CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003700110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 7, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 77
OCI NO. 0433/62
7 Sept 62
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept. review completed
GROUP 1
Excluded from outom.:Itic
downgrading and
declassification
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 September 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 6 Sept)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Berlin: Moscow's failure to make an issue of the entry
point for its war memorial guards suggests that it wished
to avoid a test of Soviet access rights into West Berlin
prior to probable East German moves in the near future to
bar Allied military entry into East Berlin. Soviet authori-
ties are attempting to equate the USSR's right of access
to West Berlin with Allied access rights to the city.
UN tactics: Moscow's exploitation of the 30 August
U-2 incident in the Far East indicates that the Russians
may add this highly charged issue to a broader attack on
US "provocations" in Berlin, Cuba, and Asia at the forth-
coming General Assembly session. There were further signs
that Khrushchev may present the Soviet case personally.
Geneva talks: Although the Soviet delegate continued
to denounce the US and British draft test ban treaties,
he agreed to continue three-power test ban negotiations
while the disarmament conference is in recess until mid-
November.
Cuba: The USSR used a joint communique following
talks with two Cuban leaders to affirm its "right" to pro-
vide Cuba with military equipment and technicians.
Finland: After six years of sporadic negotiations,
the USSR has leased the Saimaa Canal, part of which runs
through Soviet territory, to Finland for 5 years.
IMPROVING SOVIET FIGHTER DEFENSES IN EAST GERMANY . . . . Page 4
The all-weather fighter intercept capability of the
Soviet tactical air army in East Germany has been improved
this summer by the introduction of a number of modified
Fishbed (MIG-21) aircraft
The recent deliveries are part of a general program ox im-
proving Soviet bloc fighter defenses which has been under
way since at least early 1960, and do not a ear to be in
reaction to heightened tension over Berlin.
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE SHELTER POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet Union apparently has decided that it can
carry on a useful civil defense program without building
massive deep-level bomb shelters. Present policy calls for
use of shelters already built, but stresses partial urban
evacuation, preparation of homemade fallout shelters, and
improvization of protection in caves, underpasses, interior
rooms of large buildings, and cellars.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
There have been no announced withdrawals of North
Vietnamese personnel since the evacuation of 15 "technicians
and advisers" on 27 August. While significant numbers of
North Vietnamese appear to have been covertly withdrawn
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 September 1962
from Laos during the past month, substantial elements prob-
ably remain, either in se orate units or as LJEt]2~. )f P-
-Lao units.
The coalition government
on 4 September approved the establishment of diplomatic
relations with a number of Communist countries, including
China, East Germany, and North Vietnam,
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The re-establishment of the political bureau in Algiers
is a significant victory for Ben Bella. Since Wilaya IV
troops no longer control the city, the political bureau
should be able to operate more effectively than before, and
if Ben Bella quickly restores order he will have the solid
support of most of the population. He may have to make
further compromises with powerful opponents such as Belkacem
Krim and Mohamed Boudiaf, however, and the basic question
of the political role of the army remains unresolved.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Tshomb6 on 3 September said the UN-sponsored plan pro-
vided "the basis" for a settlement, but he obviously hopes
to get the UN and Leopoldville bogged down in further negotia-
tions on the specifics. The UN, nevertheless, proceeding
as though Tshombc had in fact accepted the plan, is urging
rapid implementation. Leopoldville's attempts to establish
a separate northern Katanga province may become a major
issue between Adoula and Tshombd, and sporadic fighting
between Congolese and Katangan forces continues there. Pres-
sure for the release of Gizenga is still rising in Leopold-
ville.
PORTUGAL'S RELATIONS WITH THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Portuguese officials are increasingly concerned about
Leopoldville's extension of aid to Angolan rebels in the
Congo. Lisbon is considering economic sanctions against
the Congolese. Military action cannot be ruled out, partic-
ularly if the Salazar regime should become convinced of
the necessity of a military "victory" to stifle domestic
discontent over the mounting costs of the Angola campaign.
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7 September 19602
DEVELOPMENTS IN DENMARK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Jens Otto Krag, who replaced the ailing Viggo Kampmann
as Denmark's prime minister on 3 September, will make no
marked changes in foreign and defense Policies. He faces
increasing difficulties on the domestic front, however.
Factionalism within his own Social Democratic party is
growing, and the popularity of the coalition government has
declined. Such impending matters as t'he farm price problem
and national labor negotiations will place further strains
on the government and may lead to a reorganization.
COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The Commonwealth prime ministers' conference opening
in London on 10 September will be dominated by the question
of British membership in the European Common Market. Although
the meeting will be purely consultative, attitudes ex-
pressed there on this issue will influence political opinion
in Britain.
PRE-ELECTORAL TENSIONS IN NICARAGUA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Nicaragua's preparations for presidential and congres-
sional elections next February are already increasing the
bitter rivalry between the two major parties. There is a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 September 1963
strong possibility of violence before or immediately after
the elections which Communist and pro-Castro elements could
exploit. Small bands of Communist-led guerrillas--some
recently trained in Cuba--ma already be gatherin in re-
mote areas.
BRAZILIANS EXPECT MID-SEPTEMBER CRISIS . . . . . . . . . Page 21
Political tensions in Brazil may come to a head between
10 and 15 September, when Congress is scheduled to consider
President Goulart's demand for a plebiscite on restoration
of a strong presidency. On 3 September moderate Finance
Minister Walter Moreira Salles resigned, publicly criticiz-
ing the government's financial policies. Leading pro-Com-
munist Leonel Brizola and anti-Communist Carlos Lacerda,
state governors, are making violent speeches which are
causing widespread reaction. With campaigning under way
for congressional elections on 7 October, there is con-
siderable doubt that a quorum can be assembled at Brasilia.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . Page 1
Nationalist China is making a determined fort to
maintain the edge it gained in the UN General Assembly last
year when the Soviet proposal to oust Taipei and admit
Peiping was decisively defeated. The continuing support
of the African states, particularly the Brazzaville group,
is essential for Taipei's success at the session opening
tember.
The USSR is ex-
pected to resume its efforts toward Pei.ping's admission.
This year, however, the Soviets may concentrate on the
tactic of seeking rejection of the Taipei delegation's
credentials. This would be a procedural question needing
only a majority vote for approval, whereas the ouster of
Nationalist China and admission of Peiping would be an "im-
portant question" and would re uire a two-thirds vote to
pass.
INDIA'S ECONOMY UNDER THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . Page 4
During the first 18 months of India's $25 billion Third
Five-Year Plan the economy has not measured up to the goals
set, although its performance has been good even by Western
standards. Administrative remedies are being applied to
break bottlenecks, boost production, and conserve fast-
dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Major reductions in
plan targets appear unavoidable.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
The USSR marked time last
week on further major steps in
the Berlin situation. Soviet
military authorities in East
Germany complied with the Western
commandants' instructions that
Soviet vehicles transporting
guards to and from the Soviet
war memorial in West Berlin
should use either the Branden-
burg Gate or Sandkrug Bridge
entry points in the British sec-
tor, rather than Friedrichstrasse
in the US sector. Soviet com-
pliance involved an implicit
disregard of East German decrees
designating Friedrichstrasse as
the only crossing point for
foreigners, including personnel
of the four powers in both parts
of Berlin.
The Soviet decision not to
make an issue of this point was
probably prompted by Moscow's
desire to maintain its presence
in West Berlin, at least for the
time being, and to avoid any
test of Soviet access rights to
West Berlin prior to probable
East German moves in the near
future to bar Allied military
entry into East Berlin.
The strongly worded Soviet
note of 5 September, which re-
jected Western proposals of 24
and 27 August for four-power
talks to ease Berlin tensions,
apparently was designed to pro-
vide justification for East
German measures to incorporate
East Berlin in the GDR and to
impose new restrictions on
Allied entry into East Berlin.
The note catalogued a variety
of alleged Western aggressive
acts in West Berlin and repeated
Moscow's demand for ending the
occupation regime, liquidating
the "NATO military base," and
withdrawing Western troops from
West Berlin.
Soviet leaders undoubtedly
recognize that East German meas-
ures to close East Berlin to
Allied traffic will almost
certainly produce Western retali-
atory steps to exclude the USSR
from West Berlin. In an effort
to deter such Western reprisals,
Soviet military authorities in
East Germany are continuing
vigorous efforts to equate the
USSR's right of access to West
Berlin with Allied access rights
to the city.
If the Western powers,
however, proceed with action
to exclude the USSR from West
Berlin in response to East
German moves to bloc Allied
entry into East Berlin, Soviet
retaliatory measures may in-
clude associating the East
Germans with Soviet control
procedures at autobahn check-
points. This would be con-
sistent with present Soviet
tactics directed at achieving
the main objectives of the
separate peace treaty by gradual
unilateral actions.
