DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

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CIA-RDP79-00927A004100020002-5
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S
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12
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December 19, 2016
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REPORT
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21 June 1963 OC I No, 0285/63C Copy No. 79 SPECIAL REPORT DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-OQ927AO04100020002-5 Approved F Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-007A004100020002-5 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS. TITLE 18, USC,SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 117, the document must be handled within the framework of tshe i i m i tati on so imposed. Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004100020002-5 %0~ 111111110 SECRET 21 June 1963 DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE The countries of Fastern Europe have arrived at a point in their relations with Moscow where they can no longer be considered docile satellites. More and more frequently their national self-interests, rather than bloc interests, are being given primary considera- tion. While there are numerous practical and intangible factors which hold these countries to Moscow, the USSR realizes it must deal with them by persuasion rather than caveat or direct force. Satellite Self-Assertiveness Through a process of evolu- tion starting with Stalin's death, Eastern Europe's ties with Moscow have loosened to the point where the Soviet bloc now is more nearly an alliance of ruling elites sharing com- monly professed goals and sim- ilar political backgrounds. While this stage was bound to be reached sooner or later, its advent was hastened by Khru- shchev's early realization that Stalin's methods in dealing with Eastern Europe were self- defeating and had to be abandoned. With the adoption almost ten years ago by Moscow of a policy of permissiveness toward Eastern Europe, the stage was set for the regimes there to begin dealing with their coun- tries' particular problems in terms of greater self-interest and to give freer rein to na- tivist feelings when consider- ing Moscow's policies. Only Albania, however, has actually broken with Moscow. As Khrushchev recently said to a West German industrialist, he is faced with an emerging younger generation in the satel- lites eager for the better things in life, particularly consumer goods, food, housing and clothing. By his own ad- mission, Soviet ambassadors can no longer rule in Eastern Europe as they once did. The situation, Khrushchev said, reminded him of the father's problems with the son who has grown too big to spank. There is always that one spanking where the son turns on the father, kicks him in the belly, and sends him reeling. The desire and willingness of the Eastern European regimes to give precedence to what they conceive to be their own in- terests gained added impetus in the past year from a number of developments in the bloc. These include the drive acceler- ated since last June by the bloc's economic organization (CEMA) to effect meaningful bloc-wide planning and integra- tion, some aspects of which infringe on national self-interest. Moscow's feud with the Chinese Communists, for which the Eastern European leaders see no solution, and Albania's apostasy have en- couraged the natural, but usually suppressed, tendency of the SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-OP927A004100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04100020002-5 SECRET Eastern European leaders to as- sert themselves. Moscow's back- down in Cuba and inertia in Berlin, interpreted in some satel- lite quarters as evidence of Khrushchev's uncertainty, have also encouraged more independent policy making. Indeed, accord- ing to one reliable Polish source, Moscow is no longer providing expected guidance on key policy questions. Nevertheless, there remain powerful forces which hold the European Communist regimes to Moscow. Aside from a common ideology, these include fear that harder policies would follow an irrevocable break between Moscow and Peiping, and the unaccept- ability of China's militant pol- icies--which are the antithesis of those favored more and more in Eastern Europe. There is thus little likelihood at this stage of any attempt by the satel- lites at an armed breakaway from Moscow. "Many Roads" to Socialism The past year's developments in the Communist world, in par- ticular Moscow's rapprochement with Yugoslavia and the widening of the Sino-Soviet rift, were accompanied by a broadened inter- pretation of Moscow's concept of "roads to socialism." By giving the stamp of approval to Yugoslavia as a "socialist" country and ignoring Belgrade's many unique internal policies, Moscow has tacitly accepted, if not sanctioned, more open pursuit in Eastern Europe of policies reflecting national interests. SECRET The USSR in effect is ac- cepting an incipient stage of national communism, most clearly practiced in Poland, for all Eastern Europe. In return the USSR expects undeviating sup- port for its foreign