(UNTITLED)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
38
Document Creation Date: 
January 12, 2017
Document Release Date: 
April 25, 2011
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 14, 1962
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0.pdf3.18 MB
Body: 
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 aw 10"t, SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY' COPY NO. 72 OCI NO. 0434/62 14 Sept 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ` I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 SECRET *NW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 September 1962 T 11 E W E E K I N B R I E F (Information as of 1200 EDT 13 Sept) SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 Although Moscow's statement of 11 September on Cuba was designed to advance a variety of Soviet objectives, the most immediate aim was to deter the US from active interven- tion in Cuba. While the statement again avoided a specific commitment to defend Cuba, it further engaged the USSR's prestige in ensuring the survival of the Castro regime. The statement conveyed an indirect assurance that Moscow does not intend to confront the US with simultaneous challenges in both Cuba and Berlin. The Soviet leaders ap- parently envisage a hiatus in serious Berlin talks until late this year. This will provide time for them to assess the impact on the West's negotiating position of attacks on US "aggressive actions" at the UN as well as of probable maneuvers to involve the UN in a Berlin settlement. Moscow may attempt to strengthen its position in the UN disarmament debate by introducing a new test-ban pro- posal based on the "compromise" plan advanced at Geneva last April by the eight nonaligned nations. SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 The flow of Soviet military equipment and personnel o Cuba continues.r Soviet MIG-21 (Fishbedl) single-jet interceptors have also arrived in the current deliveries, as well as tanks, artillery, and large amounts of transportation equip- ment. OAS ATTITUDES ON CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5 Most Latin American governments are apparently willing to have foreign ministers meet this month or early in October to discuss the Soviet presence in Cuba, but prefer an in- formal meeting rather than invoking the formal machinery of the organization of American States. Peru and several others will not attend if Venezuela persists in demands that the meeting should also discuss military coups. Bra- zil and Mexico are willing to participate but will probaby be reluctant to endorse any joint action against Cuba. SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 September 1962 SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7 Prospects for Sino-Indian talks this fall, even on pro- cedural matters, are dim in view of Peiping's recent charge that New Delhi is seeking to use "phony negotiations" to cloak military pressure against China along the disputed border. Skirmishes may recur in the next four or five weeks, after which weather conditions will force a reduction in forward patrolling. .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 8 The new Yugoslav constitution, to be made public on 20 September and adopted before the end of the year, aims to improve governmental efficiency, institutionalize the re- gime's unique internal system, and provide for the orderly transfer of power after Tito's death. Some of its provisions, however, will probably cause conflicts within the regime and between the republics and the federal government. The document will be opposed in the bloc on ideological grounds, but Moscow will probably refrain from attacking Belgrade with vigor in the interest of continuing their rapprochement. ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10 The authority of Ben Bella and his political bureau is not being openly challenged--at least for the moment. Algerian Popular Army chief Colonel Boumedienne and his military staff are potential challengers, however, while Ben Bella's opponents in Wilayas III and IV retain their troops and arms. Ben Bella is trying to reassure European interests, but these as well as the French Government are awaiting clearer si ns of what his economic program will be. r CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11 UN chief representative Gardiner has presented to Adoula and Tshombd the schedule of specific steps to get Katangan reintegration under way. Progress is likely to be slow. The Leopoldville-Katangan joint commissions en- visaged in the plan are almost certain to become involved in lengthy palaver. The draft federal. constitution is nearly completed, but UN officials are already concerned that the Congolese parliament may not ratify it. Congolese and Katangan military forces, meanwhile, continue to jockey for position in northern Katanga. The release from detention of South Kasai "King" Albert Kalonji may presage the release of leftist former Stanleyville leader Gizenga. LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1.3 There are continuing indications that North Vietnamese troops in Laos have been pulled back from forward areas, but there is no further evidence that significant numbers have actually been withdrawn. At least some North Vietnamese forces appear to be remaining to bolster the Pathet Lao. SECRET BRIEFS Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 September 1962 Meanwhile, Souvanna is on a tour of several rightist-held towns, probably in an effort to drum up popular support for the coalition government. The government now is in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and Communist China, but apparently has de- ferred exchanging diplomatic missions with East Germany and North Korea. SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 Viet Cong guerrilla activity has again increased after several weeks of decline. Small-scale attacks continue against the government's regular and paramilitary forces, along with sabotage of road and rail facilities. The Viet Cong, despite losses inflicted by increasingly effective government security operations, retain a capabilit to make coordinated attacks using several battalions. CEYLON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 Prime Minister Bandaranaike's failure to make any signif- icant headway in the economic sphere during her two-year rule is creating serious political. problems for the gov- ernment. The regime seems able to withstand the current political wrangling within its own ranks but may be losing some of its original strong popular support. IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . Page 17 The gradual erosion of Prime Minister Qasim's support continues. Opposition elements are still disorganized, however, and are kept off balance by Qasim's policy of playing off his antagonists against each other. The army's failure to suppress the Kurdish rebellion is increasing dis- satisfaction among army leaders, who might attempt a coup to save face. Assassination is the most likely means of removing Qasim. BRITISH GUIANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 Political maneuvering is growing more intense in ad- vance of the London conference on independence, now con- templated for late October. Dissatisfaction with Premier Jagan seems to be increasing among the East Indian popula- tion, although not to the point of challenging his leader- ship of the People's Progressive Party. The opposition to him remains seriously divided and unable to agree on a position to take at the forthcoming conference. Meanwhile, the country's economic position continues to deteriorate. SECRET iii BR I EFS Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Awi wvnul 7kow 14 September 1962 Osten Unden, Sweden's foreign minister since 1945 and widely regarded as the architect of its alliance-free foreign policy, is to retire later this month and will probably be succeeded by another Social Democratic leader, Torsten Nilsson. Nilsson, a former minister of defense, is staunchly pro-Western. He is not :Likely to advocate any marked changes in foreign policy, but he will probably adopt a more flexible attitude about cooperating with Western Europe. In the absence of prospects for an agree- ment on disarmament, he will probably support those ele- ments in the cabinet and the party which favor Sweden's acquiring an independent nuclear weapons capability. Page DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO WEST GERMANY . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 20 During his 4-9 September tour of West Germany, De Gaulle went to extraordinary lengths, even for him, to win popular support for himself and his European policy. Bilateral cooperation between France and West Germany will probably become even closer than before. However, some of De Gaulle's statements have stiffened Benelux opposition to his concept of a loose European confederation with the Bonn-Paris alliance at its center. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21 Mounting interest in De Gaulle's prospective announce- ment of a referendum on a proposal to elect his successor by universal suffrage overshadows the senatorial elections of 23 September, in which no noteworthy shifts are expected. The minor cabinet reshuffle announced on 11 September has led to some speculation that De Gaulle is grooming a suc- cessor to Premier Pompidou. THE EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The armed forces of East Germany, with Soviet assistance, have continued a gradual buildup which is probably intended chiefly to make East Germany a more effective member of the Warsaw Pact alliance. They now have a capability for con- ducting limited defensive operations and maintaining order within the country except in the event of widespread revolt. Khrushchev's threats to conclude a peace treaty with the Ul-' bricht regime have not been accompanied by any substantially increased flow of Soviet military aid or other sudden in- crease in Fast Germany's armed strength. KHRUSHCHEV, CEMA, AND THE CHINESE . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6 In a recent major policy statem ent,Khrushchev has clarified the double task which he envisages for the Com- munist bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). SECRET iv BRIEFS Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET Vad 14 September 1962 He is planning to have CEMA take a more active role in achieving the economic integration of its member states as one means of countering the growing: impact of the European Common Market (EEC). He is also ustng it to exert economic pressures on those Communist countries, led by the Chinese, which were excluded from membership at the June meeting of CEMA because they refuse to fully sup- port the Soviet Union. Peiping's response has been to renew its polemical attacks on Khrushchev':s leadership and views. SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 %W-11 I 11%W SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Moscow's statement of 11 September on Cuba-was designed to advance a variety of Soviet objectives, foremost among them being to deter the US from active intervention in Cuba. It was intended'as the USSR's response to President Kennedy's request for authority to mobilize reserves--a move which the Soviet leaders felt called for a strong reaffirmation of their support for Castro. Although this statement, like previous Soviet pronouncements on Cuba, used vague and ambiguous language to avoid a clear-cut commitment to defend the island in all contingencies, it has further engaged Soviet prestige in ensuring the survival of the Castro regime. Moscow carefully refrained from spelling out its precise reactions in the event of an attack on Cuba. In some respects, the statement was less specific than previous Soviet warnings, such as. that contained in Khrushchev's letter of 18 April 1961 to President Kennedy. As before, however, Moscow at- tempted to create the impression that Cuba .is under the protection of the full range of Soviet nu- clear and missile power. In addition to the deterrent effect, the Soviet statement was calculated to enable Moscow to claim full credit for having protected Cuba if no US-supported invasion or interference with Soviet shipping materializes. The Russians apparently were also seeking to check growing concern in the US and Latin America over Soviet intentions in Cuba. The statement stressed the defensive nature of Soviet military equipment being fur- nished the Cubans and implicitly denied any intention to establish Soviet military bases in Cuba. In this connection, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin told Am- bas;sador Stevenson on 6 Sep- tember that only defensive weap- ons; were being. shipped and that both the Cubans and Russians were.genuinely apprehensive over a possible US attack on Cuba. The statement, moreover, con- veyed an indirect assurance that Moscow will not confront the US with simultaneous challenges in both.Cuba and Berlin. At the same time, however, the USSR strongly advanced the argument that it has a right to provide military assistance to Cuba and cited the.existence of US military alliances and bases on the periphery of the Sino- Soviet bloc and the presence of American fleets in the Medi- terranean and the Taiwan Strait. The statement reflected the So- viet leaders' long-standing de- sire to "settle old accounts" with the US by establishing a military and political presence close to the US in an area which traditionally has been an Amer- can sphere of influence. Mos- cow's policy toward Cuba has been strongly influenced by this desire to establish the USSR's claim to great-power equality with the US. Although the statement was brusque and threatening regard- ing Cuba, it was moderate on Berlin. Moscow apparently in- tends to launch a strong attack on US policy at the UN General Assembly. The Soviet leaders appear to recognize that these tactics will rule out any prog- ress in the Berlin talks for the time being. The statement tacitly acknowledged this by noting that a "pause now has SECRET 14 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 'INV SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY been reached" in these talks and by observing that it is "diffi- cult" for the US to negotiate during an election campaign. Although Moscow reiterated. the usual line that it favors the "earliest conclusion" of a German peace treaty and. a Berlin settlement, the Soviet leaders probably do not wish to break off diplomatic contact altogether. They probably envisage a resump- tion of high-level talks on Berlin late this year. They may feel that, in the meantime, propaganda denunciation of US "aggressive actions" will enable them to further delay a sep- arate peace treaty with East Germany without appearing to re- treat on this issue. Such a de- lay would also permit them to assess the impact on the West's negotiating position of this propaganda offensive as well as of probable maneuvers on their part to involve the UN in a Ber- lin settlement. Dobrynin informed Ambassador Stevenson that Khrushchev would not attend the UN General As- sembly before mid-November, but left the impression that no fi- nal decision had, been reached and that there was more than a possibility that the Soviet pre- mier will come to New York. Dobrynin said Foreign Minister Gromyko would deliver the So- viet speech during the Assembly's general debate. Local Berlin Developments Soviet authorities in East Germany continued to comply with Western instructions on trans- porting their guards to and from the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin. There have been no incidents to date. The Soviet officer in charge of the guard. convoy, however, re- fused to acknowledge a Western request on 10 September that the guards be transported in buses rather than in armored personnel carriers. He asserted that any communication must be addressed to General Yakubovsky, chief of the Soviet forces in East Germany. The Soviets nevertheless, are evidently preparing to comply with the Allied request. A Soviet Embassy spokesman made a statement to this effect in a background briefing to a West German correspondent. He as- serted that the use of the armored personnel carriers was necessary for the protection of the guards and implied, that, if the security of the guards could be assured, they could return to the use of buses. Allied military convoys have not experienced any difficulties or delays in transiting the au- tobahn, despite Soviet hints to retaliate against Western access. De Gaulle Visit to West Germany Soviet propaganda on De Gaulle's visit to West Germany has attacked the French for "following in the wake of Bonn" on major international issues. Moscow claimed,to be surprised at the "naivete" of French leaders who think that Paris and not Bonn will dominate the close alignment between the two countries. Moscow gave wide coverage to De Gaulle's appeal for a "dam" against the USSR and. asserted, that French policy on a military and political union with West Germany is "shortsighted and dangerous." It charged that France plans to harness its nuclear capacity to West German "revanchism." SECRET 14 0.-....+ cn T17TTS77 v rrr, T1a? ^ of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET 4VOW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The USSR continues, however, to avoid attacks on De Gaulle personally. Disarmament and Nuclear Test Ban At the final session of the Geneva disarmament conference prior to the recess, Soviet dele- gate Kuznetsov delivered a harsh indictment of US policy, charg- ing that the US was seeking to expand the arms race and. planning preventive war. He and the satellite delegates insisted that no progress had been achieved since the opening of the con- ference and blamed the US for the impasse. Kuznetsov charged that the US aimed to undermine Soviet security by proposing a reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles while at the same time maintain- ing US bases abroad. He rejected all Western control proposals on the ground, that they were designed to give the West military ad.- vantages over the USSR. The Soviet delegate also reaffirmed the standard Soviet position on a test ban and termed the US and British position as "tough and uncompromising." He charged. that the US and Britain were unwilling to take as a basis for negotiations the "com- promise" memorandum of the eight nonaligned powers. In an informal meeting with the US delegate on 7 September, Kuznetsov firmly indicated that the USSR will not compromise on the question of obligatory on- site inspection under any test- ban agreement. He attempted to play up the importance of Soviet acceptance of an international commission, claiming that this had only been achieved after several days' debate in the So- viet party central committee. He expressed confidence that the Soviet Union would issue irlvita- tions for on-site inspection if the commission, after.consulta- tion, was not satisfied about the nature of any suspected, seismic events. He stated, however, that the USSR could not commit itself in advance to issue the invitation in each and every instance. Kuznetsov's remarks to Am- bassador Dean and Soviet propa- ganda stress on the neutralists' "compromise" memorandum suggest that the USSR may be drafting a treaty based on the memorandum for presentation during the UN discussion of the test ban issue. Moscow probably feels that this draft, which would modify the Sov.et.d.raft treaty of November 1961 and provide for invitational on-site inspection of suspicious events, will place the USSR in a better position during the debate and will draw considerable support from the uncommitted nations. The Soviets are probably confident that, given the US announcement of more high-altitude tests, there will. be a neutralist move at the UN fora ban on atmospheric, under- water, and outer-space tests,cou- pled with an uncontrolled morato- rium on underground testing. Congo Soviet reaction to the UN Congo reunification plan indicates that while Moscow seeks to main- tain overt good relations with the Adoula government, the primary So- viet interest continues to lie in an enduring political instability in the Congo. Characterizing the plan'as a Western "conspiracy," Moscow declared that thefionly function of the UN is to neu- tralize foreign interests in Ka- tanga, a task which should require no more than a month, after which time the UN should withdraw. This renewed. note of urgency in Moscow reflects Soviet sensi- tivity to the possibility of a solution of the Congo problem under Western auspices and may presage Soviet efforts to end the UN Congo operation at the forth- coming UN General Assembly meeting.__... SECRET 1.4 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Pace 3 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 NOW SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA The flow of Soviet mili- tary equipment and personnel to Cuba continues. As of 8 Septem- ber Soviet ships were still leaving the USSR with military cargoes for Cuba, many of them now making their second voyages in the current series of ship- ments. Another Soviet passen- ger vessel disembarked person- nel in Cuba this. week, raising the total number of Soviet per- sonnel believed to have arrived in connection with the current shipments to at least 3,500 and possibly many more. Current Soviet deliveries also have included additional combat aircraft.) 