CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 74
OCI NO. 0439/62
19 October 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 18 Oct)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow took further steps last week to prepare the way
for talks between Khrushchev and President Kennedy. In a
long interview on 16 October with the new US ambassador,
Khrushchev reportedly stressed his desire to negotiate a
9erlin settlement. Moscow also took the initiative in
arranging Gromyko's talk on 18 October with President Kennedy.
The Soviet press, meanwhile, has deplored recent statements
by US leaders regarding the possibility of a new Berlin
crisis after the US elections.
ALBANIAN REACTION TO SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT . . . . Page 3
Albania's first official comment on the recent
Brezhnev trip to Yugoslavia condemns Khrushchev for a
"great betrayal" of Marxism-Leninism. It warns that the
Soviet bloc rapprochement with Yugoslavia could split
international Communism into competing ideological groups.
Since Albania is too weak to organize a rival movement, its
more immediate aim is probably to foster factionalism in
the Communist world, particularly in Eastern Europe.
SOVIET CROP PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Crop and livestock production in 1962--the mid-point of
the USSR's Seven-Year Plan--will once again be well below
plan. Khrushchev's insistence on use of fallow land was in
large part responsible for a 5-percent increase in the sown
area, but poor weather in man important agricultural areas
has reduced yields.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S GRAIN IMPORTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE
POSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Peiping's recent agreement to buy (680,000 tons of
wheat from Australia brings total grain contracts signed
with the West since late 1960 to over 11 million tons,
with a value of over $700 million. China is meeting its
payment obligations for this grain, and thus far the
foreign exchange problem has not been unmanageable.
Although Peiping has expressed hopes for a "slightly better"
harvest this year, all indications point to a continuing
need for grain imports.
SINO-INDIAN BORDER CLASHES INTENSIFY . ? . . . . . . . . . Page
Military activities along the Indian-Chinese border
have been further stepped up, with clashes occurring
recently between forces of battalion size. Although
the political. and military moves by each side contain
large elements of bluff, both New Delhi and Peiping have
committed their prestige so far that only severe winter
weather will force a suspension of military operations
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PAKISTANI OPPOSITION UNITING AGAINST AYUB . . . . . . . . Page
The opposition of old-line politicians to President
Ayub has become increasingly effective since most re-
strictions on political activity were relaxed last spring.
Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Suhrawardy.,
they are attracting substantial popular support. Ayub
will probably try to avoid countermeasures which would
discredit his experiment with limited constitutional rule.
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Despite Tshombd's steps to implement part of the UN
reconciliation plan, Adoula precipitated a new crisis on
1.7 October by publicly repudiating the cease-fire and
the financial arrangements his representatives had signed
in Elisabethville. Another dispute is almost certain to
develop 'over the UN-drafted constitution which Adoula
presented to the provincial presidents on 16 October.
Adoula's repudiation of the Elisabethville accords will
cause Tshombd to hold up on any further moves on implementing
the UN plan.
THE EEC AND AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Ministers of the six Common Market countries and of
18 associated African states are meeting in Brussels on
23 and 24 October to resume discussion of an EEC-African
association convention. They are attempting to meet. the
deadline imposed by the expiration this year of the present
convention, and a broad area of understanding has already
been reached. Nevertheless, several knotty problems remain,
and there now are two new ones--what Algeria's relationship
with the EEC should be, and the implications of the decision
by the African Commonwealth members to reject prospective
association with the Common Market.
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ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Premier Fanfani's center-left government is making steady
progress toward implementing its program of economic and
administrative reform. Its success is in part due to-the
support it is receiving from its Socialist allies in Parlia-
ment, a development which is also significantly reducing the
parliamentary influence of the Communists. The coalition
parties hope to maintain this momentum so as to be able to
make gains in the national elections. planned for next spring.
However, the reform program still faces numerous obstacles,
and the government parties are already bickering among themselves
in an attempt to bolster their own chances in the elections.
PORTUGAL AND THE UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
In the forthcoming UN General Assembly debate on Angola,
Portugal's African policy is likely to face the most bitter
attack yet by the Afro-Asian bloc. If the Portuguese do not
receive from their NATO allies the support to which they feel
entitled, Lisbon may again consider withdrawing from the
world organization.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Soviet military shipments are continuing. There is no
evidence that Cubans have begun training in the operation of
missile installations being set up in Cuba, but training is
under way on other Soviet equipment supplied. Meanwhile,
the USSR continues to show concern over efforts to restrict
shipping being used to carry nonmilitary goods to Cuba.
CONFERENCE ON BRITISH GUIANA'S INDEPENDENCE . . . . . . . Page 18
The conference on independence for British Guiana--origi-
nally set for last May but postponed because of the February
riots--is to open in London on 23 October. Britain is not
likely to set an independence date until some agreement is
reached on the electoral provisions of the colony's future
constitution. Premier Jagan's Communist-oriented party and
the main opposition party give the appearence of being
sharply at odds on this issue, and the conference may reach
an arl deadlock.
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ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA SET FOR NEXT SPRING . . . . . . . . Page 19
The Guido government's intention to hold elections
sometime between March and June 1963 will probably cause
concern among hard-line military elements. However, an
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 October 1962
immediate revival of the military struggle for power is not
expected; the hard-liners do not seem to have the necessary
support at the present time. Nevertheless, factionalism
among the "legalists" continues, and may increase as
Peronists intensify their political activity. 7::~
THE BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Partial returns from the elections of 7 October indicate
that extreme leftists have made slight gains while the
majority of positions in congress and in the states remain
in the hands of moderates and conservatives. In the
gubernatorial races, conservatives have won Sao Paulo and
Rio Grande do Sul, extreme leftists have won Rio de Janeiro
State and the vice governorship in Guanabara, and the outcome
for pro-Communist Miguel Arraes in the key northeastern state
of Pernambuco remains in doubt. Extreme leftists have
somewhat increased the small number of seats they hold in the
Senate; most votes for the lower house have not et been
counted.
VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT PLANS TO OUTLAW COMMUNIST PARTY . . Page 21
President Betancourt on 15 October announced the
government's plan to arrest extremist congressmen and
eliminate leftist groups responsible for the persistent
terrorism in Venezuela. Betancourt stated that the minister
of justice had petitioned the Supreme Court to outlaw the
Communist Party and the Movement of they Revolutionary Left
(MIR), and that Communist and MIR congressmen would be
prosecutes' for "civil rebellion." The armed forces and
the major labor confederation are expected to support the
government plan, but opposition groups will probably attempt
to obstruct its execution.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 1
The Soviet system contains no built-in machinery for
ensuring the transfer of power. When Khrushchev leaves
the scene, an interregnum "collective leadership" will
probably provide a facade of unity behind which his lieutenants
will. fight for power. There are no guarantees that. Frol.
Kozlov--Khrushchev's present successor.-designate--will emerge
victorious from such a struggle. Some adjustments in policy
and administrative structure will certainly result from the
succession, but the new leadership will probably adhere in
general to the Khrushchev line.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
LAND REFORM IN IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Iranian Government's program of breaking up the
estates of large landowners and distributing them to peasants
has been under way since last March. it aims to increase
agricultural productivity by introducing modern farming
methods and by providing the peasants with the incentive of
ownerrhip. If fully implemented, the program also will
bring revolutionary changes to Iranian rural society. Peasant
impatience with the slow pace of reform could u set the re ime's
orderly timetable.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moscow took further steps
1!^.,t week to prepare the way
for, talks between Khrushchev
and President Kennedy. Khru-
shchev had a three-hour inter-
view with Ambassador Kohler
on 16 October in which he re-
portedly stressed his desire
to negotiate a Berlin settle-
ment. Moscow announced that
the talk took place in an
atmosphere of "frankness and
mutual understanding."
The USSR also took the in-
itiative in requesting Gromyko's
18 October talk with President
Kennedy. Gromyko used his
press conference at the UN on
13 October to emphasize Moscow's
commitment to peaceful coexist-
ence and the settlement of dis-
putes through negotiations. He
implied that now it is up to
the Western powers to make new
proposals for a Berlin solution
and called on Western authori-
ties to'take measures to pre-
vent "provocations" at the
Berlin wall. Gromyko repeated
the usual warning that a German
peace treaty cannot be postponed
indefinitely. He again called
for the withdrawal of NATO
forces from West Berlin and re-
jected any suggestion that West
German troops might be stationed
in the city.
