WEEKLY SUMMARY-OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 29, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

29 March 1963
OC I No 0 02'73/63
Copy No~ %~
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~"~ ~~~
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25X1 ~~ c ~ SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 28 March 1963)
Page
CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ABROA
e t;upan
Solidarity Congress in under way in Brazil.
PREPARATIONS TO FORM CASTRO POLITICAL MACHINE
Formal establishment is promised for this year,
and Castro evidently hopes, by organizing his
party from scratch, to keep down the influence
of the veteran Communists.
CASTRO INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH JOURNALIST
There is no reason to doubt that the Cuban
leader made the statements attributed to him,
despite his "categorical refutation."
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
PENKOVSKY SPY TRIAL RUMORED IMMINENT IN MOSCOW
High-ranking officials are said to be implicated,
and the case could have repercussions in the
highest levels of the Soviet leadership.
THE MOSCOW-PEIPING DIALOGUE
Attempts by both sides to dispel the atmosphere of
outright hostility without giving the appearance
of willingness to compromise suggest that prepara-
tions are being made for bilateral talks.
PEIPING CALLS FOR MORE RATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING
There is no suggestion in two recent editorials
of any intent to use last year's slight easing
of economic difficulties to justify another
crash economic program.
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
PARTY-ARMY RELATIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 10
A political indoctrination program now under way
may reflect concern about declining morale rather
than any special apprehension over military
loyalty.
T'IE REGIME VERSUS EAST GERR~IANY' S INTELLECTUALS
Barred by the bloc's present ideological line from
adopting a "Stalinist" attitude toward the rest-
less intelligentsia, the German Communists will
probably be guided by Moscow's cultural policy.
(See Special Report OCI No. 0273/63B)
KOREAN MILITARY RULERS MANEUVER TO KEEP POti4'ER
They intend to use a conference of military and
civilian leaders now under way to arrange a
coalition that would appear to broaden support
for the junta.
COMMUNIST THREAT TO LAOTIAN NEUTRALISTS CONTINUES 12
The pro-Communist forces on the Plaine des Jarres,
reportedly augmented by several hundred newly ar-
rived North Vietnamese troops, are preventing the
delivery of supplies to neutralist farces there.
SOUTH VIETNAMESE DISCONTENT ~'IITH DIEM'S RULE
He and his influential brother Nhu believe that
criticism from the American press and US offi-
cialdom is abetting antigovernment activity in
Saigon.
UAR-SYRIA-IRAQ FEDERATION TALKS IN RECESS
Reports differ on whether any significant measure
of accord has been reached, but Nasir still is
said to want more centralized control than is
acceptable to the Iraqi and Syrian Baathists..
KING HUSAYN APPOINTS NEW JORDANIAN CABINET
He decided that the possibility of serious re-
percussions from the recent coups in Syria and
Iraq was strong enough to require a government
better able to maintain firm control in Jordan.
15
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued} Page
OPPOSITION DIFFERENCES HELPING CONGOLESE PREMIER 16
The desire of individual members of Parliament
for ministerial office has divided the opposition
forces, but Adoula could still miscalculate in
attempting to exploit this situation.
STALEMATE IN TOGO MAY BE BREAKING
President Grunitsky is still having trouble,
however, in implementing his program for elections
and in gaining foreign recognition.
UN SHOWDOWN LOOMS ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA QUESTION 2U
London's refusal to press the colony's white gov-
ernment for increased African rights invites new
attacks by the Afro-Asian and Communist blocs at
the UN.
FRANCE STILL AT ODDS WITH EEC PARTNERS
While the issue of British EEC membership still
rankles, the discord now centers on problems as-
sociated with the forthcoming trade and tariff
talks under the US Trade Expansion Act.
DE GAULLE'S PERSONAL POLITICAL PLANS
He evidently plans at least to start another term
in 1965, and perhaps serve another seven years.
FRENCH COAL STRIKE ENTERS FIFTH WEEK
The government, still determined to hold the line
against inflation, hopes pressures will mount to
force the miners to accept terms only slightly bet-
ter than the S-percent wage boost they rejected.
NORWAY SEEKS CONTINUED US MILITARY AID
It says that as a result of the scheduled phase-
out of such aid, it will be unable to meet its
defense commitments.
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EUROPE (continued) Page
AUSTRIAN COALITION FORMED AFTER LONG NEGOTIf',TIONS 24
This will allow Vienna at Iast to come to grips
with the urgent problem of reaching some arrange-
ment with the EEC.
LAG IN ARGENTINA'S ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS
The seven parties, including the Peronists, in the
"national front" still have not agreed on a pro-
gram or a candidate, and the military remain con-
cerned about Peronist intentions.
POLAND AND LATIN AMERICA
By persistent effort, Poland has been able to
establish 15 diplomatic, consular, and permanent
trade missions in Latin America, as compared with
only six for the USSR.
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Jl'~ (.el[['1 l
Lacerda is having foreign
delegates arrested as fast as
they arrive at Rio airport,
One Mexican delegate was put
back on the plane on which he
had just arrived. Others, how-
ever, will probably be able to
attend. An Argentine delega-
tion has arrived without inci-
dent, as has Isabel Blum, vice
president of the Belgian Union
for the Defense of Peace. Oth-
ers known to have made prepara-
tions to attend include Mexican
Communist Lombardo Toledano,
Costa Rican Communist leader
Eduardo Mora, a 53-man delega-
tion by ship from Uruguay, and
a 20- to 30-man group from Chile.
In Brazil, the Congress for
Solidarity with Cuba--barred
from Rio de Janeiro city by
anti-Communist state governor
Lacerda--opened across the bay
at Niteroi on 26 March with
only about 400 participants.
The only delegate of national
prominence was Peasant League
leader Francisco Juliao, re-
Gently returned from Cuba.
Press reports have indicated
that the meeting to be attended
by foreign delegates might shift
to Sao Paulo, although this
also may be held in Niteroi.
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Indications that efforts are
being made to speed up the organ-
ization of the long-heralded Cuban
political machine, the United Party
of the Socialist Revolution (PUBS),
continue to appear in the press
and in speeches by Cuban leaders.
