CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 2?
OCR NO.0407/62
9 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
.9 March .1962
T H E W E E K I N B`R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 8 Mar)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's acceptance of the Western proposals for
a foreign ministers' discussion at Geneva was probably
heavily influenced by his failure to gain support for an
immediate summit meeting and by his interest in opening
new contacts on the Berlin question. In addition, he
made it clear in his letter of 3 March that he considered
a subsequent summit meeting virtually agreed. Khrushchev's
letter also opened the Soviet campaign to turn world opinion
against the US on the question of new nuclear testing and
the test ban. The dominant element in this campaign ap-
pears to be a Soviet threat to precipitate an intensive
nuclear arms competition. Although his major address to
the central committee plenum on 5 March did not deal di-
rectly with foreign policy, Khrushchev vigorously criti-
cized known Chinese Communist views.
KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL PROPOSALS .
. . . . . Page 4
At the opening of the central committee plenum, Khru-
shchev freely admitted the failures of Soviet agriculture,
but his promises for substantial increases in investment--
a requisite to any major advance in production--were not
specific. Similar promises at the 1959 plenum and after-
ward are apparently yet to be fulfilled. Again turning
to organizational adjustments as the principal means of
solving the USSR's chronic agricultural problem, he called
for a far-reaching reorganization of the system of man-
agement and control over agriculture and outlined plans
to enlarge the acreage of cultivated crops.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . .
Souphannouvong has suggested several changes in the
cabinet list proposed to him by Souvanna with Western
concurrence. Chief among the undesirable features of
Souphannouvong's changes--which Souvanna would accept--
is the substitution of Souphannouvong for Phoumi as
information minister. There is therefore the prospect
of further negotiations among the various factions
which will determine both Souphannouvong's flexibility
and the extent of Phoumi's resistance to an accommodation
with Souvanna. Military activity remains at a low level.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The negotiating session between the French and the
rebel government which began at Evian on 7 March is ex-
pected to culminate in a cease-fire agreement, since all
major substantive issues have reportedly been settled.
OAS terrorism and lawlessness continue in spite of large-
scale deployment of French troops in the major cities of
Algeria. French security officials admit that the task of
neutralizing the OAS is increasingly difficult as negoti-
ations proceed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 March 1962
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Tshombe's announcement that he will leave for Leopold-
ville on 15 March for talks with Adoula offers a prospect
for a new break in the Congo stalemate. Tshombe's entou-
rage, however, strongly resists any rapprochement with Leopold-
ville. Adoula has indicated to UN officials that he is under
heavy pressure to bring Tshombe to heel, and that unless the
Katanga issue is "resolved" by 31 March, he will attempt to
settle the matter by military means. The movement of Congo-
lese troops to northern Katanga continues,. while in south-
ern Katanga tension between Katangan and UN forces has re- 25X1
sulted in shooting incidents at Kamina and Elisabethville.
BURMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The Union Revolutionary Council under General Ne Win
took over the government of Burma on 2 March and established
an authoritarian government. The new government will prob-
ably reinstitute the reform programs launched by Ne Win be-
tween 1958 and 1960 and make no change in Burma's neutral
foreign policy. Internal reforms may meet with opposition,
especially because this time Ne Win's government lacks the
approval of Nu, the country's most popular figure.
NORTHERN RHODESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
African nationalist acceptance of Britain's constitu-
tional proposals for Northern Rhodesia makes widespread
violence in the protectorate unlikely, although some of
moderate nationalist Kenneth Kaunda's more radical followers
may still try to stir up demonstrations. Prime Minister
Welensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland also
seems ready to go along with the proposals. All sides--
whites and Africans in the Federation as well as the British
Government--appear to be preparing their position for an
early renewal of the controversy over the future of the
Federation, which most Africans still strongly oppose. The
long-adjourned federal constitutional talks seem likely to
reopen in the next few months. 25X1
FOOD SUPPLIES IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . Page 13
No basic improvement is likely until at least mid-
summer in the amount of food available per capita from do-
mestic supplies. increases in imports and reductions in
exports of some food products are planned, but this will
probably not be sufficient to change the situation appre-
ciably. While there will be adequate food in terms of
caloric intake, the quality and variety of the diet will
ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IN HUNGARY . . . . . . . . . Page 14
For the past several months a shake-up within the party
and government apparatus has been under way. Functionaries
who have found it difficult to adjust to the party line or
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
have proved incompetent have been criticized and in many
cases dismissed from their posts. The Ministry of Interior,
the administration of heavy industry any' investment plan-
ning, and the provincial party apparatus have been most
affected.
SOVIET PRIVATE DOUSING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The Soviet regime as apparently decided to continue
temporarily its support for private housing construction,
despite earlier indications that such activity was to be
discouraged. The decision was probably made in order to
aid achievement of Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) goals.
THE USSR'S ATOMIC ENERGY AID PROGRAM ABROAD . . . . . . . Page 16
The USSR is providing assistance to a number of coun-
tries in the field of atomic energy research. It has com-
pleted the construction and installation of nuclear reactors
and related laboratory equipment in Yugoslavia and Egypt,
and is implementing agreements to provide Iraq, Indonesia,
Afghanistan, and Ghana with reactors. Moscow also is send-
ing scientists and technicians to assist these countries
in developing their atomic energy programs and is providing
technical training as well as academic scholarships for
the study of nuclear physics in Soviet universities.
SOVIET AND CHINESE ECONOMIC AID TO YEMEN . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Both Moscow and Peiping are discussing new development
projects with Yemen. Moscow has offered to provide a water
supply system and an improved electric power establishment
for the city of Al-Hudaydah and to build an irrigation dam
and a cement plant in the interior; it has also shown a
renewed interest in providing assistance for civil aviation.
The Chinese have completed preliminary surveys for a textile
plant and have offered to develop production in the Jawf
area to supply the local textile factory.
JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE GOALS FOR 1962 . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Japanese and Soviet negotiators have agreed on an ex-
panded trade program for 1962 amounting to $225,000,000--
about 2 percent of Japan's total trade. The new program,
marked by continued increases in Soviet purchases of Japa-
nese heavy industrial equipment, also provides for a 17-per-
cent increase in Soviet petroleum sales. At the same time
it calls for an overall balance in Japan's favor, which
would be Tokyo's first surplus in trade with the USSR since
normal trade was resumed in 1958. Negotiations on the ex-
change of Soviet crude oil and Japanese steel pipe for the
trans-Siberian pipeline have been deferred, possibly until
next September, when Moscow is expected to seek a new five-
year trade agreement to replace the three-year pact ex-
piring this year.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 March 1962
BELGIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Strains between the Socialists and the Social Chris-
tians over the government's fiscal reform program threaten
Belgium's coalition cabinet. Interparty relations are als-,
complicated by differences between the Roman Catholic -
oriented Social Christians and the anticlerical Socialists
over education. 25X1
ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
another military die: a.torship. 25X1
the UC''I, since the ?l~ or ?. :y of Argentines do not wish
Prospects appear improving for President Frondizi's
Intransigent Radical party (UCRI) in the elections on 18
March, in which 87 of the 192 seats in the National Chamber
of Deputies are at stake, along with 12 provincial govern-
orships and various local offices. The outcome of these
elections will strongly influence the presidential elections
in 1964 and Frondizi's ability in the meantime to continue
the US-backed stabilization program. Widely publicized
rumors that the armed forces plan a revolt if Peronista
candidates are elected should elicit further support for
ELECTIONS TN COLOMBIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The congressional elections in Colombia on 18 March
will test the National Front system of government, which
provides for parity between the Conservative and Liberal
parties in all appointive and elective offices and alter-
nation of the presidency every four years until 1974. This
system, introduced in 1958 to return the country to con-
stitutional rule after the Rojas dictatorship, has given
Colombia relative stability but has been impaired by sharp
divisions within and between the two parties. I:? the
coalition of moderate factions of both parties, which has
been President Lleras' principal support since 1960, suffers
a marked reverse in these elections, prospects will be
weakened for continued political stability and particularly
for the election in May of a moderate Conservative to succeed
Lleras as president, 25X1
SOVIET TACTICS AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE . . . Page 1
General and complete disarmament is expected to be re-
iterated as the stated goal of Soviet policy at the dis-
armament conference scheduled to open in Geneva on 14 March.
At the beginning of the conference, however, the nuclear
test ban question is likely to predominate. Moscow may
later introduce other proposals related more to the questions
of Germany and European security than to disarmament.
POTENTIAL OF FRENCH SECRET ARMY ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . Page 5
There is increasing evidence of the OAS' capability
to disrupt a French-rebel settlement in Algeria, and this
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 March 1962
has been an important factor in the rebels' reluctance to
come to terms quickly with Paris. While Paris is still
confident it can overcome the OAS, French officials admit
the likelihood of extensive bloodshed before the organiza-
tion is crushed. The OAS now has enough die-hard personnel,
arms, money, and food to maintain resistance for some weeks
or months--possibly long enough to upset arrangements for
the transitional period before Algerian independence and
thereby to impose increased political strains on both the
rebel regime and the De Gaulle government.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Cameroon President Ahidjo, who wi'.1 visit the United
States from 13 to 17 March, has aligned his country with
the moderate African states and has given a chilly re-
ception to Soviet overtures. He wants to co':Jinue close
ties with France but at the same time broader, his Western
support. He sees his visit to the US as an opportunity to
obtain more aid and to enhance his stature as an African
leader. He has demonstrated a high degree of political
skill, but he is beset with the problems of suppressing
a long-standing Communist-supported terrorist campaign
against him and of making economic gains in the face of
large outlays for security.
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CURR:'NT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
In the face of Western
refusal and neutralist reluc-
tance, Khrushchev has dropped
his plan for opening the Geneva
disarmament conference at the
summit level. In his letter to
President Kennedy on 3 March,
he agreed that the foreign
ministers should initiate the
negotiations and stated that
there would be no objection to
informal meetings of the foreign
ministers of the US, the UK,
and the USSR prior to the con-
ference. One factor influenc-
ing Khrushchev's decision prob-
ably was his interest in de-
veloping a new channel of nego-
tiation on Berlin. His letter
made no mention of the subjects
to be covered in preliminary
contacts, but the prospect that
the Berlin question will be
raised was reflected in East
German leader Ulbricht's sug-
gestion that the two German
states also send representatives
to Geneva.
Khrushchev sought to
cover his retreat from the
original summit proposals by
conveying the impression that
all concerned had virtually
agreed to a subsequent meeting
at the heads-of-government
level. His letter asserted
that there was "general agree-
ment" on direct participation
and personal responsibility on
the part of the heads of gov-
ernment, and that this was a
"definite step toward meeting
our position." The US and the
USSR, he said, should be guided
by the consideration that the
heads of government "willpartic-
ipate somewhat later." He thus
has set the stage for requesting
a summit meeting probably well
before June, when the disarma-
ment committee is scheduled
to report to the UN.
