WEEKLY SUMMARY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
26
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 17, 2009
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 10, 1963
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1.pdf1.25 MB
Body: 
10 May 1963 OCI No a 0279/63 Copy No. 79 WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE State Dept. review completed. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SECRET GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Nw~ 1400 SECRET (Information as of 1200 EDT, 9 May 1963) CASTRO'S TRAVELS Now touring the USSR, Castro may next visit Swit- zerland and possibly "some Scandinavian country." Some reports indicate his projected trip to Alge- ria has been postponed to late this year. KOZLOV ILLNESS MAY PRESAGE USSR LEADERSHIP CHANGES Formal announcement of Kozlov's removal, however, seems requisite to a new appointment to the sec- retariat signaling that a realignment is under way. USSR AGAIN OVERHAULS CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM Khrushchev's most recent criticism of the USSR's construction problems was followed by construction chief Novikov's cancellation of a US visit because he is to rework construction plans. 10 May 63 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 SECRET THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page LAOTIAN SITUATION REMAINS PRECARIOUS Prince Souphannouvong's refusal to go to Luang Prabang to resume talks has further dimmed prospects for a negotiated settlement. SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES No single group has established the organizational support necessary to assure an easy transition to representative government. NEW CRISIS IN SYRIA Actions against Nasirist elements have increased the danger of clashes between rival army elements and jeopardize Syria's political link with Egypt and Iraq. MOROCCAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ON 17 MAY The country's first national elections are being hotly contested, but the King's supporters are expected to win 80 to 90 percent of the seats. AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE TO MEET AT ADDIS ABABA The conference may result in merging of the rival groupings of radical and moderate African states into a general pan-African system patterned after the Organization of American States. AREA NOTES Congo and Pakistan-Afghanistan. 10 May 63 SECRET CURRENT INGELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Soo SECRET PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT Results of last month's election leave no practical alternative to another government led by the Chris- tian Democrats and backed by the Socialists. NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ON 15 MAY The consensus is that the Catholic People's Party will again form the nucleus of the next government, but it is open to question which of the other par- ties will make up the coalition. HAITIAN-DOMINICAN TENSIONS CONTINUE Both internal and external pressures against Hai- tian dictator Duvalier are increasing, and Domin- ican President Bosch remains determined to oust him. POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN PERU INTENSIFYING The junta insists elections be held next month on schedule, but second-level officers are rumored pre- paring to oust the junta, install a civilian-military government, and postpone the elections indefinitely. AREA NOTES Venezuela and Nicaragua. SPECIAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION Although convened to discuss financing of UN peace- keeping operations, this session will probably also be forced to take up controversial colonial issues and the subject of a nuclear test ban. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 SE CRE T Fidel Castro, now nearing the end of his second week in the USSR, spent considerable time during his first eight days there in the company of Khrushchev. On 6 May, he left Moscow for a tour of the Soviet Union, including Volgograd (Stalingrad) and possibly por- tions of Soviet Central Asia. He continues to receive red- carpet treatment. The probability that Castro's visit is more than a "good-will" trip is strengthened by the fact that two ranking Cuban economic officials as well as several senior military officers are in his entourage. The economic officials, at least, have probably remained behind in Moscow for talks. During the week just prior to his departure for the USSR on 26 April, Castro was giving serious consideration to visit- ing one or more West European countries before returning to Cuba. He saw the Swiss ambassa- dor in Havana twice during the week and Swiss Foreign Minister Wahlen has concluded from the reports he received on these visits that Castro definitely plans to visit Switzerland, Castro specifically stated that he would expect to visit of- ficials of the International Red Cross in Geneva. Castro also told the Swiss ambassador that he was consider- ing a visit to "some Scandinavian country," and that he was think- ing of extending his itinerary to include a visit with Pope John. None of these potential hosts is known to have been approached by the Cubans. The Swedes and Finns have ex- pressed themselves as being unenthusiastic about a Castro visit. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 %NW 100 SECRET The recent announcement that Party Secretary Frol Kozlov is ill may foreshadow the end of his political career and could presage a new round of changes in the top Soviet leader- ship. Well-placed Moscow sources--including Khrushchev's son-in-law Aleksey Adzhubey-- are suggesting that Kozlov will not return to his job. Kozlov was last identified in public on 10 April. His unusual absence from the Moscow May Day celebrations touched off a flurry of speculation con- cerning his whereabouts and his political status. On 4 May, Pravda published a terse an- nouncement by the party central committee that Kozlov had. been unable to appear on May Day "be- cause of sickness." The nature of his ailment has not been dis- closed, but it is widely rumored in Moscow that he has had a cerebral hemorrhage, is partially paralyzed, and will not be able to resume work for at least six months. Noting the recent signs of stress within the leadership, the American Embassy in Moscow has raised the possibility that Kozlov's illness was politically caused. A stroke could, for example, have been precipitated by the tension of political infighting. It is also possible --although less likely--that his "ailment" is in fact entirely political. There have been in- dications for some time that Kozlov has disapproved of cer- tain of Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policy innovations, and earlier this year when there were rumors of a leadership crisis Whatever the real reasons for Kozlov's illness, it must have forced Khrushchev's at- tention to the succession prob- lem once again. In these cir- cumstances it seems unlikely that he would relinquish any of his own authority at this time. The probability that Kozlov is out of the running is cer- tain to increase the friction among the top contenders. There are, however, no indications as yet that his apparent incaipac- itation has had any impact on th' distribution of power within the hierarchy. Two of the most likely successors to Kozlov in terms of background--Supreme Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyan- sky--do not now occupy posi- tions of political advantage. The appointment of either to the party's central sec- retariat would signify that he is at least a strong con- tender, if not the actual replacement. In any event, formal announcement of Kozlov's removal seems a prerequisite for those changes in the secretariat which would signal that the realignment is under way. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 %.01 VOO SE CRE T A recent move toward greater centralization of control over construction activities in the USSR is apparently to be fol- lowed by the "complete overhaul" of the construction program. Khrushchev's criticism of the "disorder in construction" last month was followed by abrupt cancellation of construction chief I. T. Novikov's planned trip to the US with the explana- tion that Khrushchev had put him in charge of reworking plans. While Khrushchev has frequently expressed his concern in the past, the emphasis in his re- cent speech on punitive measures and his criticism of top planners by name strongly suggest that personnel changes will be made if improvement is not seen soon. Although construction prob- lems are chronic in the USSR, the major one, that of unfinished construction--which "freezes" investment resources in place on projects which have not yet been put into operation--has be- come more significant in the last several years because of mounting resource allocation problems. Other weaknesses in- clude wasteful practices in the use of resources, late deliveries of equipment, inefficiency of organization and management at construction sites, and lagging production of building materials. At the 22nd party congress in October 1961, Khrushchev sug- gested a moratorium on new con- struction starts. A decree published at that time was de- signed to reduce their number, strengthen the priority-projects system, bring the construction program into line with available resources, and improve designs. Plans for 1962 were cut back. Only one new ferrous metallur- gicalproject was scheduled, for example, compared with 14 in 1961. The number of unfinished projects on which construction actually was to be continued was apparently reduced sub- stantially--in Kazakhstan by half However, plans were again underfulfilled in 