CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003400010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DIA and DOS
review(s)
completed.
COPY NO. 7;
OCI NO.0302/61
20 October 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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T H( E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 19 Oct)
Page 1
Khrushchev's report to the 22nd Soviet party congress
was a generally moderate restatement of established foreign
and domestic policies, covering both immediate internation-
al issues and long-term theoretical and ideological ques-
tions. It was highlighted by his formal withdrawal of a
deadline for a German peace treaty, his announcement that
the USSR's present nuclear test series could be expected
to end by 31 October with a 50-megaton explosion, his
emphasis on the prospects for achieving peaceful coexist-
ence, and his unprecedented indictment of the Albanian
leadership.
Page 7
Recent Viet Cong guerrilla successes have lowered the
morale of government officials the military. and t
lace
/ The recent increase
in Viet Cong guerrilla activity in central Vietnam indi-
cates a drive to sever the government's land communica-
tions with the northern part of the country. A recent South
Vietnamese request for US troops as "combat-trainer units"
is a significant departure from Diem's earlier position that
South Vietnamese forces, given enough material support,
could handle the Communist guerrilla problem.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
King Savang on 18 October "accepted" Souvanna Phouma
as the man to form a new government. Formal designation
apparently awaits agreement among the three princes on the
composition of the new cabinet and Boun Oum's subsequent
resignation. Souvanna intends to call a new meeting of
the princes--possibly at Xieng Khouang, where Souphannou-
vong remains. The positions of Vientiane and the Pathet
Lao remain essentially unreconciled, and neither General
Phoumi nor Souphannouvong has given much indication of a
willingness to compromise. Recent skirmishing on a bat-
talion level in southern Laos was apparently in reaction
to Laotian Army sweeping operations. At Geneva, the So-
viet representative is pushing for a rapid windup to the
Laotian conference.
. . . . . . . . . . Page 11
UN and Congolese authorities have balked at the terms
of the formal Katangan cease-fire, negotiated by Tshombc
and UN representative Khiari. One provision of the agreement
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
implies that Tshombd is free to defend himself in the event
of an invasion of Katanga by central government forces.
Criticism of the agreement and the resultant delay in its
ratification by UN headquarters has prompted Tshombd to put
off the proposed prisoner exchange. However, on 18 October
he did send two emissaries to establish contact with the
A
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . .
French officials in both Algeria and France feel the
situation in Algeria is approaching another crisis
Page 12
The provisional Algerian government (PAG) has indicated
publicly that it will continue to call demonstrations in
both France and Algeria- to pressure Paris to enter "seri-
ous" negotiations. New massive demonstrations on the scale
of those in Paris on 17 and 18 October could occur before
EAST GERMANY . .
Page 13
In an effort to force some degree of cooperation from
the restless and disaffected East German population as well
as crush any signs of incipient revolt, the Ulbricht regime
is continuing to resort to arrests, massive indoctrination
campaigns, and various other coercive measures. The seal-
ing of the Berlin sector border has necessitated some ex-
tensive readjustments in the economic field but has also
enabled the regime to initiate other moves which it had
long wanted to make. Top party leaders appear confident
of their ability--with Soviet backing--to control the peo-
SHARP DROP IN CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE WITH EUROPEAN SATEL-
LITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Peiping's trade with the East European satellites (ex-
cept Albania) is down at least a third from 1960. The drop
in Chinese imports from the satellites has resulted from
cutbacks in capital construction in China and from Peiping's
inability to export. Satellite trade officials have ex-
pressed considerable dissatisfaction with the decline, which
has left them with undelivered goods manufactured for China
and not readily marketable elsewhere. The reduction is ex-
pected to continue for the duration of China's economic
COMMUNIST CHINA SIGNS NEW BORDER AGREEMENTS . . . . . . Page 1S
Peiping on 5 and 13 October signed border agreements
with Nepal and Burma. Chinese propaganda is playing up
these further examples of Peiping's "peaceful, reasonable"
policy toward its neighbors and will use them to propa-
gandize the thesis that Indian rather than Chinese in-
transigence is blocking a Sino-Indian border settlement.
China and Nepal also signed an agreement calling for Chi-
nese assistance in the construction of a road from the
Tibetan border to Katmandu, which Peiping hopes will help
k
wea
en Indian influence in Nepal.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 October 1961
The assassination of Urundi Prime Minister Prince
Louis Rwagasore may signal an extreme nationalist turn
in Urundi, tribal violence, and increased strains between
Urundi and Ruanda. Radical African states, which have
backed demands by Rwagasore's party for an early end of
the Belgian trusteeship in Ruanda-Urundi, can be expected
to renew their attacks on Belgian tutelage when develop-
ments in the trust territory are reviewed by the UN. On
16 October the Urundi Government asked the Security Coun-
cil to investigate Rwagasore's death. The Haitian chair-
man of the UN Commission for Ruanda-Urundi is convinced
that the territory is not ready for independence and that
there is no prospect of uniting the two areas.
The failure of any of Turkey's political parties to
achieve a majority in this week-':s parliamentary elections
foreshadows a period of unstable coalition government.
The voters in effect repudiated the army regime, which
favored the Republican People's party. The Republicans
obtained only a slim plurality in the lower house and
placed second in the Senate. General Cemal Gursel, the
chairman of the military Committee of National Union,
has called on all four parties participating in the elec-
tion to form a nonparty government, a move which suggests
that the committee may be unwilling to turn over the reins
to a coalition limited to parties which had tacitly op-
posed the CNU at the polls.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . .
Frictions within the Syrian revolutionary command,
together with conflicting pressures on the government by
special interest groups, are leading to political insta-
bility which Nasir may be able to exploit. Promising to
benefit from his "mistake" in Syria of trusting "reac-
tionary elements," Nasir has reshuffled Egypt's cabinet
and has called for reconstruction of the governmental
machinery so that the "national masses" can participate
more effectively in an intensified revolutionary drive.
The Jordanian Government's enthusiastic endorsement of
Syria's proposal for a federation of independent Arab
states has probably strengthened Nasir's determination
to work for the overthrow of King Husayn. The Imam of
Yemen, planning to leave the country for medical treat-
ment, has p reaffirmed his confidence in Crown
Prince Badr,
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PORTUGUESE NATIONAL ELECTIONS . . ? ? . . . . Page 24
Portuguese officials fear that opposition propaganda
during the campaign for the 12 November elections to the
National Assembly may provoke public disorder
further discredit the Salazar re
Although the opposition has regis-
tered candidates far nearly half of the assembly seats
to be filled, repressive measures are expected to assure
Salazar's National Union party an overwhelming victory.
BRITISH GUIANA SINCE THE ELECTIONS ? . . . , . , , , , . Page 25
Premier Cheddi Jagan's cabinet is concentrating on
grandiose plans for economic development and is pressing
for independence in 1962, which London might decide to
grant. During his current fund-seeking visit to the
US and Canada, Jagan is trying to minimize his Communist
inclinations by insisting that he is a neutralist social-
ist. He is assuring his continued political dominance
by selecting loyal but untrained followers for ministerial
posts and by keeping for himself the post as head of the
government information services.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC .
Page 26
The three major opposition groups have rejected Presi-
dent Balaguer's most recent offer to accept them in a coa-
lition government. The opposition's intransigence seems
to stem from increasing self-confidence derived from dem-
onstrations of wide popular backing for the opposition
cause. Some opposition leaders seem overconfident of their
ability to swing military support to their cause in a show-
down; the armed forces would be likely to take action against
rather than on behalf of the opposition.
BRAZIL . . .
Page 27
The Goulart-Neves government is moving to consolidate
its position by bringing the leader of an important oppo-
sition party into the government and by replacing hostile
officers in armed forces command positions. However, a
propaganda campaign to prepare ex-President Quadros' re-
turn to an active role in Brazilian politics is gathering
momentum. Quadros may seek election as governor of Sao
Paulo or as federal deputy next October. His chance of
making a political comeback will be improved if the pres-
ent government fails to make economic and social reforms.
ECUADOR .
. . ? . . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? . . . Page 28
President Velasco, who has been trying to contain the
mounting unrest in the country, is being threatened with
impeachment by leftist Vice President Arosemena, who pre-
sides over the national Congress. Top army leaders have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
been pressing Velasco to take more forceful action against
leftist elements and, despite a professed reluctance to
abandon constitutional procedures, would probably back
the President in extraconstitutional measures. Commu-
nist and pro-Castro elements have had considerable suc-
cess in recent weeks in fanning popular discontent with
the government, and disturbances which at first were
limited to a few northern cities now have spread to the
country's main population centers.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
MONGOLIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
A spirit of nationalism continues strong in Mongolia
in spite of the predominating influence of the USSR; in
recent years, the Mongolians have been able to profit by
the competing desire on Peiping's part to make its pres-
ence felt there. Drawing on aid from both Moscow and Pei-
ping, the Mongolians this year began their Third Five-Year
Plan--which is Intended to convert their nomadic society
into a nation of settled farmers, livestock raisers, and
industrial workers. Mongolia is also trying to win inter-
national recognition and is particularly hopeful of develop-
ing relations with the new African republics and Asian neu-
trals. 25X1
THE PROVISIONAL ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The provisional Algerian government (PAG), reshuffled
twice since it was formed in 1958, is still hampered by
factionalism among its members and by organizational weak-
nesses arising from its subordination to the National
Council of the Algerian Revolution. The Algerian revo-
lutionary* movement has yet to produce a leader strong
enou h'to dominate the situation. The present premier,
Ben 'hhedda, appears to have been appointed following a
number of compromises.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
Khrushchev's report to the
22nd party congress on 17 October
was a generally moderate and
routine restatement of estab-
lished Soviet foreign and domes-
tic policies. While covering
both immediate international
issues and long-terra theoretical
and ideological questions, the
report was highlighted by Khru-
shchev's formal withdrawal of
a deadline for a German peace
treaty, his announcement that
the USSR's present nuclear test
series "probably" would end by
31 October with a 50-megaton
explosion, his over-all emphasis
on the prospects for achieving
peaceful coexistence and prevent-
ing a world war, and his unprec-
edented indictment of the Alba-
nian leadership.
Khrushchev contended that
events had confirmed the cor-
rectness of the policy lines
adopted by the 20th party con-
gress in 1956,, and claimed that
the main result of the party's
policy had been the prevention
of war. He saw a "prospect of
achieving peaceful coexistence
for the entire period in which
the social and political prob-
lems now dividing the world will
have to be solved." In addition,
he reaffirmed the point laid
down by the 21st congress In
1959, which has drawn strong Chi-
nese objections, that "it may
actually be feasible to banish
world war from the life of soci-
ety even before the complete
triumph of socialism on earth,
with capitalism surviving in
part of the world." Khrushchev
also listed continued adherence
to the "principles of peaceful
coexistence" as the primary task
confronting the Soviet party,
with the maintenance of bloc
unity listed second.
