WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

i%d
17 May 1963
OCI No. 0280/63
Copy No. 77
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
/ y 1
SiiAJ. "'1
A~iC~1~E8'
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Nftw
SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 16 May 1963)
CUBA Page
SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY
At least some of the presumed military equipment
delivered this month by the Transbalt was probably
stored near Havana. An assembled cruise missile
noted at Tapaste may have been related to an ap-
parent mobility exercise concluded early in May
at nearby Campo Florido.
CASTRO'S USSR TRIP
The Cuban leader received red-carpet treatment
throughout his tour of the USSR. There is no
reporting on what progress, if any, is being made
in economic or military talks that may be under
way in Moscow.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SINO-SOVIET MEETING DATE SET
Talks are to begin on 5 July in Moscow, but both
sides give every indication of preparing for ne-
gotiations that will be more a new confrontation
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL INVESTMEFT RISES
The large increase for agriculture in 1962's in-
vestment program might be a forecast for 1963 as
well, although Khrushchev's public statments still
stress resource-cheap solutions for farm problems.
LULL IN SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST CULTURAL NONCONFORMISTS
The regime seems to be temporizing while it searches
for a way to control its intellectuals without giv-
ing the appearance of an oppressive crackdown.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
,M, .)AL: URr,1
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
POPULAR DISCONTENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Although youth demonstrations have been effectively
controlled by the police, they are likely to con-
tribute to intraparty pressure on First Secretary
Novotny to pursue a more liberal policy.
RUMANIAN DIFFERENCES WITH MOSCOW CONTINUE
Speeches by regime spokesmen stress national sov-
ereignty. Bucharest has made gestures of con-
fidence in its representative to the bloc economic
organization in which the dispute was sparked.
COMMUNIST CHINA SEEKS NONBLOC OIL
It imported about 30 percent of its oil in 1962
.and relied on the USSR for these purchases. Aside
from the strategic advantage of an alternate source,
Peiping might find oil cheaper elsewhere.
OPPOSING MILITARY FORCES RESTIVE IN LAOS
Kong Le apparently still intends to take some lim-
ited action in the near future, while the Pathet
Lao are improving their positions and could launch
a sharp countermove.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
TWI
SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
NASIR STILL EMBROILED WITH OTHER ARAB REGIMES
Cabinet changes in Syria and Iraq have not met the
demands of Nasir's supporters, who are undoubtedly
casting about for means of exerting further pres-
sure on their Baathist rivals.
AREA NOTES
Cyprus and Congo
PROSPECTS CONTINUE DIM FOR US-EEC TRADE TALKS
The recent EEC Council meeting authorized EEC par-
ticipation in talks with the US on tariff reduction,
but the two sides are far apart on specifics..
CLOSE FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS CONTINUE
The Bonn-Paris amity seems unimpaired by West German
political ferment or by intra-EEC differences: the
Franco-German treaty appears certain of ratification,
and cooperation in the military field continues.
ITALY'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Continuation of the center-left formula is favored
by the cabinet parties and their Nenni Socialist
parliamentary allies, but clarification of the lat-
ters' position must await their July party congress.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
THE HAITIAN SITUATION 15
the scene inside
Haiti appears quiet and the dictator's position at
least temporarily more secure.
ARGENTINE POLITICAL. SITUATION
The cabinet crisis and last-minute political ma-
neuvering before the 20 May deadline for inscribing
candidates for the 7 July elections are adding to
political unrest.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
w 1qI
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
SHOWDOWN IN BRITISH GUIANA 18
Neither the government nor the unions are disposed
to compromise in the four-week-old strike, and
new disturbances could break out at any time.
TENSIONS IN COLOMBIA
Last week's security build-up against threatened
demonstrations for the return of ex-dictator Rojas
is symtomatic of the current political uncertainty
caused by the deteriorating economic situation.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
i e SECRET
at least some of
the equipment delivered by the
presumed Soviet arms carrier
Transbalt, which arrived on 5
May at Mariel, was transported
to the San Francisco de Paula
munitions storage area south-
east of Havana.
The Soviet passenger ship
Baltika left Havana on 13 May
after two days in port.
An-
other Soviet passenger ship used
regularly on the USSR-to-Havana
run, the Maria Ulyanova, is
scheduled rrive in Cuba in
about two weeks.
a cruise missile assem-
bled and positioned on a dolly
at the Tapaste storage area six
miles south of the probable
cruise missile training facil-
ity at Campo Florido, east of
Havana. The Tapaste site con-
sists of 11 storage bunkers,
some still under construction,
and is reportedly used for the
storage of radio and electronic
gear, ammunition, and miscella-
neous weapons. It is believed
to be a Cuban installation, and
no missiles or related equipment
have been observed there in the
past. The assembled cruise mis-
sile may have been related to
the mobility exercise appar-
ently conducted at Campo Florido
the previous week.
No significant activity
has been observed at the four
major Soviet armored camps dur-
ing the past week.
Fidel Castro concluded a
ten-day tour of various Soviet
cities on 16 May and returned
to Moscow for further talks
with Khrushchev. His tour--
which took him to Volgograd
(Stalingrad), Tashkent in Uz-
bekistan, the Siberian city
of Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk in the
Urals, and finally Leningrad--
was marked by red-carpet treat-
ment. He spent more time in
Uzbekistan than anywhere else.
