived in Vientii .ne on 25 July for discus- sions concerning formation of a coalition government and has agreed to accept full powers en- abling him to appoint a new gov- ernment without reference to the National Assembly. The as- sembly is expected shortly to pass an amendment to the con- stitution to give the King this authority. Savang, however, continues to resist Phoumi's importuning that he assume the premiership himself, realizing that the Pathet Lao would never accept such a solution. The military situation con- tinues to be characterized by scattered skirmishes, ambushes, and localized movements of op- posing forces. Phoumi, uncon- vinced that a political solution can be found, is working on con- tingency plans for resumption of hostilities after the rainy sea- son ends in November. Phoumi, meanwhile, is en- gaging some of his forces in "an'ti-guerrilla" clearing opera- tions, principally in Luang Pra- bang Province,' Although these operatiofls are still limited, the trend hems to be toward an? increasingly large scale, in- volving se `oral companies in a single mission. A Pathet Lao broadcast of 21 July, quoted by Hanoi radio, complained that from 3 May to 30 June "rebel troops of the Savannakhet group" had occupied fifteen strong points of the "patriotic Laotian forces" in Vientiane and Luang Prabang provinces. Although the Geneva con- ferees have reached agreement on the order in which various sections of the neutrality and .control drafts will be consid- ered, the Soviet delegation, ha,s maintained its position that it will withhold agreement to any item which would commit a future Laotian government on any aspect of neutrality obligations. In preliminary talks on the proce- dure to be followed by the con- ference, the USSR has maintained that in the absence of a single .united Laotian delegation no agreement can be reached in a discussion, of questions which involve the future course of action of the Lao government. This stand is consistent with the bloc's contentions that the Zurich talks set the keynote for resolving all internal as- pects of the Laotian situation and probably reflects the Commu- nists' belief that by gaining acceptance in principle of this position, they will be able to restrict future conference de- liberation on the substantive issues of control. The bloc's adamancy on this point also re- flects?optimism that future talks between the three princes will ultimately lead to the for- mation of a coalition government favorable to Communist interests and one which will stanchly re- fuse-.tpi:, ;ccept?:any control- mechanism over which it does not Okercise a final veto. SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 12 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 SECRET EAST GERMAN REGIME SEEKS TO DETER REFUGEE FLIGHTS The 'flow of refugees to West Berlin during July has reached the highest rate in recent years, as an increasing number of East Germans have decided that they should flee now, rather than risk having access to Berlin denied to them at a later date. Between 1 and 26 July, 22,758 were registered at the West Berlin refugee center. To counter the rising flow, the regime has resorted to additional police measures. On 21 July, the US Mission in Berlin observed a general tightening of police controls on the East - West Berlin sec- tor border and at elevated railroad (S-Bahn) stations in East Berlin adjacent to the sector border. While these measures were probably intended to discourage attendance at the Evangelical Church's All- German Congress (Kirchentag) which ended on 23 July, they were also designed to cut the refugee flow into Berlin, and apparently continue in effect. Travelers arriving in West Berlin on 25 July via the Hamburg-Berlin expressway re- ported that they had been halted about 25 miles outside the city and requested to show their identity cards before proceeding. In an effort to intimidate potential defectors, the East German regime has launched a propaganda campaign against the "slave trade" in refugees allegedly carried out by West German and American "head hunters" in West Berlin. Simul- taneously they conducted a campaign denying reports of food shortages in East Germany. In the opinion of Am- bassador Thompson in Moscow, the USSR has been reluctant to sanction unilateral East German action to put an end to the refugee flow, because it is un- willing to advertise the weak- ness of the Ulbricht regime, and believes that such action would weaken the bloc's position in negotiations with the West. Thompson believes that Moscow will make an early move for negotiations, hoping thus to re- duce the refugee flow to tolera- ble proportions. Refugees recently inter- rogated at West Berlin's Marien- felde reception center report that the East German population is irritated by long-standing political and economic griev- ances and current shortages of dairy products, fruits and veg- etables, and potatoes. None of the refugees interviewed, however, was aware of any or- ganized resistance group in East Germany, although some had heard of minor demonstrations in certain factories. In rural areas, however, unrest and passive resistance among farmers--with resulting adverse effects on agricultural work--have increased. On 21 July, Ulbricht in a formal address at Markkleeberg, near Leipzig, for- mally reiterated the regime's commitment to full collectiviza- tion, but indicated that "per- suasion," rather than overt co- ercion, was to be used to induce farmers to work collectively. The refugee flow includes an increasing number of "border crossers"--East Berliners who work in West Berlin--a group against which the regime has imposed economic sanctions in an effort to force them into jobs in East Berlin or East Germany. Several "border crossers" said that they had been evicted from their apart- ments in East Berlin when they refused to give up their jobs in West Berlin. Flights of "border crossers," which had ranged from 22 to 24 a week in June and early July, jumped to 60 in the week ending 15 July and to 181 last week. The regime nevertheless is intensifying Its SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Page 13 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY campaign against such elements. Potsdam District has fallen into line in imposing economic sanc- tions against "border crossers." Reportedly there have also been some arrests on charges of "smug- ;ling." 51 Separate annual statistics for West Berlin and West Germany not avail- able prior to 1555. I I 1 1960 JULY wfiT 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL M AY JUNE JULY (;1~; ~"f )A 11 JULY 1961 SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW DAILY TOTALS SINCE 8 JULY 1961 Page 14 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 9 0 I Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 ", .