1962, with the plan for especially impor- tant projects suffering a greater shortfall than the plan for those of lower priority. These failures apparently led to the extensive reorganization of construction begun in November 1962. At that time, construction organizations previously sub- ordinate to the sovnarkhozes were established as independent entities in the various repub- lics or economic regions. The State Committee for Construction (Gosstroy) was reorganized and Novikov named to head it. In his latest speech, Khrushchev proposed that all project lists be examined by the Moscow offices of Gosstroy and Gosplan. Improvements can be ob- tained this year if Novikov has the authority and the fortitude to cut and slash projects, but the disproportion- ately high percentage of un- finished construction is likely to persist for a number of years. Khrushchev's proposal for even more bureaucratic centralization, by increasing the burden on central planners, may offset some of the gains SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 SECRET Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong's rejection of a proposal by Premier Souvanna to resume talks at a Council of Ministers meeting in Luang Prabang further dimmed the pos- sibility of achieving a nego- tiated settlement of the Laos dispute. Souvanna was already dis- heartened by the 3 May shooting at International Control Commis- sion (ICC) helicopters near Khang Khay and the intransigence displayed by Pathet leaders dur- ing the 2-4 May talks there. These talks consisted primarily of Pathet Lao polemics against the United States, General Phoumi, and the Kong Le neutralists, with a personal attack on Sou- vanna. The Pathet leaders in effect repeated earlier demands, including withdrawal of the ICC from the Plaine des Jarres and of all of Phoumi's Lao army forces from so-called "liberated territory," and reintegration into the Kong Le neutralist ranks of the pro-Pathet "true neutralists" led by Col. Deuane. The Pathet Lao's program calls for first settling all differences between themselves and the neutralists, and then for tripartite talks with Phoumi to settle "national problems." Among the latter the Pathet Lao apparently envisage the establish- 10 May 63 ment of a tripartite commission to revive efforts toward adminis- trative integration, and the replacement of Phoumi's security force at Vientiane with a tri- partite police force. Souvanna has stated that the Pathet Lao's intransigence indicates that they do not intend to negotiate but "want war, sooner or later." The Pathet Lao, however, have been using this interval to reinforce their own positions. Communist counteraction against Meo units north of Xieng Khouang town is in progress, and more general attacks on both Meo and neutralist positions annear likely. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5 25X1 2~DAI Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 SECRET SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES Two years after its military coup, South Korea remains em- broiled in political turmoil with no end of the conflicts in sight. Since junta leader Pak Chong- hui's promise to decide later this year whether to allow elec- tions for a new civilian govern- ment or to submit to popular referendum the question of con- tinuing military rule, no single group has established the organ- izational support necessary to assure an easy transition to representative government. General Pak's recent call for a new pan-national movement has clouded the future of the Democratic-Republican Party (DRP) which former security chief Kim Chong-pil designed to give the junta control over a successor government. The new organization is to absorb key elements of the tarnished DRP. So far, however, it has failed to attract the sup- port of significant civilian po- litical elements. 10 May 63 factional squabbles have damaged the image of civilian leaders as an al- ternative to the present govern- ment. Neither former prime minister Ho Chong nor former President Yun Po-sun has managed to consolidate potential sup- porters of his respective party. Lesser parties are also subject to divisive influences Meanwhile increasing in- flationary pressures are having an unsettling effect on the economy. The situation prob- ably still could be stabilized by firm government action with- out serious strain or a reces- sion, and the new chairman of the Economic Planning Board has already initiated corrective measures. The junta leadership has not yet made clear its backing of these steps, how- ever, and if Pak Chong-hui decides to run for president, he is likely to increase public spending romote his campaign. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 SECRET Recent action against Nasirist elements in Syria by the Baathist-dominated regime have increased the danger of clashes between pro- and anti- Nasir forces in the Syrian Army. The crisis jeopardizes the future of Syria's political union with Egypt and Iraq. pro-Nasir demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo on 8 and 9 May were for- cibly suppressed by police. Pressure by anti-Nasir ele- ments in the Syrian Army appar- ently forced the regime to dis- miss or transfer over 120 offi- cers in late April. This and other moves by the Baathist re- gime in turn caused the resig- nations-of five pro-Nasir cab- inet ministers, leaving the re- gime under Baathist domination. Since then the government also has shut down two local news- papers sympathetic to Nasir and has barred the entry of Egyptian newspapers. In a statement broadcast by Cairo radio, one of the ex- ministers has charged that these developments result from the failure of efforts to form a national front in accordance with the 17 April Cairo proc- lamation on unity. A top- level Syrian delegation which went to Cairo to discuss the effect of Syrian developments on the new federation returned to Damascus on 8 May without reaching any conclusive result, possibly because Nasir is still en route back to Cairo from his visit to Algiers. Cairo radiobroadcasts have stepped up pressure against the Damascus government, claim- ing that "all the people of all classes" in Syria are calling for the downfall of the Baath- ist regime. The Baath's elim- ination of Nasirists in Syria would appear to make a collision between Nasir and the Baath un- avoidable, although both sides want to avoid one. If they do collide, prospects for a mean- ingful federation would collapse. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 7 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 V SE CRE T The 17 May election for the lower house of Morocco's first parliament is the first of a series of seven scheduled through early October to pro- vide Morocco with representative local, provincial, and national institutions under the con- stitution adopted in December. Although supporters of the King are expected to win 80 to 90 percent of the 144 seats, the two leading opposition groups--the right-wing Istiglal and the leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)--are waging hard campaigns. The King reasoned that by holding national elections as the first of the series he would clearly demonstrate his strength on broad national issues and find it relatively easy to win support in subsequent contests. He may also have believed that giving opposition forces only a month to prepare for the most significant contest would pre- vent them from developing a co- herent attack on sensitive issues such as foreign bases and Morocco's orientation between the East and West. Although the two major opposition groups considered boycotting the elections--as the UNFP did in the constitutional referendum in December--both have submitted candidates in all constituencies. Several leaders of the illegal Com- munist Party are running as independents. These candidates will in most instances meet the formidable competition of those selected by the proroyalist Front for the Defense of Con- stitutional Institutions. The opposition has been concentrating its attack less on issues than on an individual, Ahmed Reda Guedira, director general of the Royal Cabinet who holds portfolios of both interior and agriculture. Guedira was principally re- sponsible for organizing the government's party and, as in- terior minister, for arranging election procedures. Both the Istiglal and the UNFP charge that he has fixed the elections --although the US Embassy dis- cerns no glaring instances of gerrymandering. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 IVORY COA57 31ERAA LEONE'.:._.. tIeERFA OAr0Mre J NIGERIA AFROQ Casablanca Charter States Lagos Charter States 10 MAY 1963 REPUBLIC Or THE CONGO uAR (1tP4) ~ M A$ASY Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Nov SECRET Leaders of African states of both the moderate and radical group- ings will hold a summit conference in Addis Ababa from 23 to 25 May. A meeting of foreign ministers to set the agenda is to begin on 15 May. This all-African gathering, which promises to be the largest and most spectacular of its kind since the first one in Accra in 1958, has been in preparation for over a year. It developed directly from the series of meetings sponsored since 1961 by the grouping of moderate states formalized last December by a charter signed in Lagos, Nigeria. Concurrently, certain adherents of the more militant 1961 Casablanca Charter, notably Guinean President Sekou Tourd, have played an impor- tant role in fostering a rapproche- ment between the two groups as divi- sive issues, such as the Congo, have receded. Most if not all of Africa's 32 independent states--excluding South Africa, which was not invited--will be represented by their heads of state or government. Acceptance of the newly elected regime of Togolese President Grunitsky, which is still not recognized by most African states and is strongly opposed by Tourd, will be discussed at Addis and may provoke sharp controversy. Selected African nationalist leaders from dependent territories will apparently be permitted to participate in all sessions, but non-African observers will be admitted only to the public opening and closing ceremonies. 