WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6
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RIPPUB
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S
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31
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December 21, 2016
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February 3, 2009
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1
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Publication Date: 
June 7, 1963
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SUMMARY
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*01110 I v une 19Fi. OCI No. 0283/63 Copy No. 78 WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE State Dept. review completed. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ARCHIVAL RECORD PLEASE RETURN TO AGENCY ARC?- IVES SECRET GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 SECRET C O N T E N T S (Information as of 1200 EDT, 6 June 1963) CUBA CASTRO'S REPORT ON HIS SOVIET VISIT His speech reinforced the impression in the Cuban- Soviet communique that Havana intends for the pres- ent to concentrate on consolidating the revolution and to avoid provocation of the United States. SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY Cubans seem to be training in cruise-missile o - erations at Campo Florido/ THE COMMUNIST WORLD SOVIET BLOC GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT New equipment being issued is improving the fire- power, mobility, and conventional combat capability of Soviet and European satellite ground forces. RUMANIAN OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION POLICIES A high-level Soviet delegation which visited Ruma-' nia from 24 May to 5 June apparently made little headway in settling Soviet-Rumanian differences. CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME EASES CULTURAL POLICY A marked softening, if not reversal, of the hard- line policy will probably encourage still more de- mands for change, regardless of Moscow's position. PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S SUMMER HARVEST NOT GOOD Because of unfavorable weather, the important early grain crop will probably not exceed last year's poor harvest; Peiping is purchasing more SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 SECRET W THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page the officer corps over the slow pace of moderniza- tion, as well as a feeling that political controls hamper the armed forces' effectiveness. (Published separately as Special Report OCI No. 0283/63A) ASIA-AFRICA LAOS TALKS MAY RESUME While Premier Souvanna and Prince Souphannouvong spar over arrangements, Communist military activ- ity is increasing. AFGHANISTAN RESUMES RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN This will strengthen the new regime of King Zahir and Prime Minister Yusuf, open the Pakistani access route to Afghan trade, and could allow the govern- ment to ease its Soviet-supported military program. RELIGIOUS LEADERS SPARK RIOTS IN IRAN Opposition to women's suffrage and land reform underlies the demonstrations, but the mullahs ap- parently lack broad popular support and the secu- rity forces seem ample to handle the disturbances. INTERNAL PROBLEMS BESET YEMENI REGIME President Sallal apparently sees union with Egypt as the answer to financial difficulties and reli- gious friction, but Nasir is unlikely to approve. KENYATTA'S PARTY VICTORIOUS IN KENYA As the country's first prime minister, Kenyatta has named a well-balanced,comparatively moderate cabinet to consolidate his victory and prepare for independence early next year. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Nod SECRET COMMON MARKET DISCORDS EEC agricultural and foreign ministers made some progress on minor problems at their 30-31 May meetings in Brussels, but the Community remains deeply divided on key issues. WESTERN HEMISPHERE SITUATION IN HAITI Open mainifestations of resistance to the dictator continue to decline, but any effort to implement Duvalier's "self-sacrifice" economic program could touch off new demonstrations. CONTINUED STALEMENT IN BRITISH GUIANA The general strike which began on 22 April has become a test of political strength, with the likelihood of violence increasing. ELECTIONS STILL SET FOR 9 JUNE IN PERU However, the military may still cancel or invali- date them to prevent a victory by a leftist pres- idential candiate. ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Prospects appear improved for holding elections on 7 July as scheduled, but considerable uncertainty still surrounds selection of key candidates. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 SECRET CASTRO'S REPORT ON HIS SOVIET VISIT Castro's 4 June report to the Cuban people on his visit to the Soviet Union added lit- tle substantive information to that contained in the 23 May joint Cuban-Soviet communique. His report does, however, re- inforce the implications in the communique that Cuba intends for the present to concentrate on the consolidation of the revolu- tion and avoid provocations of the United States. It also seems apparent that the visit has resulted in at least a temporary resolution of Cuban- Soviet irritations, and has brought Cuba closer to Moscow's side on a wide range of issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Castro was effusive in his praise of all things Soviet and particularly of the organization and efficiency of Soviet industry and agriculture. By contrast, he was unusually deprecatory of Cuban progress and abilities in the efficient organization of production. On economic matters, Castro said Khrushchev himself had suggested the increase in the price Moscow pays for Cuban sugar but revealed that the in- crease agreed upon was only from 40 to 60 per pound, whereas the world market price is in the neighborhood of 120. The effect will be to increase the balance- of-payments support Moscow must grant to compensate for the im- balance in Cuban-Soviet trade. Thus it is essentially a "book- keeping" operation, although it does increase long-term Cuban indebtedness to the Soviet Union. On military matters, Castro said he had been highly impressed during his visit to Soviet missile installations and praised Soviet weapons technology as "the basis of superiority over the imperialists." He made no references to any Soviet promises of future military assistance. On the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Cuban leader stated that he had urged "the need for discus- sions" to overcome differences between world Communist parties. He said,"We have to understand the Soviets and the Chinese," but emphasized that Khrushchev is working for "unity in the socialist camp." Soviet propaganda on the results of Castro's visit con- tinue to reflect the importance the Soviet leaders attach to the visit as a symbol of Cuban support of Soviet views prior to the Sino-Soviet bilateral talks set for 5 July. Pravda.'s 26 May editorial singled -out the Cuban-Soviet communique's endorsement of Soviet peaceful coexistence policies and its appeal for Communist unity. Pravda pointedly added its own comment that coexistence is the "only" correct policy and that any "violation" of unity is a disservice to world Communism. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 SECRET SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY cruise missile equipment, apparently from the training facility at Campo Florido, was observed set up adjacent to the operational cruise missile site at Santa Cruz del Norte, 25 miles east of Havana. The equipment was apparently returned to Campo Florido This second apparent mobility exercise within a month in- volving the Campo Florido in- stallation suggests that Cubans are training in cruise missile operations there SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR Page 2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 SELECTED SOVIET GROUND EQUIPMENT DISPLAYED IN MAY DAY PARADE MOSCOW, 1963 SS -1 (SCUD) SURFACE-TO- SURFACE MISSILE T-55 MEDIUM TANK (SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO T-62) i AMPHIBIOUS ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (EIGHT WHEELED) Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 i Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 SECRETI SOVIET BLOC GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT confirmed the wide spectrum of com- bat armament and equipment becom- ing available to bloc ground forces. Despite the obvious Soviet emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons, mili- tary planners have not neglected development of conventional arms. The highlight of a display in May by the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) was the first ap- pearance in the field of a T-62, the USSR's new medium tank. This is the latest Soviet answer to the 'US M-60 and is further evidence that Moscow recognizes the prime importance of armor in either nu- clear or conventional combat. The T-62 mounts a 115-mm. smooth-bore gun which uses armor-piercing am- munition with the very high muzzle velocity of 5,300 feet per second, as compared with 3,300 for the 100-mm. projectile fired by the earlier T-55. This significant firepower increase allows the T- 62's gun to penetrate 4.5 inches of armor under optimum conditions at 60 degrees obliquity. Although the new gun increases the tank weight by a half ton (to 40.5 tons), it does not materially affect the tank's mobility. The tactical surface-to-sur- face SS-1 (Scud) missile, although not a new weapon, was sighted for the first time last month in the GSFG. The Scud has a nuclear as well as a conventional and chemical capability up to 150 nautical miles. Recent evidence has disclosed the presence of SS-ls in both Czech and Bulgarian ground units, strongly suggesting that all satellites now have or w this weapon. The Sovi grated antita into their gr the wire-guid Swatter (guid --recently se are mounted o cars--3 Snapp per car. Bot have the same istics: the c targets in th yard range an 14-16 inches An eight armored perso BTR-60P) has replaced the motorized rif new vehicle w capacity and ity. In conj engineer impr and bridge eq when complete more plausibl advance rate (62 miles) ?pe 11 shortly receive is have also inte- k guided