~... ?JJ L iWAV CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY FURTHER SOVIET ARMS AID FOR INDONESIA As a result of negotiations held in Moscow in early June, Soviet military assistance com- mitments to Indonesia have been increased more than $75,000,000, raising the total since mid-1960 to over $600,000,000, The in- crease is accounted for in part by the USSR's agreement to pro- vide surface-to-air missiles to the Indonesian Air Force and by a large rise in expenditures for training. Equipment con- tracted for earlier this year has begun arriving in Indonesia; two TU-16 jet medium bombers were ferried from the USSR in late June and additional de- liveries will probably be made shortly. A shipment of MIG-19 jet fighters along with other arms and equipment may be deliv- ered by the end of this summer. In addition to surface-to- air missiles for several battal- ions under the new agreement, the air force had previously arranged for six of the 20 TU- 16s it is to receive to be equipped with air-to-surface missiles and for the 20 MIG-21s --on order for 1962--to be armed with air-to-air missiles. The army also is scheduled under the original agreement to receive missiles, probably surface-to- air, for three battalions; and the navy has contracted for 12 motor torpedo boats which are to be equipped with surface-to- 25X1 surface missiles. new contracts negotiate y the army, includ- ing one for 15 K-61 tracked amphibians, raise its total purchases from the USSR more than $30,000,000 to a total of $122,000,000. The latest agreement brings Sino-Soviet bloc military assist- ance to Indonesia to over $830,- 000,000; over-all economic assist than $540,000,000 BLOC ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AIR SERVICES Aid for the establishment and operation of national com- mercial air services is becoming an increasingly important facet of the bloc's activities in West Africa. Such aid provides a further opportunity for the bloc to identify itself with the na- tionalist aims of new African governments and at the same time enables bloc nations to enhance their prestige over a wide area of the continent. Soviet- and Czech-made aircraft, familiar to Africans through their partic- ipation in the Congo operation, are now, or soon will be, the major if not the only aircraft operated on air lines in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. In each of these countries, recently estab- lished public air lines are displacing services formerly provided by the British and French. The IL-18 turboprop, which has a capacity of from 75 to 100 persons, and the IL-14, with a capacity of about 24 persons, are the principal passenger planes being supplied to Africa by the bloc. At least 12 IL-18s and 7 IL-14s have been contracted for by the three West African states. Other smaller aircraft being supplied include the AN-2 biplane (used primarily for crop spraying) and the MI-2 heli- copter. Credits totaling SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 15 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 lqw SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY over $21,000,000 have been ex- tended by Czechoslovakia and the USSR for these purchases. Other types of aircraft may soon appear in Africa. Ghana is reported-to have con- tracted to purchase the AN-12 turboprop military transport for use in carrying commercial cargo. It is also rumored that the Ghanaian officials accom- panying President Nkrumah on his current visit to bloc countries are prepared to dis- cuss the purchase of jet pas- senger planet if negotiations with the West for such aircraft fall through. Probably the most signifi- cant long-run feature of the bloc program is the provision of training facilities. Over 125 nationals of Guinea, Ghana, and Mali are training in the bloc and reportedly will be ready in two years to take over operation and maintenance of their country's newly acquired aircraft. In the interim, the bloc is providing both ground and aircrews for each of the planes delivered. An esti- mated 150 such bloc technicians are now working in West Africa, and more are scheduled to ar- rive soon. The greatest concentration of bloc aid for civil air lines has been in Guinea. Last year Czechoslovakia extended that nation a $2,000,000 credit for the establishment of Air Guinea, including the purchase of four IL-14s. These Czech planes plus two Soviet-built IL-18s, all operating in Guinea, form the nucleus of Guinea's air line. Four Czech experts, one the director of Air Guinea, are in Conakry managing the line. Moreover, the USSR has provided a $2,100,000 credit for enlarg- ing and modernizing the airport facilities in Conakry and has sent some 20 technicians to the city 'for this purpose. 