WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 26, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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2-11111111Z
26 July.1963
OCI No. 0290/63
Copy No. 79
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Referral Review
by N GA
State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded From automatic
downgrading and declassification
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 25 July 1963)
CUBA
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
THE MOSCOW TEST-BAN TALKS
The tone of Khrushchev's speech at a rally on
19 July suggested he expected the talks to bring
early agreement on a limited nuclear test ban.
END OF SINO-SOVIET TALKS SIGNALS CONTINUED CONFLICT
Each side is determined to stand by its position
in the dispute; neither is yet ready to accept
responsibility for a formal split in the Communist
movement.
SOVIET MID-YEAR ECONOMIC RESULTS
The report on plan fulfillment issued by the
Central Statistical Bureau claims an 8.5-percent
increase in industrial production over a year
ago--a figure in line with the somewhat lower
rates of growth since 1960.
SOVIET FLIGHTS TO CUBA
After making only three weekly flights on its
newly announced Moscow-Conakry-Havana route, the
USSR was notified by Guinea that such flights
were to be terminated.
COMPLETION OF FRIENDSHIP PIPELINE POSTPONED
The target date for completion apparently has
been moved back to mid-1964.
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME UNABLE TO SILENCE CRITICS
Party leader Novotny seems to have met with little
success in his effort to put a stop to criticism by
party intellectuals.
NASIR'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA DETERIORATE FURTHER 11
He has publicly denounced Syria's Baathist leadership
in the wake of the abortive coup attempt on
18 July.
ROBERTO'S GROUP GAINS AMONG ANGOLAN REBELS
His government-in-exile has been recognized by
Leopoldville, and the nine-nation African Liberation
Committee is recommending that all aid be channeled
to it.
ROUNDUP OF SUBVERSIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA
The police appear to have broken up the last large
subversive organization in the country, but remnants
may turn toward anti-white violence.
AREA NOTES
Laos, Iraq
WEST EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE MOSCOW TALKS
France is alone among West European nations to
oppose a limited nuclear test ban, but most countries
have reservations about extending the negotiations
to include nonaggression arrangements.
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EUROPE (continued)
Page
25X6
COMMON MARKET AND TURKEY REACH AGREEMENT
Under the accord about 37 percent of Turkey's
exports to the Community will receive preferred
entry and the EEC will give Turkey developmental
assistance.
LISBON CONCERNED OVER PORTUGUESE GUINEA
Portugal is in the process of reinforcing its
military force in the colony by as many as 4,000
troops.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
There are indications that the initial popular
approval accorded the Peralta regime is giving
way to increasing discontent.
BOLIVIAN MINERS' STRIKE
An early showdown seems likely in the government's
dispute with Communist-led tin miners. Widespread
violence could result.
ECUADOREAN DEVELOPMENTS
The new junta has announced that it plans a program
of economic development and reform. It hopes to
hold general elections in 1964.
AREA NOTES 22
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Peru
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GUANO CAYMAN
llamaul
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25X1
25X1
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
de-
creasing Soviet helicopter
activity
rom Playa Baracoa, the
principal helicopter base in
Cuba.
The fifth military ship-
ment to Cuba since October 1962
arrived on board the Metallurg
Bardin, which docked a ahia
26 July 63
vehicles of various sizes en-
gaged in the unloading. Part
of the cargo may be stored at
the former Guanajay MRBM site
No. 1, about 40 miles from
Bahia Honda. Several trucks
unloaded unidentified material
at Guanajay
There are several installations
in the Guanajay area, probably
including an underground stor-
age area. There is no evidence
to indicate that either the
unidentified material or the
activities in the Guanajay area
are missile-related.
seeing three SS- 150-n.m.
surface-to-surface missiles
(SCUDs) on a truck in the port
of Cardenas. There is no good
evidence to indicate that such
missiles are in Cuba, however,
and his description also fits
the FROG rocket which has been
identified at Soviet installa-
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THE MOSCOW TEST-BAN TALKS
Khrushchev used the occa-
sion of his 19 July speech at
a rally for Hungarian leader
Kadar to state publicly his
views on the test-ban talks.
The tone of the speech suggested
that he expected the tripartite
talks to reach an early agreement
on a limited nuclear test ban.
The Soviet premier seemed to
treat an agreement virtually as
an accomplished fact by express-
ing the hope that it will be
"useful" in improving the inter-
national atmosphere. He also
claimed that it would demonstrate
the validity of his policy of
peaceful coexistence.
Khrushchev did not indi-
cate that an agreement banning
tests in the atmosphere, outer
space, and under water would to
conditional on a moratorium
on underground tests or on a
NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression
treaty. He simply stated that
"we would like to hope" that the
Moscow talks will produce agree-
ment on a nonaggression pact and
hinted at considerable flexi-
bility on the precise formula
for such an agreement. Soviet
commentators have echoed his
remark that the main thing about
a nonaggression pact "is not the
form but the content."
Khrushchev's speech re-
flected his apparent intention
to use the current talks as a
point of departure for further
negotiations on a nonaggression
pact and other proposals bearing
on European security. He re-
newed previous Soviet proposals
for reductions in military budg-
ets and measures to prevent
surprise attack. The only
variant he suggested would pro-
vide for stationing Western rep-
resentatives with Soviet forces
in East Germany and Soviet rep-
resentatives with Western forces
in the Federal Republic.
