THE WEEK IN BRIEF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800130002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 14, 1962
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP79-00927A003800130002-7
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 December 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 13 Dee)
CUBA . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Recent public statements
size businesses by the Castro regime may further increase
suggest that Cuba is considering giving greater support
than before the crisis to Latin American insurrectionary
movements. The recent nationalization of small- and medium-
domestic disenchantment with the regime.
OR
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Khrushchev's 12 December speech to the Supreme Soviet
was intended as a definitive interpretation of his actions
in the Cuban crisis. His account of the crisis was aimed
primarily at establishing the point that the USSR had "con-
firmed its agreement" to withdraw offensive weapons only
after a public statement by President Kennedy that--in
Khrushchev's words--the "US would not attack Cuba and would
restrain its allies from such an action." The speech con-
veyed no sense of urgency regarding a Berlin settlement
and implied that Soviet domestic problems will be given
priority over foreign policy in the period immediately ahead
Khrushchev's thinly veiled attack on the Chinese Com-
munists will undoubtedly produce a vigorous response from
Peiping. These exchanges will increase the momentum of
the dispute and make it more difficult to avoid a formal
break in party relations. In contrast to the deepening
Sino-Soviet rift, the growing rapprochement between Moscow
and Belgrade was symbolized by Marshal T:ito's presence on
the platform when Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet
and by the fact that Tito himself addressed that body the
following day. An address by a foreigner to the Supreme
Soviet is highly unusual,, if not unprecedented.
THE SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Increasingly strident Chinese pronouncements and Nehru's 0r,
formal rejection of Peiping's key proposals for mutual with-
drawal and negotiation have moved the border dispute a bit
closer to a resumption of fighting. The cease-fire along
the frontier is now three weeks old and Chinese withdrawals,
at least in the northeast, are apparently continuing at a
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ma'r' SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 December 1962
slow pace. The conference of six nonaligned nations in
Colombo, which concluded on 12 December, seemed agreed only
that the two adversaries should negotiate rather than fight.
Ceylonese Prime Minister Bandaranaike's projected visit
to New Delhi and Peiping with the conference proposals will
serve to provide both sides with additional time for maneuver.
1963 SOVIET PLAN AND BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The USSR's 1963 plan and budget show no change in Soviet
planners' emphasis on heavy industry; only modest improve-
ments are scheduled for agriculture and consumer goods pro-
duction. Military spending is scheduled to increase only
slightly. Most growth rates for 1963 are shaded downward
from the 1962 plan, apparently reflectitna mounting difficulties
congress--postponed for two months to
enable party boss Novotny to silence his opponents--was used
to demonstrate his renewed authority. He continued his re-
fusal to institute de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia, but
nevertheless reaffirmed his fealty to Moscow by identifying
his regime with Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist policies on
such issues as China and Yugoslavia. Specific solutions
to the country's economic problems, a cause of party and
popular disaffection, were postponed until the new seven-
CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The recent 12th OK
Soviet positions on peaceful coexistence and de-Stalinizatid
p y congress--
scheduled for mid-January--Ulbricht is attempting to recast
the image of himself and the party in the light of current
ULBRICHT PREPARES FOR PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . Page
As the time approaches for the sixth art OK
He is bringing his party's position into line with Moscow's
by de-emphasizing the Berlin issue, and he has belatedly
taken some limited measures against Stalinist practices in
the domestic apparatus. Major changes in the economic ap-
paratus are likely. Despite Ulbricht's efforts, Moscow may
consider his Stalinist background a handicap and use the
congress as a means of av g the way for his retirement.
OK
14 25X1
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iwsw ANIE ;ltE 1 ' `Fwd
THE BRUNEI REVOLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
UK
The short-lived revolt in Brunei brought into the open
foreign and Bornean opposition to the projected federation
of Malaysia. Substantial British forces were used to sup-
press the rebellion, pointing up the degree to which the
federation's stability will depend on continued outside
military support. Malayan Prime Minister Rahman's annoyance
with Philippine sympathy for the rebels was turned against
Djakarta when President Sukarno publicly intimated his
support for the insurgents.
mitments. 25X1 25X1
ress toward national renunification. Souvanna's control
over his neutralist military forces has evidently been
seriously eroded, and the further estrangement of his
foreign minister, Quinim Pholsena, attests to his loss of
significant neutralist support. Meanwhile, the Pathet
Lao continue to block effective inspection procedures by
the International Control Commission. Phoumi returned to
Laos from Moscow and Peiping with substantial aid com-
TENS IONS CONTINUE IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
Factional tensions continue to impede even nominal prog OK
FIGHTING IN YEMEN INCONCLUSIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
Fighting between royalist tribesmen and Egyptian and QK
Yemeni revolutionary forces in northern and eastern Yemen
is still inconclusive. The Yemeni royalists in an effort
to stave off US recognition of the revolutionary regime,
have made exaggerated claims of successes. However, the
royalists control approximately the same area they have
controlled since the revolution began. Friction between
the Yemeni revolutionaries and Egyptian personnel in Yemen
evidently is growing.
4ge. 2 5
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. Page 28
The Ben Bella. government is taking a more balanced
line in foreign affairs. Although Ben Bella still seeks
aid from any quarter, his regime apparently believes that
its best hope of survival lies in economic cooperation
with the West. Paris has agreed to provide interim financial
assistance and will negotiate for broader aid arrangements.
Meanwhile, the UAR has announced a $24?000,000 loan.
aIC
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 29
The team headed by new Minister of the Economy Mendez OIL
Delfino must contend with serious economic deterioration
in Argentina and is unlikely to achieve quick results. With-
out such results, the political situation could again become
explosive.
BRAZILIAN - SOVIET BLOC TRADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 30
OT'
Some expansion in Brazilian - Soviet bloc trade is likely
to result from a new pact with Moscow to be signed this month;
such trade now accounts for about 5 percent of Brazil's total
trade. It is not yet clear whether this agreement will pro-
vide for economic development credits as did a recent
Brazilian-Polish agreement.
ELECTIONS IN THE DOMIN:[CAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . Page 31
OK
Presidential and congressional elections are scheduled
for 20 December. It now appears that remnants of the
Trujillo regime, with the support of Haitian President
Duvalier, intend to try to disrupt or prevent them in order
to regain control. Such a development probably would
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 December 1962
encourage opportunists in the interim government to force
postponement of the elections and bid for dictatorial
power. The two main olitical parties have been conducting
a vicious cam ai n
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Approved For Release 2008/08/22: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800130002-7