policies and for its position in the dispute with Communist China. Foreign Policy Differences While the East European re- gimes adhere to the general lines of Soviet policies in foreign affairs, some of them have become more independent according to the dictates of their national interests. Po~- land long has pursued a complementary, rather than identical, foreign policy-- except in UN affairs--geared to the general idea that Poland's interests are close to those of the USSR. Even in the sensi- tive Sino-Soviet dispute, Warsaw maintains broader state rela- tions with Peiping than other bloc countries do. Poland has taken the lead in improving rela- tions with West Germany eco- nomically and politically and signed far-reaching agreements with Bonn this spring permitting the establishment of trade of- fices in Warsaw with semidiplo- matic status. The example of Polish re- lations with the West may en- courage other East European countries to effect more mean- ingful relations with both the US and West Germany. Hungary seems to be on the verge of reaching a similar agreement with Bonn and, along with Bulgaria Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-0 927AO04100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A00 100020002-5 SECRET and Czechoslovakia, seems pre- pared to improve relations with the US. Rumania also has begun to take a more independent stance. In late March, reportedly with- out prior consultation with its allies in the Warsaw Pact, Bucharest resumed normal dip- lomatic relations with Tirana. Rumania alone among the "satel- lites" has yet to re-establish party contacts with Tito, al- though Yugoslav-Rumanian eco- nomic relations are increasing. While the USSR and the other bloc countries sharply attacked the Common Market as an obstacle to international trade during the recent meeting of the UN Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, the Rumanian delegate gave only a short and noncom- mittal declaration. Later at this meeting, while discussing the economic consequences of disarmament, the Soviets at- tacked the Western attitude at the Geneva disarmament confer- ence. The Rumanian delegate promptly took the floor to op- pose "losing our time and dis- cussing political problems" and to bring the discussion back to the economic and social conse- quences of disarmament. In time the differing interests of the regimes in Eastern Europe are likely to exercise greater influence on bloc foreign policies. Soviet plans to link the East European economies more closely through supranational CEMA plan- ning have brought diverse reac- tions. The northern industrial countries--especially Poland and Czechoslovakia--support the policy, while Rumania has vig- orously opposed proposals which would have the effect of cur- tailing projects it sees as essential to its national eco- nomic growth. As integration plans are presented by the USSR in CEMA, others--perhaps Bulgaria and Hungary, already reported con- cerned about CEMA plans--are also likely to question certain moves which once would have been accepted. Kadar's mid- May journey to Poland reportedly was in part for the purpose of discussing the possibility of Hungary's association with Poland, East Germany, and Czecho- slovakia--whose representatives have recently met to examine plans for joint development of certain border regions. Hungary reportedly made its approach be- cause of its difficult economic relations with Rumania. Nevertheless, the East Eur- opean countries continue to sup- port certain multilateral CEMA- sponsored undertakings--such as Friendship oil pipeline, the electric power grid, and increased coordination of rail and ocean SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-0; 927AO04100020002-5 East Germany: 'AP&QYl fio lease 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-009 :0 &%93-5 A problem for his friends as well ,is .,is guideline now is: "He who is not enemies, against us is with us." Poland: Wladyslaw Gomulka Plagued by party cliques and diminishing popularity. EASTERN EUROPE TODAY "It is incorrect to evolve a certain model--to adhere to it in relations with other socialist countries. It would be an error to condemn as renegades alI those who do not fit that model ... " N. S. Khrushchev, 12 December 1962 Albania: Enver Hoxha Bloc member in name only. Rumania- Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej Suddenly disobedient to Moscow's CEMA plans, Czechoslovakia: Antonin Novotny Faces growing pressure for de-Stalinization. Yugoslavia: Marshal Tito Enjoying renewed legitimacy. Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov Still Khrushchev's loyal lieutenant. Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04100020002-5 SECRET freight handling--which link their economies more closely and which they see as advan- tageous to their national devel- opment. Leadership Problems Each of the regimes in Eastern Europe is taking on a character and style of its own because of it unique economic, social, and political problems, a development which will tend to result in more diversity. Although still despots, the top party leaders more and more are forced to take account of popular and internal party pres- sures, particularly as economic problems increase. Czechoslovak party leader Novotny, by background and in- clination a typical Stalini , is attempting, apparently un- successfully to ride out Soviet and internal pressures for de- Stalinization by taking only token measures. The party cen- tral committee apparently is divided between Stalinists and a less hard-line element which for over a year has been seeking to force a real relaxation. Having undertaken a very limited de-Stalinization in April, No- votny has since been forced, although this was not his inten- tion, to permit a genuine relaxa- tion of controls over the intel- ligentsia. Even more ominous for No- votny personally is the fact that his party colleague, Pre- mier Siroky, long one of the three most powerful men in the regime, has been publicly con- demned for Stalinist practices. Since Novotny is tarred with the same Stalinist brush as Siroky, he may lose control of his party, if not his position as its leader, unless he can successfully make policy ad- justments toward generally more liberal domestic practices. His initial reaction has been to abandon even his pretense of de-Stalinization. Ulbricht, in East Germany, continues to enforce hard-line measures and propagate his own personality cult, on grounds that the regime's security and Moscow's German policy demand both. While his party is super- ficially unified, economic prob- lems already have led to sweep- ing changes in the structure of party and government. New and technically trained younger men, who seem to be grouping them- selves around Erich Honecker, Ulbricht's second-in-command, are rising in the regime hierarchy. Ulbricht clearly regards the recent political developments in Czechoslovakia as threatening to his own position. The East German intelligence service has ended abruptly its cordial re- lations with the Czechoslovak service, whose officers it now has under surveillance. Strict control of press coverage of developments in Czechoslovakia has been instituted, and no press references to the cultural liber- alization there are permitted in East Germany. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-OP927AO04100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO004100020002-5 SECRET In Bulgaria, party leader Zhivkov, who has tied himself closely to Khrushchev, is some- times caught between Moscow's pressures and the stolid re- sistance of his predominantly Stalinist party. Criticized by middle-level party elements for weakness and indecision-- perhaps stemming from Soviet in- decision--Zhivkov, for all his Russian leaning, is imparting to his regime an increasingly Bul- garian character. Well-known Stalinist Vulko Chervenkov, how- ever, much respected by certain elements within the party, seems neutralized and powerless. Zhiv- kov also is relying more and more on a younger group of party leaders--opportunists rather than moderates--for dealing with the conservative elements. In Hungary and Poland, con- servatives are entrenched in local party and state offices, but Stalinism, while occasionally disruptive, no longer exists as a potent political force in the leadership. Hungary's Kadar has built up a fairly effective party leadership and--by openly appealing to Hungarian national- Enver Hoxha offering to buy the statue of Stalin in Prague; Hoxha explains: "He is still highly esteemed In our country." Politka (Belgrade), 10 November 1961 The modern Ulysses--Hungarian party chief Kadar--steers a middle course between the sirens of the "right" and the "left." Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 17 February 1963 ism rather than to party loyalty --is securing some popular co- operation with his "middle road" policies. Poland's Gomulka is a practi- cal politician who has gained Khrushchev's confidence and re- spect for his ability to tailor policies to deal with Poland's particular problems. Nevertheless, Gomulka too is experiencing rising criticism from elements who challenge the seeming indecisive- ness of the regime. Independent and defiant, Albania has a classic Stalinist regime with a flourishing per- sonality cult, convinced that because of its Stalinism it has avoided the problems found else- where in Eastern Europe. A closely knit oligarchy, the Hoxha leadership owes its posi- tion primarily to its own ef- forts--not Soviet aid--and to its relatively safe geographical position. Forces For Change Among the forces for change in Eastern Europe which have SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-OP927AO04100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0 4100020002-5 %00 %10 SECRET contributed to the growing diver- sity are the constant pressures from the intellectuals for more liberal cultural policies and popular discontent over the failure of the regimes to make good on past promises of economic betterment. Writers, artists, journalists, and professional men in nearly all the Eastern European countries are urging greater freedom from party cul- tural controls and relaxation of restrictions on foreign travel. As a result Khrushchev's 8 March threat of reprisal against writers and artists in the USSR who continue to advocate "ideological coexistence" caused near panic. At the same time