CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SUMMARY
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 68
OCI NO. 0413/62
20 April 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 April 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 19 Apr)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . + . . . . . . Page
On the eve of Secretary Rusk's 16 April talk with
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, an authoritative Izvestia artii-
dle~ stated that new guarantees for Western access o Ber-
lin could be negotiated without difficulty if the West
agreed to a .change~ in the status of West Berlin which would
terminate the "occupation regime." This demonstration of
Soviet willingness to move ahead in Berlin talks however
was overshadowed by Khrushchev's
maneuvers to
place the USSR in a strong position to exploit the re-
sumption of US atmospheric tests.
CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS
. P 9 ? i e 7
Citing "tremendous difficulties" on the economic front,
Premier Chou En-lai presented to the National People's Con-
gress a program of retreat and adjustment that gives prior-
ity to agricultural recovery rather than industrial expan-
sion. Chou also advanced a program aimed at shoring up
popular support for the regime. Mao Tse-tung and the other
authors of policies leading to the present crisis are ap-
parently still powerful enough to deflect criticism from
themselves. Chou's remarks on international affairs and
recent Soviet comments and actions indicate that, while
both sides wish to muffle the controversy as much as pos-
sible, neither has modified its basic positions on issues
i n A a s
,.a-
p
e
ISRAEL AND SYRIA e .
Page
? . . . . Page 8
Further trouble along the Israeli-Syrian border seems
likely. Israel has categorically rejected the UN Security
Council's resolution on 9 April condemning Israel's attack
on Syria, and has attacked the objectivity of General von
Horn as chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion. Syrian fishing boats are again operating on Lake
Tiberias, and the Israelis have moved a limited number of
tanks and heavy equipment toward the border area. The com-
position of Syria's new transitional cabinet, which contains
only one prominent political figure, represents a considerable
shift to the left. This may lead to a gradual improvement
in relations with Egypt. The army, despite continued fac-
tionali
sm, remains the dominant factor in Syria.
FRANCE-ALGERIA
+ . . + . o ? e e p a e o ?
a ? o
Page
The provisional Algerian government (PAG) on 18 April
again publicly criticized French failure to curb OAS ter-
rorism against Moslems in Algiers and Oran, and there are
indications that Moslem restraint is beginning to crack.
The new French cabinet's steps to move immediately against
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20 April 1962
the OAS--including appointment of a new commander in chief
in Algeria--are probably intended to reassure the PAG.
Plans to restore order in Oran, the worst trouble spot, may
be difficult to implement even with the, reinforcements
being sent there. The PAG, now meeting in Tunis, is try-
ing to integrate Ben Bella and the other recently liberated
ministers into the active Algerian leadership. A power
struggle could develop
THE NEW FRENCH CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The cabinet Premier Georges Pompidou will present for
investiture soon after parliament reconvenes on 24 April
is similar to Debre's. Pompidou himself, although long a
loyal Gaullist, has the reputation of not hesitating to
disagree with the President on specific. issues, Despite
De Gaulle's desire to allay parliamentary opposition, early
difficulties with National Assembly opponents of the growth
of presidential power are in prospect.
. , . . Page 13
The stalemated talks concerning Congolese unification
were recessed by Adoula on 16 April. The central govern-
ment's attempt to prevent Tshombe's departure for Elisabeth-
ville on 18 April, despite public UN guarantees of his
freedom of movement, may further inflame anti-Adoula senti-
ment in southern Katanga. UN representative Gardiner has
informed Tshomb6 that he expects talks to resume no later
than 24 April and that Tsh.omb6 should come forth with con-
crete proposals at that time. However, it may be difficult
to bring the two together again.
. Page 14
Renewed demands by top military leaders that President
Guido take immediate steps to ban the Peronistas from all
political activity may cause the Chamber of Deputies
to speed up a decision on the Peronista. electoral victories.
Elements of the two major political parties are discussing a
compromise formula calling for the Chamber to seat the 47
new Peronista deputies on 1 May and for the Peronistas to
agree to the federal government's taking control of the
provinces where Peronistas won the governorships. Action
on the Peronista question has been delayed by differences
within most political parties and among the military. A
Chamber committee is to pass on the seating of newly elected
deputies by 26 April.
. Page 15
A new coalition proposal by Vientiane provides for
neutralist control of defense and interior in a cabinet
headed by the King. This appears designed to shift the
onus of inflexibility onto Souvanna Phouma. Vientiane is
planning to send "friendship missions" to several South-
east Asian nations to seek diplomatic and financial support.
Antigovernment units are maintaining pressure on Nam Tha
as well as in the Saravane-Attopeu area in southern Laos.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 April 1962
ETHIOPIA - SOMALI REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Relations between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic,
already strained because of religious, cultural, and trib-
al differences, have recently worsened,. Government offi-
cials in both states appear to be attempting to control
forces in the border areas, but the rise in tension has
increased the likelihood of fighting between Somali nomads
and Ethiopian villagers. An incident might be seized upon
by an Ethiopian troop commander as an occasion to strike
at Somali targets across the border.
GUATEMALA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The death of four students following a clash with mil-
itary police on 12 April has led to demands by the main
anti-Communist opposition parties, supported by some pro-
fessional and labor groups, that President Ydigoras resign.
Ydigoras apparently regards the present threat to his re-
gime as more serious than that posed by the rioting in mid-
March; he made a conciliatory speech on 15 April and has
subsequently sent his family abroad. The military leaders
profess loyalty to the President but their continued sup-
port is by no means assured.
EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
The presidential election set for 29 April will be
the culmination of efforts by the army=-backed reform group
to give El Salvador a constitutional government committed
to overdue social and economic reforms. The government
candidate, Colonel Julio Rivera, is unopposed; all opposi-
tion parties are boycotting the election, charging it will
be rigged in favor of the widel opular government party.
Rivera l b
on 1 July as scheduled, since thearmed forces acontinue
e
to support him.
ECUADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
President Arosemena, who has adopted a program of
moderate social reform, continues under heavy pressure from
both right and left. Military leaders, who forced him to
break diplomatic relations with Cuba on 2 April, still
threaten to overthrow him unless he rids his government of
"Communists"--thus far unidentified. A Communist-front
group staged an abortive rising on 5-6 April, and the
Communist party seems to be preparing for guerrilla war-
fare.
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Khrushchev, who was 68 years old this week, appears to
be in generally fair health, but there are signs that he
is beginning to slow down. There is no indication that his
leadership is challenged or that there is any increase in
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20 April 1962
political maneuvering in the party presidium in prepara-
tion for a succession struggle. During Khrushchev's ex-
tended absences from Moscow, party Secretary Kozlov and
Deputy Premier Kosygin seem to have the primary "care-
taker" responsibilities for party and government affairs
respectively.
SOVIET ECONOMY IN FIRST QUARTER 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
Soviet industry in the first three months of 1962
continued to perform at a high tempo, with rates of increase
little changed from a year ago. A TASS summary of re-
sults reported that industrial output increased over 9 per-
cent, well above the pace needed to achieve the objective
of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), The 5-percent increase
in industrial productivity, although still below both the
planned rate for 1962 and the Seven-Year-Plan rate, marks
some improvement over 1961. Investment and construction
data, which during 1961 indicated possible future dif-
ficulties for the economy, are not included in the first-
quarter summaries.
SOVIET BLOC OIL EXPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The Soviet bloc last year exported to nonbloc coun-
tries more than 30 million tons of crude oil and petro-
leum products, a quantity valued at about $500,000,000 and
constituting a 25-percent increase over 1960. Exports by
the bloc in 1961 filled about 3 percent of total nonbloc:
demand for petroleum. Prices for bloc petroleum are gener-
ally lower than world market prices, and the bloc encourages
barter arrangements. Present indications are that bloc
petroleum exports in 1962 may rise another 10 percent.
BURMA UNDER NE WIN'S MILITARY REGIME . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
Ne Win's military regime, now in its second month, has
been marked by a drive for discipline, efficiency, and
austerity--qualities notably lacking in Burma under civil-
ian rule. Pledged like previous regimes to a neutral for-
eign policy and to socialism at home
FINLAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
President Kekkonen's success in obtaining a majority
coalition government further strengthens his already firm
control over foreign policy and internal affairs in Finland.
The new cabinet, which controls 112 of the 200 seats in
parliament, consists of Agrarians, Conservatives, Liberals,
representatives of the Swedish People's party, and three
extraparliamentary ministers from the Communist-influenced
Central Confederation of Trade Unions (SAK). Kekkonen
wanted SAK participation to counterbalance the Conserva-
tives and mollify the USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
20 April 1962
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOVIET FLIGHT ACTIVITY IN BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS . . . . . . Page 1
With the cessation of scheduled Soviet military trans-
port flights in the corridors, the USSR has ended, tempo-
rarily at least, its probing of Western determination to
maintain air access to Berlin.