125X1 at least one Soviet MIG-21 (Fish- bed) single-jet interceptor had been assembled at Santa Clara airfield, and 25X1 the total num- 25X1 ber of MIG-21s to be located there may be as high as 20. In- troduction of this aircraft-- normally armed with air-to-air missiles--into operational sta- tus in Cuba doubtless will re- quire extensive Soviet assist- ance. Such assistance is still being provided on older models of Soviet fighters in the Cuban Air Force. Prior to the delivery SECRET 14 r_ n ?.,--- - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 *001 L31MUIM.1 -*W of the MIG-21s,Cuba had about 60 MIG fighters, including Fagots (MIG-15s), Frescos (MIG- 17s), and at least a dozen Farm- ers (MIG-19s), all of which were delivered in mid-1961. So far no bloc bombers are known to be in Cuba. Additional tanks (prob- ably including T-54s), assault guns, field and antiaircraft artillery, and large numbers of trucks and transportation equipment also have arrived in Cuba recently. Information available thus far, however, suggests the bulk of current shipments is made up of equip- ment to strengthen Cuba's air and coastal defenses rather than the ground forces, which have been receiving Soviet land ar- maments for more than two years. The large amounts of motor trans- port equipment, electronics equipment,-and other material associated with each missile in- 25X1 stallation could account .for most of the current shipments. Most Latin American govern- ments appear willing to have their foreign ministers attend an informal meeting in late September or early October to discuss the recent arrival in Cuba of Soviet military tech- nicians and material. result in a boycott by Peru, Paraguay., and Argentina. Peru in any case will probably not attend, even though disturbed by Cuban developments, in the expectation that Venezuela will bring up the subject whether it is on the agenda or not. The Central American coun- tries, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, and Argen- tina are taking the strongest positions in favor of collective action against the increasing Soviet presence, some feeling that an informal meeting is not a sufficiently forceful show of concern. Several countries have in- dicated, however, that their foreign ministers will attend only if the meeting is truly informal rather than an official session of the Organization of American States (OAS), and only if the discussion is con- fined to the Cuban problem. Brazil, Mexico,, and Haiti are willing to take part in an in- formal meeting, but will prob- ably be reluctant to endorse any joint action against Cuba. Venezuela, still smarting over its recent failure to con- voke a formal meeting of OAS foreign ministers in response to the Peruvian coup, insists that the mee.ting should also discuss military take-overs of Latin American governments. Any such agenda would probably SECRET Chile will not attend for fear that the Lauca River dis- pute with Bolivia will be brought up. Bolivia has sus- pended its participation in the OAS because the organization has not taken the action Bolivia sought in the dispute with Chile, and hence will attend the foreign ministers' meeting only if it is in fact informal. Although the Mexican foreign minister probably will not attend because he plans to tour the Orient with President Lopez Mateos, his government is will- ing to have its acting foreign minister at the meeting. An indication of the dif- ficulties to be encountered in trying 'to get an agreement for action is the failure in late August of the Guatemalan effort to invoke the Rio Treaty against Cuba. Several countries, most notably Brazil and Mexico, have felt strongly that the OAS must not take action in matters which they feel are internal af- fairs of a hemisphere country. There are indications, however, that Mexico is becoming-in- creasingly concerned about the :soviet buildup. 25X1 25X1 14 Sent +32 WEPI T,V 11.1-07T-f,w T`nrT~ .,-F 97 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 `' SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Both India and Communist China are maintaining a tough, unyielding military stand along the disputed border, and new clashes have occurred. In early September Peiping charged that "large numbers" of Indian troops fired some 200 rounds at a small Chinese force in the Chip Chap River area of Ladakh. there was a sep- 25X1 arate clash the previous day in the same area, with the odds greatly reversed. At the other end of the Sino-Indian border, in the Northeast Frontier Agency, recent press reports claim the Chinese have crossed into Indian-claimed territory adjacent to Bhutan. AFGH ANI$WAN IRAN a000 4 Rudog Ha e; Taphigong Demarcated Delimited only Indefinite Boundary shown on, recent Chinese and Indian maps (where differing from US and Western maps) Chinese Indian SECRET Road Major caravan route or trail 1t1 ~.' -+ 0- r) WTiT!TTT V ) TTL'W Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 f 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 )fl.' Ldt l CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Skirmishing may recur during the next four.or five weeks. Thereafter severe winter con- ditions will hinder forward patrolling and force both sides to withdraw to more permanent, less exposed positions. Each side, meanwhile, is seeking to bring the problem to the conference table, but on terms unacceptable to the other. At present prospects for talks even on-procedural matters seem dim. India's latest note, dated 22 August, proposed a meeting of Indian and Chinese repre- sentatives in New Delhi to discuss preliminary matters. but reiterated that Chinese withdrawal from the disputed area of Ladakh is. essential to the start of "purposeful" negotiations. While Peiping has not yet formally replied, a People's Daily editorial of 7 September inc sates that the Chinese will not accept the bid for ex- ploratory discussions. The editorial calls the Indian proposal an attempt to use "phony negotiations" to cloak military pressure against China. It calls once again for nego- tiations without conditions. Peiping probably regards New Delhi's initiative for talks as a victory for the tough Chinese stand against Indian military pressures in Ladakh. The Indian Government, al- ready under fire domestically for its "vacillating" China policy, is unlikely to yield in its demand for a Chinese pull-back in Ladakh. New Delhi may in fact welcome a Chinese rejection of its offer to open preliminary talks--not only on domestic grounds but also as refutation of Peiping's persistent propa- 25X1 ganda efforts to portray India as the intransigent party in the dispute. YUGOSLAVIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION On 20 September, a joint meeting of Yugoslavia's Par- liament and of the federal board of the mass political organization (SAWPY,) will be- gin debate on a draft of the country's new constitution. After this group has approved the draft in principle, the local units of SAWPY will or- ganize meetings to explain the document to the public. The new document is intended primarily to improve govern- mental efficiency, institution- alize the regime's unique in- ternal system, and achieve greater stability by providing for the orderly transfer of political power after Tito's death. The constitution, accord- ing to the Yugoslav press, will call Yugoslavia a "socialist republic." Such a status in the Marxist lexicon is an im- portant step toward Communism and equivalent to the level of development which the USSR claims to have achieved in 1936. Yugoslavia's pretensions to a similar status is intended to enhance its prestige in the Communist world and in Marxist- oriented non-aligned states. This claim will be opposed in the bloc on ideological grounds. Otherwise Yugoslavia,; which has not met many of Moscow's criteria for such status, would outrank most of the European satellites. Other than the USSR, only Czechoslovakia has thus far been allowed to declare itself a socialist republic. SECRET .14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW "f 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The new constitution will also institutionalize many features of Yugoslavia's domestic system which are considered heretical by the bloc, such as workers' councils and administrative and economic de- centralization. Moscow, however, will probably refrain from at- tacking Belgrdde's pre- tensions with any vigor in the interest of continuing the present rapprochement.. Peiping and Tirana, consistent opponents of the Belgrade re- gime, may condemn the entire document in strong terms. Apparently in the belief that when the 70-year-old Tito dies no one man can fill his shoes, the regime seems to be setting the stage for rule by a triumvirate of the secretary general of the League of Com- munists(Yugoslavia's party), the president of the republic, and the president of the Federal Executive Council (premier). All three posts now are held by Tito. he constitution will redefine the functions of the presidency and premiership. After the new law is adopted, Tito is expected to step down from the premiership in favor of Edvard Kardelj, who would become the government's chief administrative officer. By retaining the presidency, Tito would still represent Yugoslavia at heads-of-state gatherings and set overall governmental policy. The constitution will also strengthen the government as an organization separate from the party-by discouraging persons from holding high party and governmental posts simultane- ously. To prevent the govern- ment's degeneration into a stagnant bureaucracy and to bring new blood into its leader- ship, the constitution will limit the tenure of most government positions. As in.all Communist states, the party is the primary source of power in Yugoslavia. Aleksander Rar.Lkovic seems to be the leading contender for party leadership after Tito's death. Should Rankovic bid for unchallenged power, the provisions of the new constitution probably would not prevent his achieving that goal but would make it more difficult than now is the case. Regime hopes to ease the suc- cession problem would therefore not seem to be assured. The constitution may'instead have made the succession issue po- tentially more explosive by providing Kardelj as premier a semi-independent power bake from which to contest any moves by Rankovic as party leader to assume dictatorial powers. The constitution will also 25X1 redistribute power among the 25ni federal government, the republics, and the opstinas, Yugoslavia's smallest territorial unit. This was the issue which was most hotly contested in the sessions of the constitutional revision commission. The Yugoslav federalists wanted to diffuse the republic's powers among the opstinas so that the federal government would be left the only ef- fective seat of power. Re- publican nationalists were apparently able to defeat this move, however, so that the republics and opstinas will probably have their powers in- creased at the expense of the federal authorities. SECRET 14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW "_ --.