it encouraged the conservatives in the bloc to press for the reimposition of harsher controls. Novotny, for example, par- roted Khrushchev's line. He was unwilling, however, or un- able, to silence the dissident writers and journalists--espe- cially in Slovakia--and was forced to agree to a more liberal policy than Moscow favored. U1- bricht, on the other hand, pleaded "somewhat different conditions" from those in the USSR and prob- ably has gone further than the USSR in cracking down on writers. He said, "certain works of that kind (on de-Stalinization) may be useful in the Soviet Union ..., but there is no reason why they should be published in the GDR." However, the East German writers have continued to press for change, although in a lower key. The East European peoples themselves, never really con- SECRET verted to communism but having made varying accommodations to it, now show signs of resentment at their regimes' failures to make good on past promises of more consumers goods and to provide the promised improvement of living standards. Their dis- enchantment is likely to grow in view of the generally poor economic outlook for 1963 and to force their governments to adopt a variety of measures to meet popular demands, measures which in turn may not fit with bloc plans. Industrial workers in the northern tier of countries with traditions of effective pre- war trade-unionism are growing increasingly restive at the re- gimes' failure to supply addi- tional incentives and the use of ever-tightening work norms. Strikes and sitdowns broke out in Poland after an unannounced price rise in April. Here and in Czechoslovakia students have joined the workers in dem- onstrations against the regime. In East Germany workers also are similarly irritated, although less outspokenly. In Czechoslov- akia, this is intensified by the popular belief that commit- ments to underdeveloped countries entail a lower domestic living standard. Workers in all three coun- tries, stirred by the recent strikes in France and West Ger- many, have reacted ironically to regime propaganda concerning them. Polish workers, for ex- ample, in commenting about the French industrial unrest, ask, "What are they striking for-- a second car?" Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-OP927AO04100020002-5 Approved For ease 2006/10/11 : CIA-RDP79-0092704100020002-5 EARN EUROPEAN SATIRIST !"VIEW... ... popular commitment to communism: 4 Polityka (Warsaw), 14 April 1962 ... success of Marxism with the youth: Szpilki (Warsaw), 7 October 1962 A new fad in Prague schools is the beard. In the class of 1962, the pro- fessor is the only one who shaves. Mlada Fronta (Prague), 4 February 1962 ... the Worker's Paradise: She: "Why didn't I marry a plumber?" He: ' 'Before you moved into this new building, you should have married a whole crew of repairmen." Dikobraz (Prague), 12 January 1961 ' 'We've investigated your case thoroughly and there can't be anything wrong with your suit." Urzica (Bucharest), 31 October 1961 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04100020002-5 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-0092704100020002-5 SECRET Membership in the Warsaw Pact and in CEMA is among the more traditional forces holding the Eastern European regimes to the USSR, although in the case of the latter it has proven at times to be a source of dis- agreement. The presence of So- viet troops in or on the borders of the East European countries and Moscow's demonstrated will- ingness to use them are also obviously a restraining element considered by the regimes' rul- ing cliques. There are, in addition, the more subtle and less tangible factors of common ideology and political goals. In the Sino- Soviet dispute, whatever dif- ferences the East European coun- tries may have individually with Moscow are overridden by the fact that they cannot accept Peiping's policies and interpretations of dogma. They fear that a victory for Chinese militancy would mean an end to their increasing abil- ity to stand up for their par- ticular local interests, and in foreign affairs would lead to nuclear war. Among the northern coun- tries, a common fear ofa resur- gent Germany acts as a cohesive force. In addition, it is gen- erally accepted in Eastern Europe that geography and the results of World War II have placed these countries in Mos- cow's strategic and economic sphere for the foreseeable fu- ture. Nevertheless, there is an inexorable trend toward more frequent dissent with Moscow when its proposed policies im- pinge on or threaten national interests. The Kremlin realizes that it is becoming too risky to deal with such dissent by caveat or direct force and that persuasion is the saner course. In bloc councils the desires of the individual countries will have to be taken into con- sideration and policy decisions affecting Soviet bloc matters will be reached on the basis of a consensus. With time this can only lead to a looser and looser association of the Eastern European states with Moscow. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-0! 927A004100020002-5 Approved For Fase 2006/10/11 : CIA-RDP79-0092704100020002-5 SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04100020002-5