Berlin
On the questions of Germany
and Berlin, Khrushchev gave a
positive assessment of Gromyko's
talks with American and British
leaders and drew the conclusion
from these talks that the Western
powers had displayed an under-
standing of the situation and
were inclined to seek a settle-
ment on a "mutually acceptable
basis." While warning that a
German treaty could not be post-
poned "to infinity" and repeat-
ing that it would be signed with
or without the Western powers,
Khrushchev stated if the West
showed readiness to settle the
"German problem" then the "date
of signing will have no signifi-
cance." "In that case, " he
added, '"we shall not insist on
the peace treaty being signed
necessarily before 31 December
1961.11
His withdrawal of the dead-
line and favorable view of West-
ern attitudes were probably in-
tended to meet Western objections
to negotiating._under pressure of-
threats of unilateral action and
to open the way for formal nego-
tiations. However, Khrushchev's
claim that the "forces of social-
ism" are stronger than the "ag-
gressive imperialist forces,"
and his warning against the
dangers of a "position of strength"
policy reflect his confidence
that the West can be induced to
grant concessions which the USSR
could represent as marking a
fundamental change in the status
of West Berlin.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
Although Khrushchev re-
affirmed at the congress the
major ideological positions
which were the targets of Chi-
nese Communist attacks in 1960,
his restraint in discussing
these issues and his gestures
according the Chinese delegation
headed by Premier Chou En-lai
a special position indicate
the Soviet leader's desire to
maintain the uneasy truce worked
out at the Moscow conference of
world Communist leaders in No-
vember 1960. However, Khru-
shchev's unprecedented attack on
the Albanian leaders for re-
jecting the 20th Soviet party
congress' condemnation of the
"cult of personality" places
the Chinese in a difficult posi-
tion both because of China's
close relations with Albania and
because Peiping itself is vul-
nerable to the same charge.
Sino-Soviet exchanges over the
"cult of personality" were among
the most virulent during the
height of the dispute in 1960.
Khrushchev accused the
Albanian leadership, which was
not represented at the congress,
of not only opposing Soviet poli-
cy on the "cult of the person-
ality," but of practicing it and
"trying to drag our party back to
the system which is to their
liking." He-asserted that "no
one will succeed in leading us
astray from the Leninist policy."
Moreover, Khrushchsv's : attack
went far beyond the question of
de-Stalinization by accusing the
Albanian leaders of "departing
from the generally agreed line
of the whole world Communist
movement on the most important
questions of modern times." He
issued a sharp warning that if
the Albanian leaders value the
cause of building socialism and
friendship with the Soviet Union
and other bloc parties, "they
must abandon their mistaken views"
and return to the path of unity.
However, he concluded his
assault on the Albanian leaders
with a pledge to do everything
so that Albania can "march in
formation with all the socialist
countries." Khrushchev's use
of the "cult of the personality"
as the specific pretext for
attacking Albania and his careful
differentiation between the Al-
banian leaders and the rank-and-
file Albanian Communists sug-
gest that his immediate aim is
to overthrow the present Albanian
leadership.
The Chinese alone within the
bloc have continued to offer un-
qualified support for the Hoxha
regime in the face of Moscow's
growing efforts to undercut the
Albanian leadership. As recently
as late September, Vice Premier
Lu Ting-yi, an alternate member
of the party politburo and the
regime's leading propagandist,
endorsed Hoxha's "correct''
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
leadership and declared that
Peiping is "proud of having
such a comrade-in-arms as Al-
bania." More recently, the Chi-
nese and the North Vietnamese
were the only bloc members to
send delegates to a congress of
Albanian women which opened in
Tirana on 15 October, just two
days before the CPSU congress
opened in Moscow.
In what may be Peiping's
opening shot in defense of the
Albanians, Communist China
broadcast on 17 October--after
Khrushchev's attack on Albania--
a speech delivered on 16 Octo-
ber by China's delegate to the
Albanian women's congress. The
Chinese delegate pledged Pei-
ping's support for Albania "even
in storm and stress" and de-
clared that "no force can de-
stroy" the unbreakable Sino-
Albanian friendship. The only
indication of Chou's response
to Khrushchev's remarks so far
is an unconfirmed Western press
report that Chou refrained from
applauding passages in the So-
viet leader's speech which dealt
with Albania and the Soviet
"antiparty" group.
In view of the announcement
that the tests will be ending,
the USSR may plan to repeat its
performance of March 1958 and
Khrushchev announced that declare a unilateral suspension
the current series of nuclear of tests, while calling upon the
tests probably would be completed three Western powers to join in
by the end of the month and that a voluntary uncontrolled mora-
the last test "probably" would torium on all tests. As a means
be a 50-megaton detonation. of further pressure,the USSR
might make a unilateral suspension5X1
of testing contingent on US,
British, and French agreement to
an early moratorium. Although
Moscow continues to insist that
a nuclear test ban treaty can be
discussed only in the context of
general and complete disarmament,
this position would not prevent
the USSR from supporting India's
draft UN resolution which calls
for an uncontrolled moratorium
"pending the conclusion of the
necessary agreements in regard
to tests or general and complete
disarmament."
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In the portion of his re-
port dealing with domestic poli-
tical affairs, Khrushchev renewed
the attack on the antiparty
group, and for the first time
publicly listed Marshal Voro-
shilov -- former titular chief
of the Soviet state -- as the
seventh member of the group
which had tried to unseat him
in 1957. Previous information
indicated that Voroshilov had
either taken a neutral position
or had joined the plotters only
after it became clear they had
won a majority in the 11-man
party presidium. Khrushchev,
however, claimed that the aged
marshal was one of the original
group--along with Ma lenkov, Molotov,
and Kaganovich -- who "fiercely
opposed" de-Stalinization and
desired a return to the repres-
sive measures by which the old
dictator had maintained his
power. He further accused the
four of personal responsibility
for many of the crimes of the
Stalin era, implying that Voro-
shilov had been involved in the
massive purges which wracked
the Soviet military establish-
ment from 1936 to 1938.
Perhaps in order to explain
Voroshilov's retention as figure-
head "president" of the USSR un-
til 1960, Khrushchev said that
the marshal had been prompt to
see the error of his ways. Voro-
shilov confessed his complicity
and condemned the machinations
of the group at the central
committee plenum of June 1957,
at which Khrushchev used his
support in the central committee
to smash the seven-to-four ma-
jority aligned against him in
the party presidium.
Khrushchev later revealed
that the "elaboration" of a new
state constitution is about to
begin. Work on a new basic law
for the USSR has evidently been
under way for more than a year,
and a draft may be ready for
publication before the end of
1961. All signs at present point
to a constitution which is little
more than a legal reflection of
the new party program. There is
no evidence of serious intent
further to democratize the Soviet
system; the new constitution seems
primarily intended to make the
construction of communism a matter
of state law, and its appearance.:
after the congress will provide
all the more opportunity to link
the Khrushchev name with the
building of communism in the USSR.
Impending changes in the top
party leadership are foreshadowed
both in Khrushchev's report and
in the composition of the honor-
ific governing bodies which pre-
side over the party congress and
which traditionally provide indi-
cations of standing in the hier-
archy. It appears that at least
six of the 23 members of the
party's ruling presidium are
slated for removal at the end
of the congress. Presidium can
didate Pervukhin, who was a
member of the antiparty group,
is almost certain to be among
them. Front runners for election
to the presidium, probably as
candidate members, include De-
fense Minister Malinovsky, For-
eign Minister Gromyko, and secret
police chief Aleksandr Shelepin.
Economic Development
Khrushchev's speech of 18
October presenting the new party
program reveals even more clearly
than did the draft issued in July
that the present pattern of So-
viet economic growth favoring
heavy industry is to continue
during the next 20 years. The
continued high rate of growth
in industry--although somewhat
lower in 1961 than in recent
years--which has resulted in
overfulfillment of annual plans,
has permitted the announcement
at the congress of a decision to
raise Seven Year Plan (1959-65)
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goals. Construction problems
apparently continue, however,
leading Khrushchev to suggest a
concentration of resources on
fewer construction projects in
the future.
Heavy industry is to play
the decisive role in creating
the material basis for communism
and in the defeat of capitalism
by surpassing the US in per
capita production. The consumer
industry by 1980 is to increase
fivefold,while industry as a
whole will grow by six times.
This means that both the light
industrial base, which produces
most of the consumer goods, and
heavy industry are expected to
grow at approximately the rates
claimed in recent years--8 per-
cent for light industry and 10-
11 percent for heavy. While
Khrushchev implied that the con-
sumer by 1980 will be receiving
a greater share of total indus-
trial production than at present,
actually his share will decline.
The massive capital imvest-
ment program of 2 trillion rubles
announced by Khrushchev is nearly
ten times the total investment
during the entire Soviet period
to date but will be needed to
meet the production goals of
the program. Investment in
equipment to support planned
industrial growth would probably
account for at least one third
of the total projected invest-
ment, and fulfillment of the
housing program would account
for one fourth.
Khrushchev repeated the
unrealistic agricultural goals
contained in the draft program
but did not reveal an intention
to back up the goals with signif-
iodant increases in investment.
Historically, Soviet agriculture
has occupied a very low position
in the allocation of resources,
though Khrushchev's statements
earlier in the year suggested
that some improvements might be
forthcoming. The only new agri-
cultural figure announced was
for total grain production by
1980--300 million tons. The
1961 harvest is estimated at
115-120 million tons. To achieve
the 1980 level the growth rates
of recent years would have to be
doubled. Khrushchev's modest
predictions for 1961 industrial
output of livestock products
suggest a mediocre performance
in this sector where production
from privately owned livestock
is still important.
Khrushchev repeated recent
press criticisms of the construc-
tion program for wasteful dis-
persion of funds among too many
projects, poor planning and lo-
cal mismanagement. He suggested
a new solution-to these long-
standing problems--a moratorium
on new construction, with certain
exceptions, to be put into effect
for a year. Khrushchev indicated
that improvements would be forth-
coming in the housing program.
This program, which until last
year had a high priority--has
been substantially underfulfilled
for the last 18 months. Khru-
shchev's remarks by no means
constitute a clear reinstatement
of that priority.
A major reason for the pres-
ent difficulties in construction
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KHRUSHCHEV`S ECONOMIC FORECAST FOR 1961
Average Annual
Percentage
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Khrushchev's Prediction
Percentage
Needed
Increases
to Meet Original
Original 1961
Percentage Increase
Increase
Seven-Year Plan
Plan Figure
Production
1961 over 1960
1960 over 1959
Goals
Pig iron (million metric tons)
51,2
51.1
9.1
8.8
7,1-8.1
Steel (million metric tons)
71.3
71.0
9.1
8.5
5.8-7.0
Rolled steel (million metric tons)
55.2
55.0
7.8
8.5
5.3-6.9
Cool (million metric tons)
510.0
513.0
---
1,3
3.0-3.4
Oil (million metric tons)
164.0
166.0
12.2
14,1
93-10.4
Gas (billion cubic meters)
59.7
59.5
26.0
26.5
27.5
Electric power (billion kilowatt-hours)
327.0
327,0
11.9
10.2
11.1-12.0
Cement (million metric tons)
51.0
51.0
12.0
17.2
11.1-12.8
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
1959 over 1958
1960 over 1959
1961 over 1960
1959 over 1958
1960 over 1959
1961 over 1960
Planned Actual,
7,7 11
Planned Actual
8.1 10
Planned Est. Actual
8.8 9
Actual
12
Actual
11.5
Est. Actualr
9.5
is a lag in the acquisition of
machinery and equipment and in
the growth of building materials
production. Khrushchev's sug-
gestion, if implemented, should
speed up completion of con-
struction projects considerably.
Khrushchev's 1961 forecasts
for consumer goods production
were carefully selected to show
progress when, in fact, produc=
tion of some important goods has
dropped. For example, he indi-
cated that production of wool
fabrics will increase rapidly
in 1961 but ignored the fact
that the much more important
cotton production has for the
first nine months of this year
been slightly below 1960 pro-
duction. Third-quarter statis- 25X1
tics indicate that the increase
in light industry as a whole
will be below tar et.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnam's recent
request for American troops
as "combat trainer units"--
presented to Ambassador Nolting
on 13 October by Deputy Defense
Minister Thuan--is a significant
departure from President Diem's
earlier position that South
Vietnamese forces, given enough
material support, could handle
the Communist guerrillas. The
proposal to station Americans
near the border of North Viet-
nam to act as a "symbolic" de-
terrent to attack and to free
additional South Vietnamese
units for anti-guerrilla opera-
tions was probably made as much
for psychological as for secu-
rity reasons. Diem's declaration
on 18 October of a state of na-
tional emergency reflects his
concern over the impact of re-
cent Viet Cong successes on the
morale of government officials,
the military, and the populace.
