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lease 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 9 August 1963 OCI No. 0292/63B Copy No. SPECIAL REPORT CUBAN SUBVERSIQN IN LATIN AMERICA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ~~~~~ ICJ SECRET Y7`r~5~,'./~at~ig~ ing and declassification Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0~0927A004100090003-7 Approved Fcelease 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-009,004100090003-7 THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT- ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS- SION OR RE~7.ELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTSa If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the I i mi tati on so imposed . Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004 00090003-7 SECRET 9 August 1963 The Castro regime continues to regard the pro- motion of Communist-led revolution in Latin America as one of its principal goals. Fidel Castro's 26 July address was the most militant public expres- sions of this policy to come out of Cuba in many months. He declared that conditions in many Latin American countries now are mare propitious for the initiation of revolutionary action than they were in Cuba ten years ago when he began his revolu- tionary struggle. He said that what has happened in Cuba can happen "exactly the same" in many other Latin American countries and exhorted revolution- aries there to "open the breach" and begin fight- ing. Castro repeatedly declared that Cuba does not "export" revolution. If by this he means that Cuba does not send Cuban weapons and Cuban military units to other countries, there is no evidence to refute him. However, he and other Cuban leaders openly declaim that they regard their country as the main source of guidance and inspiration far what they call the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. The Cuban subversive effort is being carried on in a number of ways, principally through the indoctrina- tion and training in Cuba of hundreds of Latin Ameri- cans who return home to pass on what they have learned, and through the provision of practical guidance, monetary aid, and open propaganda support to revo- lutionary leaders and groups. Between March and Castro's 26 July address, the surface manifestations of the Cuban subversive effort in Latin Amer- ica appeared much more restrained than during the several months before, This period of rela- tive restraint coincided with the period of repair in Cuban- Soviet relations that followed the shock of last fall's mis- sile crisis. It might also be significant that the resumption of the more militant Cuban line did not take place until after the breakdown in the Sino-Soviet discussions in July. One result of Castro's trip to the USSR this spring may have been, at least for the time being, to bring Moscow and Havana closer to partnership, rather than rivalry, in the Com- munist effort in Latin America. Castro stated specifically in his 26 July address that "we know by experience and conviction SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-Op927A004100090003-7 Approved Fc~elease 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-009,004100090003-7 Latin America DOMINICAN O REPUBLIC Santo 1?uertoRico Domingo Havana o c Ug R IAMAICA FikITI J Kingston P~ ace San~SalvedorQ, ~7NICARAGUA EL SALV ADO O~nagua COSTA ?b na m2 RICA O San Jose pANAM1~ Salvador Rio de Janeiro O 0 Buenos Aires Montevideo Boundaries ore no[ necessarily those recognized by the U. S. GovernmenE. CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE Caracas.. a art-of-Spain O TRiN[DAD & TOBAGO VENEZUELA __-_-__ _____.__ Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 SECRET that all people who do what the Cuban people have done will have the decided support of the So- viet Union and of all the so- cialist camp. The whole subject of Com- munist goals and tactics in Latin America was almost cer- tainly a subject of discussion during Castro's visit. The joint Cuban-Soviet communiqud suggests agreement on the point that conditions in certain Latin American countries offer more hope of Communist victory through peaceful means than through vio- lence.There had been indications before the Moscow trip that the USSR was concerned about Cuban support for dissident Communist or non-Communist revolutionary groups in certain countries, notably Brazil, over the op- position of orthodox Communists whose strategy was to attempt to influence and eventually to dominate the government rather than to overthrow. it. Several Latin American Communist leaders may have par- ticipated in the discussions between Castro and Soviet leaders. Three prominent South American Communists were in the USSR at the time of Castro's visit, and at least two of them met with him there. The lavish treatment Castro received during his Soviet trip undoubtedly raised his prestige among old-line Latin American Communists by indicating to them that Moscow had accepted Castro's leadership of the first Commu- nist regime in the western hem- isphere. Uruguay's Communist leader Rodney Arismendi, long regarded as Moscow-oriented, had the following to say during a Communist gathering in