CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003600010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600010001-3
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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 70
OCI NO. 0411/62
6 April 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
ARMY review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
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195CU
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 April 196;2
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1201) EST 5 Apr)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow continues to evince interest in further high-
level negotiations with the United States on the Berlin
problem and to avoid actions which might lead to a confron-
tation with the West. The suspension of Soviet flights in
the Berlin air corridors after 29 March apparently is in-
tended to appear responsive to President Kennedy's press
conference remarks welcoming the "care" with which the
Soviets are proceeding on Berlin. The lull, however, prob-
ably does not indicate a decision to terminate these flights
but suggests that Moscow's actions will be restrained, at
least pending further developments in negotiations. The
USSR has shifted its attention to efforts to restrict and
erode Western rights in ground travel to and within Berlin
and to curtail or terminate the activities of Western Mili-
tary Liaison Missions in East Germany.
FRICTIONS TN THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP . .
. Page 3
Fidel Castro's strong attack on veteran Communist
leader Anibal Escalante marked a significant point in a
struggle for power that has been growing in.intensity'for
some months within the Cuban leadership. Escalante's re-
moval from his leading position in the party organization
was a victory--although perhaps only a temporary one--for
Castro and his followers over veteran Communists. The
basic issues of the struggle have not been fully revealed,
but the implications in Castro's speeches since early March
strongly suggest that he was resisting the efforts of vet-
eran Communists to erode his own authority and to rule be-
hind his image under the rubric of "collective leadership."
. Page 6
Souvanna's departure for France on 3 April highlights
the continuing political impasse. Soupahannouvong, while
joining with Souvanna in requesting additional US sanctions
against Phoumi, has indicated that his forces will conduct
"clean-up" operations against government units in areas
claimed by the Pathet Lao as of the 3 May 1961 "cease-fire."
Souvanna had earlier stated that his forces would not ex-
ploit any Vientiane weakness resulting from the imposition
of such sanctions. Antigovernment forces have conducted
limited attacks in northern Laos. Supply operations from
North Vietnam continue.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 April 1962
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS .
The power struggle among Syrian military factions,
which erupted this week into open rebellion)has tempoii=
rarily abated following a compromise negotiated at Homs.
Nasir, who initially appealed to Syrians to avoid civil
war and offered his services as mediator between pro- and
anti-Nasir factions, now charges Damascus with i 1 t
Page 9
V o a ing
the Homs accord by trying to put "reactionary" officers
back in co
t
l
n
ro
.
The Syrian-Israeli
borde
i
r s
tuation remains tense, and flarther clashes are
ARGENTINA . . , , . , . . , . . .
. . . . . . . . . . Page 12
President Guido is consulting with all political
groups including the Peronistas, on steps to resolve the
crisis without violence. The Peronisias have threatened
to fight to retain their electoral victories but reportedly
believe they can make a deal with the armed forces. Al-
though military leaders are determined to prevent a resur-
gence of Peronista political power, most of them prefer
constitutional government; they regard their ouster of
Frondizi as responding to popular will. in the face of his
refusal to resign. Venezuela's campaign to deny Guido
diplomatic recognition has received little support else-
W), e r e i
T .. + ; _ w __ _ __ .
n
CONGO . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The stalemate continues in the negotiations between
Tshombe and Adoula concerning Congolese reunification, ac-
companied b
i
y s
gns of political and popular unrest in
Leopoldville and by indications of growing frustration
from Adoula. The UN apparently plans drastic action a-
gainst Tshombd'should the talks break down. Any UN ef-
fort to collect Katangan mining revenues on behalf of the
central government--using UN forces in Katanga--would pose
l
_
the threat of t.
ti
it
NEW BLOC ECONOMIC AID TO EGYPT .
Czechoslovakia's recent extension of a $56,000,000
credit raises total bloc economic assistance to Egypt (be-
ginning in 1955) to more than $671,000,000. Cairo ranks
as the second largest recipient of bloc economic and mili-
tary aid. Current discussions between Moscow and Cairo
regarding a new long-term trade agreement probably also
are concerned with additional Soviet assistance for Egypt's
economies revelo
me
t
p
n
EAST GERMAN ECONOMIC PROGRAM .
The recent East German party central committee plenum
and the subsequent Volkskammer meeting were devoted largely,
to economic problems. Plans for 1962 indicate a continua-
tion of the more realistic short-term economic policies
SECRET
ii
. Page 14
Page 15
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 April 196,2
adopted in 1961, and measures have been taken to cope with
those factors which slowed growth in 1960 and 1961. The
lagging investment program will be pushed in 1962 at the
expense of a steady increase in consumption promised to
the East German population,
BRITISH GUIANA .
Page 16
The Jagan government has made its first deal for capital
equipment from the Soviet bloc by provisionally agreeing to
purchase approximately $600,000 worth of agricultural proc-
eu~:sing equipment from an East Berlin firm. The British will
probably not veto this deal, in view of the colony's pre-
carious economic position compounded by the tendency of the
middle classes to emigrate since the February riots. Lon-
don has apparently not decided whether to postpone the May
independence conference, but local disagreement over the
constitution could dela rode endence
ECUADOR . ? 0 . 0 . 0 O . ? . ? . 0 . . 0 , 0 0 . . Page 17
Faced with a threat of revolt by the armed forces, Presi-
dent Arosemena on 2 April broke relations with Cuba, Czech-
oslovakia, and Poland. Ecuadorean leftists received the move
with little resistance beyond token demonstrations. Arose-
mena balanced this concession to the right with a government
reorganization which gives him a cabinet of political moderates
likely to push ahead with reform measures--particularly those
of an agrarian and fiscal nature.
STUDENT UNREST IN PORTUGAL 0 .
0 ? O 0 . . ? O O O O O O O Page 18
Unrest and leftist influence are growing among Portuguese
students as dissatisfaction with the Salazar regime increases
among all elements. Government repression of recent demon-
strations by students of Lisbon and Oporto universities
seems to have alienated some of Premier Salazar's supporters
and may have opened a split in the regime over how to deal
with the student problem. Leftist groups will probably press
their advantage in student demonstrations which the regime
has approved for mid-April.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION . .
Page 1
The bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
has expanded its activities designed to bring about closer
economic cooperation among the European satellites. This
development, inspired by Khrushchev's open criticism in 1958
of the inadequacy of such cooperation, has involved the co-
ordination of individual country plans for 1961-65 during the
drafting stage and of long-term planning through 1980. The
organization has also accelerated industrial standardization
and specialization, scientific and technical cooperation, and
establishment of joint investment programs and joint industrial
projects. There remain, however, serious impediments to great-
er eco
o
i
i
n
m
c
nterdependence among the satellites.
SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 April 1962
THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Page 4
Despite the deep anti-Russian sentiment of most Finns,
the Communist party is one of the strongest political forces
in Finland today. It is entrenched in organized labor, and
its front organization, the Finnish People's Democratic League,
has the support of more than 20 percent of the electorate.
The Communists have achieved this position by capitalizing
on socio-economic grievances, by maintaining a well-organ-
ized party apparatus, and by exploiting Finland's proximity
to the Soviet Union. Since 1948 the democratic parties have
successfully blocked Communist efforts to gain cabinet rep-
resentation, but the party and its front remain a threat
to Finland's established democratic order.
SOUTHERN RHODESIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Prime Minister Whitehead and his associates have been
pushing a campaign to liberalize racial relationships; they
hope thereby to win Africans to their side, while preserving
as much of the European position as possible. Whitehead has
shown some sensitiveness to the two central issues of African
discontent: land tenure and political repres~.