WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OCI jTo. 028 /63
Copy No. 91
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 20 June 1963)
SINO-SOVIET GULF WIDENS AS "UNITY" TALKS NEAR
Recent declarations and actions by both the Chinese
and Soviet Communists reinforce the conclusion that
there is virtually no prospect of resolving any of
their substantive differences in next month's talks.
SOVIET PARTY PLENUM DISCUSSES IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 4
Keynote speaker Ilichev admitted Soviet society is
plagued with ideological ills, but advanced no spe-
cific plan for eradicating them. Khrushchev may do
so in his closing address, however.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S NOVOTNY MOVES TO REASSERT CONTROL
He has again condemned purge victims earlier con-
sidered fully rehabilitated, warned his outspoken
Slovak critics, and scheduled explanatory TV inter-
views on the economy and ideology.
EAST GERMANS SEEK MORE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC
Inauguration of a new crossing point from West Ber-
lin near East Germany's Schoenefeld Airport presages
new moves to advance Schoenefeld as the "internation-
al" air terminal for the Berlin area.
COMMUNISTS INCREASE PRESSURE IN SOUTHERN LAOS
General Phoumi is concerned over the neutralists'
weakening position and has reinforced Lao army
posts in the area.
INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY SHIFTS
Sukarno may be moving away from the left for the
moment as he seeks to get more Western economic
aid and to improve Indonesia's standing among
other nonaligned countries.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
FINNISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ELECT NEW CHAIRMAN
They hope to end the political isolation forced on
them by the dominant Agrarians on the ground that
the Social Democratic leadership does not support
the official policy of friendship with Moscow.
DRIVE FOR EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION
Kenya and already independent Tanganyika and Uganda
hope to federate by the end of the year when Kenya
gains its independence.
STALEMATE OVER RHODESIAN FEDERATION ENDS
Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Field has agreed
to attend talks on dissolving the federation, but
his party's right wing may desert him on the issue.
TSHOMBE FLEES THE CONGO
Under threat of arrest, he Probably will not
back soon
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EUROPE (continued) Page
GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS SUBSIDES
Outgoing premier Karamanlis has backed the care-
taker government formed by Panayotis Pipinelis to
prepare for new elections.
CONTINUING TURMOIL IN ARGENTINE POLITICS
Adverse reaction to the endorsement by both Peron
and ex-President Frondizi of an unpopular presiden-
tial candidate for the Peronist-backed front has
further disturbed the chaotic political situation.
THE NEW BRAZILIAN CABINET
President Goulart's latest combination of leftists,
moderates, and nonentities is no more likely than
his previous cabinets to pose any obstacle to the
country's leftward drift.
SPLIT IN ECUADOR'S COMMUNIST PARTY
An apparently irreparable break over the issue of
peaceful versus violent means of attaining
power coincides with new pressure on the govern-
ment to crack down on the left.
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Recent declarations and ac-
tions by both the Chinese and So-
viet Communist parties reinforce
the conclusion that there is
virtually no prospect of resolv-
ing any of their substantive dif-
ferences in their bilateral talks
opening on 5 July. The Chinese
in their belated reply to Moscow's
30 March letter, again forcefully
demonstrated that they are not
coming to the meeting in a spirit
of compromise. The Soviets, more
in deeds than in words, have in-
dicated that there is no give in
their position either.
New Attacks From Peiping
On 15 June, the Chinese de-
livered to the Soviets what will
probably be the last in the ex-
change of letters between them
before the "unity" meeting con-
venes in Moscow. The timing of
the letter and some of its state-
ments suggest that it was planned
to coincide with the opening of
the Soviet central committee
plenum opening on 18 June. How-
ever,its content over-all--a long,
intransigent position paper, in-
sulting in tone and bristling with
unconcealed attacks on the Soviet
party--seems intended more for
the international Communist move-
ment than for Moscow. The letter
not only was printed in People's
Daily on 17 June, but was im-
mediately broadcast around the
world and has been published,
along with the other letters in the
series, in a pamphlet which will
undoubtedly be widely distributed
wherever Peiping feels it can
exert an influence.
This last letter was an at-
tempt by the Chinese to define
more sharply the differences
between themselves and the "mod-
ern revisionists" over 25 points
of "principle" which they feel
should be discussed at the Mos-
cow meeting. The issues range
widely, from the mistaken view
of general policy the Chinese
profess to see in Soviet words
and actions; through the USSR's
incorrect tactics in foreign
policy, its mishandling of prob-
lems in the international Commu-
nist movement, and its exercise
of "great-nation chauvinism" in
respect to other Communist regimes;
to the degeneration of Marxism-
Leninism in Soviet domestic
doctrine and society.