Monte- video in late June, shortly after his return from the USSR where he had met Castro: "We are an echo of the continental revolutionary movement which is bursting forth, fighting against imperialism, with its eyes on the victorious struggle of the Cuban revolution. We are a single force, the force of anti- imperialism in Latin America, whose heart beats in the Cuba of Fidel Castro." Latin American Trainees in Cuba An estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Latin Americans received train- ing in Cuba last-year. The trainees are subsequently re- turned to their homelands, many via circuitious routes through Europe, to put into practice what they have learned and to recruit additional personnel. In recent months, for instance, Cuba-trained subversives have set up guerrilla training camps in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama. Among the more than 300 Latin Americans wha traveled to Cuba in recent weeks under the guise of visitors to the 26 July celebrations, many are ex- pected to remain for some months. These will probably join others already there and receive ideo- logical indoctrination and train- ing in the practical arts of subversion. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-Op927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 `~ SECRET Reports on last year's training programs in Cuba pro- vide considerable detail on the types of training received. The training programs, varying in length from several weeks to six months, included in- struction on virtually all as- pects of guerrilla warfare, as well as heavy doses of ideolog- ical indoctrination. A re ort from a recentl returned disillusioned after seen ing several months in Cuba, sug- gests that many Latin Americans go to Cuba in the expectation of receiving a useful education but are then embroiled in ideo- logical and paramilitary train- ing. Other Cuban Support Reports from some of the trainees reveal that groups from certain Latin American countries have received spe- cific advice on what to do on their return they are 25X a the are to cultivate . laims to have been as a erectly by Che Guevara to prepare a detailed report on Colombia covering the politi- cal situation, labor, student and peasant affairs, social and economic conditions, as well as the extent and estimated ef- fectiveness of the guerrilla bands operating in his country. The purpose of the report was to assist the Cubans in devel- oping "future plans for Colom- bia." Similar reports have come from sources of other nation- alties. A number of reports in- dicate that Cuba continues to provide financial assistance to various subversive groups in Latin America. There is still no convincing evidence, however, of Cuba's supplying military equipment directly to these groups. In most of the countries concerned, military equipment can be obtained through illicit channels, or is captured during attacks on military and police posts. Cuban Propaganda Cuban radiobroadcasts, although less inflammatory than during the October to March period, still perform a direct service to Communist and pro- communist actions and state- ments. The Cuban radio, for instance, is the primary means by which the Venezuelan Commu- nists' Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) obtains pub- licity in Venezuela. This pub- licity carries a considerable psychological impact, since a relatively small group like the FALN measures the degree of its success to a large ex- tent an its ability to create the impression of much greater strength than it actually pos- sesses. Similarly, the publicity received through Cuban media has been one of the main assets of the small guerrilla groups which have operated sporadically in Guatemala. Travel Between Cuba an Lain America Cuba has been faced in re- cent months with a growing problem SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-Op927A004100090003-7 -Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 SECRET in keeping open means of travel between Havana and the rest of Latin America. The increasingly tight controls be- ing imposed by the Mexican Government on travelers who pass through that country en route to and from Cuba has been an important case in point. Cuba's response has been to route an increasingly large proportion of clandestine trainees via the much longer and more expensive commercial links through Europe. There have also been suc- cessful Cuban efforts to return a few visitors to Cuba by way of Grand Cayman Island and other western hemisphere air- fields. Also, 24 South Amer- icans who had visited Cuba for May Day went home on a special CUBANA flight, the only stated purpose of which was to take the new Cuban ambassador to his post in Brazil. On its return trip, this special flight car- ried three of the Venezuelans who had participated in the seizure of the SS Anzoategui early this year.