CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003600060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 11, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0416/62
11 May 1962
ARMY review(s)
completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 May 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 10 May)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow reacted to the NATO meeting in Athens and state-
ments by US leaders last week by sharpening its tone on
Berlin and Germany. This reaction suggested that the USSR
is uneasy over the future course of Berlin negotiations.
Hints that Moscow's patience may soon be exhausted and
charges that the US is retreating from its earlier "sober
approach" in the bilateral talks on Berlin were aimed at
exploiting Western differences over Berlin and inducing
the US to step up the pace of the talks. Despite these
efforts to increase pressure on the West, the Soviets
avoided any threat of a break-off and reaffirmed their in-
terest in "honest and serious talks."
SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Although indecision and drift are still evident in
many areas of Soviet policy, there have been increasing
signs within the past few weeks that the Soviet leaders
have reached decisions on some outstanding domestic prob-
lems and are moving toward the resolution of others. Most
notable of these problem areas are the 'treatment of Malen-
kov, Molotov, and others of the "antiparty group"; the ex-
tent and pace of de-Stalinization; the allocation of re-
sources; and lagging production in the agricultural sphere.
ANDREY KIRILENKO--NEWEST OF THE TOP SOVIET LEADERS . . . . Page 4
The sudden promotion of Andrey KiLrilenko to full mem-
bership on the Soviet party presidium at the April central
committee plenum brings another of Khrushchev's old Ukrai-
nian associates into the Soviet Union''s top policy-making
body. Kirilenko was also named first deputy chairman of
the central committee Bureau for the ILSFSR, which, under
Khrushchev's personal direction, administers party business
PUTN I:K XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Sputnik XVI, launched on 26 April. and recovered three
days later, appears to have been part of a new phase in the
Soviet space flight program directed toward extending the
duration of manned flights in near-earth orbits, an essen-
tial step toward manned lunar exploration. Although des.-
i'gaat.ed..; Cosmos IV in Soviet announcements, Sputnik XVI
differed in several respects from the first three Cosmos
satellites. It appears instead to have been related to
flights of the Vostok series, which involved the Gagarin
and Titov flights.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Antigovernment forces which took Nam Tha on 6 May are
pressing toward Ban Houei Sai, on the Thai border, where
the government commander hopes to establish a 'defense per-
imeter, Souvanna, in Paris, has called upon Souphannouvong
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11 May 1962
to withdraw his forces from Nam Tha. Phoumi, meanwhile,
has cited the attack as proof that the Communists do not
want a peaceful settlement. The Soviets have turned down
a British request to call for a report. from the Tnter
national Control Commission on the incident.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The mounting OAS terrorism in Algiers and Oran makes
it likely that further French-Algerian talks will be neces-
sary. There is growing concern both in Paris and in the
provisional Algerian government in Tunis lest the security
situation require postponement of the self-determination
referendum now envisaged for early July. However, the French
Army's failure to respond vigorously to government directives
for drastic anti-OAS action suggests that it is still trying
to avoid an all-out and bloody showdown.
Little change has been noted in the level of Viet Cong
ctivity, with the number of attacks in the last week of
April only slightly below the previous week:'s. Despite a
high Viet Cong casualty rate and continued government pres-
sures, some areas of the country have reported further
security deterioration since January. Saigon has sent a
second note to Phnom Penh charging Cambodian responsibility
in a recent border incident, but both governments profess
. . . . . . Page 11
a desire to play down the episode.
. Page 12
The Netherlands' offer on 7 May to resume talks with
Indonesia is unlikely to be acceptable to President Sukarno.
Dutch Foreign Minister Luns has warned that willingness to
discuss the dispute does not mean that the Netherlands has
agreed to hand over administration of West New Guinea to
Indonesia as Sukarno has demanded as a basis for further
talks.
. Page 13
UN authorities in the Congo have sought to use the
recess in the Adoula-Tshombd talks to clarify substantive
differences prior to a resumption of negotiations. The
two sides remain far apart, particularly over the division
of powers between the central and provisional governments.
UN officials, who are likely to play a, more active role as
mediators than in the past, have indicated that they are
prepared to put pressure on Adoula as well as Tshombd.
RESISTANCE GROUPS IN CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Passive resistance is fairly widespread in Cuba, but
because of the tight control by the security forces, active
resistance is still limited to a few scattered and poorly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 May 1962
equipped groups. There are, however, some recent signs
of iacreasdd acttvitjr::.among::.?o osition groups. There
have been new pockets of
guerrilla activity in recent weeks, and two major fires
in Havana have been attributed to sabotage.
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
President Guido has completed his cabinet, despite
continued differences among the military over some of the
appointees and future political policies. Foreign Min-
ister del Carril's initial speech on 5 May stressed Argen-
tina's pro-Western position. Economy Minister Alsogaray
has described the financial crisis as grave; he cited a
fall of more than $500,000,000 in foreign exchange re-
serves during the past year and a cumulative government
deficit that now approaches that same amount
VENEZUELA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Antigovernment plotting by extremists of both left and
right continues to threaten political stability in Venezuela.
Rural violence is increasing, and the Communist party is
engaged in guerrilla activities designed to discredit Presi-
dent Betancourt's government and cause its eventual collapse.
Government security forces seem capable of suppressing large-
scale Communist outbreaks, however, and Betancourt will
probably take increasingly severe anti-Communist measures,
partly in response to ressure from the militar and from
rightist groups.
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
India's efforts this spring to assert its position in
Ladakh by moving to isolate advance Chinese outposts has
led to a new exchange of threats between New Delhi and
Peiping. New Delhi's hard line, coupled with Peiping's an-
nounced determination to hold what it considers its own,
has set the stage for small-scale clashes along the frontier
KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO BULGARIA .
.000.0 .. Page
Khrushchev, in his mid-May visit to Bulgaria as head
of a party and state delegation, will probably stress his
support for Bulgarian party boss Todor Zhivkov's de-Stalin-
ization campaign. Zhivkov has had difficulty with domestic
Stalinists since the ouster of Stalinist ex-party boss
Vulko Chervenkov from his party and major government posts
last fall. The party leaders evidently want to resolve
this problem before the party congress scheduled for late
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11 May 1962
EXPANSION OF EAST BERLIN'S SCHOENEFELD AIRPORT . . . . Page 21
East Germany's Schoenefeld Airport is the Berlin ter-
minal for all Soviet bloc civil and military aircraft. The
airport, located just south of Berlin, could have handled,
without modification, a substantial increase in traffic.
For several years, the East Germans have been engaged, on
a priority basis, in an elaborate expansion and construction
program to make the airport a major European terminal. The
hope it will replace West Berlin's Tempelhof and Tegel air-
ports, where facilities are relatively cramped. The East
Germans will probably increase their efforts to attract
traffic away from West Berlin in order to control non-Allied
freight and passenger traffic to the city by air in the
same way they now do on railroads and hi hwa s.
RUANDA-URUNDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
The special UN Commission for Ruanda-Urundi is strongly
anti-Belgian and will almost certainly recommend to the Gen-
eral Assembly in June that Belgian forces be replaced with
Africans after 1 July, the tentative independence date. The
governments of Ruanda and Urundi, under pressure from the
commission, have both taken a position against the retention
of any foreign troops, U Thant says the UN now is in a posi-
tion to supply training and possibly some command personnel
but not troop replacements. Tribal warfare on a wide scale
seems likely to break out, particularly in Ruanda;, unless
arrangements can be made to provide strong internal security
forces.
The election of Italy's new President, Antonio Segni,
was bitterly contested largely because he has not favored
Christian Democratic Premier Fanfani's experiment in center-
left, Socialist-backed government. Se?;ni's election is
likely to encourage his supporters within the Christian
Democratic party to step up their efforts to sabotage im-
portant parts of the program on which the government's
existence is based. Resentments aroused within the govern-
ment coalition by the election will complicate the choice
. . . . . . . . Page 24
of a new foreign minister to replace Segni.
SPAIN . .
. Page 26
Spain's,firstserious labor agitation in four years has
involved 75,000,workers in walkouts and led Madrid on 4 May
to declare a three-month state of emergency in several
northern provinces. Opponents of the Franco regime are
stepping up efforts to exploit the situation--strikes are
illegal in Spain--but will probably be unable to profit
politically from this unrest unless the current economic up-
swing is drastically affected.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 May 1962
SPECIAL ARTICLES
CAIRO RADIO . .
Cairo radio has one of the most powerful broadcasting
systems in the world and is utilized extensively by Nasir
for advancing his aims in Africa and the Middle East. An-
nounced plans call for further expansion of its transmitter
strength and for a more diverse and voluminous propaganda
output. The broad themes it develops are the virtues of
nationalism, the iniquities of imperialism, and the power
and dignity of Nasir's Egypt. However, it frequent
strikes at more specific targets with viciousness.
BRITISH AFRICAN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS .
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The Macmillan government is making new efforts to over-
come sharp internal conflicts in its remaining East and
Central African colonies in order to achieve orderly tran-
sitions to independence. Senior cabinet member R. A. But-
ler arrives on 11 May in the white-ruled federation of the
two Rhodesias and Nyasaland in search of a formula that
will reduce Africans' hostility to federation and allow
some future association of the three territories. In
East Africa, London must cope with antagonisms among non-
European groups. In recent weeks these antagonisms have
delayed constitutional advance in Kenya and Zanzibar and
threaten to bring about violent outbreaks in Uganda, which
is
h
d
l
sc
e
u
ed to become independent on 9 October.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow reacted to the NATO
ministerial meeting in Athens
and statements by US leaders
last week by sharpening its tone
on Berlin and Germany. This re-
action suggested that the USSR
is uneasy over the future course
of Berlin negotiations. Hints
that Moscow's patience may soon
be exhausted and charges that the
US is retreating from its earlier
"sober approach" in the bilateral
talks on Berlin were aimed at ex-
ploiting Western differences over
Berlin and inducing the US to
step up the pace of the talks.
Despite these efforts to increase
pressure on the West, the Soviets
avoided any threat of a break and
reaffirmed their interest in
"honest and serious talks."
The Talks on Berlin
Moscow used an authoritative
Pravda "Observer" article on 3
a1V3 y, timed to coincide with the
NATO meeting, to indicate its
displeasure with the US position
in the Berlin negotiations and
to dispel any notion that the
Soviets are satisfied with the
results of the talks to date.
Pravda complained that the
"slightest indications of a sober
approach" in the West to the Ger-
man and Berlin problems "fade
away as soon as they appear," and
charged the US with raising new
obstacles to an agreement and de-
liberately stalling the talks.