Peiping's decision to set
forth in so stark a fashion its
rigid, fundamentalist views in
opposition to the somewhat more
liberal, pragmatic Soviet ap-
proach reflects its arrogant
confidence, perhaps over-con-
fidence, that in the conte%t
the tide of opinion within the
movement is flowing in the di-
rection of China. The Chinese
methodology resembles Lenin's
constant insistence on clearly
marking the boundaries between
himself and the Menshiviks in
their earlier disruptive no-
holds-barred ideological battle.
This approach entails some
danger for the Chinese. Earlier
in the dispute, they generated
a, great deal of sympathy for their
views when they concentrated on
fewer issues and presented them
in a more generalized fashion.
Now that the range has been ex-
tended to Soviet practices and
views, the possibility of equiv-
ocation on the part of other
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Communist parties has been nar- solidify support from others,
Moscow's Restrained Reply
The Soviet party apparently
continues to believe that it can
best prevent the Chinese from
adding to their past. successes
in the int_er.na.tiona.l_ Communist.
movement by.ma.intaining_its
righteous pose as the champion
of courtesy.and "unity." On
18 June, the Soviets published
a statement noting receipt of
the letter, regretting its tone
and distortions., and expressing
the hope that the Chinese, like
the Soviet. Union, would "concen-
trate their. efforts on what
unites" the two parties rather
than on what separates them.
The statement also explained
that the USSR at this time would
not publish the letter--which,
like earlier Chinese communica-
tions, taunted the Soviets for
their failure to publish
Peiping's views as the Chinese
publish attacks on themselves--
since it would only lead to a
renewal of bitter polemical
exchanges, which have aided in
Chinese efforts to undermine
Soviet leadership.
In fact, for the most part,
the USSR has lived up to its
self-proclaimed ban on polemical
attacks. While firmly maintain-
ing its well-known positions,
so contrary to what the Chinese
preach, and continuing its ef-
forts, as in its extravagant
wooing of Castro last month, to
it has not returned to. the peak
pitch reached just before the
East German party congress in
January. Its actions, however,
or in some cases its refusal to
act, have proved that it remains
as intransigent as the Chinese
and consequently have infuriated
Peiping.
Soviet Foreign Policy Moves
The Soviet-Yugoslav rap-
prochement, one of the key ex-
hibits in the Chinese case for
Soviet revisionism, has contin-
ued to prosper, with Moscow
even praising Yugoslavia's new
and controversial "socialist"
constitution. A recent report
from a diplomat in Belgrade
states that a Yugoslav delega-
tion will be in Moscow around
1 July to negotiate a role for
Yugoslavia as observer in the
bloc economic organization CEMA.
Soviet actions with re-
spect to India also continue to
contain a heavy anti-Chinese
flavor, particularly Moscow's
un-Marxist "neutrality" in the
Sino-Indian border question and
its continuing deliveries of
aircraft which the Indians use
in support of their forces on
the border.
In agreeing to meetings
with US high-level negotiators
in Moscow on 15 July for further
discussion of a nuclear test ban,
the USSR has shown in another
field that it will pursue its
own policies with little regard
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The Communist World
for Chinese feelings or views.
Although prospects are slim for
any better results in these than
in earlier talks, Peiping views
with deep disapproval any Soviet
negotiations with the West on
this and related subjects.
These delegations to dis-
cuss agreements with the USSR,
which the Chinese view as inim-
ical to their own interests, will
be in Moscow at approximately
the same time as the two Communist
regimes face each other across
their negotiating table. Such a
juxtaposition does not appear at
all accidental and certainly will
not appear so to the Chinese.
Some of the Soviet actions
have been met by the Chinese with
an eloquent silence. Although
the final Soviet-Cuban communique
was printed by People's Daily,
there was no comment y Pe-fpfng
on Castro's month-long trip in
the Soviet Union. Prior to that
trip, Castro's activities had
been widely publicized by the
Chinese. The forthcoming East-
West negotiations in Moscow were
dismissed by China with a two-
line announcement.
Peiping's Unrestrained
Restrictions
The Chinese are coldly vitu-
perative about other matters,
however. They have issued a con-
stant stream of protests alleging
Indian violations of Chinese ter-
ritory, apparently building up
a case of innocent injured party,
and they have again accused a "cer-
tain socialist country" of failing
to support a socialist ally when
attacked by a bourgeois country.
On 16 June, they editorialized on
the failure of the Geneva
Conference co-chairmen (the
USSR and the UK) to condemn al-
leged Western and US violations
of the agreements on Laos. The
editorial was obviously in-
tended to demonstrate for other
Communist parties the sharp con-
trast between the proper Chinese
support for militancy in a revolu-
tionary situation and the im-
proper Soviet caution.