The steady drain on South
Vietnam's resources by effective
Communist sabotage is underscored
by a statement attributed to
Diem's brother and close adviser,
Nhu, that army casualties now
are exceeding the rate of re,
cruitment. Added to the exist-
ing security burden will be an
immense problem of rehabilitation
and reconstruction in several
provinces in the Mekong delta
now inundated by severe floods.
Intensified Communist ac-
tivity in the coastal area of
central Vietnam suggests a Viet
Cong effort to sever communica-
tions between the northern and
southern regions of South Vietnam.
Two large-scale attacks as well
as considerable bridge and rail
sabotage have occurred in the past
month near Quang Ngai, which is
linked by secondary roads to the
Communist-infested highlands
areas of Kontum Province near the
Laotian border.
Viet Cong incidents through-
out the country reached an all-
time weekly high in early October.
25X1
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CU .. 1 A I i?T ;LLIG: ,IXE WE ,KLY JUMIARY
Communist Guerrilla Activity in South Vietnam
ti NORTH VIETNAM
i Quang Tr
Major areas of Viet
Cong concentration
+-F- Railroad
Road
Flood area
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The unofficial designation
of Souvanna Phoumi to form a
government, announced after
his audience on 16 October
with King Savang in Luang
Prabang, is the first step
toward the establishment of a
coalition in Laos. Souvanna's
next move probably will be to
call a new meeting with Sou-
phannouvong and Boun Ourn to
reach definitive agreement on
a provisional cabinet. Vien-
tiane and the Pathet Lao are
still in conflict over many
issues involved, and a settle-
ment may prove difficult.
General Phoumi indicates
he intends to insist that half
the proposed eight-man "neutral-
ist" center group of the cabinet
be drawn from leaders not
associated with Souvannals
group at Xieng Khouang. Sou-
phannouvong, on the other hand,
appears adamant in his insist-
ence that all eight center
candidates be selected from
among the followers of Souvanna.
While a compromise on this
point may be reached fairly
soon, the assignment of port-
folios is likely to present
greater difficulties.
If and when agreement is
reached on a cabinet, Boun Oum
will submit his resignation
and the King will formally
appoint Souvanna as premier-
designate, according to informa-
tion received from Souvanna
after his interview with Savang.
Next, Souvanna's government .
would be presented to the King,
who presumably by then would
have been legally endowed with
special powers to appoint a
government without reference
to the National Assembly, as
envisaged under last June's
Zurich agreement.
In the absence of a political
settlement, scattered fighting
continues in widespread areas.
Relatively large-scale attacks
southwest of Tchepone and south-
east of Thakhek on 11 and 12
October respectively were ap-
parently in reaction to recent
Laotian, Army sweeping operations
in central and southern Laos.
The Communists may be concerned
that government actions could
threaten their lines of supply
and logistical build-up in this
area. There has been further
evidence that the Nhommarat-
Mahaxay area east of Thakhek
is being developed as a major
logistic base defended by
emplacements and antiaircraft
weapons.
At Geneva, Soviet delegate
Pushkin, who canceled earlier
plans to attend the 22nd party
congress on Gromyko's instructions,
has urged that the USSR and the
US should proceed rapidly to
work out a compromise agreement
on the two most critical issues
remaining: voting procedure
for the International Control
Commission (ICC), and the SEATO
protocol on defensive guarantees
for Laos. Earlier last week,
Pushkin delivered a letter from
Khrushchev to Ambassador Harriman
in which the Soviet premier
maintained that a Laotian agree-
ment would have a favorable
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
effect on the peaceful settle-
ment of other East-West issues.
In addition to demonstrat-
ing the USSR's desire for
serious negotiations on Berlin
and Germany, the Soviet leaders
probably be.:..,e progress to-
ward a Laotian settlement will
forestall any developments which
could result in direct inter-
vention by the United State-M.s
and other SEATO powers. Th--=,
may also feel that a more
fortlcoming Soviet attitr.'e
on the remaining points at
issue would deter any sub-
stantial increase in US military
commitments in South Vietnam.
During the past week,
Pushkin developed the line
that in view of Soviet willing-
ness to expand the cochairmen's
responsibilities for guarantee-
ing Laotian neutrality, the West
should drop its demands that
the ICC must have free and un-
restricted access to all parts
of Laos and that permanent ICC
inspection posts must be es-
tablished throughout the coun-
try. Pushkin offered to write
into any agreement a provision
that the cochairmen will assume
the responsibility for seeing
that the conference signatories
respect a Laotian declaration
of neutrality.
Pushkin, in his 14 October
meeting with Ambassador Harri-
man, pressed for a compromise
solution of the SEATO issue--
on which he had previously been
adamant--and suggested that
the conference could accept
the Indian delegate's approach,
which would, in effect, have
all the SEATO signatories agree
to respect a Laotian declaration
renouncing the protection of
military alliances. With regard
to the ICC voting procedure,
Pushkin seemed to imply that
the USSR would not insist on
unanimity for the initiation of
investigations and also might
be willing to compromise on
the question of majority and
minority reports resulting from
such investigations.
Although Pushkin has not
yet submitted new Soviet drafts
on ICC voting procedure, he
assured Ambassador Harriman on
17 October that investigations by
the ICC could be started and
carried out by a majority vote
of the ICC. He agreed that
provision could be made for
majority and minority views
in all reports from the ICC
but asserted that any recommenda-
tion by the ICC to the Geneva
conference must be reached
unanimously. Pushkin also
agreed that all investigations
requested by the Lao government
would be made without any voting
by the Commission.
The USSR probably feels that
by proposing compromise solutions
to these key issues, it will be
able eventually to secure Western
agreement to a settlement at Geneva
effectively subordinating the ICC to the
authority ofa provisional Laotian
government headed by Souvanna.. Pushkin
has consistently pointed out that the
ICC will have to establish a working
arrangement with Souvanna, and on 10
October told Ambassador Harriman that
the "US must get used to having such
matters in Laotian hands."
DED
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Protracted efforts to
achieve a formal cease-fire in
Katanga resulted, on 13 October,
in a tentative agreement between
Tshomb6 and UN representative
Mahmoud Khiari. The proposed
agreement includes provisions
for a prisoner exchange, origi-
nally set for 16 October; for
the evacuation by the UN of
several strong points in Elisa-
bethville; for retention by
Tshomb6 of garrisons in north-
ern Katanga; and for military
inspection teams to visit the
installations of each side.
The most controversial
point of the proposed agreement,
Article 10, states that a counter-
attack by Katangan forces against
an attack from "the exterior"
would not constitute a violation
of the cease-fire. This article,
generally interpreted to mean an
attack by the central government,
caused consternation among UN
officials both in Leopoldville
and New York. Khiari on 16 Oc-
tober flew to Leopoldville to
explain the terms to Congolese
officials and foreign diplomats.
Premier Pdoula issued a public
statement expressing his appre-
hension regarding the terms,
which he stated would reinforce
Tshombe's position, and implic-
itly urged that the UN not rat-
ify the agreement.
UN headquarters' failure
to date to confirm the terms
has delayed implementation of
the agreement and has increased
bitterness in Elisabethville.
UN representative O'Brien on
16 October denounced Tshomb6
for not implementing the pris-
oner exchange, while Tshomb6
stated that he would not carry
out the agreement until it was
ratified by the UN. In New York,
Congolese Foreign Minister Born-
boko on 17 October attacked the
proposed cease-fire and hinted
that the Congo might seek Soviet
aid in launching an offensive to
crush Tshomb6.
Apart from the terms of the
cease-fire, the military stale-
mate in Katanga is a setback to
both the UN and the central gov-
ernment in their efforts to de-
feat Katanga's secession.
Tshomb6 on 18 October carried
out his commitment to send two
emissaries to negotiate with the
central government. In the wake
of his '"victory" over the UN,
however, he is unlikely to accept
any formula put forth by Adoula
which involves Katanga's reinte-
gration with the Congo. The cur-
rent impasse is embarrassing to
Adoula, who has associated his
government with the UN venture
in Katanga. Although Adoula has
indicated an awareness of the
logistical pitfalls inherent in
any Congo Army "invasion" of Ka-
tanga, he will be under increased
pressure from radical elements
of his government to take tough
action against Tshomb6.
On 13 October, four Dornier--
28 light transports--flown from
West Germany--passed through
Libreville, Gabon,C:: route to Ka-
tanga. With these, Tshomb6
probably now has at least five 25X1
Dorniers at airfields in south-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Elsewhere, Vice Premier
Gizenga--who had been scheduled
to return from Stanleyville to
Leopoldville on 14 October--
may be carrying on political
consultations with hard-core
supporters in Orientale Province.
Although many of Gizenga's form-
er aides have now taken posts
in the Adoula government, Gizenga
may still hope to form an "oppo-
sition" with a view to supplant-
ing Adoula. Any such move would
be handicapped by Gizenga's re-
luctance to spend much time in
Leopoldville, as well as by
problems in obtaining financial
assistance from abroad. Most
of Gizenga's erstwhile foreign
allies--including the USSR and
the UAR--are seeking accredita-
tion from the Adoula govern-
ment.
Belgian Foreign Minister
Spaak, speaking before the
Senate on 12 October, defended
his policy of cooperation with
the UN in the Congo against
charges by Social Christian
and Liberal party critics that
he had failed properly to pro-
tect Belgian interests there.
Spaak made clear his disapproval
of certain aspects of the UN
action, charging that General
Assembly actions now are deter-
mined by an emotional majority
without reference to justice.
He added that he had repeatedly
protested to the UN concerning
its treatment of Belgians, and
had warned that if the UN per-
sisted in such discrimination
Brussels would be forced to
review its policy toward the
UN.
Spaak stated, however,
that his government still
supports the central govern-
ment in the Congo, emphasizing
to his critics--many of whom
are zealous proponents of 25X1
Katangan separatism--that
Brussels does not intend
to support Tshombe.
FRANCE-ALGERIA
French officials in both
Algeria and metropolitan France
feel the situation in Algeria
is approaching another crisis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The OAS has probably not
been significantly weakened by
the silencing of its clandes-
tine radio in Algiers or the
capture of an OAS assassination
squad, although these successes
have helped the morale of the
security forces. The OAS may
nevertheless feel compelled to
act soon, since its indiscrim-
inate terrorism has begun to
alienate many of the European
settlers it counts on for mass
demonstrations to overwhelm
the police.
The OAS may also seek to
provoke widespread violence
by exploiting tension between
Europeans and Moslems. Eu-
ropean mob attacks on Moslems
in Oran on 17 and 18 October,
following a series of smaller
clashes which began on 13 Octo-
ber, could result in Moslem re-
taliation throughout Algeria.
The European attacks, probably
encouraged by the OAS, in-
crease the likelihood that the
nationwide Moslem demonstrations
scheduled for 1 November by the
provisional Algerian govern-
ment (PAG), even if intended
to be peaceful, will result
in racial clashes extensive
enough to require intervention
by the French Army.
The US consul general in
Algiers--who feels that Moslemre-
straint is the principal
reason general violence has
not already erupted in Algeria
--suggests that the 1 November
demonstrations may not be in-
tended to be peaceful. He notes
the presence in the Algiers
Casbah of many new Moslems,
some of whom have reportedly
recently arrived from Tunisia.
The massive Moslem dis-
turbances in Paris, although
ostensibly directed against
the recently imposed curfew,
appeared to be highly organized
and to indicate much more
active support for the PAG a-
mong the approximately 400,000
Moslems in France than the
French authorities had assumed.