At his UN press conference,
Gromyko denounced the alleged
"campaign of war psychosis" being
waged in the US and other NATO
countries. .The Soviet press
has. deplored recent statements
by US leaders regarding the possi-
bility of a new Berlin crisis
after the US elections. Izvestia
charged that President Kennedy
himself has encouraged "war hys-
teria" in the US to prevent a
reasonable solution of the Ger-
man problem. Moscow has also
professed concern that Chancel-
lor Adenauer's visit to the US
next month will increase US op-
position to a Berlin settlement.
A visiting Rumanian dele-
gation won Indonesia's endorse-
iment of the bloc's position on
~a German peace treaty and the
(creation of a "free, neutral,
;demilitarized" West Berlin.
UN Affairs
Soviet leaders have ap-
parently decided not to op-
pose U Thant if he decides to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
run for the office of UN Secre-
tary General. Gromyko told the
press on 13 October that he
did not wish to cast "a single
aspersion" on Thant, "whose
qualifications. in this task
were never a matter of doubt
to us."
However, Gromyko evaded a
direct response to a question
concerning Moscow's position
on Thant's possible candidacy
for a full five-year term. He
recalled Khrushchev's state-
ments on the UN Secretariat at
the 1960 General Assembly and
went on to say that "sooner or
later" the question of the
structure of the Secretariat
will have to be solved "radi-
cally." He did not specifically
note the Soviet premier's de-
mand that the position of sec-
retary general be filled by a
three-man executive organ.
Nuclear Test Ban
Soviet officials during
the past week firmly reiterated
Moscow's intransigent position
on a nuclear test ban. Gromyko
stressed to the press that an
agreement must include under-
ground explosions as well as
tests in all other environments.
At the UN Political Com-
mitt-ee's initial session on a
test ban, Soviet delegate Zarin
emphasized that national detec-
tion means are sufficient to
police an agreement. He re-
pezi ted the Soviet Government's
endorsement of the eight-
power "compromise" memorandum
and claimed that the US viewed
the memorandum as a "senseless"
proposal.
In Geneva, the Soviet del-
egate to the test-ban subcom-
mittee continued his abusive
assault on US and British
positions. He accused the West--
ern. delegates of pursuing "ulti-
matum" tactics.
A high-ranking Soviet UN
delegate on 11 October defen-
sively protested a US delegate's
attack on Moscow's refusal to
produce scientific evidence to
support the claim that all
underground tests can be identi--
fied by existing national means.
He contended that the disclosure
of such information would prej-
udice Soviet security. When
questioned about the relation-
ship between seismology and
security, the Soviet official
said that other detection means
--such as satellites--may also
be employed. He added that satel?--
lites had already proved capable 25X1
of detecting iron ore deposits,
citing "Soviet publications" for
this information.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ALBANIAN REACTION TO SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT
There is clearly deepening
concern in the Albanian leader-
ship over the implications for
Albania posed by the Soviet-
Yugoslav rapprochement. Alba-
nian Premier Hoxha is aware
that this step symbolizes Alba-
nia's complete separation from
Moscow, and he may suspect that
Moscow and Belgrade have con-
cluded or will soon reach an ac-
cord on a common line of action
against Albania.
In its first official com-
mentary on the 24 September -
4 October visit to Yugoslavia of
Soviet president Brezhnev--a
commentary characterized. by bit-
ter desperation--the Hoxha re-
gime staked out its claim to
Communist orthodoxy by accusing
Khrushchev of a "great betrayal"
of Marxism-Leninism in iiis
policy of rapprochement with
Tito. The 13 October article
in Albania's official newspaper,
Zeri i Popullit, hinted that the
policy of rapprochement with
Yugoslavia could lead to a split
in the international Communist
movement and in effect called
on other Communists to join Al-
bania in its opposition to
Khrushchev's policies.
Claiming that the mass of
Communists and, the revisionists
cannot live together for long
in the same party or in the inter
national movement, the article
asserted that "as soon as pos-
sible," Communists and even their
leaders who have so far supported
Khrushchev must find "the energy
and courage" to "detach them-
selves from the revisionists."
The article compared the present
situation with the struggles of
Lenin and Stalin against the
revisionists and opportunists
of their day. "We know very
well," it said, "it was only by
definitely eliminating the
Mensheviks in 1912 that a real
unity was established.."
The Albanians have not
hesitated to attack Khrushchev
by name, and they appear to be
urging the Chinese.to abandon
their subterfuge of using Tito
as a "whipping boy" when their
actual target is the Soviet
leader. The article noted that
1Yugoslav revisionism had been
"greatly discredited" but that
Khrushchev's "common front" with
Tito has "not been completely
unmasked," and that the time
has come to do this.
Albania undoubtedly real-
izes that no communist party
would be prepared to join it in
a grouping formally independent
of Moscow. It may believe, how-
ever, that there are a number
of parties which would support
Peiping if the Chinese Communists
took the lead in forming an op-
position "international." While
there is no indication that
Peiping now intends to take
such a radical. step, Tirana may
have been encouraged to hint at
the possibility because of the
occasional allusions in the
Chinese press to Lenin's struggle
against revisionists of his day.
Last February, for example, Red.
Flag, the Chinese Communist
theoretical journal, pointed
out that Lenin had had. to unite
with "revolutionary Marxists of
various countries" in opposing
the revisionists of the Second
International.
The more immediate purpose
of Tirana's attack is probably
to foster factionalism in the
Communist world, particularly
in the East European parties.
Four of them--the Bulgarian,
Hungarian, Czech, and East Ger-
man--are to hold party congresses
between November and January.
Tirana is probably aware that
all, except possibly the Hungar-
ian, harbor important elements
which disapprove in varying de-
grees of certain of Khrushchev's
internal and foreign policies.
The European satellites have not
uniformly followed Moscow's
policies toward Albania. Not
all have withdrawn their am-
bassadors from Tirana, and Poland
and Bulgaria have renegotiated
1962 trade agreements with Al-
bania. The Hoxha regime may be-
lieve that deeper and. more signif-
icant differences between Mos-
cow and the satellites lie be-
low the surface.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET CROP PROSPECTS
Agricultural production in
1962--the midpoint of the USSR's
Seven-Year Plan--will again
disappoint Soviet leaders.
Khrushchev's insistence on use
of fallow lands for crops was
in large part responsible for
a 5-percent increase in the sown
area--from 506 million acres
in 1961 to 534 million acres
this year.. However, poor weather
in many important agricultural
areas has reduced yields, and
crop and livestock production
will be well below plan.
The northern half of the
European USSR was abnormally
cool and wet in 1962, the south-
ern half warm and dry. Drought
prevailed in most of the impor-
tant grain-producing areas of
the New Lands. Only in the
Volga valley, some adjacent
regions, and in the central
black-soil zone have conditions
for. crop development been aver-
age or above.
Khrushchev stated in late
September that grain production
in 1962 would be greater than
in 1961. This seems unlikely,
although the mediocre 1961
harvest was estimated at only
115 million metric tons (the
official claim was 137 million
tons). Ten percent more land
was sown to small grain this
year, but bad weather hampered
growth and harvesting operations.
Corn acreage, too, was greatly
expanded, but the crop has suf-
fered from drought in the Ukraine
and North Caucasus and cool wet
weather in areas to the north.
Production of potatoes and vege-
tables will probably be somewhat
below normal because of weather
conditions and a slightly re-
duced acreage.
The production of cotton
will probably be no greater than
the mediocre crop of 1961. An
unusually cold, wet spring in
Central Asia retarded early
development, and some areas had
to be replanted because of
damage by wind and hail.
19 Oct 62
Khrushchev's recent tour of the
principal cotton-growing areas
indicates official concern. A
record crop was harvested in
1959, but otherwise annual cot-
ton production has not risen
much since 1956.
Significant increases in
the number of livestock may per-
mit an increase of about 5-7
percent in production of meat
and milk. An additional factor
is the incentive offered pro-
ducers in the form of higher
state prices for such products.
A significant improvement in
the Soviet diet, however, is
unlikely. Production of meat
and. milk will fall far short
of the 12.9 million and 85 mil-
lion metric tons, respectively:,
cited by Khrushchev at the
March plenum as necessary "to
meet requirements more fully"
in 1962.
As of 1 September procure-
ment of feed crops was lagging
behind the 1961 pace. However,
the harvest of corn and sugar
beets, which will weigh heavily
in the feed balance, had just
begun.
The corn crop probably will
be no better than last year. The
beet crop sown expressly for feed
may be significantly larger be-
cause acreage devoted to this
crop was approximately doubled.