The Nuclear Test Issue
Khrushchev also sought to
offset his concession by launch-
ing a vigorous challenge to
the US decision to resume
nuclear testing in the atmos-
phere. The main element in
this campaign will be the
threat to precipitate a new
and intensive arms race by
renewing Soviet tests. The
Soviet leader denounced the
US decision as a "new expres-
sion of an aggressive course
in international affairs." He
repeated earlier warnings
that the US tests in the at-
mosphere would leave the
USSR no choice but to do
likewise. His letter stated
that the "Soviet Union will
be faced with the necessity
of carrying out such tests
of new types of its own nuclear
weapons," implying that the
next Soviet series could have
far-reaching implications for
the future military balance.
Khrushchev is also trying
to turn world opinion against
the US and shift to it the
onus for a nuclear arms race.
To this end, he introduced a
new contention: that since
the US not only had conducted
more tests than the USSR but
had exploded the first atomic
device, then the USSR "must be
the last" to conduct nuclear
weapons tests. Khrushchev
claimed that the US tests
would open a "new phase" of
the nuclear competition and
that it would inevitably lead
to a "chain reaction which
will become still more stormy.
While Khrushchev's letter
makes it clear that the USSR
will not hesitate to excoriate
the US, it also reflects the
problem facing Khrushchev in
replying to the US proposals
for a strictly controlled test
ban to be agreed on before the
latter part of April. Khru-
shchev merely dismissed these
proposals as "atomic blackmail,"
and repeated that the US posi-
tion on a test ban had already
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
been rejected. It thus would
appear likely that the USSR
will renew its offer of a
ban on tests in the atmosphere,
underwater, and at high alti-
tudes, to be monitored by each
country's own national detec-
tion systems. Khrushchev may
even modify this plan to ex-
ploit the US-British offer
last'September of a ban on
atmospheric tests only. Such
a Soviet proposal, relying on
national detection systems,
however, would freeze the pres-
ent status of nuclear technology
--a situation which Moscow may
no longer consider to be in its
interest. At any rate, Khru-
shchev can be expected to use
the period between now and the
US resumption to score the maxi-
mum propaganda points and to
generate mounting pressure on
the US to refrain from testing.
Berlin and Germany
The acceptance of the for-
eign ministers'meeting, immedi-
ately after the US announcement
on testing, nevertheless sug-
gests that Khrushchev is not
shifting to an all-out campaign
of vilification and denuncia-
tion of the US. In such a
highly charged atmosphere, he
may believe that all chances
for negotiating on Berlin would
rapidly fade. Soviet interest
in negotiations on this issue
has been reflected in the com-
mentary following the meeting
in Moscow between Khrushchev
and Ulbricht. During Mikoyan's
visit to the Leipzig fair, more-
over, statements by both him
and the East German leader em-
phasized the dual themes of
promoting an "international
detente" and solving the Berlin
and German treaty questions.
In his speech of 5 March,Mikoyan
stated that the USSR was doing
"everything possible" to con-
clude a treaty, and he added
that "our aim is to achieve an
agreed solution." However,
Mikoyan also warned that Soviet
readiness for negotiation should
not be construed as an opportu-
nity for endless delays of a
solution of the "German question"
and renewed the threat to con-
clude a separate peace treaty
with East Germany.
Although Mikoyan abjured
a more detailed discussion of
a peace treaty in his speech,
on the ground that "negotiations
are being continued," the pros-
pect of talks in Geneva has
not inhibited the Soviets and
East Germans from undertaking
further calculated probes of
the Western position in Berlin.
Continuing the procedure they
initiated late last month of
regularly filing plans for use
of the air corridors, the So-
viets filed plans for and car-
ried out on 7 March ten trans-
port flights--the largest num-
ber up to that time. The fol-
lowing day they filed plans for
24 such flights on the 9th.
They thus appear to be testing
Western reaction to an increas-
ing number of flights to the
point where they virtually pre-
empt the air space in one or more
corridors. When the US repre-
sentative at the Berlin Air
Safety Center discussed with
his Soviet counterpart a con-
flict in scheduling flight plans
for Soviet aircraft and US flights,
the Soviet controller said:
"Maybe we will have 100 con-
flicts. . . maybe tomorrow,
maybe later."
In another move toward
harassment of access, the East
Germans appear to be preparing
for early enforcement of pass-
port, visa, and customs regula-
tions at the Friedrichstrasse
crossing point between East and
West Berlin as a step to assert
their sovereignty over East
Berlin. On 6 March barriers
which had been built behind the
sector border wall were removed,
apparently to permit easier ac-
cess to customs sheds, and the
following day two new customs
buildings were opened at the
crossing point. This move has
been accompanied by repeated
high-level references to the
necessity for Western acquiescence
in East German demands for pass-
ports and visas at the East Ger-
man "state frontiers," including
the sector border.
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Soviet - East German Relations
Following the talks between
Khrushchev and Ulbricht in Moscow
from 26 to 28 February, Mikoyan
and East German Deputy Premier
Leuschner on 5 March signed an
agreement calling for a special
goods credit for East Germany in
the amount of $325,000,000 and a
trade agreement envisaging a 12-
petrcent increase in 1962 trade
tcc, $2.325 billion. At the sign-
ing, Mikoyan remarked that East
Germany now is the USSR's biggest
trade partner and takes about one
fifth of the Soviet foreign trade
volume. The new credit probably
is intended to facilitate the
purchase of badly needed commodi-
ties from the West, as well as to
refinance existing heavy obliga-
tions to bloc countries, especially
the USSR.
These agreements are designed
to shore up East Germany's economy
and enable it to progress toward
its goal of 'economic invulnera-
bility" to any West German trade
embargo, but they do not appear
calculated to prepare the regime
for weathering possible NATO
countermeasures. 1ffhrushchev evi-
dently made clear to Uibricht at
their recent rrieeting that East
Germany's economy must be markedly
improved; Ulbricht told '.'c'_?kers
at a Leipzig factory that the
achievement of "peace" depends not
only on "the diplomats" but also
on the speed of economic develop-
ment, on "scientific-technological
development of the socialist
states... above all the GDR. 11 He
added that "the basis for the suc-
cess of foreign policy lies in
economic success, in the speed of
the production drive, and in the
increase in labor productivity,"
Sino-Soviet Relations
In the opening part of his
report on agriculture to the cen-
tral committee plenum on 5 March,
Khrushchev vigorously attacked
Chinese criticism of the Soviet
party's new program, derided by
implication Mao's road to Commu-
nism, as set forth in 1958, r^d
warned the Chinese and other Com-
munist parties against using it
as a future model. Among the
"foreign comments" on the new
program, Khrushchev singled out
those of his opponents who uphold
9 Mar 62
idealistic positions and preach
a low standard of life and asceti-
cism--a reference to the Chinese
statements that poverty must not
be detested, as even a disciple
of Confucius lived happily on a
"single dish of food and a single
ladle of water in a poor alley."
He condemned the view that Commu-
nism is a "table with empty
plates with 'highly conscious'
people" sitting around it, and
insisted--with an emphasis in
sharp contrast to Chinese com-
mentary--on abundance for the
individual as a goal for any
transition to full Communism.
Khrushchev's remarks and
the assault by Leningrad party
boss Ivan Spiridinov at the
plenum on dogmatists and "at-
tempts to run ahead" in apply-
ing the principles of Communism
suggest that the Soviet leaders
intend to maintain their pres-
sure on the Chinese. Khru-
shchev's insistence that building
Communism in the USSR serves
the interests of "all revolu-
tionary forces" is intended to
counter Chinese charges that
Moscow's "USSR first" policy is
carried out at expense of revolu-
tionary movements. The Soviet
leader may also hope to under-
cut any future Chinese criticism
of the program, possibly to be
made at the forthcoming National
People's Congress in Peiping.
The Russians have thus main-
tained the momentum of their assault
on Chinese opposition. In a four-
part series of talks broadcast to
China from 26 February to 1 March,
a Soviet commentator criticized the
"Albanians" for rejecting Moscow's
attack on the personality cult and
for denying that tine attack is "the
common line" of the international
Communist movement. The Chinese
apparently are avoiding the issue
of the personality cult--on which
Mao is cioarly vulnerable--and are
pressing their case against Khru-
shchev's interpretation of "peace-
ful coexistence." An article in the
early March issue of Red Flag, the
Chinese party's theore icaI ournal,
criticized the "Yugoslav" view that
coexistence should be unconditional.
Such a view, the article charged,
really signifies "constant compro-
mise and constant concessions to-
ward imperialism."
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KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL PROPOSALS
At the opening of the
Soviet party central committee
plenum on 5 March, Khrushchev
freely admitted the failures of
Soviet agriculture, but his prom-
ises for substantial increases
in investment--a requisite to
any major advance in production
--were not specific. Similar
promises at the 1959 plenum and
afterward are apparently yet
to be fulfilled. Khrushchev
offered no new solutions to the
basic problem of inadequate
work incentives. Again turning
to organizational adjustments
as the principal means of solving
the USSR's chronic agricultural
problem,he called for a far-
reaching reorganization of
management and control over
agriculture which would cen-
tralize party control and
government direction over both
collective farms and state
farms in a single administra-
tive system.
In Khrushchev's reorgani-
zation, republic and provincial
party bosses would head agricul-
tural committees established in
their areas and be made directly
responsible under a national com-
mittee for local agricultural
production. At the local level,
"production administrations"
would be established, each
with a council consisting of
the most experienced farm di-
rectors and "possibly" party
and government chairmen. The
executive arm of these adminis-
trations would be inspectors
who are to be charged with
making "recommendations" di-
rectly to the farms and with
reporting any malfeasance.
Eventually, their salaries
would depend on the fulfillment
of production tasks assigned to
farms under their supervision.
Apparently each farm would also
have an "organ of agricultural
management" which would be re-
sponsible for planning, book-
keeping, and "influencing" farm
production and would be respon-
sive to the inspectors.
In these new committees
and their local officers would
be centralized the managerial
powers which in large part had
been diffused by earlier re-
forms also vigorously sponsored
by Khrushchev, particularly the
abolition of the Machine Tractor
Station system (MTS) in 1958.
Indeed, at one point in his
speech, Khrushchev designated
as "the purpose of calling the
plenum" the assignment of those
powers over collective farm
management once exercised by
the political department of the
MTS system.
Since 1958 the question
of administering the collective
farms has been a politically ex-
plosive issue. Numerous organ-
izational devices have been
proposed, including a hierarchi-
cal structure of unions of col-
lective farms. By the reforms
adopted by the January 1961
plenum, state farm administra-
tion was made the direct re-
sponsibility of the State Plan-
ning Committee and, in most
areas, of republic-level state
farm ministries; however, no
similar provisions were announced
for the collective farm system.
Khrushchev now claims that state
farm production has not been con-
trolled sufficiently. The new
committees will apparently fill
these gaps.
Khrushchev's proposals
would institutionalize party
control and dominance to a far
greater extent even than during
the Stalinist period. For the
first time the party boss in
every major territorial unit of
the country will not only be a
formal part of the state admin-
istrative machinery for agri-
culture but will be the man
in his area directly in charge.
