THE SITUATION IN HAITI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100070006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 July 1963
OCI No. 0290/63A
Copy No. 79
I!,k ZOO
SPECIAL REPORT
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
M
RM
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS, If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.
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26 July 1963
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
Summary
Haitian dictator Duvalier presently is in a
stronger position than ever, largely because of the
collapse of organized opposition to him following
the critical period last April and May. He has
been successful in remaining in power beyond his
legal presidential term mainly through his under-
standing and exploitation of the weaknesses and
eccentricities of the Haitian people. ;3e has been
careful to shift or remove regime officials before
they could build up personal followings against him,
and most of the small number of top officials who
have retained their posts throughout his administra-
tion are extreme opportunists, including some Com-
munists and pro-Communists. It is from this group
of persons that a successor to Duvalier would be
most likely to emerge as matters now stand. The
chances that a bloodbath and a general breakdown
of central. authority would result from Duvalier's
removal from the presidency are considered high.
The Haitian Army, traditionally the kingmaker
in local politics, has been transformed by repeated
purges from the most likely agent of Duvalier's
downfall. into one of three armed groups supporting
him and responsive to his dictates. The civil mili-
tia and a secret police organization--both created
by Duvalier originally to counter the power of the
army--complete the roster of the forces maintaining
him in power. Army efficiency and capabilities have
declined as US-trained officers have been removed
or have fled into exile, while the discipline and
degree of training of the militia appear to have
increased. Some form of unification of the two
forces may be carried out in the future.
The Communist threat in Haiti, heretofore con-
sidered negligible because of comriunism's lack of
appeal. among the country's politically inert masses,
is increasing. Haiti's Communists presently lack
militancy but are permitted to operate relatively
unchecked by the regime and consequently are increas-
ing their strength. The danger of a seizure of
power by a small, determined Communist elite group
in the event of Duvalier's removal. is clearly mounting.
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On the other hand, the threat posed by Haiti's lim-
ited ties with the bloc appears to be minor compared
with the internal threat at this time. Haiti has
few contacts with the bloc or with Castro's Cuba,
and there appears to be little evidence of political
or subversive interest in Haiti on the part. of Com-
munist-controlled countries.
Haiti's economic deterioration probably has
been accelerated under Duvalier. An economic col-
lapse, however, does not appear imminent, since a
bumper coffee crop later this year is expected to
alleviate the country's present foreign exchange
shortage. A grandiose "economic development plan"
announced by Duvalier on 22 May appears, like a pre-
vious "self -development" program, to have been devised
for internal political reasons. It holds little
promise of accomplishing anything, but may be used
by the regime to attempt to coax and extort additional
funds from domestic and foreign sources.
Haitian opposition to Duvalier is characterized
at present by the despair and inactivity of the dic-
tator's opponents within Haiti and by the weakness
and fragmentation of exile groups. The death of
Clement Barbot on 14 July virtually ends organized
resistance to Duvalier within Haiti, and Haitian
exile groups now active in the Dominican Republic
appear to be dissipating most of their energies in
attempting to discredit each other rather than build-
ing strength against Duvalier. Exile disintegration
is being accelerated by Dominican President Bosch's
sudden decision to refuse permission for the use of
Dominican territory by the exiles for training and
staging purposes.
Annex Basic Facts On Haiti
Annex B: Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings
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HISPANIOLA
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CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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Duvalier's Political Situation
Haitian dictator Duvalier
has emerged from the turbulent
period of April and May in a
stronger position than ever.
There appears to be no organ-
ized group within the country
or abroad that is now in a po-
sition to attack him, let alone
topple his regime. The rela-
tively small segment of the
population in Haiti which is
sufficiently active politically
to carry any weight in opposing
him has been bowed and demoral-
ized by the failure of this
spring's attempts against him
and by the regime's subsequent
imposition of even tighter
measures of cofitrol and re-
pression.
Duvalier has managed to
maintain his regime largely by
building up a body of loyal
henchmen to act as the instru-
ments of his policy of terror-
ism and repression, and by
effectively playing off and
neutralizing those individuals
who might at some time oppose
him. He has instituted a per-
vasive, effective informant
system to apprise him of plots
well before they can materialize.