He met with Cuban agricultural
students studying there and
conferred with local Soviet
officials who had helped organize
an irrigation program for Cuba
last year.
So far, there has been no
reporting on what progress, if
any, is being made in the eco-
nomic and military talks that
may be under way in Moscow.
The date Castro is to
leave the USSR evidently is
also a closely held secret.
It remains uncertain,therefore,
whether he will pursue his
plans to visit Switzerland and
Scandinavia on the way home.
The timing of his trip to Al-
geria also continues obscure.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
I-
SE CRE T
The Communist World
SINO-SOVIET MEETING DATE SET
The Soviet Union and Com-
munist China have finally agreed
to hold bilateral talks in Mos-
cow on 5 July. The long series
of proposals and counterpro-
posals concerning the time and
place for the meeting foreshad-
ows the intense wrangling cer-
tain to take place there.
Both sides give every in-
dication of preparing for ne-
gotiations that will be more
in the nature of a new con-
frontation than an effort at
accommodation. The Soviet Union
has not yet publicized the meet-
ing Chou En-lai had with Soviet
Ambassador Chervonenko on 9 May,
during which the Chinese pro-
posed sending a delegation to
Moscow for bilateral talks on
15 June. The Chinese statement
on the subject contained only
three terse paragraphs and noted
that a formal reply to a Soviet
note proposing an earlier date
for talks would be forthcoming.
Peiping's announcement of the
date finally selected was also
direct and noncommittal, with
none of the usual expressions
of hope for a successful outcome
to the talks.
Peiping's choice of dele-
gates gives another indication
of difficulties ahead. Secre-
tary General Teng Hsiao-Ping
carried the brunt of the debate
for the Chinese at the Moscow
meeting of world Communist
leaders in November 1960. He
will be matched, as before, by
the leader of the Soviet delega-
tion, M. A. Suslov, who ably
presented the Soviet side in
1960. Aiding Suslov will be the
USSR's top ideologists and
specialists in'interparty af-
fairs: Ilichev, Andropov, and
Ponomarev.
The coleader of the Chi-
nese delegation, politburo mem-
ber Peng Chen, was the head of
the Chinese delegation to the
meeting of Communist parties in
Bucharest in June 1960. After
one of Khrushchev's personal
attacks on Mao Tse-tung, Peng
countered by calling Khrushchev
a "revisionist" who was creat-
ing illusions about imperialism.
"We have no trust," Peng went
on, "in your analysis of the
world situation."
The Chinese continue to
indicate this lack of trust.
On the very day of Chervonenko's
meeting with Chou En-lai, Pei-
ping broadcast several bitterly
anti-Yugoslav commentaries.
Izvestia promptly printed a
rebut to applauding Belgrade's
new constitution and contra-
dicting Peiping's assertion
that Yugoslavia was not a social-
ist country. Two days later,
Tirana joined in. with a typically
Albanian abuse of Tito which
included explicit condemnation
of "Khrushchev and his group."
China's Chief of State Liu
Shao-chi also kept the polemical
pot boiling in remarks to a
Hanoi rally on 12 May by urging
SECRET
17 Ma-' a' (TTRR1 NT TNTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT
(Expressed as share of total investment)
Annual Increase (%)
All Other investment 14.6 8.7 2.9 3.4
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT
(billion rubles)
By the State
(mainly for
State Farms)
By the Collective
Farms
EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOVIET AGRICULTURE
(Expressed in absolute numbers and as percentage
of total annual production)
Tractors
percentage
67.6
65.8
70.3
71.8
number
(thousands)
Trucks
144.3
1
57.0
1
85.3
2
06.0
percentage
20.6
1
7.2
17.2
20.0
number
(thousands)
76.3
6
6.1
69.7
82.6
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
iw~ SECRET
The Communist World
the cause of revolutionary
struggle and disparaging the
principle of peaceful coexist-
ence.
While the Soviet Union has
made clear that it will not
compromise on its basic prin-
ciples, its policy in Laos re-
flects an unwillingness to give
the Chinese an unnecessarily
easy target for criticism.
Moscow still appears to be a
reluctant partner to the Pathet
Lao's present aggressiveness,
but it has stepped up its prop-
aganda and diplomatic support
in recent weeks. As has been
true in the past when the ground
was being prepared for talks
with the Chinese, Soviet policy
in general can be expected to
take on a somewhat harder cast
as protection against Chinese
attack.
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT RISES
Investment in Soviet agri-
culture in 1962 registered the
largest annual increase since
1955. This was probably the
greatest investment gain al-
lotted any major component of
the economy.
While there is no real
basis for determining that this
is a firm trend, the relative
increase in priority for agri-
culture in 1962 might be a fore-
cast of the course of agricul-
tural investment in 1963. Dur-
ing the first quarter, produc-
tion of agricultural machinery
was continuing to grow at a
high rate. There recently have
been several regime statements
pointing to the necessity of
improving the investment posi-
tion of agriculture as one
remedy for the poor production
of the last several years. The
latest, by party bureau chief
for agriculture Vasily Polyakov
cites this as one of the most
important problems now facing
the party.