Moscow's evident aim was to supt its
broad political ob ective of altering the status Berlin.l
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet leaders last
week gave further indications
of their desire to maintain
contact with the US for further
exchanges on a Berlin settle-
ment. On the eve of Secretary
Rusk's 16 April talk with Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin, an author-
itative Izvestia article un-
derseoreT Moscow's view that
new guarantees for Western
access to Berlin could be nego-
tiated without difficulty if
the West agreed to a change in
the status of West Berlin which
would terminate the "occupation
regime." This demonstration of
willingness to move ahead in
Berlin talks, however, was over-
shadowed by Soviet maneuvers
to place the USSR in a strong
position to exploit the resump-
tion of US atmospheric tests.
The Nuclear Test Issue
Moscow apparently antic-
ipates that the weeks immedi-
ately ahead will be dominated
by the nuclear testing issue.
Khrushchev's denunciation
Jwas followed by a Soviet
call or a moratorium on tests
and acceptance of the "compro-
mise" control proposals advanced
by the eight neutral nations at
Geneva as a basis for further
negotiations.
Soviet tactics at Geneva
have been aimed at portraying
the bloc delegations as
closely aligned with the eight
neutral-nation delegations
against the US and Britain.
Soviet chief delegate Zorin
promptly endorsed India's
call, for a moratorium on all
testing for the duration of
the conference. He warned that
US tests would have serious con-
sequences for the negotiations
and challenged the US and
Britain to accept a moratorium.
Zorin also characterized the
US-UK joint statement as a
blatant maneuver to fix
responsibility on the USSR for
the impending Western tests and
charged that the US now is in-
terested only in justifying
its tests. The Soviets are
attempting to create the im-
pression that US and British
rejection of a moratorium is
a direct rebuff to the eight
neutrals.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Zorin's acceptance on 19
April of the eight neutralists'
"compromise" proposal for a
control system as a basis for
further negotiations was a fur-
ther maneuver to demonstrate
the USSR's support of neutral-
ist efforts to break the impasse
at Geneva. He coupled this
with a renewed call for a
moratorium on testing for the
duration of the negotiations.
Moscow clearly hopes these
moves, which are designed to
appear as acceptance of the
principle of international in-
spection and verification of
unidentified events in the USSR,
will blur the issue of Soviet
rejection of an effective in-
spection system and maximize
the political costs to the US
and Britain of proceeding with
atmospheric tests.
Zorin interpreted the neu-
tralists' proposal, which
would base an inspection and
control system on existing
national detection networks,
as an endorsement of most of
the USSR's position. He
contended that the provision
that the nuclear powers could
"invite" the proposed inter-
national commission of scien-
tists to conduct on-site inspec-
tions does not carry a clear
obligation to allow such in-
spections. He added, however,
that this does not mean that
the Soviet Union will necessar-
ily refuse to permit inspections.
It is likely that Moscow
will make further moves prior
to the resumption of US tests
to demonstrate its professed
desire for a test ban agreement
and the alleged US and British
opposition to any proposals
which might delay their test
series. The Supreme Soviet
session which convenes on 23
April may be used as the forum
for issuing new appeals for a
test moratorium while negotia-
tions proceed on the neutralists'
proposal.
Despite these patent ma-
neuvers to attach sole blame on
the West for another round of
nuclear tests by both sides,
the tactics at Geneva have
underlined the Soviet leadrs'
unwillingness to pay the price
of meaningful concessions to
forestall US tests. They ap-
pear confident that international
pressures will oblige the US
to make further modifications
in its position. A member of
the Soviet delegation frankly
acknowledged to a US official
that, in the USSR's view, the
control provisions worked out
by bloc and Western scientists
at Geneva in 1958 are dead; he
predicted that the US eventually
would come to accept the So-
viet stand on a test ban based
on national detection systems.
Moscow's negative attitude was
also reflected in the absence
of any reference to a test
bare in the 1962 May Day
slogans.
bloc delegations may
w t-h raw from the disarmament
talks in protest against the re-
sumption of US atmospheric tests.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A ranking member of the So-
viet delegation, however,
conveyed the impression to a
US official on 13 April that
the USSR will not stage a
calk-out, but he tried to leave
some doubt about Soviet in-
tentions. It is unlikely
that the bloc could win the
support of the nonaligned dele-
gat ions for such a maneuver.
Sentiment among these delegations
for a breakoff or an indefinite
recess after the US resumes
testing appears to have weak-
ened. The Burmese delegate
recently told Ambassador Dean
that the eight neutrals did
not have a concerted plan for
a walk-out.
Berlin and Germany
Moscow probably regards
the bilateral talks on Berlin
which resumed in Washington
on 16 April as a holding opera-
tion pending developments on
the nuclear testing front .F_
the Soviets are prepared
or a period of recriminations
on testing which will at least
temporarily reduce prospects
for movement toward a Berlin
settlement. There are no in-
dications, however, that this
agitation will result in any
immediate hardening of the
Soviet position on Berlin or
any sharp intensification of
harassments of Western access
to the city.
Bloc progaganda contains
no warning that Moscow is in
any hurry to bring the Berlin
situation to a head in the near
future. The Izvestia article----
s_Lgned by Polyanov, w o authored
a series of authoritative com-
ments on Berlin in January and
February--left the impression
that Moscow envisages a series
of high-level talks; it avoided
any suggestion that the Soviets
might break off and sign a
separate peace treaty with
Fast Germany. The article
sought to convey Moscow's
readiness to enter serious bar-
gaining on an international ac-
CE!ss authority by reaffirming
the proposal made last month
by East German party chief UI-
bricht that an arbitration body
composed of the guarantor coun-
tries be established in con-
nection with a new Berlin agree-
ment. This scheme is designed
to provide a facade of continu-
ing Soviet responsibility for
Allied access by stipulating
that the USSR would act as the
aribitration body's agent in
settling any access disputes
which may arise between East
Germany and the West.
Although both Izvestia and 25X1
the Ulbricht speech called for
the replacement of Western
"occupation troops" by UN or
neutral contingents, an East
German deputy foreign minister
hinted in a recent interview
with an Indian correspondent
that token Western forces might
remain in West Berlin. He added
that Ulbricht's proposed
arbitration body was only a
first step to solve the problem,
and that further measures to
meet Western objections "are
not excluded."
The East German press has
described reported US ideas
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on an international access
authority in which East Germany
would play a role as an "ap-
proach to reality" and asserted
that the US-Soviet talks "have
not been so negative as the
Bonn troublemakers had hoped."
Paul Verner, a high-level East
German party spokesman, stated
on 14 April that while the
situation in West Berlin cannot
remain unchanged, this problem
"must be regulated" before the
conclusion of a separate peace
treaty. This was the most
explicit statement to date by
an East German official that
the bloc governments do not
expect to sign a treaty until
prior arrangements on the status
of West Berlin and access to
the city are negotiated with
the West.
In a further reflection of
the USSR's desire to improve
the atmosphere in Berlin in
light of favorable prospects
for continued East-West talks,
Marshal Konev has been replaced
as commander of Soviet forces
in East Germany by Colonel Gen-
eral Yakubovsky. Konev's re-
call followed by a few days
the announcement that General
Clay would return to the US.
Konev was sent to East Germany
in August 1961 in a move close-
ly related to the decision to
seal the Berlin sector bound-
aries and reflecting Khrushchev's
desire to place a close asso-
ciate in this key position dur-
ing a period of greatly increased
tension in Berlin.
While the USSR maintains
its suspension of flight activ-
ity in the Berlin air corridors,
it is continuing low-key efforts
to secure advance notification
from US military authorities
for the movement of small con-
voys onythe autobahn to Berlin.
In the past, the US has given
prior notification of convoys
of eight or more vehicles in
order to facilitate processing
at the border crossings. On
13 April, in the fourth such
incident during the past week,
the Soviets objected to the
movement of a six-vehicle con-
voy without prior notification,
but they have not imposed any
prolonged delays.
Outer Space
In a recent conversation
with a US Embassy officer,
a Soviet Foreign Ministry
official emphasized that co-
operation in outer space
could serve as a symbol for
the improvement of US-Soviet
relations and perhaps as a
"touchstone" for progress in
other areas. He said that in
order to be consistent with
the Soviet position at the
Geneva disarmament conference, 25X1
Khrushchev had sidestepped
the President's suggestion
for an exchange of tracking
equipment on the grounds that
this could present an oppor-
tunity for US access to so-
viet territory. The official
said, however, that this
should not deter agreement in
other areas enumerated by
Khrush ch ev .
The official also expressed
interest in an agreement which
would preclude the use of
outer space for experiments ob-
structing or hindering future
research. Such an agreement
could be used by the Soviets
as the basis for objecting to
satellites of the Samos type.
In the recent US-Soviet bilateral
talks in New York on joint co-
operation in outer space re-
search, the Soviet delegation
broached but later withdrew a
call for discussion of a ban
on reconnaissance satellites.
A Soviet delegate at the Geneva
conference recently informed a
US delegate that a separate
ban on nuclear wea.aons in outer
space is not acceptable if it
"involves inspection."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Citing "tremendous dif-
ficulties" provoked by three
consecutive years of "serious
natural calamities," Chinese
Communist Premier Chou En-lai
presented a program of'retreat
and adjustment to the dele-
gates attending the 1962 ses-
sion of the National People's
Congress (NPC),from 27 March
to 16 April. Peiping's em-
barrassment and frustration
over the failure of its "leap
forward" policies for rapidly
transforming China into a
modern first-class power were
underscored by the repeated
postponements of the congress
and by the secrecy which
cloaked the meeting after it
convened. Of the 164 speeches
made to the congress, only a
summary of Chou's "state of
the union" address has been
published.