27 July 61 Recent developments indi- cate that in the future Mali may be a center for bloc civil air activities in Africa. After the evacuation of French military personnel next month the USSR reportedly expects to use the airport at Bamako as a central base for the maintenance of bloc aircraft ir} West Africa. The center presumably will service not only bloc-built aircraft owned by Air Guinea, Ghana Air- ways, and Air Mali but also planes of the Czech and Soviet airlines during their flights in the area. About 50 Soviet technicians are expected to arrive in Bamako in the next month to begin this operation. Such a facility in Africa would be of great value-- particularly for servicing IL-18s, which now must make frequent trips back to Moscow for engine over- haul. The Czechs had hoped to take over the operation of the control towers at the airport, but final. agreement on this ar- rangement is 'in doubt. A Czech has recently been named special assistant for Malian civil avia- tion with full responsibility for all civil air affairs in- cluding Air Mali. In March, Mali contracted with the USSR to purchase two .I,L- 18s, three IL-14s, an unknown number of AN-2s, and some heli- copters. Czechoslovakia last month extended a special credit of $2,500,000 to Mali, about $1,- 000,000 for the purchase of planes and $1,500,000 for air training. Ghana has purchased eight IL-18s from the USSR, six of which have been delivered and are now operating in Africa. In addition, Moscow earlier presented Nkrumah with a gift helicopter. Although the :airport at Accra continues to be managed by a BOAC employee, the bloc's influ- ence there is predominant--about 100 bloc technicians are employed to service aircraft ac uire- from the USSR. 25X1 25X1 SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 '"NOV SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY A paucity of natural re- sources, severely limited ex- port potential, and lack of managerial and technical per- sonnel will handicap efforts by the South Korean military re- gime to promote political stability by satisfying wide- spread expectations for im- proved economic conditions. A two-month campaign by the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) to eradicate corruption and prof- iteering has led to the ouster of 20,000 of the country's 240,000 civil servants, and an- other 20,000 are expected to be dismissed. Seventeen leading businessmen, the core of the nation's industrial and finan- cial leadership, have been ar- rested for illegal accumulation of wealth--calculated at more than30,000,Od through tax R evasion, misuse df bank loans, and political kickbacks. Thir- teen of those arrested were re- leased after they offered to surrender to the government all their assets, including indus- trial facilities. It is still uncertain whether the SCNR will take over these facilities. The moves against business- men and a decree limiting in- terest rates on loans to 20 per- cent per annum have resulted in industrial, commercial, and fi- nancial stagnation. This decree, designed primarily to protect farmers against exploitation by money lenders, has made farm credit scarce. The SCNR has not improved the employment situation; approximately 25 per- cent of the labor force is out of work. As a long-term solution, the SCNR has drafted a five-year economic development program calling for the establishment of an industrial base which would include cement manufacture, oil and steel production, and oil refining--all requiring heavy imports of raw materials. More immediately, the SCNR is launching a series of spending schemes to assist the farmer, increase the pay of civil serv- ants, raise veterans' benefits, expand public works projects, and finance a mass political organization. }+ flat ion. There are signs the gov- ernment spending program is re- storing some confidence within the business community and that some economic revival is under way. At the same time, however, despite governmental econom es, which include a cutback in Me- fense expenditures, there are not enough funds to finance the official programs. In all prob- ability the SCNR will have to re- sort to deficit financing, with a consequent resumption of in- NATIONALIZATION IN THE UAR On 23 July, on the eve of the ninth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, President Nasir issued five economic de- crees with the avowed purpose of "furthering the country's socialist policy." The decrees reflect Nasir's intention to avoid doctrinaire socialism while moving toward his concept of a "socialistic, democratic, cooperative society." SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 17 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 W SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY In Egypt and Syria, 149 companies and organizations of "a national character" were completely nationalized. These include all banks and insurance companies, both foreign and locally owned, and most trans- port, timber, cement, metal, and some chemical and fertilizer companies. Payment for seized property is to be in the form of long-term government bonds. Another decree calls for the government to have majority cap- ital participation in an addi- tional 91 companies in both regions, including at least one Western-owned oil company (Anglo- Egyptian Oilfields Ltd.) in which British interests pre- dominate. In addition, the maximum individual capital participation in a list of 159 specified in- dustries is limited to about $29,000. This is designed chiefly to break up large enter- prises owned by wealthy Egyptians. Other regulations set limits on profits, order 25 percent of profits, distributed among the workers, and institute a sharp- ly graduated income tax. Other decrees' issued two days later limited individual land owner- ship in Egypt to about 100 acres --about half the amount allowed under the 1952 land reform pro- gram. Thus agriculture continues to be based on the small family farm, but is increasingly being molded into a state-dominated cooperative pattern. Earlier decrees had nation- alized the cotton trade with other countries, as well as the concerns handling most other imports and exports. While com- panies with interests held by nationals of other Arab countries and other foreign nationals were affected, American firms were excepted. Some impetus for the decrees probably stems from Nasir's de- sire to eliminate sources of political opposition, but his basic motivation appears to be economic. The UAR President probably has been heartened and emboldened by the economic as well as the political successes of the revolution. His regime has halted the the economic