The PAG has indicated publicly
its intention to continue to
call demonstrations in both
France and Algeria as a means
of pressuring Paris to enter
"serious" negotiations. New
large-scale demonstrations
could occur as early as 22
October, the anniversary of the
capture by the French of rebel
leader Mohamed Ben Bella.
De Gaulle's plans to visit
Rocker Noir, the new French
administrative headquarters east
of Algiers, around 1 November
now seem less certain. Jean
Morin, the French delegate
general, told the US consul
general on 14 October that De
Gaulle's visit had been agreed
upon in principle "if there is
something for him to do."
Morin confirmed that by this
he meant that the French had
not yet been successful in
persuading Moslem-elected
officials to participate at this
time in the proposed consulta-
tive body which would advise
the delegate general on problems
relating to the self-determina-
tion referendum. De Gaulle ap-
parently intended to install
this body during his visit to
Rocher Noir.
Morin added that Minister
for Algerian Affairs Joxe would
probably come to Algeria at the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
end of the week. Morin said
he would urge Joxe to hold
a press conference if nego-
tiations with the PAG were a-
bout to be resumed, in order
to calm Europeans by assuring
them of the government's con-
cern for their future.
Reports from Tunis indi-
cate that last week's meeting
of the PAG was devoted to
"internal affairs," and that
no decision was reached in re-
gard to resuming negotiations.
There are indications that
some rebel military commanders
are dissatisfied with the PAG
leadership, especially with
deputy premier Belkacem Krim.
The US ambassador in Tunis be-
lieves that this situation may
account for the recent PAG
statement demanding the release
of vice premier Ben Bella, now
detained in France, before ne-
gotiations are resumed. The
ambassador comments that if
the PAG's authority over the
rebel military units is at
all insecure, the full and
explicit support of Ben Bella
will be necessary to assure
their compliance with any
agreement negotiated with the
French.
The likelihood that the
French have similar reports
of dissension and are trying
to exploit it seems indicated
by Joxe's public admission on
17 October that in June 1960,
just prior to the abortive
Melun talks, De Gaulle had
received three rebel field
commanders desiring to sur-
render. Although the gov-
ernment's version of the inci-
dent makes it clear that one of
the commanders betrayed the
others and quashed the move,
Joie's account is likely to pro-
voke repercussions in French
military circles in view of
ex-General Challe's allusion
to the incident during his trial
as justification for his belief
that the army had won militarily
in Algeria and that De Gaulle's
policy of negotiation was de-
priving it of the fruits of
victory.
Further expressions of the
intention of De Gaulle's oppon-
ents to try to press him to step
down have also been reported.
Ex-Premier Pinay is said to be
planning soon to announce his
candidacy for leadership of a
national coalition designed
eventually to replace the present
government. He maintains close
contact with army officers and
may have been encouraged by the
recent tendency among hitherto
silent moderate elements to ex-
press support for a civilian-led
"democratic alternative" to De
Gaulle.
reputedly "nonpoliti-
cal"--to the effect that the army
does not want to take power it-
self but would support an effort
to oust De Gaulle "by moving a
few strategically located regi-
ments," particularly paratroop
units and forces in Germany.
The American Embassy in
Paris, however, commented last
week that it detected an evo-
lution of attitude among many
officers in favor of loyalty to
the government in event of a
crisis is.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In an effort to force some
degree of cooperation from the
restless and disaffected East
German population as well as
crush any signs of incipient re-
volt, the Ulbricht regime is
continuing to resort to arrests,
massive indoctrination campaigns,
and various other coercive meas-
ures. Despite these moves, the
population--although cowed--ap-
parently remains openly hostile
and has perpetrated a variety
of minor antiregime acts and
even some open violence. Top
leaders of the Socialist Unity
party (SED) appear confident
of their ability--with Soviet
backing--to control the people.
Resistance by Factory Workers
The regime is pressuring
workers to "produce more in the
same time for the same pay."
In some cases this pressure has
resulted in the imposition of
longer work hours. One report
asserts that the regime is al-
ready implementing decrees pub-
lished on 26 August designed to
Autobahn
Highway
Railroad
-~- Railroad (elevated)
Subway
SECRET
tighten its control over the
allocation of labor.
In East Berlin, SED offi-
cials reportedly have been ordered
to take part in a massive propa-
ganda campaign to overcome the.
growing apathy among industrial
workers there which followed the
move to seal off West Berlin.
Work slowdowns and acts of sabo-
tage have been reported in some
factories in the area.
Resistance Among Youths
Incidents of open defiance
of the regime continue to be re-
ported from all areas of East
Germany, particularly cases in-
volving youths which have brought
heavy prison sentences to the of-
fenders. In one instance students
at a secondary school in Schwerin
District reportedly staged a dem-
onstration against the regime; in
another, one student was arrested
for provocation to "murder and
espionage."
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Transportation Problems
Closure of the Berlin sector
border has necessitated extensive
efforts by the East Germans to
replace transportation routes
which crossed West Berlin terri-
tory. New control measures on
the interurban and intracity
rail links in the Berlin area
and the elimination of most rail
traffic through West Berlin have
slowed Communist rail transport
in the Berlin area to the point
where several hours are required
to travel distances which for-merly.took only minutes.
Double-tracking and elec-
trification of the Berlin rail
bypass and new facilities for
the elevated railroad (S-Bahn)
are receiving first attention,
displacing the priority for-
merly assigned to the route be-
tween Berlin and Frankfurt/Oder
--the main rail route from the
Soviet Union through Poland.
Track for the bypasses is ap-
parently being taken from those
S-Bahn lines which formerly ran
into West Berlin and from the
Berlin-Frankfurt project.
Despite the high priority,
it will be some months before
adequate service can be restored,
although the East Berlin press
announced on 12 October that the
double-tracking of the rail line
circling Berlin was almost fin-
ished.
Economic Situation
The SED central committee
and the government's Council of
Ministers held a conference
attended by 3,500 delegates on
ing alternate Western sources of
supply for goods now obtained from
West Germany and also is attempt-
ing to integrate its economy more
closely with the economies of
other bloc countries.
Negotiations between East
Germany and the USSR for Soviet
provision of chemicals and medica-
ments are continuing, and the So-
viet Union has promised to help
replace in 1962 any imports from
West Germany that East Germany
cannot replace through its own
production or from other sourc-
es. Soviet first Deputy Premier
Mikoyan, at East Germany's 12th
anniversary ceremonies, en-
larged this offer by promising
to supply food as well as raw
materials. Other bloc nations
have also promised to assist
East Germany, but its negotiators
are finding these nations re-
luctant to set firm delivery
dates.
A new currency law, which
became effective on 1 October,
emphasizes the regime's need
for foreign exchange. East
German holders of West German
marks and of claims in West
German marks must exchange them
for East marks at the official
one-to-one exchange rate. This
law, which could not have been
effectively enforced before the
closing of the border, should
permit the Ulbricht regime to
acquire some West marks to bol-
ster its foreign exchange posi-
tion.
A recent SED announcement
disclosed that East Germans
must postpone the planned time
10 and 11 October to discuss the for catching up with West Ger-
current economic situation. Ac- man living standards. The an-
cording to reports of the meeting, nouncement stated that there
East Germany continues to be un- would be cutbacks in the pro-
able to fulfill all the goals of duction of some consumer goods
the Seven-Year Plan, but a rapid and warned citizens to "tighten
expansion of heavy industry re- their belts" to pay for defense
mains the primary economic goal. measures against the West.
The meeting also revealed
that the regime's contingency
economic planning is based on
the assumption that interzonal
trade will have ceased by the
time the 1962 economic plan is
effective. East Germany is seek-
Several price increases have
been announced for consumer
goods, and more are slated for
early 1962. In addition, the
regime has restricted install-
ment buying in order to help e-
liminate excess purchasing power.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SHARP DROP IN CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE WITH EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Peiping's trade with the
European satellites (except Al-
bania), like that with the USSR,
has sharply declined this year
as a result of China's economic
setbacks. Peiping has severely
curtailed shipments of complete
industrial plants from East
Germany, Czechosolvakia, and
Poland, which account for the
bulk of Sino-satellite trade,
and this reduction is expected
to continue at least through
most of 1962.
Sino-satellite trade since
1950 has involved a mutually
beneficial exchange of satel-
lite industrial goods for Chi-
nese agricultural products and
raw materials. Machinery and
equipment--about half of which
consisted of complete plants--
have in recent years made up
nearly 85 percent of satellite
exports to China. The satel-
lites have not extended long-
term credits to China, and the
level of trade has depended pri-
marily on Peiping's ability to
export.
Last year, Sino-satellite
trade amounted to roughly $625,-
000,000--the same as in 1959--
and constituted about 15 percent
of total Chinese trade. Avail-
able evidence for 1961 suggests
a reduction of from one third
to one half, indicating that
trade this year probably will
come to no more than $400,000,-
000. Total Chinese trade is
expected to drop from about $4
billion in 1960 to some $3 bil-
lion in 1961,
Peiping still has not signed
a trade protocol for this year
with Czechoslovakia; the agree-
ments with the other satellites
undoubtedly involved a sharp
reduction in trade.
The curtailment of Peiping's
industrial imports from its bloc
trading partners has resulted in
part from the cutbacks in capital
construction in China and the re-
gime's current industrial poli-
cies--which emphasize improving
quality and making use of exist-
ing capacity rather than start-
ing new projects--and in part
from China's inability to pay
by exports. The Chinese can-
celed many imports of complete
plants for 1961 and probably
hoped to postpone other deliv-
eries until 1962 and beyond.
Trade officials in the sat-
ellites have expressed consider-
able dissatisfaction with the
state of their countries' trade
with China. The Chinese re-
trenchment policies have left
the satellites with undelivered
orders manufactured for China
and difficult to sell elsewhere;
China's failure to deliver raw
materials and foodstuffs, more-
over, has forced the satellites
to look for new sources of these
goods. Preliminary trade talks
for 1962 should normally be get-
ting under way now, but there
is no sign that China is pre-
pared to restore trade to former
levels, and further reductions
may be made (Prepared
by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNIST CHINA SIGNS NEW BORDER AGREEMENTS
Peiping capped its October
National Day and Double Ten
festivities by signing border
agreements with Nepal on 5
October and with Burma on 13
October during the friendship
visits of Nepal's King Mahendra
and Burma's Prime Minister U
Nu. Chinese propaganda hailed
both agreements as examples
of what can be accomplished by
negotiations conducted in the
spirit of the "five great
principles of peaceful coexist-
ence." In each case, Peiping
took a conciliatory stance dur-
ing negotiations, yielding on
many disputed points to secure
agreements which it could use
in its efforts to blame New
Delhi for the impasse on the
far more important Sino-Indian
border dispute.
The signing of the border
protocol with Burma follows
five years of negotiation.
Both sides have extracted
maximum propaganda effect from
each of the many intermediate
steps. The Chinese pulled
out all stops in welcoming U
Nu and his entourage to Peiping
for the signing ceremonies.
The text of the Sino-
Nepali border treaty reveals
almost no changes of signifi-
cance from the traditional
boundary. When Mahendra
arrived in Peiping, it appeared
that the only serious point at
issue between the two countries
was ownership of the summit of
Mt.. Everest. Nepal had rejected
such Chinese Communist corn-
promises as internationalization
of the summit. The text of the
new treaty does not settle the
question; it merely lists Everest
as one of the mountains through
which the border runs. A formal
decision on the issue, if forth-
coming in the near future, will
probably be worked out by the
joint border commission charged
with physical demarcation of
the border. A mapping proto-
col--similar to that just signed
between Burma and China--will
be drafted after the border
markers are in place.
New Delhi contends that
the Sino-Nepali treaty strongly
supports India's argument that
the Indian border with China is
well settled by tradition and
custom at the high watershed
all along the Himalayan Range.