Beyond this, he has perhaps
succeeded in prolonging his
term of office where other
Haitian presidents have failed
because he thoroughly under-
stands and has cunningly used
the weaknesses and eccentricities
The impetus behind the
drive to oust Duvalier on or
before 15 May--the date his
legal term of office expired--
has been entirely dissipated.
There are no prospects for an-
other psychologically propitious
period for a drive against his
regime for some time to come.
He claims that the term to which
he was "re-elected" in 1961 is
to run for six years, but several
domestic groups already have
urged "..spontaneously" that he
be "president for life." In
this situation, the most likely
possibilities for his removal
appear to have narrowed down to
two: his death from assassina-
tion or from natural causes
(the 55-year-old Duvalier's
health is and has been uncertain),
or a coup staged by one or more
of his trusted associates.
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sador Thurston to return to Haiti. confidence and whose authority
Duvalier has been careful not appeared to increase during the
to press his attacks on the US recent cris'~n. I
inf,
too farApOtblYFojtfldJ1a?0/011106: C1}-g
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of the Haitian temperament to
his own advantage. To the
apolitical, superstitious
masses, he is "Papa Doc," the
virtual personification of a
Voodoo god; to the country's
overwhelmingly Negro population,
he has shown himself to be anti-
mulatto and a devotee of black
supremacy, which he calls
"negritude"; to all Haitians,
he poses as a Haitian national-
ist, frequently invoking past
glories and the names of famous
national heroes such as Emperor
Dessalines.
One aspect of his exploi-
tation of nationalism has been
seen in his use of the US as a
scapegoat for virtually all the
ills that beset the country. He
has consistently charged that
American miserliness, not
Haitian mismanagement and cor-
ruption, is the basic reason
for Haiti's continuing economic
and social deterioration. In
recent weeks, anti-US pronounce-
ments by regime leaders have
taken on a different tone; they
have asserted that the US was
responsible for the recent
critical period and for the
abortive attempts against
Duvalier which then took place.
These charges appear to have
culminated--at least for the
present--in the ousting of the
US naval and air force missions
and the refusal of the Haitian
Government to allow US Ambas-
sador Thurston to return to Haiti.
Duvalier has been careful not
to press his attacks on the US
too far; he may still hope to
regain some sort of US economic
aid commitment, and he may
believe that the risks attendant
upon a complete break with the
US are too great to be taken.
Few regime officials are
permitted by Duvalier to exer-
cise real power, and those who
do are largely of the same stripe
as the dictator himself. Most
top officials are sporadically
reshuffled or removed in order
to prevent their building up a
personal following which might
some day challenge Duvalier.
Several of the men who have
occupied cabinet-level positions
longest under Duvalier are Com-
munists or pro-Communists.
Pro-Communist Minister of
Finance Herve Boyer allegedly
is a former member of the French
Communist Party. The same re-
port has been received on Jules
Blanchet, who is currently serv-
ing as Haiti's ambassador to
the European Common Market.
Minister of Commerce Clovis
Desinor is frequently reported
to be at least pro-Communist,
although some reports classify
him as an extreme opportunist.
Others fitting into the latter
category are Minister of Public
Works Luckner Cambronne and
Jacques Fourcand, the director
of the social security institute.
Both the latter are top Duvalier
aides and confidants. Adrien
Raymond, who holds the number
two position in the Foreign
Ministry, is another individual
who evidently has Duvalier's
confidence and whose authority
appeared to increase during the
recent crisis. He and his
brother, Colonel Claude R.tymond
--quartermaster general of the
Haitian Army--are tough, trusted
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as the most likely source of an
attempt to overthrow him, he now
considers it one of the groups
which solidly supports his re-
gime. He has been able to
achieve this complete about-
face by systematically elimi-
nating all officers whom he
regarded as not completely sub-
servient to him. Since his
inauguration in 1957, Duvalier
has cashiered approximately 191
officers (49 percent of the
officer corps), the last purge
of about 60 officers having
taken place in the 20-23 April
period.
The officers purged from
the FAd'H have been the older,
more experienced and stable
elements of the armed forces.
For the most part they were US-
trained, pro-US and competent.
In their place, Duvalier has
placed political appointees
(many former enlisted men) who
offer little in military quali-
fications but are politically
acceptable and loyal to his re-
gime. The effectiveness of the
armed forces has been reduced to
the point that it has minimal
value as an organized military
force.