Chou En-lai asserted in
his report that economic condi-
tions had "begun to improve,"
but a ten-point program which
he laid out indicates that no
sharp upturn is being pro-
jected for 1962. The program
gives priority to agricultural
recovery, calls for more con-
sumar goods, and prescribes
further cutbacks in construction
projects.
Despite Chou's assertion
that the extremist "leap for-
ward" programs between 1958
and 1960 were correct, his
speech made clear that these
programs had been abandoned
completely. A "free and de-
tailed" discussion of Chou's
report went on for almost
three weeks, after which he
had to make a second speech to
answer questions from the
delegates; clearly, the details
of the shift were controversial.
Chou's speech and the
other official releases from
the congress acknowledged the
existence of problems in all
sectors of the economy but shed
no light on the details of the
problems or the extent of the
declines in industrial and
agricultural production. For
the first time, the state plan
and budget were not presented
to the congress. They will in-
stead be referred for ratifica-
tion to the elite body of the
NPC, its Standing Committee.
The regime's unwillingness to
submit these documents to even
a closed session of the congress
suggests that the two-year
blackout on release of econom-
ic information will continue.
Political Problems
In addition to formal-
izing the broad retreat on the
economic front, Chou advocated
a number of measures designed
to shore up faltering popular
support for the regime. He
said through 1966, and possibly
longer, the regime will con-
tinue to pay capitalists inter-
est on their confiscated hold-
ings, although such payments
could have ended this year
under Peiping's original
schedule. Intellectuals, most
of whom Chou asserted now are
loyal to Peiping, are also to
receive more favorable treat-
ment. Their status has
gradually risen since the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
withdrawal of the Soviet tech-
nicians in 1960, when Peiping
was suddenly made dependent on
its own scientific and techni-
cal personnel.
Peiping's published ma-
terial about the congress threw
little light on the possibility
of a major purge of individuals
responsible for the mistaken
leap forward policies. People's
Daily on 16 April defended the
essential correctness of the
leap forward policies. This sug-
gests that their authors are
still influential enough in the
hierarchy to deflect charges
that they were responsible for
the economic debacle.
Mao Tse-tung, the chief
author of the leap forward, at-
tended both the opening and
closing sessions of the con-
gress. Six.full members of the
politburo were not listed at
all as attending the congress.
Most of them, however, had not
attended the last session of
the NPC--in 1960--and their
absence this year is not neces-
sarily indicative of impending
loss of positions. Similarly,
the absences among lower levels
of the party hierarchy do not
warrant firm conclusions of an
immiment purge.
International Relations
The summary of Chou's re-
marks to the congress indicates
that he dwelt on the continuing
need to unify the world's
people in the struggle against
"US imperialism." Reflecting
a growing sensitivity in-Pei-
ping; to Chinese Nationalist
plans regarding the mainland,
the premier declared that "US
military provocations and war
threats," coupled with Chi-
nese Nationalist "sabotage
activities," made it necessary
for the Chinese people to
"heighten their vigilance"
and build up the strength of
their armed forces. The
"liberate Taiwan" slogan did
not appear in the official sum-
mary, however, and no sense
of urgency was developed on
the Chinese Communist goal of
seizing the island.
In the key area of Sino-
Soviet relations, Chou En-
lai, according to the summary,
followed the pattern of re-
cent Chinese propaganda in try-
ing to call attention to the
community of Sino-Soviet inter-
ests without relinquishing
fundamental Chinese positions
in the dispute. Sops to Mosr
cow included Chou's placing
of a qualified approval of
peaceful coexistence ahead of
support for national liber-
ation and his pro forma en-
dorsement of negotiations with
the West.
In other passages, how-
ever,, Chou touched on Chinese
positions which have long sepa-r
rated Peiping and Moscow. These
included an emphasis on the
need for constant struggle and
a rei'.teration that the concept
--objectionable to the USSR--
that the "east wind prevails
over the west wind" is a proper
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
guide for Communist strategy.
Insistence on the correctness
and continued vitality of the
leap forward and the commune
also demonstrated Peiping's
continued adherence to formu-
lations that have divided the
two Communist giants.
The Sino-Indian border is
another area in which Peiping
refuses to modify its views to
placate Moscow. Delegates to
the Congress were instructed
on the deterioration in Sino-
Indian relations and given
copies of last winter's exchange
of notes between Peiping and
New Delhi. Mosocw regards Chi-
na's stand in this matter as a
reflection of narrow nationalism.
Moscow, too, has reaffirmed
the basic concepts of its for-
eign policy. In the same 17
April issue of Izvestia which
carried an account oche reso-
lutions and communique of the
NPC, a long article appeared
dealing with the practice of
"peaceful coexistence and inter-
national law," attacking Molotov
and Stalinism, and defending
Khrushchev's policy of "peace-
ful coexistence" between com-
munism and capitalism.
In other areas, differences
between the.two countries con-
tinue to appear. At the 14th
Soviet Komsomol Congress the Chi-
nese delegate, who was sitting
on the podium along with the
speaker, refused to applaud a
Soviet attack on Albania delivered
by the head of the Komsomol.
Furthermore, Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko arrived in Yugo-
slavia on 16 April to return
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popo-
vic's visit last year. The
Chinese continue to express
their enmity to that country
and its "revisionist" policies,
and Gromyko's visit thus was
made in complete disregard for
Chinese views.
At the same time, attempts
to rnuffle the controversy con-
tinue. The Soviet delegation
which arrived in Peiping on 13
April to complete negotiations
on trade "and other economic
matters" for 1962 is headed
by Minister of Foreign Trade
Patolichev and is about the
same level as last year's dele-
gation. The presence in the
delegation of a vice chair-
man from the Soviet State Com-
mittee for Foreign Economic
Relations and references to
"other economic matters" sug-
gest that the sharply cur-
tailed program of Soviet aid
to China is being discussed.
It is unlikely, however, that
any significant improvement in
this program will be negotiated.
The need for China to build an
"independent" national economy
was stressed to the congress
delegates.
Recent bloc trade pro-
nouncements indicate that
Soviet trade with China this
year is expected to drop
to less than $1.1 billion--
about half the peak year of
1959.
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%W Irowe
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Border Tension
Developments since the UN
Security Council passed its
resolution on 9 April condemn-
ing Israel's recent attack on
Syria appear to portend further
trouble along the border. On
10 April, Israel's Knesset, by
a 76-3 vote, categorically
rejected the Security Council
resolution and reasserted Is-
rael's right of self-defense
and its sovereignty over all
of Lake Tiberias. in a speech
introducing the motion, Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion strongly
criticized the United States,
which had cosponsored the UN
resolution, and General von
Horn of the UN Truce Super-
vision Organization (UNTSO) for
applying a "double standard"
in judging Israeli and Syrian
actions. The Israelis objected
to Von Horn's "inaccurate state-
ments" and "distortions" in his
report to the Security Council
on the border clashes.
Syrian fishing boats are
again operating on Lake Tiberias,
and the Israelis claim that Syr-
ian Army equipment has been
seen on the lake shore. The
Israelis have returned their
patrol boat to the lake and
have moved a limited number of
tanks and heavy equipment to-
ward the area. US Embassy of-
ficials in Tel Aviv are con-
vinced that Israel will launch
any new retaliatory operation
in greater force because of the
evident failure of the 16-17
March raid to intimidate the
Syrians.
The Israelis tend to iden-
tify Syrian shootings with at-
tempts to thwart implementation
of their plans to use the waters
of Lake Tiberias in their Jordan
River diversion project. The
chief question affecting the
border situation is what the
new Syrian regime intends to
do about Israel's scheme.
Meanwhile, three road
ambushes within the past week
in the Negev wasteland of south-
ern Israel have aggravated Israe-
li sensitivities about border
conditions. Isreal apparently
believes bedouin marauders are
responsible, and Jordan has in-
dicated it will cooperate in
efforts to control its border.
Syrian Cabinet
Syria's new transitional
cabinet, formed on 16 April,
is headed by a poltical non-
enity--Bashir al-Azmah, a
Syrian University Medical School
professor who served as UAR min-
ister of health from May 1959
to August 1960. Assemption of
the key Defense Ministry post
by army Chief of Staff Gen. Zahr
al-Din, paralleling the practice
during the Shishakli military
dictatorship from 1949 to 1954,
indicates that the army is the
final arbiter. The remainder of
the cabinet for the most part
is composed of leftist-inclined
technicians who will administer
their departments but will show
little initiative on policy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Although constituting a consid-
erable shift to the left, the
cabinet is anti-UAR.
Leftist pressure for cab-
inet representation has been
recognized by the appointment
of a majority of socialist-
minded ministers. Prominent
among them is pro-Baathist Ah-
mad al-Karim, a former army
colonel, as minister of social
affairs, labor, and agrarian
reform. This is an office from
which the Baath's socialistic
goals may be furthered and its
grass-roots strength augmented.