However, acreage devoted to
beets for processing by the sugar
industry was increased only
slightly, and poor weather condi-
tions in some important producing
areas will probably prevent any
significant increase in this
crop.
The replacement at Khru-
shchev's behest of grasses
with cultivated crops--corn,
sugar beets, peas, and fodder
beans--may have boomeranged to
some extent. The cool, wet
conditions in the northern part
of European USSR not only re-
tarded development of these
crops but also impeded culti-
vation and harvesting operations
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNIST CHINA'S GRAIN IMPORTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION
Peiping's recent agreement
to buy 680,000 tons of wheat from
Australia brings purchases in
1962 from that country to 1.4
million tons and from the West
as a whole to 5.3 million tons.
Since it began large-scale pur-
chases of Western grain in De-
cember 1960, China has agreed to
buy over 11 million tons for do-
mestic consumption at a cost of
about $700 million. Although
Peiping has expressed hopes of
a "slightly better" harvest this.
year, all indications point to
a continuing need for grain im-
ports.
China continues to meet
its payment obligations on time.
While the unprecedented import
of emergency food supplies in
the first half of 1961 created
a serious drain on China's for-
eign exchange reserves, the Chi-
nese managed by 1962 not only
to stem the depletion of their
foreign currency holdings but
to replenish the losses of the
first half-of 1961. This was
achieved by (1) sharply reducing
nonfood imports; (2) obtaining
substantial short-term credits
from Western grain supplies;
(3) expanding exports to the
West; and (4) selling silver.
payment scheduled largely for
nine months to a year. Exports
of silver rose from $17 million
in the first half of 1961 to $40
million in the second half. Al-
-though three successive years
of poor crops severely reduced
China's export capabilities,
considerable efforts were made
to expand nonfood exports to
the West,
By these measures, Peiping
achieved stability in its inter-
national reserves during 1961
and will probably be able to
maintain it through 1962. Next
year, however, when short-term
credits come due, further trade
adjustments will be necessary.
Otherwise China's slim reserves
of gold and convertible curren-
cies could be quickly exhausted.
Too little is known about China's
silver output and holdings to
permit an estimate on whether
last year's heavy sales can be
repeated.
There are indications that
the Chinese are considering the
long-run possibilities of con-
tinuing to import Western wheat
in order to free domestically
produced rice for export.
By the second half of 1961,
China had slashed nongrain im-
ports by 60 percent relative to
the first half of 1960. In ad-
dition, it had obtained Western
credits for grain imports amount-
ing to $120 million, with re-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-INDIAN BORDER CLASHES INTENSIFY
The struggle between India
and Communist China along the
Himalayas is now in its fifth
year. Military activity is
greater than ever, with clashes
between forces of battalion size.
The military activities still
take second place, however, to
political moves. Each seeks
to impress the other with the
seriousness of its resolve,
assuming that the other side
cannot afford a war and is
therefore bluffing.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Indian leaders have loudly
reaffirmed that India will dis-
lodge the Chinese from positions
"illegally" occupied early in
September on what India regards
as its side of the McMahon
Line. The realignment of the
Indian Army's command structure
in the northeast area, the
huddles of Indian generals in
New Delhi and in the northeast,
and Nehru's "go ahead" to the
military to push the Chinese
out have all been highly pub-
licized. Lest this publicity
alarm the Indian public, how-
ever, Nehru has also stressed
the long-term nature of the
struggle, expressed great con-
fidence in the army, and carried
on with planned trips to Nigeria,
the UAR, and Ceylon.
The Chinese, for their part,
are taking pains to project a
defensive and "reasonable"
image. They emphasize the
restraint shown by Chinese
border guards in the face of
repeated Indian provocations
and admit larger casualty
figures than the Indians.
In repeated exchanges about the
possibility of border talks
this fall, the Chinese left it
for the Indians finally to slam
the door--in New Delhi's note
of 6 October. At the same time,
the tone of Peiping's public
utterances is aimed at impressing
New Delhi with China's determi-
nation to resist force with
force.
Both sides have now committed
their prestige so far that they
cannot suspend operations ex-
cept in the face of severe winter
weather. The Indians, moreover,
are gradually running out of
bluffing room and, despite their
logistics difficulties, must
move soon to back up their
words or they will by default
have allowed the establishment 25X1
of Communist China's presence
south of the Indian-claimed
northeast border.
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PAKISTANI OPPOSITION UNITING AGAINST AYTJB
The challenge to Pakistani
President Ayub's control over
his five-month-old constitutional
government continues to grow as
opposition leaders work to or-
ganize a united front against his
regime. Since Ayub promulgated
the constitution last March,
legislative assemblies have been
elected and political parties
have been legalized. The parties
are still prevented from gaining
effective power, however.
Former Prime Minister Suhra-
wardy announced on 4 October that
he had secured the qualified sup-
port of most of Pakistan's promi-
nent politicians, whom the army
ousted from power in 1958, for
a new National Democratic Front.
It is a loose coalition of
parties determined to amend basic
provisions of Ayub's constitution
as a means of regaining power. They
particularly want to reconsti-
tute parliamentary government
in place of Ayub's presidential
system, and election by direct
suffrage rather than by an
electoral college composed of
local government councils.
Student unrest has acquired
broad antiregime overtones. The
opposition is also capitalizing
on sentiment in some regions
favoring more provincial autonomy
rather than the strong central
controls provided under the con-
stitution.
Ayub attempted with some
success last June and July to
deal with the politicians on
their own ground, mainly by
distributing patronage.. This
secured for him the support of
some East Pakistani politicians
and gave the regime majorities in
the new national and provincial
assemblies. 25X1
The government
has suggested that it may begin
to enforce rulings of martial law
tribunals--rulings technically
still in effect--which bar
Suhrawardy and many of his col- 25X1
leagues from political activity.
The Front is backed by the
same elements which have opposed
Ayub ever since he instituted
martial law'in 1958. As re-
strictions have been progres-
sively relaxed under the new
constitution, Suhrawardy and
his fellow politicians have
been attracting substantial
publicity for their views and
have shown that they have con-
siderable popular support.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Congolese Premier Adoula
precipitated a new crisis on
17 October by publicly re-
pudiating the cease-fire and
the preliminary financial
agreements his representatives
had signed in Elisabethville.
Charging UN and other diplomatic
interference, Adoula declared
that the central government had
unanimously agreed that the
agreements were "contrary to
the spirit and letter of the
UN plan." He said he opposes
the cease-fire because it is
limited to northern Katanga,
and the financial agreements
because they recognize that
Katanga's financial requirements
should be subtracted from the
amounts of revenue and foreign
exchange to be shared with the
central government.
Adoula's precipitous stand,
which appears to throw the whole
UN reconciliation plan into
doubt, stems from the mounting
political pressures on him and
from his basic distrust of
Tshombe.. Adoula is convinced
that Tshombe:, despite the partial
step he has taken at Under
Secretary McGhee's suggestion,
does not in fact intend to im-
plement the UN plan, and that
he is only awaiting Adoula's
downfall and the collapse of
the UN operation in the Congo.
Central government leaders
continue to push the idea that
the only way to solve the problem
of Katanga is for the US to
give direct assistance to the
Congolese Army. At the 17
October cabinet meeting, there
was considerable pressure on
Adoula to get the UN out of the
country and to seek aid elsewhere.
Although Adoula may cool down,
the. varied pressures on him have
put him in a defensive frame of
mind and further reduced his
maneuverabili
In view of the difficulties
arising over the preliminary
agreements, there is likely to
be great difficulty over the
UN-drafted constitution which
Adoula had presented to the pro-
vincial-presidents on 16 October.
Although the UN plan had specif-
ically called for a federal
constitution providing for
genuine provincial autonomy, the
draft as it now stands outlines
a highly centralized arrange-
ment and gives the provinces
little more authority than under
the present Belgian-drafted
constitution.
Tshombd has already hinted
his disapproval, and he can be
expected to demand changes and
to halt further implementation
of the UN plan. In his talks
with Under Secretary McGhee,
Tshombe again made it clear
that a "truly federal" constitu-
tion remained the sine qua non
of a'Tinal and lasting agree-
ment."