It is on the question of
Yugoslavia that the Chinese have
vented their full anger. After
republishing an earlier Tito
speech which had set forth Yugo-
slavia's views of Chinese errors,
People's Daily on 15 June.sav-
agely attacked Yugoslav revision-
ism, carefully tarring the Soviet
Union with the same brush by im-
plication. The Chinese proclaimed
that Tito's views were but "spit-
tle collected from the cuspidors
of the imperialists and other
revisionists"--an obvious ref-
erence to 'Chrushchev.
Both sides nevertheless
continue to pay lip service
to the need for "unity" and
proclaim loudly that they each
are working to that end. Both
are apparently still ready to
meet on 5 July as if that meet-
ing could be meaningful in terms
of unity. The Chinese were the
more honest, however, in their
editorial on Tito when they boldly
said that their dispute with the
revisionists was "irreconcilable."
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SOVIET PARTY PLENUM DISCUSSES IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
Moscow has admitted that
contemporary Soviet society is
plagued with a wide variety of
ideological ills. The opening
speech at the. Central Committee
plenum on ideology--delivered by
Party Secretary Leonid Ilichev
on 18 June--clearly indicated a
widespread lack of faith in Com-
munist theory and practice.
Speaking in an essentially
negative and defensive vein,
Ilichev blamed the whole gamut of
doctrinal problems on the influence
of bourgeois morals and on "rem-
nants of the past in the minds of
the people." He declared that the
West has gone over to a policy of
"ideological subversion" and psy-
chological warfare, and his unu-
sually harsh characterizations of
Western morality appear to reflect
concern over the extent to which
the Soviet populace, particularly
the youth, has been infected by
alien ideas. He lashed out, for
example, at young people who "occa-
sionally howl about an attack on
freedom of the individual and on
democracy." He asserted that it
is.impossible to build a Communist
society without eradicating ves-
tiges of bourgeois morality.
The failure of many to become
personally involved in the drive
to communism also came under fire,
as Ilichev catalogued a multitude
of activities and attitudes which
are unacceptable to the regime.
In addition to such common whipping
boys as thieves, hooligans, swin-
dlers, parasites, and drunks, he
included officials who continue
to behave like little Stalins,
those who pr
omise much but de-
liver little,
glory-seekers, and
private prop
erty interests. He
also admitte
d that religion is
on the rise
in the Soviet Union.
Despite
the virulence of
his attacks,
Ilichev advanced
no specific
proposals for solv-
ing the problems he raised. A
considerable
portion of the
speech was devoted to general-
izations on the need for better
political education of youth
and for intensified efforts to
create a "new Communist man"
devoid of any vestige of bour-
geois thought. Veiled threats
against those who "consume well
but work poorly" could, however,
result in some future cutbacks
in their economic or financial
status.
Since the plenum is almost
exclusively concerned with the
domestic ideological situation,
Ilichev gave scant attention to
the Sino-Soviet dispute. He
asserted that Soviet Marxism
is the only correct model and
reaffirmed the doctrinal valid-
ity of Khrushchev's peaceful
coexistence policy.
that time.
most certainly be revealed at
Ilichev's address may have
been intended to set the stage
for the real business of the
plenum. After several days of
"debate" on his report--during
which lesser party luminaries
deliver the requisite promises
of better ideological work--
Khrushchev will probably deliver
a concluding speech. If the
Kremlin has devised any new plans
for liquidating the ills which
Ilichev described,they will al-
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MIROSLAV HYSKO
Slovak journalist whose public-attack on the regime
brought strong reaction from party leader Novotny.
Hysko was unanimously elected to the presidium of the
Slovak Journalists Union after his speech .
LACO NOVOMESKY
Supposedly rehabilitated along with former Slovak
leader Gustav Husak, both were attacked by Novotny
for their continued roles as leaders of Slovak nationalist
demands. The Slovaks are not likely to calmly accept
Novotny's renewed attacks on these men and what they
represent.
JOSEF LENART
Chairman of the Slovak National Council
since October 1962
Chief spokesmen for Slovakia in Prague, they flanked
Novotny during his speech in Kosice. Brought to their
important posts by Novotny, they may ignore their
particularly Slovak commitments and support the present
regime. Neither man, however, has taken a public
stand for or against Prague's new line.