The development of the party,
interrupted during the crisis last
fall, has resumed.
"Model workers" are being
"elected't to FURS cells at work
centers and state farms throughout
the country. The several hundred
cells formed so far are. being or-
ganized into district committees.
The formal establishment of the
party, promised this year, is to
occur at a still unscheduled First
National Congress.
On 22 February Fidel Castro
spoke before what he described as
the first mass meeting of party
adherents. Although emphasizing
that the organization of the party
must move slowly, stressing quality
rather than quantity, he pointed
out that PUBS cells in the western
provinces include some 10,000 mem-
bers and that 30, 000 peasani;s in
Oriente Province had joined. Presi-
dent Dorticos, in a speech on 21
March to party members in Camaguey
Province, implied that the party
organization would not follow
Soviet or Chinese models but would
be fitted to Cuba's particular
needs. On 30 March Castro is
scheduled to address a PUBS meet-
ing in Matanzas Province.
Castro first formally announced
the formation of a single po-
]itical party during his "26th of
July" speech in 1961. Pending
its official formation, he ex-
plained, a provisional organ, the
Integrated Revolutionary Organ-
ization (OBI), would develop the
bases on which the single party
would be built. The ORI was oa-
ganized, beginning in the spring
of 1961, from three pre-existing
groups: the veteran Communists'
Popular Socialist Party (PSP);
Castro's 26th of July Movement
(M26J), and the 13th of March
Revolutionary Directorate (DB),
a student group which played an
independent role in the fight
against Batista,
During early 1962, this
"fusing of revolutionary forces"
and the methods of achieving it
were subjects of growing friction
between Castro and his "new" Com-
munists, on the one hand, and a
group of veteran PSP members, on
the other, The leader of the
latter group, long-time PSP
leader Anibal Escalante, was
subsequently expelled from the
ORI leadership and exiled. Since
then the remaining veteran Com-
munists appear to have accommo-
dated themselves to Castro's
leadership.
as we 11.
The PUBS is evidently being
organized from scratch--rather than
out of the ORI organization--and
in a manner designed to prevent
it from being influenced by any
organized remnants of former po -
]itical part~.es, including the
PSP. Veteran Communists, however,
are almost certain to play an
important role in the new party
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Cuba
CASTRO INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH JOURNALIST
Both Havana and Moscow were
evidently embarrassed by the
publication of an interview be-
tween Fidel Castro and French
journalist Claude Julien in the
Paris newspaper Le Monde on 22
and 23 March. Despite Castro's
"categorical refutation," the
interview as published is char-
acteristic of Castro, and there
is no reason to doubt that he
made the statements attributed
to him. These comments further
reveal his anger over the So-
viet missile pullout last fall,
his condemnation of the subser-
vience to Moscow of satellite
governments and parties, and
his resolve not to allow Cuba
to fall into such a role.
Moscow published only those
portions of Castro's refutation
reaffirming his friendship for
Khrushchev and the Soviet party
and government, and alleging
that his remarks had been dis-
torted by "pro-imperialist"
elements. The Pravda article
made no reference to Castro's
denial that he had ever made
any statement about Khrushchev
"in an unfriendly manner."
The Communist World
PENKOVSKY SPY TRIAL RUMORED IMMINENT IN MOSCOW
It is rumored in Moscow that
Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet official
accused last December of spying
for the West, will shortly stand
trial for treason. Several high-
ranking officials are said to be
implicated, and the case could
have repercussions in the highest
levels of the Soviet leadership.
The American Embassy believes
that some top-ranking political
figures could be manipulating
the affair to discredit or dis-
grace their rivals.
asserted on 15 Decem ear that
Penkovsky had given "foreign
knickknacks" to his superiors.
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The Communist World
First deputy premier and
party presidium member Aleksey
Kosygin is also among those al-
leged to have been "hurt" by the
case. His son-in=law, Dzherman
Gvishiani, was Penkovsky's imme-
diate superior in the USSR State
Committee for Coordination of
Scientific Research Work, and the
two are rumored to have been close
friends, As part of his normal
duties, Gvishiani has frequent
contacts with members of the West-
ern community in Moscow and he
has on occasion been relatively
outspoken in discussing Soviet
economic problems with them.
The Kremlin may not yet have
decided how to handle Penkovsky's
trial. Its seeming potential for
touching off a major political
scandal would suggest that he is
to be tried in camera and quietly
executed. If, on the other hand,
the current rumors hold true, his
alleged British accomplice will
be placed
same time
therefore
in the
and an
be re
dock
open
arded
at the
trial might
as un-
avoidable.
25X1
25X1
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THE MOSCOW-PEIPING DIALOGUE
Attempts by both the Chi-
nese and Soviet parties to dis-
pel the atmosphere of outright
hostility but at the same time
to demonstrate that they have
no intention of compromising
suggest that preparations for
bilateral talks are being made.
Immediately after the Chinese
on 13 March published the ex-
change of letters which agreed
in principle to such talks, So-
viet Ambassador to China Cher-
vonenko returned to Moscow,
perhaps to take part in prepar-
atory discussions.
There is some indication,
however, that the Soviets may
be attempting to stall these
initial sessions. Peiping on
25 March broadcast the text
of an Indonesian letter to
both the Chinese and Soviets
which welcomes the "fact" that
the two parties will hold bi-
lateral talks as an important
step toward a meeting of the
Communist parties of the world.
The letter also warned,
however, that the "modern
revisionists"--the Chinese
characterization of Khrushchev
and his followers--will "attempt
to frustrate the bilateral
talks." Khrushchev probably
would want to drag out
preparations as long as
possible, since his interest
lies more with keeping the
Chinese from attacking his
policies than with meeting with
them to resolve differences. In
publicizing the Indonesian letter
the Chinese may be prodding Mos-
cow to get on with the meeting.
Moscow has so far ignored the
letter.