In pre-UAR Syria, Abd al-Karim
was a member of the Army's Rev-
olutionary Command Council, which
in cooperation with other left-
ist elements and the Communists,
pushed Syria into a strong pro-
Soviet posture. He served for
a time in the Syrian Region
cabinet during the UAR era as
minister of municipal and vil-
lage affairs.
Another leftist gain has
been the appointment of Abd al-
Halim Qaddur to the influential
post of minister of interior.
Qaddur, a Baathist parliamen-
tary deputy from 1954 to 1958,
dropped his party affiliation
after the union with Egypt and
became a strong Nasir supporter,
for which he was rewarded with
the governorship of Latakia
Province. There are indica-
tions that he may have returned
to Baathist allegiance. In any
case, he can be expected to fol-
low a leftist line in a ministry
which exerts considerable influ-
ence on the day-to-day affairs
of the country and can rig elec-
tions.
Defense Minister Zahr al-
Din may turn out to be a figure-
head for the military junta rul-
ing from behind the scenes.
Syrian chiefs of staff tradi-
tionally have not been strong men
Conservative elements ap-
pear to be in a minority, hold-
ing only three posts to the
socialists' seven. The only rank-
ing politician is Populist Rashad
Barmada, who is deputy premier
and minister of education and
agriculture. This is a consid-
ISRAELI - SYRIAN
BORDER AREA
Jordan River project: canal or
conduit to be completed by late
1963
\\\\\ Demilitarized Zone
s'~;. jjteriunean
GAZA
~STRI%~ NEGEV
DESERT
(Drained)
Pumping Station
(Under Construction)
enable. change from the Dawalibi
cabinet, with its reactionary
Moslem Brotherhood complexion,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Provisional Algerian
government (PAG) on 18 April
again publicly criticized French
failure to curb terrorism by
the Secret Army Organization
(OAS) against Moslems in Algiers
and Oran, and there are indica-
tions that Moslem restraint is
beginning to crack. The new
French cabinet's steps to move
immediately against the OAS--
including appointment of a new
commander in chief in Algeria--
are probably intended to reas-
sure the PAG. Plans to restore
order in Oran, the worst trouble
spot, may be difficult to imple-
ment, even with the reinforce-
ments being sent there.
Air Force Lieutenant Gen-
eral Michel Fourquet, the new
commander in Algeria, seems
to have been appointed primari-
ly because of his loyalty to
De Gaulle, both in implementing
France's NATO policy and during
the 1961 military insurrection
in Algeria, when he was named
air commander there in place
of a disloyal officer. Both
his relative youth--he is 47--
and the fact that the bulk of
French forces in Algeria are
army units may handicap his
effectiveness, at least initial-
ly.
A French Foreign Ministry
official told a US Embassy
representative on 18 April that,
despite blows sustained by the
OAS in the first weeks after
the cease-fire, the situationsin
Algiers and Oran last week had
shown considerable deterioration.
The French official noted that
the Moslem Force Locale is still
largely a paper organization,
and complained that effective
operation of the mixed armistice
commission is being delayed by
"political infighting" among
the rebels concerning their
representatives.
French officials, including
Minister for Algerian Affairs
Jox,e and ex-Delegate General
Morin, have for some time been
less optimistic about the
government's chances of putting
down the OAS in Oran than in
Algiers. High Commissioner
Fouchet reportedly admitted
this week that the government
had lost control of portions
of the city. The European
population of Oran, largely
of Spanish descent, is said to
have an even greater attach-
ment to the OAS than that of
Alg Lers .
The increased violence in Al-
geria began last weekend with a
general strike and other protest meas-
ures following the death sentence im-
posed on ex-General Jouhaud, num-
ber-two OAS leader and a native
of the Oran region. The govern-
ment's current drive to smash
the OAS, particularly in Oran,
may be adversely affected by
the obligatory review of Jouhaud's
sentence, which the superior
council of the magistracy will
begin examining on 24 April.
Eventually this will involve a
personal decision by De Gaulle
whether to exercise clemency.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ex-premier
eorges Bidault announced
to Paris newspapers last week
that a clandestine "National
Resistance Council" was being
set up in metropolitan France
by OAS. leader Salan.
The PAG, now meeting in
Tunis, is trying to reintegrate
Ben Bella and the other recently
liberated ministers into the
active Algerian leadership. A
power struggle could develop P
Ben Bella arrived in Tunis
on 14 April, after visits to
SECRET
Ben Khedda. At one point he
ignored both Ben Khedda and
Tunisian President Bourguiba
in order to embrace each mem-
ber of an Algerian National
Army (ALN) guard of honor.
Cairo, Baghdad, and Libya.
The US Embassy in Tunis reports
that he left no one in doubt
as to his dominant position
among Algerian leaders during
elaborate welcoming ceremonies
at the Tunis airport. In his
speech he stressed his inde-
pendent position by not refer-
ring in any way to the PAG,
the Evian accords, or premier
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The cabinet which France's
new premier, Georges Pompidou,
will present for investiture
soon after parliament reconvenes
on 24 April is basically similar
to Debre's in both personnel and
party representation. In view
of the close relationship be-
tween Pompidou and De Gaulle,
he President's grand strategy
will probably be loyally imple-
mented, but perhaps with more
flexibility than in the past
because Pompidou does not have
Debre's propensity for antagoniz-
ing people. Despite De Gaulle's
desire to allay parliamentary
opposition, early difficulties
with National Assembly opponents
of the growth of presidential
power are in prospect.
Approximately two thirds
of Pompidou's 29-member cabinet
--mostly holdovers--are from
the Gaullist Union for the New
Republic (UNR). The overall
orientation is slightly liberal-
ized, with the rightist UNR as-
sociate of Debre, Christian de
la Malene, giving way to the
"left-wing Gaullist" Gilbert
Grandval. The increased "Euro-
pean" influence of Popular Re-
publican leaders Pierre Pflimlin
and Maurice Schumann is somewhat
offset by the nomination to a
minor post of the leading UNR
publicist on European integra-
tion, Alain Peyrefitte, whose
ideas on the merits of confedera-
tion rather than federation seem
to reflect De Gaulle's own views.
Gaston Palewski, minister of
state in charge of scientific
research--which includes atomic
energy--opposed a national nu-
clear weapons program when he
held a similar position in 1955,
but he is a faithful Gaullist
and can be expected to adhere
to De Gaulle's wishes.
Pompidou is already under
fire from the leftist press
for his Rothschild connections.
French law permits him to retain
his business holdings,and this
will provide a continuing polit-
ical issue.
As a confidant of De Gaulle,
Pompidou has apparently deliber-
ately refrained from airing his
views on many subjects. Most
Minister of Ste -e in Charge
of Algerian Aflairs Louis Joae'
Minister of Ste -ein Charge
of Cultural Aft sirs
Minister of Sta a in Charge
of Overseas Departments
and Territories
Minister of Sta a in Charge
of Scientific Research and
Atomic and Space Questions =Pierre Guillaumat'
Minister of State in Charge
of Cooperariar
Minister Deleg sue to the
Prinno Mini. er'< OffiCe
CABINET ANNOUNCED
15 APRIL 1962
Georges Pompidou'
NO CHANGE
Minister Doing' ire to the Primo
Minister's Offi to for Relations
With Parliament Louis Terrenoire (UNR)
Pierre Pflimlin (MRP)
Maurice Schumann (MRP)
Roger Dusseaulx (UNR)
Minister for For Affairs _. Maurice Couve de Murville" _. g
Minister of the Interior Roger Froy (UNR)
Minister of Finsnce and
Economic Affairs Valery Giscard dVEstofng (Ind)_
Minister of Labor Paul Bacon (MRP)
Minister of Public Health
and Population Joseph Fontanel (MRP)
Minister of War Veterans and
War Victims - Raymond Triboulet (UNR)
Minister of Justice and
Keeper of the Seals Bernard Chaner'. Joan Foyer (UNR)
Minister of Pasts and
Telecommunicat ions Michel Maurice-Bokanowski (UNR) Jacques Marette (UNR)
Minister of Industry Jean-Marcel Jeannene Michel Maurice- Bokanowski (UNR
Minister of Edu-:otion Lucien Pierre Sudreau'
Secretary of Stare to
Prime Minister or
Information,.._ Christian de la Malene (UNR) Alain Peyrefitse (UNR)
Secretary of State to
the Prime Minis , far
Moslem Social Affairs
Secretary of Sta -e to rho
Prime Minister
ve s ftr Sahara,
O s Departments and
Territories _
Prime Minister for Civil
Service
Secretary of Stan for
Public Works
Secretary of Sto a for
External Trade ______
Secretory of Ste a for
Foreign Affairs Georges Gorse'.
