CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY COPY NO. 74 OCI NO. 0265/63 1 February 1963 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE .IORI CDF Pages 1-3 NO FOREIGN DISSEM GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification SECRET AI',CIIIVAL ftWCOaD PLEASE RTU ---r n.--'r "rV, Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. In addition certain intelligence items con- tained herein may be marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7. Each item so marked must be controlled within the frame- work of the limitation placed upon it. The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence. Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 February 1963 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F (Information as of 1200 EST 31 Jan) . . . . . Page 3 Soviet commentators maintained a cautious stance last week regarding developments in the nuclear test ban talks and the Common Market. A Soviet official in Geneva hinted privately, however, that Moscow believes progress toward a test ban may open the way for renewed high-level nego- tiations on a Berlin settlement. He reaffirmed the USSR's desire for a "thaw" in East-West relations and suggested that a foreign ministers' meeting to sign a test ban treaty would provide a suitable opportunity for discuss- ing other problems such as Berlin. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 Communist China's first editorial comment on Sino- Soviet issues since the East German party congress was no less abusive than its propaganda before Khrushchev's call for a cessation of polemics. The latest round in the contest between the two nations has further demonstrated the lack of common ground upon which they can stand. (Confidential) THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5 The interpretations of the loosely worded Colombo conference proposals made public in the past week by Peiping and New Delhi provide little ground for discussions. New Delhi is giving increasing play to the warmth and close- ness of its relations with Moscow but, at Soviet request, has promised to avoid publicity concerning the recent ar- rival of four crated MIG-21 fighters in Bombay. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) SECRET i BRIEFS Approved For Release 200151097:28 : uiA-KuH/~j-uu~)2iAuu3UUUUbUUUI-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 February 1963 THE CUBAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7 With continuing Soviet military assistance and economic support, the Castro regime appears to be concentrating on an aggressive campaign of subversion in Latin America. Havana has announced that about 400 Soviet agricultural technicians are coming to Cuba over the next three months. Castro's guerrilla training program for Latin Americans is continuing, and Cuban leaders have given the impression that they consider the possibilities for subversive action to be especially promising in Venezuela. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) SOVIET ECONOMY IN 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9 Soviet heavy industrial development continued in 1962 to receive clear priority over consumer goods production and agriculture. In general, trends of the preceding year were maintained. There are signs of continuing difficulties, particularly in investment in certain key industries. (Confidential) SINO-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12 There has been some cooling in Sino-Mongolian relations as a result of Mongolia's role as Khrushchev's advocate in Asia. However, Chinese aid programs continue, and Peiping has not abandoned its practice of sending workers to labor- short Mongolia. Ulan Bator is attempting to expand its diplomatic contacts beyond its two quarreling neighbors by pushing for recognition from nonbloc countries. (Confidential) DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 Joseph Ileo, Leopoldville's new minister-resident in Elisabethville, has begun taking steps to reintegrate Katanga. Ileo has made it clear that his mission is to execute reintegration, not negotiate, and he is dealing firmly with Katangan attempts to obstruct him. Leopold- ville is pressing hard for the introduction of additional Congo army forces into key cities in South Katanga, but is presently resisting Baluba tribal pressures for changes in Tshombe's government. Tshomb6, trying to re-establish his authority, is insisting on rigid application of the UN reintegration plan and is trying to enlist the UN to referee differences between him and Leopoldville. (Confi- dential No Foreign Dissem) INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN TOGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 The political situation in Togo has remained unstable since the assassination of President Olympio in mid- January. Behind Provisional President Grunitsky's weak leadership, the diverse factions represented in the cabinet and the military elements which staged the coup are in- volved in a power struggle. Grunitsky's authority has been undercut by the reluctance of countries in the moder- ate African group to extend diplomatic recognition. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) SECRET ii BRIEFS Approved For Release 200 - - 9 A 03900060001- Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 1 February 1963 REFERENDUM IN IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16 The Shah's overwhelming victory in Iran's reform pro- gram referendum on 26 January will encourage him to acceler- ate reforms and possibly to advance the date of national elections now planned for June or July. The regime mustered a 99.9-percent affirmative vote, partly by intimidating the mullahs, the landlords, and the National Front. They appear to be demoralized temporarily, and probably have lost many supporters. Trouble for the regime is in prospect when workers and peasants find that progress toward im- plementing the reforms is slower than they have been led to expect. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) INDONESIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD MALAYSIA . . . . . . . . . . Page 17 Indonesia has announced a policy of "confrontation" with Malaya over the inclusion of the British Borneo ter- ritories in the projected Malaysia Federation. It reportedly is giving guerrilla training to both Indonesian and rebel elements, and a monthly training capacity of five or six hundred may have been reached. These moves have sharpened British and Malayan concern over Indonesian intentions in northern Borneo, and Britain has alerted troops in the UK and the Far East for movement to Borneo. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRUGGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 Former security chief Kim Chong-pil has emerged from a fight for control of the new government party with his power intact for the time being, if not strengthened. How- ever, the factional struggle within the regime almost cer- tainly will continue, with Kim's enemies biding their time for a new opportunity to attack his position. The open struggle will make it more difficult for the regime to maintain the facade of free elections this spring. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19 The parliamentary debate occasioned by the Communists' recent no-confidence motion in effect opened the campaign for national elections to be called some time this spring. Special attention in the debate focused on the new Italian defense position announced by Premier Fanfani following his Washington talks. The Nenni Socialists, in marked con- trast to their position of a year ago, indicated no op- position to a NATO nuclear force. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem) DENMARK'S FAEROE ISLANDS PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20 The new coalition government in the semiautonomous Faeroe Islands is expected to exert pressure on the Danish Government to revise the Home Rule Law of 1948 and the status of US and NATO defense facilities in the islands. One of the two principal parties in the coalition wants almost complete independence and removal of NATO installa- tions. Danish officials will probably insist that special elections be called before any drastic changes are made. (Confidential) SECRET BRIEFS Approved or Release - - 0927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET 1 February 1963 BRAZIL'S NEW CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21 Joao Goulart, who has recently received full pres- idential powers, appears to believe that he can strengthen leftist influences in Brazil without endangering the coun- try's chances for sizable new economic aid from the United States. He has increased the number of leftists among his advisers as economic negotiations with Washington are about to begin. Brazil is seeking aid to avoid de- faulting on its international obligations this spring. (Secret) ARGENTINA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22 The Argentine Government's present financial resources are inadequate to meet either foreign or domestic obliga- tions. It is giving priority to paying foreign debts to encourage new aid from abroad in the present crisis. Meanwhile both the government and businesses are behind in salary payments, unemployment is growing, and living costs are rising. The economic and social unrest are jeopardizing preparations for the general elections scheduled for this June. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1 The Chinese Communist Navy, although numerically stronger than that of any other Asian country, is primarily a defensive force. Its largest vessels are four obsolescent Gordy-class destroyers acquired from the USSR before 1955, and no new construction of major vessels is likely in China unless Soviet assistance is resumed. The effectiveness of the submarine fleet, the fourth largest in the world, is limited by its apparent inability to engage in operations far from its bases. (Secret No Foreign Dissem) TURKEY'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4 Turkey will be making its first systematic effort to mobilize its resources when it officially puts its Five- Year Plan for economic development into effect on 1 March. By accelerating the rate of private and government invest- ment, it aims to achieve a 7-percent annual growth in GNP. Recommendations for new taxes to finance the plan have been watered down, however, and an international con- sortium's offer of aid has fallen far short of Turkish hopes. Nevertheless, the Inonu government seeks early visible accomplishments that will provide the psychological stimulus necessary for the plan's success. (Confidential) SECRET iv BRIEFS 25X6 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 In contrast to Moscow's public insistence that it CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Moscow maintained a cau- tious stance last week regard- 25X1 ing developments in the nuclear test-ban talks and the Common Market. Moscow be ieves prog- ress owar a test ban may open the way for renewed high-level negoti tions an a Re lin settle- 25X1 ment. the USSR's desire tor a aw in East- West relations and suggested that a foreign ministers' meet- ing to sign a test-ban treaty would provide a suitable op- portunity for discussing other problems such as Berlin. The Soviet press continued to express optimism regarding 25X1 prospects for a test-ban treaty. SECRET said that Common Market Moscow has reacted along familiar lines to the breakdown of the UK-EEC talks in Brussels. Soviet propagandists have described it as a graphic revelation of the inherent contradictions in the NATO partnership and implied that West Germany, acting out of purely selfish motives, was the principal advocate of com- promise between France and Great Britain. Soviet commentators took much the same line they followed in elaborating on Adenauer's trip to France, claim- ing that West Germany's sole in- terest was in the acquisition of nuclear :arms and that Bonn would play )oth sides of the Atlantic fe 1ce in order to achieve this ambition. The USSR has avoided strong attacks on ?rench policy and di- rect criticism of De Gaulle per- sonally. Moscow has apparently decided to avoid committing it- self to a clear line of attack pending further developments in the Common Market issue and to retain its freedom of maneuver in any future discussions with the French leader on larger East-West issues. although the USSR cannot ac- cept 8 to 10 on-site inspections, it might consider four such in- spections "reasonable." He also implied that Moscow would not rigidly insist on the maximum of three automatic seizmic stations indicated in Khru- shchev's recent letters to Presi- dent Kennedy. A further hint of flexibility was contained in n encnnl remark by the that the USSR "might compromise on seven" inspections. High-level Soviet officials, however, continued to indicate pessimism regarding an early agreement. Soviet President Brezhnev complained to Am- bassador Kohler on 24 January that US "delaying" was due more to diplomatic than to technical reasons. Moscow reported without comment President Kennedy's order postponing underground tests in Nevada during the present talks. The Soviet press has not repeated Gromyko's 21 January insistence on French participation in a test-ban treaty, but Moscow radio noted it is not difficult to foresee De Gaulle's "obstruction" of an agreement. Berlin and Germany Although there has been no significant authoritative com- mentary on the Berlin and Ger- man issues during the past week, Soviet propagandists have at- tempted to rebut alleged Western assertions that the German question has lost its urgency. Bloc com- mentators continue to stress that Khrushchev's latest proposals pro- vide an acceptable "compromise" solution tc the Berlin question, and Red Star on 27 January claimed that points of rapprochement are beginning to crystallize in the position of both sides." Soviet propaganda carefully avoids the question of whether the US-Soviet discussions on these is- sues should be resumed soon but, in implicit allusion to the current test-ban n?gotiations, points up the intrinEic value of negotiations in resolvirg outstanding East-West differences. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 3 of 22 Approved or Release 2006/09/28: - - 00 - Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET Communist China's first ed- itorial comment on Sino-Soviet issues since the East German party congress was no less abu- sive than its propaganda before Khrushchev's call for a cessa- tion of polemics. Peiping is anxious, however, not to alienate potential sup- porters, many of whom felt that Khrushchev's appeal made sense. The North Vietnamese, for ex- ample, who have attempted to maintain a balanced position between the two antagonists, hailed "the proposal by Com- rade Khrushchev... that polemics be stopped." With this in mind, Peiping is discrediting the truce pro- posal as merely a hypocritical grandstand play accompanied by action designed to aggravate rather than terminate the con- troversy. A long People's Daily editorial on 27 January charged Khrushchev and his sup- porters with paying only lip service to bloc unity while planning the chorus of boos and catcalls directed at the head of the Chinese Communist del- egation to the East German congress. This charge of a deliberately staged demonstra- tion probably is a valid one and will carry weight with many of Peiping's supporters who wit- nessed the event from close range. The editorial goes beyond a disparagement of Khrushchev's sincerity to insist on impossi- ble conditions for a truce. As Peiping presents the case, the attitude toward Yugoslavia is central to the issue, and the Chinese will refuse to join in the "sham unity" that implies any toleration of bloc amity with Belgrade. The "real unity" demanded by Peiping would thus permit it to continue implicit attacks on Soviet policies by means of explicit attacks on "Yugoslav revisionism." To keep their position on record, the Chinese are giving wide circulation to the 27 Jan- uary editorial. It has been reprinted as a pamphlet, and it is being rebroadcast to domestic and foreign audiences. There were 80 such broadcasts-- 13 in Russian--on 27 January alone. In addition, Peiping is continuing to circulate other recent polemical editorials from People's Dail and Red Flag, which have been gathered into a pamphlet in Chinese and other languages. The Chinese domestic audience has also been informed by extracts in People's Daily of speeches at the East German party congress that were explicitly critical of Peiping. The effect has been to impress on the Chinese people the fact of their compara- tive isolation in the bloc. By noting in the 27 January editorial that Sino-Soviet relations have reached "the brink of the prec- ipice," the Chinese leaders have alerted their followers to the possibility of new dramatic developments. The next move is in the hands of the Soviet leaders. They may feel that their best strategy is to continue to maintain the high and principled stand Khrushchev adopted at the East German congress and to stress the necessity for a pause in the polemics. In this way, they could take credit for trying to maintain "unity" in the face of Chinese intransigence without impairing their freedom to institute policy moves-- like the reported delivery of MIGs to India--directly contrary to Chinese interests. On the other hand, the insults to Khrushchev in the 27 January editorial may goad the Soviets into taking the line that Peiping's display of dogmatism in the face of their generous offer left them no choice but to point out the dangers the Chinese pose for the whole international Com- munist movement. In either event, the net result of the latest round in the contest between the two nations set in motion by the East German congress has been a further demonstration of the lack of common ground upon which they can stand. (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 4 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: (;IA-HUP/9-UUV21AUU~~~)UUUbUUUI-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE The interpretations of the loosely worded Colombo Con- ference proposals made public in the past week by Peiping and New Delhi are largely incom- patible and provide little com- mon ground for productive dis- cussions. Although the Chinese accept these proposals "in principle," they make it clear that they will insist on two major modifications to which the Indian Government cannot agree. Chou En-lai's formal reply to Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Peiping's follow-up editori- al on 28 January preclude the return of Indian forces to large areas in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) vacated by the Chinese. The Colombo proposals, as "clarified" during the Bandaranaike mission to New Delhi and discussed in the Indian Parliament, would permit the return of Indian military forces to the McMahon line everywhere except in the Dhola and Longju areas. The second of Peiping's modifications excludes Indian civil administration from the proposed demilitarized zone in Ladakh and from Bara Hoti, Longju, and the Dhola area. The Colombo proposals called for a one-sided Chinese pull- back in Ladakh and would have permitted a return of Indian civil administration to many positions from which the Chinese had driven New Delhi's forces last fall. As a compensating gesture, Peiping has offered to take "another step forward on the road of reconciliation" by waiving the right to set up civil administration in certain disputed border areas. Peiping Boundary shown on Chinese Communist maps I N D I A Boundary shown an US and Western maps SECRET 1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW BURMA Page 5 of 22 Aroved or Release - - - Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY also announced on 28 January that its troop pullbacks would "soon be completed along the entire border," at which time Chinese forces would be "far behind" the line of 8 September 1962--which New Delhi has de- clared is one essential condition for negotiations. The Indians, aware of Pei- ping's terms earlier this month through diplomatic channels, had flatly called them unacceptable. Both Peiping and New Delhi probably look forward to a pro- tracted deadlock on the border issue and a long period of dip- lomatic jockeying and propaganda exchanges. The Afro-Asian nations will probably continue their ef- forts at mediation, although new initiatives will probably be individual rather than collective. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio has just visited New Delhi, and Cambodia's Sihanouk is visiting India prior to a trip to Peiping. On a related aspect of the Sino-Indian border dispute, New Delhi is giving increasing play SECRET to the warmth and closeness of its relations with Moscow. R.K. Nehru, secretary general of India's External Affairs Min- istry, returned from the USSR on 26 January after a week of wide-ranging talks with Soviet officials. Included in the topics discussed, according to the Indians, were prospects for increased trade, Soviet aid for India's Third (1961-66) and Fourth (1966-71) Five-Year Plans, details concerning the establishment of the "MIG factory" in India, and possible Soviet help for other Indian defense industries. Nehru also in- vited Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin and Defense Minister Malinovsky to visit India. In playing up these develop- ments, the Indian Government has omitted--at Moscow's request-- any publicity concerning the arrival of four crated MIG- 21 fighters in Bombay this week, although the Indians can be expected to make the most out of the news once it becomes known. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Page 6 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET Military Developments the crates arrived by sea during the period immediately prior to 11 January or if they had been in storage in Cuba for some time. ports that on 14 January Cuban army and militia members visited farm owners in a wide area just southeast of the city of Havana. The owners were told that the government needed their land Soviet Economic Support The Cuban trade delegation which had been in Moscow since mid-December negotiating details on Cuban-Soviet trade for the coming year now has left for its next stop in Communist China. There has been no indication of what has been agreed upon. Moscow announced on 26 Jan- uary that, at Havana's request, it is sending some 400 special- ists to Cuba during the first three months of the year. The specialists are to include agrono- mists, zootechnicians, agricul- tural machinery operators, agri- cultural economists, and veter- inarians, and are to spend a year in Cuba helping to improve crop production, animal husbandry, and farm mechanization. Internal Developments Cuban press and radio re- ports indicate a resurgence of small-scale insurgent activity. The Castro regime, however, is in no immediate danger from the activities of the active opposi- tion. While most Cubans are probably dissatisfied with the regime, only a small minority actively resist it. Various forms of passive resistance, such as work slowdowns, however, are probably more widespread. Cuban leaders continue to show concern over worker apathy and the threat that labor pro- ductivity will not reach planned levels. At a 27 January cere- mony honoring "outstanding" workers, Che Guevara publicly referred to the "symptomatic and alarming" fact that many Cubans "do not work hard enough." He said that many of the same young Cubans who have shown them- selves ready to fight courageously on the battlefield in defense of the fatherland do not show the same spirit when it "becomes SECRET Page 7 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET necessary to perform obscure and boring daily tasks" on the production front. Guevara de- clared that the working class must learn that the two kinds of sacrifice are equally im- portant in the "building of so- cialism." In this speech Guevara also stated--with his characteristic frankness--that there are no more spare parts for the factories in Cuba which came from the United States, and that Cuba has reached "a more or less critical point" in this respect. Indications continue to multiply that the Castro regime has embarked on a more aggres- sive program of subversion in Latin America since last fall's missile crisis. Bias Roca, Cuba's senior veteran Communist leader, de- livered a public address on 23 January in which he praised the Venezuelan "people" for their present struggle against the "tyranny" of President Betan- court. He expressed Cuban ap- preciation for the acts of sab- otage committed in the Vene- zuelan oil fields during the crisis last fall. He used this as an example of "proletarian internationalism" and stated flatly, "We shall continue to give our support, each day in greater proportions, to the Venezuelan people." In his references to Vene- zuela, Roca was even more spe- cific than Fidel Castro had been in two recent speeches singling out the "people's struggle" in Venezuela for special mention. Roca concluded his speech by declaring that when the Vene- zuelan revolution takes place, then "all Latin America will be ablaze." He declared that the "victory of Venezuela will give Cuba a tremendous boost...we will have a nation on the con- 25X1 tinent to back us." o er rep- resentatives rom Central Americp5X1 had discussions with Che Guevara during their stay in Cuba. Guevara told them that they must prepare for united and simul- taneous revolutions in all of Central America. Any idea that they can gain power by other means is a myth, Guevara said, and no Communist Party has ever come to power through elections. Guevara described the tactics being used in Venezuela as an ex- ample for the Central Americans. Cuban officials appear to be gathering detailed informa- tion from Latin Americans un- dergoing guerrilla training in 25X1 Cuba to aid Cuban planning and support of guerrilla cam ai ns e other countries. 5X1 recently returned from guerrilla training in Cuba re- ports that he and some 150 of his countrymen training in Cuba were asked to answer a 58-point questionnaire. Questions covered a wide range and included military, political, and geographic sub- jects, as well as means for legal and illegal entry into the country and methods by which foreigners can buy property and establish commercial firms in the country. Questions on the feasibility of guerrilla warfare covered drop zones suit- able for air supply of guerrilla bands. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS- SEM) SECRET Page 8 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET Soviet heavy industrial de- velopment continued in 1962 to receive clear priority over con- sumer goods production and agri- culture. In general, trends of the preceding year were main- tained. There are signs of continuing difficulties, partic- ularly in investment in certain key industries, in the selected data released by the Soviet Gov- ernment on 26 January. Industry Industrial output is claimed to have increased by 9.5 percent, very slightly above the 1961 rate. As usual, the greatest increase was in group "A, So- viet jargon for the bulk of heavy industrial output. The seven percent increase claimed for the group "B" industries, mainly consumer goods, is a shade higher than the 1961 rate, but there are many signs in the report and elsewhere that 1962 was a poor year for the Soviet consumer. Soviet gross industrial production indexes, moreover, give an inflated picture of actual performance--they con- tain certain technical biases and reflect considerable double- counting of goods produced. For this reason, it is b9lieved the increase in 1961 was only 7.6 percent, rather than the 9.2 percent claimed by the USSR. The 