These strictures reflected the
Soviet leaders' sensitivity to
recent statements by Secretary
Rusk and General Clay which con-
tradicted the relatively optimis-
tic assessments of the Berlin
talks made late last month by
Khrushchev and Gromyko.
there and by Chancellor Adenauer's
visit to the city on 7 and 8 May
to address a labor congress.
The "Observer" article
bluntly restated Moscow's posi-
tion on Berlin and Germany and
hinted that further negotiations
would be futile if the US adhered
to its position that termination
of the Western "occupation regime"
in West Berlin and withdrawal of
"occupation troops" are not nego-
tiable. Pravda reiterated Soviet
objections to the US-proposed
international access authority
and insisted that unrestricted
Western access would be possible
only by agreement with East Ger-
marty.
.
Walter Ulbricht echoed these
themes in a carefully staged in-
terview with the editors of Pravda
and Izvestia, published on 7May,
in which ie repeated that the
prerequisites for his proposed
international arbitration agency
to settle access disputes are
termination of the "occupation
regime" and creation in West
Berlin of a "peaceful, demili-
tarized, and neutral free city."
Ulbricht again indicated that a
"contractual settlement" could
be negotiated which would pro-
tect the freedom of and access
to the city, but he rejected any
international access authority
invested with the right to con-
trol the lines of communications
across East Germany. As a prece-
dent for a Berlin settlement giv-
ing East Germany "100 percent
control" over communications
across its territory, Ulbricht
cited the United Nations Head-
quxLrters agreement with the US
which accorded the US the right
to issue entry visas.
Pravda also accused West
German levers of attempting to
upset the US-Soviet negotiations
and warned that "provocative
visits" to West Berlin by Bonn
leaders might "complicate" the
talks and "frustrate" an agree-
ment. This outburst was occa-
sioned by President Luebke's
latest visit to West Berlin to
participate in May Day ceremonies
Reaction to NATO Meeting
A Pravda dispatch warned
that the decisions announced at
Athens to put Polaris submarines
at the disposal of NATO and on
the "nuclear arming of NATO"
could be an "irreparable blow"
to further East-West contacts
and could "undermine" the USSR's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
trust in the "sincerity of pro-
posals submitted to it." Pravda
stated that the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries will not leave these deci-
sions unanswered and called at-
tention to the "silence" of the
NATO ministers regarding a non-
agression pact between NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries. East
European comment also took the
line that the Athens meeting
had endangered the US-Soviet
Berlin talks.
Situation in Berlin
Mayor Brandt has expressed
concern over the increasing at-
tempts of Soviet Embassy offi-
cials in East Berlin to expand
contacts in West Berlin govern-
ment, business, academic, and
cultural circles. In conversa-
tions with West Berliners, they
are asserting that under a "free
city" agreement, guaranteed by
the four powers, the USSR will
participate in West Berlin af-
fairs on an equal footing with
the Allies. They are also pre-
dicting that the city sooner or
later will fall to the Commu-
nists, indicating that it would
be prudent to establish good
relations in the interim.
In a 9 May call on Ambas-
sador Kennan in Belgrade, Soviet
Ambassador Yepishev, who is
soon to take up new duties in
Moscow, stated that the "only"
serious remaining problem with
regard to Berlin is the question
of the troops to be stationed
there. He repeatedly gave his
"personal assurance" that if
the Soviet Government went into
an agreement on Berlin, it would
do so with the intention of
carrying it out "punctiliously"
in spirit and letter.
The Soviets continue to
show interest in improving
Soviet-US relations in Berlin.
In a meeting with the chief
of the US Military Liaison Mis-
sion on 29 April, General Yaku-
bovsky, chief of the Soviet
forces in East Germany, said
long-standing agreements on
the use of the autobahn by
Allied forces are still valid
and that the USSR has no desire
to make changes or initiate
a new agreement. While Yaku-
bovsky agreed that the checkpoint
procedures along the autobahn
should be designed to provide ex-
peditious processing of military
convoys, he continued to insist
that advance notification be given
on the transit of all military
vehicles.
Disarmament and Nuclear Testing
Moscow has apparently be-
gun to prepare the Soviet people
for an imminent resumption of
Soviet nuclear testing. Soviet
leaders have repeatedly stated
that US tests would oblige the
USSR to resume testing of "new
types" of its own nuclear weap-
ons, and almost two weeks after
the US began atmospheric tests,
Moscow radio has started re-
porting workers' meetings in
the USSR protesting this "new
criminal act of the American
warmongers" and demanding the
immediate termination of the
US tests. A member of the
Soviet delegation at the Geneva
disarmament conference recently
indicated to Western delegates
that the USSR is "fully pre-
pared now" to begin testing.
The Soviet delegation re-
cently made a halfhearted at-
tempt to secure a recess in the
disarmament conference during
June, and July, with the under-
standing that it be reconvened
on 1 August in New York. After
failing to draw Western and neu-
tralist support for this pro-
posal, Soviet chief delegate
Zorin announced at the 10 May
session that the USSR was will-
ing to go on negotiating in Ge-
neva "without a break." He is
expected back in New York for
the UN General As~,iembl session
next month.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
Although indecision and
drift are still evident in many
areas of Soviet policy, signs
have been increasing within the
past few weeks that the Soviet
leaders have reached decisions
on some outstanding domestic
problems and are moving toward
the resolution of others. Fol-
lowing the 22nd party congress
last October, the regime seemed
hesitant and uncertain on what
policies to pursue in several
domestic areas. The most notable
of these problem areas were the
treatment of Malenkov, Molotov,
and others of the "antiparty
group"; the extent and pace of
de-Stalinization; the alloca-
tion of resources between heavy
and light industry and between
industry and agriculture; and
the critical problem of lagging
production in agriculture.
With the adoption and imple-
mentation of Khrushchev's new
schemes for reorganizing the
management of agricultural pro-
duction and changing the crop-
rotation pattern, a sense of
firm direction was imparted to
the chronically troublesome
agricultural field. Party
secretary Ilichev's warning
on 22 April--in a speech honor-
ing Lenin's birthday--against
contraposing heavy industry and
consumer-goods production or
industry and agriculture could
indicate that agreement on a
general formula for handling
resource allocation problems
has also been worked out. A
decision to continue primary
stress on heavy industry while
at the same time somewhat in-
creasing resources devoted to
agriculture and light industry
appears the most likely possi-
bility.
No real progress seems to
have been made in defining the
limits of de-Stalinization, but
there appears to have been con-
siderable slackening in the pace
of the drive, and a more cautious
approach is evident. Moderation
also seems the agreed course in
regard to the antiparty group.
Malenkov, who was displaced as
arch-villain of the group by
Molotov at the party congress,
now has been returned to his
pro-congress role, and Ilichev,
who argued at the congress that
the group should bear responsi-
bility "before the party and the
people," described it in his
Lenin anniversary speech as
"ideologically and politically
defeated," giving the impres-
sion that the matter was closed.
There is no known connec-
tion between these various policy
problems and the abrupt down-
grading of Ivan Spiridonov--
former central party secretary
and party leader of Leningrad.
The only issue on which Spiridonov
has clearly spoken out is that
of the antiparty group. At
the 21st party congress he was
in the forefront of the attack--
calling for the ouster of the
group from the party. At the
22nd congress, however, he
refrained from mentioning
further disciplinary action, al-
though he charged the group mem-
bers with responsibility for mass
repressions during the Stalin
era, Spiridonov's recent posi-
tion appears to be between the
two extremes of further sanc-
tions and leniency.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While it is always dif-
ficult to distinguish policy is-
sues from disputes over power,
the Spiridonov affair appears
more clearly than usual an
example of the latter. The
fact that Khrushchev and not
Kozlov on 3 May went to Lenin-
grad--Kozlov's power base--to
speak at the meeting which
effected Spiridonov's removal
as Leningrad party boss will
be widely interpreted in the
party as publicly associating
Khrushchev with a move detri-
mental to Kozlov's position.
This is the first time in over
five years that Khrushchev has
participated in the dismissal
of a local party official.
Khrushchev's remarks in
Leningrad have not been pub-
lished, up to the present time.
It seems likely that if a policy
dispute were at the base of
Spiridonov's ouster, some indica-
tion of the issues involved
would have been forthcoming.
The secrecy which has sur-
rounded these recent changes
suggests that the situation is
still unsettled; some early
clarification of Kozlov's involve-
ment seems likely, however.
Meanwhile, a first attempt has
been made to gloss over the
problem. In a symbolic effort
to portray unity, Kozlov,
Spiridonov, and Kirilenko--the
official reappointed to the
presidium at the time of Spiri-
doiiov's ouster from the secre-
tariat--were dispatched together
to represent the Soviet Union at
an East German Embassy reception
on 7 May.
ANDREY KIRILENKO--NEWEST OF
The sudden promotion of
Andrey Kirilenko to full member-
ship on the Soviet party presi-
dium at the April central com-
mittee plenum brings another of
Khrushchev's old Ukrainian
associates into the Soviet
Union's top policy-making body.
Kirilenko was also named first
THE TOP SOVIET LEADERS
deputy chairman of the central
committee Bureau for the RSFSR,
which, under Khrushchev's
personal direction, administers
party business in the Russian
Federation. These appoint-
mE!nts are the first changes in
the composition of the presi-
dium and the bureau since the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
22nd party congress last
October.
Kirilenko was born in the
Ukraine in 1906 and became a
member of the party in 1931.
No information is available on
his background or education,
but his career as a party
official specializing in in-
dustrial affairs suggests
training as an engineer, per-
haps in the field of heavy
machine building. In all like-
lihood he spent his early pro-
fessional years in the Ukraine
and may have been established
as a lower level party func-
tionary by 1938, when Khru-
shchev began his 11-year stint
as party overlord in the re-
public. Kirilenko had clearly
come to Khrushchev's attention
by the end of World War II,
and his progress up the polit-
ical ladder since that time
has been marked by Khrushchev's
patronage.
By 1946, Kirilenko was
serving as party second secre-
tary in a steel and chemical
industry center in Zaporozhye
Oblast, working under Leonid
Brezhnev--now a presidium mem-
ber and "President" of the
Soviet Union. In February 1947
Kirilenko was promoted to first
secretary in nearby Nikolayev
Oblast and given the task of
getting that area's transport
machinery industry back on its
feet. His success during the
ensuing three years won him
the Order of Lenin and a promo-
tion; in July 1950 he was named
party chief in Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast, "the Pittsburgh of the
Ukraine." He replaced his former
boss Brezhnev, who had been moved
up the line to become first secre-
tary of the Moldavian Republic.