Secretary of Stae for
Internal Commerce Francois Missaffe (UNR)
Secretary of Stale for
Repatriates Robert Boulin (UNR)
UNR - The Daulllst Union for the New Republic
Ind = Independent party
MRP =Popular Republican Movement
' Not affiliated with any party
Member of the Democratic Left, a Radical Socialist splinter
Member of the Democratic Union of Labor, a left-wing Gaullist group
Jean de Broglie (Ind)
Pierre Dumas (UNR)
Gilbert Grandval "'
STAT
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
observers agree that his eco-
nomic and social policy outlook
is considerably more liberal
than Debrd's and that he is
more wholeheartedly behind De
Gaulle's Algerian policy. His
attitudes toward NATO and Euro-
pean integration however, are
not well known
The Leopoldville negotia-
tions between Adoula and Tshombo
were recessed by the central gov-
ernment on 16 April. Adoula de-
parted by riverboat for a "rest"
tour of the provinces the follow-
ing day, and probably will not
return to Leopoldville before 24
April. UN representative Gardiner
has informed Tshomb6 that he ex-
pects talks to resume no later
than that date, and that Tshomb6
should come forth with concrete
proposals at that time.
vincial autonomy, he is prepared
to drop Katanga's claim to in-
dependence and to contribute to
the national treasury. Adoula,
in turn, came up with a consti-
tutional formula which, while
permitting Tshombo to retain
half of Katanga's mining rev-
enues, would centralize author-
ity at Leopoldville to a degree
unacceptable to Tshombo. Neither
party has shown a disposition for
serious bargaining. Gardiner has
said that fatigue has made Adoula
"irrational and irascible." 25X1
The central government's
pique at Tshomb6 was dramatized
by its action on 18 April in
physically blocking his departure
from Leopoldville airport. His
aircraft finally left for Elisa-
bethville on the morning of 19
April, after UN troops removed
fire trucks which had been placed
on the runway to prevent his de-
parture. His freedom of movement
had earlier been guaranteed by
the UN Command.
It is unclear whether Tshombo
--who charged Adoula with bad
faith in recessing the talks--
will seize upon Adoula's action
and upon the airport incident as
reasons for breaking off nego-
tiations. Back in Elisabethville,
he spoke disparagingly of the
central government, stating that
the talks had not been broken off,
because they had never seriously
started. The ill-advised attempt
to detain Tshomb6 reflects the
central government's sensitivity
to charges that Adoula is incapa-
ble of coping with the problem
of Katanga's secession.
As of 17 April, Adoula and
Tshomb6 appeared no closer to
agreement than when the talks
began on 18 March. Tshomb6 has
indicated vaguely that, in re-
turn for a high degree of pro-
There is increasing evidence
that Tshombo's month-long absence
from Elisabethville,"together with
the increasing frequency of inci-
dents involving UN and Katangan
troops, has increased tension in
southern Katanga. A spokesman
for Tshombe's Elisabethville sup-
porters has reportedly urged that
Tshombo return at the first oppor-
tunity in order to quiet anxiety
and reassert his leadership. Word
of rshombe's treatment at the Leo-
poldville airport may inflame his
supporters against the central
government. There is no assur-
ance, moreover, that the UN's in-
tervention on Tshombo's behalf will
materially alleviate the deep- 25X1
seated hostility between his sup-
porters and the UN Command.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Renewed demands by top
military leaders that Pres-
ident Guido take immediate steps
to ban the Peronistas from all
political activity and offices
may exert pressure on Argen-
tina's Chamber of Deputies to
speed up a decision on the key
problem of the Peronista elec-
toral victories. Action has
been delayed by divided opinion
within most political parties
and among the military, who
seem increasingly impatient as
the deadline for decision nears.
The Chamber has extended its
special session through 25
April. A Chamber committee is
to pass on the seating of newly
elected deputies by 26 April.
Elements of the Intransi-
gent Radical Civic Union (UCRI)
and the People's Radical Civic
Union (UCIP) have been
discussing a compromise formula
which would afford a solution
within constitutional bounds
and lessen the chance of vio-
lence which the Peronistas
threaten if banned from office
on 1 May
The formula calls for the
192-man Chamber of Deputies
to seat the 47 new Peronista
deputies and for the Peronistas
to agree to the federal govern-
ment's taking control of the
nine provinces where neo-Peron-
istas won the governorships.
Such federal intervention in
the provinces is permitted by
the constitution under the ex-
isting state of siege, but only
the Chamber of Deputies can
rule on its own membership. The
UCRI and UCRP, which now dom-
inate congress, do not wish to
alienate possible future Peron-
ista support by banning the
Peronista deputies. Moreover,
they consider these deputies
no real threat because, despite
electoral losses, the two par-
ties will still outnumber the
Peronistas after 1 May--the
UCRI with 74 seats and the UCRP
with 56.
Differences over the Peron-
ista question have delayed ac-
tion in the lower house on the
proposed amendments to the law
on presidential succession
which would permit President
Guido to complete Frondizi's
term and to postpone elections
until late 1963. The Senate,
which passed the amendments
by a 35 to 0 vote, could over-
ride any Chamber modifications
by a two-thirds vote and pass
the bill into law, according
to UCRI Vice President Lebrero.
Lebrero's expectation of Cham-
ber approval after Easter is
supported by a UCRI position
paper whose nine points on
necessary political steps would
allow room for negotiating the
compromise formula. The pro-
posals include the establish-
ment of proportional represen-
tation and measures against
totalitarianism--laws which
the armed forces have been de-
manding.
The Peronistas have in
the past suggested a variation
of the compromise formula.
They requested federal inter-
vention in all the provinces
where elections were held on
18 March, in order to make it
appear that such action was not
directed exclusively at the
Peronistas. In the meantime,
however, Peronista labor lead-
ers have put their followers
on alert for a general strike
on 2 May. The armed forces
have already strengthened se-
curity measures to deal with
possible trouble.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
P u Kho
Muarm
Kp
,y
"f ' VIENTIANE
Ban Hin
P 13
{}{Ph Tc,
/
hel~ne
V nnaAhet Muong
V
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uei Save t-_'~R.
L A O S
Government forces - Road
25X1 Meo operational areas --- Trail
- Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North Q Route number
1-.~ Vietnamese forces
SA
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S' AAVANC
a^aVa7-
departure from Phoumi's pre-
vious inflexibility, his alleged
interest in such a solution
may be only a gesture at
reasonableness designed to
ease Western pressure and shift
to Xieng Khouang the onus for
blocking a settlement. Neither
Souvanna nor Souphannouvong
has found previous "king's
solutions" acceptable, and with-
out their acquiescence, Savang's
willingness to play such a
direct role remains doubtful.
Vientiane leaders are
continuing preparations for
dispatching "friendship mis-
sions" to various Asian na-
tions in an effort to solicit
support. A mission is sched-
uled to visit Thailand from
24 to 26 April, and South
Vietnam the following week.
The host nations--most of them
heavily dependent on the US
for economic and military
aid--are unlikely to provide
more than moral encouragement
to the Vientiane leaders.
The siege of Nam Tha by
anti-government forces con-
tinues. Elsewhere--north of
Vientiane and near the south-
ern towns of Saravane and
Attopeu--Kong Le/Pathet Lao
units have engaged in probing
actions against government
positions. Meo guerrillas
of the Vientiane government
have continued their harass-
ment of enemy units in north-
eastern Laos.
The Chinese Communists
apparently are continuing
work on the road from Meng
La in Yunnan Province to
Phony; Saly. From the Chi-
nese border the road now is
basically complete as far as
Muong; Yo, some 20 miles south-
west of Phong Saly. 25X1
F_ F
SECRET
Vientiane leaders are con-
tinuing their efforts to de-
velop an alternative solution
to a Souvanna-led government.
Sisouk na Champassak, acting
foreign minister in the Vien-
tiane government, has outlined
to Ambassador Brown a new pro-
posal which he said had "in-
trigued" General Phoumi. It
calls for King Savang to as-
sume direct control of th- gov-
ernment, with Souvanna, Souphan-
nouvong,,.and Boun Oum serving
as vice premiers. The cabinet
would be composed of an eight-
member neutralist center group
flanked by two four-member
wings representing the Vien-
tiane and Pathet Lao factions.
Sisouk claimed that Phoumi had
evinced a willingness to let
Souvanna and another neutral-
ist control the posts of de-
fense and interior.
While this proposal would
seem to indicate a significant
Ou Neu
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20 Apr 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 15 of 25
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ETHIOPIA - SOMALI REPUBLIC
Relations between Ethiopia
and the Somali Republic, always
strained because of religious,
cultural, and tribal differences,
have sunk to a dew low following
several weeks of vitriolic propa-
ganda broadcasts. The rising
tension has increased the like-
lihood of fighting between
Somali nomads and Ethiopian
villagers which might be used
by an Ethiopian troop commander
as an occasion to strike at
Somali targets across the border.
Top government officials in
both states appear to recognize
the danger and to be trying to
control forces in the border
areas.
The tension stems largely
from the recent actions of
Somali Premier Abdirascid. Faced
with a parliamentary crisis, the
premier stirred up nationalist
support by demanding the union
of all ethnic Somalis with
Mogadiscio--particularly those
in Kenya and Ethiopia. Having
STAT
SECRE
wo:i his parliamentary victory,
Abdirascid is likely to taper off
the incendiary broadcasts. On
10 April be reportedly charged
that Ethiopia was massing troops
on the border and appealed to UN
Acting Secretary General Thant
to intervene. On 13 April,
Under Secretary Bunche denied
that the UN had received any
such request, but he added that
Thant would be willing to do
"whatever he can."