The new system will thus be a
major departure in Soviet ad-
ministrative practice. Hereto-
fore, the regime has carefully
kept the government machinery
institutionally separate from
that of the party. If the new
scheme proves effective, it may
form the pattern for mergers of
party and government machinery
elsewhere. In any event, it
is clear that Khrushchev intends
the party organizations from the
republics down to assume full
responsibility and direct con-
trol over agricultural produc-
tion.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Khrushchev's proposals
would also mark a major step in
destroying the collective farm
system and creating a unified
system of state agricultural
producing units. Khrushchev ad-
mitted that the highly vaunted
and much propagandized "collec-
tive farm democracy" had been a
fiction. Maintaining that fic-
tion, however, had kept the
party from assuming direct con-
trol at the point that really
mattered--the level of produc-
tion. The authority to be given
the new agricultural production
administrations and committees
will apparentlyremove most of
the last vestiges of autonomy
that remained in the collective
farm. With both collective farm
and state farm under the same
administrative umbrella, further
moves to make them more alike
can only be a matter of time.
Khrushchev's decision to
"put an end to the drift" in
farm administration will, no
doubt, reduce the number of
abuses engendered by the looser
control of the last three
years--deviation from the state
plan, statistical falsification,
and the like. It does not, how-
ever, favor the development of
agriculture--which by its nature
requires a high degree of flexi-
ble, decentralized decision-
making.
Khrushchev's further
elaboration at the plenum of
his decision--initiated at the
22nd party congress last October
--to restructure the cropping
pattern is obviously aimed at
rapidly improving the milk and
meat supply situation. Khru-
shchev frankly admitted that
"we simply do not have enough
meat..., If we remain with
the present disposition of sown
crops, with the present types
of fodder crops, and with the
present yield, we shall have no
fodder. There will be no meat
or milk either today or tomor-
row."
Under the traditional crop-
rotation systems, almost one
fourth of the cultivated acreage
has been in grass or in clean
fallow each year. Khrushchev
called for the area so occupied
to be cut by half in 1962, a
move which would raise by some
55,000,000 the number of acres
planted in cultivated crops.
The resulting increase in pro-
duction will be limited by
shortages of machinery and
fertilizer. These changes in
land use might also have adverse
long-term effects.
Khrushchev's proposal, which
would eventually eliminate the
ley or grass rotation system of
farming and seriously restrict
the practice of clean fallowing,
calls for the more intensive cul-
tivation,of fodder crops on 128,-
000,000 acres currently sown to
grasses or in clean fallow.
Alfalfa and clover would be sown
on 27,000,000 acres, while 101,-
000,000 would be shifted to the
cultivation of corn, peas, sugar
beets, and fodder beans. Because
of the lack of mineral fertiliz-
ers., seed, cultivating tractors,
and other machinery, the shift to
row crop production will require
several years. Of the additional
acreage to be sown to cultivated
crops in 1962, 45,000,000 acres
will be sown to grain, peas, and
fodder beans and the remaining
10,000,000 presumably to sugar
beets.
A major increase in agri-
cultural investment is an im-
portant key to the success of
the crop programs proposed by
Khrushchev. His statement on
investment carried a scathing
indictment of irresponsibility
toward agriculture at the highest
governmental levels and admitted
that the party had relaxed its
support of agriculture in the
last two or three years. But
his outline of steps for increas-
ing investment, as with similar
proposals at the 1959 and 1961
agricultural plenums, was- vague
as to target dates and sums in-
volved. The presidium of the
central committee was charged with
working out a "concrete investment
program" which presumably would
include the doubling of agricul-
tural machinery output and the ex-
pansion--of unspecified degree--
of production capacity for equip-
ment and fertilizer--at some un-
(Pr,:,~?pared jointly by ORR)
specified time.
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 Following several days of
consultations with 3ouphannou-
vong on-a Western-approved cab-
inet list, 3ouvanna on 4 March
produced a new roster incor-
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
porating several undesirable
changes. In addition to giv-
ing 3ouphannouvong instead of
Phouni the Information Ministry,
it proposes members from the
NAMTHA
Luang^
Pribang
Lai Chat!
Thanh
Hoa
n:~ Soui '7Xiengl rowan
Pa
J Tha~t~r~
~rhonp
VIENTIANE 'Pak
i+ 'ue?'I;rieni f`f:e
~- Kong Le-Pathet Lao forces
Kong Le-Pathet Lao areas
Road
Trail
Route number
Road under
construction
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
center, "neutralist" grouping
who are somewhat weaker per-
sonalities than those on the
former list. Souvanna seems
likely to go back to Vientiane
soon for further talks with
the Western ambassadors and
possibly with Phoumi, who re-
turned there on 7 March from
medical care in Bangkok.
Phoumi_still has shown no
disposition to moderate his op-
position to any government
headed by Souvanna. He appar-
ently will continue to promote
his plan for a government by
The negotiating session
between the French and the pro-
visional Algerian government
(PAG) which began at Evian on
7 March is expected to culminate
in a cease-fire agreement, since
all major substantive issues
have reportedly been settled.
Terrorism and lawlessness on
the part of the Secret Army
.Organization (OAS) continue in
spite of large-scale deployment
of French troops in the major
cities of Algeria. French se-
curity officials admit that the
task of neutralizing the OAS
is increasingly difficult as
negotiations continue.
the prob-
functionalcouncils under the
aegis of King Savang--a plan
which has been firmly rejected
by Souphannouvong.
range.
In the meantime, military
activity in Laos continues at
a'. low level. Souvanna and Sou-
phannouvong have said they will
maintain the cease-fire so long
as government troops do likewise.
The government airfield at Nam
Tha has again become usable,
with enemy mortars there appar-
ently having withdrawn beyond
FRANCE-ALGERIA
lems to be settled before a
cease-fire announcement are:
the precise composition of the
provisional executive that will
govern Algeria until a self-
determination referendum is
held; a timetable for withdrawal
of the French Army; and the re-
lease of prisoners. Prime Min-
ister Debrd, however, told a
US Embassy officer on 2 March
that the PAG was not yet ready
to agree to a cease-fire and
was still making deriands.
The PAG has publicly and
privately expressed concern over
OAS-inspired killings of Moslems
in Algiers and Oran, and over the
French Army's alleged willingness
.to fire on Moslems while at the
same time failing to crush the
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OAS. Some PAG ministers are re-
portedly deeply pessimistic re-
garding what will happen in Al-
geria after a cease-fire.
Ambassador Walmsley in Tunis,
however, feels that the PAG's
decision to go ahead with public
negotiations, reached at a 3
March meeting in Tunis, indi-
cates that it has secured satis-
factory assurances from the
French that the OAS will be con-
trolled and an agreement en-
A French Foreign Ministry
official told a US Embassy offi-
cer in Paris on 5 March that the
French now are considering pro-
mulgating a cease-fire agreement
by means of a simultaneous an-
nouncement by Paris and the PAG,
rather than by signing a docu-
ment. The embassy comments
that, while such a plan may re-
flect continued disagreement
over who is to sign a cease-
fire, it may also result from
the PAG's fears regarding the
efficacy of a cease-fire and
its consequent reluctance to
commit itself in a signed docu-
ment.
SECRET
on 3 March that the negotiators
had not yet settled the question
of a timetable for the release
of PAG vice premier Ben Bella and
the other ministers detained in
France and their incorporation
into PAG deliberations. There
are indications that the PAG
resents Moroccan King Hassan's
attempts to take credit for the
prospective release of these
important figures, and that it
is making efforts to keep their
stay in Morocco as short as
possible--or even induce the
French to return them directly
to Tunis. Vice premier Belkacem
Krim, a potential rival of Ben
Bella for power in an independ-
ent Algeria, is said to feel
that the problem of assimilating
Ben Bella into the PAG would be
made more difficult if he were 25X1
lionized in Morocco,
Rebel information minister
Yazid told a US Embassy officer
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Tshombd's announcement
that he will leave for Leo-
poldville on 15 March for talks
with Adoula offers a prospect
for a new break in the Congo
stalemate. It is not certain
that Tshombd will carry through
on his commitment. He remains
under heavy pressure from ex-
tremists in his entourage to
resist any rapprochement with
Adoula. In his statement on
6 March, however, Tshombd in-
dicated that he was satisfied
with assurances for his per-
sonal safety provided by the
UN.
Tshombd's announcement
came at a time when friction
was mounting among the Leo-
poldville government, the
UN Command, and the Tshombd
regime in the absence of dis-
cernible progress toward
Katanga's reintegration with
the Congo. Adoula told Am-
bassador Gullion in early
March that he had warned the
UN Command that unless the
Katanga issue were "resolved"
by 31 March, he would proceed
to settle the matter by mili-
tary means. In conversation
with UN officials, Adoula
has asserted that he is under
heavy political pressure to
bring Tshombd to heel. Am-
bassador Gullion believes
Adoula's threat represents in
part a bargaining position.
He notes, however, that Adoula
is under some pressure to at-
tempt the recapture of Kongolo.
In a move to strengthen
the central government's pres-
ence in northern Katanga, 600
poorly disciplined Congolese
troops were airlifted from
Luluabourg to Albertville in
late February and early March.
Other Congolese forces are
being sent to Kabalo, which
the central government regards
as threatened by Katangan units.
Adoula has sought to prevent
his northern Katanga operation
from being used by Katangan
extremists as justification
for breaking off communication
with Leopoldville; on 4 March,
following an inspection trip
to Albertville, Adoula announced
that Congolese troops had been or-
dered to fire only in self-defense.
There is evidence that
Adoula is confronted with se-
rious problems in maintaining
his unwieldly coalition. Presi-
dent Kasavubu reportedly is
concerned over a spate of tele-
grams from Orientale Province
protesting Adoula's ousting of
Gbenye from the Interior
Ministry. The President is
worried that Adoula may have
overplayed his hand. Kasavubu
reportedly has urged all deputies
to consider carefully the effect
any substantial weakening of
the Adoula government would have
on the stability of the state.
There are indications
that leftist elements may
become more aggressive in their
criticism of the Adoula govern-
ment. Stanleyville elements
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of Gbenye's National Congo
Movement (MNC) who attended the
MNC conference in Leopoldville
in late February reportedly
favor going into formal opposi-
tion and bringing down the
Adoula government. Less radi-
cal members reportedly support
Gbenye in his refusal to
accept a vice-premiership, but
are not disposed to withdraw
from the government at this
time.
SECRET
REPUBLIC
ing to the base. In Elisa-
bethville, UN officers had
noted an increase in tension
between UN forces and the Ka-
tangans, and shots were ex-
changed by UN and Katangan
soldiers on the outskirts of
Elisabethville on the night
of 6 March.
UN Under Secretary Bunche
told US officials on 2 March
OF THE CONGO
*LUANDA ANGOLA
The uneasy truce between
the UN Command and Tshombd's
forces in Katanga was disrupted
on 5 March, when Katangan and
UN soldiers clashed near Kamina.