de- cline which had characterized the Egyptian economy since shortly after the turn of the century. Production in all sectors has increased substantially, and, despite limited resources and a burdensome population increase, per capita gross national prod- uct has been rising. The goals'of the UAR's economic plans have been deliberately set; high, however, and even with sub- stantial foreign aid--both Western and Communist--success requires a complete marshaling of domestic resources. The UAR planners evidently felt that providing the economic incentives necessary to ensure full partici- pation by the private sector would be too costly or only par- tially successful. Although the Egyptian and Syrian business communities had long expected Nasir's action, the suddenness of its execution probably stunned and angered both groups. Some opposition can be expected, par- ticularly in Syria, but this is not likely to be translated into effective action. In addition, the government's success in pre- vious economic moves suggests that reaction to the latest de- crees will have little or no negative effect on the country's economic development. 25X1 SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 of 2.3 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 *"W 3LUXr, I _"O CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN DIFFICULTIES Portugal's continuing dif- ficulties in Angola are empha- sized by its recent decision to raise troop strength there to double the number considered necessary in May. In Portu- guese Guinea, armed clashes have occurred recently between Lisbon's troops and nationalist insurgent elements based in Senegal, which on 25 July severed diplomatic relations with Portu- gal. If the disorders in Portu- guese Guinea become widespread, Portuguese criticism of the United States for "encouraging" African self-determination can be expected to reach new heights. V?LT S CAMEROOWS SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 19 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The failure of Portuguese forces to bring the five-month- old Angola rebellion under con- trol has led to reassessments in Lisbon. In mid-May, Colonel Arriaga, then under secretary of air, told the US Embassy the rebellion would be crushed by early September, a date which now appears to have been overly optimistic. The chief of staff of the armed forces has gone to Angola to step up pacification efforts before the September rainy sea- son permits the rebels to in- tensify guerrilla activity. Portuguese troops are to be re- inforced from the mid-July level of about 26,000 to a strength of 40,000. The air strength build-up reportedly includes 12 British-made heli- copters recently purchased in West Germany and 12 jet fighter bombers. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira told the UN subcom- mittee chairman on Angola last week that he would provide the chairman with well-documented evidence that the UN troops of Ghana and India trained, armed, and supplied the terrorists in the lower Congo. Nogueira warned that Portugal might find it necessary to cross over into the Congo to stop the interfer- ence at its source. Portugal has given the sub- committee chairman access to some records in Lisbon, but Salazar told him on 21 July that the subcommittee would not be allowed to visit Angola. Nogueira told the British am- bassador it would be allowed to enter when UN subcommittees got permission to visit Hungary and South Africa. The subcommittee is currently drafting its report, although the chairman believes that it cannot produce a "real- istic" report without going to Angola. The possibility of an- other Security Council meeting or even a special session of the General Assembly will be in- creased by the submission of a negative report from the sub- committee. Senegal-based elements of the Portuguese-Guinean national- ist movement clashed with Portu- guese forces near the border with Senegal on at least three occasions since 18 July. Sene- gal, claiming violations of its air space and other "illegal ac- tivities" on the part of Portu- gal, broke diplomatic relations with Portugal on 25 July. Lis- bon had anticipated trouble in Portuguese Guinea for many months but had expected that border incursions would come from the Republic of Guinea, since Sekou Tourd admits expan- sionist designs. If extensive terrorism does break out in Por- tuguese Guinea, anti-US attitudes in Portugal--already widespread among officials and the public-- will be intensified. The Lisbon press has taken its cue from Premier Salazar's address to the National Assembly on 30 June in which he complained that the US stand in the UN en- couraged African nationalism. Ambassador Elbrick reported on 7 July, "There is no question but that the US is now identi- fied as public enemy number one." This attitude presages diffi- culty for renegotiation of the Azores bases agreement, which expires at the end of 1962., 25X1 SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 20 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING After two years of dispute over various aspects of De Gaulle's proposals for a Euro- pean "confederation," the Common Market (EEC) countries have submerged their differences sufficiently to announce agree- ment on measures designed to strengthen their political ties. Meeting in Bonn on 18 July, the EEC heads of government issued a kind of manifesto reaffirming political unification as their explicit goal and setting up regular "summit" and ministerial meetings as a step in this direction, The six leaders also instructed an existing committee to develop a European "statute," or constitution, and to examine other measures intended to promote political integration. This agreement is in many respects a victory for De Gaulle; Paris is elated, and Brussels and The Hague--which have been most suspicious of De Gaulle's views--are accordingly depressed. However, a number of observers believe that both De Gaulle and his opponents have given ground. The Dutch, for example, who steadfastly opposed con- sideration of