Soviet commentators are
still careful to temper their
optimistic assessments of the
prospects for a successful
conclusion of the talks with
routine warnings that "in-
fluential circles" in Washing-
ton, Bonn, and Paris are work-
ing against an accord.
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26 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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END OF SINO-SOVIET TALKS SIGNALS CONTINUED CONFLICT
After two weeks of futile
and probably acrimonious meet-
ings in Moscow, the Chinese
Communists have returned home
clearly determined to carry on
with the war. The Russians,
no less determined, have acted
quickly to tighten their lines
in preparation for continued
conflict.
heroes' reception accorded the
returning delegation on 21'
July. Mao Tse-tung headed
the top-level group of govern-
ment and party leaders which
turned out at the airport. The
welcoming crowd carried banners
and shouted slogans affirming
Peiping's position in the quar-
rel with Moscow.
The talks ended on 20 July,
and the curt joint communique-
issued simultaneously in Moscow
and Peiping the next day indi-
cated only that neither side
is yet ready to accept respon-
sibility for a formal split in
the Communist movement. The
only agreement recorded was to
recess the talks until an un-
specified future date.
To this end, both sides
sought to maintain the appear-
ance of unity despite their
failure to achieve it. In a
minimum courtesy gesture, the
Soviet party presidium gave a
farewell dinner for the Chinese
delegation at which Khrushchev
made his only publicized con-
tact with the visitors. Offi-
cial Communist accounts of the
affair declared--in what is
probably the overstatement of
the year--that a "friendly at-
mosphere" prevailed.
The feeling of the Peiping
regime was indicated by the
Even before the Chinese
had left town the Russians
were moving ahead with efforts
to consolidate bloc support
against the Chinese. Follow-
ing Moscow's lead, the Czechs
on 19 July expelled an offi-
cial of Peiping's news agency
and declared two others--
currently on leave in China---
personae non gratae for dis-.
tributing literature attack-
ing the USSR.
Beginning on 20 July the
East European satellites
started to issue commentaries,
apparently based on specific
guidance from Moscow, casti-
gating the Chinese for advocat-
ing nuclear war and for moving
the dispute out of the party
arena and into the sphere of
state relations. As of 25
July only Rumania remained to
be heard from.
Party first secretaries
and government leaders of the
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CHRONOLOGY OF SINO-SOVIET TALKS
(MOSCOW TIME)
5 July 1430 Chinese arrive Vnukovo Airport
1630 - 1830 Preliminary meeting
Evening dinner given by Suslov
6 July 1000 Day's discussions opened
Length of sessions undetermined
7 July Both sides take Sunday off
12 July 1000 Day's discussions opened
Length of session undetermined
14 July Both sides take Sunday off
CPSU open letter in Pravda attacks Chinese
15 July 1000 - 1330 Talks resume
East-West test ban talks open in Moscow
16 July Day-long recess taken
17 July 1000 Day's discussions opened
Length of session undetermined
18 July Day-long recess taken
19 July 1000 Day's discussions opened
Afternoon recess
1500 - 1700 Substantive issues rumored to have been discussed
for the first time
Concurrent meeting between lower level assistants
Day-long recess taken
Chinese hold rally in Peiping honoring expelled
personnel
Day's discussions opened
Length of sessions undetermined
Soviet central committee attacks Chinese
Day-long recess taken
Chinese party issues reply to CPSU statement
People's Daily editorial provides first comment on
talks and attacks Soviets.
People's Daily editorial criticizes Moscow
test ban talks
Khrushchev reaffirms policy of peaceful
coexistence at Moscow rally for Kadar
20 July 1000 Talks resume
Length of final session undetermined
Khrushchev attends farewell banquet for
Chinese
Chinese depart Vnukovo Airport
Peiping and Moscow publish joint communique
on conclusion of talks
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CEMA states gathered in Moscow
on 24 July and the Russians
probably used the occasion to
close bloc ranks against the
Chinese. These talks may
well be used to arrange con-
certed action in the field
of economic relations with
Peiping. Moves to isolate
the Chinese by downgrading
the level of diplomatic rep-
resentation from other Commu-
nist states may also be dis-
cussed. Four of the six am-
bassadors representing European
satellite states in Peiping
were away from their posts
as of 21 July and their return
might be delayed indefinitely.
Moscow's determination to
stand firm on the issues which
separate the USSR and Commu-
nist China has been underscored
by a number of moves which
will certainly kindle new rage
in Peiping. Among these are
Khrushchev's decision to visit
Yugoslavia in August, announced
on 19 July, and the agreement
to provide the Yugoslavs with
technical assistance which was
publicized the next day. Prog-
ress on a nuclear test ban
and indications that Moscow
is disposed to go ahead with
negotiations on other Impor-
tant East-West problems are
even more obnoxious to the
Chinese.
Peiping struck out angrily
at the test-ban talks on 19
July in a major editorial
denouncing US attempts to
perpetrate a "nuclear fraud"
designed expressly to prevent
China from getting atomic
weapons. After noting that
even before the talks began
the Soviet Union had expressed
willingness to agree with the
US, the editorial declared
the hope, without conviction,
that the Russians would not
fall into the American trap.
