SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MOROCCO UNDER KING HASSAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000010004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

elease 2006/07/18: CIA-RDP79-00927A00400001004b5 0272/63B
COPY NO. 73
22 March 1963
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
MOROCCO UNDER KING HASSAN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I/CDF Pages _1 thru
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
7J]", LE 18, USC. SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
a?ISSEMINATION CONTROLS
document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS. In addition certain intelligence items
contained herein may be marked with specific dissemi-
tion controls in accordance with the provisions of DC1D
1/7. Each item so marked must be controlled within the
framework of the limitation placed upon it.
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During his two years on
the throne of Morocco, King
Hassan has consolidated his
authority in his own country,
has sought recognition as a
leader of African and Arab na-
tions, especially in the Maghreb,
and has guided Morocco's non-
alignment policy slightly to-
ward the West. His visit to
Washington on 27 and 28 March
will mark a further effort to
promote his personal stature
and to secure help in solving
his country's economic problems.
The 33-year-old Hassan
has maneuvered adroitly with
increasing assurance to domi-
nate Moroccan politics. At
first he drew heavily on the
popularity of his father, Mo-
hamed V. I
cent of -be Gaulle an expressions
which developed within the opposi-
tion have further helped him
consolidate his control.
Hassan's principal achieve-
ment has been to give Morocco
its first constitution. In
getting the document drafted
and approved in a referendum
and promulgated last December,
he fulfilled his father's commit-
ment to provide a constitution
before the end of 1962.
Under the constitution,
which is patterned after De
Gaulle's fifth republic and
defines the regime as a "con-
stitutional, social and demo-
cratic monarchy," the King has
surrendered virtually none of
what had been a theoretically
absolute power. He continues
to play quite disparate roles.
He remains the "sacred" symbol
of the nation and its spiritual
leader. He is also head of the
used by President Kennedy.
Hassan was particularly im-
pressed in 1957 at seeing visit-
ing Vice President Nixon min-
gling with crowds of Moroccans,
and his own use of such tactics
has helped him to win quickly
the adulation of the illiterate
peasants who comprise 85 percent
of Morocco's population.
At the same time Hassan
has disarmed his left-wing opposi-
tion by adopting many of its
socialistic policies. The in-
decisiveness and factionalism
HASSAN
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government's executive branch,
and the powers so derived, added
to his spiritual role, far exceed
those granted the bicameral legis-
lature to be elected sometime
this year.
Hassan's flirtations with
the Soviet bloc during the first
year of his reign were to some
extent an attempt to press the
West to be more forthcoming in
its offers of assistance. In
the past year, however, he has
turned more frequently toward
the West. This slight shift
in emphasis may have resulted
from his own pro-Western pro-
clivities as well as from the
influence of Ahmed Reda Guedira,
his francophile confidant, direc-
tor of the royal cabinet and
minister of agriculture and in-
terior.
Nevertheless, Hassan con-
tinues to pay lip service to
nonalignment and, when his critics
charge that he has become pro-
Western, he can point to a mili-
tary aid agreement with the USSR,
civil air agreements with Czecho-
slovakia and the USSR, and credits
from Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Hassan has become somewhat
disillusioned with Nasir, whose
success in playing off the Soviet
bloc against the West he had
sought to emulate. This dis-
illusionment is as much the re-
sult of the Egyptian President's
cool attitude toward Hassan during
the Casablanca conference in 1961
and Hassan's resistance to UAR
patronage as it is to Nasir's
links with Hassan's leftist
opposition.
Algerian independence in
mid-1962 removed the principal
deterrent--Morocco's forthright
aid to the rebellion--to the
development of closer ties with
France. Hassan soon realized
that he must compete with Algeria
for French economic and military
aid, and consequently he has
trimmed his sails accordingly.
As the Algerian situation
has stabilized, Hassan has become
concerned that the Ben Bella
regime may encourage republican
tendencies within the Moroccan
opposition. The King has also
become suspicious of Nasir's
influence over the Algerian
premier. With Baathists in the
new Iraqi and Syrian regimes
pointedly describing Algeria as
a "liberated" country, Hassan's
concern may increase.