Somalia's ground forces are
inferior to Ethiopia's, and
Mogadiscio lacks fighter air-
craft .
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INEC ii law
The deaths of four stu-
dents following a clash on 12
April with military police has
led to a renewal of the polit-
ical crisis that nearly forced
President Ydigoras' resigna-
tion during the antigovernment
rioting in mid-March. Some
professional and labor groups
and the opposition-controlled
municipal council of Guatemala
City have joined in the demand,
issued by the three main anti-
Communist opposition parties
on 14 April, that Ydigoras re-
sign.
In an address broadcast
late on 15 April Ydigoras re-
jected the demand, but his con-
ciliatory tone and the conces-
sions he offered suggest that
he regards the present threat
to his regime as more serious
than last month's crisis. He
promised that he will soon
change his cabinet to assure
good government during the re-
maining two years of his term,
a promise which many Guatemalans
will probably regard as tacit
admission of the charges of
corruption and ineptness which
have, with considerable justi-
fication, been leveled against
his administration.
Ydigoras also announced
that he would postpone the visit
to the United States he had
planned for late this month
and early May. In another
move possibly suggestive of
his concern, Ydigoras sent his
two children and their families
out of the country on 16 April.
The present antigovernment
campaign is spearheaded by a
loose alliance of the main op-
position parties: the moderate
leftist and anti-Communist Revo-
lutionary party, the small Chris-
tian Democratic party, and the
rightist National Liberation
Movement. Their tactics are
based on the recognition that,
in the final analysis, the
armed forces will determine
whether or not Ydigoras is
forced to resign. Opposition
leaders now appear to believe--
probably accurately--that the
armed forces will not weaken
in their support for the Pres-
ident until and unless convinced
that Ydigoras has lost popular
support.
However, if these leaders
encourage radically inclined
students to engage in further
demonstrations which might
spread and provide the military
with the "proof" of Ydigoras'
unpopularity, they take the
chance of unleashing serious
violence from which the Com-
munists would benefit. Com-
munist and Communist-influenced
groups are probably trying to
gain the initiative from the
anti-Communist parties in the
antigovernment struggle. While
Communist and Communist-in-
fluenced guerrilla activity has
subsided since last month, it
could be resumed at any time.
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SWMW' JL-LK1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The presidential election
set for 29 April is the cul-
mination of efforts by an army-
backed reform group to give El
Salvador a constitutional gov-
ernment committed to social
and economic improvement. Re-
forms are urgently needed in
overpopulated El Salvador, where
the gulf between rich and poor
is probably greater than in any
other Latin American country.
free the election may be--are
boycotting it on the grounds
that it will be government
rigged.
The reform group, now led
by Col. Julio Rivera, has been
in power since January 1961,
when junior army officers
removed a Communist-influenced
junta which, with the help of
ex-President Oscar Osorio, had
ousted President Lemus in Octo-
ber 1960. The Rivera group
rapidly initiated reforms to
benefit the peasants and to
establish government control
in the complex and powerful
coffee company and Central
Bank, both instruments of
wealthy power. It also created
the powerful National Concilia-
tion party (PCN) and last De-
cember held legislative elections
considered the freest in Salva-
doran history. The PCN candi-
dates won all 54 seats in the
assembly, which has revised the
constitution and installed a
provisional government. The
41-year-old Rivera now is the
PCN presidential nominee.
As election day approaches,
the PCN's overwhelming popular-
ity has become a liability.
All the opposition parties--
convinced that they have no
chance against Rivera, however
the
US a ac believes Rivera
retains strong support among the
active military forces and the
peasants, and it seems likely
that he will take office as
scheduled on 1 July for a five-
year term.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President Arosemena contin-
ues ulider heavy pressure from
both rightist military men and
extreme leftists.
Since December the leaders
of the armed forces have threat-
ened to depose Arosemena unless
he meets their demands--that he
break with Cuba and that he ex-
pel the "Communists" from the
national government and some
provincial offices. They have
not named specific individuals,
but apparently include in their
demand all leftists and even
some nonleftist officials who
press strongly for social re-
forms. Arosemena on 1 April
discharged from his cabinet two
non-Communist leftists as well
as two conservatives who opposed
the Alliance for Progress re-
forms he is pushing. Their re-
placements in turn have fired
a number of leftists, but many
suspect subordinate officials
remain in all ministries.
The seventh congress of
the Ecuadorean Communist party
(PCE), early in March, resolved
to abandon "peaceful" political
action and to prepare for "Castro-
type" guerrilla warfare. The
abortive revolt of 5-6 April
apparently was staged by the
Communist-front Union of Revo-
lutionary Youth (URJE), which
the PCE has in the past used as
shock troops in street fighting.
This rising appeared to be the
result of URJE impatience rather
than part of coordinated PCE
plans, which call for simul-
taneous outbreaks near several
key rural crossroads.
Leaders of both the PCE
and the URJE disappeared from
their headquarters in the major
cities shortly after the an-
nouncement of the diplomatic
break with Cuba on 2 April.
Most of them are still at large
and have vowed to continue the
struggle until the Arosemena
government is replaced by a pro-
Communist administration.
Arosemena has prepared a
comprehensive reform program
for presentation to congress
after the elections in June;
meanwhile, he is pushing ahead
with certain measures--such as
the agrarian census--which can
be accomplished by executive
action. However, guerrilla
tactics by the PCE and URJE
will. force the military leaders
to take stronger measures for
ECUADOR
Manta
QUEVEDO
LATACUNGA
MSATO
Salinas
of violence'
\~,Scene'
(5-6 April 1962)
~
SANTO DOMINGO QUITO,
de los COLORADOS
m Site of planned communist guerrilla
activity
-- Road
- Railroad
maintenance of internal security, 25X1
and they may renew their threats
against Arosemena.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
Khrushchev, who was 68
years old this week, appears to
be in generally fair health,
but there are signs that advanc-
ing age and the rigors of high
office have begun to slow him
down.
The other leaders carry on
quietly during Khrushchev's ex-
tended absences from Moscow,
and as yet there has not been
any noticeable increase in polit-
ical maneuvering within the party
presidium in preparation for a
succession crisis. Khrushchev
himself gives every indication
of being in full command; spec-
ulation that he is still involved
in a fight to maintain his posi-
tion seems to be unfounded.
However, there probably continue
to be disagreements within the
hierarchy over such questions
as the proportion of economic
resources that should be devoted
to consumer goods and the
pace and extent of liberaliza-
tion in the wake of renewed at-
tacks against Stalin.
When Khrushchev is away from
the capital, party secretary
Kozlov and Deputy Premier Kosygin
seem to have the primary "care-
taker" responsibilities for
party and government affairs,
respectively. Kozlov, however,
does not receive the preferential
treatment that might be expected
for someone who has been desig-
nated first lieutenant and
eventual successor.
likely.
It is still unclear how
some of the responsibilities
at the top are being divided
since the personnel shifts
at the party congress in Octo-
ber. This is particularly
true in the ideological and
propaganda fields, with Suslov,
Kuusinen, Ilichev, and Pono-
marev now all members of the
party secretariat. Friction
and jockeying in this area seem
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET ECONOMY IN FIRST QUARTER 1962
Soviet industry continues
to perform at a high tempo,with
rates of increase little
changed from a year ago, ac-
cording to a TASS summary of
the first quarter economic re-
sults. Industrial output re-
portedly increased over 9 per-
cent, well above the pace needed
to achieve the objective of the
Seven-Year Plan (1951-65). The
5-percent increase in industrial
productivity, although still be-
low both the planned rate for
1962 and the Seven-Year Plan
rate, marks some improvement
over 1961. Investment and con-
struction data, which during
1961 indicated possible future
difficulties for the economy,
are not included in the first-
quarter summaries.
Of the major industrial
sectors reported, only the
machine-building and metalwork-
ing industry showed a drop in
the rate of increase compared
with a year ago. The change,
however, was slight, and the
sector is advancing at a rate
well above plan.
Basic industrial commodi-
ties cited continued the general
trend. Crude steel was the ex-
ception. Although the reported
7.4-percent increase is approx-
imately adequate in terms of the
Seven-Year-Plan goal, it is
somewhat below the rate of in-
crease planned for 1962. While
there is no reason to believe
that the lag cannot be made up
during the remainder of the
year, the performance of the
first three months does reflect
difficulties which the industry
faces in installing new facil-
ities and modernizing existing
plants. Of 17 open-hearth fur-
naces to be completed by the
end of 1961, only 13 were in
operation by the first of this
March. Planning, technological,
and equipment-manufacturing dif-
ficulties will continue to ham-
per expansion of the industry
and achievement of the improved
quality and variety of steel-
mill. products desired by Soviet
planners.
Despite considerable atten-
tion and effort on the part of
the Soviet leadership to im-
prove lagging agriculture--
seconded in recently announced
May Day slogans which label
farming a "shock front" of "all
the people"--there is nothing
in the quarterly report which
as yet suggests priority allo-
cation of resources to agricul-
ture. Agricultural machinery
was produced in the first quar-
ter at a rate considerably short
of the 1962 plan, although grain-
combine production, the only
equipment item specified, was
approximately on schedule.