Tshombe alleged that 1,200
UN troops had launched an "of-
fensive" from the base; the
UN countered with a statement
charging that Katangan soldiers
had fired on a UN patrol, which
had returned fire before retreat-
that UN military commander
McKeown would be instructed
once again to curb provocative
actions by UN officers in
Katanga. Bunche observed that
McKeown had earlier made a
trip to Elisabethville to dis-
courage such activity, and that
the continuing problem was one
more example of McKeown's
ineffectiveness.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The takeover on 2 March by
the Union Revolutionary Council
suspended indefinitely all sem-
blance of democratic government
in Burma. General Ne Win, the
new premier, has followed close-
ly the pattern set by Ayub Khan's
seizure of power in Pakistan in
1958. Contemptuous of the in-
efficiency, weakness, and cor-
ruption of U Nu's civilian ad-
ministration, the general has
suspended the constitution,
fired all elective officers,
and arrested all major leaders
of the Union party cabinet. To
replace the ousted civilians,
Ne Win has appointed a cabinet
which, with one exception, is
composed of military officers.
In the ethnic states, Ne
Win has appointed "Supreme
Councils" to head the govern-
ments and told them to maintain
order: "Go and do your best. If
you fail, just hang yourselves."
To underscore the authoritarian
nature of his regime, Ne Win
has called in leaders of the
major political parties to ask
their cooperation and to warn
that opponents face "retirement
from public life."
The takeover was apparently
timed to take advantage of the
presence in Rangoon of almost
all major political leaders andwas
sparked by an accumulation of
grievances against the U NU
government. Administrative
weaknesses, economic deteriora-
tion, and the decline in inter-
nal security had disturbed Ne
Win ever since he left office in
April 1960 to allow parliamen-
tary democracy a second chance.
As early as in January 1961,
even while he rejected the urg-
ings of his military colleagues
to oust Nu, Ne Win declared that
the civilian leaders, "too busy
fighting among themselves," were
failing to provide effective
government, and that "the Bur-
mese people have once again
shown that they are not ready
for democracy and self-rule."
Since that time the flaws
in civilian rule have become
increasingly apparent. The
constitutional amendment making
Buddhism the state religion
alienated the minorities and
added force to demands for the
decentralization of control and
the establishment of a feudal
system for Burma. Insurgent
bands have increased their
depredations. The business com-
munity has been alienated by
government efforts to national-
ize the import-export trade. The
political parties were on the
verge of fragmentation. To cap
No Win's disillusionment with
parliamentary democracy, of
which he had long been one of
Burma's staunchest supporters,
Nu was apparently ready to yield
to the minority pressures for
decentralization and to rein-
stitute Soviet economic devel-
opment projects canceled during
the previous military adminis-
tration.
sition.
The new government has an-
nounced that it intends to con-
tinue Burma's neutral foreign
policy and concentrate on inter-
nal problems. It will probably
attempt to reinstitute the re-
forms which were launched by
Ne Win between 1958 and 1960
but scrapped by Nu. Ne Win
will probably face greater dif-
ficulties than in the past, how-
ever. Despite his national pres-
tige, which is second only to
Nu's, the discipline and auster-
ity of army rule are not popular
in Burma. Moreover, since Ne Win
failed to obtain Nu's approval--
as he did doing the earlier mil-
itary regime--the latter, whether
kept in jail or released, may be=
come the,'rallying point for oppo-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NORTHERN RHODESIA
General African national-
ist acceptance--albeit con-
ditional--of British consti-
tutional proposals for Northern
Rhodesia makes widespread
organized violence in the
protectorate unlikely. The
proposed constitution, a
modification and to some
extent a simplification of
an earlier plan to which
Africans had reacted with
violence last summer, appears
designed to produce a slim
African majority in a 28-
member legislature. Under
a system of separate voters'
rolls and weighted representa-
tion, however, African national-
ists might find their numbers
balanced by those of whites
and African conservatives.
After some soul-searching,
Kenneth Kaunda and his United
National Independence party
(UNIP) decided to accept the
proposals if Britain would
agree to modify certain restric-
tions on African political
activity. British officials in
London doubt whether these
conditions can be met fully;
nevertheless, UNIP's pro-
visional acceptance sets the
party's policy in a moderate
key, and further efforts by
Kaunda and the British to
reach an accommodation seem
likely.
Kaunda has so far carried
with him his party's radical
wing, which advocates direct
and often violent action
against the whites who con-
trol Northern Rhodesia's po-
litical and economic life.
The radicals, however, may
still try to stir up scattered
demonstrations against the
new plan. Moreover, UNIP's
rival, the African National
Congress, may try to embarrass
Kaunda by charging that he
has sold out to the British.
To establish a reputation as
an "extreme" organization, it
may also try to stir up trouble
in its areas of strength in the
southern part of the protectorate.
Prime Minister Welensky of
the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland--which includes the
colony of Southern Rhodesia and
the Nyasaland protectorate as
well as Northern Rhodesia--made
a sudden trip to London last
week, ostensibly to protest the
constitutional plan. There are
indications, however, that his
bluster was largely for the con-
sumption of the Federation's
312,000 whites and that he had
already agreed to the proposals
during Commonwealth Relations
Secretary Sandys' recent visit
to Salisbury. In any event,
little opposition has materialized
among the British right-wing
conservatives who normally sup-
port Welensky, and the Mac-
millan government should be
able to resist pressures to
change its decision.
The center of controversy
now is shifting to the consti-
tution of the Federation as a
whole. Welensky, the focus of
African opposition to the Federa-
tion, is already saying that
discussion of the federal consti-
tution cannot be put off any
longer. His personal prestige
with the Europeans was never
higher, and there are signs that
he may call elections to get a
mandate from the largely white
electorate which would strengthen
his position when the long-
adjourned constitutional talks
are reconvened--probably within
the next few months. White
Southern Rhodesians, however,
will probably be reluctant to
stay closely tied to African gov-
ernments in the two northern
territories. In the face of Afri-
can and European opposition to a
continued political connection,
therefore, it is unlikely that the
reconvened talks will accomplish
much more than agreement to main-
tain an economic and customs union.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FOOD SUPPLIES IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Agricultural production
in the European satellites last
year indicates no basic improve-
ment until at least midsummer
in the amount of food available
per capita from domestic sup-
plies. Bad weather in most
satellites and difficulties
associated with collectiviza-
tion--especially in East Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, and Hun-
gary--reduced overall food
production. Increases of im-
ports and reductions in exports
of some food products are
planned, but this probably will
not be sufficient to relieve
the situation.
Estimates of the satellite
grain harvest indicate it was
slightly below 1960 and totaled
about 43,000,000 tons. Excep-
tions were the Polish grain
harvest, which established a
postwar record, and that in
Albania, which was 31 percent
over 1960. The satellites'
potato crop approximated that
in 1960, but reduced output in
East Germany, Hungary, and
Rumania will result in continued
shortages in those countries.
Total satellite production of
sugar beets decreased about 12
percent from 1960. Production
of vegetables and fruits was
generally below 1960 in Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
and Rumania.
Output of meat increased
about 6 percent, but production
of some livestock products
fell. In Bulgaria and Hungary,
the heavy slaughtering in the
latter part of the year reduced
the number of animals available
for slaughter in 1962. Meat
and butter are reportedly al-
ready scarce in East Germany,
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia;
unless imports of livestock
products are increased, such
foods will be in even shorter
supply. Total milk production,
however, probably did not change
appreciably from 1960, when it
was adequate in comparison with
past years.
Although sufficient food
will be available in terms of
caloric intake, the quality
and variety of the diet will
decline--except in Poland and
Albania. In all the other
countries, fruits, vegetables,
and potatoes, as well as some
animal products, will soon be
in short supply, and only bread
and sugar will be readily avail-
able during the next few months.
Only in Poland can the con-
sumer expect an improved diet
in 1962. East Germany will
suffer the sharpest decline
in the quality of diet unless
food imports are increased
significantly. Even though
total satellite food imports
will probably rise in 1962,
most consumers in Eastern Europe
face a worsening supply si
tion in the coming months. u~
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY l$T;IRY
ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION IN HUNGARY
For the past several months
a shake-up in the secondary levels
of the party and government appa-
ratus has been under way in Hun-
;?ary. Functionaries who have
found it difficult to adjust to
the party line or who have proved
incompetent have been criticized
and in many cases dismissed from
their posts. At least 12 persons
in the central government with
the rank of deputy minister or
of committee head have resigned,
been dismissed, or have moved to
other jobs since September 1961,
and over 20 new appointments have
been made.
Extensive changes made in
the Ministry of Interior since
September appear designed to
downgrade the security apparatus
and place it under firm regime
During the same period, the
chiefs of the major departments
in the Ministry of Interior were
replaced. In late October, Deputy
Minister and head of the civil
police Antal Bartos was dis-
missed
A new
police c ie was named in Jan-
25X1 uary. Also in early 1962, the
chief commander of the workers'
militia was replaced, and the
border guards were transferred
to the jurisdiction of the Min-
istry of Defense.
also been heavily affected by
The heavy industry and in-
vestment planning sectors have
personnel changes. An early
i
SECRE
indication of dissension here
was the dismissal in January
of former Stalinist Istvan Friss
from the chairmanship of the pub-
lic finance department of the
party central committee because
of his lack of enthusiasm for
the investment policy of the
Five-Year Plan (1961-65). Arti-
cles in the party economic jour-
nals and a speech on 16 February
to the National Assembly by
politburo alternate member Sandor
Gaspar have implied regime con-
cern about criticism of the
plan's moderate targets.
A reorganization of the
economic leadership--perhaps
to cope with this criticism--
has resulted in the transfer
on 11 February of the first
deputy minister and three other
deputy ministers of the Machine
Building and Metallurgy Indus-
tries and in the appointment
of three former provincial fac-
tory managers to replace them.
On 22 February the composition
of the new Committee for Tech-
nical Development was announced,
and several new members were
named to the Planning Bureau.
The provincial party ap-
paratus is yet another area
which has undergone far-reaching
personnel changes. Six of the
19 regional first secretaries
were moved to other posts, and
20 to 30 percent of the leader-
ship in the primary party organi-
zations was changed as a result
of elections held last fall.
The turnover constituted a purge
of inadequate or dishonest work-
ers, as well as the elimination
of those who retained views in'
opposition to Kadar's policies.
The provincial press continued
to report dismissals of party
functionaries earlier this year,
and politburo members were un-
usually active in attending
party meetings in the provinces
through February. One report 25X1
suggests that party secretary
Gyorgy Marosan was appointed
the chairman of a "de-Stalini-
zation" committee and is travel-25X1
ing about the countryside dis-
missing "neo-Stalinists" from
rural party positions.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
The Soviet regime has ap- to contribute "about 25 per-
"
parently decided to continue
its support for private housing
construction in order to aid
achievement of Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65) goals. Despite
earlier indications that such
activity was to be discouraged,
a recent article in the Soviet
newspaper Economic Gazette gave
grudging sanction to a limited
program of loans for private
building but warned that pri-
vate housing will eventually be
replaced by a system of "home-
builders` cooperatives." To
date, cooperative housing has
accounted for an insignificant
and declining share of total
housing.