10 May 63 Proceedings and final resolu- tions will, as usual, focus heavily on the twin themes of anticolonial- ism and African unity. Specific attention is certain to be directed to Portugal's African domains, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. Some of the participants, notably Ghana's Nkrumah, apparently intend to press for expanded material aid to embattled "freedom fighters." Nkrumah has made a strong bid to steer the conferees toward early organic unity by circulating a scheme for a "Union Government of African States." However, any steps taken at Addis to institutionalize the unity urge are more likely to develop from proposals formulated for the Ethiopian Government by Chile's ambassador to the Organiza- tion of American States (OAS), Manuel Trucco. He counseled the Ethiopians not to advance the Lagos Charter as an initial working docu- ment--a tactic likely to invite early friction with the Casablanca states--but to focus attention instead on a series of draft res- olutions and statutes on noncon- troversial topics which he has pre- pared. Such drafts provide for perma- nent inter-African functional commit- tees for economic-social, educa- tional-cultural, and scientific- technical cooperation. Other Trucco drafts deal with peaceful settle- ment of disputes, reciprocal assist- ance, and a general secretariat-- and possibly other organs--based on applicable OAS and UN articles. As a final step, agreement would be sought on a common charter for SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 %W01 %0 SE CRE T Congo: After trying vainly for weeks to obtain a UN "um- brella" for his army retraining plans, Congolese Premier Adoula on 3 May formally requested that Belgium, Canada, Italy, Israel, and the US do the job directly. The plans are likely to be at- tacked not only in Leopoldville but in the special session of the UN General Assembly sched- uled to begin on 14 May. Arab and other Asian and African members of U Thant's Congo Advisory Committee maintain that the presence of Israel and the NATO affiliation of the other countries would prejudice Congo- lese neutrality. In the face of their protests the secretary general has been unwilling to accept a coordinating role for the UN. The UN's new Congo chief, Max Dorsinville, never- theless maintains that Thant has not completely barred a UN "um- brella" role. Pakistan-Afghanistan: The Pakistani and Afghan governments 10 May 63 are seeking to restore diplomatic and consular relations and to re- open the border to Afghan trade crossing Pakistan. Pakistan's President Ayub reacted favorably to the resignation in early March of Afghan Prime Minister Daud, chief figure in Afghanistan's dis- pute with Pakistan over the Push- toonistan question. To speed restoration of re- lations, Ayub has authorized Iran to inform the Afghans they will be permitted to reopen all the offices they maintained in Paki- stan before the break in relations in September 1961, including the important consulate in Peshawar. The new regime in Kabul under King Zahir and Prime Minister Yusuf wants to restore the tradi- tional access route through Paki- stan to free-world markets and has agreed to early negotiations. Both sides have moderated their propaganda to pave the way for talks under the Shah's good of- SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 10 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Christian Democrats Communists Socialisto Liberals- Neo-Fascists Monarchists Republicans Others TOTAL SENATE Christian Democrats Communists Socialists Liberals Social Democrats Neo-Fascists. Monarchists Republicans South Tiroleans Others TOTAL Votes 11,763,418 7,763,854 4,251,966 2,142,053 1,874,379 1,569,202 536,652 420,746 135,444 272,555 30,730,269 10,208,524 6,993,604 3,856,088 2,059,452 1,739,880 1,694,832 428,167 223,421 RESULTS OF ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS %: Seats Votes % Seats 38.3 260 12,520,556 42.3 273 25.3 166 6,704,763 22.7 140 13.8 87 4,206,777 14.2 84 7.0 39 1,047,073 3.5 17 6.1 33 1,345,334 4.6 22 5.1 27 1,407,550 4.7 24 1.7 8 1,436,654 4.8 25 -'' 1.4 6 405,767 1.4 6 0.4 3 133,495 0.5 3 0.9 1 379,502 1.3 2 100.0 630 29,587,471 100.0 596 37.2 133 10,782,262 41.2 122 25;5 85 5,701,019 21.8 60 14.0 44 3,683,806 14.1 35 7.5 19 1,024,309 3.9 4 6.3 14 1,135,151 4.4 5 6.2 15 1,119,873 4.3 8 1.6 2 1,350,201 5.2 7 0.8 - 369,192 1.4 - 120,250 0.5 2 760,186 3.2 3 Votes % Seats Votes -% - Seats 10,863,032 40.1 263 12,741,299 48.5 305 6,121,551 22.6 143 131 3,441,388 12.7 75 817,404 3.0 13 1,004,889 3.8 19 1,223,209 4.5 19 1,858,346 7.1 33 1,582,727 5.8 29 526,670 2.0 6 1,855,807 6.9 40 729,174 2.8 14 438,027 1.6 5 652,477 2.5 9 122,792 0.5 3 124,385 0.5 3 232,235 2.3 494,625 1.8 2 26,698,172 100.0 590 26,268,912 100.0 574 N OTE: Parliament last year pas: a constitutional amendment to increase the number of directly electedSenators to 315 and the number of Deputiesto what will be an established ceiling of 630. * The Communists and Socialists ran joint lists in the 1948 national elections. Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 %00 %W SE CRE T Western Hemisphere PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT Communist gains and Chris- tian Democratic losses in last month's general election leave Italy still without a practical alternative to a government led by the Christian Democrats and backed by the Nenni Socialists. It seems assured that the Chris- tian Democrats will be more de- pendent on both socialist par- ties in any such regime. The immediate outlook, however, is for the establishment of a care- taker government to hold the fort until after the Nenni So- cialists' convene their party congress, probably in July. Opponents of Premier Fan- fani within the Christian Dem- ocratic Party and among its co- alition partners blame him for the "distastrous" election re- sults, and are urging that he resign. Fanfani and his center- left adherents point out, how- ever, that the preferential vot- ing (whereby voters express their preference among a list of candidates offered by the party of their choice) seem to have run strongly in their fa- vor and against right-wing Christian Democratic leaders. There is an even more striking trend favoring those in Nenni's party who approve of the center- left. In any event, prolonged negotiations on the government's make-up are in prospect follow- ing the resignation of the Fan- fani cabinet when Parliament reconvenes on 16 May. open to question: it may be a reinstallation of the present government, one constructed un- der the same formula but with another prime minister, or a minority government of Christian Democrats alone. A return to the old four-party centrist coalition including the now- strengthened Liberals, or re- course to alliance with the neo-Fascists seems most unlikely at this time. The embassy comments that in view of the increased strength of Nenni's "autonomous" wing in the Socialist parliamentary del- egation, the possibility of a Socialist return to a close work- ing relationship with the Com- munists is more remote than ever. Similarly, the reported strength- ening of the parliamentary rep- resentation of the Christian 'Democrats' left wing improves chances of keeping the "opening to the left" alive. Giuseppe Saragat's Social Democrats, who made substantial gains in the elections, are indicating an in- tention to use their influence to keep a center-left govern- ment in power. However, the Socialist left wing and the Christian Democratic right, despite apparent defec- tions from both to other parties, will work to block the formation of such a government.F What sort of caretaker ar- rangement will be worked out is SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 SECRET The parliamentary election in the Netherlands on 15 May is not expected to produce any sur- prising shifts in voter senti- ment. The Catholic People's Party (KVP), the dominant ele- ment in the government coalition, and the opposition Labor Party will probably each win about one third of the 150 seats in the lower chamber. The remain- der will be divided largely among the Liberals and the two princi- pal Protestant parties. The pre-election campaign- ing has focused on purely domes- tic issues. Little has been said about foreign and defense policies, since there is a broad measure of agreement on these matters among the non-Com- munist parties. Efforts by the small Communist Party and paci- fist elements to bring into question the Netherlands' affili- ation with NATO and its military cooperation with West Germany have had little response. The consensus is that the KVP will again form the nucleus of the next government, but it is open to question which of the other parties will make up the coalition. Earlier it had been assumed that Labor, which has been in opposition since 1958, would once again be taken into the cabinet, but the failure of Labor's campaign to catch fire thus far has lessened the prospects for such a development. If the other three coalition parties--the Liberals and the two Protestant parties--hold their own in the election, the present coalition probably will be retained. 