Tshombe views the steps he
has taken to date as interim
measures. They include the dis-
puted cease-fire, the deposit
of $2 million to the credit of
Leopoldville against future
Katangan payments, the opening
of the Lubilash bridge and a
shipment of copper along the
all-Congo route to the port of
Matadi,,an oath of allegience
by the Katangan military pending
an amnesty, and the reopening of
telecommunications with Leopold-
ville. These do not in them-
selves irrevocably commit him
nor do they substantially weak-
en his financial and military
independence. By these moves,
however, he probably has effec-
tively undercut any threat.of
economic sanctions or military
action against him.
Besides the constitution,
the two other vital features
of the plan were the 50-50
split of Katangan revenues and
foreign exchange, and inte-
gration of the Katangan military
forces. Tshombe is presently
offering only 25 percent of his
mining. revenue and 30 percent
of his foreign exchange earnings.
The military commission has 25X1
devoted its attention so far to
the cease-fire and has yet to
discuss integration.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ministers of the six Com-
mon Market countries' and of 13
associated African states are
meeting in Brussels on 23 and
24 October to resume discussion
of an EEC-African association
convention. They are attempt-
ing to meet the deadline im-
posed by the expiration this
year of the present convention,
and a broad area of understand-
ing has already been reached.
Nevertheless, several knotty
problems remain, and there now
are two new ones--what Algeria's
relationship with the EEC should
be, and. the implications of the
decision by the African Common-
wealth members to reject pros-
pective association with the
Common Market.
countries and the EEC Council
have review authority over
the EEC Commission's decisions
respecting the fund are be-
lieved contrary to the
EEC' treaty. The EEC coun-
tries are also divided on the
most effective way of distrib-
uting aid, among the African
claimants--who themselves will
want a voice in the decision.
One view is that the Africans
should initiate proposals for
projects subject to later EEC
approval. Another argues that
there should be prior EEC-Afri-
can understanding on objective
criteria for such projects.
Still a third view would author-
ize the Commission to distrib-
ute aid on the basis of past
experience.
Since the joint ministe-
rialmeeting on this subject in
July, the Six have attempted
to meet African desires for
increased economic assistance.
The EEC now is prepared to of-
fer to establish an $810 mil-
lion overseas development fund
for Africans and others to be
used over the next five years
both for developmental aid
and for assistance in market-
ing exports and diversifying
production. This sum, however,
is close to what the associated
African states want for them-
selves alone, while the EEC
proposes to earmark some $70.
million of the total for as-
sociated non-African dependent
territories.
Administration of the aid
fund may also raise problems.
Proposals that a committee of
`representatives of the EEC
The ministerial meeting
may also throw further light
on the consequences of the
rejection of EEC association
by the African members of the
Commonwealth. Both the UK and
the EEC had believed that such
association offered the most
promising solution to the com-
mercial and economic problems
these countries would face if
Britain enters the EEC, and
there is still some hope they
may reverse their stand.. If
they do, their strongly nation-
alist-neutralist sentiments
would be a further obstacle to
the development of the kind of
close institutional ties with
the African states the EEC has
been hoping for. If they do
not and no new formula is found,
then much will be heard of the
charge that the Common Market
is "dividing" Africa.
There are also increasing
indications that the thorny
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
problem of Algeria's.future
ties with the EEC may shortly
be raised. Since the EEC was
set up in 1957, Algeria's
status under the treaty has
remained unclear. France in-
itially insisted that it be
treated as a French depart-
ment, but subsequently re-
quested and received aid
commitments for Algeria's
benefit from the EEC's over-
seas development fund. Since
the Evian accord, EEC con-
sideration of the Algerian
problem has not gotten be-
yond, the question of whether
Algeria now should be in the
same category as the 18 other
French African states or
whether it should apply for
associate status. in the EEC
similar to that of Greece.
Algeria needs to retain its
traditional market in France,
but wants to avoid any im-
plication of bowing to "neo-
colonialism" in establish-
ing formal ties with the
Common Market. The US Em-
bassy in Algiers has noted
signs that Ben Bella is
increasingly preoccupied
with this dilemma.
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
.... UGUESE
-EA
GHANA TOGO
CAMEROOyN
European Common Market (EEC) ~GAaON
African areas associated with EEC
in 1357
British and Commonwealth areas
of Africa
U K DENMAu
;I PANIS
GA HAR
CONGO
REP U B LIC
1 OP THE
CONGO
SOMALI
REPUBLIC
1 v ANYIKA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION
The center-left Fanfani
government of Italy has made
progress in its program of eco-
nomic and administrative re-
form. The three cabinet parties
and their parliamentary allies,
the Nenni Socialists, hope this
will work to their advantage in
the parliamentary elections
planned for the late spring of
1963. However, several of. the
major measures promised the
Socialists by the Christian
Democrats in return for their
support have not yet passed
both houses of Parliament. More-
over the government parties--
Christian Democrats, Social
Democrats, and Republicans?
are already bickering among
themselves in an attempt to
bolster their own chances in
the elections.
The parlia.mentary voting
patterns show that this govern-
ment,has also made progress to-
ward isolating the Communists.
Although the Communists, for
political reasons, supported
several important measures in-
volving fiscal and administrative
reform, the Communist vote was
unsolicited and unnecessary for
their enactment. On all major
measures on which the Communists
voted against the government,
the Socialists abstained or
voted in support. For the first
time, the Socialists refrained
from joining the Communists in
opposing the defense budget,
which is increased over last
year's. They have announced
they will do likewise on the
budget for the Interior Min-
istry, which controls the police.
The long-debated measure
for the nationalization of elec-
tric energy--one of the require-
ments levied by the Socialists
for support of Premier Fanfani--
passed the Chamber of Deputies
by a large majority, and a simi-
lar vote is ultimately expected
by the Senate. Its supporters
predict this by November, but
opposition parties, including
the Communists and rightists,
will seek to delay it until af-
ter the elections.
A source of friction between
the Socialists and the Christian
Democrats is the latter's demand
that,, the Socialists give an ex-
plicit public pledge to cooperate
with them and not the Communists
in forming regional governments.
The government's measure to
give effect to the constitutional
provision authorizing the estab-
lishment of regional administra-
tions is not expected to be
taken up by Parliament until
after the spring elections.
The Socialists' tendency
to disengage from collaboration
with-the Communists in local
governments at the town and
city level is already marked.
The Socialist Party now governs
more Italian citizens in
collaboration with the cabinet
parties than it does with the
Communists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PORTUGAL AND THE UN
In the forthcoming UN Gen-
eral Assembly debate on Angola,
Portugal's African policy ap-
parently faces the most bitter
attack yet by the Afro-Asian
bloc. If the Portuguese do
not receive from their NATO
allies the support to which they
feel entitled, Lisbon may again
consider withdrawing from the
world organization.
Portugal's current diffi-
culties in the UN stem in large
part from its unwillingness to
accept publicly the principle
of self-determination for its
overseas territories.
At a meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) on 28
September, the majority of the
NATO countries stressed the
importance of the principle of
self-determination and their
difficulty in acceding to
Portugal's request for support
in the UN unless Lisbon is
willing to recognize this
principle. A high official in
the Portuguese Foreign Ministry
told the Council, however, that
Portugal could not accept the
principle of self-determination
as defined by the majority of
.UN members, or even indicate
some movement toward this
principle. To do so, he said,,
would begin a slide toward the
loss of all of Portugal's over-
seas territories, since to the
Afro-Asians, self-determination
means complete independence.
could not even accept public
comments by its NATO allies
that Portuguese reforms =n
Angola are leading to self-
determination, since this would
necessitate Portuguese reaction
to such statements. The offi-
cial was obviously shaken by
the forceful way in which the
NAC members disagreed with his
country's African policy and by
the refusal of the majority to
promise the support in UN de-
bate he had requested for
Lisbon's position.
As a gesture of concession
the. Portuguese have prepared the
text of what they consider an
acceptable resolution regarding
the appointment of a UN
rapporteur to investigage con-
ditions in their African terri-
tories. Their version, however,
does not meet even moderate Afro-
Asian demands.
Lisbon's stand will further
stimulate an Afro-Asian campaign
for diplomatic and economic
sanctions against Portugal and
perhaps gain more support for
the Brazzaville group's proposal
that Lisbon be expelled from the
UN. Sanctions are legally with-
in the purview of the Security
Council, not the General Assembly,
but pressure for such measures
will increase if the Afro-
Asians are successful in their
current effort to obtain a
consensus favoring sanctions
aga: nst South Africa. 25X1
The same official told the
NAC on 10 October that Lisbon
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Soviet military shipments are being trained to operate
to Cuba are continuing. other equipment from the USSR.