The government's attitude
toward private construction--
originally scheduled to make up
35 percent of urban housing
under the Seven-Year Plan--has
grown gradually cooler since
1958, when the goal for private
o tsing was substantially ex-
ceeded. In early 1960, Khru
.sev disparaged private housing
as wasteful and out of tune
with the Communist way of life.
In October of that year, Izves-
tia stated in an inconspicuous
article that loans to individu-
als for housing construction--
normally used by half of the
private builders--had been
discontinued, but conflicting
reports over the past year made
it unclear whether such a poli-
cy had actually been carried
out. The rec^:?nt Econ.: !ic
Gazette article and a state-
ment to US Embassy officers by
officials of the State Committee
for Construction Affairs confirm
that state loans are still
available on a limited scale.
While the private housing
sector will decline slightly
in importance during the 1962-
65 period, it is still expected
of total new urban housing
cent
during that period. Actually,
materials of the kind used in
private construction would be
available for substantially more.
At the same time, however,
the Soviet leadership remains
uncertain as to the correct
approach to private housing.
The drive to eliminate the
chronic and severe housing
shortage in the USSR began in
USSR
URBAN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
TOTAL: ...,.PUN -ACTUAL
MNLION 1958
1959 1960 1961
HIS
HOUSING BUILT BY
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS:
HOUSING BUILT BY
STATE AND COOPERATIVE
ORGANIZATIONS:
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMnaY
1957 and was scheduled to be
accomplished in 10 to 12 years,
but it has bogged down in the
past two. Although plans for
neither state nor private
housing have been fulfilled,
that for private housing fell
short of achievement to a con-
siderably greater degree.
While each year of under-
fulfillment makes the task of
meeting Seven-Year Plan goals
more difficult, they can still
be net through annual increases
of only 4-5 percent over the
last three years of the plan,
provided the ambitious goal of
a 19-percent increase in 1962
is achieved. During housing's
peak growth period, 1956 to
1959, annual increases averaged
more than 25 percent. In order
to achieve 1965 goals, the re-
gime will have to grant addition-
al resources to state construc-
tion; it probably will attempt
to minimize the burden on state
funds by liberalizing its atti-
tude toward private housing.
The USSR is providing as-
sistance to a number of countries
in the field of atomic energy
research. It has completed
the construction and installa-
tion of nuclear reactors and
related laboratory equipment
in Yugoslavia and Egypt, and
is implementing agreements
to provide Iraq, Indonesia,
Afghanistan, and Ghana with
reactors. Moscow also is
sending scientists and tech-
nicians to assist these countries
in developing their atomic
energy programs and is pro-
viding technical training as
well as academic scholarships
for the study of nuclear
physics in Soviet universities,
the cooperative system.
Cooperative housing, men-
tioned in the Economic Gazette
article, would enable the re-
gime to secure the desired
state control over the housing
program and at the same time
benefit, without ideological
embarrassment, from the advan-
tages of private construction.
Not only would private rather
than state funds be used, but
private labor would assist in
this type of construction. The
state will be able to impose
the type of architecture it
advocates both on aesthetic and
economic grounds. The construc-
tion of large cooperative apart-
ment buildings is cheaper in
overall cost per resident than
that of private houses because
of economies in the construction
of municipal facilities and
utilities. Finally, there is
less chance for speculation in 25X1
building and renting under
Under its first atomic
energy agreement, Moscow in
1956 contracted with Yugoslavia
to deliver and mount a 10-
megawatt reactor and provide
the enriched uranium and heavy
water for its use. The reactor,
completed in 1959, is in
operation at the Boris Kidric
Nuclear Institute at Vinca.
Subsequent Soviet assistance
appears to have been limited to
the supply of instruments and
some chemicals and to training
facilities for Yugoslav
scientists and technicians.
Soviet assistance for
Egypt's nuclear energy program
has been considerable. The USSR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
drew up the plans and supplied
equipment and technicians for
the establishment of a nuclear
research center at Inshans.
Facilities of the center include
a Van de Graaff accelerator
(2,5-3,0 mega-electron volts),
a 2-megawatt VVT S-type research
reactor, and associated research
equipment. By the end of 1960,
equipment had been installed
in the nuclear physics labora-
tory and experiments were under
way using the accelerator. The
reactor--construction of which
started in 1958--began to operate
at full capacity last October,
with Soviet scientists assigned
to guide laboratory operations,
The USSR is providing technical
training for Egyptian personnel
in the use of the equipment,
and a number of students are
in Moscow attending a five-
to six-year course in atomic
energy.
Soviet scientists arrived
in Baghdad in January to super-
vise construction of the initial
stages of the Tammuz atomic
reactor project. The USSR is
supplying a 2,000-kilowatt
IRT-type reactor and the
principal laboratory components,
and is providing technical
training for Iraqi personnel in
Soviet atomic establishments.
Work is scheduled to begin soon
on the necessary infrastructure;
bids for the construction of the
reactor building and related
buildings will be announced
in March. The component parts
of the reactor are in temporary
storage in Baghdad awaiting un-
crating and assembly. The
reactor is scheduled to be in-
stalled early next year and is
to be in full operation in 1964.
The cost of Soviet equipment--
over $2,000,000--is not in-
cluded under the Soviet eco-
nomic credit and will be paid
for in convertible currency
upon completion of the project.
The USSR is supplying
Indonesia with two atomic
reactors--a subcritical assembly
and an IRT 1,000-kilowatt swim-
ming-pool type--at a total cost
of about $2,200,000 under the
terms of its long-term eco-
nomic credit. Soviet experts
have installed the subcritical
assembly reactor at the Gadjah
Mada University, where it is
being utilized for training
and research purposes. This
January the USSR signed the
contract for construction of
the second reactor, which is
scheduled for completion in
1963.
The atomic energy agree-
ment concluded last October
between the USSR and India
provides for research in the
development of atomic power
reactors, reciprocal exchange
of scientific and technical
information, training of Indian
specialists, and assistance
in the mining and production
of Indian uranium. The agree-
ment specifies that individual
contracts are to be signed
covering the details of collabo-
ration in specific fields,
Thus far, Moscow and New Delhi
have not signed any implementing
protocols, but the agreement
provides a framework for ex-
tensive Soviet collaboration
and assistance to India's
nuclear energy program.
The USSR has also agreed
to provide the universities of
Ghana and Afghanistan with
nuclear reactors for research
purposes and is to provide
training in Moscow for stu-
dents from those two countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET AND CHINESE ECONOMIC AID TO YEMEN
With the completion of
their two principal economic
undertakings in Yemen, both
Moscow and Peiping are discuss-
ing new development projects
with that country. Moscow has
offered to provide a water
supply system and an improved
electric power establishment
for Al-Hudaydah and to build
an irrigation dam and a cement
plant in the interior, and has
shown a renewed interest in
providing assistance for civil
aviation. Chinese experts have
selected the site and completed
preliminary surveys for a tex-
tile plant, and Peiping has
offered to develop cotton pro-
duction in the Jawf area to
supply the local textile fac-
tory.
The port at Al-Hudaydah--
the major Soviet project--was
officially opened in April 1961.
Despite reports of deteriora-
tion, it has stimulated economic
activity in Yemen and is a
visible reminder of Soviet
economic assistance. Moscow
now has prepared blueprints
for 600 private dwellings and
12 government buildings there.
Seventy-five percent of the
cost is to be financed under
the 1956 Soviet credit of $25,-
000,000, with the balance in
grant assistance.
A Soviet offer in June
1961 of extensive assistance
for organizing a domestic air-
line service in Yemen appar-
ently never was seriously dis-
cussed. Moscow, however, is
providing some equipment and
service for Yemen's airports
as well as training for local
personnel. Soviet technicians
operate weather stations at
all three airports, and Soviet
navigational beam units are in
operation at Sana and Taiz air-
ports. Soviet instruction for
local personnel has been limited
to radio operation and meteorol-
ogy, but aviation training, in-
cluding flight instruction, is
to be inaugurated soon at Sana.
In view of Yemen's interest in
buying modern aircraft, Moscow
may repeat its offer of Soviet
models.
In August 1961 the USSR
and Yemen initialed an agree-
ment for the construction of a
road from Al-Hudaydah to Taiz,
and shortly thereafter Soviet
experts arrived to conduct pre-
liminary surveys. However,
plans for Soviet construction
appear to be in abeyance and
Yemen has approached the Chi-
nese. Peiping is likely to
agree to build this road, since
it achieved considerable pres-
tige with the successful com-
pletion of the road from Al-
Hudaydah to Sana. Discussions
also have been held with the
Chinese on extending that road
to Marib, but thus far there
have been no serious negotiations.
The textile plant is to be
financed under the $16,000,000
Chinese credit extended in 1958,
but the project came to a stand-
still because of Yemeni reluc-
tance to use good agricultural
land for the project. Recently, 25X1
however, Yemen has decided to
compel the farmers to sell their
property.
JAPANESE-SOVIET TRADE GOALS FOR 1962
Japanese and Soviet nego-
tiators have agreed on a trade
program for 1962--the conclud-
ing year of a three-year trade
pact signed in 1960--which calls
for a 17-percent increase in
Soviet petroleum sales but an
overall balance in Japan's favor.
This would be Tokyo's first
favorable balance in trade with
the USSR since normal trade was
resumed in 1958. The new
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 14EEKLY SU
1961
(Prelim.)
1962
(Froposed)
JAPANESE SALES TO USSR SOVIET SALES TO JAPAN
( F.O.B. JAPAN) K.I.F. JAPAN)
(Million Dollars)
program--which would account
for about 2 percent of Japan's
total trade--does not include
any exchange of Soviet crude
oil and Japanese steel pipe for
the trans-Siberian pipeline.
The Japanese target for
exports to the USSR has been
set at $120,000,000--almost
double the 1961 performance.
Taking into consideration long-
term sales contracts for steel
products, dockside cranes, in-
dustrial machinery, and tire
cord, this goal appears reason-
ab' e . Most of the contracts
for complete plants, merchant
:hips, and industrial machinery
are being financed by five-year
credits, and delivery schedules
range over several months or
even years. The imbalance in
Soviet-Japanese trade has arisen
in large part because of this
lag between conclusion of the
contracts and delivery of the
goods.
Soviet exports to Japan,
on the other hand, have exceeded
planned goals, largely because
of the ready availability of
,Soviet raw materials and semi-
finished goods. As a result
of Japanese complaints, Soviet
export goals have been reduced
to $105,000,000, or 28 percent
below last year's level. The
Japanese are planning to reduce
by half their imports of Soviet
lumber, valued at more than
$150,000,000 in 1961, and to
cut pig-iron purchases from
500,000 to 200,000 tons.
Negotiations for a new
long-term trade pact are to
begin next September. Conclu-
sion of the five-year agree-
ment Moscow is requesting will
depend on the USSR's willing-
ness to step up its cash pur-
chases of Japanese goods and
also on a satisfactory settle-
ment of the problems connected
with Japan's imports of Soviet dil.