missiles and units. Both d Snapper and the nce undetermined) n in East Germany-- amphibious scout rs or 4 Swatters are believed to general character- pability to engage 500- to 2,700- to penetrate f armor. wheeled amphibious nel carrier (the pparently now largely utmoded BTR-152 in e regiments. T#iis 11 increase lift ross-country mobil- nction with other vements in ferry ipment, this carrier, y issued, will make the Soviet planned f 100 kilometers day, despite numer- ous water crogsings in Europe. The issuing of this equipment indicates that the Soviets are continuing to improve and in- crease their firepower, mobility, and combat capability through a sustained equipment modernization program. This program implements the Soviet tactical doctrine that all ground forces on the nuclear battlefield will have to count on fighting as self-contained forma- tions, capable of conducting sus- tained combat, probably without contact with other friendly units. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 SECRET The Communist World RUMANIAN OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION POLICIES A high-level Soviet party delegation which visited Rumania from 24 May to 5 June apparently made little headway in resolving the differences between Moscow and Bucharest on certain Soviet- sponsored economic integration policies. The partial Russian commentary so far available gives no conclusive indication of the outcome, but statements from Bu- charest suggest little or no change in the views of the Ru- manian regime. Both sides, how- ever, paid lip service to the con- cept that the "socialist" coun- tries are bound by common aims and ideology. Although the Soviet dele- gation did not include any top officials, of the Council for Mu- tual Economic Assistance (CEMA), it was led by presidium member and Ukranian party Secretary Nikolai Podgorny and included Alexei Yepishev, former ambas- sador to Rumania. Such direct political intervention by Mos- cow probably was designed totper- suade Rumania that its national economic interests and coopera- tion with CEMA are not incompat- ible. Rumanian party First Secre- tary Gheorghiu-Dej,,at a final meeting with the delegation on 4 June,personally and publicly endorsed the position of the re- gime. This followed by six days a speech by party Secretary Ceausescu, also in the presence of the Soviet delegation, at the Brasov Tractor Works which made it clear that Rumania remains ad- amant. Ceausescu said the Rumanian Work- ers Party accepts Lenin's instruc- tions that the development of heavy industry is obligatory for every country building socialism. This statement is similar to one published in the Bucharest City Agitator's Notebook on 1 May. Dej not only reiterated these arguments but also stressed the need to recognize national sov- ereignty and independence--a ref- erence earlier used in the com- munique of the Rumanian party cen- tral committee plenum in March. Ceausescu also said, although Dej apparently did not, that "equal- ization of the level of develop- ment of socialist countries is an indispensable condition for the construction of Communist society." This view is shared by the Chinese Communists, although it has never been so explicitly stated even by them. His resort to an ideolog- ical argument similar to that used in the past by Communist China in its dispute with the USSR and his reference to Lenin's instructions may reduce the chance of compromise. Publication of the full text of Ceausescu's speech in Pravda on 31 May was Moscow's first public admission of the existence of a disagreement with Rumania. Concern reportedly has been mount- ing among the other satellites about Rumania's obstructionist stand. Additional information about the hastily arranged Kadar-Gomulka meet- ing on 16-18 May indicates that Hun- gary and Poland may make joint ef- forts to help resolve the conflict. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 W SECRET CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME EASES CULTURAL POLICY At the recent Writers Union and Journalists Union congresses in Czechoslovakia, the re- gime, apparently in response to pressure by the intellectuals, showed a willingness to permit at least the beginnings of real de-Stalinization in the, arts. In spirit and atmosphere these congresses were highly critical of the regime, and there were repeated demands for an end to "Stalinist" repression of the arts. Ignoring the hard-line con- clusions of the 1959 writers conference, the just completed third congress of the Czecho- slovak Writers Union reverted to the liberal line taken at its second congress in 1956. Three new secretaries, all lib, erals, were elected. Hard-line Chairman.Ivan Skala retained his post, but not without es- pousing some of the liberals' causes. Representing the party, Jiri Hendrych delivered a mild speech, the gist of which was "we trust you to help us build communism." After lengthy and somewhat apologetic remarks on the economy, Hendrych reminded the writers of their duty to educate the youth and to fight bourgeois idealism. From the writers' point of view his most promising remarks were his warning against