Production of "some 4 million
tons" of chemical fertilizer
constituted only modest prog-
ress. Eventually both machin-
ery and fertilizer production
will have to be increased much
more rapidly if Khrushchev's
new program for planting mil-
lions of acres of beans, peas,
and corn on land formerly cul-
tivated in a grass-rotation
program is to succeed.
Indications of the future
of consumer welfare were mixed,
but in general there has been
little beyond the slight upward
trend of recent years. Output
of refrigerators and washing
machines was approximately on
schedule,; but production of con-
sumer durables in general is
still far from meeting demand.
Cotton fabrics production did
not increase at all over the
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'ilikIl 13 M "I , Ill
GENERAL
INDICATORS
(percentage increase)
Industrial Production
Industrial Productivity
FIRST
QUARTER
1961
nearly
9
3+
FIRST
QUARTER
1962
9+
5
FIRST
QUARTER
FIRST
QUARTER
PERCENTAGE
INCREASE
(million metric tons)
Petroleum
39.1
43.7
11.7
(million metric tons)
Gas
15.2
19.9
30
(billion cubic meters)
Electric Power
72.7
81.9
12.6
(billion kilowatt hours)
1962 ANNUAL % INCREASE
ANNUAL NEEDED FOR
PLAN 1965 GOAL
8.1
5.6
1962 ANNUAL ANNUAL % INCREASE
PLAN PERCENTAGE NEEDED FOR
INCREASE 1965 GOAL
first quarter of 1961, possibly
reflecting the unwillingness of
the regime to allocate addition-
al labor to the industry after
the shift of Soviet workers to
a shorter workweek in 1960-61,
or some effects of agricultural
difficulties. The output of
woolen fabrics increased some-
what but is below the Seven-
Year-Plan rate.
A seeming hopeful sign
for the Soviet consumer was the
claimed 21-percent increase over
1961 in meat production at state
slaughterhouses, but this in-
crease is misleading: production
during the first quarter last
year was particularly depressed--
only 87 percent of production
during the first quarter of 1960.
However, there are indications--
pri:narily, larger herds--that to-
tal meat production in 1962
should increase somewhat above STAT
the level at which it has re-
mained for the past three years.
The livestock feed supply, how-
ever, remains the critical fac-
tor. Khrushchev's new crop
program is intended to bring
about a rapid improvement here,
but its success will of course 25X1
be :Largely dependent on the
nature of the growing season.
SOVIET BLOC OIL EXPORTS
The Soviet bloc exported
more than 30 million tons of
crude oil and petroleum prod-
ucts, valued at about $500,000,-
000, to nonbloc countries last
year. This quantity is a 25-
percent increase over 1960.
About 26 million tons--or 85
percent--of the bloc's total
1961 oil exports were supplied
by the USSR, a share similar
to that provided in 1960. Ru-
mania accounted for almost 3
million tons.
All the crude oil--more
than half the total exports--
originated in the USSR. Soviet
crude exports in 1961 were 6
million tons above those in
1960, reflecting the more rapid
growth of production relative
to refining capacity.
Exports by the bloc in 1961
filled about 3 percent of total
nonbloc demand for petroleum.
More than two thirds of these
exports went to Western Euro-
pean countries, which as a group
met about 9 percent of their
consumption needs with bloc oil.
Bloc: oil shipments to Africa,
Asia, and Latin America are
growing, largely as a result of
extensive imports by Egypt,
Japan, and Cuba.
Italy imported over 6.6
million tons of bloc petroleum,
or about 23 percent of its to-
tal domestic requirement; more
than a million tons of this
petroleum, however, was refined
for eventual re-export to other
countries. Similarly, about
600,000 tons of the more than
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Nor, 41111110
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BLOC OIL EXPORTS IN 1961
Belgium/Luxembourg
515
6
Afghanistan
50
France
984
3
Inciia
173
Germany
2,791
6
Japan
2
681
Greece
1,128
45
Bur ma
,
21
Italy
6,628*
N.A.
fatal
2,925
Netherlands
1,190**
negl
UK
117
negl.
Denmark
234
4
Iceland
u
340
92
Argentina
15
aegl
Port
gal
10
1
Brazil
44A
negl
Norway,
3306
8
3,932
.
100
Turkey
39
2
4
2
Switzerland
Austria
50
1
050***
1
34
Total
5
4,41
Sweden
,
2,461
19
Spain
77
1
Finland
2,310
88
Yugoslavia (Trieste)
68
4
Total
20,298
*Includes crude ail to be refined For re-export on-, third-cousitry
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
accounts.
Algeria
G
i
M
li
59
3
**Includes oil transshipped to other countries in Euro
e
u
nea/
a
93
N.A.
p
.
Morocco
T
isi
122
12
***Net imports of petroleum from the Bloc were 300,000 tons.
Austria shipped a total of 750
000 tons of crude oil to Poland
un
a
E
59
12
,
,,
Hungary, E. Germany
and Czechoslovakia on the USSR account i
gypt
S
i
2,239
45
,
n
1961, as part of Austrian reparation deliveries made to the USSR
yr
a
253
23
.
Yemen
4
14
Total
2,841
1.7 million tons of crude and
products delivered to ports in
the Netherlands were trans-
shipped directly to other coun-
tries in Europe--chiefly West
Germany; the rest entered the
country in bond and probably was
delivered to other European
countries.
The USSR continues to stim-
ulate oil sales through barter
agreements with the developed
countries. With the industri-
alized countries, the USSR ex-
changes petroleum for capital
goods. The Soviet trade agree-
ment with Italy, for example,
provides for the sale of pe-
troleum in exchange for large-
diameter pipe and pipeline
equipment.
Prices for Soviet petroleum
are generally lower than world
market prices. In several in-
stances, however, the USSR,
after it had gained a market
in an area, began to raise
prices to correspond more close-
ly to existing market prices.
Under 1962 contracts with im-
porters in West Germany, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands, the
prices of gasoline, gas oil,
and heavy heating fuel were
about $2.00 a ton over those
in ].961. Similarly, in recent
negotiations with Swedish im-
porters, Moscow indicated it
planned to raise prices.
Agreements with the chief
nonbloc importers of Soviet oil
suggest that bloc petroleum
exports will rise again this
year, possibly by as much as
10 percent to a new peak of
33 mullion tons. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ne Win's military regime,
now in its second month, has
moved to replace all elective
bodies by appointed officials
responsive directly to central
government orders. Parliament,
the state governments, and most
municipal administrations have
been dissolved, and the inde-
pendent Judiciary replaced by
an appointed court whose tenure
depends on government approval.
Few national policies have yet
been changed, but the government
is emphasizing discipline, ef-
ficiency, and austerity--quali-
ties notably lacking in Burma
under civilian rule.
The government itself has
emerged as largely a one-man
organization. With the ex-
ception of Brigadier Aung Gyi,
Ne Win's second-in-command, the
subordinates in the Union Revo-
lutionary Council (URC) are weak
men lacking the willingness to
challenge his decisions. Ne
Win is a narrow nationalist with
a suspicious conspiratorial out-
look, a short temper, and a
tendency toward snap decisions.
These factors give an unpredict-
able quality to the course of
future government policies. Ap-
parently distrusting all foreign
nongovernmental activities, Ne
Win has ordered the Asia Founda-
tion and the Ford Foundation to
wind up their activities.
The URC has invited the
civilian political parties to
rally to its support, but so
far only the Communist-dominated
National United Front has
complied. Other parties, fear-
ful of being too closely identi-
fied with unpopular authori-
tarianism, apparently intend
to remain silent until the
regime has proven itself.
In the economic field the
government, aside from rescind-
ing U Nu's unpopular order na-
tionalizing the import trade
and, by indirection, driving
down food prices, has taken
little action. It is, like
all previous regimes in Burma,
dedicated to the development
of a socialist system in which
the private sector is assured
a role.
For the future, the chief
danger to Western interests in
Burma is that, despite its
pledge to a neutral foreign
policy, the No Win regime may
drift unintentionally toward
closer association with the
bloc. Although its members are
anti.-Communist and fear ulti-
mate Chinese domination of
Burma, they also admire Chinese
discipline. Moreover, if their
only civilian political support
continues to come from the pro-
Communist NUF, they may recip-
rocate by building it up as
the country's national party.
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aZt.,r%r_d,1 1400
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The formation of a major-
Conservatives and to mollify
ity government in Finland under the Soviets
Ahti Karjalainen, 39-year-old
foreign minister in the previous
Agrarian minority cabinet and
a protege of President Kekkonen,
provides the broadly based gov-
ernment which Kekkonen has de-
sired. The new cabinet, which
controls 112 of the 200 seats
in parliament, consists of Agrar-
ians, Conservatives, Liberals,
representatives of the Swedish
People's party, and three extra-
parliamentary ministers from
the Communist-influenced Cen-
tral Confederation of Trade
Unions (SAK).
Kekkonen was overwhelmingly
endorsed by the electorate in
the January presidential and
February parliamentary elections.