Khrushchev, on the other
hand, has been stressing the
importance of resource-cheap
expedients and has steered clear
of new commitments. Recent de-
crees on certain aspects of
farming--e.g., increasing potato
output--have stressed the boot-
strap approach for the current
season.
In any event, the needs of
agriculture are clear. Farm
production has been virtually
stagnant since 1958, but the
population has increased by
about 14 million. The plowing
up of millions of acres of fal-
low and grass lands, a program
introduced last year, has
greatly increased needs for
equipment and fertilizer.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
SECRET
NOO
The Soviet leadership ap-
pears to be temporizing in its
cultural policy while it con-
tinues its search for a way to
control its restive intellec-
tuals and at the same time avoid
the appearance of an oppressive
crackdown. Invective directed
against individual writers, art-
ists, and musicians which
reached a peak in late March
and early April has abated with-
out the imposition of harsh pu-
nitive measures. The central
committee plenum which was to
be attended by the creative in-
telligentsia, scientists,and
educators has been postponed
from 28 May to 18 June.
Discussion of plans for
reorganizing the cultural un-
ions and centralizing control
of publications has also less-
ened. There have been no known
purges of editorial boards, no
expulsions from the unions, and
no arrests. The only signif-
icant personnel shift to date
has been the replacement of
the moderate Stefan Shchipachev
with the conservative Georgiy
Markov as head of the Moscow
branch of the Writers' Union.
The regime not only has
failed to follow through with
threatened repressive measures,
but reportedly has recently re-
leased three of the four writers
confined in insane asylums last
year. Their return home will
probably lend further encour-
agement to the liberal writers.
Attendance at the Young
Writers'Conference in Moscow
from 7 ~'to 10 May was notably
lackluster. The prestige-laden
names which would attract the
attention of Soviet readers
had recently been under heavy
attack, and apparently none
of the well-known young writers
could be trusted to follow the
correct line from a public plat-
form. Those who did were de-
scribed as primarily factory
and farm workers who wrote in
their spare time, and the sec-
tions offering advice on writ-
ing techniques were chaired by
conservatives who are not widely
popular with the reading public.
The speeches of Konstantin
Fedin, who opened the meeting,
and of Writers' Union Secretary
Aleksey Surkov contained en-
couragement to the liberals.
Their moderate tone contrasted
strongly with the harsh per-
sonal attacks launched by
Komsomol Secretary Sergey Pav-
lov, who warned against tol-
erance for the "germs" of
bourgeois society in ideology.
The central committee ses-
sion, as originally announced
on 9 April, was to hear a re-
port on party tasks in the field
of "ideology" from Chairman of
the Ideological Commission
Leonid Ilichev. At that time
it appeared that the plenum
would further the attack on
the dissident intellectuals.
Its postponement and the abate-
ment of the harsh propaganda
campaign suggest that the re-
gime now will try some other
approach, apparently realizing
that its efforts to date have
only muffled the dissident
voices but have had little or
no permanent impact.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 4
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET
POPULAR DISCONTENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Continued popular dissatis-
faction over the economic situa-
tion,,ferment among the Czech and
Slovak intellectuals, and signs of
uncertainty in the party leader-
ship suggest that the regime is
faced with a potentially unstable
situation.
An antiregime demonstration
attempted by young workers and
students on 1 May has been followed
by two other outbreaks. Shortly
after midnight on 11 May, 250-300
youths beat up two foreign stu-
dents--one African and one Arab--
on Prague's central street, ap-
parently without police interven-
tion. That evening, at the same
spot, a group of Czechs attacked
two more African students, attract-
ing a crowd of several hundred
;persons. After police broke up
the fight, youths from the crowd
slashed the tires on the car of
an African ambassador who had ar-
rived at the scene.
Czech students, like the
public at large, are resentful
of the regime's economic commit-
ments to underdeveloped areas
which they believe lower their
own standard of living. The stu-
dents also are angered by the
large number of scholarship stu-
dents from these areas and by the
favored treatment the government
accords them.
These conditions have been
aggravated in recent weeks by the
flood of rumors concerning the
current party purges and the pos-
sible rehabilitation of victims
of the Slansky trials. 25X1
Although the public manifes-
tations of discontent have been
effectively controlled by the
police, they are likely to con-
tribute to the pressure on Novotny
within the party to pursue a
more liberal policy and initiate
effective de-Stalinization.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
Page 5
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Party boss Gheorghiu-Dej (second
from left front row) conducts
Khrushchev (center) and his party
on a tour of Rumania's iron and
steel combine at Hunedoara in
June 1962.
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
NW SECRET NW
The Communist World
Rumanian-Soviet differences
over bloc economic policies con-
tinue unresolved. Recent speeches
by regime spokesmen in Bucharest
stressed the need for national
sovereignty, and the regime has
made gestures of confidence in
Alexandru Birladeanu, its repre-
sentative to the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA),.
Rumania's stand may have been a
major reason for convening the
CEMA Executive Committee in War-
saw on 10 May--described by Bucha-
rest as an "extraordinary" session.