Peiping is clearly preparing
a series of new polemical blasts
at Moscow. A statement by a cen-
tral committee spokesman on 19
July urged "revolutionary comrades
throughout the world" to study
and compare the Russian and Chi-
nese positions so that doctrinal
purity might be achieved through
criticism of Moscow's errors. The
Chinese Communist press is print-
ing roundups of attacks on the
Chinese party by Russian-oriented
parties elsewhere in the world and
the Chinese have promised to an-
swer them "when necessary-,,/
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26 July 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5
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SOVIET
ECONOMIC
PICTURE
Percentage Increase
1961 1962 1963
mid-year mid-year mid-year
over over over
1960 1961 1962
mid-year mid-year mid-year
1963
PLAN
(annual)
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY
PIG IRON
ELECTRIC POWER
10.5
13
13
11.0
GAS
28.0
26
22
17.0
PETROLEUM
12.7
12
11
10.0
CEMENT
12.0
13
10
10.7
FERTILIZER
11.7
9
13
16.2
TRACTORS
10.9
3
17
13.0
REFRIGERATORS
27.3
23
11
8.0
WASHING MACHINES
28.7
43
28
24.0
COTTON FABRICS
0
2
2
2.0
MEAT (STATE-SLAUGHTERED)
-7.1
8
19
10.0
HOUSING (STATE)
-11.8
26
-5
12.2
(based on official Soviet data)
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Soviet industrial produc-
tion continues to expand at
about the same rate as in recent
years with problems still ham-
pering growth. The mid-year
plan fulfillment report issued
by the USSR Central Statistical
Bureau on 19 July claims an 8.5-
percent increase in production
over a year ago--a figure in line
with the somewhat lower rates
of growth since 1960.
Most heavy industrial
commodities continued their
trends of the past few years.
However, crude steel and pig
iron have been cut back as antic-
ipated in the 1963 plan issued
last December and as already
evident in the economic report
for the first quarter of this
year. The chemical industry
and industrial support for
agriculture continue to make
strong advances. The over-all
output in chemicals was up 17
percent while chemical fertil-
izer increased 13 percent.
Tractor production was 17 per-
cent higher, well ahead of the
planned rate. This trend seems
to fit--at least in direction--
with the program outlined by
Khrushchev last November but
there are many signs that he is
still far from satisfied. In
April, he castigated Soviet
planners for dragging their heels
on reorienting industry in
favor of chemical production.
Soon after that the guidelines
for the 1964-65 plan clearly
specified top priority for
chemicals, particularly in sup-
port of agriculture and the
consumer goods industry. A re-
cent Khrushchev conversation
with Belgian Foreign Minister
Spaak suggests that drastic
upward revisions of plans for
the chemical industry are in
the offing.
That problems still plague
the economy and hamper growth
is most evident from the perform-
ance in capital investment.
State-planned investment rose
only 4 percent compared with al-
most 10 percent a year ago.
Organizational and supply diffi-
culties, shortage of resources
for the investment projects
under way, and the severe winter
probably all contributed to this
result. In addition, construc-
tion was probably slowed by
Khrushchev's demand in April
that existing projects be re-
viewed with the object of clos-
ing down those of lower priority
and accelerating others.
Within the general area of
investment, the chemical indus-
try and agriculture continued
their fairly rapid expansion.
The 15-percent increase in chem-
ical investment is only a slight
improvement over last year's-
performance, but considering
the lower rate of increase in
the total investment program com-
pared to mid-1962, it is evident
that the chemical industry's share
of the total has increased markedly.
State farm investment--about half
of total agricultural investment
and the only share reported on
at mid-year--rose 12 percent,
well below the increase last
year but, one of the largest in-
creases among those sectors for
which information is given.
Once again the Soviet con-
sumer is faced with a disappoint-
ing report on his share of the
economic pie. Construction of
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W SECRET The Ckolmunist World
25X1
state housing--about three
fourths of all urban housi;ig
built--actually decreased
somewhat from a year ago. Re-
tail trade was below plan, al-
though the food industry was
about on target. The growth of
private savings by 6 percent
attests to the continuing scar-
city and unacceptably poor
quality of consumer goods.
Soviet efforts to establish
an air-route to Cuba via Africa
have been temporarily thwarted.
After making only three weekly
flights on its newly announced
Moscow-Conakry-Havana route, the
USSR was notified by Guinea on
12 July that such flights were
to be terminated. Subsequent
TU-114 flights to Havana have
followed the route established
last January via the North At-
lantic over international waters.
Moscow probably will now
seek an alternate stop-over in
--notably in Algeria.
USSR has area y o land-
ing rights at Ouargla airfield
in the northern Sahara in support
of a route to Cuba and arrange-
ments allegedly have been made
with Shell Oil Company for the
servicing of Soviet TU-114 air-
craft.
Last May Soviet technicians
surveyed three Algerian airfields
and it probably was determined
then that Ouargla had adequate
facilities to accommodate the
TU-114 once the refueling problem
was solved. If the flight from
As usual, the economic
report gave no worthwhile clue
on the direction or extent of
defense expenditures; there is
little question, however, that
the low rate of increase in state-
planned investment was in part
caused by the cumulative effect
of the increasingly heavy mili-
tary spending of the last few
years.
Ouargla is to be direct to
Havana it will offer Aeroflot
little in advantage over the
existing North Atlantic route.
The distance from Ouargla is
only a few hundred miles shorter
than the distance from Murmansk
to Havana. Moscow would also
have to negotiate overflight
rights with Morocco.