1962 claim was probably similarly inflated. Rates for most basic indus- tries were virtually unchanged from 1961. Chemical output ad- vanced by a percentage point above the preceding year's increase, while ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and the machine-build- ing production rates dropped very slightly. Output plans for gas, oil, and electric power were overfulfilled. Pig iron and steel goals were slightly under- fulfilled. This pattern prob- ably reflects implementation of the policy first discussed by Khrushchev nearly two years ago, laying more stress on SOVIET PRODUCTION STATISTICS 1960 1961 1962 GROSS INDUSTRIAL F uWi 9.6 9.2 9.5 PRODUCTION w w LABOR PRODUCTIVITY U 5.3 4+ 6 (INDUSTRY) f a Z STEEL (MILLION METRIC TONS) 01L (M. M. T.) GAS (BILLION CUBIC METERS) ELECTRIC POWER (BILLION KILOWATT HRS.) MINERAL FERTILIZER (M.M.T.) U.S. 1960 1961 1962 1963 1962 (Plan) (Preliminary) 65.3 70.8 76.3 80 89 147.9 166.1 186 205 360 47.2 60.9 75.2 88 385 292.3 327.6 369 407.9 1004 13.9 15.3 17.2 20 33.1 (1960) SECRET Page 9 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET INCREASES IN SOVIET INVESTMENTS ( in % over preceding year ) TOTAL (STATE CENTRALIZED)' 10.'7 13.2 10.1 AND METALWORKING 39 23 14 ELECTRIC POWER STATION S chemicals, oil, metallurgy, and machine building--doing poorly. Light industrial investment in- creased only eight percent com- pared with a planned 33.5 per- cent. As usual no information was released on military programs. Industrial labor productiv- ity increased by six percent after having slackened during the im- plementation of a shorter working week in 1960 and 1961. Produc- tivity in construction was also greater than in the two previous years., but was still below plan. ' ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF ENTIRE INVESTMENT OUTLAYS. EXCLUDES PRIVATELY FINANCED HOUSING, COLLECTIVE-FARM INVESTMENT, AND SMALL-SCALE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS ACCOMPLISHED WITH LOCAL FUNDS. IN 1962 TOTAL INVESTMENT HAS PROBABLY INCREASED AT A LOWER RATE THAN INDICATED FOR STATE-CENTRALIZED, AS IT DID.IN 1961. synthetic materials and less on the output of the ferrous metallurgical industry. Moscow's economic report gives some hints of the dif- ficulties which have inspired two major reorganizations in less than a year. These dif- ficulties--in the areas of planning, supply, and invest- ment--stem from the mounting competition for resources for the military programs, for in- dustrial development, and for maintenance of an acceptable level of consumption. There is little in the report to suggest that these problems abated in 1962. A higher rate of introduction of new fixed capital suggests that the policy undertaken late in 1961 to con- centrate investment resources on those projects nearing com- pletion has had some success. However, investment data, al- though sketchy and ambiguous, show some priority sections-- Agriculture Despite considerable lip service from Moscow to the needs of agriculture, nothing in the report suggests that its priority was raised substantially in 1962. The output of mineral fertilizer was slightly above the annual target but too low to meet Seven-Year-Plan goals or the actual requirements of Soviet farming. The production of farm machinery continued to in- crease fairly rapidly, although tractor production increased at a lower rate than in 1961. State investment in agriculture in- creased 22 percent, but at least a part of the increase resulted from the transfer of collective farms to state-farm status and adds nothing to total agricul- tural investment. Production results in ag- riculture were mediocre in 1962, despite a fairly large increase in acreage at the expense of fallow land and land in grass- rotation. The report claimed a record grain harvest of nine billion goods (147 million metric tons), but Western ex- perts after an extensive study of acreage, crop, and weather SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY information--estimate it at about 115 million tons--well below the record 1958 crop. There appar- ently was a fair increase in meat production, encouraged by the higher prices for meat introduced in mid-1962 and by the prospect of feed shortages this winter. The potato crop was the worst one in over a decade. Consumer Goods and Housing Other features of the 1962 economic performance may also dis- hearten Soviet consumers. The output of light industry increased only four percent comparedwith f ive percent the preceding year. Pro- duction of cotton fabrics did not increase at all. Production of all kinds of textiles rose two percent. Retail trade turnover, although somewhat improved over 1961, was below plan. The urban housing program, for the third year in a row, was substantially underfulfilled. Taking into account the 1963 plan,it now appears that the urban housing construction will fall about ten percent short of the Seven-Year-Plan goal. Like- wise, rural housing is badly behind schedule. Foreign Trade Soviet foreign trade turn- over amounted to $13.1 billion in 1962, an increase of approximately $1.3 billion or 11.5 percent over the 1961 level. This was the largest increase in several years and resulted largely from a 17- percent increase in trade with CEMA countries and a 30-percent increase in trade with nonbloc underdeveloped countries. Moscow gave no data on trade with China, but apparently there was some decline in 1962. Competition With the US One of the main propaganda features of Moscow's report is the self-styled "competition" with the United States, which, as in the past, is presented in terms highly favorable to the Soviets. For example, the claim that Soviet industrial production has reached 63 percent of the US level is based on statistical methods which give a strong upward bias to Soviet efforts. No comparisons between two countries with dis- similar economies can be entirely fair or unbiased, but Soviet industrial production is in fact believed to be less than half that of the US. (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 11 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Since the Cuban crisis last fall, Mongolia's advocacy of Khrushchev's views has brought it to the point of open criti- cism of the Chinese. Always a dependable supporter of Soviet foreign policy, Mongolian party chief Tsendenbal has emerged more and more in recent months as Khrushchev's Asian spokesman. Tsedenbal has given all appearances of accepting this role with enthusiasm. At a re- cent party ideological conference in Ulan Bator, he reiterated Moscow's explanation of its Cuban policy, in effect defend- ing it against Chinese charges of appeasement. Disparaging those "who cling to obsolete formulas" and do not display flexibility in face of changed world conditions, the Mongolian leader labeled as "irresponsible and conceited" Peiping's "ground- less criticism" of the USSR's policy. He pointedly charged the Chinese with "incorrect and extremely harmful