The USSR, which in 1961 pro-
vided 6.3 percent of Japanese
crude oil imports, has agreed to
limit petroleum sales in 1962 to
3,400,000 metric tons. The Jap-
anese fear that if foreign ex-
change controls on petroleum im-
ports are liberalized as scheduled
in October, relatively cheap Soviet
oil will cut into sales of both
American suppliers and the Jap-
anese-owned Arabian Oil Company
(AOC), which operates in the Per-
sian Gulf. Tokyo is considering
postponing liberalization until
administrative measures can be
devised to enable the AOC--whose
production for 1963 is estimated
at close to 20 percent of Japanese
needs--to market its output in
Japan.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Belgian cabinet is In addition, long-standing
threatened by increasing strains I party differences on education
between the two members of the are coming to a head in a PSC
coalition government, the So- proposal to split the Ministry
cialist.party (PSB) and the So- of Education, now headed by a
cial Christian party (PSC). Socialist, into Walloon and
These strains, in turn, jeopard-
ize the prospects for a meaning-
ful fiscal reform program.
The cabinet--formed by Prime
Minister Lefevre of the PSC in
April 1961, following parliamen-
tary elections the previous
month--has been dominated by
pro-labor elements in his party
and by moderate Socialists like
Foreign Minister Spaak. Its
program seeks to reform the tax
structure and put government
finances on a sound fiscal basis
by eliminating inequities and
abuses and by increasing gov-
ernment revenue. It also hopes
to stimulate investment and
thereby national economic growth.
The economic austerity features
of this program are not as severe
as those proposed by the previous
conservative PSC-Liberal coali-
tion--features which provoked
the widespread protest strikes
led by left-wing Socialists in
December 1960 and January 1961.
Recently, however, the
Social Christian leadership
has started to water down the
reform measures because it is
alarmed by the inroads which
the Liberals, hostile to the
fiscal reform program, have
made among the middle-class
elements of the PSC. The So-
cialists, harassed by discon-
tent within their left wing,
are responding with counter-
proposals. Spaak's preoccupa-
tion with foreign affairs has
prevented him from exerting his
maximum influence in getting
his Socialist colleagues to
back the program.
"'.l Christians 96
be r.l: 20 V.Iksu nie 5
F .-h -i...lis84
Flemish components. The Social-
ists, however, wish to keep the
ministry intact to prevent
the Roman Catholics from acquir-
ing full control over the Flemish
sector. Both the labor and
middle-class factions of the
PSC would hold together on this
issue, while the Socialists
would rally around the banner
of anticlericalism. The fact
that the Socialists are largely
French-speaking and the Social
Christians heavily Flemish
further complicates the situa-
tion.
Friction between the parties
now has reached the point where
an open break is possible if
compromises on these issues are
not reached. There are strong
pressures for a continuation of
the present coalition, even if it in-
volves elimination of Lefevre, whose
handling of the economic program has
been criticized. The labor wing of
the PSC strongly opposes the forma-
tion of another PSC-Liberal coali-
tion.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The prospects for Pres-
ident Frondizi's Intransigent
Radical party (UCRI) in the
18 March elections appear to
be improving. Elections will
be held in 18 of 23 electoral
districts to choose 87 of 192
members of the Chamber of Dep-
uties, 12 governors, and other
provincial and local officials.
These elections will strongly
influence the presidential
elections in 1964 and Frondizi's
ability in the meantime to con-
tinue the US-backed stabiliza-
tion program, which he adopted
in January 1959 and has pressed
at the cost of considerable po-
litical support in previous
elections. Frondizi considers
the program in line with the
Alliance for Progress, for
which he would like to become
a leading advocate in South
America.
To retain its slim major-
ity in the Chamber, the UCRI
must win 50 of the 87 contested
seats. It must place first in
either the powerful Province
of Buenos Aires, which is elect-
ing 26 deputies, or in the Fed-
eral Capital--Buenos Aires city--
where 18 seats are at stake; it
must also place second in the
other. In both areas it faces
strong opposition from the Peo-
ple's Radical Civic Union (UCRP)
and the Peronistas, the only
other political groupings that
have been able to poll as much
as 20 to 25 percent of the vote
on a nationwide basis.
The Buenos Aires provin-
cial elections are also of
priority importance to the
UCRI, since 6,000,000 of Ar-
gentina's 21,000,000 people
live in that province. The
UCRP, which has threatened to
scuttle Frondizi's economic
program if it gains control
of congress, has lost ground
in various provincial elec-
tions during the past year.
The Peronistas are split
into a number of neo-Peronista
parties, and all parties are
angling for the Perpnista vote.
The Justicialista party, the
formal successor to the outlawed
Peronista party, has been banned
in both the capital and Buenos
Aires Province, but some of the
neo-Peronista parties are collab-
orating in the so-called Justi-
cialista Front. Support for the
Front has been announced by the
Communist party--with some 50,000
members, Latin America's largest
outside Cuba--since the Commu-
nists have been banned from most
provincial elections.
President Frondizi's speech-
es over the past fortnight, em-
phasizing that hopes for better
living conditions lie in support
for the UCRI's economic program,
have given a considerable boost
to his party's candidates through-
out the country. His effective
presentations have also served
to counteract the impression
which resulted from the early
February crisis over the break
in relations with Cuba that he
is dominated by the military.
Widespread rumors 25X1
that the military is threaten-
ing a coup if there are Peron-
ista victors on 18 March could
elicit further support for the
UCRI, since most Argentines do
not want another military dicta-
torship.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY-
The congressional elections
in Colombia on 18 March will be
an important test of the Nation-
al Front system of government,
which provides for parity be-
tween the Conservative and Lib-
eral parties in all appointive
and elective offices and alter-
nation of the presidency every
four years until 1974. This
system, introduced in 1958 to
return the country to constitu-
tional rule after the Rojas dic-
tatorship, has given Colombia
relative stability but has been
impaired by sharp divisions
within and between the two par-
ties.
Moderate factions of both
parties have formed a coalition
which since 1960 has provided
majority support in congress
for the administration of Pres-
ident Lleras, a Liberal. Oppo-
sition to the system exists
primarily among Conservatives
aligned with former President
Laureano Gomez and in the left-
ist Liberal Revolutionary Move-
ment (MRL), a Communist-influ-
enced minority faction of the
Liberal party. If either of
these two groups should make
significant gains in its con-
gressional strength, prospects
for the successful operation
of the National Front and for
continued stability would be
reduced.
More immediately there
would be an impact on the May
presidential election, when a
Conservative must be elected.
The coalition of moderate Con-
servatives and Liberals has
selected Guillermo Valencia
as presidential candidate, but
the Laureanistas hope to win
a majority of Conservative votes
to force acceptance of their
candidate as the Conservative
nominee, while the MRL refuses
to accept any Conservative and
has nominated its faction lead-
er. The possible loss of mod-
erate Conservative strength may
be offset by gains in the major-
ity Liberal faction at the ex-
pense of the MRL, which has
suffered serious internal dis-
sension in recent weeks.
No other parties are per-
mitted to present candidates,
but the followers of former
dictator Rojas are campaigning
strongly against the National
Front. The Communists, who
have relatively minor voting
strength, have announced that
they will support the MRL.
Lleras has cooperated with
the United States on the Alli-
ance for Progress and on the
Cuban question, but neither for-
eign policy nor the country's
gradually deteriorating eco-
nomic condition has figured
significantly in the campaign.
A recent increase in rural
violence--which has plagued
Colombia since 1948,.-may in-
timidate many people and keep
them from voting.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOVIET TACTICS AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
General and complete dis-
armament will remain the stated
goal of Soviet policy at the
disarmament conference scheduled
to open in Geneva on 14 March.
At the beginning of the confer-
ence, however, the nuclear test
ban question is likely to pre-
dominate.
Origin of the Conference
The conference is the
direct result of US-Soviet talks
last summer in Washington, Mos-
cow, and New York--in ,vhich Am-
bassadors Zorin and McCloy were
the chief participants--and sub-
sequent conversations last De-
cember between Zorin and Ambas-
sador Stevenson in New York.
When the Zorin-McCloy talks
ended on 20 September, Zorin had
virtually accepted a US declara-
tion on principles to govern a
future disarmament conference.
However, he did not accept a
clause which called for verifi-
cation of armaments retained as
well as armaments abolished in
initial stages leading to total
disarmament. After McCloy noted
that the clause is a key element
in the US position, Zorin re-
sponded that such "control of
armaments would deteriorate into
an international system of legal-
ized espionage." Zorin and Mc-
Cloy also failed to reach agree-
ment on the composition of a new
disarmament forum.
five Warsaw Pact powers. While
the agreement fell short of this
position, Moscow probably con-
sidered it had gained further
recognition for the troika con-
cept by securing the addition
of nonaligned states in negotia-
tions on what had traditionally
been an East-West issue. Three
of the countries selected for
the new forum--India, the UAR,
and Mexico--were among the five
initially nominated by the USSR.
Agreement on the other five
states--Brazil, Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Burma, and Sweden--was reached
after hard bargaining in which
Zorin refused to accept countries
associated with the US in mili-
tary pacts, especially Japan,
Iran, and Pakistan.
In the Zorin-Stevenson
talks, the USSR gave up its de-
mand that the disarmament forum
submit a draft treaty to the UN
General Assembly by 1 June 1962
and settled for the committee's
being instructed to make a prog-
ress report to the UN Disarma-
ment Commission by that date.
President Kennedy's announce-
ment of 2 March was immediately
denounced by the Soviet press
and radio as an "aggressive ac-
tion." Soviet commentators
stressed that the Western con-
trol proposals were "completely
unacceptable."
After the UN urged a fur-
ther US-Soviet effort to reach
agreement on the latter point,
Zorin last December worked out
an agreement with Stevenson add-
ing eight countries to the old
10-nation disarmament committee.
At the beginning of the talks
Zorin demanded that the new forum
add five nonaligned states to the
old committee of five NATO and
On 3 March--in Moscow's
first high-level response--
Khrushchev "reluctantly" ac-
cepted the US-British propos-
als~ to hold a Big Three foreign
ministers' meeting prior to the
opening of the 18-nation confer-
ence and to convene the confer-
ence at the foreign minister
level. However, he denounced
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the President's decision, re-
jected the treaty proposal as
"atomic blackmail," and de-
clared that the USSR will re-
sume testing if the US conducts
tests.
Khrushchev may eventually
propose a Big Three or Big Four
summit meeting on the test ban
question. In a recent letter
to De Gaulle, he pointed out
that the four nuclear powers
have a special role and respon-
sibility in disarmament negotia-
tions and expressed willingness
to take part in a Big Four ex-
change of views, which he said
could facilitate agreement on
the most important disarmament
problems. Khrushchev added that
the four nuclear powers must
agree on liquidating nuclear
weapons and prohibiting nuclear
tests. At a Big Three or Big
Four summit meeting, or even
at the forthcoming foreign min-
isters' meeting, the USSR might
suggest a test ban limited to
atmospheric testing, in line
with the Kennedy-Macmillan pro-
posal of 3 September. Moscow
may believe that such a move
could embarrass the West and
stimulate unfavorable reaction.
to a US resumption of atmos-
pheric testing.