A more favorable route to
Cuba via Africa would be through
Morocco, and the USSR may intend
to approach Morocco regarding a
transit point on a route to
Havana. The Soviet-Moroccan
air agreement signed in March
1962 provided for the eventual
extension of Aeroflot's service
from Morocco to Central and
South America; however, implemen-
tation of such routes would
probably require additional
negotiations between the two
countries. Moreover, Soviet
use of Nouasseur air, base near
Casablanca--apparently the only
airfield which-can accommodate
the TU-114--would be barred at
least through the end of this
year,. when US control will be
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,:.J EAST
)Schwedtf
Soviet Zone
?ZaTu'zi
Sala Kosice
,
4f Mozyr ?-~ rnmar acre or cnsrrucrron not Kr-own.
~~l.,r~rirh
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,~Ventspils
? li,anstruction ro begin it~ i9d4.
Polotskj
Refinery, not completed
% Penis 1
an :k........
Unech l.........
Brest . Pinsk M ichurinsk
for completion i,l 1965
*ik
Completed
Under construction For completion in 1963
Under construction For completion in 1966
Under construction Completion date not known
Construction not begun as of mid-1963 but to
be completed in 1964
In planning stage
Refinery
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COMPLETION OF FRIENDSHIP PIPELINE POSTPONED
The target date for com-
pletion of the much-publicized
Friendship pipeline which will
supply Soviet crude oil to
selected East European countries
apparently has been pushed
back from 1963 to mid-1964.
Construction is about seven
months behind schedule on the
995-mile sector of 40-inch
pipe between Kuybyshev and
Mozyr. All other segments of
the central system--which use
smaller pipe--at the present
rates of construction should
be completed by the end of
1963.
With 40-inch pipe in short
supply in the bloc, priority
in its allocation has apparently
been given, at least temporarily,
to natural gas. No deviation
from the scheduled rate of con-
struction of the 1,185-mile
Gazli-Ural 40-inch gas pipeline
scheduled for completion by the
end of 1963, has been reported.
The plan for 1962 called
for completion of 250 miles of
the Friendship line between
Kuybyshev and Penza, but this
sector will probably not be
completed until at least August
of this year. The plan for the
rest of 1963 envisages the ex-
tension of the 40-inch pipeline
beyond Penza, to Michurinsk.
Rail tank cars have been
used to supply crude oil to the
Czechoslovakian portion of the
Friendship pipeline, which also
supplies the branch pipeline
into Hungary. Both of these
lines were completed in 1962.
Until the 40-inch segment can
be completed, a similar arrange-
ment will probably be made to
supply crude oil to the branch
line into Poland and East Ger-
many. This line is expected
to be put into operation by the
end of 1963.
Only one branch pipeline to
the Baltic Se.a--to the port of
Ventspils--is now planned; con-
struction is to begin in 1964 and
to be completed the following year.
Frequent mention has been made of
Klaipeda as a second pipeline ter-
minus on the Baltic, but shifting
sands in the harbor have made con-
tinual dredging necessary to keep
the port navigable. Construction
of a pipeline from Polotsk to
Kaliningrad, and beyond to the
Baltic port of Baltysk, has been
discussed as an alternative.
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The three members of the Czechoslovak
leadership who are most open to party
criticism for their "Stalinist" pasts:
Premier Vi I i am Si roky, Party First;
Secretary and President Antonin Novotny,
a n d V c e_ Premier Jaromir Dolansky.
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Efforts by the Czechoslovak
regime to stifle agitation for
liberalization and redressment
of past Stalinist policies have
apparently met with little suc-
cess. Despite numerous speeches,
warnings, and visits by top
party officials to provincial
party meetings, party leader
Novotny still seems unable to
silence critical party intellec-
tuals and to bring the political
situation--particularly in Slo-
vakia--back under his undisputed
control.
The harsh regime pronounce-
ments in June stemmed the flood
of boldly critical articles in
the two party dailies--which
had come dangerously close to
criticism of Novotny himself.
However, criticism is again
creeping into at least the Slo-
vak party daily,-censured by
Novotny in June, although it now
refrains from singling out by
name those involved in the ex-
cesses of the "Stalin era."
On the other hand the week-
lies of the Czechoslovak Writers'
Union, the Commission for Social-
ist Culture and--especially--
the Slovak Writers' Union have
never relented in their campaign
for de-Stalinization. These
journals continue to criticize--
albeit in somewhat veiled terms--
regime attempts to silence the
intellectuals. The Slovak
Writers' Union weekly, singled
out for attack by Novotny in
June,, has not only vigorously
defended itself but has reaf-
firmed its commitment to views
directly opposed to those ex-
pressed by Novotny on the par-
ty's past.
Although much of the pres-
ent dispute centers on the
fate of the Slovak "nationalists"
condemned during the "Stalin
era," the debate has been broad-
ened to touch on the politi-
cal--not purely cultural or
ideological--issues of the na-
ture of power and leadership
responsibility in a socialist
society. In this context the
regime is criticized not only
for trying to stand in the way
of a cultural "thaw" but for
trying to resist the tide of
the times--the "social necessity"
of liberalization.
The open opposition to
Novotny's attempts to permit
only limited or token de-Stalin-
ization and the regime's con-
tinued inability to cope ef-
fectively with it suggest that
the intellectuals have found
important supporters in the
higher echelons of the Czech-
oslovak and Slovak parties.
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Asia-Africa
Nasir's public denunciation
of Syria's Baathist leadership
and the abortive coup attempt
on .18 July have ended all pres-
ent prospects for achieving the
union of Egypt, Syria and Iraq
planned last April.
Nasir's 22 July speech was
devoted almost entirely to re-
counting his differences with
the Syrian Baathists from the
time of the formation of the 1958
Syrian-Egyptian union to the pres-
ent. His aim was to shift the
blame for the failure of the
scheduled union of three coun-
tries to the Syrian Baathists.