Soviet Plans for UN Assembly
Moscow is exploiting the
incident involving a U-2 air-
craft which the US acknowledged
may have unintentionally violated
Soviet air space in the Far East
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on 30 August. Although Moscow
could have confined its reaction
to a private, oral protest, it
chose to send a harshly worded
note which recalled US "perfidy"
in the U-2 incident of May 1960
and emphasized that previous
Soviet warnings of "retaliatory
measures" against U-2 bases in
foreign countries "remain fully
in force."
The USSR reserved the right
to raise the question of "US ag-
gressive actions" at the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. The Soviet leaders
presumably believe that by add-
ing the highly charged U-2 issue
to a broader attack on US "provo-
cations" in Berlin, Cuba, and
the Far East, they will place the
US on the defensive in UN debate.
They would hope thereby to gen-
erate strong pressures among
smaller UN members for a more
forthcoming Western attitude
on negotiations with the USSR,
particularly on Berlin.
Geneva Disarmament Talks
The Soviet delegate in
Geneva has continued his efforts
to discredit the two draft trea-
ties for banning nuclear tests
submitted by the US and Britain.
He stressed that they are not
based an the "compromise" pro-
posal offered by the eight non-
aligned powers at Geneva last
April. He contended that the
USSR is ready to meet the US
and Britain half way and con-
clude a treaty banning tests
in the atmosphere, outer space,
and under water, with a
moratorium on underground tests
while negotiations proceed on
the latter problem. He rejected
the Western drafts as a basis
for further talks, arguing that
the Western position had not
changed since the proposals of
April 1961.
The Soviet delegate agreed
on 5 September to continue three-
power test ban talks while the
formal disarmament conference
is in recess for the UN General
Assembly.
In contrast with Soviet
pronouncements last week which
stressed the nonmilitary nature
of Soviet shipments to Cuba,
the 2 September communique is-
sued at the end of the Moscow
visit by ranking Cuban leaders
Che Guevara and Emilio Aragones
vigorously affirmed the USSR's
"right" to provide Cuba with
military equipment and technicians
to help counter threats from
"aggressive imperialist quarters."
The communique stated that the
USSR, in response to Cuban re-
quests for assistance, agreed
that "as long as threats from
the aforementioned quarters
continue, the Cuban republic
has every right to adopt measures
to guarantee its security.. .and
all sincere friends of Cuba
will. have full right to accede
to these legitimate demands."
The statement also refer-
red to Soviet commitments to
support the long-term economic
development of Cuba by assisting
in the establishment of iron
and steel industries and by con-
tiniiing technical assistance
in agriculture, irrigation,
hydroelectric power, and other
fields. The communique re-
flected both Cuban pressure
for renewed public support and
Moscow's desire to respond to
the publicity the US has been
giving the influx of Soviet
military equipment and personnel
into Cuba since late July.
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Soviet propaganda continues
to charge that the US is prepar-
ing another invasion attempt
and to hint that the USSR will
raise the issue of "dangerous
US machinations in the Carib-
bean" at the UN. Moscow has
also ridiculed speculation in
the West that the USSR is send-
ing military forces to Cuba and
setting up military bases. A
broadcast on 1 September said
there is only one military base
in Cuba--Guantanamo--and alleged
that US efforts to "invent" the
presence of Soviet bases and
demands for invoking the "de-
funct" Monroe Doctrine are aimed
at providing a pretext for
"crushing revolutionary Cuba."
Moscow radio called on the
US to abandon its "adventurous
policy" and to model its rela-
tions with Cuba on the USSR's
policy of peaceful coexistence
with such neighbors as Iran
and Turk-y, which not only re-
ceive US military aid but belong
to US-led military alliances
and have US military bases on
their territories. Moscow
pointedly noted that Cuba is
not a member of the Warsaw Pact
and that there are no Soviet
bases on its territory.
Soviet-Finnish Relations
The recent Soviet-Finnish
agreement on the leasing of the
Saimaa Canal to Finland for 50
years marks the end of over six
years of sporadic bargaining.
The canal, which connects the
Finnish inland lake system with
the Gulf of Finland and the
Baltic Sea, runs partly through
territory which the USSR annexed
during World War II. According
to the terms of the agreement,
Finland must pay the cost of
modernizing the canal--a task
which the Finnish press concludes
will not be completed before 1966
at the earliest. All Finnish
ships, except warships, will be
entitled to use the canal, as
will merchant ships of other
countries. The USSR, however,
reserved the right to deny pas-
sage "in exceptional circumstan-
ces" to all third-party ships
through the Soviet section of the
carnal.