defense issues in a six-nation framework, have now agreed to participate in future "little summit" meetings with an unrestricted agenda. The French for their part have agreed to an insti- tutional and constitutional approach to the problem of political cohesion, and pro- integrationists generally take comfort that the EEC's parlia- mentary assembly has been in- vited to extend its delibera- tions to the political field. The unresolved relation- ship between the proposed new instruments of policy coordi- nation and existing EEC institu- tions, and with NATO in particu- lar, is apparently causing the most concern in the Benelux countries. According to various accounts of the Bonn meeting, De Gaulle still seemed disposed to transfer some EEC functions, such as joint policy toward Africa, to the new institutions, although he apparently retreated under strong opposition. De Gaulle cut short his much-heralded presentation on European defense because, he said, the Berlin crisis made a general defense review inoppor- tune, but there was reportedly some disappointment and alarm over his long-ran a intentions. 25X1 De Gaulle spoke of the necessity of giv- ing military planning a "more 25X1 European orientation" and 25X1 minimized the US role in Euro e's defense, Given these suspicions, it seems likely that the forging of political links among the EEC countries will continue to proceed slowly and laboriously, even though aspects of the De Gaulle "confederation" now ap- pear an established part of the European scene. French offi- cials themselves acknowledge that the "battle between the confederalists and the integra- tionists" is still unresolved SECRET 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 21 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY and that the drafting of the European "statute" is certain to be a lengthy process. Adding to the uncertainty is the prospect that London will ask for and eventually ob- tain some voice in what this "statute" should look like. All six EEC leaders joined in declaring at Bonn their "desire" that other European states BRITISH LABOR A substantial shift in trade union voting on the issue of unilateral British nuclear disarmament now assures endorse- ment of Gaitskell's pro-NATO policy by a large majority at the party conference this fall. Five of Britain's six largest trade unions--comprising about 60 percent of the total union membership and a majority of the party conference vote--are now on record in support of Gaitskell's policy, with three of them having revised their stand this year. Only Frank Cousins' Transport and General Workers Union maintains support for unilateralism. The American Embassy in London cites the shift in the position of even many small left-wing unions as an indication of the "aston- ishing"improvement in Gait- skell's position in the party within the past few months. Gaitskell has indicated to US Embassy officials that he may still have trouble at the conference on the related issues of American nuclear bases in Britain and the basing of Polaris missiles in British waters. Several unions which participate in the European communities and in the process of political unification--a "desire" which London is be-, lieved preparing to test. Mac- millan has promised a parlia- mentary statement on Britain's intentions toward the EEC on 31 July, and in preparation for it has called a meeting of the Outer Seven for 28 Juy. PARTY TRENDS now support the official defense policy continue to demand "an end to the need" for the bases, and left-wing Laborites are emphasizing this in their con- tinuing campaign to undermine Gaitskell's position. Gait-, skell told a US official in May that party leaders are being deliberately vague in their public statements on those issues. Party neutral- ists have also begun to exploit the Macmillan government's an- nouncement on 12 July that--as a result of a NATO decision-- a German tank battalion will receive three weeks' training in Britain this fall. The growing sentiment for Labor party unity comes at a time when Britain's worsening economic situation has brought the first substantial decline in public support for the govern- ment since the 1959 general elections. This could be the decisive factor in persuading the Labor rank and file to accept Gaitskell's plea that this year's conference be as free as possi- ble from controversy so that the British public may see the party as a cohesive organization capable of forming a government. 25X1 core riAL 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 92 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY NEW AGRARIAN GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND Premier Miettunen's minor- ity Agrarian government, formed after a reconvened parliament proved unable to agree on a coalition, contains six members not in the previous cabinet but will probably pursue the same policies, particularly in seek- ing to reassure the USSR of Finland's strict neutrality. The new cabinet is generally ex- pected to serve until the mid- 1962 parliamentary elections. The cabinet crisis was pre- cipitated by Prime Minister Sukselainen's resignation fol- lowing his conviction by the Helsinki Court of Appeals for "careless and illegal discharge of duties" as general director of the National Pensions In- stitute. Parliament, called back from its summer recess on 11 July, negotiated for several days regarding a broadened gov- ernment and ended by reconsti- tuting the Agrarian cabinet which has been in office since January 1959. President Kekkonen appar- ently continued to oppose in- cluding the Social Democrats in view of the cabinet crisis in 1958, when Moscow expressed its dislike of certain Social Demo- cratic and Conservative ministers in the Fagerholm government by overpowering economic pressure. The minor democratic parties such as the Liberals and the Swedish People's party--presum- ably with an eye to the parlia- mentary election in mid-1962 as well as to next February's pres- idential election--evidently had no desire to share governmental responsibility with