ALEXANDER DUBCEK
Slovak party first secretary since April 1963
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`wi SECRET The Communist World
Czechoslovak party leader Novot-1 public acknowledgment of his ties
ny has responded vigorously to mount-
ing pressures for more liberaliza-
tion--pressures which threaten to
topple him. The Slovaks, who have
the additional aim of advancing their
nationalist aspirations, are playing
a leading role in applying those
pressures.
In a major policy change--re-
vealed in a speech on 12 June at
Kosice, symbolic home of modern Slo-
vak nationalism--Novotny reversed the
regime's attitude toward certain vic-
tims of past Stalinist purges. He
said that former Slovak leaders,
Husak, Novomesky, and others "in the
eyes of the central committee remain
guilty of violation,oJ the princi-
ples of party unity" despite their
judicial rehabilitation. The Czech-
oslovak central committee had an-
nounced to the party in April that
these men would be fully rehabili-
tated, and the Slovak party press,
along with the Czechoslovak and Slo-
vak writers' anti journalists' unions,
had enthusiastically welcomed them
back to public life.
Novotny also offered some de-
fense, of his close colleague Premier
Siroky, who was severely criticized
for Stalinism by Slovak journalist
Miroslav Hysko at the late May Slo-
vak journalists' congress. Novotny
implied that Siroky was in "princi-
ple correct" in the very policies
Hysko--and the Slovaks--attacked.
This somewhat weak defense was
coupled with a sharp warning to spe-
cific Slovak editors and writers
-ghat they were following a "danger-
ous road." Besides indicating
Novotny's concern over growing Slo-
vak dissidence, such statements also
probably reflect his sensitivity to
with Siroky and the purges.
Novotny also rebuked the Slo-
vak party daily for publishing
"hysterical attacks against the
party." This suggests that Hysko's
remarks about Siroky and the
Prague leadership were printed
without Prague's knowledge or pos-
sibly against its wishes. In any
case their publication attests to
the strength, in Slovakia at
least, of supporters of a liberal
policy.
Prague apparently hopes to
calm popular discontent and pres-
sures by a series of television
interviews, to begin next week,
with top party and government
personalities on economic and
ideological questions. There is
no assurance, however, that his
tactics of repression and expla-
nation will stop Slovak dissi-
dence-or the pressures to liber-
alize. The Slovak party, through
its press and various mass organ-
izations, has committed itself to
the full rehabilitation of Novo
mesky and Husak--who have become
symbols of Slovak aspirations. Al-
though those Czechs pressing for
liberalization are probably less
concerned about the fate of these
men as individuals, Novotny's reha-
bilitation program had represented
for the Czechs an important first
step in the direction of de-Stalin-
ization.
Novotny's opponents probably
believe that he is unable or un-
willing to revert to the Stalinist
measures of repression he knows
best. They will therefore probably
continue their demands and exert
still greater pressures for a more
liberal leader who can control the
party.
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Inauguration by the East
Germans of a new crossing point
on the Berlin sector/zonal bor-
der on 15 June presages new
moves to advance Schoenefeld
Airport in the Soviet zone as
the "international" air terminal
for the Berlin area. They want
to restrict. use of this Walters-
dorfer Chaussee crossing point-,
which permits ready access from
West,Berlin to Schoenefeld, to
travelers with an East German
visa valid for Schoenefeld or an
air ticket valid for the day of
their crossing. The East German
airline, Interflug, which re-
cently inaugurated a direct
flight to Vienna, now will prob-
ably seek to expand its services
to the West and later to induce
Western airlines to fly directly
to Schoenefeld rather than to
the relatively cramped downtown
West Berlin airports.
Schoenefeld is well equipped The East Germans already
and could handle, without further control all non-Allied freight
modification, a substantial in- and passenger traffic to West
crease in traffic. An elaborate
expansion program designed to
make it one of the finest air-
ports in Europe has been under
way since 1959. A new terminal
and other passenger and air con-
trol facilities went into opera-
tion in the fall of 1962.
Berlin via rail and highway,
and have long wanted to control
air traffic as well. The Ulbricht
the city.
regime has prepared much of the
legal framework necessary for
claiming full authority over
Western commercial carriers.
Such additional East German
control would considerably
weaken West Berlin's independ-
ence and viability, and further
the Communist goal of isolating
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La{ Chat
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Muong Hie
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\rd' 4411110
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COMMUNISTS INCREASE PRESSURES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
The Communists are step-
ping up their military efforts
against key areas in Lags as
the political stalemate -on-
tinues.
Communist military activity
in the past week has been
directed primarily at neutralist
positions in south-central Laos.
Neutralist evacuation of
Mahaxay., Nhommarath, and Lak
Sao give the Communists virtual
control over the major routes
through Laos between North and
South Vietnam and greatly in-
creases the vulnerability of
Thakhek on the Mekong, still
held by General Phoumi's Lao
Army forces. Phoumi had be-
come increasingly concerned by
the weakening neutralist posi-
tion.
