DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100020002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

21 June 1963
OC I No, 0285/63C
Copy No. 79
SPECIAL REPORT
DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
downgrading and declassification
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21 June 1963
DIVERSITY AND CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE
The countries of Fastern Europe have arrived at
a point in their relations with Moscow where they can
no longer be considered docile satellites. More and
more frequently their national self-interests, rather
than bloc interests, are being given primary considera-
tion. While there are numerous practical and intangible
factors which hold these countries to Moscow, the USSR
realizes it must deal with them by persuasion rather
than caveat or direct force.
Satellite Self-Assertiveness
Through a process of evolu-
tion starting with Stalin's
death, Eastern Europe's ties
with Moscow have loosened to
the point where the Soviet bloc
now is more nearly an alliance
of ruling elites sharing com-
monly professed goals and sim-
ilar political backgrounds.
While this stage was bound to
be reached sooner or later, its
advent was hastened by Khru-
shchev's early realization that
Stalin's methods in dealing
with Eastern Europe were self-
defeating and had to be abandoned.
With the adoption almost
ten years ago by Moscow of a
policy of permissiveness toward
Eastern Europe, the stage was
set for the regimes there to
begin dealing with their coun-
tries' particular problems in
terms of greater self-interest
and to give freer rein to na-
tivist feelings when consider-
ing Moscow's policies. Only
Albania, however, has actually
broken with Moscow.
As Khrushchev recently said
to a West German industrialist,
he is faced with an emerging
younger generation in the satel-
lites eager for the better
things in life, particularly
consumer goods, food, housing
and clothing. By his own ad-
mission, Soviet ambassadors can
no longer rule in Eastern Europe
as they once did. The situation,
Khrushchev said, reminded him of
the father's problems with the
son who has grown too big to
spank. There is always that
one spanking where the son turns
on the father, kicks him in the
belly, and sends him reeling.
The desire and willingness
of the Eastern European regimes
to give precedence to what they
conceive to be their own in-
terests gained added impetus
in the past year from a number
of developments in the bloc.
These include the drive acceler-
ated since last June by the
bloc's economic organization
(CEMA) to effect meaningful
bloc-wide planning and integra-
tion, some aspects of which
infringe on national self-interest.
Moscow's feud with the Chinese
Communists, for which the Eastern
European leaders see no solution,
and Albania's apostasy have en-
couraged the natural, but usually
suppressed, tendency of the
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Eastern European leaders to as-
sert themselves. Moscow's back-
down in Cuba and inertia in
Berlin, interpreted in some satel-
lite quarters as evidence of
Khrushchev's uncertainty, have
also encouraged more independent
policy making. Indeed, accord-
ing to one reliable Polish source,
Moscow is no longer providing
expected guidance on key policy
questions.
Nevertheless, there remain
powerful forces which hold the
European Communist regimes to
Moscow. Aside from a common
ideology, these include fear that
harder policies would follow an
irrevocable break between Moscow
and Peiping, and the unaccept-
ability of China's militant pol-
icies--which are the antithesis
of those favored more and more
in Eastern Europe. There is
thus little likelihood at this
stage of any attempt by the satel-
lites at an armed breakaway from
Moscow.
"Many Roads" to Socialism
The past year's developments
in the Communist world, in par-
ticular Moscow's rapprochement
with Yugoslavia and the widening
of the Sino-Soviet rift, were
accompanied by a broadened inter-
pretation of Moscow's concept
of "roads to socialism." By
giving the stamp of approval to
Yugoslavia as a "socialist"
country and ignoring Belgrade's
many unique internal policies,
Moscow has tacitly accepted, if
not sanctioned, more open pursuit
in Eastern Europe of policies
reflecting national interests.
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The USSR in effect is ac-
cepting an incipient stage of
national communism, most clearly
practiced in Poland, for all
Eastern Europe. In return the
USSR expects undeviating sup-
port for its foreign policies
and for its position in the
dispute with Communist China.