While Khrushchev may not
succeed in dragging out the
preliminary discussions as long
as he would wish, he has suc-
ceeded, at least temporarily,
in quieting Peiping's direct
and nasty public attacks on the
Soviet party. Even this success
is only partial, however, As
a substitute for polemics, the
Chinese have begun publishing
a collection of 44 anti-Chinese
statements and articles by various
Communist parties. An editorial
note in People's Daily on 21
March accompany~n~'~e first
of these statements adapted the
gratingly arrogant holier-than-~
thou tone characteristic of the
Chinese in this dispute: "The
deeds of the Chinese Communist
Party suit its words," and there-
fore "this time we merely publish
your marvelous essays" while
reserving the right to answer
them at a time that suits Peiping
better.
While the Chinese continue
to build their case as the in-
jured party willing even in the
face of obvious provocation to
be reasonable, the Soviet Union
continues to publish statements
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which mildly, but firmly, up-
hold its basic positions in
the debate. The latest of
these ap,pearec~ on 26 March, in
a Pravda editorial eulogizing
Pa miro Togliatti on his 70th
birthday. Without attempting
to refute all the Chinese
strictures against the Italian
Communist leader, Pravda mani-
fests complete support~or the
Togliatti views Peiping had
condemned as erroneous. Peiping
ignored the occasion altogether.
ily be reversed.
direction of events could eas-
The Communist World
Thus, while the battle is
not fully joined, probing con-
tinues. At the moment, the
two parties are on the down-
swing in-one of the recurring
cycles of intensification and
relaxation of tension. There
has been no significant change
in the composition of the fac-
tors that continually bring
them close to the explosive
point, however, and the current
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PEIPING CALLS FOR MORE RATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING
Several recent editorials
in People's Daily indicate that
Peiping is still taking a
cautious approach in planning
means to revive the depressed
economy. ~No specific goals
have been announced, either for
this year or for the Third Five-
Year Plan which began in January.
The editorials do not sug-
gest any intent to use last
year's slight easing of economic
difficulties to justify another
crash economic program. On the
contrary, they explicitly con-
demn the waste involved in "ir-
rational" planning and direct all
enterprises "to prevent and
oppose" any tendency to ignore
quality in pursuit of quantita-
tive goals. They acknowledge
the need to set strict technical
standards, strengthen research
and design, and respect the
authority of scientific and
technical personnel.
Peiping's continued adher-
ence to its goal of autarky is
evident in the statement: "We
must reply on our own industry
to provide various raw materials,
supplies, and fuel as well as
machinery...for the moderniza-
tion of agriculture and national
defense."
Agricultural workers are
given the modest goal of an
aver-all increase in production,
and are enjoined to draw up their
plans within reasonable limits
and with local conditions in
mind. Better quality of farm
work is linked with improving
the operation and management of
the production teams, and "prac-
tical measures" for improving
their operation are stressed..
Communes are warned to respect
the rights of the production team
and to discuss with the members
proposals related to the state
plan.
While Peiping remains
cautiously optimistic--"our
difficulties are less than they
were before"--there is a strong
undercurrent of concern over the
summer harvest. The regime seems
to recognize the importance of
increased agricultural output as
a stimulant to the lagging
economy, shows no inclination
to risk the consequences of fur-
ther radical innovations in
rural organization, and has ex-
pressly prohibited allowing
any "undertakings or conferences"
to hamper performance of the
spring farming tasks. Although
further experiment and adjust-
ments in farm organization are
likely, the leadership must be
aware that any severe tightening
of controls could wipe out the 25X1
present narrow margin of food
supplies.
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The Communist World
PARTY-ARMY RELATIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
For the past two months the
Chinese Communists have devoted
more than customary attention to
questions of morale and political
reliability in the armed forces.
Military representatives have
been summoned to a series of "po-
litical work" conferences in Pei-
ping. Mao Tse-tung and other top
political leaders have addressed
the sessions or personally re-
ceived the delegates.
The longest conference was
a 25-day session in February-
which apparently centered on pro-
moting acceptance of party poli-
cies by the professional military
officers. Political education
was held to be the "foremost"
task in the armed forces, which
were exhorted to see that party
directives were "truly imple-
mented."
There is apparently consid-
erable dissatisfaction among mili-
tary officers about delays in
modernizing the armed farces.
This feeling seems to be strong-
est in the air force, where some
elements are said to favor a po-
litical accommodation with Mos-
cow in order to restore Soviet
military aid to China. Two po-
litical work conferences since
September were convened specifi-
cally for air force representa-
t Ives .
The party line verbally ac-
cepts the need to accelerate the
modernization program. However,
it was. made clear at the 25-day
session in February that modern-
ization could not go forward on
a crash basis. Officers and men
were urged to be "patient in
anticipation of further im-
provement."
There are also indications
of official concern over the evap-
oration of revolutionary elan
among enlisted personnel. Mast
of the men now in the armed forces
entered after the Korean war, lack
combat experience, and have been
affected in their attitudes by re-
ports of economic hardships suf-
fered by their families at home.
A campaign is under way to propa-
gandize the life and deeds of
Lei Feng, a model soldier said
to personify the best in Com-
munist revolutionary and patriotic
qualities.
The increased attention to
political indoctrination in the
armed forces coincides with a
"socialist education" campaign
among the population generally.
The program, therefore, may simply
ref lest a prudent concern about
slipping morale, rather than any
special anxiety about military
loyalty. Combat performance was
good during the border hostilities
with India last fall, and the armed
forces were fully responsive to
regime directives in terminating
the mass exodus to Hong Kong the
previous spring.
In the counts`y at large ,
the "socialist education" cam-
paign had reportedly resulted
in numerous arrests. It is
possible--although there is no
firm evidence on this point--
that some purging has also been
under way in the armed forces.
It was reported last September
that dissident air force offi-
cers were to be "dealt with"
shortly.
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~ ~~ ~s~ s
KOREAN MILITARY RULERS MANEUVER TO KEEP POWER
South Korean military
leaders are maneuvering for an
accommodation with civilian
politicians that will preserve
military domination of the gov-
ernment. The chiefs of the
armed services and some senior
generals have moved to take con-
trol of the situation. It is
not yet clear whether Pak Chong-
hui, heretofore leader of the
ruling junta, now is merely a
front or is still able to exert
s ignif icant influence .
but they continue to press the
regime to compromise. Otherwise,
they say, they will "resume the
struggle." Although the prin-
cipal civilian leaders, like
former president Yun po-Sun and
farmer prime minister Ho Chong,
appear firm in such a position
lesser figures faced with the ~
military's determination to
retain control may choose to
accept whatever deal they can
get rather than be completely
shut out of the government.