In southernmost Laos, the
Lao Army has reinforced its
besieged forces in the Attopeu
area with two battalions.
The situation in the Plaine
des Jarres remains quiet, with
the Communists continuing their
small-scale efforts to push
Kong Le's forces out of their
positions on the northern and
southern edges of the plain.
Muong Hiem, a neutralist out-
post north of the plain, has
recently come under attack.
Relations between Souvanna
and General Khamouane, the op-
portunistic "neutralist" com-
mander in Phong Saly Province,
remain tenuous. Khamouane has
rejected Souvanna's demands
that he report personally to
Vientiane. Subsequently,
however, Souvanna agreed to
resume supply flights to
Khamouane, and further deteri-
oration inrelations may thus
be halted.
25X1
25X1
Communist-held Phong Savan 25X1
on the Plaine des Jarres.
Meanwhile, no significant
political progress has been
achieved. Premier Souvanna
will probably reject Pathet
Lao chief Souphannouvong's
"agreement" on 19 June to
hold preparatory talks at
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A series of Indonesian
foreign policy developments with-
in the past month involves a
tactical shift away from the
left. The relatively slight
change apparently derives from
President Sukarno's desire to
get economic aid from the West
and from an assessment of recent
policy failures.
The developments have in-
cluded the decision on 27 May
to adopt in great part an eco-
nomic stabilization plan recom-
mended by the International
Monetary Fund, the conclusion
of an agreement on 1 June with
three large Western oil companies
permitting them to continue
operations on a contract basis,
a request in late May to Japan
that it intercede with the
Olympic Committee to permit In-
donesia's readmission to the
Olympic Games, and the abrupt
reduction in early June of overt
opposition to the proposed
Malaysian Federation.
Sukarno had decided some
time ago to accept large-scale
Western aid if it could be ar-
ranged, and may have delayed
decisions on the stabilization
plan and oil companies in order
to preserve doubt as to his
intentions. Indonesia's un-
sportsmanlike handling of the
Asian Games in Djakarta last
November which resulted in its
expulsion from the Olympics had
helped tarnish Indonesia's in-
ternational image, especially in
Asia and Africa.
The changed policy toward
Malaysia reflected concern over
the ineffectiveness of Indonesia's
efforts to frustrate the
Malaysian concept by 31 August
--when the federation is to
come into being--and concern
over the poor reception many
nonaligned governments accorded
the anti-Malaysian campaign.
The new course emphasizes a
peaceful solution of area prob-
lems and is calculated to
counter the impression of an
expansionist Indonesia hypo-
critically supporting the am-
bitions of neighboring areas
for self-determination. Sukarno
may also have reasoned that an
aggressive anti-Malaysia policy
could endanger his Western aid
prospects.
There are indications that
Sukarno regards the Sino-Soviet
dispute as offering him another
power factor to juggle in his
over-all policy of noncommitment
and'acceptance of aid from all
sides in the cold war. Djakarta's
relations with the bloc chiefly
involve efforts to reschedule
payments on the $650 million
Indonesian debt to the USSR.
Since the settlement last August
of Indonesia's claim to West New
Guinea--a struggle which the
USSR strongly supported--Djakarta
has pursued bloc relations with
less intensity and reportedly
has tried to extricate itself
from some of its purchase commit-
ments.
Sukarno will use the new
policies to test reactions of
the Indonesian Communist Party.
Now dominated by its militant,
pro-Peiping faction, the party
is still generally committed to
support the President but has
criticized the recent policy
trend.
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DRIVE FOR EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION
The leaders of Kenya and
of independent Tanganyika and
Uganda are driving hard to fed-
erate their countries by year's
end--concurrent with Kenya's
achievement of independence.
In the three weeks since
Kenya became self-governing,
President N.y.er.er.e of Tanganyika
has moved-rapidly to bring about
his long-held dream of East
African federation. His talks
early this..month with Kenya's
Kenyatta and.Uganda's Obote
produced agreement in principle
to federate and set up a com-
mittee of ministers which hopes--
with the help of UN advisers--
to write a constitution before
September.
This will involve settling
the sensitive issue of where
the Federal capital will be
located, deciding whether the
federal chief of state will have
executive powers or be largely
a figurehead like India's presi-
dent, and dividing powers between
the central government and the
member states. The outlook at
present is for a strong federal
government with a central parlia-
ment, its own revenue powers,
and responsibility for foreign
policy.