The Ton Ton Macoutes
(Duvalier's secret police) were
established in late 1957 by
Clement Barbot, who later turned
against the regime and recently
headed, until his death on 14
July, the sole known organiza-
tion opposing Duvalier within
Haiti. The TTMs are a loosely
organized mixture of military,
paramilitary and civilian ac-
tivist supporters of the regime.
Their mission is to keep
Duvalier and Haiti's blacks in
absolute power as long as pos-
sible. Ostensibly a presiden-
tial bodyguard, they are
Duvalier's confidential agents,
dealing in terrorism and vio-
lence. Composed mostly of
thugs and other undesirables,
the TTMs number from 1,000 to
1,500, are expert in brutality
and the techniques of political
repression, and serve the regime
while serving themselves.
The civil militia is a
part-time paramilitary force.
Even though it has been in
existence since 1958, it was
not legalized until November
1962 when it was officially
designated the "National
Security Volunteer Corps" (VSN).
The VSN represents a politically
mobilized and ideologically
oriented force which keeps the
masses in line. Formed, ac-
cording to Duvalier, for in-
ternal security and to ensure
against an external invasion,
it was actually established to
offset the strength of the FAd'H.
The VSN has the potential to
identify and report clandestine
opposition to Duvalier anywhere
in Haiti; it has been used
successfully to turn out the
vote for Duvalier and to sup-
press minor political disturb-
ances. There are about 10,000
militiamen, of which only about
25 percent are equipped with
firearms. Some 2,500-militia-
men are concentrated in the
Port-au-Prince area alone. The
VSN operates as an adjunct of
the Ton Ton Macoutes and is
used to implement TTM orders
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when the number of men needed
is fairly large.
some memuurS 01
the VSN took part in the 22 May
parade celebrating the second
anniversary of Duvalier's "re-
inauguration." On the basis of
its impressive appearance at
this time, the VSN is believed
to have received considerable
training during the past year.
.The US military missions
in Haiti--which until their ex-
pulsion by Duvalier this spring
maintained close relations with
the officers of the FAd'H--were
feared by Duvalier. He claimed
that the missions "interfered"
with the absolute personal
loyalty which he demanded of his
officers. As of now the oppor-
tunities for such "interference"
have been greatly reduced; FAd'H
officers and men have been vir-
turally barred from the slightest
contact with those US MAAG per-
sonnel still remaining in the
country. Duvalier continues,
however, to give evidence of
his fear of such contacts by
hampering any and all efforts by
the MAAG group to accomplish its
normal functions.
The chances of a military
coup occurring in the foresee-
able future appear quite small.
It is more likely that the
militia will become better or-
ganized,, trained and equipped as
the army's capabilities and
standards continue to deteriorate.
An eventual merger of the two
groups could occur when Duvalier
considers that his present drive
to convert the armed forces into
a more useful tool of his regime
has been accomplished. Such a
force probably would not be
worthy of consideration as a
military organization by non-
Haitian standards, but would be
powerful enough to suppress
quickly any internal move against
Duvalier that might develop.
The Communist Threat
The threat of communism in
Haiti has traditionally been re-
garded as small, largely because
the Haitian populace is generally
apathetic, illiterate, and apo-
litical. Also, the pressures for
land reform which have been ex-
ploited to such advantage by
Communists in other Latin Ameri-
can countries are largely non-
existent in Haiti; the Haitian
peasants have owned their own
tiny plots of land for genera-
tions. Haiti's abject poverty,
its appalling social conditions,
and its political bankruptcy,
however, do create a situation
which readily lends itself to
Communist exploitation. While
the docile, lethargic nature of
the population probably would
preclude the possibility of a
Communist takeover through a
mass uprising, it would facili-
tate the control of the country
by a small, dedicated Communist
elite group if it were to seize
power.
The evidence now available
indicates that such a dedicated,
hard-core Communist organization
is being built up within Haiti.
While the effectiveness and
militancy of local Communists
are believed to be rather low
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at this time, their potential
is clearly increasing. This
results in no small degree from
Duvalier's policy of tolerating
--for his own devious political
purposes--the existence of Haiti?
two Communist parties, both of
which are permitted to function
almost unhindered despite their
clandestine status. These
organizations are the People's
Unity Party (PEP), which is
estimated to have roughly 500
members, and the People's Na-
tional Liberation Party (PPLN),
with an estimated membership
of up to 1,500 persons. The
PEP has well-established inter-
national Communist connections
and is recognized as the official
Communist party by the interna-
tional Communist apparatus. It
is concentrating on building
well-trained and disciplined
cadres; the PPLN is less tightly
knit and is more of a mass party.