publicly ostracizing an individual who comes under literary or polit- ical criticism, and the state- ment that writers are "not ex- pected to illustrate slogans and appeals" even though they must "not be isolated from the main stream of political life." A heated discussion fol- lowed in which leaders of the union were criticized for failing to oppose past campaigns against various writers. There were repeated appeals for more con- tact with Western intellectuals, if only to "know the enemy," and for an end to repressive measures. Traditional hard-liners jumped on the bandwagon of liberaliza- tion but came in for criticism nonetheless. Both the Czechoslovak and Slovak journalists congresses reflected the same line in their appeals for a freer press with less "direction from above." The Slovaks, as at their own writers congress in April, were more outspoken in their demands than the Czech journalists and even criticized them for not going far enough. This marked softening, if not reversal, of party leader Novotny's hard-line cultural policy may have stemmed from growing pressures upon him at home to liberalize--regardless of Moscow's position. The lively discussions at the Writers Con- gress and Hendrych's response. containing repeated appeals for moderation, cooperation with the party, and devotion to socialism indicate that the regime's new position is by no means unan imously approved or 100-percent liberal. The regime, however, did nothing at the recent con- gresses to stop the growing crit- icism, and its,promise not to punish artists guilty of "in- correct"political views will tend to encourage still more demands for change. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 W SECRET The Communist World PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S SUMMER HARVEST NOT GOOD China's early grain crops --which normally supply one fourth of its total annual grain production--will probably be no better this year than last year's poor harvest be- cause of unfavorable weather and the failure to expand acreage. Despite favorable planting conditions for winter wheat, the regime apparently did not main- tain even last year's below- normal acreage. Although weather conditions for this wheat were generally good through the winter, spring weather has included cold waves, dryness in the northern part of the wheat belt, and excessive rain in the southern portion. While Peiping claims that the.wheat crop is growing bet- .ter than in the past two years, it has displayed considerable concern that waterlogging may interfere seriously with the harvest. Heavy rains through- out the last months in the area of the Huai and Yangtze rivers have brought water levels up to flood stage in some areas. Heavy monsoonal rainfall is normal in this area during June and July. Severe and prolonged drought in South China may al- ready have caused losses in the early rice crop. Addi- tional losses are certain if there is further delay in the arrival of the monsoon rains. Coastal areas in southeast China are suffering one of the worst droughts in history; Hong Kong has had only 2.5 inches of rain this year compared with a normal 25 inches for the period. The drought has already delayed transplanting of rice, and resultant delays in harvesting will interfere with the care- fully balanced schedule for planting of intermediate and fall crops. In the meantime, Peiping con- tinues to purchase grain from the, West: A new contract was signed on 31 May with Australia for 1.2 million tons of wheat, bringing total Western contracts for de- livery this year to approximately 4.5 million tons. This figure may be raised after a Canadian grain- selling mission completes its sched- uled meeting with the Chinese this month. Peiping has the option of buying 1.5 million tons of grain from Canada on the basis of an existing agreement which runs through the end of this year. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pagie 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 0' jqyluong ng Yto Meng' Muongr? Sing.f N m Tha A NAMTHA Ban / Htauei Road --- Track or trail Airfield Luang" Prpbang V1Nong Khai T H A I L AND `~?-^-X?"'~. don a n i .Muong Kheung Ban Song Hoc e Phou Theneng Lai Chau -^- Ohang Khay Phong Savan PLAINS DE IV, RR Lot Houang ?'"~...,G,,,;.. ,S Muang Ubon 75 for) Miles Thanh Hoa SAVANNAK;HET ~,3'~,i,ep ne Muong Phine StARAVA NJE-' w ti Sarava /-- Pakse 0 I Attop u IPASSAK ? r SOUTH, VIETNAM Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 W SECRET Premier Souvanna has ac- cepted a proposal by Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong for resumption of talks at the Plaine des Jarres airfield, but they have not yet agreed on arrangements. Souvanna has rejected Souphannouvong's conditions that a Pathet Lao guard force be present, that Kong Le release certain Pathet Lao prisoners beforehand, and that neutralist ministers come to Pathet Lao headquarters at Khang Khay for preliminary discussions. In his answer Souvanna pointed out that he did not have a security de- tachment at the previous meetings at Khang Khay, and that prelim- inary details could be handled by Pathet Lao representatives