Hassan has sought to meet
this challenge and to ease his
country's growing isolation from
African and Arab affairs by
tightening its bonds with the
other North African monarchy,
Libya. He has also sought ac-
commodations with Algeria as
well as with Spain and Mauritania
over Morocco's long-standing
territorial claims. He offered
to mediate Ben Bella's dispute
with Tunisian President Bourguiba,
and later seized upon Ben Bella's
invitation to visit Algiers from
13 to 15 March. Although coolly
received by the Algerians, he
probably sought at least a tacit
Algerian commitment to desist
from encouraging subversive
elements in Morocco.
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Hassan's most pressing in-
ternal problem is his country's
stagnant economy. Although a
development program has been
drafted and projects for in-
creasing rural employment have
been introduced, results are
meager. Efforts to stimulate
development have been largely
palliative, unbalanced, and
poorly executed.
The Opposition
The principal opposition
to Hassan is the National Union
of Popular Forces (UNFP), a
leftist group formed in 1959 and
consisting of an educated elite
allied with a powerful labor
organization. The UNFP objected
to the King's procedures in
drafting the constitution. It
wanted to have a constituent
assembly elected to write the
document. The UNFP campaigned
for abstention in the referendum,
but only in its main urban
strongholds did it have any im-
pact. Recognizing that the ab-
stention policy was unwise, it
will contest as many seats as
possible when elections are held,
and campaign for amending the
constitution to make it more
democratic.
The conservative Istiglal
party, which led the fight for
the restoration of Mohamed V
to the throne and for Morocco's
independence, has also gone into
the opposition. Its three minis-
ters resigned from the govern-
ment early this year in an effort
to keep Ahmen Guedira from
extending his influence into
economic development. As the
King's principal adviser, Guedira
has become the country's second
most influential personality.
In opposition, Istiqlal may
prove troublesome. It will hope
to prove its strength in the
country's first elections, and
where seats are lost, can be
expected to claim foul play from
Guedira, who controls the election
machinery. Istiqlal will also
continue to exert pressure to
maintain policies which it ini-
tiated and which have proved
troublesome and embarrassing to
Hassan. After independence,
Istiglal President Allal el-
Fassi initiated Morocco's claims
to Mauritania, Spanish Sahara,
and westernmost Algeria. Hassan
still gives lip service to these
policies despite his desire for
an accommodation.
Out look
Since the overwhelming accept-
ance of his constitution in the
December referendum, Hassan has
moved with more assurance. Having
dropped the Istiqlal, he now has
a cabinet composed of men pri-
marily loyal to him. It repre-
sents only two relatively minor
political groups, and should
function with less friction if
not more efficiently than its
predecessor.
The King has promised par-
liamentary elections later this
year under the new constitution--
probably between May and October.
The elections, the first such
ever to be held in Morocco,
should give the first firm indi-
cation of the comparative strengths
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of the political parties. The
first parliament is likely to
convene on 18 November.
Despite his present mastery
of his country, Hassan evidently
believes that he cannot retain
power indefinitely in the face
of economic stagnation. His
government has cast about for
external assistance, and has
concluded aid agreements with
France and West Germany, as
well as with the US and the
World Bank.
Hassan apparently hopes
that his visit to Washington
and other projected trips to
Western and African states will
improve his own and his country's
standing. While in the United
States he almost certainly ex-
pects to receive commitments of
economic aid beyond what is al-
ready projected. He may also
request further military assist-
ance, particularly modern air-
craft.
Hassan seems likely to agree
to continued US use of some air
base and communications facilities
beyond the end of this year when
the air base and Voice of America
agreements terminate. He has,
however, resisted efforts to
pave the way toward an agreement
on the use of the naval air
facilities at Kenitra by insisting
that discussions be held only
with the President. Decisions
regarding the three other bases
have lagged largely because the
inexperienced Moroccan officials
lacked firm policy direction.
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