CEMA's apparent desire for
abandonment of certain projects
for the rapid development of Ru-
mania's basic industries is re-
gardedby 3ucharest as interference
in its plans for a well-rounded
economy. Reportedly, CEMA also
wants Rumania to redirect to other
bloc states some agricultural and
raw material exports presently used
to purchase technical machinery
in the West. Although Rumanian
officials favor closer cooperation
within CEMA, they advocate it
only on the basis of voluntary
coordination of national economic
plans and oppose establishment of
a supranational CEMA authority.
During Rumania's celebration
of Lenin's birthday on 23 April,
the main speaker said "'relations
of a new type (have been) estab-
lished among the socialist states--
relations whose immovable law is
their complete equality in rights,
strict respect for independence
and national sovereignty . . .
The principal May Day speech--
stressing the need for "strict
respect of national independence"--
SECRET
was delivered by Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers Emil
Bodnaras, a politburo member who
is considered Moscow's right-hand
man in Bucharest. His selection
was probably designed to demon-
strate that all elements of the
party solidly support the regime
in its opposition to Moscow's CEMA
plans.
The May Day celebrations
made little reference to the USSR
and, in contrast to past years,
not one living Soviet leader was
portrayed. An editorial on 1
May in the Bucharest City Party
Committee Agitator's Notebook
stated that "the sole basis for
progress in the national economy,
for continuous strengthening of
economic and political independence
of the country,, is the machine-
building industry." The reference
to "political independence" in this
context by a party publication is
unprecedented.
Birladeanu, although reportedly
told by other CEMA representatives
to relinquish his post, attended
the 10-14 May Executive Committee
session. He was designated by
the regime to meet UN Secretary
General Thant when he arrived on
4 May in Rumania. Birladeanu
has never before fulfilled such
a protocol function.
Peiping may plan to exploit
Rumanian-Soviet differences. On
28 April People's Daily featured
the entire textof a communique
issued after a 5-8 March Rumanian
plenum which contained the first
definite indication of the dispute.
The paper also gave preferential
reportage of May Day celebrations.
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
%/ fV'
SECRET
Communist China apparently
is seriously investigating non-
bloc sources of petroleum prod-
ucts to cover its import needs
--about 30 percent of its total
supply in 1962.
Several motives might be
behind such approaches. Most of
Peiping's petroleum imports now
come from the USSR, and Moscow
could cease or reduce deliveries
if its dispute with Peiping
worsens. Nonbloc oil delivered
by tanker would be cheaper than
Soviet oil, most of which is
brought in by rail--an extremely
expensive form of transport.
In addition, strategic concerns
might indicate development of
several sources.
China does not now pur-
chase crude oil, but imports
only petroleum products. So-
viet deliveries reached 3.2
million tons in 1961 but fell
to 1.9 million tons in 1962.
Last year, domestic crude
oil processed in Chinese re-
fineries provided 4.3 million
tons of petroleum products,
70 percent of the total supply.
17 May 63
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 7
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Ban Ta Viang' Tha Thom
ti
a
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Phou Keng ? g Khay
Muong Phanh. we hong Savan
OEa ARRis
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET
Both the Kong Le and Pathet
Lao military forces appear
restive amid the continued po-
litical stalemate in Laos.
Kong Le apparently still
intends to take some limited
action in the near future to
recoup some of his losses in the
Plaine des Jarres. The timing
and scope of this action is in-
definite, but recapture of Xieng
Khouang town appears to be a
primary objective.
The Communists, meanwhile,),
have reinforced Xieng Khouang
and other positions in the Plaine
des Jarres. Despite Meo efforts
at interdiction, supplies con-
tinue,to arrive from North
Vietnam over Route 7. In other
areas also, particularly in
south-central Laos and in the
Vang Vieng area north of Vien-
tiane, the Communists continue
to improve their positions. Al-
though a limited offensive by
Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres
might succeed, such action could
result in sharp Communist coun-
termoves and a serious escala-
tion of the fighting.
The USSR continues to re-
sist efforts by the UK, the
17 May 63
other chairman of the Geneva
conference in Laos, to secure
Soviet cooperation in discharg-
ing their responsibilities.
On 10 May, for the second time
in three weeks, Moscow ignored
British objections and made
public its own draft of a mes-
sage it had proposed that the
co-chairmen send to Premier
Souvanna Phouma. The message
repeated Pathet Lao charges
that the dispatch of Indian and
Canadian representatives on
the International Control Com-
mission (ICC) to the Plaine
des Jarres violated the Geneva
agreements and argued that ICC
activities require the unanimous
consent of all three Laotian
factions. The Soviet draft also
endorsed the Pathet Lao proposal
to replace General Phoumi's
security force in Vientiane
with a tripartite police force.
Moscow's support of Pathet
Lao attempts to frustrate the
ICC underscores the Soviet
leaders' unwillingness to risk
exacerbating their relations
with the Chinese Communists
and North Vietnamese before
the Sino-Soviet negotiations
in July.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET
NASIR STILL EMBROILED WITH OTHER
The Baathist-Nasirist
struggle has intensified during
the past week. It continues
to be centered in Syria, with
side effects in Iraq.