He has, however, wanted a ma-
jority government in order to
demonstrate clearly--particu-
larly to Moscow--that his pol-
icy of good relations with the
USSR is firmly supported in
parliament as well as to make
the cabinet less subject to
pressure on domestic issues.
He called for SAK participation
in order to counterbalance the
FINNISH PARLIAMENT
(FOLLOWING FEBRUARY 1962 ELECTIONS)
,or
5001111. DEMOCRATIC
DEMOCRATIC AGRARIAN PARTY PEG
AAi
i s3
1.1 38 _ Fq
UIEIALS
DEMOCRATIC 13 LIREIAL
OPPOSITION UNION
200 SEATS
However, the three SAK
ministers are Opposition Social
Democrats (Skogists) and not
Communists. By having SAK in-
cluded, Kekkonen can counteract
any claims by the Communist-
front Finnish People's Demo-
cratic League (SKDL), the sec-
ond largest party in parliament,
that labor's interests are be-
ing ignored.
SAK participation in the
government will impede reunion
prospects for the regular Social
Democrats and the Opposition
Social Democrats. The latter
lost most of their parliamen-
tary seats in the February elec-
tions and hence might otherwise
be disposed to patch up the old
quarrel. The regular Social
Democrats are still distrusted
by the USSR, and Kekkonen is
determined to keep them impo-
ternt and outside the government
until the party purges its lead-
ership.
labor's interests.
The formation of this ma-
jority government further con-
solidates Kekkonen's control of
Finland's political life and
foreign relations. Neverthe-
less, there are elements of
weakness in the new government
because of strains and ill will
between the dominant Agrarians
and the more conservative par-
ties in the coalition. The SAK
representatives, moreover, will
be under pressure from the con-
trolling radical elements in
their organization to pursue such
aggressive policies as will dom- 25X1
onstrate their protection of STAT
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Now
SECRET
SPECIAL ARTICLES
With the cessation on 30
March of scheduled Soviet mil-
itary transport flights in the
Berlin air corridors and Control
Zone, the USSR ended-- temporar-
ily, at least--its latest chal-
lenge to Western air access.
Soviet use of the corridors,
beginning on 8 February, was
a carefully calculated probe
of the West's determination to
maintain the sole remaining
means of access not subject to
some degree of Communist con-
trol. Broadly speaking, the
USSR was attempting to create
a situation which would support
Moscow's ultimate objective of
changing the postwar status of
Berlin and gaining at least de
facto Western recognition of
the East German regime.
In seeking to alter the
existing arrangements in the
Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC)
and flight procedures in the
corridors, Moscow attempted to
establish its?"right," osten-
sibly by agreement with the
East Germans, to use the air-
ways to Berlin on a basis of
complete equality with the West
and to underline its contention
that all access to the divided
city is by Communist sufferance.
In this way, the Soviets hoped
to supersede the original pur-
pose of the three air corridors
as channels for unrestricted
Western access and to bring air
access procedures more into
line with those governing
ground access. The flights
were staged in such a way as
to make the corollary demands
which the Soviet element in
BASC was making for changes in
traffic control procedures ap-
pear reasonable or, where
necessary, to force Western
acquiescence to those demands
in the interest of "flight
safety."
Cautious Approach
There is no evidence that
Moscow intended to provoke a
serious incident. The flights
took place during the midwinter
lull in air passenger travel to
Berlin, when the three Western
commercial carriers which op-
erate in the corridors--Pan Amer-
ican, British European Airways,
and Air France--annually cut back
their regularly scheduled flights.
From the outset on 7 February--
when the Soviet controllers at
BASC "reserved" for three and a
half hours the following day all
altitudes in the southern corri-
dor up to 7,000 feet, below the
level normally flown by the com-
mercial carriers--the Soviet
flights were designed to mini-
mize the risk of incidents. They
were flown at altitudes below
those favored by Western commer-
cial carriers, or according to
"flight plans" filed in BASC by
the Soviets far enough in advance
to pre-empt use of certain alti-
tudes normally used by commer-
cial flights.
When conflicts in schedul-
ing did occur, the Soviet con-
trollers refused to signify
their willingness to guarantee
the safety of the Western flight
in question, and in practice the
three Western carriers vacated
the contested altitude in favor
of the Soviet flights. This,
together with time and altitude.
separation between planes in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the corridors, tended to lessen
the likelihood of collisions
between the Soviet transports
and the faster moving Western
civil and military aircraft.
At all timesthe Soviet con-
trollers in BASC maintained
telephone contact with their
headquarters at Karlshorst and
presumably arranged to exchange
pertinent flight information
with the East German traffic
control center at Schoenefeld
airfield south of Berlin.
Later, however, the Soviets
did seek to monopolize the area
in which they flew by spacing a
relatively few low-performance
transport aircraft at altitudes
and times which could have posed
a hazard to Western flights
between 7,000 and 10,000 feet.
Flight Patterns
There seems to have been
little day-to-day consistency
to Soviet flights, although
generally the Soviets seem to
have flown under optimum weather
conditions, when visual flight
rules were in effect; on at least
two days, unfavorable weather
probably contributed to cancel-
lation of their flights at the
last moment. They flew four
transports in the northern cor-
ridor during the hours of dark-
ness for the first time on 16
March, scheduled evening flights
only twice after that, and
canceled such flights on 30
March.
Training flights by Soviet
tactical bombers, fighters, and
transports near and across the
Berlin air corridors above and
below the altitudes normally used
by Western planes are routine.
Before 8 February, however, Soviet
flights through the corridors--
even at those lower altitudes
which are used rarely and only
as a matter of convenience by
Western flights--had not been
noted for several years. During
the period 8-20 February, the
Soviets seven times "reserved"
all altitudes up to 7,000 feet
in the central corridor and
7,500 feet in the northern cor-
ridor, and the Soviet control-
lers at BASC refused to provide
the Western controllers with
detailed information on specific
flights. It is not clear how
many transports or other Soviet
aircraft were active in the
corridors during this period,
although there is evidence
that transports did fly on at
least two occasions.
At the same time, non-
hostile identification passes
by Soviet fighters against
Western aircraft--noted occa-
sionally in the past--increased
markedly, becoming particularly
aggressive on 15 February when
Western pilots reported "near
misses" and a Soviet fighter
signaled an Allied transport
to land in East Germany.
Late on 15 February, the
ch:Lef Soviet controller in BASC
demanded that henceforth all
civil flight plans be filed 24
hours in advance and include
estimated times for crossing
the East - West German inter-
zonal border, and that Western
planes not deviate from the al-
titudes submitted in their flight
plans. To underline these
demands, which implied that
Western flights were subject
to Soviet and/or East German
authorization, the Soviet BASC
controllers began that evening
to refuse to initial southern-
corridor flight plans which did
not contain estimated border
crossing times. This refusal
still applies to this corridor,
for which the US BASC controllers
area responsible.
On 16 February, the Soviets,
perhaps uncertain as to what
the Western response to their
new demands would be and mind-
ful that further "near misses"
in the corridors could lead to a
serious incident or the use of
armed escorts for Western com-
mericial flights, canceled their
"reservations" for the day with
the comment that they had com-
pleted that phase of their oper-
ations in the corridors.
The following day, the So-
viet Foreign Ministry responded
to 'Western protests over the
corridor flights by asserting that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OVIET?
r2 2 ? BERLIN POLAND
A.IR aCQ?N7ROL ZONE`
r. ~r `~?SRLIN
Auk dmPfy+c` t 1 '.
Z. Mle~ endoFf~
tjllkmersdorf ~~,
BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR ACTIVITY
8 February ? 29 March 1962
SOVIET
Flights conducted Flights conducted Flights conducted
below 7000'/7500' between 7000'/10OOB' any single day
WESTERN --
Daily Western ' it flights Cane-way)
lea al 30 March 1'9621
O Soviet Military Transport Base
? Soviet Tactical Fighter Base
I Boundaries are not necessarily those
25X1 recegnaed by the U.S. Government.
there are no "documents" which
give the Allies unrestricted
air access to Berlin or the
right to control flights. within
the corridors. The note main-
tained that Soviet corridor
flights were provided for by
bilateral Soviet - East German
agreements and not governed by
the rules of the Berlin Air
Safety Center. The note im-
plied that the Soviets partic-
ipated in BASC only as a means
of preserving flight safety,
and it seemed to raise the pos-
sibility that they would with-
draw from the center if the
Allies failed to meet their
demands.
New Phase
Soviet corridor operations
entered a second phase on 19
February, when the Soviet con-
trollers in BASC supplied
"flight information" or "plans"
for transport flights to take
place the next day. Since
there were no legal grounds
for V+restern objection to So-
viet flights for which "plans"
were filed, the next step was
for the Soviets to increase
gradually the number and ex-
tent of their corridor opera-
tions to the point where they
were again pre-emptin whole
blocks of airspace.
Flight Statistics
The Soviets filed "plans"
for and carried out military
transport flights in one or
more of the three corridors
for several hours a day on
27 occasions in six weeks.
However, it was not until
12 March, when the Soviets sent
four transports through the
southern corridor, that they
operated in the altitudes re-
served by usage to Western
commercial flights, Subsequently
they flew as many as six trans-
ports at a time at altitudes
above 7,000 feet on six days.
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