Kirilenko remained in Dnepro-
petrovsk for five years.
He left in November 1955
to assume direction of the party
in Sverdlovsk Oblast, hub of the
Urals heavy industrial complex.
This move was clearly part of
Khrushchev's preparations to bring
his own men to the fore at the
20th party congress in February
1953. At the congress, Kirilenko
was elected to full membership
on the party central committee
and was additionally chosen to
serve under Khrushchev as a
member of the newly formed Bureau
for the RSFSR.
Kirilenko continued to
head the party organization in
Sve:rdlovsk until his promotions
last month, when he moved to
Moscow for full-time duty. He
had been elected a candidate
on the party presidium at the
central committee plenum of
June 1957, probably as a reward
for his reported help in engi-
neering Khrushchev's victory
over the antiparty group, but
was dropped at the 22nd party
congress last October. The
reasons for this setback have
never become clear, but his
return--as a full member of
the party presidium--leaves
little doubt that he has become
a powerful political figure 25X1
his demotion last fall.
who may be in a position to seek
revenge against those who pushed
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llvft~ SECRET Vaal
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Sputnik XVI, launched on
2.6 April and recovered three
days later, appears to have
been part of a new phase in
the Soviet space flight program
directed toward extending the
duration of manned flights in
near-earth orbits, an essential
step toward manned lunar ex-
ploration.
Although designated, Cosmos
in Soviet announcements, Sput-
nik XVI was unlike the first
three Cosmos vehicles. The
announced purposes of that
program are broad enough, how-
ever, to include Sputnik XVI's
probable mission.
SECRET
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Analysis of the Sputnik
XVI operation establishes a re-
lationship both to flights of
the Vostok series, which in-
volved the Gagain and Titov
flights, and to an apparently
unsuccessful attempt last Decem-
ber to orbit either a modified
Vostok vehicle or a new vehicle
25X1
Sputnik XVI and the December
196L operation probably had
simLlar missions.
 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03600060001-8
NW SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The movements of the So-
viet space event support ships
after participation in the
Titov flight last August indi-
cate that the USSR probably
intended to initiate flight
testing as early as October in
the phase represented by the
December operation but en-
countered technical difficulties.
The Pathet Lao - North
Vietnamese forces which cap-
tured the provincial capital
of Nam Tha on 6 May are advanc-
ing toward the government fall-
back position at Ban Houei Sai,
a town on the Mekong River bor-
der with Thailand. Government
forces, disorganized and lack-
ing heavy weapons and ammuni-
tion reserves, have been fight-
ing only a token delaying ac-
The movements of these ships
between the time of the Decem-
ber and April operations sug-
gest that they were expecting
a rescheduling of the opera-
tion.
Sputnik XVI is expected
to lead to manned flights of
from three to ten days' dura-
tion. On his flight last
August, Titov was in space
slightly over 24 hours.
Manned lunar missions,
including circumlunar flights,
will require flights of from
five to ten days. Other
critical problems which must
be solved before lunar mis-
sions can be undertaken in-
clude radiation shielding,
midcourse guidance, high-speed
re--entry, and development of
large-thrust booster systems.
tion against the pursuing for-
ces, comprising an estimated
two Pathet Lao and two North
Vietnamese battalions. Lao-
tian. Army commander General
Bounleut, who is directing
the defense in northern Laos,
hopes that the retreating
troops can be regrouped to make
a stand a few miles outside Ban
Houei Sai. This town can be
supported logistically from
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Y
SECRET ~ftw
n
d 1, A~1THA
` ~
Hei $11 LUA`INy / a
eu
ena PRABA
en Pak . T i
uon Hou
Luaflg'41
URMA, MuonRr Ye
Sing Nam `
'ViOn Tha a A 0
PKha? Munnn -
Plfong Saly
iYEg2K oun eua
HONG
M6ong AMY
~,. rer,Gs u Neu
T-ayl
an m
Heup is
/" VI NTIA
Nong
NAIt. ANt
Government forces
///: Meo operational areas
~- Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North
Vietnamese forces
Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North
v~P+?amese areas
Road
Trail
Route number
Road under
CO ttUCtion
KHAMPI'
N io
Muong
Phine
Thailand via Keng Sen, a road-
head located approximately 30
miles upriver.
The attack on Nam Tha had
been preceded by the fall on
3 May of Muong Sing, near the
Chinese border and 20 miles
northwest of Nam Tha. Although
Vientiane claims Chinese mili-
tary intervention, there is no
firm evidence that Chinese Com-
munist troops were involved in
the actions at either town.
Souvanna, in Paris, has
expressed disapproval of the
yIENTIANE Pak San
Pathet Lao moves as "contrary to
my instructions." In an apparent-
ly futile move, he has asked Sou-
phannouvong to withdraw his
Pathet Lao troops to their pre-
attack positions.
Phoumi, who returned to
Vientiane on 9 May from good-
will visits to several Asian
capitals, has cited the Nam Tha
attack as proof that the Com-
munists do not want a peaceful
settlement. He indicated, how-
ever, that he is still willing
to resume negotiations with Sou-
vanna in an effort to ease the
crisis.
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BEET"
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The close parallel between
Soviet propaganda on the Nam Tha
attack and that of the other
Communist powers, together with
the fact that the USSR shifted
its airlift to northwestern
Laos early last month, suggests
that, at the least, Moscow con-
curred in the present breach
of the Laotian cease-fire.
Gromyko's remarks to British
Ambassador Roberts in Moscow
on 8 May are consistent with
this view. The Soviet foreign
minister turned down Roberts'
request that the USSR and Brit-
ain--as cochairmen of the Ge-
neva conference--make a joint
appeal to the International Con-
trol Commission for an early
report on the Nam Tha incident.
Gromyko claimed that such a re-
quest was unnecessary because
the commission was already on
the scene. He contended that
the Pathet Lao was "forced to
repulse the sallies of Phoumi's
troops" in order to burb the
f"arrogance" of the Vientiane
leader.
Bloc policy in Laos for the
past month seems based on the
assumption that the political
impasse will continue indefinite-
ly. The Communist leaders,
therefore, apparently are not
concerned that the present of-
fensive will make a political
solution even more difficult
and remote. Soviet Ambassador
Abramov's remarks on 22 April
to the British and French am-
bassadors in Vientiane clearly
showed Moscow's confidence that
a prolonged delay in resolving
the stalemate in Laos would be
more to Communist advantage
than an early settlement. The
Communists probably anticipate
that the impasse will steadily
increase, the erosion of Sou-
vanna Phouma's political and
military position.
The fact that the Nam
Tha offensive occurred
while both Souvanna and Kong
Le were out of the country
underscores the Communists'
indifference to the declin-
ing influence of the neu-
tralist forces and to Sou-
vanna's prospects for form-
ing a national coalition
government. This indiffer-
ence probably stems from a
shift in emphasis in the
thinking of Soviet leaders
which now places the Laotian
problem in the larger con-
text of the conflict in
South Vietnam. Abramov
noted in his 22 April re-
marks that if the Laotian
impasse dragged on for
two, three, or even seven
years, the Soviets were
prepared to wait,but that,
in this event, a solution
in :Laos would be likely be-
fore the problem of South
Vietnam is settled.
The Communists obviously
have a strong interest in
maintaining the Soviet airlift
into Laos and in keeping a
corridor open through southern
Laos for supplying the Viet
Conk; forces in South Vietnam.
A settlement based on the
Geneva agreements would make
these operations more difficult,
even if it did not impede them
completely. Given the present
prospect for a prolonged stale-
mate in which Laos, for all
practical purposes, will remain
partitioned, bloc policy will
be focused on strengthening
the military and political
position of the Pathet Lao
forces and enhancing capabilties
for assisting the Viet Cong
forces in South Vietnam.
SST
11 May 62 WEEKLY REVIEW
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t
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRANCE-ALGERIA
French and provisional
Algerian government (PAG) offi-
cials are increasingly concerned
over the Algerian situation as
mounting Secret Army Organization
(OAS) terrorism threatens to
incite massive Moslem retalia-
tion. PAG premier Ben Khedda's
10 May radio address to the
Moslems in Algeria added little
to previous FAG appeals for
calm, and seemed to have no im-
mediate effect on the Europeans.
There is growing concern that
Paris may be obliged to post-
pone the self-determination
referendum, now envisaged for
early July.
Minister for Algerian Af-
fairs Joxe told a US Embassy
officer on 4 May that he intends
to seek De Gaulle's authoriza-
tion to meet with PAG officials
in hopes of dispelling their
doubts as to the French desire
to restore order. Joxe commented
that his prolonged negotiations
which culminated in the Evian
accords were "child's play"
compared with the present im-
plementation phase. The likeli-
hood of further, probably se-
cret, French-PAG talks on the
security situation was also
hinted at in PAG information
minister Yazid's press state-
ment of 8 May that "other
measures must be worked out"
to cope with the OAS.
Still another possible
channel for talks has been
suggested by High Commissioner
Fouchet's personal staff chief,
who believes a round-table
meeting between Algerian rebel
leaders and 15 or 20 prominent
settlers might "clear the atmos-
phere." The possibility that
the OAS would be at least in-
directly represented is hinted
in Provisional Executive Presi-
dent Fares' press statement last
week that he is ready to talk
with "everybody."
The US Embassy reports
that the period since the 19
March cease-fire has "clearly
been a disappointment" to Paris
because of the increase of
OAS terrorism, despite the cap-
ture of the top OAS leadership,
the danger that weakening Moslem
discipline may produce major
racial clashes, and the slow
establishment of the Provisional
Executive's administrative con-
trol.
Military reluctance to
press the clean-up of Algiers
and Oran has been evidenced
not only in the few reinforce-
ments thus far sent to those
cities but in the frank admis-
sion made last week by retiring
Suret6 Nationale Director for
Algeria Jannin that "surgery
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Mor 3M" %W
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
has to be performed here,; and
our people are unwilling to
do it." He said the military
are pressing the government
to hold the referendum no later
than 1 July--corresponding to
the period informed French
official comment has usually
mentioned--on the grounds that
the army could no longer ful-
fill its mission after that
date if De Gaulle continued
his present rate of troop with-
drawals. While there are prob-
ably as many as 370,000 troops
still in Algeria, only about
50,000 at most have been sent
into Algiers and Oran.