-" Overt Operations Cuba is also seeking--not too successfully so far--to fur- ther its goals in Latin America by various overt means, such as participation in a number of in- ternational conferences. The "Congress of Solidarity with Cuba" held at Niteroi, Brazil, in March, was a failure as a propaganda effort. The Student Seminar on the Underdeveloped World, held in Bahia, Brazil, in July, also appears to have been unsuccessful. Preparatory meetings with Chilean, Bolivian, and other Latin American yabor leaders in an effort to spon- sor the formation of a new inter-American labor organiza- tion to replace the CTAL as the Communist trade union vehicle in Latin America have not yet produced any concrete results. The Second Latin American Youth Congress, which was to have been held in Chile next month, had to be postponed after the organizers became increasingly aware of the difficulties likely to be encountered in that coun- try. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0 927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 V SECRET A country-by-country rundown of the Cuban sub- versive effort in Latin America suggests strongly that the total Cuban effort has not diminished dur- ing the past six months. In some countries, notably Brazil and Chile, where Havana may have come to agree with Moscow that peaceful methods offer more hope of a Communist victory than does violence, Cuba is showing restraint. In others, such as Vene- zuela, Peru, and Colombia, the Cuban effort appears to be continuing as before. Argentina Since early 1963, there have been a number of indica- tions of a Cuban effort to win the cooperation of former Argentine dictator Peron and his followers. There is no evidence that Peron himself has made any commitment to the Cubans, although he reportedly has just appointed a Cuban agent as his representative in charge of the revolutionary wing of-the Peronist movement. Such extreme left-wing Peronists as John William Cooke and Amer- ico Barrios are also reportedly cooperating fully with Cuban agents in their efforts to in- fluence the Peronist movement. In the meantime, Cuban propaganda media gave strong support to the Peronist effort to sabotage the 7 July national elections in Argentina. Also, three of Castro's top aides who accompanied him to Moscow contacted associates of Peron in Spain while Castro was still in the USSR. Despite the deep splits within the Peronist movement, revealed by the recent elec- tions, extremist Peronist lead- ers still threaten revolution- ary activity. Cuban-Peronist revolutionary activities may also find new help from the Argentine Communist Party (PCA). This may result from Moscow's recent criticism of PCA leader Codovilla--made partly at Cas- tro's behest--for his lukewarm leadership. The working headquarters for the Cuban subversive effort against Argentina is located in Montevideo, Uruguay, where the Cuban Embassy gives support to a small group of Argentine terrorists and Peronist revo- lutionaries. The Cuban Embassy in Montevideo has been instru- mental in recruiting and pro- viding travel arrangements far Argentines sent to Cuba for training. At least 2E3 Argen- tines traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebration, and some may remain for training. The preparation of mili- tary training areas in Bolivia and Paraguay for Argentine sub- versives has also been reported. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0 927A004100090003-7 Approved For Relea~s'e~ 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 SECRET Bolivia Evidence that Cuba regards Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countries was reinforced since late May by the arrest of a number of Peru- vian subversives, some of whom had received training in Cuba. These Cuba-trained subversives apparently enter Bolivia from Brazil for an onward journey to Peru through the dense, un- patrolled jungle regions. Also, two Peruvians having Cuban funds and propaganda in their possession were found in Cocha- bamba, Bolivia, staying at the home of a pro-Communist news- paper editor. The Cuban Em- bassy in La Paz has reportedly offered to pay monthly rent for a meeting place for a newly formed Bolivian youth group. There are also tentative indications that the Cuban Em- bassy in Bolivia may be pre- paring to support and guide certain extremist political factions with a view to influ- encing the presidential elec- tions in Bolivia scheduled for next year. So far this year, at least 37 Bolivians are known to have traveled to Cuba, 18 of them for the 26 July cele- brations. Brazil The appointment of Raul Roa Kouri, son of Cuba's for- eign minister, to be ambassador in Rio de Janeiro is clear evi- dence of the importance Cuba attaches to Brazil in its over- SECRET all hemispheric planning. Roa proved an able and popular diplo- mat at his previous assignment in Prague and is reliably re- ported to have been Fidel Cas- tro's personal choice for the Rio post. The first six months of this year have been character- ized by a struggle among several Brazilian Communist and pro-Com- munist groups to win Cuban sup- port. Chief among them are the orthodox Communist party headed by Luiz Carlos Prestes, that portion of the Feasant Leagues of northeast Brazil still led by Francisco Juliao, and the relatively small dissident Communist party which is ideo- logically allied with Communist China. During 1962 Castro had shown his sympathy for Juliao and the dissident Communists, both of which favor the violent revolutionary approach to power, and had