Site of unidentified activity,
possibly missile-related
? Confirmed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site
X Possible SAM site, exact location unknown
Support facility for processing equipment
Airfield with MIG aircraft
0 Coastal defense cruise-missile site
Effective air defense perimeter
(estimated radius: 20-25 nautical miles)
MISSILE ACTIVITY IN CUBA, OCTOBER 1962
Two additional SA-2 sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) sites
have been installed in Oriente
Province, one of them within
range of the US naval base at
Guantanamo Bay. In addition,
a SAM support area similar to
the one previously identified
near Havana has been noted
near Santiago de Cuba in Oriente.
A previously identified
SAM site in Pinar del Rio Prov-
ince has apparently been aban-
doned and the equipment moved
to an unknown location. Thus,
21 confirmed SAM installations
have been identified.
At least seven of the
twelve SAM sites noted in in-
formation of 15 October are
completed to the point where
missiles are on the launchers.
Some of them are probably opera-
tional,
There is still no evidence
that Cubans are being trained
in the operation of the sur-
face-,to-air and coastal de-
fense missile installations be-
ing set up in Cuba, but Cubans
.The USSR continues to show
concern over US action to in-
terdict Soviet shipments to
Cuba. In a note of 14 October,
Moscow charged the United States
with. condoning "unlawful actions"
by Puerto Rican judicial authori-
ties who had impounded a cargo
of Cuban sugar bound for the USSR.
The note--the second on this
subject--rejected the US Govern-
ment's position that the matter was
a legal one in which it could not
interfere.
A lecturer in international
law at the Moscow Institute of
International Relations asserted
that the "US economic boycott of
Cuba amounts to lawless violence.
Modern international law and the UN
Charter categorically forbid a resort
to force (armed force or economic
pressure) in international relations,
except with a view to combating ag-
gression.'.' A limitation of the rights
of third powers to engage in free
international commerce and shipping,
he said, is "a grave violation of
international law. It could entail
restrictive measures and, if armed 25X1
force were used, it might precipi-
tate an open armed conflict."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONFERENCE ON BRITISH GUIANA'S INDEPENDENCE
The conference on independ-
ence for British Guiana--origi-
nally set for last May but post-
poned because of the February
riots--is to open in London on
23 October. Britain is not
likely to set an independence
date. until some agreement is
reached onnthe- electoral provi-
sions of the colony's future
constitution. Premier Jagan's
Communist-oriented People's
Progressive Party (PPP) and the
main opposition party, Forbes
Burnham's People's National Con-
gress (PNC), give the appearance
of being sharply at odds on this
issue, and the conference may
reach an early deadlock. Should
it break down, new outbreaks of
violence may follow.
The dispute centers on the
question of proportional repre-
sentation and the age require-
ments for voting. Jagan's party
draws its support mainly from
East Indians, who are already
the largest single element in
the population and have the
highest birth rate. Jagan in-
sists on retaining the present
system of election by plurality
and wants to lower the voting
age to 18 years. Burnham's pre-
dominantly Negro PNC, supported
by the ultraconservative United
Force (UF) and by those PPP
elements disillusioned with
Jagan, are pressing for the in-
troduction of a proportional
representation system and re-
tention of a legal voting age
of 21.
In the last.election in
August 1961, Jagan's.PPP won a
plurality of only 1.7'percent
over Burnham, but received nearly
twice as many seats in the As-
sembly--20' for, the PPP, 11 for
the PNC, and 4 for the UF.
the resu is under a propor iona xep-
z-esentation system would have been
approximately 15-14-6, and about
the same general distribution
might occur in a new election
using this system even if other
minor parties participated or the
voting age were lowered to 18.
The British governor told
US officials last week that all
three political parties were
apparently going into the con-
ference "pathetically unprepared"
for serious negotiations. He
believes that the PNC and UF
might even welcome a failure--
which Jagan, with more to lose,
would try to prevent. However,
the governor did not rule out
the possibility of some Jagan-
Burnham deal. He also suggested
that a deadlock might lead Jagan
to resign and call new elections
which, under the present system,
would probably strengthen the PPP
position.
Even if proportional repre-
sentation is adopted, however,
serious differences within the
opposition groups would make
it difficult for them to provide
an effective check on Jagan
whether or not they increase
their parliamentary contingent.
Failure to cooperate in the
last election is still plaguing
the PNC and the UF. Both B. S.
Rai, a former PPP cabinet minister
who was ousted by Jagan last
June, and Legislative Assembly
speaker Gajraj, who has become
increasingly disenchanted with
Jagan, appear to be awaiting
developments at the London
conference before committing
themselves to any course of
action, although the latter has
said he would form his own
Moslem party if a proportional
system is adopted. None of the
potential centers of real op-
position to Jagan appears to
have made any significant prog-
ress recently, despite the
economic and other difficulties
which plague the government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ELECTIONS IN ARGENTINA SET FOR NEXT SPRING
Interior Minister Rodolfo The government has not yet
Martinez announced on 16 October found a solution for_this
that elections will be .held in
Argentina some time between
March and June 196:1--the exact
date will be announced within
four weeks--and,. that the new pres i-
dent will be installed not later
than 12 October 1963. The sys-
tem of proportional representa-
tion announced by President
Guido last July will be followed;
the present political parties
statute will be replaced; all
sectors of public opinion will
be allowed to participate in
the elections provided they
have a democratic leadership;
and the government will not in-
terfere in the internal affairs
of political parties.
This announcement will
probably cause concern among
the military as a whole.. The
"legalists" are in control of
the military.at the present
time and have minimized the
possibility of an immediate re-
sumption of the power struggle
by completely reorganizing the
three services and arresting
or retiring "hard-line" leaders.
Therefore, the basic prob-
lem confronting the Guido gov-
ernment is that of reintegrat-
ing Peronists into the body
,politic without allowing them
to become the decisive factor
in the, elections. Argentina's
political parties will probably
not be able to agree on a com-
promise candidate., and some, will
therefore attempt to win Peron-
ist support for their candidate
as they have done in the past.
problem. Methods are under
study to obtain the Spanish
Government's cooperation in
quarantining Peron to make it
uifficult for his followers to
receive directives. Another
proposal is to elicit a direc-
tive from Peron himself where-
by Peronist political objectives
would be limited in exchange
for congressional representation.
Former president Arturo
Froridizi's influence is becom-
ing increasingly evident in
the present political situaton.
Both Interior Minister Martinez
and Foreign Minister Muniz were
nominated by Frondizi. T
Economics Minister Also-
garay, Martinez, and Muniz,
are the most powerful and in-
fluential members of the Guido
cabinet. Alsogaray, however,
may be forced to resign in the
near future. He is under in-
creasing public attack by a
variety of political elements
who blame him for the continuing
economic crisis. The resigna-
tions on 10 October of the vice
president and a director of the
central bank in protest against
Alsogaray's performance were
the latest in a series of de-
velopments deliberately aimed
at discrediting him. The former
defense and interior ministers
have publicly charged him with
corruption. Similar attacks
have been made by Peronist labor
elements as well as influential
business leaders. Alsogaray
will probably be able to per-
suade President Guido to keep
him in office at least until
the end of October to permit
him to attend the 22 October
meeting of Latin American eco-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS
Partial returns from the
elections .of 7 October indi-
cate that extreme leftists
have made slight gains while
the majority of positions in
congress and in the states re-
main in the hands of moderates
and conservatives. Returns
are almost complete for the
gubernatorial races in southern
Brazil, but are still fragmen-
tary for other contests.
In Sao Paulo machine poli-
tician Adhemar de Barros, whose
campaign emphasized his anti-
Communist position, won by a
sizable margin over erratic
former President Janio Quadros.
Moderate Bonifacio Nogueira,
protege of the capable incum-
bent, trailed badly. The out-
come tends to strengthen moder-
ate former President Kubitschek,
who openly supported Adhemar.
Leftist President Goulart tended
to support Nogueira but was
primarily interested in the de-
feat of Quadros., whose rivalry
he feared.
In Goulart's home state
of Rio Grande do Sul, con-
servative Ildo Meneghetti won
by a small margin over Goulart's
candidate. The election re-
flects opposition to Goulart's
ultranationalist brother-in-
law, outgoing Governor Leonel
Brizola.