stationed in Vientiane. Communist military activity, meanwhile, has been stepped up, and Kong Le's position on the Plaine des Jarres is further threatened. Communist pressure is concentrated against neu- tralist positions at Lat Bouak, on the northern edge of the plain, and against Phou The- neng, a hill commanding Route 4 near Lat Houang on the southern edge. Capture of these positions would improve Pathet Lao capability to move against Kong Le's bases at Muong Phanh and Muong Kheung. The Communists have also increased pressure on Kong Le garrisons in south-central Laos. Although direct clashes have not yet occurred, Communist intimi- dation has led to withdrawal of Kong Le forces from Muong Phine, while the position. of other neu- tralist troops at Mahaxay and Nhommarath is also in jeopardy. The morale of Kong Le's forces both in the Plaine des Jarres and elsewhere is low. The USSR continues to sup- port Pathet Lao efforts to paralyze the International Control Commission (ICC) and to blame the US for the deteriorating situation. Moscow agreed to the 29 May co-chairman's appeal for negotiations among the three Laotian factions only after gaining British consent to a formula designed to strengthen Communist insistence that all important ICC decisions require both unanimity within the commission and the consent of the Laotian coalition govern SECRET Page 7 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Afghanistan -Pakistan PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 SECRET Asia-Africa AFGHANISTAN RESUMES RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN The resumption of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan after a 21-month break was an- nounced on 28 May. This should strengthen the new regime of King Zahir.and Prime Minister Yusuf in Kabul and help it re- turn to a more balanced neu- tral position between the West and the bloc. The agreement provides for the re-establishment of consu- lar and trade as well as diplo- matic relations, all of which had been demanded by Kabul. The Afghan Government now will again allow Afghan trade with the free world to use the nat- ural Pakistani route rather than require it to go through Iran or the Soviet,Union--a move Afghan trading interests will welcome. The improvements in rela- tions with Pakistan will give Kabul less reason to,channel resources into its military establishment. This could help restore a more cautious approach to Soviet military assistance programs, which include military training. However, Kabul prob- ably will continue to avoid any abrupt actions which might raise doubt about its relations with the USSR. The fall in March of the Pakistan-baiting Daud regime set the stage for the agreement by allowing Pakistan to ease its own line toward Kabul. Once negotiations got under way, the Ayub government agreed to Kabul's principal term j Pakistan hopes that the agreement will encourage favor- able trends in Kabul, and is using it to underscore its own flexibility on regional disputes in contrast to India's alleged obstruction of progress regard- ing Kashmir. The two countries thus side-stepped the dispute which led to the break in relations in September 1961--Afghanistan's demands that the Pushtoon tribes living on the Pakistani side of the border be given the right of self-determination. Although the new Afghan regime has obtained a settlement es- sentially on the same terms set by the Daud government, it will still have to cope with die-hard supporters of Daud's Pushtoon- istan campaign who may continue to agitate on the issue. SECRET Page 8 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 W SECRET The rioting that began in Tehran on 4 June and has spread to other Iranian cities arises out of religious opposition to two key elements of the Shah's reform program--women's suffrage and land redistribution. The direct leadership is provided by religious leaders (mullahs) of the Moslem Shiite sect, but it is likely that other opposition groups, such as landowners and University of Tehran students, have had a hand in the demon- strations. The tension between the government and the fanatic ele- ment among the clergy has been growing in recent months, with clashes between mullah-led crowds and government forces occurring in several cities. The government was forewarned that trouble could be-expected during the annual month-long period of religious mourning that began on 25 May. It decided, however, to permit religious processions and gatherings and even anti- government statements in sermons as long as the Shah was not per- sonally attacked. Meanwhile, a strong effort was made to split the mullah leadership and win over influential Shiite person- alities to the government's cause. After a dispute between local security forces and a group of religious demonstrators in the shrine city of Meshed in northeast Iran resulted in the death of a policeman, the government reacted by arresting the spiritual leader of the Shiites, Ayatollah Khomeini, and a number of his closest supporters. The massive demon- strations which partially wrecked the Tehran bazaar on 5 June were initially in response to his