Moscow has been on record
since last November with a draft
treaty which would ban testing
in the atmosphere, under water,
and in outer space, each side
using its own national detection
means and agreeing to a volun-
tary moratorium on underground
testing. Although in late Jan-
uary the USSR abandoned its
former position and rejected
the US-UK proposal to merge the
test ban negotiations with the
broader disarmament negotiations,
S.K. Tsarapkin, the chief Soviet
delegate at the test ban talks,
informed US-UK delegates at an
informal meeting on 22 February
that the USSR would make every
effort at the 18-nation confer-
ence to resolve the test ban
problem within the context of
general and complete disarma-
ment.
Partial Versus Total
Disarmamen
Khrushchev has clearly in-
dicated, in his recent letters
to the heads of the governments
participating in the conference,
that Moscow still regards the
slogan "general and complete
disarmament" as a key political
warfare weapon against the West
and as a rallying point for neu-
tralist and nationalist forces
in the non-Communist world. The
USSR can be expected at Geneva
to continue agitating for a
treaty on general and complete
disarmament as a device for dis-
crediting and inhibiting US pol-
icy and for identifying itself
with the universal desire for
peace and an end to the arms
race.
At the same time, there
have been increasing signs that
the USSR will also seek measures
bearing on European security and
restrictions on the armaments of
the two German states and foreign
military installations and forces
in the two Germanys. This ap-
proach would also support Moscow's
objectives of promoting the stabili-
zation of the East European satel-
lites and the de facto recognition
of the partition of Germany. So-
viet leaders probably believe they
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
can gain neutralist support
for their partial disarmament
proposals, which would allegedly
strengthen confidence between
states and promote agreement on
total disarmament but which
would weaken the West more than
the bloc.
The US-Soviet agreement
last September on the principle
of general and complete disarma-
ment will reduce the effective-
ness of this slogan for Moscow
and may increase the USSR's in-
centive to press for partial
measures designed to advance
its policy aims in Central
Europe. It submitted several
such measures to the UN shortly
after the US-Soviet agreement
on principles was reached, and
the Soviet party congress in
October devoted comparatively
little attention to the subject
of general and complete disarma-
ment.
Moscow will probably try
to exploit the widespread senti-
ment against the extension of
nuclear weapons in order to
block the creation of a NATO-
controlled nuclear force and,
in particular, to prevent West
Germany's acquisition of any
form of nuclear capability.
To this end the USSR might pro-
pose a ban on the transfer of
nuclear weapons to other coun-
tries or a nonaggression treaty
between NATO and Warsaw Pact
members and a nuclear-free zone
in Central Europe. In his talks
with Secretary Rusk last fall,
Gromyko gave considerable at-
tention to these issues. The
Soviets will also probably see
political advantages in pressing
such standard proposals as a
ceiling on military budgets,
prohibition on the use of nuclear
weapons, a ban on war propaganda,
a system for preventing surprise
attack, reduction of forces in
Germany, and the withdrawal of
all foreign troops from the ter-
ritories of other countries.
In November, the USSR managed
to secure some measure of UN en-
dorsement for several of its
standing positions on partial
disarmament. On 24 November,
the 16th General Assembly ap-
proved two resolutions: one
calling upon UN members to con-
sider Africa a denuclearized
zone, and a second requesting
the secretary general to consult
member governments concerning a
possible conference to negotiate
a convention banning the use of
nuclear weapons. On 4 December,
the assembly approved two more
resolutions: one, introduced
by Ireland, calling for conclu-
sion of an agreement barring the
transfer of nuclear weapons, and
one by Sweden proposing a "non-
nuclear" club. Soviet officials
and commentators indicated that
these resolutions would serve
as points of departure for
future Soviet attacks on NATO
sharing and US deployment arrange-
ments; they may even be incorpo-
rated in formal Soviet proposals.
There has been no change
in Moscow's public position on
the issue of disarmament con-
trols since Khrushchev proposed
general and complete disarmament
during his US visit in 1959.
The line has been that the USSR
would accept the American con-
trol proposals if the US would
accept Soviet disarmament pro-
posals.
In private conversations
with Western officials, Soviet
spokesmen have indicated that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the USSR would accept certain
controls over initial stages
of disarmament. While they
have expressed willingness to
have checks on those armaments
already destroyed, they have
generally maintained, as Zorin
did last September, that verifi-
cation of armaments retained
would have to await implementa-
tion of a final disarmament
treaty. In early December,
however, a Soviet UN delegate
told a Western delegate that
he thought it would be possi-
ble to work out some compromise
position. Later in the month,
at a luncheon with members of
the American UN delegation,
Soviet delegates "admitted"
that the US has the "propaganda
advantage" in the matter of
control. They claimed that
the Soviets do not believe the
United States' public stand is
its actual position, because
they are convinced that neither
the US nor the USSR could accept
very extensive controls in the
early stages unless "substantial
disarmament measures" were being
implemented.
There have been a few hints
that the USSR may see the con-
cept of random sampling in se-
lected inspection zones as a
possible way out of the present
impasse on control and inspection
procedures. Under the random
sampling technique, which was
presented by US scientists last
September at the conference at
Stowe, Vermont, on science and
world affairs, a high degree of
confidence could be established,
even if only a fraction of the
total area were searched thorough-
ly. Soviet scientists expressed
guarded interest in the plan.
Pravda on 24 February published
a special article by John Bernal,
president of the Communist-con-
trolled World Peace Council, in
which he suggested that the dis-
armament conference should seek
a mutually acceptable method
to secure effective control
at every stage of disarmament
without "espionage." He cited
the proposal of US scientists
at Stowe as a possible solu-
tion.
Outlook
Since the bloc broke off
the 10-nation disarmament
talks in June 1960, the Soviets
have given no evidence of sig-
nificant moves toward the
Western position. The main
stumbling blocks are still
inspection and control. The
economic burden of an inten-
sified arms race is still
a potentially r:.-!cisive factor
over the long :-un, but it is
not yet strong enough to
force acceptance of the West-
ern position.
Khrushchev's acceptance
of the Western proposal for
a foreign ministers' meeting
provides evidence that the
USSR's approach to the con-
ference is closely related
to its broader political
objectives in Europe, par-
ticularly the German ques-
tion. The Soviet leaders
probably view the disarma-
ment talks as an opportunity
to test Western policy on
those areas of disarmament
which would affect the
questions of Germany and
Central Europe. With a
summit conference still a
possibility and with the
Berlin question stalemated,
Khrushchev might view some
agreement on partial dis-
armament steps in Europe
as a means for compensating
for his lack of progress on
Berlin, while at the same
time achieving some gain
toward de facto recognition
of the division of Germany.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
There is increasing evi-
dence of a capability cn th^
wart of the French extremist
;3ecret Army Organization (OAL)
to disrupt a settlement in Al-
;eria, and this has been an im-
portant factor in the reluctance
of the rebels' provisional Al-
gerian government (PAG) to come
to terms quickly with Paris.
While the French Government is
still confident it can overcome
the OAS, French officials admit
the likelihood of extensive
bloodshed in Algeria before the
organization is crushed. It now
has enough die-hard personnel,
arms, money, and food to main-
tain resistance for some weeks
or months--possibly long enough
to upset arrangements for the
transitional period before Al-
gerian independence and thereby
~-o impose increased political
strains on both the PAG and the
De Gaulle regime.
Whatever the form of OAS
reaction, implementation of a
French-Algerian agreement will
;require the complete coopera-
tion of the French armed forces,
which is not necessarily assured.
The OAS has the immediate capa-
bility to launch a desperate
military assault on major govern-
ment installations in Algeria
such as the administrative head-
quarters of Rocher Noir--admit-
tedly not very defensible--and
to seize all of Oran, at least
parts of Algiers, and perhaps
other cities.
OAS Objectives
There is evidence that ex-
General Sa la n and possibly some
of the other key OAS leaders
realize that a coup in Algeria
will fail without assurance of
outside support, particularly
from the French military in
Europe. Their objective thus
appears to be to create a situ-
Personnel -- At least 3,500 hard-core personnel, augmented by
military deserters, especially Moslem auxiliaries and
Foreign Legionnaires. Stock of at least 5,000 military
uniforms can be increased by further seizures from laun-
dries, military warehouses, and used-clothing dealers.
Weapons -- At least 20,000 of all types, including many semi-
automatic; some machine guns end bazookas; augmented by
frequent raids on army and police stocks and sporting-
goods stores.
Ammunition and Explosives -- Large but unspecified quantities
of grenades and apparently ample ammunition for weapons;
augmented by frequent raids on army and police stocks.
Plastic for bombs seems to be unlimited.
Transportation -- Probably not extensive, but accounts of the
recent theft of 20 jeeps and of exploits involving pri-
vate as well as army command vehicles suggest a growing
capability to move military units.
Food -- In addition to claiming stocks of its own, the OAS
ordered Europeans to stock food for it in January and
February; response reportedly was high.
Money -- From almost daily holdups since 1 January, the OAS
has probably amassed close to half a million dollars.
Europeans also responded to its "order" to stock up on
gold coins. The organization reportedly now issues its
own "money" in some areas.
ation in Algeria which would
lead to De Gaulle's downfall.
In addition to provoking
European-Moslem clashes in hopes
of winning over army support,
the OAS also apparently calcu-
lates that it can mount a guer-
rilla effort which would produce
an early political upheaval in
France. In any event it seems
confident it can establish a
"free territory" to which Euro-
pean settlers, army elements,
and pro-French Moslems could
rally. The OAS leadership ap-
parently calculates that in the
long run such an enclave could
not be disowned by metropolitan
France, and might even receive
some support from such Western
nations as Spain, Portugal, and
the Republic of South Africa.
The possibility cannot be
ruled out, however, that regard-
less of the risk of almost cer-
tain failure, a hard-core OAS
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element may decide on a last-
ditch coup attempt in Algeria
without reference to army sen-
timent or to any decline in set-
tler support. The outcome in
any of these eventualities will
depend partly on the attitude
of the armed forces.
None of the original team
of OAS leaders in Algeria--in-
cluding Salan, ex-General Jou-
haud, and a handful of colo-
nels--has been captured since
they went underground after the
military mutiny failed last
April. Colonel Argoud--one of
the leaders interned in Spain--
escaped recently and presumably
now is in or heading for Algeria
These leaders are desperate men
under sentence of death, and
most are experts in waging as
well as combating guerrilla war-
fare.
Settler Support
The government hopes that
the terms of settlement will
convince most of the settlers
that their interests are ade-
quately guaranteed, and that
mass settler support of the
13AS will dwindle. As yet, how-
ever, there is no sign of a de-
cline of the settlers' backing
for the OAS despite French ef-
forts to convince them that their
interests will be protected.