provided each with sup- port. The support for Juliao's Peasant Leagues ended abruptly last December, however, after the eruption of dissension within the movement and the discovery of several training centers by the Brazilian authorities, In late February, Juliao and Prestes both traveled to Havana for talks with the Cuban leaders, and Prestes stopped off for talks in Moscow both on his way and his return from Cuba. On their return from Cuba, both Juliao and Prestes claimed to have won Gastro's support--Prestes for a "peace- ful" approach and Juliao for continued violence. Cuban support Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-Op927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 SECRET for Juliao has apparently been resumed although possibly on a reduced scale. The Castro regime has ex- pended considerable effort and funds on activities designed to impress Brazilians with the achievements of Cuba under Castro. Cuban support goes regularly into various Cuban- Brazilian friendship and cul- tural societies established in most major Brazilian cities and such nationwide organizations as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. At least 27 Brazilians went to Cuba for the 26 July celebra- tions. British Guiana The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana is openly pro-Castro. During the recent general strike, Jagan's regime requested and re- ceived shipments of fuel and food from Cuba and the Soviet Union. These have served to increase both the government's control over the economy and its reliance on bloc supplies. Although trade now is re- turning to normal patterns, the ships, both Cuban and Soviet, carrying various items to British Guiana and Guianese rice to Cuba provide a means for the clandestine travel of subver- sives. Guianese students and party organizers have used them to go to Cuba, most re- cently on 20 July. While there have been numerous reports that arms are being brought into British Guiana both for local use and for transshipment to Venezuela, these reports have not been confirmed. However, empty can- isters, of a type normally used for the transportation of rifles, were reportedly found hidden under bags of cement which had been shipped from Cuba to Guiana during the strike. Also, on 14 May the police found a US- made machine gun with almost 1,000 rounds of ammunition con- cealed under the house of an organizer for Jagan's political party. At least 35 Guianese students have been in Cuba this year, and four of the five men arrested in Guiana in connection with a bombing attempt during the strike are members of the youth branch of Jagan's politi- cal party who had been in Cuba. A Cuban tanker disembarked 1$ Cuban air technicians in British Guiana on 16 July. Four of them, including three pilots, are still there and may be em- ployed in Guiana's civil airline. In addition, Guiana Import-Ex- port Corporation, the govern- ment's trading agency, recently loaned the regime a sum of $1 million which had been ob- tained from Cuba, allegedly as advance payment for Cuban goods. Chi l e Chile is the only Latin American country where there is any possibility of a Commu- nist-dominated political group SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0 927A004100090003-7 Approved For Releas~e~2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7 SECRET winning in legal elections in the foreseeable future. There the Cu- ban effort is concentrating on support for the presidential cam- paign of Socialist leader Sal- vador Allende, the candidate of the Comm-unist-dominated Popular Action Front (FRAP). In June it was reliably reported that the Cuban news agency in Chile has supplied funds for office rent and other expenses for a group of far- leftist economists who are working for Allende's election. Allende himself has visited Castro several times, and his campaign manager was in Cuba as recently as last March. The latter 's trip to Cuba was paid for by the Cuban commercial office in Chile. Popular disillusionment in Chile with the Castro gov- ernment, however, has led the FRAP to avoid references to Cuba in its present campaign, since it believes this would cost votes. At least 21 Chileans traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations, including Luis Corvalan, secretary gen- eral of the Chilean Communist Party. in April of this year. The report that a Colombian sub- versive is drawing up an ex- tensive report on conditions in the country suggests that Cuban efforts there may becomQ more extensive. Thus far this year, at least 130 Colombians have traveled to Cuba, 27 of them for the 26 July celebra- tions. Costa Rica The Popular Vanguard Party, Costa Rica's Communist party, continues to maintain a pro- Castro position and to send some of its members to Cuba for subversive training in Cuba. In February, 21 Costa Ricans returned from Cuba where they had received four to six months training as instructors in guerrilla warfare. Since their return, preparations have been made to set up training camps in Costa Rica with Cuban finan- cial support. These prepara- tions appear to be directed more toward support of the sub- versive effort in neighboring countries than against the gov- ernment