- n 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The authority of Ben Bella and his political bureau has not been effectively challenged since 9 September, when Colonel Boumedienne personally led some 4,000 troops of his National Popular Army (ANP) into Algiers. However, Boumedienne himself and members of his military staff are potential challengers, and Ben Bella's opponents in Wilayas III and IV retain their troops and arms. The consulate points out that a military coup would be some- what easier before the installation of an assembly--possessing the sanction of a popular vote. The public generally 25X1 25X1 remains uncommitted to any faction. The ANP entry into Algiers --displaying heavy equipment and other evidence of Soviet bloc aid--apparently was not envisaged in the earlier com- promise. whereby the leaders of Wilayas III and IV agreed to make the capital a "demilitarized" city. The move probably was a concession by Ben Bella to ANP The appearance of a de- militarized city is being main- tained, however. The ANP troops are said to be quartered on the periphery of the city, al- though they obviously are easily available to back up the political bureau if necessary. According to press reports, no armed soldiers were visible in Algiers on 11 September. Wilaya III forces reportedly suffered few if any casualties in the recent fighting, and appear to have withdrawn intact into the Kabylie mountains to await further developments. The US Consulate General in Algiers thinks it con- ceivable, although not likely, that the ANP could assume power before the elections, now scheduled for 20 September. Ben Bella is continuing efforts to reassure the European community. He reportedly has told the French Consul Gen- eral that all Europeans ar- rested while Wilaya IV con- trolled Algiers will be re- leased. A high official of the Ministry for Algerian Affairs told a US Embassy officer in Paris on 6 Septem- ber that he did not regard Ben Bella as the wild-eyed extremist pictured by certain press circles, and felt that the Algerian leader was not unduly inclined to listen either to local Communists or to the USSR. The French of- ficial said that the political bureau would probably prove sufficiently reasonable and interested in getting the. country on its feet to-enable Paris to do business with it. France nevertheless has moved cautiously on major aid projects, partly to. await the Algerian elections, but also because there have been Algerian threats to nationalize European-evacuated property on ;a large scale, and such action would increase com- ensator costs f r France. SECRET 14 gar-t R2 mr+. E V T v nr. T~Tra ur Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Novi 0JVJL4A%XJA CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY UN officials in New York and Leopoldville have worked out the schedule and procedures for carrying out the UN plan to reintegrate Katanga into the. Congo. UN Chief Representative Gardiner on ll September pre- sented these to Congolese Pre- mier Adoula and to Katangan President Tshomb?. The plan consists essen- tially of producing a new federal constitution, splitting Katanga's revenues with the central gov-. ernment, and assimilating the Katangan forces into the-Congo National Army (ANC). The first phase involves setting up several joint.Leopoldville- Katangan commissions which, with the help of UN experts, are to work out details. Progress is likely to be slow. The mechanics of the joint commissions appear cumber- some. Differences almost cer- tainly will arise not only over interpretation of the plan it- self but also over what each side has agreed to. uinely" federal constitution. The constitution, moreover, will have to win the approval of the Congolese parliament and all the provincial assemblies, and might even, as Tshombe has sug- gested, be submitted to a popular referendum. UN officials in Leopold- ville are becoming concerned that parliament may not get around to ratifying the constitution at all. President Kasavubu and Interior Minister Kamitatu have indicated that the body will be in no hurry to do so and will probably examine each article carefully. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO The draft federal consti- tution is to be ready for Adoula to present to parliament in late September. Tshomb6 has been asked to present his views, however, and this may create delays. The Katangan leader re- gards a new constitution as the core of the UN plan, and he has hinted that Katanga's financial and military integration hinges on'the production of a "gen- /' LE LEOP01 bal . . II{wanga5 Nyunzu C aniama Marl ro' Beudouinville )Kamine K A N G A 4~=m a SECRET 14.Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 11 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 PorNhervilT oro Brk- Klndu S POLD V I LL~' {~/, \.KKakongo - DVILLE Port F rance i~ K A i j Kengalo Bondo '0 -11o LAketi. J Mungh Bu `6a ~".3 ?ButO IENTALE Y~~ St nleyville S?~?r F7,1A, EQUATEUR M_ v Coquilhatville e Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Furthermore, there is like- ly to be new political maneuver- ing in Leopoldville among the anti-Adoula parliamentary bloc. Last July this bloc, which Tshombe has supported, failed to topple Adoula but prevented him from getting absolute majority approval of his re- organized government. Tshombe's interest in supporting this group's efforts again would presumably be to win another breathing spell. The escape of South Kasai "King" Albert Kalonji, jailed last December, appears to have been masterminded by Minister of Interior Kami.tatu, who has been working for the release of Kalonji, as well as of An- toine Gizenga. settlement. He had been arrested partly to undercut radicals who opposed the arrest of the leftist Gizenga. Kalonji's release now may presage the release of that former Stanleyville leader. Adoula, although acutely aware of the dangers of such a move and, of the propaganda advantage it would give Tshombe, may feel that it would relieve radical pressures on him. Leopoldville and Katangan military forces continue to jockey for position in North Katanga, on the assumption that possession will. prove nine- tenths of the law regarding 25X1 the area's eventual. disposition. .,~"A Kalonji on his return to the South Kasai capital vowed that he is devoted to the cen- tral government, but the Elisa- bethville press reports that Kalonji has invited Tshombe to the province to "renew amicable relations." Kalonji is a minor figure on the "conservative" end of the Congo's political spectrum, but with his own 2,500-man South Kasai Army and backed by revenues from diamond mining, he could be another disruptive element in a Congo SECRET 14 Sn>t 97 WF.F.KT,V R.RVTFW Pn r 12 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 V0011" AM Ard %41%.rj .1 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY There are continuing in- dications that substantial num- bers of North Vietnamese troops are withdrawing toward the border. It is. probable, how- ever, that at least some of these troops are not returning to North Vietnam, but are being located in inaccessible re- Z.1119, Vien Tha ?' \Na Mo -1 Pou Kha? ('Muong?., Han NAMTHA nelj $al Sai LUANG PRABFl- Pak _ BengMuon Hourt' Pr ba?g ~Khng Ban \ 5 Khay r Sayaboury uhh0? .Nong .Net uo?g~ld s A Ou Neua 0"U, Tay-) M nolJ.gdL~ XIENC KHOUA4G K sy J Pa Dong' Tha T m Vieng VIENTIANE 11. NTIAN 4 ,OFF ?'w~NOni; T H A I L AND L A O S Royal Army base area Meo base area Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese areas --ICC checkpoint Road Trail Route number Road under construction gions in eastern Laos. These troops presumably would remain in Laos to stiffen Pathet Lao forces, but would be in posi- tion either to disperse or to retire.to North Vietnam should the International. Control Com- mission or a similar body initiate inspections. KHAMN UAN Nh?m- rath Maliaxay~,_ kavannakhet Muongg1 SAVANNAKHE Phine r OL)urr VIETFNA SECRET' 14 wept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 13 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Meanwhile, Souvanna Phouma, probably in an effort to drum up popular support for the coali- tion, has embarked on a tour of several rightist-held towns in central and southern Laos. Souvanna has expressed confidence that later he would visit such Pathet Lao strong- holds as Sam Neua, Tchepone, and Nam Tha. He has not spec- ified when he will do so, or whether any rightist elements would accompany him; nor is certain that the Pathet Lao it will allow him to make the trip. They show no inclina- tion to open up their terri- tory and are continuing ef- forts to consolidate their control in the country. The coalition government is in the process of establish- ing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and Communist China but apparently plans to defer action on North Korea and East Germany. Although Pathet Lao propaganda has declared that the Council of Ministers on 4 September ap- proved the exchange of repre- sentatives with the Communist German and Korean regimes, the director of protocol in the new government subsequently stated that "no action will be taken" on their requests for agrement. Nationalist China--adamantly opposed to any "two-China" arrangement--announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Laos on 7 September. In Taipei, Foreign Minister Shen asserted that the action had been taken only after it became evident that the Nationalist ambassador was being treated as a, "second-class, 'nonrecog- nized"' representative. South Vietnam has special interests in Laos and is reluc- tant to leave the field to the Communists. It has recalled its ambassador for consultations to determine whether some modus vivendi can be worked out. SECRET 14 Sent 62 WVV.WT.V PPUTP-W A Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 'f 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 SECRET 1_ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SOUTH VIETNAM Viet Cong guerrilla action has again picked up after several weeks of decline. Activity has been small-scale but widespread.,. including attacks against regu- lar and paramilitary government forces, ambushes, and sabotage of road and rail facilities. The aggressiveness' displayed in these actions demonstrates that the Viet Cong have been able to absorb losses inflicted by sus- tained government security oper- ations. The Viet Cong also retain the capability for coordinated attacks involving several battal- ions. There are continuing in- dications of possible prepara- tions for a