Iraq was hardly mentioned.
Nasir obliquely urged "con-
scientious"Arab nationalists in
the Baathist ranks to change
their leadership. He called for
the formation of a new pan-Arab
organization combining all Arab
pro-unity elements. Already
Egyptian propaganda is trying
to sell this idea in competition
with the Baath's area-wide appeal
and organization.
Nasir made no reference to
East-West problems or his rela-
tions with the Communist bloc
and the free world, an exception-
al omission and a measure of his
present obsession with intra-
Arab affairs.
Despite his denunciation
of the Syrian Baathists he re-
frained from criticism of Iraq
which, unlike Syria, sent a dele-
gation to the Egyptian anniver-
sary celebrations. Baghdad, in
turn, continues its line of
brotherhood with Egypt and
Nasir as a means of assuring
that blame for failure of the
proposed federation falls on
the Egyptians.
Although the Baath's first
reaction to the speech hinted
that Syria and Iraq might pro-
ceed with a union of their own,
within a day both Prime Minister
Bitar and the Council of the
Revolutionary Command broadcast
declarations which implied that
further efforts would be made
to reach an accommodation with
Nasir regarding tripartite union.
Bitar, at the same time, did not
entirely brush aside the possi-
bility of a bilateral Iraqi-
Syrian union. He announced that
a general conference of the
party's branches from through-
out the Arab world is planned
soon in which future strategy
will be decided.
The abortive pro-Nasir coup
in Damascus on 18 July did not
catch the regime entirely un-
awares. Indications are that
the move was ill-conceived and
hastily carried out. Thirty-
four of its participants have
been summarily executed, and
Damascus radio has broadcast a
list of nearly 60 others on the
regime's "wanted" list. Trials
in absentia are 'scheduled and
sentences will be summarily
carried out upon apprehension of
the "criminals."
This policy of executions is
a clear break with the past. At
no time since Syrian independence
in 1945 have unsuccessful con-
spirators been executed. Al-
though some were sentenced to
death,the sentences always have
been commuted.
The reason for the outbreak
of firing in Damascus again on
24 July remains unclear.
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ROBERTO'S GROUP GAINS AMONG ANGOLAN REBELS
Holden Roberto's political-
ly moderate Union of Angolan
Peoples (UPA) appears to be
gaining ascendancy in the long,
bitter rivalry between Angola's
rebel groups.
Roberto's government-in-
exile, with headquarters in
Leopoldville, received its first
major boost on 29 June when
Congo's Premier Adoula official-
ly recognized it. Adoula sub-
sequently granted Roberto ex-
clusive Angolan use of radio
Congo for broadcasts into Angola.
Adoula's action forced the
hand of the nine-nation African
Liberation Committee, set up at
the late May Addis Ababa summit
conference, which had hoped to
form a united Angolan front.
On 18 July committee rep-
resentatives visiting Leopold-
ville announced that they would
recommend to the African foreign
ministers' meeting in Dakar
early next month that all
aid to Angolan nationalists be
channeled to the UPA through the
Leopoldville government. They
were convinced that the UPA had
the only effective fighting
force inside Angola and that
the Congo's key geographic posi-
tion made it impossible to ig-
nore Adoula's desires.
The UPA's principal rival
the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA),
will protest this recommenda-
tion at Dakar and its supporters
are likely to renew efforts to
form a common front. Roberto
wants to absorb the MPLA's mod-
est military arm but has con-
sistently resisted unity with
its capable, well-educated
leaders who might pose a danger
to his own position.
In the long run, the strength-
ening of Roberto's organization
may further decrease chances of
a negotiated settlement between
the Portuguese and the Angolan
nationalists. While the Portu-
guese believe the UPA to be
racially oriented and firmly
committed to the ouster of all
white influence, there is a
feeling current throughout Angola
that an eventual accommodation
could be effected between the
whites and the Portuguese-edu-
cated leaders of the MPLA, which
has been more a Portuguese oppo-
sition party than an Angolan
independence art
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With the arrest of 17
whites, Indians, and Africans
in Johannesburg on 11 July,'the
South African police appear to
have broken up the last large
subversive organization in the
country. The 17 reportedly con-
stituted most of the top leader-
ship of "Spear of the Nation,"
a Communist-influenced sabotage
group which had eluded the po-
lice for two years. In mid-
July the police also picked up
the leaders of a small Trotsky-
ite roue
Earlier this year, "Pogo," a
loosely organized African racist
movement, had been broken up
after a year of rapid growth.
"Spear of the Nation,"
thanks to the organizational
know-how of its Communist back-
ers, had the greatest staying
power of any of these movements.
By insisting on tight security,
the Communists managed to develop
an extensive network of local
action groups under relatively
close central control. Just
before the 11 July raid they
even managed to set up a clan-
destine radio transmitter in a
Johannesburg suburb. The police
apparently had made no headway
against "Spear of the Nation"
until new legislation earlier
this year gave them more ex-
tensive powers.
Along with the 17 leaders,
a huge quantity of documents
was picked up in the 11 July
raid. 'Further police action
against local cells is there-
fore likely.