Goulart's major victory
thus far in the elections is
in Guanabara. There, supporters
of Goulart outvoted those of
his bitter enemy, incumbent
Governor Carlos Lacerda, in the
races for the vice governorship
and for a Senate seat which most
Brazilian observers had con-
ceded to moderate outgoing Bahia
Governor Magalhaes. In. Brazil
candidates are not bound by state
residence requirements. In ad-
dition, the number of pro-Goulart
federal deputies increased from
one- third to one half of Guana-
bara's delegation. Leonel Brizola,
who seeks national leadership of
leftist nationalist forces,. won
a deputy's seat by an unusually
large margin of votes. Communist
Party central committee member
Marco Antonio Coelho will also
be a member of the delegation.
Fellow-traveler Badger
Silveira, who won the governor-
ship of neighboring Rio de
Janeiro State, is a member of
Goulart's Labor Party and would
support leftist moves by the
federal administration.
In the key northeastern
state of Pernambuco, conserva-
'M.to Grosso
Rio Gra
do Sul
P.O.
/~ Ser9 Prli~rn.~ero
~Rrecaiu
~ahia s.mseo f
ft d 1~
oirom~ Elirorto Santo
Ro de Janeiro 't TlANT/C
G. 01 Ito OCEAN
r.5 Gu.n.be.e
elections on 7 October,
Estado or lerrirorio boundary
Esrado or terrirorio Capital
STAT.
tive.C;leophas is leading pro-
Communist Arraes but voting
trends indicate that either
candidate could win by a small
margin. In the event of a.re-
count, the victor would prob-
ably not be known for months.
In the Senate elections,
the winners of 39 of the 45
seats at stake now are known.
Of these,29 are centrists or
conservatives, two are reaction-
aries, two are Communist fellow-
travelers, and two are leftist
ultranationalists. Others can-
not be readily classified,
including, for example, million-
aire industrialist Ermirio de
Moraes, who helped finance the
pro-Communist gubernatorial
candidate in Pernambuco. The
outgoing senators included only
one leftist ultranationalist
and no Communists or fellow-
travelers.
Returns in federal deputy
races are not yet available for
most states.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT PLANS TO OUTLAW COMMUNIST PARTY
President Betancourt on
15 October announced the gov-
ernment's plan to arrest extrem-
ist congressmen and eliminate
leftist groups responsible
for the persistent terrorism in
Venezuela. Betancourt stated
that the minister of justice
had petitioned the Supreme
Court to outlaw the Communist
Party and the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR), and
that Communist and MIR con-
gressmen would be prosecuted
for "civil rebellion." He
identified the terrorists as
"agents of Khrushchev and
Castro."
Betancourt is determined
to eliminate the leftist
terrorism in order to avert
a possible military takeover
and to restore order before the
1963 presidential campaign
intensifies. He has been
under heavy pressure from the
military to take drastic action
against the extremist leaders.
Although the Social Christian
Party (COPEI) has threatened
to leave the government coali-
tion if unconstitutional meas-
ures are used,Betancourt has
indicated that r~ will carry
out his plans even at the risk
of causing a split in the
coalition. The Social Christian
members of the cabinet apparent-
ly have assented to the plan,
indicating a possible shift in
COPEI's attitude.
More than 400 terrorists
reportedly have been arrested,
but the Communist and MIR
congressmen identified as lead-
ers of the terroristic activity
have been protected from prose-
cution by their congressional
immunity. The opposition-
controlled Chamber of Deputies
has persistently rejected
administration requests to
suspend the immunity of any
members of congress.
The US Embassy reported
that initial public reaction to
the announced plan was "luke-
warm." The armed forces and the
major labor confederation are
expected to support the govern-
ment, but opposition groups will
probably attempt to obstruct
execution of the plan. The
dissident ARS faction of
Betancourt's Democratic Action
Party protested that the plan
is ;Largely a subterfuge to re-
gain control of the Chamber
of Deputies. The opposition
Democratic Republican Union is
also expected to condemn the
proposals,
The US Embassy reports
that Supreme Court delays may
postpone further government
action for several weeks or
longer. The government is ex-
pected to remain in control of
the situation, but if significant
violence erupts before. action is
taken against the extremist con- 25X1
gressmen, the military may renew
its demands for immediate measures.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION
At age 68 Khrushchev
is still in generally good
health, but advancing years and
the rigors of high office have
begun to slow him down. The
time may not be far distant
when death or physical in-
capacitation removes him from
the political scene. Almost
inevitably direct&on of the
nation's affairs will then be
assumed by an interregnum
"collective leadership" com-
posed of the remaining members
of the party presidium and
secretariat. The Soviet
system contains no built-in
machinery for ensuring the
orderly transfer of power;
when the top leader goes,
a power vacuum is created,
and collectivity provides the
facade of unity behind which
the fight for the post of party
.first secretary is waged.
Like Lenin and Stalin,
Khrushchev has made no attempt
to devise a permanent solution
to the succession problem; he
has merely designated his
favorite in advance. As early
as 1959
he revealed
that he and Mikoyan had decided
upon Frol Kozlov, now 54, as
the man who would eventually
succeed to power. Kozlov's
status as heir apparent was
first publicly acknowledged
in the USSR last October; in
the official listing of the
party secretariat elected follow-
ing the 22nd party congress,
his name appeared second to
that of Khrushchev and out of
the customary alphabetical
order, thus formalizing his
position as second-in-command.
What little is known about
Kozlov suggests that he would
adhere essentially to the
Khrushchev line, but probably
with increased emphasis on
control rather than incentive.
Kozlov's designation as
heir comes with no guarantees,
however.. It is not binding on
his peers, and Khrushchev can
always change his mind. More
important, among the shrewd and
ambitious men who make the inner
circle of leaders, there is
bound to be at least one who
regards himself as better
-qualified and with abetter
chance of winning. Once another
hat is tossed into the ring,
the power struggle is on.
Emergence of the New Leader
Ultimately, the victory
will go to that member of the
hierarchy who succeeds in
establishing personal domination
over the Communist Party, the
single cohesive political force
in Soviet society. It tolerates
no rivals, and no organization
or group of any kind is permitted
to exist outside its control.
Thus, he who runs the party
runs the country, without
constitutional or other legal
restraints.
However, since no single
member of Khrushchev's coterie
appears politically strong
enough to step immediately into
the dictator's shoes, the new
leader must establish a position
of pre-eminence among _his col-
leagues in the presidium and
secretariat, and he must cir-
cumscribe and then reduce the
influence of possible rivals in
those bodies. In the process,
it will not suffice for him to
argue his own merits and to
espouse policy positions to
which his associates can ac-
commodate. Very few of them
can be expected to pledge their
support without some kind of
commitment in return.
Gaining the support of
the members of the secretariat
will be particularly important.
Through the staff departments
of the central committee, they
control personnel appointments
at all levels of the party and
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government. From the outset,
the future dictator must seek
to secure as many key positions
as possible for members of his
personal following and to see
to it that no posts of conse-
quence fall to his opponents.
Heads of other elements
in the power structure will
also have to be won over. For
example, bearing in mind that
the Soviet military high com-
mand sided with Khrushchev in
his 1955 polemic with Malenkov--
the advocate of increased con-
sumers' goods production--the
new leader will seek the sup-
port particularly of those
marshals who are central com-
mittee members. In order to
ensure that they do not become
disenchanted and side with his
opponents, he will be likely
to advocate a strong military
establishment and the high
budgetary appropriations in-
volved.
At the same time, he will
identify himself with a high
living standard and will give
vague promises of improvements
in the welfare of the consumer.
While he gives public indica-
tions of his intent to continue
the "liberalization" begun
under Khrushchev, he may be
privately assuring the secret
police that there will be no
inroads on their powers and
prerogatives.
Once he has engineered his
"election" as party first
secretary, the emergent new
leader begins the task of
transforming his leadership of
the coalition into leadership
of the Soviet Union.
For the most part he will
accomplish the job by continu-
ing to exercise leadership in
the presidium. In the period
immediately following his
election as first secretary,
he must consistently win a .
majority of that body to his
point of view on policy
positions.
Success in the presidium would
increasingly establish his
authority in the lower party
echelons. With the passage
of time, the working level
would, by and large, accept the
fact of his predominance and
fall into line behind him.
Role of Central Committee
The central committee
normally has no life of its own
-except at its periodic plenary
sessions, and these are usually
devoted to speeches approving
decisions made in advance by the
top leaders. However, by basing
his authority largely on control
of a majority in the central
committee and by using that
control to defeat his opponents
in 1957, Khrushchev in effect
institutionalized the central
committee as one of the principal
bases of political strength.