large-scale effort, which would be intended primarily for psychological impact to off- set recent government successes. The government's military efforts show steady improvement in coordination and flexibility.. The airborne operations, par- SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 ticularly, are proving increasingly effective in seizing the initiative and.. keeping the Viet Cong off balance. Making contact with sizable Viet Cong formations is still difficult, however. Government efforts to pro- vide security for the peasants and obtain their support are also showing progress. These efforts center on the.strategic hamlet construction program and. pro- vincial_ rehabilitation projects. of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The failure of Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike to .make any significant economic headway during her two years in office is increasing politi- cal pressure on her government. This pressure comes both from within the cabinet and from the opposition. -The government seems able to withstand the current wave of maneuvering and rumored plotting against it, but in the process may be losing some of its original strong popular support. The resignation on 25 August of Finance Minister Felix Bandaranaike, the prime minister's nephew, highlighted the sharp disagreement within the cabinet over economic prob- lems. External assets have steadily declined, budget defi- cits have risen, and the many development plans have not been carried out. In his budget speech in July, the finance minister introduced some highly unpopu- lar fiscal measures designed to reduce government spending and conserve foreign exchange, including a 25-percent reduction in the government-subsidized rice ration. The cabinet had origi- nally gone along with this latter proposal. However, when the opposition whipped up wide- spread popular feeling against it, the cabinet eliminated it rather than risk defeat. As a result, the strong-willed min- ister resigned, but he continues as parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minister and retains considerable influence as her chief political adviser. This dispute touched off a rash of political controversy. Leftist forces claim that they forced withdrawal of the rice cut, and long dissatisfied con- servative elements have become more depressed. SECRET 14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 VJ.:IVLWA NOOO~ IRAQ Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's his severe restrictions on political prospects still seem ammunition supplies and on the bleak. Nearly every political actions of his subordinates element in Iraq is arrayed in militate against a sudden move- some degree against him. Civilians ment by disloyal army elements. are disaffected with his However, this does not preclude failure to fulfill promises his assassination by an individ- to return to constitutional ual or small group, and chances government and hold parliamentary are strong that he will be over- elections. Army officers are thrown in this way--probably by blaming him for the army's military rather than civilian inability to make headway against opponents. the Kurdish rebels. The handling of the Kurdish rising remains the re- gimes most conspicuous failure. The revolution of 1958, followed by massive re-equipment with Soviet materiel, was supposed to have transformed the army from an imperialist-dominated police force into the strong arm of Iraqi nationalism. For over a year this army has been engaged against the Kurds; over half its 70,000 men are committed to this campaign. The Kurds appear as tough as ever, however, and indiscriminate bombing of Kurdish villages by the Iraqi Air Force has alienated even many of those who were not followers of rebel leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani. Qasim's policy of playing one group off against the other and shifting suspected officers from command to command, and SECRET 14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 17 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 The Communists, while not wholly satisfied with the Qasim regime, apparently feel that any change would be for the worse and have been distributing pamphlets warning against the dangers of a *AMMAN U S S R 60,000 i SAUDI ARABIA 25X1 "reactionary coup"--Communist terminology for a.blow struck by Arab nationalist elements. Mosul -1 As 800,000 000 Number of Kurds in each country Proportion of population made up of Kurds 100 7060 40 20 0 percent CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Jf, Lait!'.r l *00 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Political maneuvering in British Guiana is growing more intense in advance of the Lon- don conference on independence, now contemplated for late Octo- ber. Dissatisfaction with Pre- mier Jagan seems to be increas- ing among the East Indian popu- lation, although not to the point of challenging his lead- ership of the People's Progres- sive Plarty (PPP). The opposi- tion to him remains seriously divided, and is unable to agree even on a position to take at the forthcoming conference. A few of Jagan's govern- mental colleagues are displaying increased restlessness. Legis- lative Assembly Speaker Gajraj, a Moslem leader who has been disenchanted with Jagan for some time, recently said he would break with the PPP on the ground that Islam and Communism are incompatible. However, Ja- gan apparently cannot constitu- tionally force him out of office, and Gajraj now has indicated he will not resign. The US consul general believes Gajraj is es- sentially an opportunist and in any case lacks the drive to sustain an effort to build an anti-Jagan opposition. He ap- pears to be only another unsuc- cessful challenger to Jagan's leadership. Attorney General Ramsahoye also appears discontented but not to the point of resigning in an attempt to bring down the government. Former PPP minister Rai, although he has skillfully at- tacked Jagan in the Assembly, has apparently made little ef- fort to rally his personal sup- porters to form a rival party since his ouster from the gov- ernment in June. The Jagan government's draft constitution for discus- sion at the independence con- ference provides for a republic --to be called "Guyana"--within the Commonwealth. Jagan has refused to accede to opposition demands for new elections before independence using a system of proportional representation. People's National Congress leader Forbes Burnham, now visiting the US, is particularly insistent on introducing such a system, because he believes it would give his party substantially increased representation in the Legislative Assembly. In the last election the PPP gained a plurality of only 1.7 percent over Burnham's party, but obtained nearly twice as many seats. .Jagan might accept a delay of independence of as long as three years provided a definite date is set and US and British financial assistance is assured. The consul general believes, however, that this version of Jagan's position re- flects only his harassed state of mind, and is unlikely to be accurate. The consul believes also that the PPP may take some sort of "sudden rash action" if an independence date is not set soon. Trade ties and student ex- changes with Cuba and the bloc are increasing. The first bloc trade agreement--for the sale of rice to Czechoslovakia--was con- cluded in July. A new trade agreement with Cuba, primarily for additional rice sales to Havana, has just been concluded. There are now 17 students from British Guiana known to be in Moscow, plus 26 en route; there may be as many as 60 in Cuba. Janet Jagan was received with much fanfare during her August visit to Peiping, but no substan- tial Chinese Communist aid is likely to be forthcoming. 25X1 25X6 25X6 SECRET 14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1.8 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Jl.Ciltf l CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SWEDEN Osten Unden, Sweden's for- eign minister since 1945 and widely regarded as the architect of its alliance-free foreign policy, has announced his inten- tion to resign later this month. He is expected to be succeeded by Torsten Nilsson, now minister of social affairs. Unden is disliked by the dominant right wing of his own Social Democratic Party as well as by the opposi- tion bourgeois parties His long tenure and prestige,. however, gave him virtually a free hand at the Foreign Minis- try. The party leadership has indicated it wishes to replace him with a less controversial figure more responsive to party views on foreign policy. The 57-year-old Nilsson, who became an active union and party member during his youth as a bricklayer, is a typical example of the second generation of Swedish Social Democrats who have advanced solely by means of their association with the party. One of the most influen- tial and popular figures in the party, Nilsson is staunchly pro-Western in outlook. As defense minister during the period 1951-57, he built up the defense establishment, and strengthened ties with Sweden's NATO neighbors Norway and Den- mark. He lacks the prestige and authority of Unden, however, and is handicapped by limited experience beyond the domestic field. making the appointments. SECRET iatory gesture to this faction in Prime Minister Erlander is expected to play a much more prominent role than previously in foreign policy decisions and Nilsson probably will rely more on career officials in the min- istry than did Unden in formu- lating policy. Although no marked change is likely, Sweden probably will play a more pas- sive role in international af- fairs, in contrast to Unden's proposals and initiatives which were often embarrassing to both Sweden and. the West. As the new foreign minister, Nilsson's views may be decisive in determining the final out- come of the two major issues confronting the Swedish Govern- ment: acquisition of a domestic nuclear weapons capability, and relations with the Common Market. On the question of EEC ties, he will be more flexible than Unden, who has stressed the limits imposed on cooperation with Western Europe by Sweden's policy of neut:ra l,it y . On the issue of nuclear weapons, Nilsson is expected to support acquiring them if pros- pects continue to fade for an agreement on disarmament. He and -the cabinet will be primarily concerned., however, with avoid- ing an open rift in the Social. Democratic Party. Unden, as the 'Left wing's most stalwart member and spokesman, has been strongly opposed to acquisition of nuclear weapons. The left wing's threat to leave the party influenced the leadership in 1959 to postpone until 1963 a decision on this controversial issue. Other cabinet changes pre- cipitated, by Unden's resignation are likely to follow