Peiping, arguing that the Sino-
Indian border has never been
delimited, claims territory
south of the McMahon line, which
follows the watershed in the
eastern sector. The Chinese hope
to barter their claim in this
sector for India's claims in
Ladakh, but the matter continues
to stand on dead center. The
impasse has split the Indian
Communist party, which, for
vote-getting purposes, has bad
to issue an election manifesto
that again offers general sup-
port for the Indian Government's
border stand.
Peiping used the occasion
of the agreements with Nepal
and Burma to herald its regard
for the "rights" of small nations.
In the joint communique follow-
ing Mahendra's visit, the Chinese
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
promised never to adopt an
attitude of "g-reat-nation
chauvinism" toward Nepal.
Mahendra eagerly picked up
the Chinese line and made much
of an assurance--which he al-
leged Liu Shao-chi had given
him priva:.ely--that Communist
China would never invade or
aggress against its neighbors.
Economic talks during Ma-
hendra?s visit resulted in the
signing of an agreement, long
sought by Peiping, for Chinese
assistance in building a road
from the Tibetan border to
Katmandu. Such a road is of
dubious economic value at
present Peiping probably hopes,
however, that it will help
reduce New Delhi's influence in
Katmandu by breaking India's
virtual monopoly over access
to Nepal. The road will also
serve as an artery for carrying
Chinese propaganda into Nepal
through the activities of
Chinese technicians and laborers.
Katmandu may have acquiesced in
the project out of fear--reportedly
encouraged by the Chinese--that
New Delhi would delay Chinese aid
shipments transiting Indian ports.
China on a good-will junket.
foreign countries, but has never left
Both Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-
lai accepted Mahendra's invitation
to visit Katmandu, but no formal
date for their trip was set. Liu
has a number of open invitations from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The assassination of Urundi
Prime Minister Prince Louis
Rwagasore on 13 October may
signal an extreme nationalist
turn in Urundi, tribal violence
between the Hutu and Tutsi peo-
ple there, and increased strains
between Tutsi-controlled Urundi
and Hutu-dominated Ruanda--al-
ready the scene of continuing
violence between the two ethnic
groups. Rwagasore, the son of
Urundi's ruler, Mwami Mwabutsa,
had led the moderate wing of
the Union for the National
Interests of Urundi (UPRONA),
which represented the interests
of the ruling but minority
Tutsi people and pressed for
early independence for Urundi
In legislative elections on 18
September, held under UN super-
vision, UPRONA overwhelmingly
defeated the Belgian-supported
Front Commun, a group of parties
from a rival Tutsi clan and the
Hutu peoples; the Front Commun
had previously governed Urundi.
withdraw completely and immediate-
ly if Ruanda-Urundi so desired.
Vice Premier Ngendandumwe,
a Hutu and a moderate, is tech-
nically in line to become prime
minister, but Andre Muhirwa,
minister of interior, son-in-law
of the Mwami, and a Tutsi, seems
a more likely successor. Muhirwa
heads the extreme nationalist
wing of UPRONA and is in close
contact with the more radical
African leaders. His coming
to power would increase tribal
animositites in Urundi and. strain
Urundi's relations with Ruanda,
where the Ijutus are in control.
The Belgian delegate at the
UN stated on 17 Ocoober, that a
Greek resident of Urundi had been
arrested for the murder. The
Belgian Foreign Ministry believes
the Greek was probably hired by
family rivals of Rwagasore who
wished to prevent further con-
solidation of the present ruling
family.
The UPRONA victory "stunned"
local Belgians, who had worked
to eliminate the feudal regimes
of the Tutsis and bring the
Hutus, who comprise more than
80 percent of the population,
to power. Rwagasore had assured
the Belgians that UPRONA's theme
of "independence in 1961" was
campaign propaganda, that he
would not press for independence
before late 1962, and that he
wanted the Belgians to continue
to give Urundi technical and
financial assistance. He had
added Hutus to his government
but could not convince other
members of UPRONA to accept
members from the Front Commun.
The Belgian Foreign Ministry
told Ambassador MacArthur that
Rwagasore's assassination was
"hard blow" to Belgium and
would create an inflammatory
situation undoing "all Belgium's
good work in the elections."
Belgian Foreign Minister apaak
had informed MacArthur early in
October that while Belgium want-
ed to be helpful, it did not wish
to impose its presence and would
top ron
leaders have been arrested, and 25X1
that preliminary inquiry has
established that the Front had
organized the assassination.
On 16 October the Urundi
Government asked the UN Security
Council to investigate the assas-
sination and charged that a Front
Commun coup d'etat was in the
making. Prior to the assassina-
tion, developments in Ruanda-
Urundi were scheduled for re-
view in November or December at
the 16th session of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. On 17 October,
20 African states presented a
draft resolution calling for an
immediate investigation and a
report to the General Assembly
"as soon as possible."
Haiti's Max Dorsinville,
chairman of the UN Commission
for Ruanda-Urundi, observed the
elections and will make recommen-
dations to the TTN which will. carry
considerable weight. He is con-
vinced that neither Ruanda nor
Urundi is ready for independence,
that there is no possibility of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
uniting the two, and that a "UN
presence" is necessary for some
time. He told US officials in
early September that the Belgians
would be fortunate if the General
Assembly, which he described as
determined to "punish Belgium,25X1
did not push for an independ-
ence date "five or six months
after April 1962."
The close results in Tur-
key's orderly parliamentary
election last Sunday will make a
coalition government necessary.
Prospects, for its stability are
dim. The long-established
Republican People's party (RPP),
led by former President Ismet
Inonu and committed to economic
and social reforms, suffered
from its close association with
the junta which took power in
the coup on 27 May 1960. The
RPP won just a slight plurality
in the lower house and only
second place in the Senate. It
may choose to remain in the op-
position. The heavy vote for
those three parties which ap-
pealed to former members of
Menderes' Democratic party (DP)
indicates the degree of opposi-
tion aroused by the military
government.
The Justice party (JP),
led by former General Staff
chief Ragip Gumuspala, had no
program other than appealing to
the ex-Democrats, but it re-
ceived almost as many seats in
the lower house as did the RPP.
Despite the limited success of
the New Turkey party (NTP), it
will have a strong bargaining
position in the negotiations
for the formation of a coalition
During the campaign this party
also appealed to former DP sup-
porters. There is no barrier
to cooperation between the Jus-
tice and New Turkey parties.
On the other hand, the cam-
paign platform espoused by NTP
leader Professor Ekrem Alican
is compatible with the professed
views of the RPP.
Chances are slight that the
>.mall Republican Peasant Nation
party (RPNP) would enter a Coa-
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lition with either the RPP or
the JP. The RPNP conducted a
bitter campaign to displace
the Justice party as the leading
beneficiary of the protest
vote. The RPNP's demagogic
appeal is to the peasants,
and it opposes the seculariza-
tion and Westernization of Turkey
to which the RPP is committed.
Presence of the RPNP in a
coalition would reduce the
appeal of such a government
to all elements other than
the peasants.
The rebuke to the military
in the elections and the diffi-
culties inherent in forming an
effective coalition--even aside
from the likelihood that a JP-
based coalition would be inimi-
cal to the military--present
the junta with serious problems.
General Cemal Gursel, whom
most parties may agree on to
be president, has appealed to
all four parties to organize
a nonparty government. It
has been reported that the CNU
will not dissolve itself, as
had been planned, but will
continue to meet to keep an
eye on the politicians.
Apparently in an effort to
close ranks, the CNU issued
a statement shortly after the
election that 14 of its members,
exiled in November 1960 over
disagreements with the junta
leadership, were loyal citizens
with the good of the country
at heart. The CNU may permit
these individuals to return
to Turkey, despite the danger
that they may stir up the
younger officers and thus
introduce still another
element of instability into
the situation.
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Syria
Friction is reported to
have developed within the Syrian
officer corps and within the
revolutionary command itself
on the question of immediate
denationalization of industry,
as well as on the extent to
which the military should inter-
vene in day-to-day governmental
decisions. The command is
apparently having difficulty
maintaining discipline in the
army, especially in the three
Qatana brigades, elements of
which played a leading role in
the revolt.
These problems in the mili-
tary leadership, coupled with
pressures being exerted by
various political interests on
President of the Executive
Council Kuzbari, seem likely
to restore Syria to its tra-
ditional condition of insta-
bility and provide Nasir with
a useful climate for his sub-
versive efforts. However, a
temporary boost to the Syrian
regime may result from the
return to Damascus of former
president Shukri al-Quwwatli,
who has more prestige than
any of the men in the new
regime and who has had long,
painful experience conciliating
Syria's diverse political ele-
ments.
The new government moved
quickly to request aid from
abroad to tide it over during
its initial period of economic
adjustment. Even before the
US recognized Syria, Kuzbari
had appealed for quick supply
of PL-480 grain. Last week
the chairman of a special
Syrian committee on economic
affairs approached a West Ger-
man commercial attache for a
$25,000,000 two-year loan to
cover short-term obligations.
The government will, in ad-
dition, probably seek longer
range loans to compensate for
the loss of economic develop-
ment funds Egypt was to have
supplied.
The new Syrian regime will
probably also welcome continua-
tion--or perhaps even expansion
--of military and economic as-
sistance from the Soviet bloc.
The basic long-range agreements
for military and economic aid
from the Soviet Union were ne-
gotiated by Damascus and Mos-
cow before Syria's merger with
Egypt in 1958.
The government is also
moving to restore trade re-
lationships which had languished
while Syria was part of the UAR.
Egypt
In a speech on 16 October,
Nasir promised to benefit from
his "mistake" of trusting "re-
actionary elements"--which he
blamed for the Syrian secession
--and pledged new steps to give
.Egypt's masses the commanding
role in a social and economic
revolution. He said it would
be necessary to "shake the
government machinery to its
foundations" and reconstruct
it "to stand the force of the
revolutionary upsurge." He
declared that the National
Union--the single political
party system--must be purged
of reactionary elements and
"converted into a revolutionary
means for the national masses
alone." New government moves
are thus to be expected against
private business and landowning
interests; a number of wealthy
"reactionaries" may soon be
arrested and their property
confiscated.
The cabinet shuffle an-
nounced on 18 October included
a number of new appointments
and other shifts, primarily
in ministerial assignments con-
cerned with social services
and economic matters. In the
much more important vice presi-
dential posts, however, all
five of the Egyptian vice presi-
dents from the previous govern-
ment were retained and given
ministerial jobs in addition.
Nasir's statements on 16
October concerning Syria were
uncompromising. He talked of
the "reactionary assault" there
and alleged that any peasant
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now is shot dead if he hesitates
to surrender to the "big feu-
dalist" his legitimate right to
his land. Nasir pledged his
own--and the UAR's--efforts to
try to protect the "rights of
social justice and self-suf-
ficiency" of the Syrian Arab
masses, adding that it was not
his "right" to return Syria to
the UAR but a decision for the
Syrian and Egyptian peoples.
Nasir's determination to
press for the overthrow of King
Husayn has probably grown as a
result of public statements by
Jordanian officials welcoming
"the blessed Syrian upsurge" and
as a result of Husayn's en-
thusiastic backing of Syria's
proposal for a loose federation
of Arab states. Egyptian spokes-
men have ridiculed the proposal
as providing for only a facade
organization, not even as strong
as the Arab League, but Nasir is
obviously irritated by any such
attempts to snatch away his
"Arab unity" banner.
The Jordanian Government
is aware of the danger of
Egyptian-supported subversive
activity. Potential opposition
inside the country has been
increased, moreover, by the
government's thorough rigging
of parliamentary elections,
making the voting on 19 October
little more than a formality.
The government announced early
this week that deputies for 40
of the 60 parliamentary seats
had been elected unopposed.
The Imam, in a statement
broadcast on 12 October, indi-
cated that he has delegated a
certain amount of authority to
Crown Prince Badr and reaf-
firmed his confidence in Badr
as heir to the Yemeni Imamate.