actions" in egging on the Albanians. These correct state rela- tions were exemplified by the signing of a border treaty in late December. It probably mat- tered little to the Mongolians that the Chinese motive in ar- ranging the treaty at that time was to place India in a bad light. For their part, the Chinese were probably under no illusions that their accommodation on the border, along which the number of inci- dents has been increasing, would budge Ulan Bator from its pro- Soviet orientation. Tsedenbal, who went to Pei- ping to sign the treaty, gave the Chinese no reason to enter- tain any such hope. In return for the fanfare with which he was greeted, Tsedenbal dis- comfited his hosts at a public rally in Peiping by hailing Mos- cow's "sensible compromises" on Cuba. His remarks reportedly caused the audience of 150,000 to "buzz with surprise" and were greeted by Chinese leaders on the rostrum with impassive silence. State relations with Pei- ping, however, remain outwardly correct, although Mongolian of- ficials admit privately there has been some cooling. The most conspicuous form of Chinese as- sistance, the use of Chinese workers for big construction projects around Ulan Bator, ap- parently continues. Labor-short Mongolia has employed as many as 10,000 of these workers at one time. Mongolian officials have told recent foreign visitors that workers from China who com- pleted their tours of duty in the past year have all been re- placed by the Chinese. The Mongolians describe their position, wedged in be- tween the USSR and Communist China, as "overpowering," and take advantage of every op- portunity to cultivate foreign diplomats and plump for recogni- tion. Their record--recognition by 14 non-Communist countries-- is far better than that of the other Asian satellites. Recogni- tion last week by the United Kingdom--the first from a West European country will no doubt be exploited as an example to be followed by other states. (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET 1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 12 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Joseph Ileo, the Congolese Government's recently appointed minister-resident in Katanga, has begun what may prove to be a long and difficult period of reintegrating the province. He has privately described his mission as one of an executor of integration. While he has begun talks with Tshombd, Ileo has made it clear that he does not intend to get bogged down in involved negotiations with the Katangan leader. He said soon after his arrival he would not tolerate Katangan obstruc- tionist tactics, and on 28 Jan- uary he ordered the arrest of directors of the former Katangan National Bank who had been in- structed not to divulge infor- mation on the bank's operations. Ileo does not intend to adhere to the letter of U Thant's reintegration plan, according to several sources. He is said to feel it has been "overtaken by events." Leopoldville appears at least temporarily to have dropped the idea of convening a special session of the combined North- South Katanga Assembly as a means of ousting Tshombd, or reshuffling his government. Ileo has said that such a move would be illegal, since North Katanga has been established by the Congolese Parliament as a sepa- rate province and this situation could be changed only by new parliamentary action. Adoula may be waiting to establish a firmer grip on the province before moving against Tshombd. Anti-Tshombd Baluba tribal pressures for a combined session remain strong, however. Bertin Mwamba, president of the Congo- lese Chamber of Deputies, main- tains that North Katanga is too poor to get along on its own. He apparently is willing to let Tshombd remain, but wants to oust some of his ministers. On the other hand Isaac Kalonji, presi- dent of the Congolese Senate, opposes reunification of Katanga, even though he wants to oust Tshombd. The behavior of central government officials in Elisabeth- ville has alarmed both UN and Belgian officials. UN officials are trying to rein in Leopold- ville's politicians and to limit the number of the carpetbagger horde until the detailed work of reintegration is completed. Foreign Minister Spaak says he fears that replacing Tshombd would provoke tribal outbreaks and violence, although he says Brussels is not seeking to retain Tshombd "in perpetuity." Leopoldville is continuing to press for the introduction of more Congo National Army (ANC) troops into South Katanga. Ileo and General Mobutu have succeeded in persuading UN offi- cials to permit ANC soldiers to patrol with UN troops in Elisa- bethville, and they now are press- ing for the extension of mixed SECRET WEEKLY REVIEW Page 13 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY patrols to the key mining town of Jadotville, Kolwezi,and Ki- pushi. Mobutu wants to send another ANC battalion to Elisa- bethville, and one each to Jadotville and Kolwezi. UN offi- cials, although fearful of the European reaction, have appar- ently agreed to the gradual introduction of three or four more ANC battalions. Tshombd has moved quickly to reassume his mantle of Ka- tanga's provincial president. He has held a series of cabinet meetings, has toured the African communes of Elisabethville an- nouncing nouncing that he is the sole authority in Katanga. and called in selected mem- ers o the Katanga Assembly to remind them he is the legally elected president and to warn them to remain loyal. In a letter to Adoula on 27 January he asked what the exact functions of Ileo were. Tshombd said that neither he nor his government SECRET wanted any "conflicts of com- petence" to arise. The central thread running through Tshombd's actions since his return is strict application of the U Thant plan. He has now offered to send his officers to Leopoldville to take an oath of allegiance as provided in the plan. He protested to the US consul on 26 January that the takeover of the Katangan banks was not consonant with the UN plan, and several times repeated that either the plan should be applied as written or Leopold- ville should declare it null and void. The Katangan leader now is seeking to involve the UN in resolving his differences with Leopoldville. On 24 January he asked Thant to appoint a special UN representative to settle "certain problems" which had arisen "in application of your plan." (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Page 14 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A00~0060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN TOGO The political situation in Togo remains basically un- stable following the assassina- tion of President Olympio in mid-January. Behind Provisional President Grunitsky's weak leadership the diverse factions represented in the cabinet and the military elements who staged the coup are involved in a power struggle. Grunitsky's authority has been further undercut by the reluctance of most countries, especially those in the moderate African group, to