De Gaulle has scheduled
a press conference for 15 May
and will tour four south-central
departments from 17 to 20 May.
According to the press, security
officials are reportedly worried
over a tour at this time, in
view of reports that OAS assas-
sins are infiltrating France via
Spain. The trial of ex-general
Raoul Salan, captured OAS head,
begins on 15 May, and there are
reports that the group respon-
sible for the attempt to assas-
sinate De Gaulle last September
will stand trial this month.
SOUTH VIETNAM
During the week ending 30
April, 120 armed Viet Cong at-
tacks were reported, marking
little change from recent weeks.
Total Communist casualties for
the period were reported as 569,
as compared with 182 for the
government. In the Second Corps
zone of the central Vietnam, the
Viet Cong concentrated on harass-
ment of army engineer units and
sabotage of roads under repair,
apparently to prevent completion
of the road work in this area
before the rainy season. In
the southern or Third Corps
zone, no large-scale attacks
were reported during the last
three weeks in April, but a
Civil. Guard post was heavily
damaged by an unknown number
of Communists on 6 May, and a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
battalion-size Viet Cong action
was reported on 4 May.
In the last week of April,
government forces conducted three
large-scale actions in the north-
ernmost military zone and four
helicopter operations in the
southern zone. One such airlift
operation resulted in the capture
of 189 suspects, of whom 49 were
identified as Viet Cong regulars
and 61 as local guerrillas.
Despite the high Viet Cong
casualty rate and continued gov-
ernment pressure, the American
consul in Hud recently reported
that, except in Kontum Province,
where conditions improved in
recent months, security in the
northern provinces has continued
to deteriorate gradually since
the first of the year.
Saigon has sent a second
note to Phnom Penh, still charg-
ing Cambodian responsibility in
the 20 April raid on a South
Vietnamese border village. Both
sides profess willingness to
moderate the issue, but face-
saving considerations appear to
be delaying moves toward a
settlement.
le de ehaQuoe ,I ll
Military region boundary
(South Vietnamese,
Major areas of Viet Cong concentration
AT323611r
The Netherlands Govern- Guinea to Indonesia. He pro-
ment on 7 May offered to resume fessed to be concerned with the
discussion with Indonesia on
the West New Guinea dispute,
provided both parties are free
to bring to the agenda all items
they deem relevant. Foreign
Minister Luns warned, however,
that willingness to discuss
the proposals formulated by
Ellsworth Bunker in early
April did not mean that his
government agreed to hand over
administration of West New
difficulty of persuading the
Dutch cabinet and public opinion
that the Bunker formula provided
the latitude for useful negotia-
tions. Luns said he doubted
that the Indonesians would act
in good faith with regard to
self-determination for the
Papuans and questioned the value
of any guarantees that might be
given.
SECRET
Communist buerrilla Activity
N Phan Thiet
ang Tau' ZONE
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~ftr V4010
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Somewhat earlier, Luns had
been bitterly critical of
Bunker's proposals, which he
claimed had undermined Dutch
confidence in the US and had
required an accelerated buildup
of Dutch military strength in
the territory. He said there
would soon be 10,000 Dutch
troops in West New Guinea and
2,500 Papuans with military
training, as well as adequate
naval strength. He said air
strength still required improve-
ment.
The Netherlands' offer
is unlikely to be acceptable
to Sukarno. The Indonesian
President has held the posi-
tion that although he accepts
the Bunker proposals "in
principle," he will negotiate
only on the basis of the transfer
of West New Guinea administra-
tion to Indonesia. He claims
that should the Dutch make
this concession, he would be
willing to discuss other mat-
ters.
UN authorities in the
Congo have sought to use the
current recess in the Adoula-
Tshomb6 talks to clarify sub-
stantive differences prior to
The Netherlands represent-
ative at the UN delivered a
formal note on 3 May accusing
Indonesia of aggression and
spelling out Indonesia's acts
of violence against West New
Guinea territory during and
since the three-day secret Dutch-
Indonesian talks of mid-March.
a resumption of negotiations.
On 7 May, the senior UN rep-
resentative, Robert Gardiner,
flew to Leopoldville to report
to Adoula concerning his
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MW SECRET
ANG,0LA
$la I u ._ f' UGANDA
no g l
~,h Idl.
~FSwanga5 , Noooo
.
Ka niama ryj ugono' Daudoulnvlllo
GA NYIKA
lolville ~~
}- --. Elis ah hrillc ~~
.~~PtiS h~ t~ JJJ
Kdwe Lola
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA ,
AND NYASALAND
conversations with Tshomb6. Al-
though the two sides remain
far apart, particularly in
matters relating to provincial
autonomy, a UN official has
observed that Gardiner's efforts
may save "considerable time"
once negotiations are resumed.
Tshomb6, who ostensibly
has been ill with the flu, has
stated that he will shortly
return to Leopoldville. There
are indications that he may
be prepared to accept a formula
by which Katanga, in a reunified
Congo, would contribute half
of its revenues to the central
government. No overall agree-
ment appears likely, however,
as long as Adoula continues
to reserve to himself most gov-
ernmental powers and Tshombd
envisions an essentially con-
federal arrangement. In con-
trast to the first round of
talks, when the UN remained
largely in the background, UN
officials will probably play a
prominent role as mediators
when talks are resumed.
The prospect that Adoula
might appeal to "neutralist"
states for bilateral military
aid may have diminished tem-
porarily as a result of the 7
May action by the Congolese
parliament in clearing the way
for a trial of leftist leader
Antoine Gizenga. The Chamber
of Deputies approved 64 to 22
a :report which cited Gizenga's
efforts to obtain UAR assist-
ance in overthrowing Adoula,
and voted to divest Gizenga
of his parliamentary immunity.
Radical African states, most
of which are lukewarm toward
Adoula, would probably not
respond favorably to an aid
request which coincided with
the trial of the Congo's lead-
ing "nationalist."
The UN Command announced
on 4 May that it would attempt
to disband the massive Baluba
refugee camp outside Elisa-
bethville. Repatriation of
approximately 40,000 Balubas
to their tribal areas in
Kasai Province began on 8
May. The refugee camp, which
sprang up after anti-Tshomb6
Ba]Lubas sought UN protection
during 1961, has long been
a health and security hazard;
the UN repatriation effort
was launched with Tshomb6's
concurrence.
There have been uncon-
firmed reports of fighting
between central government
and Katangan forces in north-
ern, Katanga near Nyunzu.
The Leopoldville government
first confirmed and then
denied that fighting had
taken place; the security
situation in northern Ka-
tanga has long been precari-
ous, and there have been in-
dications of unrest among
Congolese Army units in
Albertville.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A majority of the Cuban
people of all socio-economic
backgrounds now seem resentful
toward the present regime,
largely because of the eco-
nomic privations it is imposing
and its pervasive authoritarian-
ism. Most Cubans are behaving
with at least outward apathy,
however, evidently believing
there is no recourse with suf-
ficient chance of altering
the situation to justify the
risks of open antiregime
activity. The ability of thou-
sands of Cubans to leave the
country has acted as a safe-
ty valve, releasing from the
immediate scene the most desper-
ate and highly motivated oppo-
nents of the regime.
Passive resistance, such
as job slowdowns and deliberate
inefficiencies, is fairly wide-
spread in the cities as well
as the countryside, according
to reports from Cuba. Active
resistance, however, is limited
to a few scattered and poorly
equipped groups continually har-
assed by the regime's large,
effective internal security
machine. Nevertheless, there
have recently been some signs
of increased activity by these
groups.
While the reported death
or capture of several anti-
regime leaders during the gov-
ernment military drive begin-
ning in mid-April against guer-
rilla bands in the Fscambray
Mountains has dealt a blow to
these bands, there have been
persistent reports of an in-
creasing number of desertions
from Cuban military units and
the creation of new pockets of
guerrilla activity. At the
same time, there has been an
increase i.n acts of sabotage
in the Havana area; two major
fires there in the past two
weeks were attributed to sabo-
tage, presumably by clandestine
resistance groups.
Castro made his public attack
on veteran Communist
Anibal Escalante in a
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
speech in which he nevertheless
made clear his own continued
dedication to Communist objec-
tives.
Even if Castro's duplicity
toward his non-Communist former
comrades-in-arms should lead
them actively to oppose him,
it is unlikely now that, short
of assassinating him, they could
act decisively against the regime.
Any plots they might develop
would probably quickly become
known to the Communist-controlled
Department of State Security
ity, To succeed, these plots
would need to be accompanied 25X1
by large-scale civil resist-
ance, and this is not immediate-
ly in prospect.
President Guido has com-
pleted his cabinet, despite
continued differences among the
military over some of the ap-
pointees. Foreign Minister
Bonifacio del Carril's initial
speech on 5 May praised the
United States highly and stressed
Argentina's pro-Western
position. He invited any of-
ficials differing with this
policy to resign--with an ob-
vious reference to those who
had advised a soft policy on
Cuba. The Foreign Ministry has
announced that with the excep-
tion of Venezuela, Uruguay,
Costa Rica, and Mexico, all
countries which had diplomatic
relations with the Frondizi
regime now have acknowledged
continued relations with Argen-
tina.
Economy Minister Alvaro
Alsogaray on 7 May announced
plans to deal with the financial
crisis, which he described as
the most serious Argentina had
ever known. He cited the drop
in foreign exchange reserves
from $700,000,000 to $180,000,000
during the past year and the
mounting budget deficit of some
$500,000,000. Official foreign
trade statistics released on 4
May report a trade deficit for
1961 of $496,200,000. Alsogaray
said the armed forces had agreed
to economize by deferring planned
purchases and by the early
release of recruits.
The two major non-Peronista
parties, the Intransigent Radical
Civic Union (UCRI) and the
People's Radical Civic Union
(UCRP), now are meeting in
separate conventions and may
develop new positions on the
key problem of elections. Interi-
or Minister Perkins--formerly
of the UCRP--has again urged
reunification of the two parties,
which together would be the
largest single political group;
however, both parties are split
on the unification issue.
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*AW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Antigovernment plotting also been weakened by internal
by extremists of both left splits. In March 1962 a dissi-
and right continues to threaten dent faction defected from the
political stability in Venezuela. AD, giving the opposition a
The leftist-inspired revolt majority in the lower house.
by a marine battalion on 4 May This faction's attitude toward
is the most recent outbreak administration programs will be
occasioned by the Communist decisive. Although still in
campaign to discredit President control of the Senate, the gov-
Betancourt's administration ernment may be blocked in Con-
through agitation and violence. gress on important legislation,
Extreme rightists among the particularly that needed to
military and business groups-- approve foreign aid agreements.
dissatisfied with the govern-
ment's failure to quell the
continuing unrest--are deter-
mined to effect the collapse
of the regime.