The PPLN publishes a small
periodical pamphlet which ap-
pears irregularly entitled
Haiti Demain (Haiti Tomorrow).
Both the PEP and the PPLN
are steadily gaining new members..
Duvalier's removal could lead to
an acceleratied growth partic-
ularly if a new government were
formed by those elements of the
pro-Communist or opportunist
stripe who now surround the
dictator. If Duvalier's down-
fall were to result in chaos and
a breakdown in national authority,
only the Communists, who are the
only organized opposition forces in
Haiti, would be in a position
to gain influence and power.
External Communist atten-
tion to Haiti appears to be of
minor importance compared with
the potential threat posed by
domestic forces at this time.
Poland is the bloc nation most
active in Haiti and is the only
one maintaining diplomatic ties
with the Duvalier regime. A
Polish commercial attache has
resided in Port-au-Prince since
April 1962. Warsaw's new ambas-
sador to Mexico, who is resident
there but accredited as minister
to several Middle American coun-
tries, presented his ministerial
credentials to Haitian officials
last month. Recent information
reveals a growing Polish com-
mercial interest in Haiti and
indicates that Duvalier probably
is encouraging still more interest
on Poland's part. Several Polish
trade officials have visited
Haiti since April, and as of
26 June a Polish-Haitian com-
mercial firm reportedly was
being established in Port-au-
Prince to promote barter deals
between the two countries. The
first barter contract set up by
the firm is said to envisage an
exchange of Haitian coffee and
other products for 17,000 tons
of Polish cement and other prod-
ucts,, with a total value of
$300,000.
Czechoslovakia also has
evinced commercial interest in
Haiti, but evidently to a lesser
extent. A six-man Czech-trade
delegation visited Haiti in
early March of this year and met
informally with Haitian business-
men. There was no indication
that the delegation met with any
Haitian officials, and no im-
portant deals for cash or barter
were made. There have been
several reports since mid-1962
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that Czech weapons have come
into Haiti, but none have been
confirmed.
Firmer indications of the
extent of bloc interest in Haiti
may develop shortly. A Haitian
cabinet-level delegation is
tentatively scheduled to leave
for Western Europe in September
to seek economic aid commitments
from France, West Germany, and
Italy. If these attempts to
acquire Western economic aid
should fail--and preliminary in-
dications are that only minor aid
offers will be made at this time
--Haiti reportedly will seek
Czech and Polish help.
Duvalier has threatened on
a number of occasions over the
past several years to turn to the
bloc for economic assistance if
he could not obtain more aid from
the US. For the most part, these
threats--the latest of which was
implied in Duvalier's 22 May re-
mark that Haiti might be forced
to turn to "other systems" if
satisfactory economic support
were not forthcoming from within
the free enterprise system--have
been implied rather than explicit
and have not been followed up.
A few tenuous feelers by Duvalier
toward the bloc have been reported,
however, such as the unconfirmed
reports that former Haitian for-
eign minister Raymond Moyse
headed a small delegation sent
to Moscow in a quest of Soviet
aid during the summer of 1962.
Such overtures as may have been
made evidently have met with
little response from the bloc.
There also have been few other
indications of any bloc interest
in Haiti; bloc propaganda media
have rarely mehtioned Haiti,
and except for the unfavorable
comments on Duvalier made by
Moscow and the Soviet delegation
at the UN during the Haitian-
Dominican crisis, bloc commen-
tary on Haiti has been largely
noncommittal.
It has been reported that
several Communist and pro-Com-
munist members of Duvalier's
coterie were plotting to remove
him from power and subsequently
declare Haiti to be a "social-
ist republic." A rash of such
reports were received during
the several weeks preceding the
end of Duvalier's legal term of
office on 15 May; none have come
in since then, and there is some
reason to believe that these re-
ports were deliberately planted
by Duvalier so that they might
reach US Government officials.