arrest. Although the mullahs have incited the bazaar crowds of the larger centers to violence, they appear to have' little real support among the Iranian people generally, who voted overwhelm- ingly for the Shah's program in the 28 January national refer endum. Iranian officials seem convinced that Egypt's Nasir is behind the planning and or- ganization of the rioting. Military and security forces seem ample to cope with the disturbances, although their leaders will need to use them more effectively than they have done with tribal insurgents. Both gendarmerie and military units used against the Tehran rioters on 5 June appeared ' willing and well disciplined, and their loyalty seems un- questionable. The Shah is evidently determined to deal harshly with the leaders of the dis- turbances, but if the trouble intensifies to the point where it seems to threaten general internal security he might seek to temporize or come to terms with the opposition. His tactic in this case might be to find a scapegoat, per- haps Prime Minister Alam, whom he could dismiss. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 SECRET INTERNAL PROBLEMS BESET YEMENI REGIME The Yemeni republican govern- ment is beset with a growing num- ber of internal problems--primari- ly financial difficulties and religious frictions--which it ap- parently hopes to ease by uniting with Egypt. President Sallal now is in Cairo probably making a strong plea to Nasir, who is re- luctant to assume Yemen's problems. Dissatisfaction within the regime with Sallal's leadership has also been increasing. On 25X1 26 May, the governmen arrested several civilians and military per- sonnel on charges of plotting, and at least three were executed and dragged through the streets. The Yemeni disengagement agree- ment remains bogged down in the UN pending Soviet agreement to forego a formal Security Council meeting to approve the UN inspectior operations in Yemen. The long delay has less- ened considerably the chances of suc- cessfully implementing the plan. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Page 10 I 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 rr--qp am" KENYA Tribal names shown in Red ZA142I BA ^ N(U K.) 13457 35 \d 4f 4,0 bCAN Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 W SECRET W KENYATTA'S PARTY VICTORIOUS IN KENYA Kenya's first prime minis- ter, Jomo Kenyatta, appears to be moving rapidly to consoli- date his party's overwhelming victory in the late May.elec- tions and to prepare his coun- try for independence early next year. Kenyatta's National Union (KANU) won control of both houses of the National As nearly two-thirds of the all-important lower house-- and three of the six regional assemblies selected. The rival Democratic Union (KADU), with 24 percent of the vote, suc- ceeded in preventing KANU con- trol of the three regions in- habited by the lesser tribes and in winning enough seats in the Senate to block any.post-inde- pendence constitutional change. Kenyatta will probably proceed cautiously to avoid inciting KADU's tribes to violence, lest independence be delayed. The 15-man cabinet is a Ca- pable, comparatively moderate group, well representative of the country's tribes and regions. The 65-year-old Kenyatta has balanced the various KANU fac- tions with evident success and preserved full flexibility for eventually designating his heir apparent. KANU's capable secre- tary general, Tom Mboya, named to the relatively insignificant Ministry of Justice and Consti- tutional Affairs, will neverthe- less be responsible for consti- tutional and independence nego- tiations with the British and laying the groundwork for an east African federation. Commu- nist-tainted opportunist Oginga Odinga received the Ministry of Homes Affairs--stripped of its police and internal se- curity functions. The British governor has "delegated responsibility" for his reserved powers--foreign affairs, defense, and internal security--to Kenyatta. Joseph Murumbi, as Minister of State at the Prime Minister's Office, will probably play a major role in these sensitive areas. Murumbi, a Goan-Masai half- caste educated in India, re- cently rose to prominence as KANU's treasurer. An able or- ganizer, he was largely re- sponsible for KANU's unexpected cohesion during the campaign. KANU leaders are likely to regard. their election victory as a mandate for early consti- tutional change. KANU would like to curtail the powers of the regional assemblies and simplify the present, almost unworkably complex constitu- tion. Mboya expects to go to London on 12 June to arrange for a final, pre-independence constitutional conference this fall. KANU is also strongly committed to forming a federa- tion with Uganda and Tanganyika. Kenyatta has already met with their prime ministers to discuss continued economic cooperation, the creation of a combined mili- tary establishment and eventual union. political SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 W SECRET Europe The basic conflicts in the Common Market continued to be evident at the 30-31 May meetings of the EEC agricultural and foreign ministers in Brussels. Progress was made on lesser