French officials have alleged
that the countryside in Algeria
is quiet, and only a few large
cities have been disorderly.
There are reports this week, how-
ever, indicating the spread of
violence to other areas such as
outlying towns around Oran and,
on 6 March, to Constantine, where
Europeans demonstrated even
though they were supposedly afraid
to do so because of the overwhelm-
ingly Moslem population.
Recent OAS tactical suc-
cesses have contributed to
maintaining European support.
These include provocation of
Moslem mobs last week in Algiers
and Oran, which resulted in
the use of army rather than
police forces against the Mos-
lems and in effect began a proc-
ess of "conditioning" the army
to take sides rather than restore
order impartially when, as the
OAS hopes, major settler and
Moslem clashes can be precipi-
tated. Among other recent and
spectacular acts have been three
bazooka attacks against special
anti-OAS police barracks in
Algiers; the detonation of a
record level of 132 plastic
bombs in Algiers on the night
of 5-6 March; the forced publi-
cation of an "OAS edition" of
the leading Oran newspaper;
and continuing pirate radio
and television broadcasts de-
spite strenuous government ef-
forts to seize or jam the il-
legal transmitters.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
De Gaulle's persistence in
withdrawing personnel equiva-
lent to two divisions, in addi-
tion to the two divisions he
withdrew last year, has report-
edly led to considerable military
protest. At most, only about
2,000 of the proposed total of
20,000 seem to have been with-
drawn to date, but further with-
drawals in the face of major
European-Moslem clashes could
lead to a serious high-level
military effort to challenge
De Gaulle's policies. General
Ailleret, commander in chief in
Algeria, has submitted his res-
ignation on the ground that he
cannot be responsible for the
results if troops continue to
be withdrawn. Reports that
Ailleret may soon be replaced
by air force General Martin,
whom some consider a "Gaullist
opportunist," will not enhance
the government's control.
The bombing raid on Mo-
roccan territory by two air force
reserve planes last month sug-
gests at leapt some official
complicity in that quarter. There
is also a recent indication that
some elements in the navy, which
the government expects to use in
a show of force off major ports
in event of a crisis, will not
obey orders to fire on these
cities.
Military Attitudes - Europe
Nor is the situation among
the military in France itself re-
assuring. Among eight officers
on active duty arrested recently
on charges of heading a regional
OAS network, four were on the
staff at St. Cyr. On 3 March
the government suspended premil-
itary training for a month on
the grounds of OAS infiltration
of this training. Premier Debre
reportedly received a very cool
reception when he made a pep
talk at the air force academy
last month. De Gaulle's un-
precedented conferences two
weeks ago with army and air force
regional commanders and key navy
officers indicate some doubts as
to their attitudes. Statements
such as that made by Armed Forces
Minister Messmer on 15 February
to the National Assembly Defense
Committee to the effect that Com-
munist party influence has in-
creased markedly in the army in
recent months will increase doubts
among the military as to the wis-
dom of De Gaulle's policies.
The major factor deterring
any substantial portion of the
armed forces from siding with
the OAS is the mass public sup-
port for De Gaulle's Algerian
policy in metropolitan France,
and the reflection of such sup-
conscripts. However,
por --n,,,
a European-Moslem bloodbath in
Algeria which led the military
to take sides against the Mos-
lems might make it impossible
for De Gaulle to retain the co-
operation of the military in
France in carrying out his Al-
gerian policy. De Gaulle might
even lose his present popular
support in France if the Com-
munist party moves to exploit
the situation by mass demon-
strations and the creation of
a "popular front" atmosphere
which would alarm moderates
and make feasible a rightist-
military move to "save" the
republic by removing De Gaulle.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Cameroon's President Ahi-
djo, who will visit the United
States from 13 to 17 March,
has aligned his country with
the moderate African states
and has given a chilly recep-
tion to Soviet overtures. He
wants to continue close ties
with France but at the same
time broaden his Western sup-
port. He sees his visit to
the US as an opportunity to
obtain more aid and to enhance
his stature as an African
lea.; -r . He has demonstrated
a high degree of political
skill, but he is beset with
the problems of suppressing
a long-standing Communist-
supported terrorist campaign
against him and of making
economic gains in the face of
large outlays for security.
The Cameroon Federation
Ahmadou Ahidjo is the
first president of the Federal
Republic of Cameroon and un-
disputed leader of East Camer-
oon, which was formerly the
French trust territory of
Cameroun and now is the larger
of the federation's two compo-
nents. The other, West Camer-
oon, was a British-adminis-
tered trust territory. The
federation, formed in October
1961, brings back together
most of the old German colony
of Kamerun, which was split by
the British and French follow-
ing World War I. The major
missing piece is the northern
portion of the former British
Cameroons; this area chose to
join Nigeria in a UN-supervised
plebiscite last year.
Cameroon thus is a country
with two different administra-
tive traditions, with the
concomitant difficulties of
reconciling languages, legal
systems, educational standards,
and other differences. Even
more fundamental, however, is
an ethnic division; with splits
the country between a pre-
dominantly Moslem north and a
Christian and pagan south. The
pro-Nigeria vote of the north-
ern part of the former British
area resulted from the belief
of the Moslems there that their
chances were better with their
fellow Moslems of northern
Nigeria than with the Camer-
oonians. Ahidjo, himself a
Moslem, continues to protest
the loss of this area.
With regard to West Camer-
oon, however, he appears through
skillful negotiations to have
allayed the fears of its prime
minister, John Ngu Foncha, that
the state would be swallowed up
completely by the larger East
Cameroon,. A provisional cabinet
and assembly have been estab-
lished at the federal level
to govern until elections in
1964. Foncha has been brought
in as a federal vice president,
and one minister and two
deputy ministers from West
Cameroon have been named to
the federal cabinet. The
Federal Assembly is to be
comprised of 10 West Cameroon-
ians and 40 East Cameroon-
ians.
Domestic Politics
Ahidjo, now 38, was raised
in modest circumstances. He
graduated from secondary school
in Yaounde and then became chief
radio operator in a northern
Cameroun city for the Depart-
ment of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions. He entered politics in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
CAMEROON
fourths of the 100-seat East
Cameroon assembly. Foncha,
party, the Union Camerounaise
(UC), controls more than three
through his Kamerun National
Democratic party (KNDP), holds
at least 25 of the 37 seats in
the assembly of West Cameroon.
The inclusion of 800,000 West
Cameroonians in the Cameroon
federation is a potential
threat to Ahidjo's regime, as
his political strength is based
almost wholly on Moslem sup-
port in the north. The federal
constitution was designed to
inhibit the formation of a
broad southern opposition, how-
ever, and Ahidjo has until 1964
to thwart any moves in this
direction. Foncha presently ap-
pears content with his own po-
sition and that of his state.
Internal Problems
1947, rising to a vice-premier-
ship in 1957 and to premier in
February 1958. Much of the
original opposition to him was
undercut by his success in ob-
taining independence for the
former French Cameroun in Jan-
uary 1960. He was elected
president of the Cameroun Re-
public by an overwhelming ma-
jority of its assembly. He has
been described as a "politi-
cians' politician," with ex-
ceptional skill at compromise
and at balancing off conflict-
ing forces. He represents the
more democratic and progressive
elements in the north, but has
been able to hold the support
of the conservative northern
tribal chiefs as well.
Both Ahidjo and Foncha are
in firm political control in
their respective states. Ahid,o's
In addition to his lack
of mass political support in
the south, Ahidjo has two. more
immediate problems: (1) a spo-
radic terrorist campaign against
him, and (2) a low level of eco-
nomic activity. The two are
related, but the potentially
more serious is the terrorism
waged since 1954 by the Commu-
nist-oriented and -supported
extremist wing of the Union of
Cameroon Peoples (UPC).
Through a combination of
tough security measures and am-
nesties, Ahidjo has dealt hard
blows at the UPC. With French
support he has so far been able
to do somewhat more than hold
his own. However, UPC terrorists,
estimated to number from 1,000
to 3,000, are concentrated along
the mountainous border between
East and West Cameroon. UPC
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
leaders in exile are located in
Accra, Conakry, and Cairo and
have visited Moscow and Peiping.
The Chinese Communists have been
the most active of the bloc
states in support of the UPC,
and numerous Cameroonians have
been trained in guerrilla
fighting and sabotage by Pei-
ping. UPC terrorists have
some Czech arms, probably ob-
tained from Ghana or Guinea.
The bloc has not yet made
a serious effort to supply the
UPC on a large scale, but even
without this, the terrorists
have compelled the government
to divert scarce resources to
.its armed forces and thereby
have impeded political, social,
and economic development. Should
they mount a concerted campaign,
Ahidjo might be forced--how-
ever reluctantly--to call on
the French for open military
intervention. In 1960, he
appealed to the US for military
equipment for his "active war
against the Communists,"' and
he may press again.
Ahidjo's economic problems
are particularly acute in trans-
portation and communications.
French aid is substantial ($40-
50 million annually) but with
so much spent on security and
on ordinary operating budgetary
expenses, economic development
has proceeded at a snail's pace.
World markets, moreover, have
not been favorable to Camer-
oon's two main export products,
cocoa and coffee, and competi-
tion from other African pro-
ducers has been stiff. The
lack of economic development
has left unemployment high and
provoked considerable grumbling
and discontent among younger
Cameroonians. The expenses of
the new federal structure will
produce even larger budget
deficits.
Foreign Relations
Officials who will accom-
pany Ahidjo during his visit
have indicated that they would
like to discuss a commercial
agreement with the US, American
private investment in the
country, and the status of the
American aid program. Ahidjo
would like to broaden Western
support in order to reduce his
heavy dependence on the French.
In addition to direct financial
subsidies, France contributes
personnel, pays the salaries of
some 2,000 civil servants in
Cameroon, and maintains three
French Army battalions there.
East Cameroonian trade is over-
whelmingly with the franc zone.
Ahidjo, although pro-
French and determined to main-
tain close ties with. Paris, is
nevertheless sensitive to
charges of his opposition and
from radical African states
that he is a puppet of France.
He is anxious to demonstrate
his "independence," and he
hopes his visit to the US will
enhance his standing as an
African leader. He has asso-
ciated Cameroon with the moderate
Brazzaville states and Monrovia
powers.
Cameroon has no economic
and technical assistance agree-
meats with any of the Communist
states, and its trade with them
is less than one percent of its
total trade. Ahidjo remains
strongly opposed to seating
Communist China in the UN and
has recognized the Chinese
Nationalists. Soviet overtures
or diplomatic and trade rela-
tions have to date been coolly
received, and no member of the
government or high civil servant
has espoused the idea of closer
ties with the bloc.
wherever possible.
The bloc's support for the
UPC terrorists makes any other
position almost unthinkable,
but there are some indications
that the USSR, at least, may
shift the tactics to more subtle
penetration efforts. If such a.
shift occurred and if he were
hard pressed for help, Ahidjo
would almost certainly moderate
his antibloc line and take aid
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