Nevertheless, if such a course
of action were ever implemented,
the chances of such a successor
government eliciting bloc or
Cuban support would appear con-
siderably greater than are the
prospects of the present gov-
ernment. Even in this case,
however, the bloc's initial
reaction to an appeal for sup-
port probably would be cautious
until the situation was clari-
fied and the nature and extent
of US reaction had become ap-
parent. Also, the bloc might
be cautious unless the neigh-
boring Dominican Republic--a
more attractive and more signif-
icant target for eventual bloc
domination--were won over first.
There is no evidence of
more than a perfunctory interest
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in Haiti on the part of the
Castro regime at this time.
Cuban-Haitian relations were
broken in August 1959 following
an abortive "invasion" attempt
against Haiti by a handful of
Castro's followers, and contacts
between the two nations have
been minimal ever since. Sev-
eral Haitian Communists report-
edly live in Cuba, and one of
them, Rene Depestre, is said to
have been given a job by Castro
at the Cuban Government printing
office in Havana. Radio Havana
devotes an hour each day to
beaming a broadcast in the
Creole language to Haiti; the
broadcast was initiated late
last December following an 18-
month lapse in Cuba's interna-
tional broadcasts to Haiti.
Aside from this, there is 1'
evidence of Cuban interest.
n ear y May, u
oreign Minister Raul Roa re-
marked that Cuba had its own
troubles and was interested
neither in Duvalier nor in
Dominican President Juan Bosch,
who were described as "equally
distasteful" to the Cuban
Government.
There have been several
reports recently that Castro
is training thousands of Hai-
tians and French-speaking
Africans to be used in a take-
over of Haiti-and that some of
these forces have already been
infiltrated into Haiti. Neither
aspect of these reports can be
confirmed. The former Haitian
consul general in Santiago de
Cuba, who returned to his coun-
try last month, estimated that
there are approximately 80,000
Haitians living in Cuba, most
of them having emigrated there
as cane-cutters in the pre-Castro
period. He stated that only a
small percentage of these per-
sons are Castro supporters and
that he found no evidence of
Africans being trained to go to
Haiti. He also made the point
that the Haitians who had gone
to Cuba found living conditions
there superior to those they had
left behind, which would incline
most of them to remain. Sources
familar with the Haitian people
point out that clandestine entry
into the country, even for native
Haitians, would be no easy task;
such persons would quickly be
spotted by local authorities,
who tend to be suspicious of any
"strangers." There is no evi-
dence that such incidents have
occurred.
The State of the Haitian Economy
Haiti remains an over-
crowded and impoverished country
where the levels of production,
income, health, and literacy are
probably the lowest in the West-
ern Hemisphere and among the
lowest in the world. The major
problems facing the economy are
those which have plagued the
country for generations: inade-
quate natural resources, low
agricultural productivity, a
lack of diversification in pro-
duction, and a lack of any
systematic economic development
program and trained personnel
to implement economic reforms.
Agricultural production--the
country's main economic activity
--is retarded by the prevalence
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of subsistence farming on small
family plots and by the owners'
failure to observe even the most
elementary principles of land
and soil conservation. Haiti's
major exports are coffee, sugar,
and sisal. Coffee, the most im-
portant crop, grows wild and re-
ceives a minimum of processing
from the peasants who collect it.
Continued heavy dependence on
coffee, with alternating high
and low crop years and continuous
price fluctuations, results in
periodic strains on the countryS
economic stability.
Under Duvalier, the coun-
try's over-all economic deteri-
oration has continued unchecxed.
Revenues ostensibly raised for
developmental purposes have been
diverted for Duvalier's personal
use and that of his top officials
and armed retainers. Taxes have
been increased as much as the
traffic will bear, and foreign
businesses in Haiti are inces-
santly asked to "contribute" to
the regime's coffers. The level
of business activity has declined
and during the last six months
business has been especially
poor due to the effects of a
longshoremen's strike in the
US, the political situation in
Haiti, and the virtual cessation
of the tourist trade--formerly
Haiti's second-largest source of
foreign exchange.
Many observers who have been
struck by the poverty and economic
stagnation so evident in the
country have assumed that an
economic collapse is imminent.
Such a collapse now appears ex-
tremely unlikely, since the coun-
try grows enough food to satisfy
the regime's heeds and since
the coffee crop to be harvested
during this October and November
is expected to be a good one.
