WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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30 August 1963
OCI No,--0295/63
Copy No.
7 5
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
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SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 29 August 1963)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
COMMUNIST CHINA VERSUS THE SOVIET-LED BLOC
State relations took another turn for the worse on
22 August when Czechoslovakia closed the Chinese
news bureau in Prague--dealing a sharp blow to the
Chinese propaganda and information apparatus.
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
The sharp revival of activity this spring suggests
that all the European satellites except Czechoslo-
vakia will achieve a moderate rate of industrial
growth this year despite last winter's hardships.
DE-STALINIZATION STILL A PROBLEM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Now that rehabilitation of victims of the 1949-54
political trials is public knowledge, the Prague
regime will face further demands for liberalization
and pressures for greater Slovak autonomy.
EMIGRE THREAT TO TITO IN LATIN AMERICA
The large number of anti-Tito emigrds in Latin
America increases the danger of an assassination
attempt when the Yugoslav leader tours the area
in September and October.
SECRET
3U Aug 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA Page
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother, is
assuming an ever more prominent role in buttress-
ing the regime against possible threats from public
demonstrations or military elements.
CAMBODIA'S BREAK WITH SOUTH VIETNAM
Cambodia, with limited oil reserves, faces a possi-
ble South Vietnamese move to cut off its principal
trade route to the sea.
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
Military action has been very limited, and there
are some signs that the Pathet Lao may be turning
again to political maneuvering.
SOUTH KOREAN REGIME PREPARES FOR ELECTIONS
Led by chairman Pak, the junta leaders are consid-
dering a number of "administrative"
measures to ensure the victory of their party.
NEW LIFE FOR INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY?
Nehru is undertaking the most far-reaching reorgan-
ization in his party's 17 years in power to strengthen
its leadership and popular appeal.
FRICTION BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALI REPUBLIC
Bolin governments are threatening new actions follow-
ing further incidents in Ethiopia's Ogaden area be-
tween security forces and dissident Somali tribesmen.
EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION STALLED
Uganda's fears of being overwhelmed by its aggres-
sive, more populous neighbors are holding up the
federation project being pushed by Kenya's Kenyatta
and Tanganyika's Nyerere.
AFRICAN ISSUES AT 18TH UN ASSEMBLY SESSION
Delegates from Africa, with the largest voting bloc
in the General Assembly, are more determined than
ever to get Portugal out of Africa and combat South
African apartheid. The session opens 17 September.
5
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30 Aug 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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EUROPE Page
CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT BRINGS UNCERTAINTY IN NORWAY
The new premier faces the problem of manintaining
unity in his four-party minority coalition govern-
ment, and two extreme leftist deputies will hold
the balance of power in parliament.
FRENCH - WEST GERMAN RELATIONS
The Paris press seems skeptical over the practical
effects of the French-German treaty. Bonn's basic
policy differences with Paris will be increasingly
difficult to hide when Adenauer retires this fall.
NEW WAVE OF TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA
Colombian terrorist
Lre exploding bombs every night, despite preven-
tive arrests by security forces using special powers
granted to combat disorders arising out of the illegal
strike by the Communist-dominated petroleum workers.
ECUADOR-PERU BOUNDARY ISSUE
Tension over the boundary issue has again revived
and now threatens a major confrontation.
AREA NOTES 18
Haiti and Bolivia
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SECRET
The Communist World
COMMUNIST CHINA VERSUS THE SOVIET-LED BLOC
Relations between Communist
China and the Soviet-led bloc
took another turn for the worse
on 22 August when Czech officials
closed down the key bureau of
the New China News Agency (NCNA)
in Prague. The Czechs also
terminated Chinese leases on
telegraph lines between Peiping
and Prague and Havana.
This action reflects the
increasing tendency of opponents
in the intrabloc struggle to
wage open warfare in the arena
of state relations. The Czech
move strikes a sharp blow at the
Chinese propaganda and informa-
tion apparatus and will tem-
porarily put a crimp in Peiping's
efforts in this field.
The office was the
cable head for landline and
radioteleprinter circuits with
Peiping and served as the key
link for communications with
agency correspondents in Europe,
Africa, and Latin America. It
was also the central relay
point for the NCNA news file,
and the place where a daily in-
formation bulletin was produced
in several languages for circu-
lation in Czechoslovakia and
other European countries.
The official Czech state-
ment concerning closure of the
NCNA office is an indictment of
Chinese activity which leaves
no doubt that Peiping's attacks
on Moscow were the main reason
for the action. The central is-
sue on which Peiping continues
to concentrate its ire is the
Soviet ".sellout" of the bloc
by signing the test ban 'treaty.