of Costa Rica. At least 12 more Costa Ricans went to Cuba for the 26 July celebra- tions. Colombia In Colombia the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), a pro-Castro revolution- ary organization, and the pro- communist Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), a terrorist organization, have been reported to be recipients of Cuban finan- cial assistance--most recently Dominican Republic Since February, a number of Dominican Communist and pro- Castro leaders have returned to the country from exile. Some are known to have received training in Cuba. One recent returnee is supposed to have brought $30,000 in Cuban funds SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0 927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A0041.00090003-7 -~,, ~7` SECRET for use by the Dominican Popu- lar Movement (MPD), a pro-Cas- tro, Communist-dominated party. At least 20 Dominicans traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations. Others, who had lived in Cuba for some time, may return soon. On 29 July, a Havana radiobraadcast was heard urging all Dominicans in Cuba desiring to return to their country to attend a meet- ing that was to be held later that day under the sponsorship of the "Committee for the Re- turn to Santo Domingo of Domin- ican Residents." Beginning in May, the Ecuadorean Government made several arrests of Communists returning to Ecuador from Europe, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.. These persons were found to be carrying sizable amounts of US currency, propaganda material, and various incriminating papers. The arrest of one of them, Jose Maria Roura, a member of the central committee of the Ecua- dorean Communist Party, touched off a bitter internal struggle within the party resulting in a split and his expulsion. These divisions and the loss of funds intended to finance guerrilla activity forced the extreme left to postpone its plans to launch guerrilla action. Prior to the recent mili- tary coup, Ecuador was one of the Latin American countries where Cuban-supported subver- sion appeared to be reaching a point of possible overt guer- rilla action. Ecuadoreans who had received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba last year had returned home and were reported on the point of beginning ac- tion. In late March, Aquiles Valencia, a member of the central committee of the Ecua- dorean Communist Party, returned to Ecuador from Chile reportedly bringing with him between $30,000 and, $50,000. These funds allegedly were supplied by the Cuban Embassy in Santiago for use in supporting the guer- rilla effort. An additional $15,000 is reliably reported to have been promised the Ecuadorean Communists by Cuba. The military junta has, since the 11 July coup, taken a very strong stand against Castro-Communists and has ar- rested several key leaders; others have gone into hiding. There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-sup- ported subversion in E1 Sal- vador during the past six months. Seventeen Salvadorans are known to have gone to Cuba since January of this year. Four Salvadorans who went to Cuba in late April for the May Day celebrations were ar- rested on their return to E1 Salvador via the Grand Cayman air route and are still being held. Four more went for the 26 July celebrations. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-O~D927A004100090003-7 Approved For Rele~ 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A0041~70090003-7 SECRET Guatemala There is strong evidence -Chat Guatemalan Communists have been receiving material support and guidance from Cuba. Meanwhile, pro-Communist for- mer Guatemalan President Arbenz remains in exile in Cuba. The strong antisubversive measures by the Peralta government have apparently been an important setback to the subversive ef- forts. Castro, in his 26 July address, singled out the "he- roic Guatemalan fighters" along with the Venezuelan guerrillas as the only groups of Latin American revolutionaries to whom he sent messages of "soli- darity and fraternity." Cas- tro declared that the "revo- lution" in Guatemala, as in Venezuela, has reached the point where: it has become ir- reversible. There has been no indica- tion during the past six months of direct Cuban-sponsored sub- versive efforts in Haiti. Ha- vana continues :its Greol.e-l an - guage broadcasts to Hari, how- ever, and a broadcast in May urged Haitian Communists to "follow the example of their Venezuelan comrades and take an active role in the struggle against the government." They were urged to oppose any form of foreign intervention in Haiti. Pro-Castro activities in Honduras appear directed largely toward support of Communist ef- forts in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The govern- ment's attitude, the country`s rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling arms into neighboring countries make konduras well suited for such a role. Mexico The Castro regime has made every effort to avoid antag- onizing the Mexican Government in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy there and its civil air connec- tions through Mexico. On 29 July, two of the Mexican Com- munist Party`s three top leaders traveled to Cuba by CUBANA flight from Mexico. Nicaragua The Cuban-supported Nicaraguan revolutionary group, the National Liberation Front (FLN), is directed by a group of Nicaraguan Communists resi- dent in Cuba. Help from Cuba has been in the form of train- ing, financial assistance, and guidance. A veteran member of the Nicaraguan Communist Party said in May that the party now receives funds and instructions from Cuba rather than from Mos- cow, via Mexico, as in the past. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0~0927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A0041 0090003-7 25X1 5X1 SECRET The FLN is active in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica as well as in Nicaragua, and Cuba-trained men are reli- ably reported to be conducting guerrilla training programs. FLN activities in general ap- peared to be on the upswing during the past three months and were highlighted by the robbery of about $7,000 from the Bank of America branch in Managua on 31 May. At least 18 Panamanians traveled to Cuba for the 26 July celebrations. Among them were two leaders of the Commu- nists' Peoples Party of Panama. Paraguay Paraguayan exiles continue to travel to Cuba and some of these receive training in sub- version. At least three came for the 26 July celebrations. The pro-Castro revolution- ary group, Vanguard of National Action (VAN), has received both material support and guidance from Cuba. During the past six months some of the more than 100 Panamanians who had earlier received training in Cuba have established rudimentary training facilities in Panama. In addition, VAN members have apparently had some success in their efforts to accumulate arms and equipment. Same of the Panamanians trained in Cuba were instructed to take every advantage of the opportunities afforded by next year's election cam- paigning. They were told to undertake campaign trips through- out Panama, to prepare reports on banks and bank employees, and to obtain information on pay- rolls and paymasters of Pana- manian Government a encies Fidel Castro had or- ere at sabotage, terrorism, and attacks on Cuban exiles in Panama begin without delay. Cuban influence is pro- nounced in some of the Para- guayan exile groups active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. In April, Havana Radio announced that Paraguayan residents of Cuba had formed an association "to publicize the struggle of the Paraguayan people against the Stroessner dictatorship and to inform the oppressed Para- guayan people about the achieve- ments of the Cuban revolution." Cuba's major effort to foment revolution in Peru apparently is being done through the Movement of the Revolution- ary Left (MIR) and the Revolu- tionary Labor Party (POR), This is evident in the clandestine re- turn of MIR and POR trainees from Cuba. While some of these trainees were apprehended by the Peruvian and Bolivian authorities as they entered the country, it is probable that others succeeded in re- turning. The MIR, at latest report, intends to begin guerrilla activity this month. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-0 927A004100090003-7 Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A00~00090003-7 SECRET Uruguay Uruguay's importance to the Cuban subversive effort in Latin America lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, partic- ularly Argentines and Para- guayans. The Cuban Embassy in Montevideo has been the focal point of this activity. During the past six months, Uruguay has also been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda. Several thousand copies of Cuba, printed in Uruguay by a local publisher and paid for by the Cuban Em- bassy, are reportedly distrib- uted fairly regularly. At least 15 Uruguayans traveled to Cuba for the 26 July cele- brations. Venezuela The Betancourt administra- tion continues to be Castro's primary target in Latin America. The Armed Forces of. National Liberation (FALN), a pro-Commu- nist paramilitary group, con- tinues to receive Cuban propa- Banda support. The FALN re- portedly also has radio con- nections with Cuba; the fact that the Cuban radio transmits news of FALN exploits very quickly after they occur would tend to substantiate this re- port. The FALN does not appear to be receiving any substantial material or financial assistance from Cuba at this time. It now is meeting these z~.eeds through its own activities. Sabotage and guerrilla activities by the FALN were stepped up during June and continue at a high level. At least 65 Venezuelans have traveled to Cuba already this year, 12 of them for the 26 July celebrations. Anti-Castro feeling among the general public in Venezuela is presently high and the ter- rorist activities of Castro supporters have probably con- siderably damaged Castro's image. Also, the government of Venezuela has taken increasingly energetic measures in an effort to counter Communist insurgency. Special emphasis is being placed on the improvement of the Venezuelan law enforcement and security agencies. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-O~D927A004100090003-7 Approved Felease 2006i1~~C~~79-00004100090003-7 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7