This will bring the regime much-
needed foreign exchange and re-
lieve temporarily much of the
economic pressure built up over
the past year. Also Haiti re-
mains fiscally sound in the
technical sense. The economy,
'iowever dreary it may be in other
respects, has had a notably good
record in fiscal-monetary per-
formance ever since the end of
the US occupation of the country
in 1934.
In his speech of 22 May,
President Duvalier announced the
initiation of an elaborate new
economic and social development
plan for the country which he
titled the "Plan of Urgency."
Basically the "plan" calls for
a $50-million investment annually
for two years, in order to put
the nation's economy on the road
to progress. The announced goal
of the plan is a five-percent
increase in the nation's per
capita GNP, to be achieved at the
rate of 2.5 percent per annum.
After the first two years of
operation, the plan calls for an
annual investment of $70 million,
the extra $20 million going toward
meeting the costs of maintenance
and replacement.
Typically, however, the plan
contains no specific provision
for financing, aside from vague
references to "national effort"
and "sacrifice," and a rather
blustering assertion that foreign
aid with strings attached will
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not be accepted. The plan
evidently assumes that the means
will somehow and somewhere be
found; aside from this,. Duvalier
referred to the program as "an
alliance with ourselves for
progress." The economy clearly
cannot produce the funds neces-
sary to finance a program of
this magnitude, and it is doubt-
ful that in its present state
the Haitian economy could absorb
an investment of $50 million,
even if it became available.
The scheme appears similar in
purpose to Duvalier's earlier
"National Renovation Movement,"
an economic development project
of smaller scope which has served
Duvalier's domestic propaganda
purposes and whose major accom-
plishment has been the partial
construction of a low-cost
workers' residential community
named "Duvalierville" in an
area where there is little need
of it. For these reasons the
plan has not been taken very
seriously in Port-au-Prince
except for its implied threat
of increased taxation.
Duvalier's Opposition
The strength of Duvalier's
position today comes not only
from his own clever manipulation
of the forces which have the
potential to overthrow him, but
also from the extreme disarray
and despair of those Haitians
who oppose him. The Haitian op-
position has long been deeply
fragmented, but only recently
have the anti-Duvalier forces--
particularly those remaining
within Haiti--lost hope of over-
throwing the dictatorship.
With the passing of the 22 May
anniversary celebrations of
Duvalier's "reinauguration" in
1961, the anti-Duvalier momentum
built up during the preceding
two months evaporated, and
despondency supplanted optimism
in opposition circles.
Recent reports from within
Haiti indicate that silent, in-
active opposition to Duvalier
among politically conscious
sectors of the population con-
tinues at a high level and
probably has increased. They
also make it clear that the
populace has been cowed by the
regime's repressive power and
by its often-demonstrated
brutality against known or sus-
pected dissidents. Most of
those Haitians who have exhibited
courage or capability in the
struggle against Duvalier have
either been killed or imprisoned
by the regime, or have taken
asylum in foreign embassies and
have fled to Other countries.
Only Clement Barbot--whose death
was announced by the regime on
14 July--and his handful of
followers actively opposed
Duvalier from within Haiti in
recent months. Barbot's death
may well leave Duvalier virtually
unopposed at home at this time;
the capabilities of the surviving
remnants of his group are believed
to be quite limited.
Such internal opposition
to the regime as exists is cen-
tered mainly in the small Haitian
mulatto element, which has been
especially persecuted by Duvalier
since he took power. He has been
largely successful in destroying
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the political power of the
mulattoes, who traditionally
have controlled most of the
country's key posts other than
the presidency. Further,
Duvalier has sharpened his.-
torical racial antagonisms
between them and the country's
Negro masses--the latter ac-
counting for approximately 95
percent of the population. There
Are reports that in the event
of an attack on his regime,
Duvalier's henchmen have stand-
ing orders to launch an all-out
attack on the mulattoes. Many
members of this group already
have been liquidated or have
fled into exile, but those who
remain--businessmen, intellec-
tuals, and professionals who
have not been harmed because of
their economic importance to the
country--are bitterly opposed to
Duvalier.