Using Indian claims of a Chinese
military build-up along the bor-
der as a pretext, the Chinese
launched a new attack on Moscow
for "collaboration with US im-
perialism" in a blistering edi-
torial on 22 August.
The Russians have sharply
rebutted these attacks and re-
acted to Peiping's growing racist
propaganda output with renewed
accusations that Chinese Commu-
nist leaders are preaching a "the-
ory" of special identity of in-
terest between the peoples of
Asia and Africa which excludes
the Soviet Union. Editorials on
this subject have been given addi-
tional weight by a long article
in the current issue of Moscow's
party theoretical journal Kommunist.
Peiping continues to supple-
ment overt propaganda channels
with semiclandestine distribu-
tion of its material by Chinese
officials stationed abroad. Ex-
pulsion of NCNA officials in other
bloc countries and perhaps the
closure of additional offices
may follow the Czech action.
At the very least, both
sides can be expected to step up
harassment of "enemy" representa-
tives, as illustrated by Peiping's
exclusion of Soviet, Polish and
East German correspondents from
a sports contest in Peiping on
27 August.
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30 Aug 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
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PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Officially Claimed by European Satellites
1962
Actual
Jan-June 1963
Actual
1963
Plan
Bulgaria
11.1
9.8
10
Czechoslovakia
6.1
-1.8
East Germany
6.2
3.7
Hungary
8
6
Poland
8.4
3.3
Rumania
14.7
11.7
12
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N'"'1 SECRET
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
The sharp revival of in-
dustrial activity during the
spring in most of the European
satellites suggests that a mod-
erate. rate of industrial growth
will be achieved this year in
spite of the stagnation during
the unusually severe winter.
Only in Czechoslovakia has the
economic situation continued to
deteriorate.
The northern satellites suf-
fered substantial economic losses
last winter, and few of these
can be recouped. During the
first quarter of 1963 total in-
dustrial production in East Ger-
many, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
fell below plan and was little
higher than in the first quarter
of 1962. Moreover, output of
some basic industrial goods and
construction activity were far
lower.
However, East Germany
achieved its best second-quar-
ter performance in several years,
with no increase in employment
and a large increase in exports.
In Poland industrial production
increased about 8 percent, but
industrial employment also rose
considerably and the foreign
trade balance worsened.
In Czechoslovakia there has
been no recovery, either from
the winter stagnation or from
the economic deterioration that
began in 1961. As late as June,
industrial production remained
below the level of last year,
and almost all other economic
indicators were unfavorable.
The country may be able to ex-
ceed the one-percent increase
planned in industrial produc-
tion for 1963, but economic per-
formance will remain poor for
a country accustomed to yearly
growth rates of 8-10 percent
in'industrial production. Ap-
parently the economy suffers
from a reduced potential for
industrial growth (reserves of
labor and productive capacity
are exhausted), from the accum-
ulating effects of past improv-
idence, and from the disrup-
tion caused by attempts to im-
prove the structure of industry.
Hungary, less affected by
the severe winter than the
northern satellites, achieved
a substantial growth rate in
the first half-year. The ef-
fects of the winter on indus-
trial growth in Bulgaria and
Rumania apparently were negli-
gible. (See table.)
Prospects for the rest of
the year are for continued mod-
erate industrial growth (ex-
cept in Czechoslovakia). East
Germany is likely to fall some-
what short of its planned goal.
Poland will probably overfulfill
its conservative target; however,
it had not planned to match--
and probably will not achieve--
the 1962 growth rate. Neither
East Germany nor Poland is likely
to achieve annual investment
goals, and the unfavorable ef-
fects of this will be felt in
subsequent years. Industry
in the three southern satellites
is likely to continue its rapid
growth, and to fulfill 1963
plan goals.
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30 Aug 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2
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SECRET `40
Slovak party first secretary
posts but has been allowed to
remain on-the central committee.
DE-STALINIZATION STILL PROBLEM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
With the 22 August public
announcement of the rehabili-
tation of Communist victims of
the 1949-54 political trials,
the Czechoslovak regime probably
has opened the door to further
demands for liberalization and
pressures for greater Slovak
autonomy.
This move, disclosed to
party members in April, was a
grudging concession to wide-
spread demands for a redress of
judicial "errors" of the Stalin-
ist era. During the trials
some 480 persons had been im-
prisoned and 11 executed for
"crimes against the party and
state." Many of the former were
released quietly in 1956 and
some have been unofficially
cleared.
Hard-line party leader
Novotny's hold over the party
rank and file has been weakened
by his failure to indict those
who--like himself--were primarily
responsible for the judicial
forces of the Stalinist period.
Relatively low-level function-
aries then and now have been
made the scapegoats; higher
ranking leaders probably face
nothing worse than retirement.
