SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YUGOSLAV INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000040005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

`W
12 April 1963
OCI No-0275/63D
Copy No. 73
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
YUGOSLAV INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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12 April 1963
In accepting President Lopez Mateos' invita-
tion to visit Mexico, probably this fall, Tito
seems to have set the stage for his long-contem-
plated tour of Latin America. His goals, like those
of earlier Yugoslav emissaries, will be to develop
broader economic and political ties and promote
collaboration with the nonaligned states in inter-
national affairs. Apparently no decision has been
made on whether to include Cuba in his itinerary.
Tito's Trip
Tito has long been an
advocate of personal diplomacy
at the highest level. He hopes
during this trip, to establish
markets for Yugoslav industrial
products which generally cannot
compete in or are barred from
established trading areas. To
this end, he is probably pre-
pared to extend modest credits
for purchase of Yugoslav goods.
Tito will also attempt to
win greater Latin American
collaboration with the non-
aligned states, thus broadening
the group which has made it
possible for Belgrade to play
an international role out of
all proportion to its economic
and military power.
As a Communist proselyt-
izer, he may also suggest that
some facets of Yugoslavia's
distinctive variety of "social-
ism" are worthy of study for
adaptation to Latin American
conditions.
In addition to Mexico,
Tito has in hand invitations
from Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile,
and Yu,-oslav diplomats are
angling for invitations from
the US, Venezuela, and probably
other countries in the Western
Hemisphere. His coming to the
US, however, would proably be
contingent on Washington's
reversal of last year's denial
of most-favored-nation trading
status to Yugoslavia.
Pending developments in
US-Yugoslav relations and the
possibility of visits to the
strong anti-Castro Latin American
states, Belgrade has apparently
not finally decided whether
Tito should seek to revive an
old invitation to visit Cuba.
In January, Yugoslav officials
claimed that Tito had a Cuban
invitation but was holding off
acceptance. When the Western
press reported in early April
that Tito would visit Cuba,
Belgrade would deny only that
any announcement of a visit
had been made.
The Tito regime views
Latin America as the colonial
appendage of the US, but an
area in which the forces of
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"independence and progress" are
beginning to assert themselves.
. Although Yugoslavia had
sought to develop trade with,
Lat?n America as early as 1950,
serious Yugoslav interest dates
from 1959, when Belgrade--again
feuding with the Soviet bloc--
was trying to increase the inter-
national activity of the non-
aligned and underdeveloped states.
In April 1959, Belgrade
granted its first credit to a
Latin American state--a $23.7-mil-
lion loan to Argentina for pur-
chase of Yugoslav ships. In
June, cabinet member Vladimir
Popovic began a good-will tour
that eventually carried him to
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela,
Honduras, Chile, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia,
Colombia, and Haiti. Popovic
attempted primarily to stimu-
ate interest in trade and cul-
tural exchanges.
A trade union delegation
headed by Svetozar Vukmanovic-
Tempo, the Tito regime's labor
czar and trouble shooter, went
to nine Latin American states in
October 1959, talked with many
high officials, and found "great
interest" in Yugoslavia's foreign
policies and domestic insti-
tutions.
By late 1959, Tito appar-
ently had decided that Yugo-
slavia's interests in Latin
America could best be served
through close association with
Castro's Cuba. This decision
was apparently reached on the
basis of Vladimir Popovic's
stay in Cuba and "Che" Guevara's
August stopover in Belgrade while
on an international good-will
tour. A very brief era of good
feeling was ushered in by Yugo-
slav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic's
October visit to Havana. In
January, 1960, Cuban Foreign
Minister Roa paid a visit to Bel-
grade, at the end of which Tito
accepted an invitation to visit
Cuba and extended an invitation
to Castro.
The Roa visit was both the
high point and the beginning of
the end of the Yugoslav-Cuban
flirtation. The Yugoslavs
claimed privately that they found
the Cubans personally distasteful,
Cuban Foreign Minister Roa (left) with Tito
and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic (far
right) at Belgrade in January 1960.
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and the Cubans were disappoint-
ed over Belgrade's lack of en-
thusiasm for their scheme to
convene an international con-
ference of underdeveloped
countries. Although a cultural
agreement was successfully
negotiated in May, the Cubans
claimed the Yugoslavs were
difficult and unsympathetic
when arranging a trade agree-
ment in July. Cuban diplomats
in Belgrade soon began publicly
complaining about Yugoslav
treatment, particularly in re-
gard to housing..
The major blow to Cuban-
Yugoslav relations awaited the
September UN General Assembly
session, attended by many heads
of state, during which Castro
reportedly scheduled and then
canceled several meetings with
Tito.
finding a close friend in Latin
America were quickly revived in
the person of Brazil's mercurial
President Quadros, who espoused
quasineutralist foreign policies.
In early March 1961, Tito ac-
cepted Quadros' invitation to
visit Brazil and apparently
several other countries.
By the end of April, how-
ever, Tito had decided to go only
to Brazil to avoid raising the
question of a stopover in Cuba.
The scheduling of the visit be-
came additionally complicated
by the planning of a nonaligned
heads-of-state conference for
Belgrade in September. In August,
Quadros resigned and the trip
was off.