A concerted drive is being
made by the Communist party to
organize and train guerrilla
forces throughout the country
in preparation for a coordinated
revolt sometime in the future.
rural violence
is increasing; several guerrilla
camps have been discovered
along with evidence of Cuban
arms assistance. The govern-
ment recently announced the
capture of more than 100 Com-
munist-trained extremists
engaged in guerrilla activity
in eastern and western Venezuela.
Government security forces
appear capable of suppressing
any large-scale outbreak by
the Communists.
The governing coalition--
comprised of Betancourt's Accion
Democratica (AD) party and the
Social Christian party--has
Betancourt's political
difficulties are aggravated by
the economic depression which
has prevailed since 1959. Vene-
zuela's economy is gradually
recovering, but unemployment
remains high. The country faces
a severe balance of payments
deficit which may reach $150
million in 1962, according to
the Venezuelan Central Bank.
Economic problems have impeded
Venezuela's efforts to carry
out social reforms needed to
implement the Alliance for
Progress.
Nevertheless, Betancourt
is generally expected to serve
out, his term, which ends in early
1964, since he has widespread
support among organized labor,
the, rural population, and the
business community, and most
military leaders appear to be
loyal. He is now under in-
creasing pressure from the
armed forces and conservative
groups to outlaw the Communist
party and take other measures
to suppress leftist subversion.
However, the Social Christians
have threatened to leave the
coalition if the Communists
are outlawed.
SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
India's frustration with
what it regards as a creeping
advance by the Chinese Commu-
nists in Ladakh and the arrival
of good weather in the area have
led to a series of probing
operations there aimed at iso-
lating advance Chinese positions.
The decision to undertake this
action had been under considera-
tion since at least last Janu-
ary; the actual orders to leap-
frog Chinese outposts in the
area southeast of the Karakoram
Pass apparently were issued in
mid-April.
Peiping's protest on 30
April, following India's estab-
lishment of outposts which
"threaten" advance Chinese posi-
tions, drew public attention to
the affair and led the Indian
Army to order a more general
alert for the northern defense
network. In dismissing the Chi-
nese note before Parliament on
3 May, Prime Minister Nehru re-
affirmed his intention to hold
all Indian positions, and sub-
sequent army orders to forward
posts have echoed this line.
Patrolling has been stepped up,
posts in the northeast are be-
ing; augmented with army regulars,
units have been told to hold
their ground regardless of
Chinese actions, and India's
thinly spread forces in Ladakh
are being reinforced by two
battalions from Srinagar.
The Chinese in the past
few years have moved to occupy
sections of the disputed area
of Ladakh, making New Delhi
resort to force should it wish
to dislodge them. The Chinese
thus have been able to plump
strongly for the status quo,
and their notes on the border
stress the wisdom of preserving
the existing situation all along
the border and frequently
COMMUNIST CHINA-INDIA BORDER AREA
AND
KASHMIR
..) (Stains in diepueel
.CEASE-F~?E LINE; ?.?? ~ t
r?
`
? Srinagar P 0 Mh~A
MILES
32434
Boundary shown on Indian maps
Boundary shown on r inenl
Chinese Communist maps
Motorahle roar
------ Motorahle roan
under construction
Minor road or All
I N D I A
Boandorres are nor nece:so,dy chore
recoooned b y the U S. Gorernmene.
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`Gyangtse
chon Line
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
mention willingness to nego-
tiate.
Peiping rejects, however,
New Delhi's demand for prior
withdrawal of Chinese forces
from forward positions in Ladakh.
The Chinese presumably feel that
such a withdrawal would put them
at a disadvantage at the nego-
tiating table, where they ap-
parently intend to press for a
compromise solution involving
acceptance of Chinese claims
in Ladakh and Indian claims in
the North-East Frontier Agency.
Peiping's sense of urgency
was demonstrated during the
recent meeting of its National
People's Congress: the border
issue was the only topic raised
that was publicized while the
congress was still in session.
Difficulties in logistics
and terrain, requiring the use
of pack animals and airdrops,
will tend to limit engagements
to company-level forces. F_
KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO BULGARIA
Khrushchev's mid-May visit
to Bulgaria as head of a party
and state delegation is probably
intended primarily to demon-
strate his support for Bulgarian
party boss Todor Zhivkov's de-
Stalinization campaign. To
date, the campaign has been
generally restrained and in-
decisive, largely because of the
strength of Stalinists in the
Bulgarian party. That Khru-
shchev hopes for a quick reso-
lution of the campaign is sug-
gested by the fact that the
eighth Bulgarian party congress--
a more logical occasion for a
visit by Khrushchev--is less
than four months off. The
decision to visit Bulgaria this
month may have been made after
a first-hand report from Soviet
party secretary and agitprop
chief Leonid Ilichev, who led
an unusual "ideological" dele-
gation to a Bulgarian conference
on de-Stalinization on 23 and 24
April.
Following the attacks on
Stalinism and the antiparty
group at the Soviet 22nd party
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE W]aEKLY SUMMARY
congress last fall, the Zhivkov
leadership reopened a limited
de-Stalinization campaign. At
a central committee plenum in
late November, Stalinist ex-
party boss Vulko Chervenkov was
ousted from the politburo, a move
followed in early December by
his dismissal as deputy premier.
The central committee ordered
a nationwide campaign to erase
the effects of Chervenkov's
"cult of personality," to dis-
credit him, and to make him
the scapegoat for all of Bul-
garia's ills which could be
attributed to the period 1950-
56, when he was head of the
party and government.
Bulgarian efforts to de-
Stalinize since 1956, however,
have in large part been half-
hearted paper measures, chiefly
because the party membership
is largely sympathetic to the
Stalinist approach and retains
its loyalty and admiration for
Chervenkov--the personification
of Stalinism in Bulgaria. As
a result, a full-scale prosecu-
tion of de-Stalinization in the
party would be disruptive to
the entire regime. Chervenkov
sought to capitalize on this
difficulty by refusing to accept
his demotion at the November
plenum.
There are signs that Zhivkov
has been unable or unwilling
to prosecute de-Stalinization
since the November plenum. Also,
pre-electoral speeches by regime
SECRET
leaders in February revealed
differing views on the way
to handle the question. On
15 March, Georgi Tsankov,
also a notorious Stalinist,
was removed as minister of
interior but retained his mem-
bership on the party polit-
buro; no public explanation
whatever has been given for
his removal from the govern-
ment post. Although the leaders
of the Writers' Union, some of
whom were compromised in the
Cherrvenkov suppression of the
writers' revolt in 1957-58,
were criticized by the member-
ship last December and January,
no changes have been made. Nor
has there been any apparent
shake-up in either the central
or provincial party apparatus.
Soviet concern with the
Bulgarian party situation may
have led to the decision to
send the Ilichev delegation
to the 23-24 April conference.
The agenda was prepared at a
two-day central committee
meeting on 20 and 21 April. Bul-
garian party secretary Mitko
Grig-orov delivered the main ad-
dress, which called for further
"unmasking" of the errors of
Chervenkov--including the re-
vision of textbooks containing
his "erroneous" theories. While
Grigorov's remarks do not ap-
pear to signal drastic new
measures affecting the party
membership, Ilichev also ad-
dressed the conference. His
speech apparently was very
critical of the Bulgarian
party, and neither Bulgarian
nor Soviet media have so far
been willing to publish it.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
EXPANSION OF EAST BERLIN'S SCHOENEFELD AIRPORT
East Germany's Schoenefeld
Airport is the Berlin terminal
for all Soviet bloc civil and
military aircraft. Located just
south of the city, it is well
equipped and could handle, with-
out modification, a significant
increase in traffic. For several
years, however, the East Germans
have been engaged,on a priority
basis, in an elaborate expansion
and construction program to make
the airport a major European
terminal. They hope it will
replace West Berlin's Tempelhof
and Tegel airports--now used for
all regular flights by Western
carriers to Berlin--where facili-
ties are relatively cramped.
At the present time, the
only Western carriers with a
Berlin franchise are Pan Ameri-
can, British European Airways,
and Air France. The East Ger-
mar.-ts apparently hope to attract
airlines from non-NATO coun-
tries, which have long been
denied a share of West Berlin's
profitable passenger and freight
traffics and many from NATO coun-
tries which do not have a Berlin
franchise now. The East German
regime, in fact, has suggested
that landing privileges will
be accorded on a first come,
first served basis. The major
obstacle to Western airlines'
use of Schoenefeld on a regular
basis is that international law
requires that landing rights
be negotiated on a government-
to-government basis. Since
East Germany has not been granted
diplomatic recognition, Western
commercial carriers have been
able to use Schoenefeld only
for occasional chartered flights.
EAST GERMAN EXPANSION OF
GREATER
BERLIN
TEGEL .f
WEST t'SECC"-
BERLIN 2.. TOR
TEMPELHOFA
SCHOENEFELD AIRFIELD
SOVIET 1-
1
i b TION
N
+' 11-New access road
-POL storage area
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Construction to expand the
airfield began in early 1959.
An 11,000-foot runway, capable
of handling the largest Soviet
planes, was completed last summer,
and Aeroflot began regular jet
service between Berlin and Moscow
on 3 April 1962. This runway
connects with a concrete-asphalt
landing strip which was recently
extended to 6,800 feet for medium-
range flights. In addition,
there are two 2,700-foot runways,
and two more runways are to be
finished by 1965. The airfield
is well equipped with naviga-
tional and landing aids: airport
control, direction finding equip-
ment, beach approach system, ap-
proach control, instrument land-
ing system, ground control
approach, a broadcast station
in Berlin, and obstruction lights
as well as rotating runway and
approach lights. Schoenefeld,
furthermore, is the site of the
control center for the Soviet
zone. Long-line telephone and
teletype services and complete
aerological service are pro-
vided. The field also has ade-
quate fire-fighting and snow-
removal equipment.
Two underground fuel storage
dumps, with an estimated capacity
of 800,000 gallons, are located
near the southeast edge of the
field and are served by a rail-
road spur. An average of four
tank cars of fuel arrive each
day. A pipeline will connect
this storage area with a new
20,000-metric-ton POL storage
facility being constructed about
ten miles east of the field at
Kablow.
