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December 21, 2016
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June 20, 2008
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May 4, 1962
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Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 VANP, w SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO, 6, OCI NO. 0415/62 4 May, 1962 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIA review(s) State Dept. review completed. completed SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 `ne SECRET W CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 May 1962 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F (Information as of 1200 EDT 3 May) SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The USSR's relatively moderate reaction to US atmos- pheric nuclear testing reflects both Moscow's desire to maintain a favorable atmosphere for the US-Soviet negotia- tions on Berlin and its apparent intention to launch its own new series of tests. This restraint was also prompted by the unwillingness of the eight neutral delegations at Geneva to withdraw from the disarmament conference or to support Soviet maneuvers to call a special session of the UN General Assembly to deal with US -testing. Soviet spokes- men continue to present an optimistic outlook for a Berlin agreement. SOVIET PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 3 Last week's central committee meeting reversed action taken at the 22nd party congress last fall by returning Andrey Kirilenko to the party presidium and dropping from the party secretariat Ivan Spiridonov, long considered a protege of party secretary Frol Kozlov. This development, which appears to reflect maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants, raises the question as to the degree of Khrushchev's support for Kozlov. There have been no other signs, however, of a threat to Kozlov's position as front-runner to succeed Khrushchev. THE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5 The first public disclosure of a, special high-level government agency which has been handling foreign economic problems and the initiation of formal moves to draft a new constitution for the USSR marked the session of the USSR's Supreme Soviet (parliament) which met 23-25 April ALGERIA . . . Economic distress among Moslems in Algerian cities and the threat of epidemics in overcrowded Moslem quarters are dangerously increasing Moslem exasperation over French failure to halt terrorism by the Secret Army Organization. The provisional Algerian government has again publicly charged Paris with responsibility for Moslem deaths re- sulting from the terrorism, while the uncertainty surround- ing the fate of French soldiers presumed to have been prisoners of the Algerian National Army has aroused the press and public in France. THE FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . Page 8 Premier Pompidou received less support than anticipated for the program he presented to the National Assembly on 27 April. Trouble for the government is foreshadowed par- ticularly by the overwhelming sentiment evidenced by the deputies for closer European political integration than De Gaulle favors; even some elements In the cabinet criticize SECRET i Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 Page 6 Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 SECRET W CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 May 1962 De Gaulle on this point. Nevertheless, the deputies will probably not try to bring down the government as long as the Algerian situation remains France's chief preoccupa- tion. . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 Phoumi now says he is prepared to negotiate "seriously" with Souvanna Phouma on the question of relinquishing the key defense and interior posts to Souvanna's neutralist group. He indicates he will not go forward, at least during May, with his scheme for putting King Savang at the head of a coalition government. Phoumi's apparently more concilia- tory attitude probably is inspired largely by Thai advice to accommodate to US policy. On the military side, there have been widespread skirmishes, and larger scale fighting could break out with little warning. . . Page 10 Communist military activity continues at a high rate, and there has been some increase in sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda. South Vietnam's relations with Cambodia have again been severely strained as a result of a recent raid on a South Vietnamese border town allegedly carried out from Cambodia. Saigon and Seoul have agreed on plans for a mission of South Korean military experts to go to South Vietnam in mid-May. . Page 11 Resumption of the Dutch-Indonesian talks appears in- creasingly remote. Sukarno says that he will not negotiate as long as the Dutch continue to send reinforcements to West New Guinea, while the Dutch insist they will stop reinforcing only if Indonesia will join in an agreement to stabilize the military situation. Sukarno has sent'a high-level delegation to Moscow, apparently to buy more arms He probably is also seeking to impress the Dutch and the US with the seriousness of Indonesia's in- 25X1 tent. Adoula, and Tshombd now are scheduled to resume talks next week. Adoula re-enters the negotiations with his political position undermined by parliamentary and army discontent over the lack of progress so far. UN officials, although desirous of bolstering Adoula, stress the impor- tance of a negotiated settlement and of avoiding any action which would provoke a "third round" of fighting in Katanga, for which they are unprepared. Page 12 ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 By concentrating troops at strategic points, the Argen- tine Government prevented the May Day violence threatened by the Peronistas, but it still has not resolved the consti- tutional dilemma regarding Congress. President Guido's SECRET ii Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600050001-9 imw SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 May 1962 decree canceling the March election of federal: deputies has provoked considerable controversy among both military and civilian elements. His new cabinet--announced on 30 April--appears designed to appeal to diverse political and economic groups. . Page 14 President Ydigoras on 26 April ,appointed a military cabinet replacing all but three of his ministers and leaving only one civilian in the cabinet. Although a stopgap,. measure, the appointments may have helped impress on the opposition that the President, after seven weeks of politi- cal crisis, still has the support of the military. The government also promised changes in those aspects of the administration's performance which have been most strongly criticized. Communists continue their efforts to win an influential role in the opposition campaign. BRAZILIAN - SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 Brazil's continuing efforts to enhance its inter. national status and relieve its economic difficulties have in recent months led to an expansion of diplomatic and trade ties with a number of Eastern European countries, but its expectations of large-scale Soviet credits remain un- fulfilled. The Soviet foreign trade minister has come to Rio de Janeiro to open the large Soviet industrial exhibi- tion on 3 May, and talks are in progress for the conclusion of a new trade agreement. STRAINS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN BLOC IM THE UNITED NATIONS . Page 16 The 20-nation:. Latin American bloc at the UN is divided over the issue of excluding Cuba from its caucuses. The group usually meets twice a month but has not held a