The three countries already
have considerable experience in
regional cooperation--their com-
mon currency, customs, communica-
tions, and transport now are
managed through a joint organi-
zation--but opposition to
federation can be expected from
such traditionally conservative
elements as Uganda's tribal
kings and Kenya's minorities.
Despite the difficulties, Kenya's
governor believes it not un-
likely that final agreement can
be reached by the end.of 1963.
A Kenyan ministerial delegation
now in London is using impend-
ing federation as a lever to
press Britain for full inde-
pendence by that date and the
right to amend Kenya's constitu-
tion to conform with that of
the federation.
As now projected, the fed-
eration would be Africa's
fourth largest and third most
populous country, but Nyerere
regards it as only a nucleus.
Zanzibar will be offered mem-
bership after it attains self-
government on 24 June, and
Nyerere believes membership
might quickly be extended to
Rwanda and Burundi and later
to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land. He looks on such a larger
federation as possibly the only
means of avoiding a violent
solution of the complex consti-
tutional and racial problems
of the expiring Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Ken-
yatta hopesthat Somalia might
join and thus subsume the
dispute over Kenya's Somali-
inhabited northeastern region,
but Mogadiscio will insist on
a favorable settlement of the
dispute first.
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Kampala / REP.
KEN
YA
Nairobi
,?c/t~rauik ;,.::mar es Salaam
SOUTH-WEST
AFRICA
0 MILES 500
33575 K
NYASALAND MOZAMBIQUE
OF RHODESIA- -.
FEDERATION
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STALEMATE OVER RHODESIAN FEDERATION ENDS
Southern Rhodesian Prime
Minister Field's announcement
that he will attend talks on the
dissolution of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland paves
the way for a peaceful breakup
of the ten-year-old grouping.
Field had threatened to boy-
cott the talks unless Britain
agreed to grant independence
to his white-controlled terri-
tory as soon as African-dominated
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land received it. A trip to
London, however, apparently con-
vinced him that Southern
Rhodesia would lose more than
it would gain from delaying the
Federation's breakup and that
his colony could not survive if
it declared itself independent
unilaterally.
The conference is to open
in the Federation on 28.June.
TSHOMBE FLEES THE CONGO
Tshombe's hasty departure
from Katanga for Europe on 14
June capped the progressive de-
cline in his influence since
January and may mark the end of
his role in the Con o for some
time.
Short of a change
of government in Leopoldville
or, even more unlikely, a guar-
antee against prosecution, he
probably will not soon return.
To save face for Field--and for
Federation Prime Minister Welensky,
who backed Field's intransigent
stand--it is likely to be short
and largely perfunctory. Although
Field reportedly secured London's
agreement that Southern Rhodesia's
internal affairs will not be
discussed, he may have trouble
retaining the support of his
party's right wing for his
participation in the talks.
If the party splits on this
issue, Field would probably be
forced to depend on the racial
moderates of former Prime Min-
ister Whitehead--a situation
which might eventually lead to
an amelioration of the govern-
ment's white-supremacist poli-
French officials have thus
far denied Tshombd official
entry because he lacks a Congo-
lese passport
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Europe
The election of a political
moderate as chairman of Finland's
Social Democratic Party improves
prospects for its reconciliation
with President Kekkonen's domi-
nant Agrarian Party. By'retiring
aged anti-Soviet Vaino Tanner
and dropping an influential exec-
utive committee leader also re-
garded as openly hostile to
Moscow, the Social Democrats are
making a strong bid to end the
political isolation into which
the Agrarians have forced them.
The new chairman elected at
the 15-16 June congress is
Rafael Paasio, who accepted the
post apparently on condition
that Vaino Leskinen, the com-
mitteeman identified with the
intransigent Tanner element,
step down. Leskinen refused to
withdraw voluntarily, but was
not re-elected.
Before the congress met,
there were indications that some
party members suspected Paasio
of "vacillation" and of being
too responsive to pressures from
the Agrarians and Soviet officials
in demanding Leskinen's retire-
ment. They proposed to elect
present Vice Chairman Olavi
Lindblom instead. Lindblom's
name was never presented in
formal nomination for the top
post, however, probably because
a compromise leading to emergence
from political isolation was
the overriding consideration
by all groups in the party.
The party leadership has
been under constant attack by
the Agrarians, who claim that
the Social Democrats do not
support the official foreign
policy of neutrality and friend-
ship with the USSR. The Agrar-
ians, with the approval of
Moscow, have stipulated that
Social Democratic participation
in Finnish government could come
only after resignation of three
leaders--Leskinen, Lindblom,
and Party Secretary Kaarlo
Pitsinki. Lindblom and Pitsinki,
however, have retained their
posts.