the local elections of 16 September. Al- though of no great significance otherwise, the election outcome may have some bearing on the in- dividuals chosen by the party lead- ership to fill other cabinet posts. If the outcome indicates that the left wing is disgruntled and in sizable numbers either had voted. Communist or had failed to vote at all, the leadership would probably 25X1 feel compelled to make some concil- 14 [l -l ?Il ,r1 T)T !T Tfl Te TIT.T _ - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 f 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 vwv~ SECRET ~Nw During his 4-9 September tour of West Germany De Gaulle went to extraordinary lengths, even for him, to win popular support for himself and his European policy. Foreign Min- ister Couve de Murville de- scribed the visit as intended "to submit the policy of the French and German governments to the people for approval." De Gaulle thus apparently re- garded it as akin to the appeals to the people he has often suc- cessfully launched in France. This, however, was his first such venture in'the broader European context. Virtually all West German comment hailed the unexpectedly enthusiastic welcome given De Gaulle as an impressive demon- stration of Franco-German rec- onciliation. The American am- bassador in Bonn viewed the visit as at least temporarily strengthening Adenauer's hand in seeking to make progress on European political integration without waiting for an agree- ment on the terms of Britain's accession to the EEC. Many newspapers warned, how- ever, against permitting the in- creasing rapprochement with France to damage either the larger concept of a united Europe or Bonn's close alliance with the United States. The in- fluential Die Welt , for example, asserted that "close coopera- tion with France is desired as a firm link in the chain of Western solidarity, but is not an exclusive friendship." Eco- nomics Minister Erhard stated publicly on 10 September that "apart from France, we must seek and establish friendship with the whole free world... integration must not stop at the six Common Market countries but should include the whole of'Western Europe." De Gaulle's speeches, al- though well received by the German public, raised strong objections from representatives of the smaller Common Market members--notably Belgium's Spaak, one of Europe's strong- est pro-integration leaders.. Spaak has commented to US Am- bassador MacArthur that De Gaulle is apparently offering Bend lux not a unified Europe, but a Franco-German alliance which "De Gaulle will generously permit" the Benelux countries to Join as satellites. Spaak says he is willing to continue working with France and West Germany toward an integrated Europe, but has.no intention of joining France and Germany in the establishment of a European alliance from which "the Anglo- Saxons" are excluded. De Gaulle's public state- ments on the need for closer French - West German ties were couched in general terms. Offi- cials connected with the visit deny that any specific institu- tional steps were considered and, according to West German press chief von Hase, the strengthening of contacts between France and Germany as cited in the official communique'of 7 September will not require special institutions. Although subordinates on both sides have denied that any- thing occurred during the visit to open the way for a joint nuclear weapons effort, and even that the nuclear weapons problem was discussed, De Gaulle publicly urged "organic coordination" of the two armed forces as required by "modern necessities." De Gaulle specifically mentioned coordination of research, financ- ing,and industrial capacities. Extensive Franco-German joint projects in the develop- ment of conventional weapons, logistics, and troop training are already in progress, but De Gaulle's statement at the Hamburg military school went beyond the official communiques in advocating cooperation on "mod- ern" problems. From the French side, at least, the statement appears to offer sufficient lee- way for lower level, unpublicized agreements in the nuclear weapons field covering the exchange of technicians and possibly some. West German financial aid. SECRET 14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Pnsra 9n of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 )1L UJ a l 'NW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY De Gaulle is expected to announce shortly a referendum on his proposal that the con- stitution of the Fifth Repub- lic be amended to allow elec- tion of his successor by uni- versal suffrage. He will pre- sumably use the attempt on his life last month as justifica- tion for such a direct appeal to the electorate. The tactic would permit him to circumvent hostile groups in parliament which could block him if he followed .the alternative means of going through parliament to amend the constitution. De Gaulle may be strongly criti- cized, however, on the ground that the referendum procedure is unconstitutional. There has been speculation that De Gaulle would welcome a move by the.National Assembly to censure the government over the referendum proposal. He could then dissolve the Assem- bly and precipitate new elec- tions for this body at the same time as the referendum. Can- didates pledged to support him thus would receive the benefit of the public backing he enjoys on the issue of direct election of the president. Assembly elections have been expected to occur next spring. The decision on 11 Septem- ber to bestow the prestige of cabinet rank on Christian Fou- chet, former high commissioner in Algeria, has led. to specula- tion that De Gaulle is grooming a successor to Premier Pompidou. Some commentators-see the move as giving De Gaulle an alterna- tive to dissolution of the As- sembly should Pompidou suffer U N ION FOR THE PARTY STRENGTHS IN FRENCH SENATE NEW REPUBLIC 3(3) (00) SEATS UP FOR REELECTION-23 SEPTEMBER SECRET 14 Sept 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Pave 21 of 22 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 `wv SECRET `11W a vote of censure over the ref- erendum issue. Fouchet is a Gaullist of long standing and would be an acceptable replace- ment for Pompidou if De Gaulle decided not to risk elections this fall. Other commentators main- tain, however, that De Gaulle instead is planning early dis- solution of the Assembly in order to set a precedent for a successor who might otherwise be hesitant about dissolving an assembly before its term. Mounting interest in the prospective referendum has overshadowed the senatorial elections of 23 September, in which no noteworthy shifts are expected. There has been lit- tle change in the composition of the senatorial-electoral college which put all the in- cumbent senators in office in 1959, and few of the seats at stake in the current election are likely to change hands. PROCEDURES FOR FRENCH SENATORIAL ELECTION As election for France's 274-seat Senate is held every three years. For these elections the country's 90 departments are divided in alphabetical order into three groups of approx- imately equal population. In each election senators from one of these groups are chosen for nine-year terms. This year's election will be held in the first 37 departments, as determined by lot in 1959 after the entire Senate was renewed. In addition, senators will be elected in French Guiana and Polynesia. Senators are chosen in each department by an electoral college composed of National Assembly deputies, members of departmental councils, and delegates of municipal councils. In departments entitled to less than five senators, the outcome is decided by majority vote, and a second ballot is held where necessary. Elsewhere--this year only in Bouches-du-Rhone-- a system of proportional representation is used. While De Gaulle had ear- lier been reported consider- ing a drastic revision of the Senate's composition and pow- ers and a severe curtailment of its legislative role,. he does, not seem to-have such a proposal in mind at present. Should the elections reduce his relatively small majority in the upper chamber, how- ever, he might be influenced to seek to make it a. purely consultative body before the next; Assembly elections. SECRET of 22 14 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25 :CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL ARTICLES THE EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES The armed forces of East Germany, with Soviet assistance, have continued a gradual build- up which is probably intended chiefly to make East Germany a more effective member of the Warsaw Pact alliance. They now have a capability for con- ducting limited defensive opera- tions and maintaining order within the country except in the event of widespread revolt. Khrushchev's threats to conclude a peace treaty with the Ulbricht regime have not been accompanied by any substantially increased flow off' Soviet military aid or other sudden increase in East Germany's armed strength. Despite the adoption of con- scription by the army for the first time this year the num- ber of personnel under arms remains about what it was last year, and no new major military units have been created. The Army The 90,000-man East Ger- man Army (EGA) has four infantry and two tank divisions. These units--organized, equipped, and trained on the Soviet pattern-- are believed to be at about 80 percent of wartime strength. They are dispersed evenly throughout East Germany, and there have been no recent moves suggestive of a changed mission for any of them analysis of military exercises indicate that the wartime mission of the EGA would be to defend against a NATO attack and, in conjunction with the 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany,. to spearhead a counter- attack which would be followed up by an offensive by Soviet troops now in the western USSR. Thus far the Soviets have not suppled the.. East Germans-- or any of the other satellites --with large free rockets or ballistic missiles which are used by Soviet military units as nuclear weapons deliver vehicles there is no evidence that East Ger- many's air force is trained in the use of nuclear weapons for ground support missions. The EGA--as well as the other satellite armies--is being given increasingly extensive experience in combined exercises with other bloc forces. EGA units have trained with the So- viets in East Germany and with the Poles in Poland. There are indications that the largest Warsaw Pact exercises to date will be held this fall. These may involve the movement of EGA units to Poland and Czechoslo- vakia. EGA armor, artillery, and motorized transport are of So- viet and Czech manufacture. About two-thirds of the 1,575 EGA, tanks are T-34 medium and JS-?2 heavy tanks of Soviet World War II