The regime intends to use
the conference of civilian and
military leaders that began on
27 March to arrange a coalition
that will appear to broaden sup-
port for the junta. The military
rulers feel that this would
allow them to remain in power
and appease foreign critics.
The acting foreign minister
claims that the regime's plans
are flexible and that the period
of extended military rule map be
only two or three years rather
than the four originally envis-
aged in the 16 March announcement
by Pak which set off the current
maneuvering. Spokesmen for the
regime also are taking the line
that an interim government--with
civilian representation--is
necessary to maintain order and
lay the foundation for "true
democracy's in South Korea.
The politicians continue
to push for a return to civil-
ian government this year. Pri-
vately they are pessimistic,
Meanwhile, the political
apparatus left behind by former
security chief Kim Chong-pil
when he was sent abroad last
February is working with the
military leaders to extend Pak's
rule. There is evidence, however,
that this cooperation may be
temporary and. that the military
leaders intend eventually to
destroy Kim's organization.
Same reports suggest that
the general public is willing
to accept a continuation of
military rule. While generally
favoring civilian government,
most Koreans at this point
appear more concerned that
stability be preserved.. Thus
far small protest demonstrations
organized by the politicians
have generated little enthusi-
asm and have been easily con-
trolled. The police have
avoided brutal tactics which
could create martyrs and inflame
public sentiment.
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~'' SECRET
Asia-Africa
COMMUNIST THREAT TO LAOTIAN NEUTRALISTS CONTINUES:
Relations between neutral-
ist and Pathet Laa forces on
the Plaine des Jarres remain
strained as the pro-Communists
continue to improve their mili-
tary posture and to interdict
neutralist supplies coming from
North Vietnam.
Recent reports indicate
that the Pathet Lao forces
located east of the Plaine des
Jarres have been augmented by
the arrival of several hundred
North Vietnamese troops. While
the deployment of such limited
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l=
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Ban Sen Louang ~~ Ban Hine'
.,~
-,f The Thom
\-
Road Track or trail
Airfield
29 MARCH 1999
STATUTE MILES 30
numbers does not appear to
presage a major Pathet Lao
military move, it suggests a
heightened Pathet Lao concern
that deteriorating relations
with the neutralists may result
in open military clashes.
Neutralist Commander Kong
Le has requested Souvanna to
push for an inspection by the
International Control Commission
(ICC) of the area east of the
Plaine des Jarres near Ban Ban.
He probably hopes to inhibit
aggressive moves by the Pathet
Lao and to compel a with-
drawal of North Vietnamese
units .
Souvanna, however, has
delayed initiating any formal
action, apparently in an of -
fort to avoid aggravating re-
lations with North Vietnam,
which repeatedly has denied
that any of its forces remain
in Laos. There are indica-
tions, hawever, that the ICC
itself will initiate such an
investigation should Sou-
vanna fail to x~ress for one.
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SOUTH VIETNAMESE DISCONTENT WITH DIEM'S RULE
Discontent with President
Diem's authoritarian rule con-
tinues rife among politically
aware Vietnamese in Saigon and
renewed plotting against his
government is rumored. Despite
the suppression of any organized
opposition activity, Diem is
said to live in constant fear
of a coup. He and his influ-
ential brother Nhu believe that
criticism from the American
press and US officialdom is
abetting internal dissension,
An anti-Communist com-
mittee in Saigon was attempting
to enlist some American support
for the replacement of Diem or
at least for the elimination
of Nhu's influence. One exile
group has boasted that "harm-
less"grenades will soon be ex-
ploding daily in Saigon, similar
to one which scattered anti-Diem
propaganda leaflets in January.
to publication of the Mansfield
report, resenting particularly
what they regard as its unfavor-
able comparison of South Vietnam
with neutralist Cambodia. The
government-controlled National
Assembly has issued a comment
labeling the report "unfair."
The government is also reported
planning to shift personnel in
its Washington embassy as a re-
sult of "strained relations"
with the US.
The brothers apparently
continue to harbor suspicions25X1
that the abortive paratroop
coup in November 1960 and the
air force bombing of Diem's
palace in February 1962 resulted
from direct or indirect American
influence. Nhu is reported to
have commented recently that the
South Vietnamese Army has come
increasingly under the influence
of American advisers, many of
whom he alleged were critical
of the regime
Diem and Nhu have privately
indicated extreme sensitivity
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~ ~.7L'i CwlC[~ l ~~
UAR, SYRIA, AND IRAQ FEDERATION TALKS IN RECESS
Negotiations on the estab-
lishment of some sort of federa-
tion between the UAR, Syria, and
Iraq are moving slowly.
The talksAwhich began in
Cairo more than two weeks ago,
now are in their second recess
and are not schedule
sume until 6 April.
The Iraqi foreign minister
believes
a w a Nasir rea y wants as
a prerequisite to federation is
control of the Syrian Govern-
ment. He says that the Iraqi
and Syrian Baathists, on the
other hand, are pressing for a
confederation among equals, in
which the central authority would
coordinate military operations
and foreign affairs while the
three states would retain their
independence of action in most
other fields.
Intensive political ma-
neuvering is continuing in
Syria itself. The military
commander in chief, General
Atasi, who is committed neither
to Nasir nor to the Baath, has
been named president of the
National Council of the Revolu-
tionary Command. This makes
him the most powerful man in
the government and, to a con-
siderable extent, diminishes
the leading role of the Baath
party in general and Prime
Minister Bitar in particular.
25X1
25X1
The Algerian Government,
while joining in t-he public
clamor for Arab unity, has indi-
cated that its own domestic con-
siderations will prevent it from
participating in any federation
in the early stages. A 24-man
Algerian delegation headed by
the defense minister arrived in
Cairo on 24 March and has held 25X1
protracted discussions with Nasir
and other top Egyptian officials.