Moscow probably believes
this agreement will both strengthen
President Kekkonen's leader-
ship in Finland and advance So-
viet interests in acquiring a
stronger voice in Finnish for-
eign policy decisions. Kekkonen,
for his part, probably considers
the agreement further proof of
his unique ability to conduct
relations with the USSR in such
a way as to retain Soviet con-
fidence without jeopardizing
Finland's independence.
Although the decision has
not excited the Finnish public,
in large part because of the
doubtful economic feasibility of
the project, a leading newspaper
of Xekkonen's Agrarian party
has lauded the "historical do-
cumeent" and exhorted all Finns
to remember that it marked the
first time since World War II
that a great power has sur-
rendered an area to a defeated
nation." The Saimaa Canal proj-
ect is largely an Agrarian party
political enterprise and con-
tinues to arouse considerable
political appeal among voters
in southeast and east-central
Finland despite its economic
shortcomings. In addition, many
displaced Karelians who lost
part of their homeland to the
USSR in 1944 have nurtured the
hope that any settlement of the
Saimaa Canal issue might provide
an opening wedge for eventual re-
covery of this area west of the
canal.
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IMPROVING SOVIET FIGHTER DEFENSES IN EAST GERMANY
The all-weather fighter
intercept capability of the
Soviet tactical air army in
East Germany has been improved
this summer by the introduction
of a number of modified Fish-
bed (MIG-2l)aircraft.
These new aircraft have
IPro a y e er equ p-
ment, and possibly better per-
formance than the Mach 2 Fish-
bed-C ground-attack fighters
previously assigned to Soviet
tactical units in East Germany.
The older Fishbeds have "range
only" radar which limits air
intercepts to conditions of
good visibility. Unitil the new
MIG-21s arrived, the only fight-
ers in East Germany possessing
any all-weather intercept capa-
bility had been a few variants
of the aging Fresco (MIG-17),
some Farmers (MIG-19s), and the
subsonic flashlight (YAK-25).
The recent deliveries do not
appear to be caused by heightened
tension over Berlin but rather
are to strengthen the air defense
capability of the Soviet tactical
air forces in East Germany. A
general program of improving
fighter defenses has been under
way since at least early 1960
and has included the introduction
of sizable numbers of newer type
fighter aircraft throughout the
Soviet bloc. Delivery of the im-
proved MIGs to Soviet units in
East Germany has resulted in the
transfer of some of their approxi-
mately 100 Fishbed-Cs to the
East German Air Force. Continuing
7 Sept 62
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deployment of the modified MIG-
21s is expected to permit more
such transfers.
At the Moscow air show in
July 1961, the Soviets had
displayed a MIG-21 with a larger
nose-cone than those noted on
the Fishbed-Cs being assigned
FISHBED C Shown carrying two infra-
red air- to-air missles and extra fuel tank.
MODIFIED FISHBED (MIG-21) Distc~5X1
photo showing enlarged nose-cone
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to operational units at that
time. Sightings of these air-
craft in East Germany were
first reported on 5 June 1962.
Other new aircraft delivered
to Soviet units in East Germany
during the past year have in-
cluded a number of Fitter air-
craft, believed intended for
ground attack roles, and the
Firebar A, which is probably
a tactical fighter/bomber.
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE SHELTER POLICY
A debate on Soviet civil
defense shelter policy ap-
parently has been resolved in
favor of a continued civil de-
fense effort using a variety of
protective measures. These
would include partial urban
evacuation, use of existing
bomb shelters, preparation of
homemade fallout shelters,
and improvization of protection
in caves, underpasses, interior
rooms of large buildings, and.
cellars.
The crux of the debate
since then has been whether a
civil defense program without
heavy blast shelters would pro-
vide useful protection under
conditions of atomic attack.
Two articles early this year in
the journal of the Soviet para-
military society, DOSAAF, are
representative of the viewpoint
which seems to have been adopted.
One, by Colonel General O. V.
Tolstikov, a civil defense of-
ficial, stated: "The appearance
of new superpowerful types of
weapons of mass destruction have
produced erroneous views among
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Shelter protects shelter dugout distance, covered from, epicenter pro
near the explosion affords protection
trench affords tection is afforded by,`
Only underground shelters
protect at epicenter of the
Variety of shelters as illustrated in Soviet Civil Defense Handbook
certain comrades ...who have as-
sumed that protective measures
include only the construction
of shelters and have ignored
other ways and means of defense."