For example, Karol Bacilek--
who as minister of national se-
curity played a major role in
the prosecution--has been divested
only of his party presidium and
Novotny's critics, including
central committee members, have
not been appeased. His half-
hearted moves have only spurred
their demands for a more meaning-
ful review of the regime's con-
duct during the period. Novotny
may have no
quiesce and
more of his
in order to
position.
choice but to ac-
perhaps to remove
Stalinist colleagues
maintain his own
Now that the action on the
trials has been made public, it
is likely that the question of
Slovak autonomy will become
still more pressing. Among those
rehabilitated last week were
former Slovak party and govern-
ment leaders who have become--
deservedly or not--popular symbols
of Slovak nationalism. The
germinal ideas of Slovak autonomy
for which they were purged in
1954 have been resurrected in
recent months by the Slovak
press. Even if the former Slovak
leaders are not restored to
prominence, the fact that they
are at liberty and have been
exonerated will make more diffi-
cult the regime's perennial at-
tempts to cope with the ideas
with which they are identified.
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30 Aug 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Nrrr'
SECRET
EMIGRE THREAT TO TITO IN LATIN AMERICA
Belgrade is probably con-
cerned that anti-Tito emigres
may try to assassinate Tito
when he visits Latin America
during September and October.
This danger, always present when
Tito goes abroad, is particularly
acute in Latin America, to which
a large number of anti-Tito
Yugoslavs fled after World War
II, including Ustashi leader
Ante Pavelic.
The Ustashi, a terrorist
organization founded in the
mid-1920s to promote Croatian
independence, assassinated
Yugoslavia's King in 1934 and
ruled a puppet Croatian state
for the Nazis. After Pavelic
fled to Argentina, he reconsti-
tuted his organization, which
apparently now is known as the
Croatian Liberation Movement
7 (HOP) .
Self-acknowledged
members of HOP in Austria claim
their organization is active
in Yugoslavia and has made
abortive attempts against Tito's
life. There is some circum-
stantial evidence to support
their claims.
Yugoslav concern for Tito'
safety has probably been
deepened by a series of terror-
ist incidents since late last
November. At that time, a
probable Ustashi affiliate, the
Croatian Crusaders' Brotherhood
(HKB), sacked the Yugoslav
mission in Bonn, and a Yugo-
slav national was murdered.
Twnety-five members of the HKB
were indicted on 15 August in
West Germany and will be tried
this fall. Terrorists have
also bombed Yugoslav diplomatic
establishments in Brussels and
Chicago and caused incidents
in Cologne, Germany, and Birming-
ham, England..
Former Ustashi chief Pavelic (center) and his interior minister, Andrija Artukovic
(far left), greet visiting Nazi dignitary in Croatia during World War II.
30 Aug 63
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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N40.1 %Q0
SECRET Asia-Africa
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The situation in Saigon
remains unstable, but Ngo Dinh
Nhu is assuming an ever more
prominent role and taking steps
to consolidate the regime's
position. Martial law restric-
tions have been eased somewhat,
but key installations in Sai-
gon have been fortified as a
precaution against any seri-
ous public or military reac-
tion. Portraits of Nhu as
leader of the Republican Youth
Movement are appearing on pub-
lic buildings, suggesting that
his position in the government
is being elevated.
Civil and military offi-
cials now are actively muster-
ing demonstrations of public
allegiance to the government,
and various Buddhist leaders
in government hands are openly
declaring that the protest
movement was the work of polit-
ically motivated extremists.
Although the government has
issued warnings against further
agitation, it insists that in-
nocent Buddhists will be quickly
released and that any remaining
religious grievances will be
settled with new moderate Bud-
dhist.leaders.
The director of the Gen-
eral Group for Civil Action,
who is engaged in arranging
progovernment rallies, has
stated that this activity is
the third phase of a broad plan
devised by Nhu. The first
phase was the raid on pagodas,
and the second step was to ob-
tain the Buddhists' disavowal
of their former leaders. The
fourth phase will be the forma-
tion, with "trusted opposition-
ists," of a coalition govern-
ment, with Ngo Dinh Diem re-
maining as President and Nhu
becoming prime minister. Other
sources have also indicated that
governmental changes are in the
offing.
Despite the recent communi-
que from military headquarters
reaffirming that martial law
was unanimously recommended by
all army generals, some officers
still insist that the army was
tricked into acting as a smoke
screen for Nhu's crackdown on
the Buddhists. It appears that
some generals were completely
unaware of Nhu's intentions,
that some were witting, and that
others probably felt that co-
operation in establishing mar-
tial law would enable them even-
tually tc oust he Diem regime.