The exile picture is one of
fragmentation and confusion. A
multitude of small, personalistic
exile groups exist, but most of
them tend to focus more on at-
tempting to discredit rival groups
and personalities than on direct-
ing efforts against the Duvalier
regime. (See Annex B for a brief
description of some of the exile
organizations most frequently
reported on.) Most of the groups
have advanced dubious claims of
substantial support within Haiti,
and few have come up with detailed
plans for a future government.
Many are limited in their appeal
to other Haitians because their
leadership is composed of Haitian
politicans of the old-school type
who, if they were to achieve
power, would probably ape the
present regime in most of its
authoritarian and corrupt prac-
tices. Few are believed to
have much financial support or
military resources available
at this time.
Concentrations of anti-
Duvalier exiles are located in
the Dominican Republic; in New
York and Miami in the US; and
in Cuba, Venezuela, and the
Bahamas. There are lesser
numbers in other areas. The
center of Haitian exile activity
is the Dominican Republic. To
Haitian exiles hoping to build
up strength for an eventual
conquest of their homeland, the
Dominican Republic is both a
natural and an important staging
area. Given their present lack
of financial and military re-
sources, the Haitian exiles
would be hard pressed to mount
any kind of an attack on
Duvalier without active Dominican
support.
Dominican President Juan
Bosch's recent loud protesta-
tions of his opposition to
Duvalier have historical ante-
cedents: Haitian-Dominlican
relations have been character-
ized by tension and strife ever
since 1822. In 1937 the two
countries nearly went to war
after thousands of Haitian
canecutters who had crossed the
border to work in Dominican
canefields were slaughtered by
the Trujillo dictatorship. Now
difficulties between the two
countries have been revived
largely because of the conflict-
ing natures of their govern-
ments. Bosch, a member of the
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political school of the demo-
cratic left, like Costa Rican ex-
president Jose Figueres and
Venezuelan President Betancourt,
opposes everything which Duvalier
stands for and has said that
their two governments cannot
exist for long on the same is-
land: one will have to fall.
The Haitian-Dominican crisis
which erupted in late April was
a reflection of this sentiment.
It was largely manufactured by
Bosch, who used the crisis to
rally the Dominican people to an
old banner in order to divert
their attention from domestic
political and economic problems.
Most of the larger Haitian
exile organizations have vied,
with some success until recently,
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Ifor Dominican support for a
move against Duvalier. Busch
now opposes providing military
equipment and training sites to
any of the exiles, although
several groups did receive
such aid earlier. His about-
face in this matter may have
sprung from his fear of inter-
national censure and from his
unfavorable impressions of the
Haitian exiles he has met. His
decision, however, has served
to accelerate the confusion and
disintegration of the Haitian
exile forces. The Dominican
Government is nevertheless
continuing to welcome Haitian
exiles into the country, and
hundreds of refugees and exiles
have crossed the border into
the Dominican Republic in recent
months. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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Capital City:
Area
Population
Rural to Urban Ratio:
Illiteracy:
Budget
Percentage of Budget for Military:
Total Value of Exports:
Total Value of Imports:
Chief Exports (1962-63):
Port-au-Prince Pop. (1963 est.)
200,000
10,714 square miles
4,400,000 (1963 est.)
85% to 15%
90%a (est.)
$28,800,000 (1 Oct 62 to 30 Sept 63)
26%
$32,000,000 (1961 est.)
$35,000,000 (1961 est.)
Coffee - 40%
Sugar - 16%
Sisal - 10%
US Investment (Direct):
Per Capita GNP:
Armed Forces (FAd'H):
Civil Militia (VSN):
Ton Ton Macoutes:
US Aid to Haiti since World War II:
US Aid to Haiti under Duvalier Regime:
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$70,000,000
$65-$70 (est.)
Army - 4,788
Coast Guard - 314
Aviation Corps - 184
10,000 (1963 est.)
1,000-1,500 (1963 est.)
$100,000,000
$50,000,000
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ANNEX B
Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings*
(Listed alphabetically)
1. Corvington military grouping:
Ex-colonel Paul Corvington, former director of Haiti's mili-
tary academy who left the country as an asylee this spring and
who is distinguished by his capable military leadership as well
as by his distrust of Haitian exile politicians, is attempting to
build an organization of other former military officers and men
for an eventual attack on Duvalier. Active mainly in the Domini-
can Republic, Corvington and a few associates have negotiated with
Dominican President Bosch and elements of the military leadership
there for their support, but the Corvington group is not believed
to be receiving such assistance at this time. A Haitian priest,
Father Jean Baptiste Georges, currently appears to be working
closely with Corvington.