The field has terminal and
administration buildings com-
pleted or under construction,
workshops, a motor transport
section, power plant, and ware-
houses. Schoenefeld is capable
of providing field maintenance
for aircraft. Two large hangars
with maintenance shops are lo-
cated at the southeast end of
the field, and a new six-bay
hangar is about 75 percent
complete. In addition, there
are barracks and dependents'
quarters, a mess hall, VIP and
tourist hotel accommodations,
and medical and recreational
facilities.
Access routes to the air-
port are being improved. An
express highway to East Berlin
was opened on 28 April. Con-
struction reportedly has begun on
a seven-mile highway which
will connect Schoenefeld with
the Berlin autobahn ring so that
travelers can go from the air-
port to West Berlin by autobahn
without going through East Berlin.
A new electrified S-Bahn line
between Adlershof and Schoene-
fe:Ld airport, which was con-
structed on a priority basis to
enable rapid travel between
Schoenefeld and the Ost Bahnhof,
the main railroad station in down-
town East Berlin, was inaugurated
on 26 February 1962. A short
double-tracked spur will branch
off from the Adlershof-Gruenau
line and terminate west of the
airport. It probably will carry
POL to the storage center on
the field. A single line which
already connects the western
part of the airport with the
POI1 facilities will be improved.
The improvement and expan-
sion of Schoenefeld Airport is
an integral part of Walter
Ulbricht's goal of asserting
the sovereignty of his regime.
The East Germans also hope to
use the facility as a control
lever over air traffic between
West Berlin and the outside
world. The East Germans al-
ready effectively control all
non-Allied freight and passen-
ger traffic entering or leav-
ing West Berlin via rail and
highway. The only access to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
West Berlin which is not sub-
ject to some form of East Ger-
man surveillance is that which
enters the city via the air
corridors to the Allied airports
in West Berlin. Thus) if com-
mercial carriers could be at-
tracted away from Tegel and
Tempelhof to Schoenefeld Air-
port, the controls which then
could be instituted against
freight and passengers enter-
ing West Berlin would consid-
erably weaken the city's inde-
pendence and viability, thus
furthering the Communist goal
of isolating West Berlin from
West Germany and the free
world.
Ruanda-Urundi
or UN--after independence makes
reversal unlikely. Assistant
Secretary Williams, who talked
with both Ruanda President
Ka;yibanda and Urundi Premier
Muhirwa on 4 and 5 May, said
the possibility that Belgian
trocps would be retained in
Urundi is almost nil--and
highly unlikely, although
possible, in Ruanda.
The UN Commission's mem-
bers are from Morocco, Liberia,
Togo, Haiti, and Iran. They
toured Ruanda-Urundi in April
and May and have just completed
a formal conference in Addis
Ababa with Ruanda and Urundi
leaders. The commission has
consistently exhibited a strong
anti-Belgian bias and has in-
sisted that the 23 February
General Assembly resolution
appointing the commission pre-
cluded the retention of Belgian
troops after independence. It
has blamed Belgium for all of
Ruanda-Urundi's problems, and
holds that Belgian troops and
many Belgian technicians must
be withdrawn rapidly.
Before the Addis Ababa
conference, Urundi had refused
to commit itself on retention
of ]Belgian troops, although
Rua:nda leaders had indicated a
willingness to allow them to
stay and were reported to have
made a secret agreement to this
SECRET
The special UN Commission
for Ruanda-Urundi appears likely
to recommend to the 16th General
Assembly session resuming in
June that Belgian troops be
withdrawn from the territory
after 1 July, the tentative date
for its independence. Tribal
warfare and administrative chaos
reminiscent of the events follow-
ing Belgium's withdrawal from
the Congo seem likely to follow.
Although such a recommendation
could be reversed by the General
Assembly, the fact that the gov-
ernments of both Ruanda and
Urundi have themselves declared
formally against retention of
any foreign troops--either Belgian,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
effect with Brussels. The com-
mission's attitude and fear of
criticism by African radicals,
however, apparently led both
Kayibanda and Muhirwa to inform
the commission by letters that
they wanted no foreign troops
after 1 July. US officials note
that the local governments are
not overly concerned about the
preservation of law and order
and are actively looking forward
to independence and Belgium's
withdrawal as an opportunity to
liquidate their opponents.
U Thant has told US of-
ficials that if the UN Commission
does recommend against retention
of Belgian troops, he will ask
the General Assembly to over-
rule it. He has made it clear
that the UN is unable to supply
security forces to replace the
Belgians, although it could
supply some training officers
for native forces and possibly
some command personnel. UN
Commission members and Ruanda
and Urundi authorities claim
that Brussels is exaggerating
the threat of disorders. and
that native forces (700-800 in
each area) are adequate. The
commission has suggested that
80-100 African replacements be
recruited to augment each native
force, a suggestion which might
have some appeal to the radical
African states. Brussels now
has 1,200 paratroops in Ruanda-
Urundi,
and feels that
800
is
a bare
minimum for law
and
order.
Ruanda
and Urundi authorities
appear
similarly unconcerned
over Belgium's possible with-
drawal of economic assistance,
apparently convinced that the
United States will fill the gap.
Both states have already made
approaches for US financial help.
Belgium considers Ruanda-
Urundi a political and economic
liability--the territory costs
it over $20 million annually--
and wants to divest itself of
responsibility. To avoid a
repetition of the Congo situation,
Foreign Minister Spaak has been
willing to leave Belgian troops,
but only if requested by the
local governments and under
some kind of joint partici-
pation with the UN. Brussels
has made it clear that if in
the end Belgian troops are asked
to leave, they will do so promptly.
Brussels also states that it
could not continue to furnish
economic and technical assistance,
because the 2,000 Belgian tech-
nicians in the area would leave
too. Many of the Belgian com- 25X1
munity, which totals some 5,000,
are already departing or making
ITALIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The bitterly contested
election of Italy's new Presi-
dent, Antonio Segni, was in
large degree a struggle between
proponents and opponents of
Christian Democratic Premier
Fanfani's current experiment
in center-left, Socialist-
backed government. Although he
served as foreign ministers
Segni does not favor the present
government formula. His election
will encourage his supporters
within the Christian Democratic
party to try to sabotage some
of the major reform plans on
which the government's existence
is based. Resentments aroused
within the government coalition
by the election will complicate
the choice of a new foreign
minister to replace Segni.
Segni's coolness toward
the present government springs
largely from his own attitude
toward reform--an attitude
frequently characterized as that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of a 19th century liberal. As
agriculture minister under
Premier de Gaspers, Segni pushed
a program which stressed the
economic aspects of land reform,
and he probably distrusts the
Fanfani government's land
program, for instance, as in-
volving too many social reform
measures such as reducing the
isolation of rural communities,
rather than emphasizing produc-
tivity. Segni apparently ob-
jects also to the collaboration
between his own Christian
Democratic party and its Nenni
Socialist backers in parliament.
Segni is temperamentally
averse to precipitate action,
however, and will presumably
reappoint Fanfani after the
government submits its res-
ignation--pro forma after the
election of a new president.
He is also likelyto dissuade
his supporters from any immediate
moves. Nevertheless, Segni's
coolness toward the government
program will make him a rallying
point over the next few months
for those who seek to dump
Fanfani. If the right-wing
Christian Democrats are success-
ful in blocking implementation
of the new government's program,
the Nenni Socialist party will
be under pressure from its left
wing to *ithdraw support, which
is essential to the government's
working majority.
The election has left much
bitterness among the progovern-
ment parties over the way elements
among both the Christian Democrats
and Socialists refused to follow
party discipline in the balloting
and over charges that a number of
leaders--especially Fanfani him-
self--had breached their voting
commitments. The Communists,
always seeking an opportunity
to disrupt the collaboration
between their former Socialist
allies and the Christian Demo-
crats, might try to exploit
this situation by demanding
a parliamentary confidence vote
SEGN I
while tempers in the progovern-
ment parties are still aroused.
Choice of Segni's replace-
ment as foreign minister will
test the depth of the wounds
within the coalition itself.
Runner-up Saragat's bitter
reaction to his defeat suggests
that he might see fit to with-
draavhis Social Democratic party
from the cabinet if the new
minister should be neither him-
self nor a man of his choice.
On the other hand, the Christian
Democratic right wing would be
unhappy with such a choice
because the Social Democrats
and the other small coalition
party already have five rep-
resentatives in the 24-man
cabinet. This right-wing
faction might fight instead
for a colleague such as former
Premier Pella, who would be un-
acceptable to the party's left
wing.
Fanfani may see fit to take
over the ministry himself, or
to reshuffle the cabinet, pos-
sibly moving Interior Minister
Taviani to the post, but there-
by opening a contest for the
Interior Minstry. One contender
for the post is said to be
Christian Democrat Giuseppe
Medici, minister for administra-
tive reform and chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
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Spain's first serious labor
agitation in four years has in-
volved 75,000 workers in walk-
outs and led the government on
4 May to declare a three-month
state of emergency in several
northern provinces. Opponents
of the Franco regimc are stepping
up efforts to exploit the
situation--strikes are illegal
in Spain--but will probably be
unable to profit politically
from this unrest unless the
current economic upswing is
drastically affected.
The strike of coal miners
and industrial workers in As-
turias and the Basque provinces
of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa was
three weeks old when the govern-
ment suspended various civil
rights and reinforced police
units there. While there has
been no violence, a high offi-
cial of the government-controlled
labor syndicates says this strike
is "the largest, most costly, and
most political since the civil
war." As in the past, the gov-
ernment has attributed it to
"Communists," and there is ap-
parently some Communist involve-
ment. Pro-monarchist elements
and the labor organizations of
the clandestine Socialist and
Anarcho-Syndicalist political
parties have also been impli-
cated.
The only overt attempts by
other groups to exploit the
strike to date came on 5 and 7
May from Madrid University
students who demonstrated in
support of the strikers by way
of registering disapproval of
the government's favoring the
church-controlled University of
Navarre at Pamplona.
No serious political oppo-
sition to the regime now is in
sight, and Franco seems to have
recovered completely from a
hunting accident in late 1961,
which had aroused speculation
on a successor.
If the strikes are pro-
longed, however, or if threat-
ening coal shortages encourage
stoppages elsewhere, there may
be serious economic repercus-
sions, since an essential phase
in the second stage of the eco-
nomic stabilization program is
to step up industrial output
in order to increase exports.
Spain's gold and foreign ex-
change reserves are at a record
level--$859,000,000 at the end
of 1961--.but its unemployment
total of at least 280,000 out
of a work force of 12,000,000
is an economic problem of some
consequence, because the per
capita GNP is only $300.