is- sues, such as relations with Latin America, Turkey, and Iran, but on the key questions of relations with London and Washington, the Community re- mains deeply divided. On in- ternal problems, such as agri- culture, nationalist and protec- tionist sentiments are major obstacles to further integration, and the institutional machinery creaks and groans under the weight of the decisions it has to produce. The 30 May decision of the agricultural ministers to in- crease the import levy on poul- try--despite strong US pressures for a reduction--is indicative of these strains. The action was apparently taken without clearance with the foreign ministers. Subsequent attempts to reduce the levy were vetoed by West Germany, evidently be- cause the EEC's poultry policy heretofore has permitted sub- sidized Belgian., and French poul- try to invade the German market. The growing predominance in EEC affairs of "technical" ministers of the member coun- tries and the corresponding decline in the influence of the foreign and economic ministers and of the "independent" EEC Commission has been increas- ingly recognized in the EEC as a dangerous trend. The technical ministers have shown themselves not only highly responsive to pressures from national inter- ests and lobbies, but also lack- ing in appreciation of the EEC's responsibilities to the outside world. However, West German Foreign Minister Schroeder, who has proposed measures to cor- rect the situation, did not attend the Brussels meetings, nor did such ardent integration- ists as Spaak of Belgium and Luns of the Netherlands. Developing frictions be- tween France and West Germany were especially evident in the widely publicized clash be- tween Erhard and Couve de Mur- ville over a German proposal for formalized consultations between the UK mission in Brussels and the permanent delegations of the six EEC countries. Although Couve held that such arrange- ments would give'London undue influence over EEC policy, Er- hard adamantly insisted on aspecial relationship for Brit- ain--making it clear that, until it is established, Bonn might stall indefinitely on farm policies of interest to France. The desire to avoid a gen- eral fiasco probably accounts SECRET CU::RENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 W SECRET y Europe for some headway being made on other issues. The minis- ters did, for example, agree to propose the establishment of "contact' groups" between the EEC and the Latin American missions accredited to the Com- munity. Despite Greek ob- jections, the ministers also agreed on the terms of an "associat*on" offer to. be made to Turkey. The offer includes preferential entry into the EEC for several export items of importance to the Turks--an approach which the EEC is pro- posing also to take with Iran, and which has been cited by the US mission in Brussels as evidence of an EEC tendency to wink at the'most-favored-nation principle. The ambiguities in Bonn's European policies in general and the'views of Erhard in par- ticular were also a disquieting feature of the Brussels pro- ceedings. An ardent advocate of freer world trade, Erhard was.helpfulat the, recent GATT ministerial meeting in,op- posing the EEC's more protec- tionist forces.: He is also admired both inside and outside the Community for his apparent willingness to "stand up to Moreover, Erhard has a long record of support for a pref- erential industrial free trade area in Western Europe and an equally long record of opposi- tion to a fully integrated eco- nomic union of the Six. He is no friend of the Common Mar- ket experiment, which he con- siders too narrow and too prone to plan on the French model. As recently as 27 May, he told Ambassador McGhee that, he thought the EEC should be comosed of "free and equal nations" and that trade and tariff negotia- tions are too important to be entrusted to the "bureaucratic" EEC Commission. From the stand- point at least of opposing the development of tighter Com- munity institutions in Brussels, De Gaulle may find in Erhard an ally rather than an enemy. 25X1 SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 13 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 w SECRET Western Hemisphere Open manifestations of do- mestic resistance to the Duval- ier government continue to de- cline, but there has been no letup in hostility toward the regime, The populace's deeply ingrained fear of government repression is evidently pre- venting any substantial overt expression of opposition at this time, however. Further unrest among do- mestic elements could be provoked if Duvalier implements the plan he announced on 22 May for an elaborate "self-help" economic development program. This so- called "Plan of Urgency" is to 25X1 be based primarily on financial and other "self-sacrifices" by the people and the business com- munity. Duvalier has also made it clear that he would accept foreign aid from any source if no strings were attached. While the "Plan of Urgency" appears to have been initiated largely for propaganda purposes, it might involve moves by the regime to impose new tax bur- dens and extract additional "voluntary contributions" from