design. There is no evidence of any priority attempt to replace these with later models or to increase their num- bers. During the past year the eight brigades of the East German Border Command were made subordinate to the Minis- try of Defense and reorganized along the lines of army units. This may have been done to facil-. itate the eventual conversion of these brigades to army divi- sions. Thus far, however, they have not been given enough heavy arms to change their basic capabilities, and there is no indication that this will be done in the near future. SECRET 25X1 25X1 14 Pnt 67 "-DV_OTAT A7 FVTr%r t Q r-..,?.,,, , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 f 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET The Air Force During the past year the USSR has augmented the East German Air Force (EGAF), here- tofore quite small. More than 200 Soviet jet fighters have been delivered, and a more com- prehensive and realistic train- ing program has been provided for EGAF personnel. When this program is completed and all the fighters are integrated in- to operational units, it would permit an expansion from the present six understrength reg- iments to nine full-strength operational fighter regiments and allow a wider geographic disposition. The EGAF now has some 370 jet fighters, about 10 Beagle (IL-28) jet light bombers, 30 helicopters, about 25 piston light transports, and some jet trainers. Some Fishbed-C` (MIG-21) Mach 2 fighters re- cently were assigned. Although only about 50 EGAF fighters are known to have some all-weather intercept capa- bility, this number may have been increased with the past year's delivery of jet fighters. Even the Fishbeds are limited to air intercepts under con- ditions of good visibility because of their "range-only" radars. Some EGAF fighters are known to be equipped with anti- aircraft missiles, but the bulk of the force--about 200 air- craft--are Fresco (MIG-1.7) types, and few, if any, of these. are missile-equipped. The present deployment of EGAF units is confined to'the eastern half of East Germany. No westward deployment of bases has been noted--a move which could be expected if the EGAF were to assume broader responsi- bilities for the defense of East Germany or for interference with traffic in the Berlin air corridors on a continuing basis. The intended role of EGAF Beagles is not clear. They might form a small unit for utility and reconnaissance func- tions, but the force would have to be augmented before it would provide any significant strike capability. The East Germans have about 50 radar sites available for early-warning purposes and ground control of fighters. Missile and Antiaircraft Capabilities Surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses under control of the East German military forces are gradually expanding and improving. During the past six months additional SA-2 (six-launcher) SAM sites have been activated and SAM-as- sociated training exercises have been increased. Of the approximately 30 operational SA-2 sites identified through- out East Germany, at least 11 are believed to be under the control of East German military forces with the remainder under Soviet control. Four of the East German sites are located in a semi- circle just north and east of Berlin and thus would appear to have a marginal capability for interfering with Western flights in the air corridors near the city. The Berlin area sites are manned by four SAM battalions controlled from a regimental headquarters at Ladeburg, the central support facility. Four additional EGA SECRET 14 \CS Y1f H9 CTT.t"VAT AT1T Tl1T T[, w Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 E 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY support facilities without launch sites are located west and south of the city and may eventually complete an eight- site SAM ring. The remaining East German SAM sites primarily defend selected targets in northern East Germany, some near the Baltic coast. At least six additional East German SAM sites are re- ported to be in various stages of completion but there is no confirmation these are.oper- ational. A limited number of mobile SA-2s may be organic to the East German Army. Ta date, at'least three East German SAM regiments, each consisting of.four firing battal- ions, have been activated and .have undergone training at Pin- now. On the basis of the pace of this training since November 1960, it is estimated that be- tween one and two regiments could be added each year. Weapons available to the. East German Army's antiaircraft artillery (AAA) regiments con- sist of about 875 light AAA guns,. These include 400 of the improved 57-mm. type--some twin- mounted on tank chassis--and 200 of the 100-mm. medium guns. Three of the AAA regiments--one at Potsdam in the Berlin area, and one each at Erfurt and Halle just south of tha,boundaries of the southern air corridor--could pose a threat to Allied air traffic at lower altitudes. C,.(,-J Tutow CENTRAL AIR CORRIDOR Eggesin ? 0 Potsdam INZ Striusberg EAST GERMAN MILITARY FORCES l Aimy headquarters Surface-to-air missile (SAM) site + Fighter base f1 Wtorized division ? Confirmed C,,L,-7 Naval headquarters 6 Tank division o Incomplete/probable ,L, Naval base Military Strengths Army 90,000 Border Command .40,000 Security Alert Police 22,500 SAP(Berlin) 4,500 Navy 11,000 Air Force , 8,000 Total 176,000 Air Force Jet fighters 370* Light bombers 10 Helicopters 30 Light piston transports 25 Total aircraft 435 Total fighter regis 6" Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and AAA 125X1 S Confirmed SA-2-sites !t. Incomplete SA-2'sites 6 AAA guns 875 Operational ships include four Soviet-designed Riga-class destroyer escorts, 51 patrol vessels and torpedo boats, 34 auxiliary vessels, and numerous service craft. The navy may have absorbed the East German Coast Guard, which has 1,000 men and 50 small surface units. The East German Navy (EGN) is primarily a coastal defense organization but is developing its patrol and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. The navy has a few helicopters, but no air arm or coast artillery branch. SECRET 14 R-0- 99 Qn'17'eTAT ADTTI Tt' 'n-go ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700101-0f 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Electronic Warfare Capability The East Germans have only a modest capability of their own to wage electronic warfare (ECM) against flights in the Berlin Paramilitary Forces Germany's police and paramili- tary forces have the primary missions of ensuring internal order, preventing escapes to West Germany, and assuring that the restless population continues to fulfill regime plans. The most reliable element, the Security Alert Police (SAP), now-is undergoing reorganization, the details of which are not yet clear.. The two SAP brigades posted on the sector and zonal borders of West Berlin were subordinated to the new East German commandant of East Berlin following the abolition of the Soviet commandant's office and now are reported to be subordinate. to the East German Army. SAP units in the 14 East. German districts are being subordinated to district People's Police com- mands. At this time the SAP probably numbers about 22,500, but this force may be scheduled for expansion. The Interior Ministry's civil police force, probably numbering 60,000 men and women, has no military role and in a crucial situation probably would not be reliable. The largest paramilitary force--the Kampfgruppen--is believed to total 300,000 persons. It has elements in all, important factories and establishments in East Germany. Kampfgruppe members are chosen primarily for political re- liability. During the last two years they have been given more rigorous training, and the majority have probably been integrated into the regular military reserve structure. Under present circumstances they Kampfgruppen probably could be used to maintain order in industrial plants, but they have only a marginal military capa- bility.. ? Until recently Kampf- gruppe: units were equipped with World War II infantry weapons. Since the 1961 Berlin crisis some units have received modern small arms, and a few battalions reportedly have mortars, anti- tank guns, and field pieces. Conscription East Germany, enacted com- pulsory military service on 24 January 1962 after the regime had acted effectively to block the escape of East Germans to the West. A major reason for introducing conscription was the-poor showing of the all-out recruitment campaign in the fall of 1961. The move also permits the regime more easily to al- locate, its scarce,manpower re- sources between the armed forces and industry,.' SECRET 14 Sept 62 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 4 of 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY .Under the conscription laws all East German males between the ages of 18 and 50 are sub- ject'to military call-up. Dur- ing a "state emergency of de- fense" the age limit is extended to 60. Moreover, all men liable to military service and officers up to age 60 are included in the reserve and are subject to annual refresher training, whether they have served on active duty or not. Women between the ages of 18,and 50 are also subject to service in support functions. In February 1962 about 550,000 youths between the ages of 18 and 22 were registered and in July and August about 400,000 in the 23-26 age.group were registered. About 75,000 of the former group have been inducted into the armed forces, and about.50,000 of the older group are expected to be in- ducted in October. However, the number of inductees normally would be offset by releases of eligible two-year enlistees throughout this year. About 250,000 East Germans constitute a.qualified, trained reserve not now on active duty. It is estimated that within 180. days after mobilization was ordered, East German forces could total 450,000. East Ger- many has about 3,352,000 men between the ages of 15 and 50, about three fourths of whom are believed physically able to perform military duties. About 1,074,000 of these are in the 18-26 age group. Ulbricht reserves to him- self, under a law of 21 Sep- tember 1961, sweeping powers to declare a ."state of defense" under which the National Defense Council, which he heads, can assign East German citizens to "personal services" as desired, alter arbitrarily production and financial plans, suspend constitutional "guarantees," and requisition property. The law provides that all males from 16 through 65 and females from 16 through 60 can be en- listed for compulsory civil air defense service. Defense Expenditures Available information does not suggest that there has been any great or sudden increase in East; German defense expenditures for weapons procurement, con- struction of new military