the Agrarians in the meantime. The new premier, Martti Miettunen, has been governor of Lapland since 1958. Untainted by the Sukselainen scandal; he is said to enjoy the confidence of many political groups and has participated in several previous cabinets, including Fagerholm's majority coalition in late 1958. The five other new ministers include Defense Minister Lars Bjorkenheim, who held that post for a few months in 1958. One of the nine con- tinuing members of the govern- ment is Ahti Karjalainen, Pres- ident Kekkonen's close associate who became foreign minister in June following the death of Ralf Torngren. As former minister of trade and industry in the Sukselainen government Karja- lainen was largely responsible for negotiating with the 25X1 USSR on Finland's accession to EFTA. CONFIDENTIAL 27 July 61 WEEKLY REVIEW D- Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 ge 23 of 23 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 TIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL ARTICLES LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING IN The USSR's long-awaited 20-Year Plan for economic de- velopment apparently is to be published on 30 July as part of the new draft program of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. The draft was approved by the central committee on 20 June and is to be published for discussion prior to its presen- tation to the 22nd party con- gress in October. The 20-year goals, on which Soviet planning agencies have been working since 1959, will embody the regime's desire to catch up with the US economically and to achieve the state of communism originally conceived by Marx and elab- orated upon subsequently by Soviet ideologists. Creation of the long-range plan, however, was rooted in objectives not directly con- nected with the transition from socialism to communism. it stems from a long-felt need for a systematic program to guide long-range development and a more recent concern for the economic inefficiencies attrib- uted to the lack of continuity in previous planning practices. Extension of the planning period to 20 years reflects the frequently expressed opti- mism of the Soviet regime in re- gard to its general economic situation and suggests confi- dence in the country's ability to fulfill the plans at least for the next five. Long-term goals, however, can at best be only imperfect guidelines since even monthly, quarterly, and yearly plans must be con- stantly reappraised and read- justed to changing conditions and policies. New technology and new resources can justify upward readjustments. A crash program--the housing program, for example--can result in the necessity to lower less urgent goals. By developing better planning techniques and better indicators of economic growth, Soviet planners hope to make their long-range goals more con- crete, better coordinated, and more likely to be attained. The Soviet 20-Year. Plan will become the general frame- work for coordinated industrial- ization plans within the entire bloc. This coordination is to be achieved through CEMA, the bloc's Counci' for Mutual Eco- nomic Assistance, which since 1957 has increased its efforts to encourage the satellites to develop complementary economies. It recently began preliminary consultations on long-term plan- ning for area-wide economic de- velopment through 1980. Background Long-range plans in the past have been limited to indi- vidual and largely uncoordinated goals for a few major products or, at most, a few key sectors of the economy. The first long- range plan, worked out under Lenin's direction in 1920, pro- vided 10- to 15-year goals for about 15 industries. The State Planning Commission (Gosplan) was created in the following year, and the long-range plan soon was overshadowed by current problems. Further evidence of long-range planning was not no- ticeable, except in a few iso- lated instances, until 1946 when Stalin presented goals for the so-called "leading links" of in- dustry which were to require three or more five-year plans for fulfillment. Major attention to long- range goals was not evident again until mid-1955, when an- nual planning was assigned to a new agency (Gosekonomkomis- siya), and Gosplan was given CO'DNTIAL 27 July 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 1 of 11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 w -.0 ^. . v N-.. s of ^w CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY responsibility for 10- and 15-year plans as well as the more traditional five-year plans. Soviet leaders in Feb- ruary 1956, apparently armed with the results of Gosplan's new long-range planning, ap- peared at the 20th party con- gress with the theme of catch- ing up with the West. The trouble encountered by the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60) however, which was replaced in 1958 by the current Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), again focused attention on current problems until November 1957 when Khru- shchev revealed 15-year goals for steel, petroleum, electric power, and cement. Earlier in 1957, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on the industrial reorganiza- tion, Khrushchev had laid the groundwork for elevating long- range planning to something more than just a few loosely co- ordinated goals. He called upon Gosplan to draw up, in ad- dition to annual and five-year plans, long-range plans which would provide the correct cor- relation of development among the various branches of the economy and regions of the coun- try. On this occasion..also, in attacking the lack of continu- ity from one plan period to the next, Khrushchev established the basis for the present treat- ment of annual plans as seg- ments of five-year plans and five-year plans as segments of still larger plans. Although Gosplan is known to have done some work on 20- year goals during 1959, a hand- ful of goals for 1975 and 1980 which were revealed by the deputy minister of. construction of electric power stations in March 1960 did not appear to be especially well coordinated. While repeated