The Algerians have made a point
of announcing to the press that
they consider moves toward unity
in the Arab Mahgreb entirely
compatible with the drive toward
greater Arab unity. The dele-
gation plans. later to visit Iraq,
Syria, and Yemen, the other
"liberated Arab states."
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KING HUSAYN APPOINTS NEW JORDANIAN CABINET
King Husayn appointed a
new government on 27 March in
an attempt to brace Jordan for
repercussions of the recent
coups in Iraq and Syria.
Husayn is well aware of the
threat those events indirectly
posed for Jordan. rie also was
aware that the government of
Prime Minister Tal had lost
much favor within the country
because of some of its policies,
including Jordanian support of
the Yemeni royalists.
The King therefore decided
that the situation required a
government which he felt would
be better able to maintain firm
control of the country in the
event of serious trouble.
The new cabinet is led
by the able, if unpopular,
Samir Rifai--a 64-year-old vet-
eran of five previous terms as
prime minister. The designated
deputy is a year older than
Rifai and is also a conservative,
former prime minister. Four
of the ministers are holdovers
fram Tal's cabinet.
The change is unlikely to
absolve Husayn of his owri re-
sponsibility for the unpopular
policies associated with Tal.
Dissatisfaction has grown and
is said to be so widespread
among junior officers in the
army that almost any coup at-
tempt would receive their
support.
Thus far there is no firm
evidence of imminent trouble.
However, the general atmosphere
and reports of plotting have
prompted the regime to take
precautionary measures. Fifty-
?two officers of doubtful loyalty
recently were retired from the
OPPOSITION DIFFERENCES HELPING CONGOLESE PREMIER
The disagreements which are
dividing the various groups in
the Congolese Parliament are
improving Prem~.er Adoula's chances
of survival, although he is
not yet out of danger. The
eagerness of individual deputies
to acquire ministerial off ice
has diminished the opposition
drive to overthrow him, and
moderate elements now are will-
ing to support him in exchange
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~"~ SECRET
for substantial cabinet repre-
sentation.
The premier continues to
assure US off ieials he will
have a comfortable parliamen=
tary majority when he completes
the reshuffling of his cabinet.
On 24 March he said he was in
the "last phase" of his nego-
tiations, and that he would
not include extremist follow-
ers of the late Patrice Lumumba
or his political heir, Antoine
Gizenga. Ambassador Gullion
believes that a showdown now is
less imminent, but thinks the
premier could still miscalculate.
Adoula's close advisers,
moreover, are making it clear
that if he allows the opposition
to pick them off one by one,
they will force President Kasa-
vubu to dissolve Parliament.
Prime opposition targets are
Foreign Minister Bomboko and
the tough Suretd chief, Victor
Nendaka. Army Chief General
Mobutu has apparently left the
impression with opposition
leaders who sounded him out on
the army's position that he
would intervene to support Adoula
Minister of Defense Anany also
has circulated reports that he
would mount a coup if there were
any danger that extremists would
come to power.
by Parliament. Katanga's Moise
Tshombd has submitted his own
draft constitution--providing
for an extremely weak form of
federation--and the centralist-
minded group is reportedly con-
templating submitting a third.
The resolutions passed at a
recent conference of leaders
from the various provinces sug-
gests that Tshombd's proposed
"league of states" strikes the
most responsive chord among them.
Even though his provincial
position seems secure, Tshombd
is touring South Katanga prob-
ably to bolster support as a
prelude to the session of the
Katanga assembly opening on
1 April. It is not yet clear
if the Balubakat deputies from
North Katanga--who now have
joined Tshombd in an alliance
for the reunification of Katanga
Province--will participate.
Although the weight of evi-
dence suggests that Tshombd still
hopes to obtain his objectives 25X1
by bargaining with Leopoldville,
. he may well secede again once UN 25X1
forces have been sufficiently
If Adoula survives, he faces
a difficult time in getting the
UN-drafted constitution approved
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'~ J'.L'(.~'1{L'1' `~ Asia-Africa
STALEMATE IN TOGO MAY BE BREAKING
Provisional President Gru-
nitsky continues to encounter
difficulties in his efforts to
restore legality in Togo and
gain foreign recognition. He
has, however, been encouraged
by some recent developments,
including firmer assurances of
French support. The promised
elections and a simultaneous
constitutional referendum now
have been set for 5 May.
Considering his meager as-
sets, Grunitsky has maneuvered
adroitly amidst the conflicting
internal and foreign pressures
unleashed by the assassination
of president Olympio in January.
While his coalition government
lacks cohesion, he appears to
have an effective grip on civil
functions and is taking stranger
measures to curb the troublesome
military elements wha staged the
coup and retain ultimate power.
Finance Minister Meatchi,
who is believed to favor close
ties with Ghana, has so far
made no move to take over. He
seems to be concentrating for
the present on building up his
following, perhaps with Ghanaian
help, among fellow northerners.
Grunitsky's position re-
cently improved when segments
of Olympio's Togolese Unity (UT)
party publicly endorsed Grunit-
sky's plan for single-list elec-
tions in which assembly seats
~Frould be distributed equally
among Togo's four parties. How-
ever, the UT's new leaders, con-
sisting of younger elements re -
sponsive to Minister of Labor
Kutuklui, appear determined to
sabotage the single-list con-
cept. Kutuklui has indicated
to US officials that his group
is playing for time and that
its resistance has been stif-
fened by the sympathetic hear-
ing Olympio's son Bonito and
other UT exiles have received
in Guinea, Nigeria, and Ivory
Coast.
Kutuklui's attitude lends
credence to assertions by Bo-
nito that-the two of them are
planning a countercoup to
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restore the UT to power, Such a
move would not now seem to have
much prospect of success.