10 May 63 LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT (SECOND CHAMBER) Catholic People's Party 49 Christian' Historical Union (Protestant) 12 Anti-Revolutionary P (Protestant) 14 Liberals 19 4 itical Reformed Party (Protestant) One of the first problems the new government will have to face is whether or not to par- ticipate in the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). Dutch officials have indicated they felt priority should be given to creating the Interallied Nuclear Force (IANF) as being the most realis- tic short-term approach. On balance, however, The Hague is believed to be sympathetic toward the proposal for a MLF but is reportedly having difficulty convincing Dutch military leaders of its feasi- bility-, SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 SECRET Western Hemisphere Tension between Haiti and the Dominican Republic remains high, but the pushing and haul- ing now is mostly on the diplo- matic level. The OAS investi- gating team is preparing to re- turn to Haiti with a broadened mandate to perform "whatever service is necessary" to settle the dispute. Dominican President Bosch is incensed because the OAS has not decided to take strong ac- tion against Haitian dictator Duvalier. He has told the US ambassador he will refuse the commission permission to enter his country, and if they arrive unannounced he will make a pub- lic speech "saying things they have never heard from a presi- dent." The ambassador says that Bosch feels "betrayed" and endangered politically. Internal as well as exter- nal pressures on Duvalier are still on the increase. His le- gal term as president expires on 15 May The in- creasingly bold attacks mounted by his enemies in recent days, notably by followers of Clement Barbot, lend some credence to these reports. Just what effect these pressures are having on the dictator is not yet clear. Dominican armed forces re- main poisad along the border. .Bosch's tactic so far, however, has been to use the "Haitian crisis" to gain political ad- vantage at home. Latin American embassies in Port-au-Prince are apparently concerned over the possibility that the regime will retaliate against them for granting asylum to large numbers of Haitians escaping Duvalier's terror. Duvalier has given the OAS guarantees for the safety of political refugees, probably in hopes of forestalling either the establishment of an OAS "presence" or a Dominican inva- sion. A few asylees have al- ready left the country. There is no certainty, however, that Duvalier will permit all asylees to leave or that he will oust relatives of the late Dominican dictator Trujillo--for whom he personally ordered visas. The Haitian Government had received from Dutch authorities landing rights for a flight from Haiti to Curacao, but canceled the flight on 8 May. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 13 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 SECRET POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN PERU INTENSIFYING Four presidential candidates are campaigning vigorously for elections which the Peruvian mili- tary junta has repeatedly claimed will be held on 9 June as sched- uled. an air of unreality pervades the political scene. One of the first acts of the junta when it seized power in July 1962 following the June elections was to promise to hold new elec- tions a year hence. The military leaders believed that the plurality of votes won in 1962 by their perennial foe, APRA leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, was the result of a "massive fraud." After re-registering all the eligible voters to eliminate "fraudulent" registrations, the junta is con- vinced that APRA now can be deci- sively defeated. APRA and its leaders are undis- mayed. In fact, they welcome the rerun as an opportunity to prove that their near victory in 1962 was genuine. Furthermore, with 10 May 63 Western Hemisphere the number of candidates reduced from seven to four, APRA members are confident that Haya will win more than the minimum of one third of the total vote required for election to the presidency. Like Haya, two other candi- dates are holdovers from 1962. Ex-dictator Manuel Odria is run- ning for his own party, the National Union for Odria (UNO), and ex- architect Fernando Belaunde is the candidate of a coalition of his Accion Popular and the Peruvian Christian Democrat Party (AP-PDC). Both UNO and AP-PDC claim to be reformist, non-Marxist, and ac- ceptable to the military and the oligarchy. The fourth candidate, ex- engineer Mario Saiaame Boggio, who presents himself as the candidate of the "responsible left," is spon- sored by a loosely organized party formed for the purpose and known as the Union of the Peruvian Public (UPP). He has no chance of winning on his own, but has let it be known that he is available as a com- promise candidate for APRA support if APRA is outlawed by the mili- tary. HAYA