As most of the Communists
are now in jail or in exile
they will have difficulty main-
taining their influence among
what subversive bodies sur-
vive inside South Africa. If
the Communists fail to main-
tain their authority, the rem-
nants of: "Spear of the Na-
tion" within the country will
probably lose much of their
cohesion and might waste their
assets as "Pogo" did, in
spectacular but fruitless ac-
tions. Without the Communists
to moderate their racism, the
movement's Africans might also
turn in the direction of anti-
white violence.
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Laos: The military situa-
tion remains quiet, except for
artillery fire on the Plaine des
Jarres and an isolated clash
between a Lao Army unit and the
Pathet Lao near Attopeu in south-
ern Laos.
Supply movements indicate
considerable Pathett Lao activity
east of the Plaine'des Jarres
in recent weeks that may be pre-
paratory to an offensive. Both
Laotian and neutralist forces
in the plain, which lack reserves,
believe a large-scale attack is
imminent. The Communists are
spreading rumors that they are
preparing for such attacks if
they are not satisfied with the
results of negotiations with
Premier Souvanna's representa-
tives. Their heavy artillery
barrage on 17-18 July was prob-
ably intended as pressure in
connection with these talks,
which still offer little promise.
Kong Le is still in Vien-
tiane, and Souvanna has stated
that if he must go abroad for
medical treatment it is essential
"from a political point of view"
that he be sent to Moscow.
Iraq: The Iraqi Army's
campaign against the Kurds is
going poorly, even though nearly
three quarters of its total
combat strength of approximately
55,000 men are engaged. Opera-
tions are being hampered by
poor logistical support, break-
downs of tanks, lack of spare
parts, and stiffening Kurdish
resistance. Reinforcements
have been sent north from Bagh-
dad and reservists have been
called up to bolster the Iraqi
26 July 63
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Europe
European governments, ex-
cept for the French, have wel-
comed the prospect of a limited
nuclear test ban. In varying
degrees, however, most countries
have reservations about extend-
ing the negotiations to include
NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression
arrangements.
France's position is no
surprise. High French officials
have consistently held that
France would not be bound by a
three-power agreement that
limited. nuclear tests but did
not include destruction of ex-
isting warheads and associated
delivery systems.
FWest Germ S,~
have expressed
tears a a nonaggression pact
would solidify the status quo
and recognize the division of
Germany. Special Tasks Minister
Krone commented that nonaggression
declarations would come "harzard-
ously close to a recognition of
the Soviet sphere of dominion."
Foreign Minister Schroeder has
noted that through such declara-
tions the Soviets are trying to
anticipate the terms of a peace
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26 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
treaty. Government leaders be-
lieve that Western agreement to
a nonaggression pledge should be
conditioned on the Soviets' moving
toward self-determination for
the Germans and recognizing the
West's vital interests in Berlin.
Italy has cautioned against
the propaganda value to the So-
viet Union of a nonaggression
arrangement and has held that
any agreement should be com-
pensated for by more than a
test-ban treaty--for instance,
the possibility of obtaining a
status quo guarantee for Berlin.
Nevertheless, Italy does not
feel the West should take a priori
a negative stand. on nonaggression
arrangements.
Press comment in the Unitdd
Kingdom has been cautiously
optimistic. A test-ban agree-
ment is seen as presaging a long
period of negotiations on diffi-
cult East-West issues. F
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COMMON MARKET AND TURKEY REACH AGREEMENT
After four years of inter-
mittent negotiation, the EEC
and Turkey have concluded and
are expected to sign in September
an agreement giving Turkey
limited association with the
Common Market. The agreement is
economically important to
Turkey and is in keeping with
Ankara's desire to promote closer
ties with Western Europe. The
accord is also something of a
foreign policy "success" for
the EEC, but one which renews
concern over the dimensions of
the Common Market's preferential
trading area, which now includes
eighteen African states and
Greece.
Under the association agree-
ment, about 37 percent of Turkey's
exports to the Community--tobacco,,
dried figs, dried dates, and nuts
--will receive preferred entry.
Tariff quotas for each of these
products have been established
and may be increased. Provision
is also made for a possible
opening of quotas on other Turk-
ish products in the future. In
addition to this guarantee of
access to the EEC market, the
Turkish economy will also bene-
fit from developmental assist-
ance from the Community which
could amount to as much as
$125 million.
While this economic arrange-
ment is of most immediate bene-
fit to Turkey, the gradual estab-
lishment of a customs union and
full participation by Turkey in
the EEC is the eventual goal.
An association Council--composed
of EEC and Turkish representatives
--with decision-making powers
will be the vehicle for accom-
plishing this goal.
The lengthy negotiations
required to produce the agree-
ment reflected the extreme dif-
ficulty the Common Market has
had in reconciling its willing-
nessto accommodate Turkey with
its obligation to abide by
the most-favored-nation prin-
ciple. Since Turkey will-not
be economically able for many
years to participate fully in
the EEC, the Common Market felt
it had few alternatives to
entering into such a discrimina-
tory arrangement. Besides seek-
ing to strengthen its ties with
a NATO ally, the EEC has seen
fit to conclude such an associa-
tion in order to combat criticism
that it is not an outward look-
ing community. Despite efforts
to camouflage the agreement with
association trappings, it will
be difficult to justify under
GATT rules for either free
trade areas or customs unions.
Now that the EEC has set
the precedent for preferential
trade agreements, it will find
it difficult to avoid an exten-
sion of similar privileges to
other Middle Eastern countries,
notably Iran and Israel, with
which the EEC has been negoti-
ating for some time. Both of
these countries have been
pressing the Common Market for
preferred access for some of
their major export items.