No African state besides
Ghana and Senegal has recognized
the Togo regime de jure, but
the 13 moderate French-speaking
states comprising the Afro-
Malagasy Union (UANt) at their
recent "summit" meeting reportedly
gave President Maga of Dahomey
a wide mandate to support Gru-
nitsky. Subsequently, Maga
sent his commerce minister and
cabinet director, who helped
install Grunitsky in January,
back to Loma with instructions
to stay there pending a solu-
tiDn to the basic problem of
.bringing the freewheeling mil-
itary under control.
present indications are that
most of the UAM leaders regard
acceptable elections as the
essential precondition for recog-
nition and will not insist on
punishment of Olympio's assassins
as urged by Ivory Coast Presi-
dent Houphouet-Boigny. In any
event, the possibility of foreign
military intervention in support
of a countercoup attempt seems
to have diminished.
Although little hard infor-
mation is available on current
Ghanaian activities in Togo,
Accra is presumed to be contin-
uing its efforts to bring about
the union bet~veen the two coun-
tries Long sought by Nkrumah.
Grunitsky, while seeking improved
relations, has successfully
fended off most Ghanaian over-
tures, including demand
mixed border t~atrols.
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25X1
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federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
~,) r,- ~'
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JLT !.w L[!'~ l `III
UN SHOWDOWN LOOMS ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA QUESTION
Britain's refusal to press
Southern Rhodesia further to
allow increased African partic-
ipation in the colony's govern-
ment is likely to draw new at-
tacks from the Afro-Asian and.
Communist blocs at the UN. Even
some Western-oriented delegates
see little justification far the
uncompramising stand taken by
the British delegate in the 24-
member Decolonization Committee
on 21 March.
Landon argues that the UN
is precluded by Article 2 of
its Charter from interfering in
the damestic affairs of any
state, and that the British
Government has gradually re-
linquished jurisdiction over
internal matters in Southern
Rhodesia since the promulgation
of the 1923 constitution which
gave the colony same degree of
self-government.
tion with South Africa's apart-
heid government. The British
also fear that Field's govern-
ment, if sufficiently provoked,
might embarrass London by ask-
ing for immediate independence.
The British have long held that
their ability to withhold inde-
pendence acts as a lever on the
whi+_e-supremacist government.
Unless the British make
some conciliatory gesture to-
ward the Afro-Asian group, how-
ever, it is likely that the
Committee of 24 will rifer the
issue to a larger forum in the
UN where Asian and African rep-
resentation is substantial. The
Tunisian delegate on the com-
mittee believes that the Security
Council should take the formal-
istic step of designating the
question as a "potential threat
to the peace." Such a move
would encounter a UK veto.
Asian and African delegates
insist, however, that London
has the power to revise that
constitution to provide for
greater African participation
in the government. Britain is
resisting pressure from other
Western delegations to make at
least a token effort at compli-
ance. It is motivated to a
large extent by fear of pushing
Southern Rhodesian Prime Minis-
ter Field into closer coopera-
The Soviet delegate on 19
March urged that the special ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly
set for May (to discuss UN fi-
nances) include on its agenda
the question of immediate inde-
pendence for an African-doma.-
na~ted Southern Rhodesia. The
USSR succeeded in a similar
tactic last spring by raising
the Rhodesian question during a 2sx1
special. session on independence
for Rwanda and Burundi.
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Europe
The proposed 29 March
foreign ministers' meeting of
the West European Union has
been scuttled by France's
opposition to including on the
agenda any discussion of in-
ternal European problems. This
means the collapse for the
present of efforts by other
EEC countries to find a forum
for continuing discussions
concerning British membership
in the Common Market.
Although the issue of
EEC links with Britain has also
been hashed over by speakers at
this week's session of the
EEC's European Parliament, the
discord between France and the
other Common Market countries
now is focusing increasingly
on problems associated with
the forthcoming; world-wide trade
and tariff negotiations under
the US Trade Expansion Act
(TEA),
France insists that fur-
ther internal progress within
the EEC is necessary before
the Common Market can partici-
pate in negotiations under the
TEA (see special report on
French economic policy toward
the Common Market and the US).
The Netherlands, Belgium, and
Italy are trying to turn this
argument around by refusing to
cooperate on internal EEC mat-
ters of interest to France un-
less Paris agrees to TEA talks.
West Germany's position is
equivocal: it has openly ex-
pressed support for the TEA,
but in some internal EEC meet-
ings has seemed reluctant to
oppose the French.
A key issue in the present
argument is the change of the
member states' tariffs which,
long before the present dissen-
sion arose, was scheduled to
occur on 1 July 1963. France
has been insisting that on this
date the six nations, as planned,
make the second of three ad-
justments toward a common exter-
nal tariff. This means that
France's generally high tariffs
would be lowered another third
of the way toward the common
level which the EEC hopes to
achieve by 196?. Benelux and
Germany, with generally lower
tariffs, would have to raise
their import duties another
third of the way toward the
common level. Italy, whose
tariffs lie between the high
and low extremes, would also
make appropriate adjustments.
The Belgians and the Dutch,
claiming to have German support,
are proposing that they and the
Germans adjust their tariffs
upward by one third less 20
percent, in anticipation that
the general level of the EEC's
common external tariff would
be reduced at least that much
through negotiations under the
TEA. Since France's tariffs
start at the high end of the
scale, they would have to be
reduced by one third plus 20
percent of the difference be-
tween present and planned future
levels.
An official of the West
German delegation to the EEC
believes France might agree to
this proposal so that the EEC
could continue its "forward
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JL (.rl[l~ l
Europe
progress." Paris might also
hope that, by agreeing to the
extra 20-percent cut on French
tariffs, it could gain support
from its partners against the
much larger 50-percent cut de-
sired by the US under the TEA.
last week essentially marked
time. Until the EEC, as one
of the world's largest trading
units, settles on a policy,
preparations for negotiations
under the TEA with other European
countries, Japan, and numerous
less developed countries will
Preparatory meetings of
make slow ro ress.
25X1
working party in Geneva
25X1
DE GAULLE'S PERSONAL POLITICAL PLANS
There is increasing evi-
dence that, at the age of 72,
General de Gaulle is projecting
his personal plans at least
through France's next presiden-
tial election in 1965, and per-
haps through the seven years of
another presidential term. He
is apparently considering a ref-
erendum on creation of a vice-
presidency to share some of the
chores which now devolve on the
president. Such a plan suggests
an interest in remaining in of-
fice beyond 1965.