In Damascus, Salah al-Din
Bitar's cabinet was reshuffled
on 13 May, after an attempt to
form a cabinet under moderate
pro-Nasirist Dr. Sami al-Jundi
had failed. The new cabinet is
even more strongly Baathist
than its predecessor, with pro-
Nasir elements largely replaced
by nonpolitical civil servants.
Army Chief of Staff Hariri, who
opposes union with the UAR, has
taken over the Defense Ministry
in addition to his previous
duties and seems on the way to
becoming Syria's strongman.
Cairo has promptly charged
that the new cabinet is a set-
back for Arab unity and has
stated publicly that Egypt will
not accept domination of Syria
by the Baath.
There have been riots in
the northern Syrian city of
Aleppo, which continues to be
a pro-Nasir stronghold. It is
doubtful that any non-Nasirist
government, even one strongly
for union with Egypt, could
maintain order there without
severe repressive measures.
Aleppo's large urban Moslem
proletariat is almost solidly
pro-Nasir; the city's Chris-
tians, about 40 percent of the
population, remain on the side-
lines although they are bas-
ically anti-Nasir. The exist-
ence of such a substantial
Christian population helps en-
gender strong pro-Nasir senti-
ment among the Moslems. Tradi-
tional rivalry with Damascus,
the capital, is an additional
factor in Aleppo's dissidence.
Although the Iraqi regime
is as much under Baathist con-
trol as that in Damascus, Cairo
thus far has soft-pedaled its
antipathy toward the new cabinet
in Baghdad.
The new Iraqi cabinet is
essentially the same as the old
one, except that Baathist leader
All Salih al-Sadi has been shifted
from the key Interior Ministry
to the Guidance Ministry, while
retaining the title of deputy
prime minister. His replacement
is another strong Baathist.
Two non-Baathist critics of the
regime were dropped from their
posts. Their replacements were
a non-Baathist civil servant
and a Baathist former general.
An innovation in both the
Syrian and Iraqi cabinets is
the appointment of ministers of
state for "unity affairs" --an
attempt to continue the fiction
that the Baathists want to move
further toward a real union of
the two countries with Egypt.
Syrian Prime Minister Bitar
has used the creation of these
posts to imply that it is Cairo
that is lagging on unification,
since Egypt has not appointed
such a minister.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 10
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET i%lw
Cyprus: An early settle-
ment Virus' explosive munic-
ipal administration issue seems
less likely than ever. Follow-
ing a court decision late last
month invalidating unilateral
actions taken by both Turkish
and Greek Cypriots, leaders of
the two communities began talks
to try to resolve the dispute.
Last week they publicly acknowl-
edged they had failed. The
court decision has left the is-
land's five major towns without
local administration, and Presi-
dent Makarios has moved to rule
them directly--over the protests
of the Turkish community. Ten-
sions are rising, and one inter-
communal clash has already oc-
curred.
Greece and Turkey, which
together with Britain constitute
the "guarantors" of the London-
Zurich agreements which estab-
lished Cypriot independence, may
be drawn further into the dis-
pute. Athens has already urged
moderation on Makarios, but its
influence on him appears to be
waning. The Turkish Cypriots
are more responsive to Ankara,,
but the Turkish Government feels
itself under strong pressure to
support them rather than hold
them back. One of the Greek
Cypriot cabinet members has urged
the US to intervene to "kee us
from killing ourselves."
17 May 63
Congo: Prime Minister
Adoula's program for retraining
the Congolese armed forces is
giving him problems. There.con-
tinue to be Afro-Asian objections
to his selection of NATO members
and Israel as the countries to
supply the'instructors. More-
over, three of these states--
Norway, Canada, and Italy--
are reluctant to provide training
through separate bilateral ar-
rangements with Leopoldville
rather than under a UN umbrella.
However, despite probable
attacks at the African "summit"
conference in Addis Ababa and
at the new UN General Assembly
session on the predominant role
assigned Belgium, Adoula con-
tinues to insist he will not
give in and continues to reject
the idea of asking any African
countries to help.
Meanwhile UN officials
apparently plan to withdraw
all 12,000 UN troops from the
Congo by the end of the year.
Tshomb6 stated on 10 May
he would head a delegation
to Leopoldville soon to try
to resolve some of the remain-
ing problems of reintegrating
Katanga into the Congo proper.
A member of his entourage has
stated that Tshombd also plans
to go to France for a medical
checkup and rest.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
The "ecretement" (leveling-off) plan originated in Bonn, but has been
most vigorously espoused by France as an alternative to the US proposal
that -- with a limited number of exceptions -- all tariffs on industrial items
be reduced by 50 percent. As now generally understood, "ecretement" is
intended to achieve a harmonization of tariff levels by the major industrial
nations -- e.g., 10 percent for finished goods, 5 percent for semifinished,
and zero for raw materials. As a first step toward this, these nations would
reduce by 50 percent the difference between their present rates and the
suggested target rates, the remaining difference presumably to be eliminated
Iater.
The rationale for "ecretement" is derived primarily from the fact that,
while the average levels of the EEC's common external tariff (CXT) and the
US tariff schedule are about the same, there is a greater spread in the US
tariff rates. Most of the CXT rates fall in the 15-25 percent range, largely
because the high and low tariffs were eliminated when the EEC calculated the
CXT by averaging the national rates of the six member countries. About 22
percent of the US tariff rates, however, are above 30 percent, and these rates
apply to about 7 percent of the total volume of US trade. Supporters of the
"ecretement" plan have therefore alleged that the US would still retain
substantial protection even after these high rates are halved.