Its very real potential for
intervening in power struggles
makes it imperative that the
would-be dictator build up
support among its members as
soon as possible.
To judge from the com-
position of the central party
bodies elected by the 22nd
congress, however, Khrushchev's
lieutenants have had little success
in maneuvering their allies into
key slots. Very few of those
elected for the first time have
discernible ties to any of the
current leaders. The only
change was an increase in the
number of members associated
with the Leningrad party or-
ganization, which Kozlov headed
for several years. Presumably
these are men upon whom he can
draw for support, but their num-
ber--along with the old Lenin-
graders in the central committee--
it still too small to give him
a decisive advantage.
Kozlov clearly cannot now
take steps toward achieving
domination of the party with-
out a green light from Khru-
shchev. The latter, who once
boasted that he would run
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the party as long as he lived,
shows no signs of allowing
Kozlov to start building a
personal political machine.
Indeed the only top-level
personnel shift since the
congress apparently worked to
Kozlov's disadvantage; the
reasons for the removal of Ivan
Spiridonov both from the central
party. secretariat and as Lenin-
grad party boss last April have
never become clear, but in-
tentionally or not, his down-
fall very likely cost Kozlov
.a well-placed ally. The ef-
fect of the move--if any--on
Kozlov's status as successor-
designate is still not known
but it must certainly have
forced him to take a hard look
at those presidium members
who--both individually and as
a body--willplay vital roles
in the succession. He must
gauge their willingness to
accept his claim on the first
secretaryship, seek their sup-
port, and at the same time
identify and assess the strength
of those who might contend
against him.
Kozlov's Peers
In all probability the
four senior members of the
hierarchy-Mikoyan, Brezhnev,
3uslov, and Kosygin--will be
the major voices in determin-
ing who steps into Khrushchev's
shoes.
If past performance
is any indication, First Deputy
Premier Anastas Mikoyan will be
primarily concerned with main-
taining his present position
in the hierarchy. Both his
Armenian nationality and his
age--he is 66--argue against
an attempt to grab the top
job. His activities will
nevertheless bear close watch-
ing. He has survived nearly
30 years of purges and other
crises in the leadership largely
because of his ability to per-
ceive the realities of Kremlin
politics--as he did by lining
up with Khrushchev against
the anti-party group. Thus,
any sign of a change in his at-
titude toward Kozlov would sug-
gest that his political in-
tuition, is again at work, and
could foreshadow a fight in
which the advantage has shifted
away from the successor-designate.
Brezhnev, the Soviet "presi-
dent," must be considered a
potential candidate for the top
job. Since 1938, he has been
a regional party secretary in
the Ukraine, high-ranking army
political officer, party boss
of Moldavia and Kazakhstan,
chief of the navy's political
directorate, and central party
secretary for industrial, trans-
port, military, and-police af-
fairs. This experience has
very likely left him a long
line of well-placed friends
from whom he could ask political
f avo.rs .
As a presidium member,
Brezhnev has a direct voice
in the formulation of Soviet
policy, but his "election" as
titular chief of state in May
1960--to replace Voroshilov--
deprived him of the vantage
point he enjoyed as a central
committee secretary. The So-
viet presidency is basically
a sinecure and has traditionally
proved a poor political spring-
board. In contrast to his
predecessor, however, Brezhnev
has brought some authority to
the job and has used it mainly
as a vehicle for expounding
Moscow's foreign policy line.
Contrary to frequent press
speculation, there is little
evidence to suggest that Mikhail
Suslov is now or could become
the rallying point for a
"Stalinist" faction. A central
party, secretary since 1947--
longer than Khrushchev him-
self--he has been concerned
primarily with ideology and
relations with foreign Com-
munist parties. Since Stalin's
death and particularly since
the 20th party congress, he
has concentrated on building
a framework of Marxist-Leninist
respectability around Khrushchev's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
STAT
KOSYGIN
621015B MIKOYAN
policies, and he sided with
Khrushchev against the anti-
party (and pro-Stalin) group.
To judge from his past
performance Suslov does not
measure up as a Stalinist die-
hard; on the other hand, he
is not a simon-pure Khrushchev
man, and on occasion the two
may have disagreed over various
aspects of Soviet policy. The
future leader will very likely
expect of Suslov the same serv-
ice he now renders as doctrinal
apologist for the regime. Like
Mikoyan, Suslov has never evinced
a desire for more power, and
because he deals in political
intangibles, he has not had these
opportunities to cultivate a
KOZLOV
personal following normally
available to a central committee
secretary.
Of the senior presidium
members, only First Deputy
Premier Aleksey Kosygin would
appear to have to chance of
becoming party first secretary,
but he is likely to occupy a
high position in any post-Khru-
shchev administration. Kosygin
is perhaps the top member of
the Soviet managerial elite, and
with the exception of the two
years immediately after Stalin's
death, has been a deputy premier
continuously since 1940. He has
never held a full-time job in
the party's apparatus, having
come up through the administrative
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and planning departments of the
economic bureaucracy. Since it
is doubtful that Khrushchev's
successor will be strong
enough, at least in the early
days, to take on both the
party first secretaryship and
the premiership, Kosygin might
become head of the government
when Khrushchev leaves the
scene.
The Younger Leaders
AREA OF
AGE RESPONSIBILITY
KOZLOV 54 Party 2nd Secretary The Successor-designate
There is always the
1958
to 1961.
possibility that a dark horse
could emerge. Their brevity
Shelepin',s
of service' at the top would
seem to militate against a
power bid by Dmitry Polyansky,
Gennady Voronov, or Andrey
Kirilenko, the three newest
members of the presidium. Yet
each of them has considerable
influence and prestige in his
own right, and during the course
of a prolonged succession
crisis, one of them might be
able to maneuver himself into
a commanding power position.
BREZHNEV 56 "President of the USSR"
KOSYGIN 58 1st Deputy Premier Senior Presidium
MIKOYAN 66 1st Deputy Premier members
SUSLOV 59 Party Secretary
KH RU S H C H E V'S COLLEAGUES
Party
Secretaries
Not Presidium
Members) SHELEPIN 44 Food Industry;
PODGORNY 59 Ukrainian Party Boss
KIRILENKO 56 1st Deputy Chairman
RSFSR Bureau
POLYANSKY 44 RSFSR Premier
VORONOV 51 1st Deputy Chairman
RSFSK Bureau
KUUSINEN 81 Party Secretary "Old Bolsheviks",
SHVERNIK 74 Chairman, each nearing end of career
Party Control Committee
DEMICHEV 50 Moscow City Junior leaders, possibly
Party Chief grooming to replace
ILICHEV 56 Agitation & Propaganda senior men.
PONOMAREV 57 Relations with (areas of responsibility
Of the four central com-
mittee secretaries who are not
presidium members, Aleksandr
Shelepin would seem best able
to rise to the top. His long
service as head of the Komsomol--
the young Communist league--
may have given him considerable
influence among the younger
party generation. However,
perhaps to his disadvantage, he
is tainted by past association
with the Soviet secret police
(KGB) which he headed from
current duties
apparently involve party
supervision of the police and
judicial apparatus as well as
some responsibilities for
industry, and his support will
thus be invaluable to those
who do contend. The future
leader will need control of the
KG]B not only because of its
coercive power, but also because
of its unique ability to keep
him informed of what is going
on in the party, and particularly
among possible rivals..
SECRET
Influence limited by
permanent resident in Kiev
Relative newcomers
to the top leadership
STAT
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Shelepin and the other non-
presidium secretaries may have
been selected. withpne aspect of
the succession problem in mind.
The exact division of respon-
sibilities in the secretariat
has never become clear, but
there is information to suggest
that the new members are being
groomed. to replace some-of the
senior secretaries.
Leonid Ilichev and Boris
Ponomarev are concerned with
propaganda and agitation, ide-
ology, and relations with for-
eign parties--fields in which
Suslov and Kuusinen are pri-
marily interested. Their ap-
prenticeships would presumably
ensure that, when the time comes,
Suslov's or Kuusinen's duties
could. be passed to experienced
understudies without any break
in the continuity of party pol--
icies or methods of operation
in these fields.
Similarly, the appointment
last year of Zinovy Serdyuk as
.first deputy chief of the party
control committee could signify
that Shvernik's job is to be
taken over by another of Khru-
shchev's oldUkrainian associates.