references to the 20-year plan have appeared since early 1960, none has fur- nished substantive details. Lon -Term planning Or ans In April 1960, responsi- bility for long-term planning was switched.from Gosplan to Gosekonomsovet, an organization which had been created a year earlier and which up to that time seemed to have worked only on the coordination of economic research. Gosekonomsovet, to- gether with the union republic ministries and departments, elaborates five- and seven-year plans as well as longer range plans: Gosplan's "summary" sections, such as National Eco- nomic Plan, Balances and Mate- rial-Technical Supply, and Labor and Wages, were transferred to Gosekonomsovet. Gosplan re- tained only those sections-- primarily industrial branches-- needed for short-term planning. In May 1961 the Soviet press announced that a network of 17 economic areas had been created. Each area is appar- ently to have a council for "planning and coordination," presumably subordinate to Gosekonomsovet--which will have as its primary task planning for two- and three-year periods. The regional councils will also plan and coordinate long-range economic development at the regional level--an administra- tive level not adequately cov- ered previously. They are to formulate proposals for the basic direction of economic de- velopment in their respective areas, for new technological developments and their effec- tive introduction into produc- tion, for the correct distribu- tion of capital investment, and for better use of labor and natural resources. These new economic areas replace 13 areas which formerly were used by Gosplan for planning purposes. Continuity of Planning While the planning changes suggested by Khrushchev in 1957 ti r% r; r 27 July 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES n/lAlrir%rRIri AA page 2 of 11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CONFIDENTIAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY have been slow to materialize, some progress has been made toward carrying out his sugges- tions to remedy the lack of continuity in planning. The lack of continuity affects the industrial process at all lev- els, because when planning is on a year-to-year basis, work schedules are disrupted, sup- plies of equipment and labor are uncertain, and enterprise directors are forced into a state of suspended animation at the end of the year await- ing control figures for the coming year. If planning for construction of a chemical plant, for example, were merely on a yearly basis, untold de- lays might result because equipment for it was not or- dered sufficiently far in ad- vance. In 1959, with the intro- duction of the Seven-Year Plan, the timing of the planning process was shifted to provide enterprises with approved plans at the start of the annual plan period rather than some months after the plan period started, as frequently had happened in the past. The Seven-Year Plan was divided into annual seg- ments, each of which was sup- posed to require only a few revisions to make it operational. Nothing more was done toward achieving continuity, although the USSR Council of Ministers ex- amined the problem in December 1960 and decided that if the planners began working out each year the main indicators of the annual plan for the fifth year following, the economy could have a constantly func- tioning five-year plan. Apparently the task of transforming annual segments of the present Seven-Year Plan into fully detailed, operational plans has proved to be a greater chore than envisioned, or per- haps the unrevised segments for forthcoming years have not pro- vided enough guidance to give the desired continuity in an- nual plans. In any event, a high-level planning conference in March 1961 recommended that at all planning levels, adjust- ments should be made in the an- nual segment two years before the year in which the segment become operational. The con- ference continued to call for planning agencies to work out each year the major indexes for production and capital con- struction for the fifth year following. Apparently unwill- ing, however, to recommend the abandonment of the traditional five-year plan, the conference also recommended that midway through such a period work should be started on the next five-year plan. The planning process which will result from these changes and recommendations will be a complex one. The formal 20- Year Plan will presumably incor- porate four five-year plans each consisting of five annual seg- ments. General planning for five years ahead will be carried out each year and at the same time the details will be set and adjustments made for two years ahead. For example, in 1966 planners will be working on the control figures for 1971 and the detailed outline of the plans for 1967 and 1968. Adoption of these practices should avoid some of the prob- lems which have caused a lack of continuity in the past. Their effect on the over-all quality of planning, however, is debat-25X1 able, and rl.early the work of planning organizations. will be considerably expanded. CONFIDENTIAL 27 July 61 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 3 of 11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 nnntirinrn1TI M Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY TRENDS OF OPINION IN THE Soviet youth, as depicted in current Russian literature, in the main accepts the polit- ical and social system which it has inherited but is unrespon- sive to the creed on which the system is based. The philosoph- ically minded are concerned with finding a more satisfactory reason for existence than is of- fered in the slogans of the Communist party. Others are increasingly frank in demanding material benefits now, in place of the vague rewards of the Com- munist future. In an effort to deal with this unresponsiveness the regime has sought to increase discipline among the youth by raising requirements for labor training in the educational sys- tem. Further, Komsomol activity has been stepped up. But neither of these actions seems to have strengthened youth's allegiance