The US has vigorously opposed "ecretement" for a variety of reasons,
among them the fact that it would not result in as great a reduction in tariffs
as the US legislation proposes. Moreover, the US believes that certain low
tariffs -- which would not be reduced under "ecretement" -- may be as great
an obstacle to trade as high rates. Finally, "ecretement" would require larger
tariff reductions from the US than the EEC, thus failing to assure the US of full
reciprocity.
Concerning agriculture, the US has proposed that agricultural trade be
treated in the forthcoming trade talks in three categories -- those covered by
tariffs, those covered by other restraints (such as the EEC's variable import
levies), and those for which world-wide commodity agreements may be
negotiated. The US has also sought interim EEC guarantees against diminution
of its markets in the EEC for farm items. The EEC, however, has so far declined
to make any specific commitments as to how agricultural products should be
treated, because there are still major gaps in the EEC's common agricultural
policy (CAP). For example, the organization of the EEC's internal market for
dairy products, beef, and rice has yet to be decided, France and West Germany
are at odds over financing the CAP, and these two countries are also at opposite
l
h
f
po
es over t
e
uture support-price level for grains.
630515 2
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
SECRET
Europe
The 8-9 May meeting of the
Common Market's Council did little
to alleviate the problems facing
the US trade expansion program.
It authorized EEC participation
in the tariff negotiations envis-
aged by the Trade Expansion Act
(TEA), but the two sides are still
far apart on specifics.
The Council's mandate regard-
ing the TEA negotiations falls
short of US hopes in two important
respects. With regard to trade in
industrial items, it endorsed the
idea of a "linear, automatic, and
general" cut in tariffs, but
avoided any commitment to an across-
the-board reduction of 50 percent
as proposed by the TEA. Instead,
the Council suggested that the GATT
establish a working party to
"evaluate" the US and "any other"
proposals, referring specifically
to the problem allegedly posed by
the disparity between the US and
EEC tariff schedules. The effect
of this is to keep alive the
French-espoused "ecretement" plan
for harmonizing tariffs among the
major industrial nations--a plan
which the US rejects but which is
backed to some extent by France's
EEC partners. (See background data
on facing page.)
Although the Council agreed
"in principle" with the US posi-
tion that the GATT negotiations
should deal with trade in agri-
cultural products, this EEC com-
mitment is also imprecise. The
Council rejected the French demand
that GATT talks on agriculture
must await the full elaboration of
the EEC's common agricultural
policy (CAP), but also stated that
"thoroughgoing agricultural nego-
tiations will only be carried out
to the extent that the EEC will
have formulated common positions."
In effect, therefore, the easing
of trade restrictions in the ag-
ricultural sector is contingent--
as before--on the EEC's resolving
its deep internal differences
over farm policy.
In view of these positions,
it remains doubtful that prepara-
tion for the TEA negotiations can
be completed by early next year,
nor is their success assured once
they have been organized. Some
observers believe that France has
seized upon the "ecretement" plan
because it wishes only the minimal
reductions in EEC tariffs in keep-
ing with the objective of creating
an autarchic community. Neverthe-
less, Paris has marshaled consider-
able support among the other EEC
members for the argument that a
straight linear cut in tariffs
would leave the US with substan-
tial protection on certain im-
ports and deprive the EEC of
bargaining powers in any future
tariff negotiations.
It has also long been evi-
dent that France is tough on
the TEA issue in part to per-
suade the other EEC members to
complete the CAP. Protectionist
sentiment among the West German
farmers, however, is the main
obstacle to agreement on the
CAP, and France is not alone in
pressing for early agreement on
farm policy. Moreover, a Com-
mon Market restricted to free trade
in industrial products only is
neither the kind of community
envisaged by the EEC treaty nor
one which would likely prove to
be viable.
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
MW SECRET W
Europe
Political ferment in West
Germany and disagreements within
the European Economic Community
on various issues do not appear
to have set back Franco-German
cooperation. The treaty covering
their relations was overwhelm-
ingly approved by the lower house
in Bonn on 16 May with the sup-
port of the Social Democrats,
and the upper house is expected
to do the same when it meets on
31 May. The French plan to sub-
mit the treaty to their National
Assembly after ratification by
the German parliament.
The West German act of
ratification contains a preamble
which specifically asserts that
the treaty in no way conflicts
with Bonn's commitments to its
other North Atlantic allies and
in fact aims at promoting Ger-
many's established foreign poli-
cies. French Government spokes-
men will probably make similar
statements to the National As-
sembly when the treaty is pre-
sented, but will not have them
incorporated into the ratifi-
cation law.
Cooperation in the military
field continues at an even pace.
No specific date has yet
been set for De Gaulle's next
visit to Germany, although it
is expected to take place some-
time in July.
invited him to
Willy Brandt
West Berlin,
but De Gaulle's answer w
as
noncommittal, and such a
visit
seems unlikely at
this
time.