2. Dejoie-Fignole Haitian "Government-in-Exile:"
Two former rivals for the Haitian presidency in the 1957
elections, Louis Dejoie and Daniel Fignole, announced on 12 May
their joint leadership of a 16-man provisional "government-in-
exile." Their organization appears never to have gone beyond the
planning stage and the two leaders have split up, according to
recent reports. Dejoie, a wealthy mulatto of conservative politi-
cal tendencies, has attempted several times since 1957 to ous7c
Duvalier, and claims a large number of supporters within Haiti.
Fignole, who actually was president of Haiti for 19 days in June
1957, is a spellbinding Negro orator and demagogue who is believed
to retain a considerable following among Port-au-Prince's slum
dwellers. Both Dejoie and Fignole are presumably continuing their
attempts to build their own organizations.
*Within the Haitian exile concentrations,'alliances be-
tween groups and their leaders shift constantly and rap-
idly as the key figures jockey for increased prestige
and support. For this reason, certain generalizations
as to the makeup of the groups and their alliances with
other organizations listed herein may very quickly become
less than accurate.
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3. FRU (United Revolutionary Force):
The prominence of the FRU has declined rapidly since mid-May,
when the organization's military training camp just across the
Haitian border in the Dominican Republic was closed down by the
Bosch government. The group, estimated in May to have a strength
of about 60 men, was set up by Haitian exile brothers Jacques and
Raymond Cassagnol and was indirectly financed by Haitian ex-Presi-
dent Paul Magloire. The FRU camp was disbanded and its equipment
seized by the Dominican Government apparently only hours before
it was to launch an invasion effort against Duvalier. Other exile
groups within the Dominican Republic reportedly have been vying
for the allegiance of the FRU members, but no one group seems to
have absorbed them.
4. MJH (Young Haiti Movement):
This well-organized and active group is led by a Haitian
Catholic priest, Father Gerard Bissainthe, who is of leftist per-
suasion. His group reportedly includes elements both of the demo-
cratic left and of the extreme left. Father Bissainthe claims that
MJH groups have been organized in several Haitian exile centers,
including New York, Caracas, and Puerto Rico, and asserts that the
organization has about 500 members within Haiti. Most of the
group's current efforts are centered in the Dominican Republic. The
MJH formerly received its military guidance from And'd Riviere, a
self-proclaimed French guerrilla warfare expert who recently was
ousted from the group.
5. MPH (Haitian Patriotic Movement):
Founded in 1.962, the MPH is led by Clement Benoit and is cen-
tered in Nassau, B.W.I. Benoit has put forward greatly exaggerated
claims as to the strength of his organization, which is believed
small and probably has little financial or any other support. Benoit
himself is generally regarded as a rather minor figure on the
Haitian exile scene who is trying to build up his own importance.
6. PNH (National Haitian Party):
The political vehicle established by the late Clement Jumelle
(an unsuccessful presidential candidate who competed against Duvalier
in the 1957 elections), the PNH today is politically quiet and is
nominally led by Clement's brother, Gaston Jumelle. The organiza-
tion has maintained its original philosophy, which is of the mod-
erate left, and its present headquarters is believed to be in New
York. Some of Haiti's most progressive, enlightened, and
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professional people maintain loose ties with the PNH, but these
people--one group of whom is referred to as the Latortue group,
stemming from the name of one its members, Francois Latortue--are
handicapped in their political efforts by the lack of any real
organization. The PNH and the Latortue group are believed to en-
joy considerable support among intellectuals in Haiti.
7. UDN (National Democratic Union):
The UDN is the older of the two amalgamations of several
Haitian exile groups, the other being the Dejoie-Fignole organiza-
tion. It was formed in 1962 by a "traditional" Haitian politician,
Pierre Rigaud, who heads the group's main concentration in the
Dominican Republic. The UDN is also represented in New York, Wash-
ington, and Caracas. It contains groups of various political per-
suasions and includes representatives of at least two of the groups
listed above (PHN and MPH). Its military leader at present report-
edly is General Leon Cantave, a competent, pro-US former Haitian
army chief of staff. The group may have greater numerical strength
than any of the others. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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