SECRET Page 15 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 W SECRET Western Hemisphere Venezuela: Army and na- tional guard officers are increas- ingly disturbed by the gradual breakdown of law and order in Venezuela due to Communist hit- and-run violence and by the appar- ent inability of civilian author- ities to deal with the problem. Sentiment to have the military assume a greater role in suppress- ing Communist terrorism has al- most certainly been fed by last week's sabotage of a military com- missary and the unending terrorist attacks on armed forces personnel. Communist leaders, whose strategy all along has been to as- sume they could ride to power on a wave of popular dissatisfaction generated by a military move to topple the Betancourt regime, see many advantages in the present sit- uation Failing to precipitate a mili- tary overthrow, Communist efforts would appear to have as a second- ary objective the creation of conditions which would compel the government to suspend constitu- tional guarantees, and perhaps cancel the presidential elections set for next November. In doing so, they would hope to shatter :10 May 63 public confidence in Betancourt's coalition government as well as to prevent the installation of a similar regime as its successor. Nicaragua: The new admin- istration of Rene Schick Guti- errez, who succeeded Luis Somoza Debayle as President of Nicaragua on 1 May, is likely to be reason- ably competent and honest. Schick has indicated a determination to govern in his own right even if it means resisting Somoza pres- sure. There will probably be no change in Nicaragua's pro-US orientation. Although several of the cab- inet appointees are relatively un- known in Nicaraguan politics, most appear to be men of integrity. The two holdovers in the cabinet, the ministers of foreign affairs and labor,are both experienced and able. There seem to be only two leftists in important positions: Pedro Quintanilla, secretary to the presidency, and Andres Garcia Perez, minister of economy. It is still too early to pre- dict what kind of relationship the new President will have with Gen- eral Anastasio (Tacho) Somoza, who has been retained as chief of the national guard, the country's only military force. So far, there has been no evidence that the gen- eral has applied pressure on Schick or his government. None of the cabinet members is a close friend of Tacho, and some have opposed the Somoza leadership of the ruling Na- reasons in the past. tional Liberal Party for various SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Nwf *%01# SECRET World Organizations The UN General Assembly is scheduled to convene in special session on 14 May to discuss financing of UN peace- keeping operations. It will probably also take up such other potentially explosive issues as Southern Rhodesia, the retraining of the Congolese Army, and the absence of an agreement on a nuclear test ban. Financing of UN operations such as those in the Congo and Palestine has been haphazard. The UN has relied primarily on voluntary contributions from the more affluent members-- chiefly the United States. To regularize this financing and also to ensure that peace- keeping expenses are more equitably shared, the United States will push for a formula which would obviate its paying more than its regular assess- ment of 32.02 percent of UN expenses. However, prospects for a financially workable formula which all UN members will honor now seem remote. The Afro-Asian bloc appears intent on using the special session to spotlight colonial issues. One of these will be Britain's refusal to press Southern Rhodesia to allow increased African participation in the colony's government. Afro-Asian members of the Congo Advisory Committee are also likely to question the legality of plans for NATO countries and Israel to train the Congo Na- tional Army. They assert that such training, even though requested by the Adoula govern- ment, would be neocolonialism.. In addition to these colo- nial issues, the eight nonaligned nations at the Geneva disarma- ment conference are thinking about submitting the problem of a ban on nuclear testing to the special session in the hopes of breaking the impasse between the US and USSR on the number of inspections needed to enforce an effective test ban. These countries contend there is no alternative to such a move in view of the failure of a compromise at Geneva. The addition of these controversial items to the already tricky problem of financing will result in pro- longed, bitter, and probably inconclusive debate. SECRET 10 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 17 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1 Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1 ,... s.i ... aa ar a .c F.!' R P. T Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080001-1