The government is reluc-
tant to grant substantial pay
raises on a nationwide basis
lest this bring a return of
inflationary pressures that
have been curbed since the end
of 1959. However, collective
agreements which have already
provided pay raises for several
hundred thousand workers in
various industries may incite
other workers to strike for
wage boosts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
CAIRO RADIO
Cairo radio has one of
the most powerful broadcasting
systems in the world and is
utilized extensively by Nasir
for advancing his aims in Africa
and the Middle East. Announced
plans call for further expansion
of its transmitter strength and
for a more diverse and volumi-
nous propaganda output. The
broad themes it seeks to drive
home are the virtues of nation-
alism, the iniquities of impe-
rialism, and the power and dig-
nity of Nasir's Egypt. When
circumstances require, however,
it hits more specific targets.
The System
increased by more than 30
percent over 1961 to the equiv-
alent of $2,660,000. According
to published figures, well over
half of budgeted funds goes
for internationally beamed
programs. Since the published
budget shows no provision for
new equipment or debt service,
or for clandestine and other
unavowed activities in the
radio field, the actual cost
of Nasir's international radio
propaganda effort is probably
considerably greater than Cairo
has revealed.
Cairo's international
radio propaganda emanates from
a complex of medium- and short-
wave transmitters in the Cairo
and Alexandria areas. With an
estimated total power of nearly
2,000,000 watts, Cairo radio
next year will place in inter-
national service an additional
1,000,000-watt transmitter
purchased from a manufacturer
in the United States for
$1,250,000.
Employing a staff of over
3,000, about half of whom are
technicians and broadcasters,
Cairo transmits internationally
in some 27 languages for a
total of 107 hours daily. In-
creased programing to Africa
will increase these totals to
31 languages and 113 hours daily
by next July. This same system
transmits Cairo's home regional
services as well.
The operating budget of
the UAR broadcasting service
for 1962 is reportedly the
largest in its history, having
Administration and
Policy Guidance
The UAR's international
radio propaganda apparatus is
subject to the general guidance
of Minister of State for Presi-
dential Affairs Ali Sabri, one
of Nasir's confidants and long
his principal adviser on psycholog-
ica]'. warfare. Minister of
State Abd al-Kadir Hatim, another
trusted associate of Nasir with
long; experience in propaganda
and radio, holds executive re-
sponsibility for information
policy and media, and also has
direct access to Nasir. Below
this level, the chain of command
has always appeared somewhat
vague. The director general of
the state broadcasting service
apparently has never exercised
genuine authority.
Cairo radio still closely
follows guiding priorities
enunciated by Nasir in the
early days of the Revolutionary
Command Council. In conformity
with his blueprint of modern
Egypt's destined spheres of
interest, it concentrates most
intensively on influencing the
policies of other Arab govern-
ments by appeals to pan-Arab
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sentiment and the universal
Arab hatred of Israel. Next,
it seeks to promote emulation
of the Egyptian revolutionary
example throughout Africa by
attacking imperialism and es-
pousing all forms of African
nationalism. Finally, Cairo
radio seeks to establish Egypt
as the spiritual and intellec-
tual center of the Islamic
world.
When confronted by sudden
shifts in the UAR's internation-
al posture, Cairo radio's
various department chiefs some-
times rely for policy guidance
on cues received via the grape-
vine from individuals in the
circle around Nasir. Cairo's
radio and press propaganda
nevertheless are closely coor-
dinated with the regime's
diplomatic and clandestine
activities. Radio news re-
portage especially shows the
influence of intelligence col-
lection.
Regular Broadcasts
Cairo's main instrument
of pan-Arab propaganda is the
long-established Voice of the
Arabs program, on the air about
120 hours weekly and heard
throughout the Arabic-speaking
world. Interspersed with
entertainment, its news and
editorial features ring the
changes on the themes of Arab
unity under Egyptian leader-
ship and the villainy of Israel.
This program regularly features
special broadcasts directed to
various regional targets--in-
cluding such sensitive areas
as Somalia, the Persian Gulf
sheikdoms, and the Arabian
Peninsula. Arab audiences in
neighboring countries also
have the opportunity to listen
to Cairo's home service, which
is relayed on short and medium
waves 133 hours weekly.
North Africa is likely to
receive substantially increased
attention from Cairo radio
after installation of the new
1,000,000-watt transmitter
next year. UAR broadcasting
officials have indicated that
this facility is intended to
strengthen medium-wave coverage
of north Africa, as well as
Chad, Nigeria, and Mali. Ex-
cept in Libya, Cairo radio's
impact in North Africa is con-
siderable, and UAR planners
apparently expect even better
prospects for extending Egyptian
influence in the Maghreb states
in the wake of an Algerian
settlement.
Cairo's Voice of Africa
program is the principal
vehicle for pan-African prop-
aganda directed toward East,
Central, and South Africa. On
the air about 49 hours weekly,
it broadcasts in Swahili, Somali,
and an increasing number of
other African languages. The
main targets of Cairo's "libera-
tion" propaganda are South
Africa, the Rhodesias, Tanganyika,
Kenya, and Uganda. Cairo broad-
casts to West Africa in Hausa
and Fulani, as well as in French
and English, for approximately
30 hours a week.
Emphasis on Egypt's position
as the Arab cultural center is
a leading theme in Cairo's
broadcasts to the western hemi-
sphere and to South and South-
east Asia. Programs in Portuguese,
Spanish, and Arabic are beamed
to Latin America for a total of
19 hours weekly. The South and
Southeast Asia service broadcasts
in eight languages, including
Arabic, for more than 60 hours
weekly and has included, for
example, features designed for
the Moslem minority in the
Philippines, as well as instruc-
tion in Arabic.
Clandestine Broadcasts
One of Cairo's favorite
and possibly most effective
techniques has long been the
clandestine broadcasting of
material violently hostile to
the West and designed to stir
up unrest in the target countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
There are at present three
pro-Nasir stations purporting
to be located outside the UAR;
in fact, however, all three
transmit from Egyptian soil.
On the air for relatively brief
periods daily, these clandestine
programs show great sensitivity
to developments in target
areas and frequently contrast
strongly in tone and content
with the regular services of
Radio Cairo.
Voice of the Arab Nation
The so-called Voice of the
Arab Nation is the UAR's current
medium for free-swinging psycho-
logical warfare against other
Arab governments. Since Syria's
break with the UAR last Septem-
ber, this station, in a feature
called. "The Filthy Hands," has
regularly been attacking the
ruling regimes of various other
Arab countries, vilifying their
leaders, and calling for revo-
lution.
This campaign proceeds
from last year's dismal ex-
perience with Syria, which led
Nasir to conclude that further
advance toward Arab unity and
Arab socialism will not be
possible until reactionary and
feudalistic Arab societies are
"reformed" from within. At-
tacks on Jordanian King Husayn--
often referred to as "the little
King" and as "Husayn Gardiner,"
an allusion to his marriage to
a British subject--have focused
on his alleged submissiveness
to British and American in-
fluence. As recently as 15
April, the Voice of the Arab
Nation was again calling on
the Jordanian Army "to revolt...
to rise against your enemy King
Husayn.... It is your duty to
finish him off. Destroy his
throne." During the same
transmission, the people of
Yemen were exhorted to "rise
against the despotic rule of
Imam Ahmad" and hang him.
The attack on the house
of Saud centers on the King,
who is represented as respon-
sible for rampant tyranny, cor-
ruption, nepotism, and sacrilege
in Saudi Arabia. Depicted as a
profligate "King of the harem"
and pawn of the United States,
Saud is constantly described
as engaged in financing under-
cover activities directed against
his neighbors at the expense
of the impoverished population
of his kingdom.
For purposes of "The
Filthy Hands" programs, Cairo
lumps Iraq with Jordan and Saudi
Arabia as countries in which the
people starve while the rulers
amass millions. Qasim is
customarily described as a
reclusive neurotic, totally
lacking in physical courage,
and is bitterly criticized as
an obstacle to Arab unity and
economic advance. Frequent
appeals directed primarily to
the Iraqi Army extol revolu-
tion as the path to true in-
dependence.
The Syrian Situation
The clandestine Voice of
the Arab Nation has played a
useful tactical role in Nasir's
recent handling of the Syrian
situation. In contrast to the
purposely restrained treatment
of Syrian developments in early
April by the Egyptian press
and regular radio services, the
Voice of the Arab Nation com-
mented freely and critically
on the motives and behavior
of the key figures involved.
Syrian President Qudsi and
Commander in Chief Zahr al-
Din were attacked as reaction-
aries trying to defeat the will
of the people as championed
by the pro-UAR factions in
Aleppo and elsewhere.
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Highly influential with the
Arab population of Zanzibar,
Cairo is trying to encourage
cooperation by that territory
in efforts to unify the Kenya
African independence movement.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In a broadcast on 19
April, the Voice of the Arab
Nation was still threatening,
"Until the Syrian Government
proves its true intentions
and its sincere desire to
realize the principles of the
Arab people in Syria--the
principles of unity and social-
ism--we will remain the rumbling
voice which speaks on behalf
of the millions of Arabs and
which exposes plots and con-
spiracies and combats treach-
eries."
On the air since 1957, the
clandestine Voice of Free Africa
is Cairo's outlet for unconven-
tional broadcasting to East and
Central Africa. In the past
it has been even more venomous
than the Voice of the Arab
Nation, at one time calling
on Africans to support the Mau
Mau in Kenya and inciting
wholesale murder of the "pig-
dog" whites in the "enslaved"
territories throughout the
region.
With the approach of in-
dependence in most of these
colonies, the Voice of Free
Africa has become more temperate,
although it still attempts to
preserve the fiction that it
is an East African station.
This is particularly useful
in connection with broadcasts
in support of various African
political movements espoused
by Cairo. The Voice of Free
Africa frequently broadcasts
speeches and articles purport-
ing to come from leading African
politicians, including Kenyatta
and Oginga Odinga of Kenya.
SET,
Cairo's latest venture
in clandestine broadcasting is
the Free Voice of Iran, which
carries propaganda in Persian
attacking the Shah's regime
on behalf of the left-wing
Iranian National Front and its
affiliated student movement.
In response to inquiries about
these broadcasts, Nasir has
not concealed their origin in
Egypt but has insisted that he
is only reacting to a campaign
against himself initiated by
the Iranians.