The statement appears to have
been issued in order to pave
the way for Badr to take over,
as he did on a previous oc-
casion, while the Imam is awa
The Imam's continued in-
sistence on Badr's right of
succession, together withthe
declining state of his health,
is likely to result in a re-
newal of coup plotting among
anti-Badr elements. Badr, who
has in the past been susceptible
to Egyptian and Soviet influence,
is opposed by conservative
members of the royal family who
would prefer to see Prince Hasan,
the ruler's brother, succeed the
Imam. Many of Yemen's northern
tribesmen also are opposed to
Badr because they feel that by
designating his successor, the
Imam has violated the historic
custom that Yemeni rulers be
chosen by tribal agreement..
Badr is generally believed
incapable of ruling Yemen in
the forceful manner that has
typified the present Imam's
reign, and any government headed
by him would probably be beset
with instability which dissident
elements, including pro-Egyptian
and pro-Communist groups, would 25X6
try to exploit.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PORTUGUESE NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Portuguese officials fear
that opposition propaganda during
the campaign for the 12 November
elections to the National Assem-
bly may provoke public disorders
which could further discredit
the Salazar regime. Elaborate
security precautions have been
taken to prevent infiltration
by exiles from Morocco who might
initiate terroristic acts to
focus world attention on the
opposition cause during the elec-
tion period.
for a modicum of campaign freedom
and by the recent imprisonment
or temporary detention of many
of them. He has also refused
to publish their campaign pro-
gram, as it "recommends a change
in the present constitutional
structure" which is "not an appro-
priate subject for discussion
during an election campaign." 25X1
The government-sponsored
National Union party has pre-
sented lists in all of Portugal's
30 electoral districts. It is
basing its campaign on the re-
gime's record for economic sta-
bility, and asks for "national
unity" in the face of current
problems'in Africa and in the
UN. The moderate opposition,
a loose grouping of Socialists,
Republicans, Christian Democrats,
and Monarchists, wants to g're-
store democratic liberties,"
including the right to form
political parties, the abolition
of press censorship, and electoral reforms. Although oppo-
sition lists are registered in
only nine districts, these
account for 00 of the 130 con-
stituencies. The regime is
likely to invalidate most or all
of these lists before election
day on the pretext of Communist
participation, or candidates
will withdraw, charging that
government interference makes
their position intolerable.
Salazar's determination to
keep his opponents within strict
bounds is shown by his rejection
of their appeal on 20 September
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BRITISH GUIANA SINCE THE ELECTIONS
British Guiana's Premier
Cheddi Jagan is in firm control
of the cabinet formed after his
People's Progressive party (PPP)
won the elections on 21 August.
He is concentrating on prepara-
tions for economic development
and early independence, and ex-
pects to follow his current
fund-seeking visit to Canada
and the United States with a
trip to London to demand inde-
pendence in 1962. While much
will depend on the views of new
Colonial Secretary Maudling,
the British continue to believe
understanding treatment can
prevent Jagan from turning to
the bloc, and they might well
concede independence before
their previously planned date
of mid-1963.
Jagan has declared he be-
lieves in socialism domestically
--state ownership of the means
of production--and a neutralist
foreign policy. Envisioning
a grandiose development program
of over $262,000,000, he was
deeply disappointed by the US
aid mission's suggested offer
of $5,000,000 and may turn to
the bloc for loans if unsatis-
fied by the West.
Jagan himself heads develop-
ment planning and the government
information services. He in-
tends to set up a permanent
planning unit for which he has
hired a reputed French Communist,
a Venezuelan, two Indians, and
a West Indian. He indicated
this spring he may seek bloc
technical advice. In an attempt
to reassure foreign investors,
he declared on 15 October the
government had no present plans
to nationalize the foreign-
owned bauxite and sugar indus-
tries but reserved the right to
nationalize in the future. He
also plans to set up a govern-
ment radio station.
Principal opposition leader
Forbes Burnham and his People's
National Congress party boy-
cotted both the Senate and
the opening of the new leg-
islative assembly when the
governor refused to give the
party all three opposition
seats in the 13-member nomi-
nated Senate. United Force
leader Peter d'Aguiar appears
willing to add his votes to
the PPP's majority in the as-
sembly and to cooperate with
Jagan on issues unrelated to
Communism. Legislative diffi-
culties are most likely to
arise through the new ministers
lack of experience and train-
ing--particularly in economics.
A Trinidad Communist has been
hired as Jagan's public relations
adviser despite Jagan's current
efforts to play down his Commu-
nist connections and his admira-
tion for Castro's tactics in
Cuba. Although Jagan apparently
is estranged from his wife, Ja-
net, she is expected to assist
him by concentrating on strength-
ening the PPP now that she holds
no governmental post. In their
current roles they may repeat
the pattern after the 1957
elections, when Jagan ostenta-
tiously banned the entry of
Communist publications, while
Janet continued to maintain con-
tact with Communists abroad.
Jagan has stated he
wants to join the OAS, but
he has refused to join
the West Indies Federation
unless it develops a more
socialistic orientation
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In recent weeks the three
major Dominican opposition
political groups have shown in-
creasing intransigence toward
the Balaguer government. All
three have rejected Balaguer's
most recent offer to accept them
in a coalition government, a
step which the President con-
siders essential to his libera-
lization program. The opposi-
tion's stiffer attitude seems
to stem not from any increase
in provocations by the govern-
ment--which have in fact de-
clined--but from mounting self-
confidence The police showed
unusual restraint in dealing
with the student rioting that
began in the capital On 16
October and spread to other
cities. Nevertheless, the
rioting, initially to protest
the naming of a pro-Trujillo
university rector, had a clear
antigovernment character and
further exacerbated the polit-
ical situation. It led the
government to close the uni-
versity until next January.
OnE faction of the leader-
ship of the largest opposition
group, the National Civic Union
(UCN), 'has been so impressed
w,vith the demonstrations of pop-
ular support for the group that
it has considered taking action
toward replacing Balaguer with
a government composed wholly
or almost wholly of UCN ad-
herents.
UCN leaders appear to have
an unrealistic and dangerous
wstx.mate of their influence in
the armed forces. While they
often privately e.apress con-
fidence that they could swing
significant military support
to their cause in a showdown,
available information suggests
that in fact the military would
be more likely to act against
the opposition. American mili-
tary liaison officers in the
Dominican Republic estimate
that the growth of opposition
strength since last June has
helped unite officers against
what they regard as a threat
to their positions. The coun-
try's most immediate danger is
still the possibility of a coup
by officers out of fear that
they would lose everything if
Balaguer's liberalization program
reached its logical conclusion
in an opposition-dominated regime.
There are some indications
that the increased intransigence
of the opposition may be due in
part to advice from Venezuelan
President Betancourt, mortal enemy
of the Trujillo family and victim
of a nearly successful assassina-
tion attempt by Trujillo agents in
June 1960
end in backing another dic-
opposition elements, includ-
ing the majority of the upper
middle class as well as
students and other groups,
remain suspicious of United
States intentions in the Do-
minican Republic and fear
that the United States will
tatorial regime
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Goulart-Neves govern-
ment in Brazil has strengthened
its political position by adding
Alfredo Nasser of the Social
Progressive party to the cabinet.
Nasser's appointment was approved
by the Chamber of Deputies by a
vote of 166 to 2 on 12 October.
The Social Progressive party,
based largely in Sao Paulo, was
not previously represented in
the government and had been con-
sidered one of the most important
potential opposition groups.
Nearly all generals hostile
to the government now have been
removed from top commands, and
similar moves against regimental
and battalion commanders are
planned.
However, a propaganda cam-
paign to prepare for Janio Qua-
dros' return to an active role
in Brazilian politics is gath-
ering momentum. Pro-Quadros
sentiments are being expressed
cenly, although not widely,
and the hostility generated by
his sudden resignation on 25
August from the presidency is
tending to disappear.
Quadros' decision on whether
to run for the governorship of :Sao
Paulo or for a seat in the Cha.,i-
ber of Deputies will probably
be based on the outlook for im-
plementation of the constitu-
tional amendment of 2 Septem-
ber, which attempts to trans-
fer executive power from the
President and the state gov-
ernors to prime ministers re-
sponsible to the respective
legislatures.
If Congress refuses to_repeal
the amendment and successfully
rebuffa:s Goulart's efforts to
circumvent it, Quadros is likely
to seek election as a deputy--
and subsequently make a bid for
the prime ministry. All seats
in the Chamber of Deputies, as
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well as two thirds of those in
the Senate and half the guberna-
torial posts, are at stake in
next October's elections.
Should repeal of the con-
stitutional amendment seem
likely, however, Quadros would
probably seek the governorship
of Sao Paulo, Brazil's most
powerful state. The amendment
impairs the attractiveness of
that post, since it applies to
the states after the incumbent
governors' terms expire.
Failure of the Goulart-
Neves government to take deci-
sive action in the economic and
social fields would enhance
Quadros' chances for a political
comeback and would increase mili-
tary unrest. Finance Minister
Walter Salles reportedly believes
that the financial situation is
critical, in part because money
is not being received on US loans
which had been granted to the
Quadros government, According
A law signed by Goulart
on 6 October providing for a
40-percent increase in the
mimimum wage is likely to in-
crease inflation--one of
Brazil's principal roblems
in recent ears.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ecuadorean President Velas-
co, facing mounting unrest, is
taking emergency measures against
his opposition. A government
spokesman on 17 October announced
that a "gigantic revolutionary
plot" centering in Quevedo and
involving both leftist and right-
ist political figures had been
smashed. Two opposition depu-
ties, as well as some 20 Commu-
nist leaders, were arrested.
The arrest of the deputies pro-
voked the Senate to denounce
the government for "violating
the constitution" by ignoring
the deputies' parliamentary
immunity. New political rioting
swept the two Ecuadorean cities
of Guayaquil and Cuenca on 18
October, and the government
charged that a revolutionary
plot centered in Guayaquil was
under way.
Julio Arosemena, vice presi-
dent and president of the na-
tional Congress, is reported
sympathetic to the disgruntled
forces in the country and ap-
parently aspires to lead them.
On 18 October he threatened to
bring impeachment proceedings
against Velasco. At a meeting
of Congress called earlier this
week to consider the arrest of
the deputies, the galleries were
packed with Velasco supporters,
and the meeting ended in stone
throwing and gunfire,
There
is no evidence that Arosemena
has significant army backing,
The antigovernment action
began on 4 October with a Com-
munist-leftist general strike
attempt which caused disorders
in three northern cities; Quito
and Guayaquil at that time were
quiet. The move was designed
to force government retraction
of certain new taxes, The Ecu
dorean Communists were reported
satisfied with the initial suc-
cess of the strike and advised
against further agitation. Pro-
Castro leftists, however, have
been pushing agitation on a
national scale.
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A second wave of disorders
began when Velasco visited the
provincial capital of Tulcan on
12 October. According to one
report, Velasco had to leave
the city under heavy guard be-
cause his life was endangered by
mobs. The anti-Velasco violence
was prompted by grievances such
as a government crackdown on
smuggling, which provides a
livelihood to large numbers, and
by government failure to allo-
cate sufficient public works
activity to the area.
9oor government planning
an(', inattention to local needs
are reflected in unrest in other
population centers such as
('uevedo, Fsmeral.das, Cuenca,
niobamba, Ambato, and Loja.
Ecuador received a token ship-
ment of military equipment from 25X1
the US on 11 October and has
reiterated its request for fur-
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NNW' SECRET #or
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
MONGOLIA
The criterion of a genuine
internationalist is above all
his attitude toward the country
which is the homeland of Lenin-
ism... , "--Y. T4edenbal, Kommu-
nist, July 1961.