extend diplo- matic recognition. Grunitsky is seriously handicapped by his lack of a real political base and the fact that he is widely regarded by Africans as a French stooge. He is further inhibited by fear of the military junta, which is drifting into a more assertive role, sometimes even acting independently of the provisional government. Grunitsky reportedly indicated recently that his relations with the military leaders, who themselves are confused and frightened by the hostile reaction to the coup, were becoming increasingly difficult. Among the contending domestic political groups, Finance Minister Meatchi's northern-based Democratic Togo- lese Peoples' Union (UDPT) ap- pears to be in the ascendancy within the provisional regime. Meatchi, who is believed to be receiving support from Ghana, has been formally designated to take over in the event of Grunit- sky's absence or inability to act. Elements of Olympio's Togolese Unity Party (UT), in which southern Ewe and Mina tribesmen predominate, are also attempting to reassert themselves. As the sole legal party for a year prior to the coup, the UT has the only ef- fective national organization. However, it is questionable whether this party, which is rep- resented in the present coali- tion regime by Labor Minister Kutuklui, can long survive Olympio's death. Kutuklui, a spokesman for impatient younger elements in the party, reportedly is attempting to take control from the more conservative older leaders, many of whom now are in exile. Grunitsky has reiterated his government's pledge to hold free elections, but so far no date has been set. The American Embassy in Lome believes they are not likely to materialize soon unless the UT drops its opposition to Grunitsky's plan for prior agreement by all parties on a single list of candidates. This device is clearly aimed at preventing the UT from prof- iting from its present electoral strength in the country. For the present, all political meetings have been banned. Only Ghana--which many African governments suspect was behind the coup--and Senegal have announced unqualified rec- ognition of Grunitsky's regime. Dahomey has accorded de facto recognition. It now seems likely that other African states will continue to defer any formal action pending a report by the five-country mission of inquiry which the moderate Monrovia powers decided to sent to Togo at their 24-26 January conference at Lagos. Grunitsky has said he is prepared to receive the mission, but opposes as unrealistic the conferees' call for the prompt release of the imprisoned ministers of Olympio's govern- ment and for punishment of the assassins. Prior to the Lagos meeting, Grunitsky indicated to the French ambassador that if general recognition were de- layed much longer he would assume other states lacked confidence in him and would simply "take off" for his former refuge in Dahomey. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET 1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 15 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY REFERENDUM IN IRAN The overwhelming approval of Iran's reform program in the referendum on 26 January will encourage the Shah to accelerate the program and possibly to advance the date of national elections now planned for June or July. The regime now believes it can override any attempts in a new parliament to obstruct reforms. The Shah has been ruling without Parliament since May 1961. The referendum sought ap- proval of six proposals: redis- tribution of large landholdings to peasants, a requirement that 20 percent of industry's profits be shared by the workers, nationalization of forests, broadening of the franchise, distribution of shares in gov- ernment-owned industry to reim- burse dispossessed landlords, and use of military draftees to teach reading and writing in backward areas. The regime mustered a 99.9-percent affirmative vote, partly by intimidating the op- position. Some opponents of reform were jailed before the voting began. The use of blue ballots to signify a negative vote prevented secrecy, and bus- loads of pro-reform demonstrators cruised through Tehran. Inten- sive security measures and dis- plays of military force imposed calm during the balloting. The spectacle of women voting for the first time failed to provoke the expected reli- gious protest. The women's vote was not included in the final tally, however. The standing of Minister of Agriculture Hasan Arsanjani appears to have been enhanced. Already popular for his key role in pushing land reform, he was responsible for organiz- ing sizable peasant demonstra- tions which upset the plans and strategy of those opposing the Shah's reforms. The opposition forces-- the mullahs, the landlords and the National Front--appear to be demoralized temporarily and prob- ably have lost many supporters. The protest demonstrations they sparked were overwhelmed by those the government staged. However, they can be expected to claim that the referendum was invalid because of rigging. The National Front, which favors reform but not under the Shah's auspices, now intends to concentrate its attack on the Shah personally. According to its moderate leader, Allahyar Saleh, it will charge that the Shah has profited from land sold to the peasants and will demand that such profits be distributed to them. The National Front may begin to compete with the regime in offering workers and peasants more than the Shah can deliver. The reforms and promises of further reforms have raised high hopes which would turn to dis- illusionment in a few months as the government encounters complex administrative and financial problems in carrying out its program. When elections are held, the regime's opponents may again seek to provoke disorders in view of the futility of com- peting at the well-scrutinized ballot boxes. (SECRET NO FOR- EIGN DISSEM) SECRET 1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET tories. "Confrontation" does not appear to imply a direct use of force. SUMATRA BORNEO Indonesia's policy, an- nounced on 20 January, of "con- frontation" with Malaya over the inclusion of the British Borneo territories in the proposed Ma- laysia Federation has sharpened British and Malayan concern over Indonesian intentions in the northern Borneo territories. In declaring the policy, Indo- nesia's Foreign Minister Suban- drio denounced Malaya as an ac- complice of "neo-colonialists" and "neo-imperialists" and for pursuing a hostile policy toward Indonesia. Steps to carry out Indo- nesia's new policy will probably include anti-Malayan propaganda activity in Indonesia, accusa- tions that Malaya encourages illegal economic and political activity directed against Indo- nesia, harassment of Malayan shipping by Indonesia's anti- smuggling patrol craft in the Straits of Malacca, and harass- ment of Malayan diplomatic and consular personnel in Indonesia. Presumably the objects of such a policy are to draw interna- tional attention to the area, to goad