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serious challenge by rebel na-
tionalists in Portuguese Guinea,
Lisbon is in the process of re-
inforcing its 5,000-man military
force in that colony by as many
as'4,000 troops. This move under-
lines Portugal's determination
to retain control of this small
West African territory at a time
when the UN Security Council
debates Portuguese colonialism
in Africa.
the rebels had
secured considerable control
over much of the southern sector
of Portuguese Guinea. This area
is adjacent to the Republic of
Guinea where the principal
Portuguese Guinean nationalist
organization is based.
Defense Minister Gomes de
Araujo--briefly referring to
the province in a 17 July inter-
view--acknowledged that rebel
groups were operating in about
15 percent of Portuguese Guinea.
This statement was the first
official public admission that
the situation is deteriorating and
may have been intended to prepare
the public for the possibility
that the province might eventually
be lost. A subsequent state-
ment by the Defense Ministry
denying that rebels controlled
any area was probably an attempt
to counteract adverse publicity
during the Security Council
debate.
In any event, Lisbon will
make a determined effort to
26 July 63
Faced with an increasingly Iretain the province despite
its essentially indefensible
nature and even at the cost of
reducing manpower and mate-
rial resources available for
the far more important provin-
ces of Angola and Mozambique.
In fact, the reinforcements
now being sent to Portuguese
Guinea are being diverted from
assignments to those areas.
The US Embassy in Lisbon
believes that these additional
forces may permit the Portuguese
to extend their area of effective
control and make the loss of the
province less imminent. The
embassy is convinced, however,
that the rebels cannot be con-
clusively defeated because the
terrain facilitates guerrilla
activities and because the
insurgents have the advantage
of sanctuaries in Senegal and
the Republic of Guinea.
Lisbon also appears to be
trying to counteract some of
the criticism leveled against
it in the UN. The regime's
concern is implicit in its
decision to appoint an indige-
nous person to an "important
government post" in Portuguese
Guinea soon in order to create
the impression that it is
increasing the province's inter-
nal autonomy. Such a move,
hcwever, does not herald a change
in Lisbon's basic policy of
refusing any substantive con-
cession in the direction of
self-determination as the person
selected--while termed a "moderate
nationalist"--is considered by 25X1
Lisbon to be completely loyal to
the regime.
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Western Hemisphere
The hiatus in Guatemalan
political plotting which fol-
lowed the overthrow of the
Ydigoras regime last March may
be over. Symptomatic of this is
the recent arrest of several ex-
treme rightists who are accused
of trying to line up military
support for a coup against the
government of Col. Enrique Peralta.
It seems likely that there will
be more manifestations of anti-
government activity in view of
indications that the initial
popular approval accorded Peralta
is now giving way to increasing
discontent.
Most non-Communist politi-
cians applauded the Peralta-led
military coup in the belief that
Ydigoras' erratic political manip-
ulations would ensure the re-
election tnis year of ex-Presi-
dent Juan Jose Arevalo. They
feared that Arevalo's return to
power would pave the way for
eventual Communist domination of
the Guatemalan Government as
was the case following his 1945-
1951 term in office.
The recent change in attitude
of these leaders is traceable,
in part, to their belief that
they have been ignored by the
government. Their disenchantment
has been heightened by a general
feeling that the regime's mainte-
ance of a state of siege and other
repressive measures is no longer
warranted. In addition, rightist
elements are registering bitter
resentment against the government's
economic and fiscal reforms which
include the introduction, for the
first time, of an income tax.
The government has recently
indicated that it is not alto-
gether insensitive to the criti-
cism now being leveled against
it. A recent controversial de-
cree denying certain civil rights
has been modified. On 17 July
Peralta, in a nationwide address,
specifically denied rumors that
his regime plans a plebiscite to
perpetuate itself in power. He
was careful, however, to leave
no doubt that any activity threaten-
ing the stability of his govern-
ment would be suppressed. In an-
other gesture to refurbish the
image of his administration,
Peralta dusted off Guatemala's
old claim to British Honduras
and on 24 July carried out his
threat to act against Great Britain's
new plan for independence of the
colony by breaking relations with
London.
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20
Iquique
Tocopil lat
Mejillonejj
l
Antofagast<
24-
Pinta?OS
l CottaA
yLA PAZ
u
(rI Bquete
Santa Any
JHvanchaca
Uyuni ~
slc _ habant a
;haragua
N T I N V
62
BOLIVIA
STRATEGIC MINERAL RESOURCES
sb Antimony Pb Lead
Iron e Tungsten
(g Tin
International boundary Selected road,.:-.
National capital Railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
I
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
GLOSSARY
lago=.. -_----- lakes
ria,no. _ _-- _---- .--river
salar --------------- salt flat
f `BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
I
Puerto Guarani
PARAGUAY
iertoCasado
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Western Hemisphere
The government's dispute
with Communist-led tin miners
seems headed for an early show-
down which could touch off wide-
spread violence. The 4-week
strike at the Catavi tin mine,
Bolivia's largest, is continuing;
24-hour strikes are being car-
ried out at several others,
and a sympathy walkout by mem-
bers of the Factory Workers'
Union is imminent.
The problem has its roots
in President Victor Paz Estens-
soro's determination to turn
Bolivia's chronically uneconomic
tin mining operations into a
paying proposition. The es-
sential feature in the plan
he is pushing to achieve this
is aimed at ending featherbed-
ding and.at"reclassifying" many
miners to other jobs. This pro-
posal is anathema to the unions,
and has been rejected out of
hand unless the government agrees
to excessive wage increases to
accompany the proposed reform
measure.