By this standard, it would
be hard to find an internation-
alist more genuine than Tseden-
bal, Mongolia's government and
party chief, for few can match
his talent for turning syco-
phantic phrases about the USSR.
Last year, however, his attitude
wavered briefly when he tried
to avoid choosing sides in the
Sino-Soviet dispute and he
still takes care not to trample
on Peiping's ideological sensi-
tivities. Tsedenbal has am-
bitious development schemes,
and Communist China has been
underwriting a portion of these
plans with an economic aid
program second in size only to
that of the USSR. The Chinese
effort and its impact on Mongo-
lian Communists seem to have
Jarred Moscow into reviewing
its own position in Mongolia.
Socialist Competition
At the Bucharest conference
of bloc party leaders in June
1960, Khrushchev reportedly
charged that the Chinese were
trying to force their concepts
on other parties, and he singled
out Chou En-lai's May 1960 visit
to Mongolia as a case in point.
Chou in fact did take every op-
portunity in Mongolia to expound
the Chinese concept of struggle
with the West. He also brought
a $50,000,000 loan for Tseden-
bal's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-
65).
While Chou was in Mongolia,
Tsedenbal's speeches steered a
middle course between honoring
his guests and reassuring Mos-
cow, which showed its lack of
enthusiasm for the Chinese pre-
mier's visit by giving him only
cursory press coverage. Mon-
golia's balancing act continued
through June, and on 5 July 1960
the central committee issued
a carefully noncommittal resolu-
tion on the Bucharest conference.
A few weeks later, Tseden-
bal was summoned to Moscow, where
apparently he was reminded that
his attitude toward the home-
land of Leninism left a good
bit to be desired. On 14 Au-
gust, Unen, Mongolia's official
newspaper, moved to remedy the
situation with an editorial declar-
ing firmly for the USSR.
But if Tsedenbal learned
that neutrality was a luxury
he could not afford, the Soviet
Union apparently decided at the
same time that Mongolia's tradi-
tional obedience could not be
taken for granted. When the
Mongolian premier returned from
Moscow in September 1960, he
had a Soviet credit for almost
$154,000,000. Six months later,
he was back in the USSR to negoti-
ate an additional credit for
more than $135,000,'000. To-
gether, these two credits for
the Third Five-Year Plan were
greater than combined Soviet
contributions to Mongolia over
the previous 13 years. With a
population of one million, Mon-
golia could, in fact, claim to
be about the world's most sub-
sidized nation in terms of foreign
investment per capita.
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`` SECRET `'o
In March 1961, Soviet De-
fense Minister Malinovsky made
a personal appearance in Ulan
Bat or to join in the Army Day
celebrations. He outranked
every other soldier present,
including Communist China's
representative and Mongolia's
own minister of defense. This
July, when Mongolian Communists
held their 14th party congress
and immediately afterward cele-
brated 40 years of Communism
in Mongolia, the USSR sent par-
ty secretary Mikhail Suslov.
Mongolian Nationalism
Historically, Rus-
sian influence was
favored by the Mongolians
as a rein on Chinese domi-
nation. Although Mon-
golians are determined to
prevent any restoration of
Chinese ascendancy, there
have been indications in
recent years that some
elements in the Mongolian
party were restive after
years of unquestioning
obedience to the Kremlin
and that they welcomed
an opportunity to widen
contacts with the Chinese
as a counterweight to
Soviet influence. Other
elements have manifested
their apprehensions about
Russification by their
efforts to heighten the
Mongol's sense of national
identity.
The return of Chinese in-
fluence to Mongolia, neverthe-
less, has an erosive effect on
traditional Soviet dominance.
Buying into what was once a
closed corporation, Peiping
seems to be following a policy
of patience and of gradual en-
croachment intended slowly to
reorient Ulan Bator's political
allegiance.
A spokesman for this last
group was a professor at Ulan
Bator's Choybalsan University,
Dr. Rinchen, who wrote a number
of books and poems between 1956
and 1959 extolling classical Mon-
gol culture and implicitly criti-
cizing the Soviet Union. At-
tacked in the Mongolian press
as.a "bourgeois nationalist,"
Rinchen was eventually dismissed
from his university post. He
suffered only partial eclipse,
however, and in May 1961 was
elected a member of the Mongolian
Academy of Sciences.
Rinchen's outlook is ap-
parently a fairly common one
among Mongolian intellectuals
and some government officials.
American students in the USSR
report that their Mongolian ac-
quaintances show a certain dis-
dain of both Chinese and Russians,
preferring Western companions
to those from the bloc. Mongolia's
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1%001 NEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
foreign minister told a visit-
ing diplomat in 1956, "We must
seek to prevent becoming en-
tirely Russified and as a re-
sult, losing our own culture
and characteristics."
Mongolian nationalism is
often associated with pan-Mongol
sentiment. As one Mongolian
official expressed it in a con-
versation with a US diplomat,
Ulan Bator represents the whole
Mongol nation including ethnic
Mongols in the USSR and China. He
described the separation of Inner and
Outer Mongolia as a "bad situation"
brought on by "historical reasons."
Members
D. Baljinnyam
T. Dugersuren
N. Jagbaral
D. Molomjamts
J. Sambuu
Y. Tsedenbal (1st Secretary
L. Tsend (2nd Secretary)
Alternate members
N. Lubsanrabdan
M. Maydar
* Politburo always listed
by Mongolians in
alphabetical order
PARTY CONGRESS
14th held in July 1961
Central Committee
75 Members
51 Candidate Members
Secretariat
Y. Tsedenbal Ist Secretary
L. Tsend 2nd Secretary
D. Baljinnyam Member
T. Dugersuren Member
Great People's Hural
L. Tsend Chairman
One deputy for each electoral
district of 4,000 citizens
(267 in 1960); 3-year term;
meets once yearly
Presidium
of Great People's Hural
J. Sambuu Chairman
D. Baljinnyam Deputy Chairman
N. Lubsanchultem Secretary
6 Other Members
Y. Tsedenbal Chairman
D. Molomjamts Ist Deputy Chairman
N. Jagbaral Deputy Chairman
B. Lhamsuren Deputy Chairman
D. Maydar Deputy Chairman
T. Ragchaa Deputy Chairman
Government Ministries
and Commissions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Economic Plans
Soviet hegemony still seems
secure in Mongolia judging from
the performance Mongolian Com-
munists put on this summer at
their party congress and anni-
versary celebrations. The
speeches on socialist brother-
hood were heavily weighted in
favor of the Soviet Union and
its economic aid program, which
has extended credits totaling
some $564,000,000 since 1947.
But the Chinese, whose grants
and credits add up to $115,-
000,000, were sar from neglected
and, if not praised as loudly
as the USSR, at least were
allocated a share of eulogy
proportional to their investment
in the Mongolian economy. On
the sensitive issues of ideo-
logical controversy, Tsedenbal
and his cohorts stayed carefully
within the boundaries of Sino-
Soviet compromise defined by
the 1960 Moscow Declaration
which ensued from last November's
meeting of world Communist
leaders.
Both Tsedenbal and L. Tsend
--a young economist and the
regime's second-ranking man--
spent a good deal of time at
the congress describing the
Third Five-Year Plan. Essen-
tially an effort to catapult
Mongolia's archaic economy into
the 20th century, the plan
constitutes a victory by the
45-year-old Tsedenbal over
older elements in the party who
preferred a more gradual ap-
proach to economic development.
These conservatives, who ap-
parently felt the pace of
socialization should make al-
lowance for Mongolia's tradition-
al culture, were purged from
the politburo in 1959, leaving
Tsedenbal in control of party
and state apparatus.
SECRET
The Third Plan is an effort
to reduce Mongolia's dependence
on animal husbandry. There are
more than 20 head of cattle for
every Mongolian, and at least
70 percent of the population is
directly dependent on the live-
stock herds. Corollary to this
objective are those of expanding
crop agriculture and developing
a degree of self-sufficiency in
consumer goods. Basic to the
achievement of these goals will
be the settlement of nomads in
permanent locations. The govern-
ment claims that most nomads
are enrolled in cooperatives,
but out on the steppes the
organization is often a paper one.
The Third Five-Year Plan
calls for increasing the number
of livestock by 11 percent to
reach 22,900,000 head by 1965;
gross value of agricultural pro-
duction is to go up 80 percent;
and gross industrial production,
110 percent. These goals are
more likely to be met in indus-
try and crop farming than in
livestock raising.
Large percentage gains in
the cultivation and output of
crops and some small increases
in the livestock herd may be
made in the next few years, but
any substantial expansion after
1965 in the crop and livestock
sector of the economy will be
difficult. The major brake on
such increases is inadequate
rainfall, which limits the
capacity of the grasslands for
grazing animals and restricts
the amount of wheat and other
crops that can be grown.
Industrial expansion dur-
ing the years 1961-65 will
continue to depend on imports
of equipment and the services
of foreign technicians, financed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by foreign credits or grants.
Even with substantial foreign
aid, industry in 1965 will still
be on a relatively small scale
and will remain centered on the
processing of animal products.
Relations Outside the Bloc
Over the past few years,
Mongolia has made a determined
effort to win acceptance as an
independent member of the in-
ternational community. This
campaign has had some success,
particularly among Afro-Asian
countries, but with one con-
spicuous failure--the US deci-
sion to drop consideration of
diplomatic relations with Ulan
Bator.
For Mongolia, recognition
by the US would have been a
most desirable status symbol
and one that the Mongolians un-
doubtedly felt would have served
to open doors in the West. Ulan
Bator, however, did not want
to appear overeager for recogni-
tion, and on two occasions Mon-
golian diplomats officially
scoffed at the idea that Mon-
golia would serve as a "listen-
ing post" between Communist
China and the USSR. These
statements also may have been
intended to reassure Peiping,
which reportedly had cautioned
Ulan Bator against permitting
the US to open a legation in
Mongolia.
Like the other Asian Com-
munist regimes, Mongolia is
particularly interested in
promoting relations with the
African republics and Asian
neutrals which might be expected
to support its bid for UN member-
ship. Membership requires a
recommendation by the Security
Council and a two-thirds endorse-
ment by the General Assembly.
Although Nationalist China
had voted in 1946 in favor of
admitting Mongolia, Taipei
used its veto to block a
Security Council recommendation
in 1955. Addressing the General
Assembly in September 1960,
Khrushchev called for Mongolia's
admission along with that of
Communist China. On 4 December,
having failed to get Mongolia's
application included on the
Security Council agenda, the
Soviets retaliated by vetoing
Mauritania's application for
membership.
Indicative of the importance
Ulan Bator attaches to its new-
ly won contacts outside the
bloc was the appointment last
year of Bayanbatoriin Ochirbat,
one of Ulan Bator's few ex-
perienced diplomats and formerly
acting foreign minister, as
ambassador to Guinea. This
May, Ochirbat was accredited
to Mali as well. Mongolia has
also been recognized by Burma,
Cambodia, Cuba, India, Indonesia,
and Yugoslavia. All bloc coun-
tries maintain diplomatic rela-
tions with Mongolia.
Ulan Bator also has become
something of a way stop for non-
bloc dignitaries; last year,
Guinean President Sekou Tour6 and
Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk made
state visits, and one of the omni-
present Cuban delegations included
Mongolia in its itinerary. The
King and Queen of Nepal are current-
ly visiting Ulan Bator.
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'"W10 Onklztm I NOW
CURRENT INTELLXGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE PROVISIONAL ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT
The provisional Algerian
government (PAG) has been re-
organized twice since it was
formed in 1958--most recently
this August--and is still ham-
pered by factionalism and ad-
ministrative weaknesses related
to its dependence on other
bodies within the rebel move-
ment.