He did agree with
the
West
Berlin mayor, however,
that
a visit to the city
might
be possible in early 25X1
1964.
SECRET
17 May 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 13
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET 'S
Europe
ITALY'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT
The immediate problem fac-
ing the new Italian Parliament
is the make-up of the interim
government pending clarification
--at a party congress set for
18-21 July--of the Nenni Social-
ists' future relationship with
the government. Continuation
of the center-left formula is
the aim of the cabinet parties
and their Socialist parliamen-
tary allies, but agreement on a
prime minister remains a stum-
bling bloc.
head a temporary regime and prob-
ably would prefer to hold off
until he could be assured of
increased Nenni Socialist back-
ing. Should Fanfani be forced
out, other possible interim suc-
cessors include: Interior Min-
ister Taviani, Chamber of Dep-
uties President Leone, Industry
Minister Colombo, and Benigno
Zaccagnini, head of the Christian
Democrats' parliamentary group.
Premier Fanfani's enemies
want to oust him, but no likely
successor wants to head a care-
taker government. Christian
Democratic Party Secretary Moro,
who is generally favored to suc-
ceed Fanfani, would be unwilling
to.relinquish his party post to
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Whether
the Socialists actually enter
the cabinet will depend in large
degree on the attitude of the
Christian Democrats' right wing.
Page 14
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
25X1
The scene inside Haiti
appears quiet and dictator Du-
valier's position at least
temporarily more secure than
ever.
The regime, meanwhile, is
turning its efforts to rally-
ing demonstrations of "popular
support." Presumably the stage
is being set for the mass cele-
bration scheduled to take place
in Port-au-Prince on 22 May.
Duvalier on 15 May publicly
denied he was contemplating
leaving the country. He said
also there was no truth to
reports he would declare Haiti
a "socialist republic" on 22
May. The Haitian consul in
Miami reportedly believes, how-
ever, that if Duvalier remains
in power through the end of the
month, he will take his coun-
try out of the Organization of
American States and turn to
Cuba or the Sino-Soviet bloc
for aid. Factors impelling
him in this direction, accord-
ing to the consul, include the
urgings of his Marxist-inclined
minister of public works and
trusted lieutenant, Luckner
Cambronnp, and the 12 May an-
nouncemetht of the formation
of a Haitian "government in
exile" under politicians Louis
Dejoie and Daniel Fignold.
The Dejoie-Fignol6 organ-
ization evidently constitutes
an attempt by leading exile
figures to bury differences
temporarily and attract wide
support from the Haitian people.
Its two primary leaders have
been political rivals at least
since early 1957 and differ
ideologically, although both
used Castro's radio to prop-
agandize against Duvalier in
1959. Dejoie is a conservative
from the small, formerly dom-
inant mulatto class, while
Fignold is a demagogic non-
Communist leftist who enjoys
considerable support among the
mass of Haiti's Negro laborers.
Both men probably would attempt
to overshadow the independents,
leftists, and democratically
oriented reformers they claim
are associated with them now.
There have been no indi-
cations that any government
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 15
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
HAITI
UNITED STATES
MEXICO
BRITISH
HONDURAS
NICARAGUA
COSTA RICA
PANAMA
HAITI DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC PUERTO
RICO
GUADELOUPE
MARTINIQUE
BARBADOS
~BRITI SH
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
W SECRET W
Western Hemisphere
will grant recognition to the
Dejoie-Fignole group. Dejoie
told the press he expected rec-
ognition from Dominican Presi-
dent Juan Bosch, but a public
.statement by Bosch on 15 May
appeared definitely to rule
out this possibility. The exiles
may also have hoped for recog-
nition by Venezuela, which of-
ficially severed diplomatic
ties with Haiti on 15 May, but
Venezuelan officials have stated
that recognition would not even
be considered.
Other Haitian exile groups
have denounced the "government
in exile." Pierre Rigaud, a
leader of the Dominican-based
"Democratic National Union"
organization, has asserted that
the only "valid" Haitian govern-
ment would be "the one that
arises within Haiti."
Bosch appears to be disen-
gaging himself from events in
Haiti and to be giving the ini-
tiative to the OAS--for which
he has little respect--and to
the United States. He told
Ambassador Martin on 14 May he
would "do nothing whatever about
Haiti now," since the "psycho-
logical moment" for acting had
passed. Dominican troops are
withdrawing from the border area
and can be expected to continue
to do so if the situation re-
mains calm. All could be quick-
ly redeployed, however.
Dominican authorities ap-
parently prevented a Haitian
exile group in their country
17 May 63
from invading Haiti on the night
of 14-15 May. This group, iden-
tified as the "United Revolu-
tionary Front" of Jacques and
Raymond Cassagnol, may have
intended to take over an area
of Haiti in order to permit
the Dejoie-Fignole group to
establish itself there and
press for recognition abroad.
Raymond Cassagnol, obviously
furious over the Dominican
action, has charged US inter-
ference and has threatened
continued "sabotage and terror-
ism" in order to topple Duvalier.