Vitriolic to an extreme,
some of the Free Voice of Iran
programs have probably been
furnished by National Front
representatives. In addition
to attacks on the Shah's
character and morals, they
include fairly circumstantial
references to the state of
relations between the Shah and
his principal ministers, and
show signs of access to some
detailed information on cur-
rent developments. A measure
of technical ingenuity was
displayed in a broadcast on
18 April referring to a US
intelligence agency report
allegedly warning against the
propagation of democracy in
Iran. As in Cairo's attacks
on Husayn and Saud, charges
that Western governments con-
trol the Shah's foreign and
domestic policies are linked 25X1
with open appeals for his
"liquidation" and the violent
overthrow of his regime.
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BRITISH AFRICAN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
The Macmillan government
is making new efforts to over-
come sharp internal conflicts
in its remaining East and Cen-
tral African colonies in order
to achieve orderly transitions
to independence. Senior cabinet
member R. A. Butler arrives on
11 May in the white-ruled
federation of the two Rhodesias
and Nyasaland in search of a
formula that will reduce Afri-
cans' hostility to federation
and allow some future associa-
tionof the three territories.
In East Africa, London must
cope with antagonisms among
non-European groups.
In the three West African
territories and in Tanganyika,
which have already completed
the transition, London faced
less difficult problems; there
were no sizable bodies of white
settlers, as in the Rhodesias
and Kenya, and tribal antagonisms
were less acute. Although the
Macmillan government has been
generally unyielding to pres-
sures by the white settler
groups through right-wing ele-
ments in the Conservative party,
such pressures must constantly
be taken into account.
Problems in the Federation
The white minority raises
particularly vexing issues in
Southern Rhodesia where--compris-
ing some 7 percent of the popu-
lation--it has had the respon-
sibility for internal self-gov-
ernment since 1923. Establish-
ment in 1953 of the Federation
of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland
was intended to bring economic
growth by joining Northern
Rhodesia's copper and Nyasa-
land's labor surplus with
Southern Rhodesia's coal and
secondary industries. Britain
also hoped the arrangement
would promote racial harmony
and especially block alignment
of Southern Rhodesia with South
Africa. Such hopes have
foundered on the growing mili-
tancy of African nationalists,
especially in Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia, who view the
Federation as designed to perpet-
uate white rule.
In the face of this African
hostility, London for some time
has recognized the impossibility
of retaining the Federation as
now constituted. It seeks, in-
stead, to salvage something
that will keep the territories
in association, with the same
economic and political goals in
mind.
In order to achieve an or-
derly review, Britain first had
to contain the most extreme
pressures for secession. London
appears to have achieved this
by a combination of reassurances
to Nyasaland's dominant African
nationalist, Hastings Banda,
that his secessionist views
would be heeded, and by a
constitutional concession to
the Africans of Northern Rhodesia.
In February the Colonial Office
shifted that colony's intricate
electoral rules slightly so as
to bring either a coalition gov-
ernment of Africans and liberal
whites or a slim African legis-
lative majority in the balloting
this fall.
In making this adjustment,
London stood firm against federal
Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky's
campaign to block any change.
Welensky's attempt to spark a
right-wing Tory revolt in London
fell flat, and left the Macmillan
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``'i SECRET `Mw
UAR
(EGYPT)
UGANDA
Oct 1962
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
Britain's African Territories _A
Former dependency now independent
(showing year of independence)
Dependency likely to receive independence
by 1965
TANGANYIKA
1961
government less restricted by
back-bench pressure than it had
been for the past year.
Macmillan took a further
step toward a Rhodesian solution
in mid-March when he centralized
responsibility for all affairs
in the Federation under Home
Secretary R. A. Butler. Pre-
viously, the federal government
and Southern Rhodesia had been
the responsibility of the Com-
monwealth Relations Office, and
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
had been under Reginald Maud-
ling's Colonial Office; dissension
and delays had followed this
arrangement.
Butler ranks second in the
cabinet to Macmillan, and his
reputation as a "modern Tory"
reformer should help his initial
dealings with the Africans.
Even Welensky has stated that
under Butler he expects greater
understanding than before.
Butler's two-week familiariza-
tion trip to the area is de-
scribed by the Economist as "of
greater significance than any
previous visit by a British min-
ister."
Prospects for a Solution
Butler arrives in a local
climate unusually favorable to
British policy. Welensky has
seriously weakened his position
by a series of miscalculations,
including the calling on 27
April of federal elections which
were boycotted by most elements
other than his own supporters.
In contrast, all major European
and African elements apparently
intend to contest this fall's
territorial elections in North-
ern Rhodesia.
Southern Rhodesian Prime
Minister Whitehead has gained
increasing stature as a moderate
by pioneering moves to bring
Africans into the political are-
na for the first time. In ter-
ritorial elections to be held
this October, a new constitution
allocates 15 out of 65 legisla-
tive seats to Africans; by regis-
tering in large numbers, they
may win up to five more. White-
head's recent approach to
Nyasaland's Banda to consider
possible future association of
the territories apparently was
cordially received.
Nevertheless, the deep
antagonisms within and between
the different racial communities
persist. The principal African
nationalist party is boycotting
the Southern Rhodesian elections.
Pre-election rivalry between
the two main African parties in
Northern Rhodesia has already
erupted into violence and caused
Butler to caution Kenneth Kaunda,
leader of the stronger party,
to restrain his followers.
Furthermore, the US Consulate
General in Salisbury notes that
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Welensky retains strong backing
from the white community and
controls the most important
security forces. It believes
Welensky is capable of a rash
act such as declaring the
Federation independent. Al-
though he could not make such
a declaration stick for long,
he could enforce his action
for the short term and probably
destroy the efforts of Britain
and moderates in the Federation
to bring the races closer to-
gether and preserve some of
the federal relationship.
The UN Investigating Committee
A new element worrying Brit-
ain is the heightened inter-
national interest in its han-
dling of both Rhodesias for the
UN's Committee of 17 on de-
colonization has singled them
out for attention. London fears
that the committee may disturb
the delicate balance of con-
flicting forces which gives
Britain its limited leverage
to promote an orderly transition
to independence.
Four cabinet members per-
sonally explained British policy
to a subcommittee of the Commit-
tee of 17 when it visited Lon-
don in mid-April. They sought
to impress it with Africans'
political gains and Britain's
lack of ability or intention to
suspend the new Southern Rhode-
sian constitution and impose one
giving the African majority a
greater role. The government's
efforts do not appear to have
succeeded, and Britain faces
the prospect that the committee's
activities will lead to exten-
sive discussions in the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Such discus-
sions might strengthen the re-
solve of the main African na-
tionalist group in Southern Rho-
desia to dissuade fellow Africans
from cooperating in the electoral
process, and it may bolster more
intransigent African elements
in Northern Rhodesia.
The UN's handling of this
problem could also have heavy
implications for London's cooper-
ation with the UN in Congo oper-
ations and more generally. The
UN committee's involvement has
already evoked considerable re-
sentment in Britain. The in-
fluential liberal, generally
anticolonial Guardian observed
that "Southern Rhodesia is in
better shape than at any time
since 1923" and warned that bad
handling by the committee could
produce "a situation worse than
the Congo." British officials
publicly and privately warn
that the government cannot
abrogate the constitution, as
the subcommittee recommended
on 30 April. The US Embassy
in London believes the govern-
ment is firmly resolved to
continue along present policy
lines.
In East Africa, Britain's
main problem is coping with dis-
sension within the non-European
community, following a decision
some two years ago that Kenya's
one-percent white minority would
have to make its way in an Af-
rican-dominated territory. Even
though internal dissension may
cause delays, the Macmillan
government is sticking to its
policy of moving these territories
toward independence as fast as
local conditions indicate a
reasonable prospect for future
order.
Rival Kenyan parties failed
to reach agreement in the seven-
week constitutional conference
that ended in early April. Their
differences proved so deep
that Colonial Secretary Maudling
took a half-step backward and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
gave the leadership of a closely
balanced coalition government
to the British Governor. This
is intended to be a short-lived
interim arrangement, pending a
compromise between Jomo Kenyatta's
Kenya African National Union
(KANU) --representing the Kikuyu
and other major tribes--and the
Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU), a grouping of the less-
er, mainly nomadic tribes. KANU
demands a strong unitary govern-
ment, whereas KADU wants regional
interests deeply entrenched in
a federal structure.
It would take little to
upset the balance. In order to
lessen personal antagonisms,
London has extended the leave
of the Governor, who only last
year assailed Kenyatta for his
role in the Mau Mau campaign,
so that the more conciliatory
acting governor can facilitate
cooperation. Britain refused
to give a portfolio to a KANU
extremist whose presence might
have aggravated tensions--a
stand Kenyatta accepted.
The acting governor hopes
that the two parties will face
the colony's political and eco-
nomic problems constructively
and so get into a habit of
cooperation that will lead to
agreement on a constitution.
The joining of the two parties
in the coalition government rep-
resents the largest measure of
harmony yet achieved in the col-
ony. Scheduling of further
steps toward independence awaits
their agreement, and also the
results of a fact-finding com-
mission London is appointing to
look into Somali separatism in
the Northern Frontier District.
A constitutional conference
on Zanzibar broke up in disarray
in early April because local
parties could not agree on a
basis for early independence.
London is allowing the present
limited self-government arrange-
ment to continue in this small
island protectorate. Last June,
it took four companies of British
troops to quell violence be-
tween the African majority
and the Arab minority, and with
the representatives of the Arabs
leading the coalition govern-
merit and the African masses in
opposition, tensions remain
high. The Colonial Office
plans to extend the franchise--
which will aid the Africans--
and appoint a commission to
delimit new constituency bound-
aries to prepare for further
moves toward independence at
a later date.
Uganda's independence is
scheduled for 9 October, but a
territorial dispute betweenthe two
tribal kingdoms threatens civil
strife in the months ahead.
A commission of the British
Privy Council recommended on
3 May that the disputed territory
be split between the kingdoms
of Buganda and Bunyoro. London
hopes this can be done quickly
so that the storm may die before
October. A constitutional con-
ference in London starting on
4 June will deal with the re-
maining controversies, includ-
ing the demands of four small
principalities for federal status
similar tothat accorded Buganda.
Meanwhile, delay in inde-
pendence in both East and Cen-
tral Africa involves continua-
tion of ultimate responsibility
for security and a prolongation
of Britain's military obliga-
tions. Although the Kenya base
may now be retained somewhat
longer than seemed likely a few
months ago, delays impose a
further demand on Britain's al-
ready strained military manpower
in Germany and elsewhere at a
time when the army is being re-
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