This viewpoint was seconded by
a lieutenant general of the
Engineering Troops, who wrote
that those who think only of
shelters built deep under-
ground are incompetent and in
error.
The well-publicized fifth
DOSAAF congress held in May also
endorsed a continuing and im-
proved civil defense program
utilizing a mixture of pro-
tective measures; it appeared
to signal the end to most of the
controversy. Any doubts as to
the validity of a civil defense
effort were probably dispelled
by Marshal V. I. Chuikov's
statement at the congress:
"Civil defense now must be con-
sidered one of the basic elements
in over-all preparations of the
country for defense."
The present concept of
protection avoids the lengthy
construction times and heavy
resource allocations associated
with massive deep-level shelters,
while providing some type of
protection for everyone in both
urban and rural areas. It does
not, however, exclude the pos-
sibility that some good shelter
is being prepared in cities to
protect personnel of important
factories, communications or
control groups.
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Since the 27 August evac-
uation by air of 15 "technicians
and advisers" from the Plaine
des Jarres, there have been no
further withdrawals of North
Vietnamese personnel through the
designated checkpoint there or
the one at Nhommarath. Commu-
nist propaganda has been claim-
ing that most--if not all--of
the North Vietnamese in Laos
have already departed. In any
additional "checkpoint" with-
drawals, the numbers involved
probably will be small and
amount to no more than a token
gesture toward fulfillment of
the Geneva accords.
There are increasing indica-
tions that significant numbers
of North Vietnamese were covert-
ly withdrawn from Laos during
the latter part of August. There
is likewise considerable evi-
dence that substantial numbers
remain, either in separate units
or as part of Pathet Lao units.
(North
vrecaamese orces are continuing
to aid the Pathet Lao in their
efforts to consolidate control
over areas surrounding the pro-
vincial capitals.
Meanwhile the three-faction
coalition government, in which
each group possesses a veto,;has
made little progress toward civil
and military integration or to-
ward demobilization of surplus
forces. A committee established
in early July to draw up a cease-
fire agreement has been hamstrung
by factional differences. Two
commissions formed at the same
time for the study of military
andl administrative unification
procedures have also failed to
reach any conclusions yet.
However, a turnover of min-
isterial functions at the national
level by the former Boun Oum
cabinet officials to ministers
of the coalition regime occurred
on 27 August. Some progress
also appears to have been made
regarding membership in inter-
national organizations, reestab-
lishment of internal communica-
tions, appointment of represent-
atives abroad,, and. preliminary
planning for foreign aid pro-
grams.
to honor the Ulbricht regime.
first non-Communist country so
The coalition government
on .4 September approved the
establishment of diplomatic
relations with a number of
Communist countries including
China, East Germany, and North
Vietnam. While this action is
consonant with Souvanna's neu-
tralist foreign policy, it
represents a substantial boost
to the Communists in the contin-
uing "divided nations" contro-
versy. The full diplomatic
recognition planned for East
Germany would make Laos the
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The re-establishment of
the political bureau in Algiers
is a significant victory for
Ben Bella. Since Wilaya IV
troops no longer control the
city, the political bureau
should be able to operate more
effectively than before, and if
Ben Bella quickly restores order
he will have the solid support
of most of the population. He
may have to make further com-
promises with powerful opponents
such as Belkacem Krim and Mohamed
Boudiaf, however, and the basic
question of the political role
of the army remains unresolved.
The US Consulate General
in Algiers feels that Ben Bella's
victory was due to the overwhelm-
ing strength of the military
forces at his disposal and their
evident willingness to advance
into Wilaya IV territory, to
the firm control his followers
had attained in the Algiers
casbah, and to Wilaya III's de-
sire to avoid civil war. All
leaders concerned probably also
realized that public opinion
would not support civil war or
a prolonged crisis with various
factions attempting to outface
each other.
So far neither Krim nor
Boudiaf has reaffirmed support
for the political bureau, and
Wilaya III--the Kabylie region
east of Algiers--and the troops
SECRET
there are still firmly under
the control of these two men.
This area reportedly has the
most effective administration
in the country, and there is
excellent cooperation between
Krim and the military commander.
Even before independence there
was a strong desire among the
Berber population of the Kabylie
for a large degree of local
autonomy. Ben Bella is unlikely
to attempt military operations
in Wilaya III territory, a
rugged area which the French
Army never completely subdued.
Ben Bella and the political
bureau are obviously indebted to
Algerian Liberation Army
military district boundary
STAT
7 Sept 62 f.IT\T 1lT