Foreign Policy Differences
While the East European re-
gimes adhere to the general
lines of Soviet policies in
foreign affairs, some of them
have become more independent
according to the dictates of
their national interests. Po~-
land long has pursued a
complementary, rather than
identical, foreign policy--
except in UN affairs--geared
to the general idea that Poland's
interests are close to those
of the USSR. Even in the sensi-
tive Sino-Soviet dispute, Warsaw
maintains broader state rela-
tions with Peiping than other
bloc countries do. Poland has
taken the lead in improving rela-
tions with West Germany eco-
nomically and politically and
signed far-reaching agreements
with Bonn this spring permitting
the establishment of trade of-
fices in Warsaw with semidiplo-
matic status.
The example of Polish re-
lations with the West may en-
courage other East European
countries to effect more mean-
ingful relations with both the
US and West Germany. Hungary
seems to be on the verge of
reaching a similar agreement
with Bonn and, along with Bulgaria
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and Czechoslovakia, seems pre-
pared to improve relations with
the US.
Rumania also has begun to
take a more independent stance.
In late March, reportedly with-
out prior consultation with
its allies in the Warsaw Pact,
Bucharest resumed normal dip-
lomatic relations with Tirana.
Rumania alone among the "satel-
lites" has yet to re-establish
party contacts with Tito, al-
though Yugoslav-Rumanian eco-
nomic relations are increasing.
While the USSR and the other
bloc countries sharply attacked
the Common Market as an obstacle
to international trade during
the recent meeting of the UN
Economic Commission for Europe
in Geneva, the Rumanian delegate
gave only a short and noncom-
mittal declaration. Later at
this meeting, while discussing
the economic consequences of
disarmament, the Soviets at-
tacked the Western attitude at
the Geneva disarmament confer-
ence. The Rumanian delegate
promptly took the floor to op-
pose "losing our time and dis-
cussing political problems" and
to bring the discussion back to
the economic and social conse-
quences of disarmament.
In time the differing
interests of the regimes in
Eastern Europe are likely to
exercise greater influence on
bloc foreign policies.
Soviet plans to link the East
European economies more closely
through supranational CEMA plan-
ning have brought diverse reac-
tions. The northern industrial
countries--especially Poland
and Czechoslovakia--support the
policy, while Rumania has vig-
orously opposed proposals which
would have the effect of cur-
tailing projects it sees as
essential to its national eco-
nomic growth.
As integration plans are
presented by the USSR in CEMA,
others--perhaps Bulgaria and
Hungary, already reported con-
cerned about CEMA plans--are
also likely to question certain
moves which once would have
been accepted. Kadar's mid-
May journey to Poland reportedly
was in part for the purpose of
discussing the possibility of
Hungary's association with
Poland, East Germany, and Czecho-
slovakia--whose representatives
have recently met to examine
plans for joint development of
certain border regions. Hungary
reportedly made its approach be-
cause of its difficult economic
relations with Rumania.
Nevertheless, the East Eur-
opean countries continue to sup-
port certain multilateral CEMA-
sponsored undertakings--such as
Friendship oil pipeline, the
electric power grid, and increased
coordination of rail and ocean
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A problem for his friends as well ,is .,is guideline now is: "He who is not
enemies, against us is with us."
Poland: Wladyslaw Gomulka
Plagued by party cliques and diminishing
popularity.
EASTERN EUROPE TODAY
"It is incorrect to evolve a certain
model--to adhere to it in relations
with other socialist countries. It
would be an error to condemn as
renegades alI those who do not fit
that model ... "
N. S. Khrushchev,
12 December 1962
Albania: Enver Hoxha
Bloc member in name only.
Rumania- Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej
Suddenly disobedient to Moscow's CEMA
plans,
Czechoslovakia: Antonin Novotny
Faces growing pressure for de-Stalinization.
Yugoslavia: Marshal Tito
Enjoying renewed legitimacy.
Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov
Still Khrushchev's loyal lieutenant.
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freight handling--which link
their economies more closely
and which they see as advan-
tageous to their national devel-
opment.
Leadership Problems
Each of the regimes in
Eastern Europe is taking on a
character and style of its own
because of it unique economic,
social, and political problems,
a development which will tend
to result in more diversity.
Although still despots, the top
party leaders more and more
are forced to take account of
popular and internal party pres-
sures, particularly as economic
problems increase.
Czechoslovak party leader
Novotny, by background and in-
clination a typical Stalini ,
is attempting, apparently un-
successfully to ride out Soviet
and internal pressures for de-
Stalinization by taking only
token measures. The party cen-
tral committee apparently is
divided between Stalinists and
a less hard-line element which
for over a year has been seeking
to force a real relaxation.