Ambassador Thurston in
Port-au-Prince suggests some
dramatic new move in French-
Haitian relations--possibly
a French invitation to Duvalier
to visit France in the near
future--may be imminent. He
notes that Haitian officials
have evidently been pleased
with the contents of a recent
letter from De Gaulle to Du-
valier. Duvalier had appealed
to De Gaulle in March for eco-
nomic aid, and this subject
presumably was taken up in the
French President's reply.
The Liberian ambassador
to Haiti, author of a recent
proposal discussed with US
officials to appeal to Duvalier
to step down, now has changed
his view. He told Ambassador
Thurston on 14 May that, since
Duvalier may feel he has come
through the recent crisis in
relatively good shape, this
would be the wrong psycholog-
ical moment to make such a
demarche.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
%W SECRET
Western Hemispher
Argentina's latest cabinet
crisis is not likely to be resolved
for at least several more days.
Meanwhile, the intense political
maneuvering before the 20 May dead-
line for inscription of candidates
for the 7 July elections is adding
to the political unrest.
President Guido has so far
managed to replace half his eight-
man cabinet, which resigned on 12
May, but he will probably need an-
other week or two to complete it.
A major difficulty is probably the
reluctance of those approached to
accept short-term appointments
during a period of political tur-
moil that is likely to last until
the inauguration of a new govern-
ment, set for 12 October.
Former Interior Minister Rauch
precipitated the cabinet resigna-
tions. As part of his campaign
against the "corrupt" influence of
ex-dictator Peron, ex-President
Frondizi, and Frondizi's adviser,
Rogelio Frigerio, he published
statements implying malfeasance in
office on the part of four minis-
ters. While many military and
civilian elements supported Rauch's
general line, they considered his
tactics clumsy, overdrawn, and a
possible threat to the election
schedule.
Rauch's successor is Brig.
Gen. Osiris Villegas, whom embassy
officials consider an able officer
and thoroughly pro-Western. He
strongly supports army commander
Ongania, the dominant figure behind
Guido, and is on record in favor
of going through with the elections.
Appointed labor minister was
Bernardo Bas, lawyer and trade
union adviser,
was approved
by Ongania. Temporary appointments
include Acting Foreign Minister
Tiburcio Padilla, a former health
minister, and former Public Works
Minister Zubiri, who is handling
the economy ministry.
In the meantime, Peronist
leaders are disturbing the polit-
ical atmosphere by their deliber-
ately two-sided electoral strategy.
Peronist Coordinating Council
President Matera declared in a
radio and television address to
his party on 13 March that their
Popular Union (UP) party would not
take part in any electoral fronts,
The front's formation--by the
UP, Frondizi's UCRI, and five'other
small parties--is a matter of pub-
lic record, but Matera's speech,
guises Peronist intentions.
SECRET
17 May 63 , CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 17
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
SECRET *wO Western Hemisphere
SHOWDOWN IN BRITISH GUIANA
;25X6
Neither the Jagan government
nor the Trade Union Congress shows
any disposition to make the com-
promises necessary to settle British
Guiana's general strike, now in its
.fourth week. The government's dec-
laration of a state of emergency
last week increased tension, and new
disturbances could break out at
any time.
Premier Jagan, influenced by
extremist advisers, refuses to with-
draw the controversial labor legis-
lation that caused the walkout.
Japan on 15 May requested the
legislature to extend the state of
emergency for three months. Despite
some waverers, his small majority
in the assembly is expected to hold
firm. This makes remote the possi-
bility of a no-confidence vote on
the way he has handled the strike
situation.
TENSIONS IN COLOMBIA
The tensions and security build-
up generated last week by the threat
of demonstrations to promote the po
litical comeback of ex-dictator Rojas
Pinilla are symptomatic of the deep
sense of uncertainty that now per-
vades Colombia's political life.
Bogota, on 10 May, was an armed camp.
Up to 4,000 persons were detained,
business activity was severely cur-
tailed, and public transportation
came nearly to a standstill.
Underlying much of the current
uneasiness is a widespread lack of
confidence in President Valencia's
administration stemming from dis-
satisfaction with his failure to do
Jagan's recent offer to re-
sign and hold new elections was a
ploy indicative of the tensions he
is under, because the terms in
which it was couched are not accept-
able either to the British or the
opposition partied.
Meanwhile, the government, act- 25X1
ing under its emergency powers, has
started to take over the distribu-
tion of food and fuel, both of whiff
are in short supply. Shortages may
remain acute, however, if workers
elsewhere in the Caribbean, not-
ably in Trinidad, embargo shipments
to British Guiana as a token of
support for the strikers. Govern-
ment officials claim they have asked
Cuba for petroleum products, a
request Havana might honor as a
gesture of solidarity with Jagan.
anything about steadily deteriorat-
ing economic conditions. The cost of
living, for example, is up 20 per-
cent since December and still rising.
Also, Colombia's poor foreign ex-
change position could develop into a
balance-of-payments crisis before the
end of the year.
The sense of futility created
by these conditions is stifling
business, prompting an increased
flight of capital, and aggravating
unemployment. Valencia, by allowing
the situation to drift as he has, is
try will spread.
thus courting more trouble for his
regime. There is a strong likeli-
hood that labor unrest already man-
ifest in the strikebound oil indus-
SECRET
17 May 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 13
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
 Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0
Approved For Release 2009/03/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000090001-0