to official party goals. Despite_Khrushchev's chas- tisement of Soviet writers in 1957, the nonconformist authors have continued to try to expand the province of Soviet litera- ture. Obedient to Khrushchev's injunction to leave fault-find- ing to the party, they have, in the main, ceased writing the exposes of Soviet life ii fic- tional form which enlivened the literature of the early 1950s, and have shifted their efforts to understanding and describing their fellow man. The regime has long de- manded that writers concentrate on inspiring enthusiasm for the socialist system and "educating" readers to conform to its re- quirements. Efforts to move beyond the individual's public duty to the state and portray his private emotional life are regarded at best as a waste of the state's resources and at worst as subversive. Neverthe- less, this private emotional life preoccupies the most prom- ising of the young Soviet writers, ;7 July 61 SOVIET YOUNGER GENERATION both because of their own in- clinations and because of the enthusiastic response of their readership. In the face of harsh stric- tures from critics, the continued appearance of such subjective works in major literary magazines suggests the existence of a re- ceptive readership as well as of editorial boards anxious to increase circulation. Moreover, their popularity appears to in- fect even the more conformist writers. The more lifelike characters with which the con- formists have attempted to meet the challenge of the nonconform- ists are often inadvertently as revealing of Soviet attitudes as are the work of their rivals. Together, the two groups of writers present a picture of an important element of Soviet youth as it sees itself. This picture, however, does not encompass the large mass of conformists who accept the sys- tem as they find it and learn to live with it. Nor does it re- flect the extreme nonconformists whose ideas, too unconventional for public print, occasionally circulate in handwritten manu- scripts or in small groups of trusted friends. What it does portray is a middle group of bright young people from whom the future leaders will probably be drawn, and to the regime's obvious concern, this group ap- parently is failing to respond to the dream of a Communist fu- ture. Search for Life's Meaning Within this group, Soviet youth accepts the system it has inherited, but apparently finds the accompanying creed sterile. It is deeply concerned with find- ing a reason for existence. Considering the regime's 40 years of militant atheism, CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 4 of 11 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03300020001-4 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4 CONFAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY religion surprisingly often is suggested as a possible answer. Frequently, it appears as an early hope which later fails. In Save Our Souls* by B. S. Lvov, a son, grie -stricken at the loss of his father, searches for the meaning of life. After the failure of his school and of a well-meaning but doctri- naire aunt to help him, he en- ters a theological seminary but is disillusioned there also. In the end he is "rescued" by the Komsomol. However, the author makes no pretense that the Komsomol can provide him with the answer to his question Occasionally, religion turns out to be the answer. In The Torch a "good" character is revealed as an able student and much-decorated hero of World War II who entered the priest- hood on his discharge from the army. "Among the partisans i saw a priest. He fought and died like a soldier. He knew just what to say to people. After all I have seen during the war, I too came to know what to say to people; I came to understand what it was they needed most--comfort, that is, faith. And now I am needed," Many other writers portray the same search without refer- ence to religion. The 18-year- old of V. Nikitin's Thaw Lands goes to the remote po ar reg ins to "build communism," He is soon disillusioned: "What common cause am I serving? What new life am I building? I am simply digging trenches,... Is this what I dreamed of, what I am meant to do with my life? Why did I study for ten years?,,.. It begins to appear that I shall never understand why I am living .... It is becoming awful." r~11 novels, short stories, and plays cited here, with the exception of "Con-- tinuation of a Legend," have been pub- lished within the last two years. In The Difficult Test by N. Dubow, snot er youngs er is repelled by the deceit and in- justice in the factory. He is also shaken by the cynicism and greed of a prominent party mem- ber's son. "Greenhorn' Are you trying to convert me? You needn't. I know more about com- munism than you do. They are still constructing it, but I have already reached the Com- munist stage--I receive accord- ing to my needs. Work! Do you think I am a beast of burden-- a donkey?" In his search for a faith, the "greenhorn" receives under- standing and sympathy from a Baptist worker: "The young don't know what to do with them- selves. Their daily bread is assured, but that isn't enough. Having fed the body, man strives to feed the soul, but he finds no spiritual food, so he wan- ders in the darkness of crude sensual pleasures. It is im- possible to quench spiritual thirst. And this thirst dries man out, makes him callous and indifferent to others." Attempts by the conformist writers to fulfill this spirit- ual thirst often appear awkward. An experienced party leader in Vasily Aksenov's Colleagues is asked: "What are those glit- tering heights (of communism)? They're too abstract." He dreams of the future of his small town in the icy north- western USSR: "Soon the small town will become the big town of Kruglogorsk. Our children will drive their motors with atomic energy. And so an end- less chain of progress will reach forward into the future; bright houses with enormous win- dows will be reflected in the warm waters of the lake, palms will wave their branches, and glass automobiles will speed back and forth over broad white highways