the populace. Such efforts could backfire by touching off more antigovernment dem- onstrations. CONTINUED STALEMATE IN BRITISH GUIANA A settlement of British Guiana's general strike, which began on 22 April, may be in the offing although considerable difficulties,persist. As of 5 June no date had been set for resumption of negotiations between the government and the Trades Union Congress, and both sides are fearful of further compromises in a struggle that has become a test of political strength. Things have not gone well for Premier Jagan. Not only does he seem to have lost ground among elements who have been his staunchest supporters, but on 30 May he and three of his followers were suspended from Parliament for the rest of the session for insulting the speak- er. He was unable to reverse this suspension by legal ac- tion. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1.5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 SECRET Jagan is thus technically without a parliamentary major- ity but as premier he can, with the governor's permission, re- gain control by proroguing Par- liament and then calling a new session. He could also call new elections. In any 'case, his opponents seem to be at a loss as to what to do in.the event Jagan should lose office. Meanwhile, the threat of violence is increasing. The governor has banned large public meetings, and some 300 persons were arrested on ,2 June in an Western Hemisphere effort to prevent further clashes between Negroes and East Indians like the one that occurred last week during the funeral of one of Jagan's min- isters.. The police are be- coming concerned over the in- crease in incidents and believe it is only a matter of time before.a major interracial clash occurs. Violence could also flare up again in connection with the imminent arrival of two ships from Cuba bringing food and fuel which Jagan would use-to gain olitical advantage, 25X1 25X1 All outward signs seem to indicate that Peru's elections will be held on 9 June as sched- uled, although rumors persist that the military will either cancel or postpone them at the last minute. Election officials are putting the finishing touches on the administrative arrange- ments, while the candidates con- tinue to campaign in earnest. Peru's 9 June a ections: one road leads -to cancellation of the elections by the army, another straight ahead to an elected government, and the third to annulment of the elections if the results are not satisfactory to the army. 25X1 In the electioneering, there has been a minimum of political horse-trading as all four presi- dential candidates have preferred to go it alone. There seems to be an equal chance that either Fernando Belaunde, an opportunistic ex-arch- itect, or Haya will win the neces- sary one-third of the total vote to qualify for the presidency. If neither qualifies, or in case of a tie, the selection of a president will be up to the new congress. Whether the military will go along with the verdict remains to be seen. 25X1 7 Ju Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 - 16 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 %0 %0 SECRET Western Hemisphere ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Argentina's prospects for holding general elections on 7 July as scheduled appear to be improving. Top military lead- ers are continuing special se- curity measures and have reit- erated their determination to see the elections through. The tension that had been building up during the Peronist-sponsored "Protest Week" has subsided af- ter the one-day general strike on 31 May, which climaxed the protest, passed without violence. A great deal of uncertainty still surrounds the selection of some key candidates. Ex- president Frondizi's Intransi- gent Radical Civic Union (UCRI), now headed by Oscar Alende, is threatened with a split over the selection of a presidential candidate. A party meeting has been under way in Cordoba this week to try to decide whether to stand by the UCRI's earlier nomination of Alende or to switch to Vicente Solano Lima., the candidate just announced by the Peronists' Popular Union (UP) Party. As of March, Aleude commanded majority support in the UCRI There is strong military and civilian pressure to block Solano Lima on grounds that he would be a mere tool of Peron, Frondizi, and the latter's ad- viser, Rogelio Frigerio. Whatever the UCRI decides will affect the political for- tunes of the Peronists, since the UCRI and the UP are the only important members of the seven- party National and Popular Front. While not formally registered as a political grouping, the front members believe that by working together they stand a good chance of electing enough presidential electors to control the electoral college. In any case, Argentina's electoral system does not bind electors to vote for the candi- date of their party, so an ele- ment. of uncertainty will remain until the electoral college meets on 31 July. SECRET 7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 17 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2009/02/03: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120001-6