De Gaulle is said to favor
former premier Michel Debrd as
vice president. Ultimately,
however, he wishes Fremier
Georges Pompidou to succeed
him at the Elysee Palace.
Under De Gaulle's plan,
the vice president would assume
the functions of the president
only on an interim basis. As
under the present system, which
makes the president of the Senate
the interim successor, new
presidential elections would be
called within 20-50 days after
removal of the president.
A decision by De Gaulle to
remain in active political life,
which his son-in-law and mili-
tary aide, Col. Alain Boissieu,
has implied has in fact been
made, would deeply affect the
plans and prospects of the
non-Communist opposition. Many
of its leaders have looked to
the 1965 presidential elections
as a catalyst in the formation
of a democratic opposition.
While some of them still think
in terms of traditional party
positions, others have been
aiming at a broad political
movement which would avoid left-
right labels.
These leaders generally as-
sumed, however, that their can-
didate would not be up against
De Gaulle personally. If De
Gaulle remains at the helm,
their hope of creating a polit-
ical system based on two non-
communist parties would be se-
verel weakened.
25X1
25X1
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Europe
FRENCH COAL STRIKE ENTERS FIFTH WEEK
Having failed to end the
four-week-old strike in the
nationalized coal industry by
an improved wage offer, the
French Government reportedly
is resigned to letting it drag
on for several more weeks. Paris
remains determined to hold the
line against inflation and hopes
pressures will mount to force
the miners to accept terms only
slightly better than the 8-per-
cent wage boost they have just
rejected. Their original de-
mand was for 11 percent.
The government based its
offer on the report of the
special committee it appointed
to study how far public sector
wages lagged behind private
industry, However, the unions
rejected the recommended time-
table for implementing the
offered wage boost, and the
government refused to discuss
union demands for a reduced work-
week and longer vacations. The
unions began to use their joint
strike fund only this week, and
officials estimate it will be
sufficient to finance the strike
for another month.
The natural gas workers
have ended their strike on the
basis of a management pledge to
grant them any benefits won by
the miners, and this development
could put pressure on the miners
to come to terms with the govern-
ment. Sporadic strikes are con-
tinuing in the public sector,
however, and utilities workers
on 28 March began an eight-day
series of harassing walkouts.
There is some talk of a strike
throughout the nationalized
industries, but union leaders
reportedly believe that only
the miners are willing to go
beyond a 48-hour strike. The
government expects strikes and
agitation in the other nation-
alized industries to continue
until summer.
The coal strike is begin-
ning to affect industrial pro-
duction; certain factories in
the north are already curtailing
operations. Work stoppages by
the electricity workers are in-
terrupting plant scheduling,
and dislocation in industry is
occurring as a result. The
government is confident that
the progressive slowdown of
production and the gradual dis-
location of the economy resulting
from a prolonged strike will seri-
ously erode the miners' public
support.
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UL' l.I1l~J 1 ~
Europe
NORWAY SEEKS CONTINUED US MILITARY AID
The Norwegian Government
faces problems in financing its
proposed defense program for
1964-68 arising from the antie-
ip ated gradual decline in US
military assistance over the
next five years. Last week it
sent Foreign Minister Lange and
Defense Minister Harlem to Wash-
ington to consult with US offi-
cials concerning prospects for
obtaining supplementary US as-
sistance to meet Norway's needs.
The government plans to con-
tinue to acquire modern equip-
ment for the armed forces and to
make a greater effort to meet
its NATO force goals. However,
increased outlays in the public
investment and social welfare
sectors are already a strain on
the economy. Government offi-
cials maintain that as a result
of the scheduled phaseout of US
military assistance--which has
amounted to almost $84 million
annually aver the past decade--
Norway will be unable to meet
its defense commitments. They
reject as economically and po-
litically infeasible any pro-
posals to increase defense spend-
ing sufficiently to offset the
loss of US aid.
The Norwegians are primarily
interested at this time in getting
increased assistance for the c?n-
struction of naval craft such
as escort vessels, large sub-
marine~chasers, and motor gun-
boats, since actual construction
costs of these items have con-
siderably exceeded estimates.
The other major problem concerns
aircraft modernization and the
choice of a fighter a ircraft
best suited. to Norway's needs
and financial means.
Both Lange and Harlem dis-
claimed any interest by Norway
in participating in the proposed
NATO multilateral nuclear force
and questioned its need. Fol-
lowing their return to Oslo, they
told the press that Norway's
long-established policy of not
permitting foreign troops or nu-
clear weapons on its territory
in peacetime was understood
and accepted by the United
States.
AUSTRIAN COALITION FORMED AFTER LONG NEGOTIATIONS
The People's and Socialist
parties , of tex four months of some-
times bitter haggling, have
agreed to extend the coalition
which has ruled Austria since
World W~ r I I.. Vienna now can
come to grips with its most ur-
gent problem--reaching some per-
manent arrangement with the
European Common Market (EEC),
which accounts for over half of
Austria's foreign trade.
Under terms of the coali-
tion compromise, Socialist Bruno
Kreiskv remains as foreign
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Europe
minister, but has been shorn
of authority over the Common
Market question. Policy respon-
sibility for this matter has
been shifted to the People's
Party - controlled Trade Minis-
try, where it is likely to be
prosecuted with greater energy.
Kreisky has been blamed in
People's Party circles for the
lack of progress in Austrian-
EEC relations, and his depar-
ture became the principal aim
of the party.
Chancellor Gorbach's han-
dlir~gof the coalition talks never-
theless has resulted in a serious
rift in the People's Party,
which he heads . Party right-
wingers, angered by the reten-
tion of Kreisky, may make life
so difficult for Gorbach on mat-
ters other than the EEC issue
that he will retire well before
the expiration of his government's
four-year term.
A new test of strength between
the two coalition partners will
occur in the presidential elec-
tion of 28 April. Adolf Schaerf,
the popular Socialist incumbent,
is expected to defeat the re-
spected, but ailing ex-Chancellor
Julius Raab, and thus retain for
the Socialists an office they have
held since _1945.