facil- ities, or conversion of a significant number of industrial plants from civilian to military production. The announced figure for military expenditures remained virtually constant'at 1 billion East marks ($250 mil- lion) per year between 1956 and 1961. This is only about 2 percent of the total budget, although the figure is believed to represent only personnel costs. This year the announced figure was increased to 2.7 billion East marks ($675 mil- lion), or 4.9 percent of the total budget. Part of this increase may be explained by some rise in personnel costs in 1962, and part may be the result of a decision to pub- licize a larger fraction of total East German defense and security expenditures. SECRET 25X1 25X1 14 Sept 62 SPECIAL ARTICLES paprr- S ?f 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Name 1#41~ SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY KHRUSHCHEV, CEMA, AND THE CHINESE In a-recent major policy statement, Khrushchev has clar- ified the double task which he envisages for the Communist bloc's Council for Mutual Economic As- sistance (CEMA). He is plan- ning to have CEMA take. a more active role in achieving the economic integration of its member states as one means.of countering the'growing impact of the European Common Market (EEC).. He is also using it to exert economic pressures on those Communist countries, led by the Chinese, which were ex- cluded from membership at the June meeting of CEMA because they refuse to give the Soviet Union unqualified support. merits and to draw neutrals into the military schemes of NATO and SEATO. In contrast, he pre- sented the bloc economic group- ing as a model for. the "inter- national division of labor" which permits each country to develop its specialized economic skills to the utmost. .To reinforce this image, Khrushchev enumerated a number of ways in which,the economic integration of CEMA member coun- tries is to be hastened. These include plans for a joint elec- tric power network, pooling of capital investment resources, and possibly the establishment of a "collective bank of social- ist, countries." This twin task--begun at the 7 June meeting of CEMA coun- tries' first secretaries--is the burden of an article under Khrushchev's signature entitled "Vital Questions of Development of the World Socialist System." First published in the September issue of the Marxist internation- al journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, the article was given a d1 onaT weight by being re- printed in the authoritative Soviet doctrinal journal Kommu- nist. CEMA and the Common Market Moscow has become increas- ingly strident in its denuncia- tions of the EEC but at the same time seems to be setting the stage for working relations with that organization as it becomes the major economic force in Europe. Both-these elements were present in Khrushchev's. statement and were the under- lying theme of the conference of Communist economists which convened in Moscow on 27 August. In his article, Khrushchev excoriated the. Common Market.as a "monopolist amalgamation" set up to.isolate the bloc from fa- vorable European trading arrange- To satisfy the demands of Marxist ideology,Khrushchev asserted that these plans would accelerate the "historical quarrel between socialism and capitalism" and inevitably re- sult in, the '.'replacement of the capitalist system by the socialist on a world scale." At the same time, however, Khrushchev implicitly admitted that EEC was a clear success and he hinted that he expected. developing trade between it and CEMA. Khrushchev's article brings into the open the division of the Communist world into Moscow- led and Peiping-led components which was implicit in the ac- ceptance of Mongolia as a full member of CEMA at the 7 June meeting and the exclusion of China, North Korea, North Viet- nam, and Albania. The article features a sharp polemic against "people who call themselves Marxists"--i.e., the Chinese. It accuses them of "scholasticism" and at the same time rejects their thinly veiled charge that Moscow is guilty of "economism," a cardinal Marxist sin. In SECRET 14 Sept 62 SPECIAL ARTICL]3&S Page 6 of 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0 %W VMW SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY mid-May Peiping's doctrinal journal Red Flag, ostensibly in a discussion of Lenin's What Is To Be Done, had attacked economism, with t e Soviet Union as its obvious target. Even more striking is Khru- shchev's division of the "so- cialist camp" into CEMA members, whose industrial development is sufficiently advanced to permit them to enter into a system of international division of labor, and unnamed others with whom CEMA members "are developing broad economic ties, facilitating the maturing of conditions for their still broader economic cooperation." The implied differences between CEMA and non- CEMA members of the bloc are so great as to postpone almost indefinitely the latter group's association with CEMA. Khrushchev also argues strongly against autarkic development of the satellites' economies, a develop- ment which Peiping favors for itself, The Chinese Response The increased economic and political pressure which Khru- shchev is exerting through CEMA and the Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia have spurred the Chinese into a renewed polemical defense of their own positions. The new open antagonism of the Chinese may also be a reflection of the stepped-up behind-the- scenes maneuvering between the two countries for a tactical advantage over the other. The Soviet Union has sent letters to China, and has in- spired letters from other Com- munist parties, suggesting that the dispute could be handled by "consultations" among the parties. The USSR, however, wants such meetings to cover the issues in dispute, other than Albania, and the ground rules the Soviets would want-- majority decision--would obviously resu]tin a Soviet victory. The Chinese have responded with letters of their own, and have inspired letters from their sup- porters, suggesting that the meeting discuss primarily the question of Albania and that it be governed by the principle of unanimity. Two recent statements by Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi also suggest that the USSR has tried to pressure the Chinese into accepting its demands. On 23 August at a Rumanian Embassy reception on the occa- sion of the 18th.,anniversary of the Rumanian liberation, Chen Yi reiterated Peiping,'s thesis that common views must be worked out through consulta- tions among equal parties and that violation of this principle, or "attempting to impose one's views on.others," is detrimental to the unity of the bloc and the international movement. This was the first open statement by a regime leader on this ques- tion since December 1961. In an even stronger statement at a North Vietnamese anniversary celebration, Chen Yi noted that "we have never forcibly imposed our views on others, nor re- placed comrade-like discussions and consultations with mutual interference in inter-nation af- fai:rs." The Chinese had been re- stricting their polemics to successive articles in Red Flag, but during the. last two weeks there has been a significant increase in attacks on the Soviets in other publications and forums. On 1 July, Red Flag had attacked "revisionists" for their ideas on the "parliamentary road to socialism" and pointed out that French and Italian Com- munist parties ~ had lost ground by following this "road." On 16 July, Red Flag carried an article on "sophism" which at- tacked "revisionists" and their "anti-Marxist distortions." SECRET 14 Sept 62 SPEC.TAT. ARTWT.F:R Dncrn Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700120001-0~f 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 law NW SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY In early September, Red Fla launched an outright attack on Yugoslavia--a move which points up the direct contrast between Peiping's continuing enmity toward Belgrade and Mos- cow's efforts to improve Soviet- Yugoslav relations. The latest issue of the Soviet journal New Times, for example, carries an article praising Yugoslav foreign policy. In July, while ,a Yugoslav economic team was in Moscow, an agreement was reached that will allow Yugoslavia to take part soon in some CEMA subcommittee meetings, and on 1 September Moscow announced the dates--24 September to 4 October--for titular President Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade. On 25 August the Chinese Peoples Daily carried a glowing account of the 20-year history of Albania's official newspaper Zeri I Po ullit, which it characterize as "waging a? resolute and uncompromising struggle for defending the purity of Marxism-,Leninism and opposing modern revisionism." People's Daily chief editor Wu eng- s , at the Albanian'Em- bassy reception that evening, added his congratulations to Zeri I Popullit for its "iinre- mi ing opposition to modern revisionism as represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia." The Chinese have renewed the attack on other'issues as well. After suppressing their views on the importance of the national liberation movement at the Soviet-led World Peace Congress (WPC) disarmament con- ference in Moscow in early July, they reversed their tactics at the Tokyo ban-the-bomb conference in August. The Chinese have described the Tokyo congress, in which they took the leading role, as the most successful and signif- icant world peace conference in 1962." Chinese speakers at a 27 August rally in Peiping singled out as "correct" posi- tions the Tokyo designation of the United States as the "enemy" and the "clear" definition of the "correct" relationship between peace and the national liberation movement--elements absent from the WPC appeal. Peiping's staunchest ally, the Albanian Communist Party, has also joined in the attack. On both 24 and 27 August, Al- banian party leaders condemned Khrushchev by name. No such statement had been made since 16 July, and this followed four months of silence concerning Khrushchev. While the Chinese have much to be angry over,inciuding Khrushchev's rapprochement with Yugoslavia and the attempts to sell MIG-21's to India, the vehemence and depth of the re- newed polemics suggest a more negotiations may be under way attempting to estab- lish.a suitable agenda for another conference of world Communist parties. The Chinese offensive may be a reflection of Peiping's dissatisfaction with the course of the negotia- SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 14 Sept 62 SPEC-TAT. ARTTrT.V.R Dt..,.o u Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0 Iq Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/25: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700120001-0