CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003600050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO, 6,
OCI NO. 0415/62
4 May, 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA review(s) State Dept. review
completed. completed
SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 May 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 3 May)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR's relatively moderate reaction to US atmos-
pheric nuclear testing reflects both Moscow's desire to
maintain a favorable atmosphere for the US-Soviet negotia-
tions on Berlin and its apparent intention to launch its
own new series of tests. This restraint was also prompted
by the unwillingness of the eight neutral delegations at
Geneva to withdraw from the disarmament conference or to
support Soviet maneuvers to call a special session of the
UN General Assembly to deal with US -testing. Soviet spokes-
men continue to present an optimistic outlook for a Berlin
agreement.
SOVIET PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 3
Last week's central committee meeting reversed action
taken at the 22nd party congress last fall by returning
Andrey Kirilenko to the party presidium and dropping from
the party secretariat Ivan Spiridonov, long considered a
protege of party secretary Frol Kozlov. This development,
which appears to reflect maneuvering among Khrushchev's
lieutenants, raises the question as to the degree of
Khrushchev's support for Kozlov. There have been no
other signs, however, of a threat to Kozlov's position
as front-runner to succeed Khrushchev.
THE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The first public disclosure of a, special high-level
government agency which has been handling foreign economic
problems and the initiation of formal moves to draft a new
constitution for the USSR marked the session of the USSR's
Supreme Soviet (parliament) which met 23-25 April
ALGERIA . . .
Economic distress among Moslems in Algerian cities and
the threat of epidemics in overcrowded Moslem quarters are
dangerously increasing Moslem exasperation over French
failure to halt terrorism by the Secret Army Organization.
The provisional Algerian government has again publicly
charged Paris with responsibility for Moslem deaths re-
sulting from the terrorism, while the uncertainty surround-
ing the fate of French soldiers presumed to have been
prisoners of the Algerian National Army has aroused the
press and public in France.
THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION . .
. . . Page 8
Premier Pompidou received less support than anticipated
for the program he presented to the National Assembly on
27 April. Trouble for the government is foreshadowed par-
ticularly by the overwhelming sentiment evidenced by the
deputies for closer European political integration than
De Gaulle favors; even some elements In the cabinet criticize
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 May 1962
De Gaulle on this point. Nevertheless, the deputies will
probably not try to bring down the government as long as
the Algerian situation remains France's chief preoccupa-
tion.
. . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Phoumi now says he is prepared to negotiate "seriously"
with Souvanna Phouma on the question of relinquishing the
key defense and interior posts to Souvanna's neutralist
group. He indicates he will not go forward, at least during
May, with his scheme for putting King Savang at the head of
a coalition government. Phoumi's apparently more concilia-
tory attitude probably is inspired largely by Thai advice
to accommodate to US policy. On the military side, there
have been widespread skirmishes, and larger scale fighting
could break out with little warning.
. . Page 10
Communist military activity continues at a high rate,
and there has been some increase in sabotage, terrorism,
and propaganda. South Vietnam's relations with Cambodia
have again been severely strained as a result of a recent
raid on a South Vietnamese border town allegedly carried
out from Cambodia. Saigon and Seoul have agreed on plans
for a mission of South Korean military experts to go to
South Vietnam in mid-May.
. Page 11
Resumption of the Dutch-Indonesian talks appears in-
creasingly remote. Sukarno says that he will not negotiate
as long as the Dutch continue to send reinforcements to
West New Guinea, while the Dutch insist they will stop
reinforcing only if Indonesia will join in an agreement
to stabilize the military situation. Sukarno has sent'a
high-level delegation to Moscow, apparently to buy more
arms
He probably is also seeking to impress the
Dutch and the US with the seriousness of Indonesia's in- 25X1
tent.
Adoula, and Tshombd now are scheduled to resume talks
next week. Adoula re-enters the negotiations with his
political position undermined by parliamentary and army
discontent over the lack of progress so far. UN officials,
although desirous of bolstering Adoula, stress the impor-
tance of a negotiated settlement and of avoiding any action
which would provoke a "third round" of fighting in Katanga,
for which they are unprepared.
Page 12
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
By concentrating troops at strategic points, the Argen-
tine Government prevented the May Day violence threatened
by the Peronistas, but it still has not resolved the consti-
tutional dilemma regarding Congress. President Guido's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 May 1962
decree canceling the March election of federal: deputies
has provoked considerable controversy among both military
and civilian elements. His new cabinet--announced on 30
April--appears designed to appeal to diverse political
and economic groups.
. Page 14
President Ydigoras on 26 April ,appointed a military
cabinet replacing all but three of his ministers and leaving
only one civilian in the cabinet. Although a stopgap,.
measure, the appointments may have helped impress on the
opposition that the President, after seven weeks of politi-
cal crisis, still has the support of the military. The
government also promised changes in those aspects of the
administration's performance which have been most strongly
criticized. Communists continue their efforts to win an
influential role in the opposition campaign.
BRAZILIAN - SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS .
. . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Brazil's continuing efforts to enhance its inter.
national status and relieve its economic difficulties have
in recent months led to an expansion of diplomatic and
trade ties with a number of Eastern European countries, but
its expectations of large-scale Soviet credits remain un-
fulfilled. The Soviet foreign trade minister has come to
Rio de Janeiro to open the large Soviet industrial exhibi-
tion on 3 May, and talks are in progress for the conclusion
of a new trade agreement.
STRAINS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN BLOC IM THE UNITED NATIONS . Page 16
The 20-nation:. Latin American bloc at the UN is divided
over the issue of excluding Cuba from its caucuses. The
group usually meets twice a month but has not held a