Such moves are perhaps in-
dicative of a nagging concern
over the future; they certainly
appear to be an initial attempt
to staff the next administra-
tion in advance and. thereby'
help ensure continuation of
Khrushchev's policies. But they
fall short of solving the basic
problem of the orderly transfer
of the dictator's powers, and.
Khrushchev has proved, unwilling
or unable to make any arrange-
ments which guarantee that his
authority will carry over to
his, 'chosen successor.
Conclusions
On balance, Khrushchev has
evidently undertaken to see
that his policies will be car-
ried forward by staffing the
top leadership with men who
are in general agreement with
his way of running the country.
With the future--and!Khru
shchev's personal niche in history
--thus probably regarded as
partially provided for, the
identity of the new first sec-
retary loses some of its im-
portance. Under these circum-
stances Khrushchev probably
sees no compelling need to de-
termine in advance the outcome
of the power struggle which,
it seems, must surely come.
This struggle, unlike the
Stalin succession with its
cleavages over basic policies,
seems likely to center on per-
sonalities and methods of oper-
ation. There seems little like-
lihood of any radical altera-
tion of present policies and
programs. The probable com-
position of the new leadership
itself would, for example, seem
to argue for this conclusion.
In addition, the bulk of
the party's professional ap-
paratus is similarly composed
of Khrushchev men. From con-
viction and an instinct for
self-preservation, they would
probably throw their support
to whoever seems most likely
to continue along the Khru-
shchev line.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
LAND REFORM IN IRAN
The Iranian Government is
pressing forward with an am-
bitious new land reform program
which aims at the ultimate trans-
formation of the country's
rural population into a society
of small landholders. Initiated.
last March, it involves the
redistribution of large private
holdings to the tenants. The
government hopes that providing
peasants with the incentive of
ownership will increase agri-
cultural productivity. Success
would also alleviate peasant
discontent which might even-
tually pose a threat to the
Shah's regime.
Background.
About four out of every
five Iranians now depend on
agriculture for their liveli-
hood. Unless some of this
wasted manpower can be shifted
to more productive activity,
prospects are poor for raising
Iran's economy above a near-
subsistence level.
Iran's small amount of
arable land has never been ef-
fectively used. Only about
one-tenth of its area is con-
sidered arable, and less than
half of that is under cultiva-
tion at.any one time. Most
land already under cultivation
requires irrigation, and much
more could be brought under
cultivation if irrigated. Ce-
reals, the staple of the Ira-
nian diet, are the most impor-
tant crop; fruits, nuts, and
cotton are the principal ex-
port crops.
The village has tradition-
ally been the basic production
unit. Of Iran's 50,000 vil-
lages, some 17,000 are owned
by individuals--10,000 by per-
sons who own more than five
apiece.. A few landlords own
from 50 to 100 villages. The
yearly income of the peasants
tilling these lands averages
the equivalant of about $150,
in goods and credits.
Most peasants work the same
plot throughout their lifetime.
In the more fertile regions a
peasant is assigned a parcel he
can till with a fixed number of
draft animals. Elsewhere the
availability of water governs
the allocations. Some landlords
reassign land periodically, thus
further reducing the peasant's
sense of responsibility toward
it. In addition to these par-
cels, the "village" includes
any pasture or woodland used
in common.
Sharecropping Practices
In most instances the peas-
ant gives the landlord an agreed
share of the crop. This share
ranges from.one fifth to four
fifths, generally depending on
whether the peasant furnishes
water, seed, or draft animals
in addition to his own labor.
With little incentive to increase
afl
40 TVR KEY USSR-1
re of recent
ear quakes
SECRET
Isfahan
Areas of Land Reform Activity - 15 October 1962
Forest area
0 Area of land reform activity
It* Cultivated area
Swamp
Salt waste
Intermittent lake25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
output, per capita productivity
-is low, and wasteful practices
prevail.
The village's work force--
its entire able-bodied popula-
tion--is fully employed only at
sowing and harvesting time. The
ready availability of labor dur-
ing most of the year discourages
the introduction of expensive
machinery or other new techniques
even though-they could increase
yields and bring new land into
production. In some parts of
the country the growing season
is long enough to permit two
.crops a year if modern methods
were used.
The Reform Program
The Shah's awareness of
the economic, social, and polit-
ical need for land reform caused
him to set an example to land-
lords by redistributing most of
his own vast private holdings be-
ginning in 1952. Land was sold
to the peasants for interest-
free payments extending over a
25-year period. Funds accrue to
the royal family's Pahlavi. Foun-
dation, which undertakes social
-welfare and charitable projects.
The government's revolu-
tionary land redistribution
program is based on decrees
enacted in 1961 to modify an
emasculated Land Reform Act
the Majlis had passed the pre-
vious year. The reform-minded
government of All Amini initi-
ated the program in the Maraqeh
administrative district in the
northwest--chosen apparently
because it is relatively pros-
perous and. not dependent on any
single crop. The area's Turk-
ish-speaking population is po-
litically stable and more ac-
customed than Iranian peasants
to communal efforts. The pro-
gram now is being extended to
other areas.
The program allows the
owner to retain one village
or, by holding parcels in sev-
eral, to retain the equivalent
of one village. The parcels
are based on the traditional
management unit, the "clang,','
which is one sixth of the vil-
lage's cultivated land. One
landlord may therefore have
holdings in as many as six vil-
lages. In Maraqeh, however,
relatively few landlords took
advantage of their right to re-
tain any land at all, evidently
feeling that six "dangs," how-
ever distributed, would not
constitute an efficient farming
unit.
The government requires
the landlord to submit a "vol-
untary offer," based on their
assessed valuation, for selling
his declared lands--thus at
least nominally observing Islam's
prohibition against.forced sales.
The landlord may appeal for ad.-
dit:ional compensation. The gov-
ernment will pay for the land
in ten annual installments,
and the new peasant owners have
15 ;years to pay off their notes
to the government.
Organization
The government has helped
to establish a cooperative for
every ten villages, in which
membership is mandatory for
peasants acquiring land under
this program. The cooperatives
assist in marketing the crop
and provide seedlings, ferti-
lizer, the services of tractors
simple hand tools, and staple
items such as tea and ciga-
rettes. The agricultural bank
extends credits for projects
beyond the cooperative's re-
sources.
To help ensure the success
of the pilot project, the re-
gime set up the Maraqeh Develop-
ment Authority to coordinate
the cooperatives' efforts and.
to carry out some projects out-
side their capabilities. When
in :full operation, the Authority
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
will provide extension-type
services and will construct
irrigation projects, storage
facilities, and tool repair
shops. It could, resort to
coercive measures if necessary
to ensure that peasants use ap-
proved farming methods. The
Authority will probably provide
a model for other areas when
the program is implemented.
Outlook
Favored by excellent weath-
er this year, the Maraqeh co-
operatives appear to have
started off well. The Shah
has staked his own prestige on
the program's success--a commit-
ment reaffirmed after the Amini
government resigned in July and.
that of Asadollah Alam took
over. The Shah has specifically
backed the figure mainly respon-
sible for implementing the pro-
gram, Agriculture Minister
Arsanjani, a holdover from the
Amini government. The land
reform program appears to have
gone too far to be easily re-
versed, although so far it has
affected fewer than one percent
of the country's villages.
There is a danger that
the vital centuries-old local
irrigation systems will fall
into disrepair once the land-
lords' managerial skill is re-
moved. During the first two
Seven-Year Plans, completed
last month, the government in-
vested heavily in large-scale
river basin irrigation projects.
Tehran apparently is sharply
cutting back such investment
in the third plan just getting
under way, in favor of greater
.attention to the smaller scale
local irrigation works.
Greatest opposition to the
land reform program continues
to come from the large land-
owners, who lose both extensive
properties and the power which
stemmed from their socio-eco-
nomic position. They still
have considerable influence
and may be expected to seek
Dang boundary -- Irrigation channel
0 Water Source
Schematic diagram of land use in a typical Iranian village.
means of sabotaging the program.
They are especially hostile to
Arsanjani for his vigor in press-
ing it. They describe him as
a leftist demagogue seeking
personal political power.
The impatience of peasants
not yet brought into the program
may also upset its orderly imple-
mentation. In August peasants
in an area of northwestern Iran
not yet affected held back prod-
uce due the landlords, who
called on gendarmerie to enforce
the collection. Clashes occurred.
.Arsanjani, by pushing the
program vigorously, may have
encouraged the peasants' actions,
Should the
withholding of produce by peas-
ants become general, government
action to collect it-could cause
severe disturbances and a slowing
up of the program.
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