Having undertaken a very limited
de-Stalinization in April, No-
votny has since been forced,
although this was not his inten-
tion, to permit a genuine relaxa-
tion of controls over the intel-
ligentsia.
Even more ominous for No-
votny personally is the fact
that his party colleague, Pre-
mier Siroky, long one of the
three most powerful men in the
regime, has been publicly con-
demned for Stalinist practices.
Since Novotny is tarred with
the same Stalinist brush as
Siroky, he may lose control of
his party, if not his position
as its leader, unless he can
successfully make policy ad-
justments toward generally more
liberal domestic practices.
His initial reaction has been
to abandon even his pretense
of de-Stalinization.
Ulbricht, in East Germany,
continues to enforce hard-line
measures and propagate his own
personality cult, on grounds
that the regime's security and
Moscow's German policy demand
both. While his party is super-
ficially unified, economic prob-
lems already have led to sweep-
ing changes in the structure of
party and government. New and
technically trained younger men,
who seem to be grouping them-
selves around Erich Honecker,
Ulbricht's second-in-command, are
rising in the regime hierarchy.
Ulbricht clearly regards
the recent political developments
in Czechoslovakia as threatening
to his own position. The East
German intelligence service has
ended abruptly its cordial re-
lations with the Czechoslovak
service, whose officers it now
has under surveillance. Strict
control of press coverage of
developments in Czechoslovakia
has been instituted, and no press
references to the cultural liber-
alization there are permitted
in East Germany.
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In Bulgaria, party leader
Zhivkov, who has tied himself
closely to Khrushchev, is some-
times caught between Moscow's
pressures and the stolid re-
sistance of his predominantly
Stalinist party. Criticized
by middle-level party elements
for weakness and indecision--
perhaps stemming from Soviet in-
decision--Zhivkov, for all his
Russian leaning, is imparting to
his regime an increasingly Bul-
garian character. Well-known
Stalinist Vulko Chervenkov, how-
ever, much respected by certain
elements within the party, seems
neutralized and powerless. Zhiv-
kov also is relying more and
more on a younger group of party
leaders--opportunists rather
than moderates--for dealing with
the conservative elements.
In Hungary and Poland, con-
servatives are entrenched in
local party and state offices,
but Stalinism, while occasionally
disruptive, no longer exists as
a potent political force in the
leadership. Hungary's Kadar
has built up a fairly effective
party leadership and--by openly
appealing to Hungarian national-
Enver Hoxha offering to buy the statue of Stalin in Prague; Hoxha
explains: "He is still highly esteemed In our country."
Politka (Belgrade), 10 November 1961
The modern Ulysses--Hungarian party chief Kadar--steers a middle
course between the sirens of the "right" and the "left."
Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 17 February 1963
ism rather than to party loyalty
--is securing some popular co-
operation with his "middle road"
policies.
Poland's Gomulka is a practi-
cal politician who has gained
Khrushchev's confidence and re-
spect for his ability to tailor
policies to deal with Poland's
particular problems. Nevertheless,
Gomulka too is experiencing rising
criticism from elements who
challenge the seeming indecisive-
ness of the regime.
Independent and defiant,
Albania has a classic Stalinist
regime with a flourishing per-
sonality cult, convinced that
because of its Stalinism it has
avoided the problems found else-
where in Eastern Europe. A
closely knit oligarchy, the
Hoxha leadership owes its posi-
tion primarily to its own ef-
forts--not Soviet aid--and to
its relatively safe geographical
position.
Forces For Change
Among the forces for change
in Eastern Europe which have
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contributed to the growing diver-
sity are the constant pressures
from the intellectuals for more
liberal cultural policies and
popular discontent over the
failure of the regimes to make
good on past promises of economic
betterment. Writers, artists,
journalists, and professional
men in nearly all the Eastern
European countries are urging
greater freedom from party cul-
tural controls and relaxation
of restrictions on foreign
travel. As a result Khrushchev's
8 March threat of reprisal
against writers and artists in
the USSR who continue to advocate
"ideological coexistence" caused
near panic. At the same time
it encouraged the conservatives
in the bloc to press for the
reimposition of harsher controls.