Malaya into action against which Indonesia might retaliate, and to encourage anti- Malaysia elements in Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo terri- Malaya's Prime Minister Rahman nevertheless claims to have information that Indonesia is preparing to infiltrate guer- rillas into Brunei in the very near future in order to rekindle the abortive revolt staged there in December. Rahman warns that only a strong show of force in the area by the British will deter Indonesia. Since the December revolt in Brunei was crushed, Indo- nesian army outposts in Borneo reportedly have been ordered to assist those rebels who have made their way to the border and to regroup them inside Indonesian territory. A com- munications post is to be es- tablished in East Borneo to maintain contact with rebel leaders on the other side of the border. Guerrilla training areas for both Indonesians and rebel elements are reported operating in Indonesia near the North Borneo and Sarawak borders. A monthly training capacity of five or six hundred may have been reached. In mid-January, both Subandrio and National Security Minister Nasution told American officials that if "independence seekers" in the North Borneo territories request military training, Indonesia will comply. (SECRET NO FOR- EIGN DISSEM) SECRET I Mak-t. Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900 - Page 17 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 SECRET Kim Chong-pil, controver- sial second man in the South Korean regime, has emerged from a fight for control of the government-sponsored Democratic- Republican Party with his power position intact, if not stronger than ever. His official position in the party is still undecided, and he may exercise control from behind the scenes. The junta intends to use the party--which Kim organized --to control the new "civilian" government scheduled to come into being after elections this spring. Senior officers in the junta feared that if Kim con- solidated his control of the party they would be frozen out of any share in political power. On 21 January a retired marine lieutenant general, Kim Tong-ha, led a move to remove Kim Chong-- pil from the party. The political crisis that ensued demonstrated once again the close ties between junta leader Pak Chong-hui and Kim, Pak's decision to allow the party sponsoring committee to resolve the issue of party leadership signaled the defeat of Kim's opponents. Kim had placed on this committee civil- ians responsive to his control and former members of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which he had headed. Assurance that the army leadership would support the move was a key influence in Pak's decision favoring Kim. Subsequently, Pak confirmed the government party as the new locus of political power by warning the junta council to stop meddling in politics. He stated he would no longer tolerate discussion of party affairs in the council, even if he had to disband it. The support of the civilian members of the party committee is enabling Kim to pose as the champion of civilian supremacy in politics. He also appears to have isolated his enemies in the army for the time being. His success, however, could make him a possible target for assassination--a device not unusual in Korean politics. Pak may be exposed to the same danger. The military forces are likely to remain the key factor in the political situation for some time to come, and power seekers will have to obtain backing among the armed forces. For the time being some of Kim's opponents probably will go along with his leadership of the party, awaiting a time when factional shifts in the military will give them another chance to challenge his posi- tion. Others may align them- selves with civilian politicians opposed to the regime and use their inside knowledge of government scandals, including Kim's financial deals, to attack the party during the election campaign. In any event, the open strife surrounding the struggle for control of the party will make it increasingly difficult for the junta to maintain the facade of free elections and return to representative government. The regime's narrow base of public support makes it sensi- tive to criticism. An indi- cation of declining support could cause the Pak-Kim forces to impose repressive measures that might provoke violence by students or other disaffected elements. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET 1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 of 22 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY The parliamentary debate in Italy occasioned by the Commu- nists' recent no-confidence motion served to launch the campaign for national elections to be called sometime this spring. Special attention focused on the new defense position announced by Premier Fanfani following his Washington talks. able electoral line, the Commu- nists emphasized the government's The Communist motion was defeated 292 to 173 in a show- down vote between government and opposition parties, with the Nenni Socialists abstaining as usual. Indicating their prob- administrations. Communist chief Togliatti also charged Fanfani with embarking on a dangerous defense policy involving exten- sion of Italy's participation in the use of nuclear arms. Nenni, for his part, deplored the Christian Democrats' fail- ure to meet all program commit- ments but reiterated support for the present government and declared that his party expect- ed a revival of the center-left experiment after the elections. monopolies and to set up regional is that "nuclear proliferation" is to be reduced by removal of the 30 obsolescent Jupiter missiles from Italian soil and by Italian !participation, instead, in a (Mediterranean but non-Italian- based NATO nuclear force. In this 1connection the US Embassy in Rome I considers it significant that INenni, on whose parliamentary !following the government depends for a viable majority, took note-- without expressing opposition--of Fanfani's statement approving such a force, whereas a year ago the Socialists were publicly opposing a NATO nuclear arm. Nenni, despite the effect his statements might have on his electoral supporters , failure to carry out its promises !even praised the results of Fan- to take action against private ;fani's Washington visit. There were numerous state- ments by party leaders deploring De Gaulle's EEC policy, with Social Democratic leader Sara- gat declaring that "De Gaulle will pass and Europe remain." Premier Fanfani called the Paris-Bonn treaty a particularism harmful to Europe and NATO. Further such sentiments are likely to be voiced during Prime Minister Macmillan's long-scheduled visit to Italy from 1 to 3 February. The government, seeking to As announced by Fanfani, avoid further no-confidence the government's defense position motions, will probably try for f early adjournment of parliament Independ?nn of which majority ore Rightht,, I. fh? Senoe, 0 are directly e1-bed and 5 are ?x d'H