The PAG is only the polit-
ical arm of the movement, whose
supreme governing body is the
National Council of the Alge-
rian Revolution (CNRA)e The
CNRA has approximately 54 mem-
bers, drawn from all facets of
the rebel movement: the uni-
formed National Liberation
Army (ALN); terrorists and
other revolutionary agents in
both Algeria and France; and
governmental and diplomatic
establishments outside Algeria.
Because of its size and the
anonymity of most of its mem-
bers, the CNRA is a shadowy,
unwieldly organization which
meets infrequently--apparently
only twice since mid-1958--and
confines itself to establish-
ing broad policies. Its meet-
ings have been long and chaotic,
reportedly punctuated with bit-
ter quarrels.
relationship to their parlia-
ments. Although there is a
premier, almost all reports em-
phasize that the PAG's decisions
are arrived at--slowly--through
group deliberation; consequently,
there is a collective sense of
responsibility to the CNRA.
Organizational Weaknesses
This method of operation
accounts for some of the PAG's
weaknesses--as exemplified in
rebel talks with the French.
The decision to seek a negotiated
settlement of the Algerian war
seems to have been made at a
CNRA meeting in Tripoli in Jan-
uary 1960. Apparently to re-
align the "government" in order
to carry out the new basic
policy, this meeting also made
extensive changes in the PAG--
notably the replacement of For-
eign Minister Lamine Debaghine,
who opposed negotiations, by
Belkacem Krim. The PAG's hes-
itation to begin talks and the
behavior of its delegation once
talks had begun are probably
traceable in part to preoccupa-
tion with strict observance of
the CNRA mandate.
Apparently in order to
gain international stature and
respectability for the rebel
movement, as well as to provide
day-to-day direction, the CNRA
established the PAG as a gov-
ernment in exile. The PAG is
even more restricted by its sub-
ordination to the CNRA than are
most governments b their
De Gaulle's reference to
the PAG as the "exterior organ-
ization of the rebellion" was a
Jab at one of its principal weak-
nesses. Many of its members
have not been in Algeria for
several years. Of its past and
present ministers, only Abdel-
hamid Mehri--now dropped--can
speak Arabic effectively. Living
in Tunis or Cairo or traveling
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to Peiping, Moscow, and other
capitals, they are isolated
from guerrillas within Algeria,
who frequently evince a mis-
trust of their "government"
and an impatience with its
diplomacy,
There are many indica-
tions that the PAG is influ-
enced by this antagonism. The
new premier, Ben Youssef Ben
Khedda, reportedly resigned
from the PAG in 1960 when it
rejected his strong plea that
at least some of the PAG min-
istries should move from Tunis
into Algeria. Krim, who be-
came interior minister in the
latest reshuffle, has indicated
to the US ambassador in Tunis
that he will work full time to
consolidate the PAG's influ-
ence among the urban Moslem
populations, and that he may
enter Algeria in order to per-
form this task more effectively.
Moreover, the diverse com-
position of the supreme CNRA
is reflected in the PAG itself
and in the factionalism which
prevails within the subordi-
nate body. There has been talk
of a "Cairo wing" in the PAG--
meaning those who would closely
ally the rebel movement with
Nasir and his policies, Many
people, possibly including De
Gaulle and his government, be-
lieve there are "hard" and
"moderate" wings, while still
others distinguish between the
"military" and the "civilian"
wings. Probably the most fun-
damental division is that be-
tween former military command-
ers and those whose service to
the rebel cause has been in
other fields,
The "Civilian" Wing
The "civilian" wing of
the PAG was dealt a heavy blow
in the latest reorganization,
when former premier Ferhat
Abbas, Ahmed Francis, and Mehri
were dropped, Both Abbas and
Francis have strong French cul-
tural backgrounds and have con-
sistently advocated an inde-
pendent Algeria having close
ties with France, Abbas, who
originally opposed the use of
violence to gain independence
and did not join the National
Liberation Front for two years
after the start of the rebel-
lion, apparently had little
power and no authority over
rebel fighting units. Although
Abbas won considerable popular-
ity with the Algerian masses,
and became more than the figure-
head he was probably intended
to be, his future in an independ-
ent Algeria does not appear
bright. His affinity with the
Moslem bourgeoisie, however,
might prove useful in gaining
its support for the new govern-
ment,
Francis, a competent tech-
nician, is even less a militant
revolutionary than Abbas, but
his ability, especially in eco-
nomics and finance, could cer-
tainly be used in an independent
Algeria. He may be utilized as
a planner or chairman of some
study committee, but his close
identification with Abbas makes
it unlikely that he will attain
real power,
Mehri, a graduate of the
Arabic Zitouna University in
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Tunis, was held in some esteem
because of his intelligence and
his excellent grounding in
Arabic culture.
and since
he is noted for an a ity to
adapt himself to changes in pol-
icy, he may yet be influential
in an independent Algeria.
The one "civilian" minister
to survive the recent reorgan-
ization, information minister
Mohamed Yazid, is considered
strongly Western oriented and
a member of the Abbas group, al-
though he has probably built up
an independent position through
his control of the official reb-
el newspaper and other informa-
tion media and his unquestioned
technical competence. He is
proficient in English, and next
to Abbas probably has the widest
acquaintance of any of the rebel
leaders, being well known in the
United States, throughout the
Arab world, and in France proper.
He will probably continue to be
a prominent and effective, al-
though not powerful, member of
the government.
The "Military" Wing
Ben Khedda, Belkacem Krim,
Abdelhafid Boussouf, and Lakh-
dar Ben Tobbal comprise the
PAGBs "military" wing, along
with Mohamed Ben Bella, who is
under detention in France. All
have served in Algeria as rebel
field commanders or. as in the
case of Ben Khedda, in active
and risky organizational work.
What control and authority the
]SAG exerts over the fighting
forces in Algeria--frequently
reported to be tenuous at best--
stems from the confidence the
fighters have in these men.
Only they have the influence
which might be required to per-
suade the ALN to observe a
cease-fire or a peace resulting
from negotiations.
The military wing has fre
quently been considered synon-
ymous with the "hard" wing, or
the "pro-Communist" wing, or
even the "China" wing--a too
facile and misleading general-
ization. Krim, for all his
revolutionary fervor,
impresses
US officials in Tunis
as moder-
ate and reasonable. He has
shown
awareness, for instance,
that
the PAG cannot come to
power
in Algeria overnight,
and
he is
personally prepared to
ac-
cept
a transitional period.
Krim
recognizes the hopeless economic
plight of an independent Algeria
without close cooperation with
France, and may use his position
as interior minister to prepare
the Algerian masses to accept
these realities.
Boussouf, on the other hand,
has generally been considered
the most unyielding of the pres-
ent rebel leaders. An efficient
administrator, he has frequently
been described as
powerful, and even feared. He
controls the rebel "secret po-
lice" and appoints commanders
in the rebel army. By placing
supporters in key positions, he
has reportedly built up a machine
personally loyal to him. There
have been many reports of rival-
ry between Boussouf and Krim,
and although Boussouf is less
well known and has less prestige
than Krim, his organizational
and political skill might give
him the advantage in a postwar
struggle for power.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ben Tobbal, who appears
to have suffered a demotion in
the latest reshuffle of the
PAG, rose to power without hav-
ing won the allegiance of any
particular group of followers
and does not appear to be in as
strong a position as either
Krim or Boussoufe
There has been much specu-
lation about Ben Khedda's po-
sition and ideology, especially
his alleged "Chinese" or "Com-
munist" sympathies, He is cer-
tainly less moderate than Krim
and admires Communist or aniza-
tion and achievement,
Key
members of the PAG, who have
several times expressed an-
noyance over Western interpre-
tation of rebel contacts with
bloc countries as "Communist
influence," have recently in-
sisted to US officials that the
new premier will not lead Alge:ria
into the Communist camp.
Plans for Govern ing-A lger is
So far, the PAG has been
a group directing a rebellion
rather than a government admin-
istering a country. Most ini-
tial comments on the recent
reshuffle stressed the effect
on negotiations with France and
intensification of the war
effort if necessary. The re-
alignment may also have been
preparation for governing an
independent Algeria.
There is considerable evi-
dence that the rebel leaders
now are taking independence for
granted and beginning to think
in terms of how they will run
an independent Algeria,
Ben Khedda, to a greater
extent than his colleagues, is
apparently looking beyond the
attainment of independence. His
recent statements suggest that
his major effort may be to de-
velop a workable blueprint for
the new Algeria. Information
from various sources indicates
that this new Algeria is to be
a social democratic country
where all races will have equal-
ity before the law, with an
agrarian reform program designed
to increase the purchasing power
of the peasants and thereby per-
mit the industrialization of the
country,
In an independent Algeria,
the "military" wing can be ex-
pected to press for measures
directly benefiting the ex-com-
batants, Both Krim and Ben
Khedda have stated that land
reform, in particular, will first
be aimed at taking care of the
former fighters. It is also the
military members of the PAG who
would be most nearly able to
guarantee public order and re-
strain the ALN from Congo-type
outrages. There is no firm
evidence, however, that any of
these men, with the possible ex-
ception of Boussouf, envisages
a military dictatorship for the
new Algeria.
On the whole, the rebel
leaders have impressed US offi-
cials and other Western observers
as reasonable and competent men.
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N.wr JntAxG I VINP,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Although the French will
find the new PAG even less com-
promising than its predecessor,
it may be easier to negotiate
with because of its apparently
increased authority and the
greater effectiveness of the
new foreign minister, Saad Dab-
lab, who impressed the French as
the most sophisticated member of
the rebel negotiating team at
Evian and Lugrin. Dahlab, al-
though not generally identified
with the "military" wing, is
considered loyal to Krim and ac-
ceptable to the ALN.
Ultimate Power Struggle
The reorganized PAG, how-
ever, is not likely to be the
actual governing body of an in-
dependent Algeria--at least not
for long. There had been many
reports that Abbas and his group
were merely being used by the
real leaders of the rebel move-
ment and would be speedily
dumped once the rebels were in-
stalled in Algeria.
Ben Khedda's appointment
may be, in the same sense, a
sort of interim arrangement.
Yazid told the US ambassador in
Tunis on 15 September that it
was designed to postpone the
question of individual leader-
ship until the detainees (Ben
Bella and others) are released--
and to minimize the risk of a
split within the rebel leader-
ship once a cease-fire is ef-
fected. The US consul general
in Algiers was told some time
ago by an influential member
of the rebel movement that Ben
Khedda would be minister of na-
tional economy in an Algerian
government.
These considerations sug-
gest that the real struggle for
power is yet to come, and that
an independent Algeria will 25X1
eventually have a single strong
leader
the PAG is preparing to
"p ase out" or to cooperate
with other Algerian elements in
transitional arrangements for
a transfer of power in Algeria,
it is unlikely that its members
intend to relinquish their power
positions. Hence they must all
be reckoned with as future lead-
ers of the country.
One important and uncertain
factor in this likely struggle
for power is Ben Bella--who the
French have said will be re-
leased when a cease-fire is ef-
fected. Before his arrest in
1956, Ben Bella was probably the
most widely known figure in the
rebel movement, and be has been
an honorary deputy premier of
the PAG since its inception. Al-
though his imprisonment has made
him a popular symbol, it is dif-
ficult to assess how his absence 25X1
has affected his actual power
within the rebel hierarchy.
a secret group 25X1
of Algerian militants in Morocco
considers Ben Bella the true
head of the government, but it
is unlikely that they are power-
ful enough to carry him to the
top over Krim or Boussouf.
Ben Bella's future in an in-
dependent Algeria will probably
depend on how advantageous a
settlement the present active
leaders are able to obtain from
the French and how effectively
they can administer the new
country. Should they compromise
the aims of the revolution or
make serious mistakes in the
early stages of attempting to
govern the country, Ben Bella,
untarnished by these failures,
could emerge as the strong man.
25X1
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