Novotny, for example, par-
roted Khrushchev's line. He
was unwilling, however, or un-
able, to silence the dissident
writers and journalists--espe-
cially in Slovakia--and was
forced to agree to a more liberal
policy than Moscow favored. U1-
bricht, on the other hand, pleaded
"somewhat different conditions"
from those in the USSR and prob-
ably has gone further than the
USSR in cracking down on writers.
He said, "certain works of that
kind (on de-Stalinization) may
be useful in the Soviet Union
..., but there is no reason why
they should be published in the
GDR." However, the East German
writers have continued to press
for change, although in a lower
key.
The East European peoples
themselves, never really con-
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verted to communism but having
made varying accommodations to
it, now show signs of resentment
at their regimes' failures to
make good on past promises of
more consumers goods and to
provide the promised improvement
of living standards. Their dis-
enchantment is likely to grow
in view of the generally poor
economic outlook for 1963 and
to force their governments to
adopt a variety of measures to
meet popular demands, measures
which in turn may not fit with
bloc plans.
Industrial workers in the
northern tier of countries with
traditions of effective pre-
war trade-unionism are growing
increasingly restive at the re-
gimes' failure to supply addi-
tional incentives and the use
of ever-tightening work norms.
Strikes and sitdowns broke out
in Poland after an unannounced
price rise in April. Here
and in Czechoslovakia students
have joined the workers in dem-
onstrations against the regime.
In East Germany workers also are
similarly irritated, although
less outspokenly. In Czechoslov-
akia, this is intensified by
the popular belief that commit-
ments to underdeveloped countries
entail a lower domestic living
standard.
Workers in all three coun-
tries, stirred by the recent
strikes in France and West Ger-
many, have reacted ironically
to regime propaganda concerning
them. Polish workers, for ex-
ample, in commenting about the
French industrial unrest, ask,
"What are they striking for--
a second car?"
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EARN EUROPEAN SATIRIST !"VIEW...
... popular commitment to communism: 4
Polityka (Warsaw), 14 April 1962
... success of Marxism with the youth:
Szpilki (Warsaw), 7 October 1962
A new fad in Prague schools is the
beard. In the class of 1962, the pro-
fessor is the only one who shaves.
Mlada Fronta (Prague), 4 February 1962
... the Worker's Paradise:
She: "Why didn't I marry a plumber?"
He: ' 'Before you moved into this new
building, you should have married a
whole crew of repairmen."
Dikobraz (Prague), 12 January 1961
' 'We've investigated your case
thoroughly and there can't be anything
wrong with your suit."
Urzica (Bucharest), 31 October 1961
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Membership in the Warsaw
Pact and in CEMA is among the
more traditional forces holding
the Eastern European regimes to
the USSR, although in the case
of the latter it has proven
at times to be a source of dis-
agreement. The presence of So-
viet troops in or on the borders
of the East European countries
and Moscow's demonstrated will-
ingness to use them are also
obviously a restraining element
considered by the regimes' rul-
ing cliques.
There are, in addition,
the more subtle and less tangible
factors of common ideology and
political goals. In the Sino-
Soviet dispute, whatever dif-
ferences the East European coun-
tries may have individually with
Moscow are overridden by the fact
that they cannot accept Peiping's
policies and interpretations of
dogma. They fear that a victory
for Chinese militancy would mean
an end to their increasing abil-
ity to stand up for their par-
ticular local interests, and in
foreign affairs would lead to
nuclear war.
Among the northern coun-
tries, a common fear ofa resur-
gent Germany acts as a cohesive
force. In addition, it is gen-
erally accepted in Eastern
Europe that geography and the
results of World War II have
placed these countries in Mos-
cow's strategic and economic
sphere for the foreseeable fu-
ture.
Nevertheless, there is an
inexorable trend toward more
frequent dissent with Moscow
when its proposed policies im-
pinge on or threaten national
interests. The Kremlin realizes
that it is becoming too risky
to deal with such dissent by
caveat or direct force and that
persuasion is the saner course.
In bloc councils the desires
of the individual countries
will have to be taken into con-
sideration and policy decisions
affecting Soviet bloc matters
will be reached on the basis
of a consensus. With time this
can only lead to a looser and
looser association of the Eastern
European states with Moscow.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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