Western Hemisphere
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?Western Hemisphere
LAG IN ARGENTINA'S ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS
Differences among the politi-
cal parties and the disruptive
tactics of the Peronists continue
to impede preparations for Argen-
tina's national elections scheduled
for 23 June. This lag is causing
marked unrest, which on 27 March
led Interior Minister Martinez,
chief architect of the government's
election plans, to proffer his
resignation.
Seven parties, including the
Peronists, have agreed in principle
to form a national front and to
select a common candidate for the
presidency. They are insisting,
however, that agreement be reached
on a program before the candidate
is selected. A still hotly debafied
issue is whether the government
should continue to maintain con-
tracts with foreign petroleum com-
panies--mainly U S firms--which
have greatly expanded production
since 1958.
There are also differences
within the parties over possible
candidates, especially with ex-
President Frondizi's Intransigent
Radical Civic Union (UCRI). The
new UCRI party president, Oscar
Alende, wants the candidacy, but
Frondizi fears this would diminish
his own future influence in the
party. Neither Frondizi nor
Peron, the two key figures in de-
ciding a possible front candidate,
has made his preferences public.
The role of the Peronists and
their Popular Union party continues
to worry some military and civilian
groups. On 8 March the Peronists
were awarded a court judgment giv-
ing their party legal status. The
navy issued a statement on 18
March asking the government
to appeal the electoral judge`s
decision, since the law bans
parties and candidates respon-
sive to Peron's personal leader-
ship. Subsequent army and air
force communiques, however, stated
that other legal safeguards
against a return of Peronism made
such action unnecessary. The
army and air force statements
attempted to minimizandlt~e navy
antes with the navy,
subsequently issued another re-
lease accepting the government's
decision.
Despite such conciliatory
government action, Peronist leader
Framini organized a meeting on 18
March at which he described Per-
onism as a revolutionary movement
which aimed to overthrow the
"oligarchy" and establish a new
social structure. The meeting
featured all the symbols of the
Peron dictatorship--pictures of
Peron and the late Evita, Peranist
Bangs, and slogans. Ambassador
McClintock interprets this as an
obvious attempt by Framini. to
provoke repressive action and
commented that the government had
no alternative but to order his
arrest. Framini was permitted to
elude capture, however, since the
government did not wish to make
a martyr of him.
Framini is an important leader
among organized labor, where Per-
onist strength is concentrated.
Whether or not his action-was co-
ordinated with other Peronist lead-
ers, it raises further doubt about
the durability of their agreements
with the government and their in-
tentions with re~nect to the na-
tional front.
s~ ~~
29 Mar 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 27
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~r
ECUADOR
snwro Daalwco~~
~e 105 COLORADOS
QUEYEDO
LATACUNG0.
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? Site Reguenlly reported as locale of Dlanned
Communist guerrilla activity.
`} Suspected iaule for smuggling guerrila materiel,
--- Road r-+ + Railroad
`~?RIOBAMBA
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sEC~ET
Western Hemisphere
POLAND AND LATIN AMERICA
The Gomulka regime in Po-
land--at a time when its re-
lations with Cuba are stagnant
--is attempting to strengthen
and expand its presence else-
where in Latin America. It has
already established 15 diplo-
matic, consular, and permanent
trade missions with-chief bases
at Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro,
and Buenos Aires. The Soviet
Union has only six diplomatic
and trade establishments in
the entire region.
Poland began its drive in
1959 by creating a separate
department for Latin American
affairs in its Foreign Ministry.
In most Latin American countries
except Cuba, the Poles based
their diplomatic drive on the
good will built up by the rela-
tively large number of Polish
immigrants and on Poland's out-
wardly good relations with the
United States. Until recently
economic incentives were a sec-
ondary factor.
During 1960 and 1961 Po-
land succeeded in elevating its
legations in Brazil and Vene-
zuela to embassies. During 1962
a third Polish consulate in Bra-
zil was opened at Porto Alegre,
and an embassy representative
established an office in Brasilia.
Last year, Poland dispatched
its first resident trade mission
to Haiti, when it became apparent
that President Duvalier's rela-
tions with the United States
were deteriorating. Reportedly
the trade commissioner is seek-
ing to substitute bloc petroleum
sources and. a Polish refinery
far US supplies of oil and
petroleum products.
Despite strenuous efforts,
Poland's trade with Latin Amer-
ica dropped from 4 percent of
its total trade in 1955 to 3.1
percent in 1961. Poland has
provided Brazil with $70 million
in credits for Palish goads and
now is negotiating another such
deal with Brazil and similar
arrangements with Chile and Haiti.
The Poles probably will renew
credit proposals previously re-
jected by other Latin American
countries.
Exchanges of high-level
personages, as-well as of par-
liamentary, business, student,
and cultural delegations, have
been stepped up in the past two
years. The Polish and Brazilian
foreign ministers have exchanged
visits, and President Goulart
reportedly plans to visit Poland
in June. Polish Premier Cyrankie-
wicz recently completed a week-
long good-will visit to Mexico,
which will be reciprocated by
President Lopez Mateos from 1
to 3 April.
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?.~- SECRET ``~
Western Hemisphere
In sharp contrast, none of
the high-ranking personages of
the Castro regime, who have
traveled extensively in Eastern
Europe, have ever been in Poland.
After a June 1962 trip to Cuba,
during which he reportedly urged
moderation on Castro, Polish
Foreign Minister Rapacki bit-
terly said that nobody can con-
trol" the courseT,of the Cuban
revolution. No Cuban ambassador
has been stationed in Warsaw
since August 1962, when Salvador
Massip was officially recalled.
Poland probably considers
its trade with Cuba burdensome
and unprofitable, but it is
obliged to fill its share of bloc
commitments. Total trade in
1960 amounted to $14 million;
in 1961 it rose to a high of
$4? million, which the Poles
tried desperately to conceal
from the US; and in 1962 it
probably fell about $22 million.
Hard negotiations on a 1963
trade protocol began in October.
Despite a meeting between Gomulka
and the Cuban negotiator--which
apparently was less than cordial
--no agreement has yet been
reached.
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