The argument started coming
to a head on 1 July when Com-
munist labor leaders at Catavi
ordered certain specialized
workers to go on strike in pro-
test against the government's
proposals. The strike was de-
clared illegal on 8 July and the
government took steps to close
the mine. On 12 July, the
workers agreed to return to their
jobs, but only if the government
paid them for the time they were
on strike. President Paz Estens-
soro refused and the ensuing
deadlock has caused the situa-
tion to drift inexorably toward
a point of no return for either
side.
Any violence that may
result from these maneuvers
would provide Paz with an excuse
for sending regular army troops
into the mining areas to restore
order, declaring a national state
of siege, and perhaps attempt-
ing a roundup of Communist lead-
ers., Presumably with these pos-
sibilities in mind, Paz has placed
the military on alert status
The prospects are that Paz, who
can count on the support of the
military and units of armed peas-
ants,, would be able to weather
any conflict he may have with
the miners.
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ECUADOREAN DEVELOPMENTS
In the two weeks since the
overthrow of President Arosemena,
it has become possible tentatively to identify the locus of
power within the military junta
as well as the general direction.
its policies are likely to take.
Opinion is widespread that
the strong man of the four-man
junta is Colonel Marcos Gandara,
who usually acts as its spokes-
man. Gandara seems to be at
once the best informed. member
of the group and the one with
the clearest ideas as to what
needs to be done. He is on
record as saying that although
the armed forces have no am-
bitions to hold the country's
political reins, the "revolution"
will fail if they do not ensure
the effective implementation of
fundamental reforms.
The junta issued a state-
ment on 18 July declaring that
it seeks to promote the country's
economic development in a way
that will benefit the people
through increased production and
a more equitable distribution
of the national wealth. What
the junta seems to have in mind
is an over-all development plan
which will include reforms in
land holding, fiscal policies
and administration.
The junta envisions the
convening in October of a con-
stituent assembly to consider a
new constitution now being
drafted by the Supreme Court.
It hopes to hold general elec-
tions sometime in 1964, but is
making no commitment until it
has a better picture of how its
program is progressing.
In the meantime, the
regime has cracked down hard
on the Communists. It has
acted. to remove Communists
from government jobs, and on
18 July outlawed the party it-
self. These actions have en-
couraged non-Communist labor
leaders to move against Com-
munists in positions of in-
fluence.
Their next
step might be the establish-
ment of a new national labor
organization composed of the
free trade union movement and
possibly the Catholic unions.
In foreign affairs, the
foreign minister has declared
that Ecuador will follow a
policy of solidarity with other
American nations in the attempt
to control Castro-Communist
subversion in the hemisphere.
He also indicated support for
the entry of Canada, Jamaica,
and Trinidad and Tobago into
the Organization of American
States. The regime, however,
has been slow in gaining for-
eign recognition. So far, it
has been recognized by only
four countries and the Vatican.
Junta Chairman Castro
Jijon has agreed to instruct
the navy to stop harassing
US fishing craft. Thus some
sort of a modus vivendi on
the basis of a twelve-mile
limit now seems to be in pros-
pect.
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Dominican Republic: The
previously widespread rumors of
an impending military coup
have been put to rest for the
time being by public denials
from principal military leaders
and by surprisingly strong
expressions of support for con-
stitutional government from all
political sectors, including
the extreme left. However, a
more serious confrontation over
President Juan Bosch's policy
toward domestic Communists may
be in the offing. For his part,
Bosch, in a speech on 16 July,
put Dominicans on notice that
he would resign rather than bow
to what he considered undue
pressure. Foreign Minister
Andres Freites has expressed
fear that the President might
already be on the point of
returning to exile as a self-
styled political martyr
Haiti: Last week's abor-
tive attack on a military out-
post by remnants of the late
Clement Barbot's followers appears
to have been a last-ditch effort.
It. probably marks the end, at
least for the present, of any
organized internal opposition
to the regime. Reports of an
"invasion" by 50 exiles at
Arcahaie, about 25 miles north-
west of Port-au-Prince, were
not confirmed and are now con-
sidered doubtful.
Argentina: Political ma-
neuverinmss now centered on the
electoral college which is sched-
uled to elect a president and
vice president on 31 July. There
are indications that Dr. Arturo
Illia and his running mate on
the People's Radical Civic
Union ticket (UCRP), Carlos
Perette, probably have lined
up enough votes to be nominated.
Extensive horse-trading is also
going on among the numerous
political parties in connection
with the election of 46 national
senators by the provincial
legislatures on 29 July, and
of 23 governors by provincial
electoral colleges late next
month. In the selection of
senators, the UCRP, which won
the recent general elections
by only a small plurality, is
expected to fall short of a
majority.
Peru: President-elect
Belaunde Terry is to be inaugu-
rated on 28 July after a year
of military rule. However,
his apparent hesitancy in mak-
ing decisions reportedly is
becoming a matter of concern
among Peruvian officials.
Belaunde has been unusually
slow in naming his cabinet
ministers and apparently has
a penchant for /prolonged con-
sultations before making up
his mind on what have been
described as even "trivial"
matters. It may be, on the
other hand, that he is moving
with extraordinary caution
because, as the head of a
minority government, he will
want to avoid antagonizing
either the opposition political
leaders or the military, which
still hovers in the background.
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Approved For Release 2009/03/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04100070001-1