Nevertheless, as the
changes which have been made
are essentially a gesture of
compromise, the Social Democrats
probably now expect the Agrar-
ians to consider renewed co-
operation between the two
parties. It is still uncertain
however, whether the Agrarians
will interpret the shift in
leadership as sufficient proof
of good will, or whether they
will press their advantage and
insist on further revisions
in the top Socialist echelon.
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Europe
Asa-result of a compromise on
17 June between Greece's King Paul
and outgoing Premier Karamanlis,
former Minister of Commerce Pipi-
nelis has been able to form a new
government. Karamanlis, who prob-
ably felt the crisis had to end if
his National Radical Union (ERE)
was to be preserved, waived his
objection to a government headed
by a politician and thereby ter-
minated the impasse.
Although ERE member Pipinelis
will be both premier and foreign
minister, this is a caretaker govern-
ment, composed largely,of nonpar-
tisan personalities. It is to
prepare for elections which prob-
ably will be held -after several
months, under the modified propor-
tional electoral system used in
1961. It will also endorse the
royal visit to Britain scheduled
for 9 July--which Karamanlis.op-
posed and which prompted his resig-
nation. Opposition Center Union
leader Papandreou has indicated he
will not oppose a government of
this nature.
Karamanlis will leave the coun-
try while the royal visit takes place,
probably as a further gesture of dis-
association from responsibility for
any Communist-inspired demonstrations
involving the royal family. His
stand on this issue has greatly en-
hanced his popularity, but a natural
erosion of this sentiment can be ex-
pected if the interim period before
the elections is at all lengthy.
However, he is unlikely to see a po-
litical threat in Pipinelis, who has
no-personal political following.
While the ERE has emerged in-
tact from the crisis, pressure of
centrifugal forces within the party
undoubtedly played a part in Kara-
manlis' compromise with the King.
These strains may be felt for some
time. Of the triumvirate Karamanlis
has designated to run the party in
his absence, one actively intrigued
against him in the crisis, one played
an equivocal role, and one, while
loyal in this case, helped bring down
Karamanlis' government in 1958. Kara-
manlis may hope through this maneuver
to heal wounds inflicted by the
crisis, but he has promised to re-
main abroad until elections are an-
nounced and a prolonged absence
from the country could weaken his
personal authority.
The Palace would probably
welcome such a development. Al-
though disclaiming any desire to
split the ERE, it would probably
prefer another, more amenable,
leader of the party. The royal
family will almost certainly make
use of its close personal relation-
ship with Pipinelis to attempt to
inject itself more directly into
day-to-day government action}.
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Western Hemisphere
CONTINUING TURMOIL IN ARGENTINE POLITICS
As Argentina's 7 July election
date nears, its chaotic political
situation is further disturbed by
adverse reaction to the endorsement
by ex-dictator Peron and ex-Presi-
dent Frondizi of an unpopular but
pliable presidential candidate for
the Peronist-backed National and
Popular Front (FNP).
The election of Vicente Solano
Lima, president of the small Popu-
lar Conservative Party, is deepen-
ing the splits among the Peronists.
Some now are calling for abstention
at the polls, while others--in-
cluding former party president
Matera, who resigned on 23 May--are
seeking new political coalitions at
this late date. The majority are
wincing at a conservative candidate,
but many are reported maintaining
loyalty to the organization, taking
some hope from the fact that presi-
dential electors are not legally
bound to vote for their party's
candidate in the electoral college
on 31 July.
The dissidents charge that the
Peronist organization has sold out
to Rogelio Frigerio, Frondizi's
dential candidate--and is ex-
ploring new coalitions.
The adverse reaction to So-
lano Lima reportedly has reduced
fears among civilian and military
leaders that he might win a major-
ity in the electoral college, but
some officers insist that he be
banned because of the manner of
his-~selectton and his statements
favorable to the Peron dictator-
ship. Consequently the government
issued a decree on 19 June for-
bidding the candidacy of presiden-
tial electors from FNP member par-
ties.
The decree will produce loud
protests but, in trying to recon-
cile sharp differences of opinion,
reflects the government's deter-
mination to hold elections on
schedule. While the Peronists
will not be able to vote for Pe-
ron's choice, they will be able
to vote for one of several candi-
dates who were considered earlier
as more likely and more popular
FNP presidential candidates. Re-
tired General Leon Bengoa, for
example, reportedly will head the
slate of three neo-Peronist parties.
rigerio, who is regarded
as a symbol of corruption and power
behind the Frondizi administration,
is widely disliked within Frondizi's
UCRI party, now irrevocably split
over the FNP nomination. Oscar
Alende has resigned as UCRI presi-
dent--but not as the UCRI's presi-
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Western Hemisphere
The cabinet reshuffle in
Brazil will do nothing to halt
the country's leftward drift.