Yugoslav Emigres
Cuban attendance at Yugo-
slavia's national day reception
in Havana the following November
was sparse. In January 1961,
Hoy, the Cuban Communist news-
paper, began attacking Yugo-
slavia, and Yugoslavia's propa-
ganda support for Castro began
to falter. Since that time,
Yugoslavia has continued to
defend Castro's right to rule
in Cuba, but relations have
been cool.
Tito First Plans a Trip
If Castro was a disappoint-
ment for Tito, his hopes for
Another factor affecting
Tito's decision to limit his
1961 itinerary may have been
the threat to his personal
safety posed by emigres and
Latin Americans of Yugoslav de-
scent who are inimical to the
present regime in Belgrade.
These groups are probably an
even more important factor in
his present trip plans.I
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Nonalignment
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and Ecuador sent only ob-
servers.
When Tito, Nasir, and
Sukarno'decided to convene what
eventually became the Belgrade
conference in September 1961,
they had hoped to be able to
draw at least some Latin American
states into closer collaboration,
if not outright association,
with their nonaligned group.
However, except for Cuba, which
proved to be a disappointment,
no Latin American country
played an active role in the
proceedings. Bolivia, Brazil,
Tito with Cuban President Dorticos
during the conference of "nonaligned"
states in September 1961.
The actions of the Cubans
at both the'preparatory and
full-dress conferences made a
bad impression on most oi' the
participants, including the
already disenchanted Yugoslavs.
Yugoslavia's next great
venture in the sphere of non-
alignment, the Economic Con-
ference of Developing States
.held at Cairo in July 1962, got
a better response because of
its "underdeveloped" rather
than "nonaligned" context.
Although Mexico declined to
cosponsor the conference, it
did send a delegation, as did
Bolivia, Cuba, and Brazil;
Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and
Venezuela sent observers. Bel-
grade sent Foreign Minister
Popovic on a tour of Brazil,
Chile, Bolivia, and Mexico in
May to drum up support and also
to pave the way for Tito's
coming tour.
As a result of the Cairo
conference, an international
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Cartoon from Topaze (Santiago de Chile), 15 March 1963. Francisco Bulnes,
president of the Conservative Party of Chile who led the opposition against
extending an invitation to Tito, is portrayed as a friar, saying: "It seems that
I am more papist than the Pope." I
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trade conference is being ar-
ranged under UN auspices. The
preparatory meetings, at which
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El
Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay have
representatives and Chile an ob-
server, are giving Belgrade yet
another opportunity to increase
contacts with Latin America.
Belgrade's latest project
is to convene an international
conference of neutral-leaning
trade unions later this year.
At the first of two preparatory
meetings--held at Casablanca
in January--the Communist- in-
fluenced'Chilean trade union
organization (CUTCh) was por-
trayed as the regional repre-
sentative from Latin America.
The major Yugoslav effort to
draw Latin Americans in on this
project came in December 1961
and January 1962, when a high-
ranking Yugoslav trade union
delegation visited Chile, Brazil,
Argentina, and Uruguay.
The Adverse Impact
The Latin Americans have
apparently been impressed some-
what by Yugoslavia's rapid
economic development and its
far-ranging international activ-
ity. On the other hand, they
have been alienated by the
actions of some of its repre-
sentatives.
Foreign Minister Popovic,
for example, almost ruined his
May 1962 good-will trip to Chile
and Bolivia by refusing to
answer questions on Cuba, Berlin,
and other East-West issues at a
press conference on his last
day. He also apparently lost
his temper and gave sarcastic
answers to questions on the
reincarceration of Milovan
Djilas, Yugoslavia's most vocal
and important dissident.
In Bolivia, he upset the
public by insisting on the arrest
of a Yugoslav refugee who is a
well-known Bolivian soccer player,
trainer, and coach at the
University of Santa Cruz--soccer
players are virtually national
heroes.
Yugoslavia's recent rap-
prochement with the Soviet
bloc may also lessen its attrac-
tiveness to Latin Americans-
Trade
Yugoslav efforts to build
up trade with Latin America have
not achieved. any appreciable
success. In'1956 Belgrade sent
3.5 percent of its exports to
and obtained 2.8 percent of its
imports from Latin America; the
comparable percentages in 1962
were only 4.6 and 2.3.
Total value of trade
ranged from a peak of over
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$38,000,000 in 1955, down to
around $11,000,000 in 1957 and
up to $52,995,000 in 1962.
Trade with Latin America
has normally been a losing
proposition for Belgrade. Its
annual deficit rose from around
$2,000,000 in 1955 to approxi-
mately $13,000,000 in 1961.
The tables were finally reversed
in 1962, when a $11,926,000
surplus was registered.
Brazil and Argentina have
consistently been Yugoslavia's
biggest trading partners in
Latin America.
Only a relatively small
share of Yugoslavia's foreign
purchase of
Yugoslav capital
equipment,
and Bolivia is con-
sidering an
offer of
$5,000,000
for a hydroelectric
project.
assistance program has been
directed to Latin America. In
addition to the April 1959
credit to Argentina, Brazil
has accepted $5,000,000 for
Prospects
Any future gains in Yugo-
slav influence with the Latin
American countries are likely
to result more from their de-
sire to assert their independ-
ence than from Belgrade's
ability to sell its ideology
or to woo them with trade or
aid. Relations with Latin
America are likely to remain
low on Bel de's priority
list.
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