Once again, President Goulart
has performed a balancing act
designed to satisfy all the po-
litical elements pressing in
on him. The new combination of
leftists, moderates, and nonen-
tities will momentarily solve
some of his immediate personal
political difficulties, but on
balance will leave the govern-
ment susceptible to continuing
pressure from the left.
Four of the new ministers,
including Foreign Minister Evan-
dro Lins e Silva, appear in-
clined to a leftward course,
and most of the others--includ-
ing even the three service min-
isters--are unlikely to oppose
it effectively. The most ex-
treme member is probably Lins
e Silva, who has a history of
pro-Communist activity and was
quoted last March as saying that
neutralism is only the first
step to the left for Brazil and
that ultimately "we must take
part in the construction of a
socialist world." Education
Minister Paulo de Tarso is the
leader of the Communist-leaning
wing of the Christian Democrats.
He replaces extreme leftist Al-
mino Afonso, who has worked to
strengthen Communist influence
in organized labor. More re-
cently, however, Afonso had
demonstrated increasing inde-
pendent strength which appar-
ently alarmed Goulart. Afonso's
dismissal almost certainly re-
sults from the President's
determination to brook no in-
terference in the labor field,
where his own political power
has always been based.
The most conservative of
the new cabinet ministers ap-
pears to be Finance Minister
Carvalho Pinto, ex-governor of
Sao Paulo. He is popular with
the Sao Paulo business community.
He may attempt to follow out-
going Foreign Minister Dantas'
policy of accommodation with
the United States and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund,
but does not appear Dantas'
equal in ability to secure sup-
port from Brazilian political
leaders for such a policy. The
embassy reports rumors that
Carvalho may in fact favor a
new policy of declaring a mor-
atorium on Brazil's debts rather
than continuing to seek for-
eign financial aid.
Labor Minister Oliveira e
Silva and Industry Minister
Joaquim Ramos will probably be
the cabinet's staunchest pro-
ponents of moderation. Oliveira
e Silva is a centrist, politi-
cally linked with the moderate
and effective Christian Demo-
cratic governor of Parana State.
Each successive Goulart
cabinet, despite the wide range
of political opinion represented,
has been as conducive to Brazil's
leftward slippage as the previous
one. This cabinet is no excep-
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Western Hemisphere
A split in the Communist
Party of Ecuador (PCE), which
became evident late last year,
has steadily widened to the
point where it may be irrepa-
rable. At the heart of the
dispute is the old question
of whether Communists should
seek power by violent revolu-
tion or by parliamentary meth-
ods. The "revolutionary" party
members--predominantly the
younger elements--have long
felt that the "bureaucratic"
members lack daring and initi-
ative, while the "bureaucrats"
believe the younger group to
be headstrong, undisciplined,
and foolhardy.
The crisis began last
month when a member of the PCE
central committee, Jose Maria
Roura Ce.vallos, was arrested
while bringing money into
Ecuador, allegedly provided
by Chinese Communists to
finance pro-Peiping propaganda
and guerrilla operations. On
29 May he was expelled from
the party for having gone to
China without the party's
permission. The expulsion was
engineered by Party Secretary
General Pedro Saad, who has
consistently opposed guerrilla
activity. On the same day, Saad
announced the removal of activist
leader Rafael Echeverria Flores
from the chairmanship of the
Pichincha Province Committee,
headquartered in Quito.
Quito on 3 June to take charge
of the Pichincha Provincial
Committee but found the faction
there almost solidly behind
Echeverria and in favor of
repudiating Saad and the PCE
Executive Committee.
The expulsion of Roura
Cevallos from the PCE probably
will be followed by similar
actions against Echeverria and
others. The expelled leaders
and their followers may then
form a rival organization; a
majority'of Echeverria's Quito
followers favor such a move at
once. The defectors may also
attempt some form of cooperation
with Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, a
free-wheeling, self-styled
guerrilla leader who claims to
have Chinese Communist support.
Ecuadorean authorities have
arrested ten leftist revolution-
aries since 1 May, a severe
blow to the formerly unhampered
left. The publicity surround-
ing these cases has created con-
siderable pressure on the
government to take stronger ac-
tion against the leftists, Al-
though Congress does not con-
vene until 10 August, respon-
sible political leaders are
already planning an intensive
investigation of leftist in-
filtration into the Foreign
Ministry and the ministries of
Development, Education, and
Government.
Saad traveled from PCE
headquarters in Guayaquil to
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