Nhu's maneuver, however,
seems to have succeeded in di-
viding the army. The three key
officers in Saigon, including
the proregime Special Forces
commander, are all apparently
taking orders directly from the
palace rather than from General
Don. The Special Forces, re-
garded as loyal to Nhu, are being
used to guard the palace. The
heavy concentration of troops
in Saigon and surrounding areas,
under various commands and with
uncertain loyalties, could lead
to serious clashes in the event
of a move by disaffected elements.
Military operations against
the Viet Cong are continuing, but
have been somewhat curtailed by
troop diversions and alerts. So
far, no appreciable change in the
pattern or level of Viet Cong mili-
tary activity has been noted during
the present crisis. The Viet Cong
appear to be taking a cautious ap- 25X1
proach, possibly uncertain what ef-
fect more vigorous activity on their
part might have.
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30 Aug 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
The rupture in relations
between Cambodia and South Viet-
nam will pose serious problems
for the Cambodian economy, and
may involve Cambodia's right of
navigation on an international
waterway.
The Buddhist crisis in
South Vietnam is a major factor
in the timing of the break, al-
though the strafing of a guard
post inside Cambodia by two South
Vietnamese aircraft on 19 August
apparently triggered Prince
Sihanouk's action. Sihanouk's
decision to sever relations with
Saigon on 27 August was also
probably made in the belief
that the Diem regime would
soon be overthrown.
Phnom Penh previously has
threatened to sever relations
after serious border incidents
but has held off becuase of
Cambodia's dependence on the
Mekong River as its principal
outlet to the sea. Realizing
the economic implications of
any prolonged stoppage of Cam-
bodian trade, Sihanouk was care-
ful to attach to the note an-
nouncing the break a statement
that Cambodia wanted to resume
normal relations as soon as the
South Vietnamese "rediscovered
liberty."
The supply of petroleum
products is the most serious
short-term problem for the
Cambodians if the river is
closed, since practically all
Cambodian oil imports enter the
country by the Mekong route.
While Caltex, Esso, and Shell
provide all of Cambodia's oil
requirements, Phnom Penh, the
primary port on the Mekong,
has the country's only petro-
leum storage and handling fa-
cilities. The port of Sihanouk-
ville on the Gulf of Siam has
very limited facilities for
handling bulk products or heavy
equipment.
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30 Aug 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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KHAMM UANY
Nhor marath
Nsm.._ ~l/94
- Luang,
Prabang
Road
---- Track or trail
Airfield
HONG SALY Dien Son
hu La
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J,oF Sam Neua
LUANG PFMBANG ` .i
Muong Hie SAM NEUA
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THAIL AND
do'"nTlani
Phou Tk Xieng Khoaang
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25 Sa 7T t;E
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Mu an
Ubon.
Thanh
Hoa
Ha Tinh
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~ft' .wxo SECRET `'y'`''"O
The uneasy stalemate be-
tween the opposing forces in
Laos continues while their rep-
resentatives attempt to agree
on security arrangements for a
meeting between Princes Souvanna
and Souphannouvong at the Plaine
des Jarres.
April, said he would stay in
Vientiane and resume direction
of his ministry. His action
suggests that the Pathet Lao
may at least temporarily be
shifting emphasis from military
pressure to political ma-
neuvering.
Military action has been
limited to small-scale probing
and clearing operations in
widely separated areas. North
of Vang Vieng, a neutralist
garrison in company strength was
forced to abandon an isolated
outpost to the Pathet Lao.
Farther south, in the Pakse-
Saravane area, conservative
forces have claimed success in a
recent mop-up designed to
eliminate pockets of Pathet Lao
infiltrators.
In what appears to be an
effort to break the'deadlock
over security arrangements
which has delayed political
talks, a key Pathet Lao figure,
Phoumi Vongvichit, flew to
Vientiane on 26 August. He
maintained that he had "full
powers" from Souphannouvong to
negotiate with Souvanna. How-
ever, his talks with the premier
do not appear to have made
progress. The Pathet Lao still
insist on the withdrawal of all
conservative forces from the
Plaine des Jarres area before
substantive discussions.
Phoumi Vongvichit, who is
minister of information in the
coalition government but had
remained in Khang Khay since
Meanwhile, neutralist
troops who defected to the Pathet
Lao earlier this year appear
increasingly dissatisfied with
their situation, particularly
severe shorts es of food and
ammunition.
some of these
troops have already broken
away from the Pathet Lao and
that others may be planning to
do so.
dissident leaders Colonel 25X1
euane and Major Thiep are
themselves considering returning
to the neutralist camp. General
Amkha, chief of the neutralist
staff in Vientiane, has indicated
he would welcome such a move.
Moscow still does not seem
disposed to intervene in the
Laotian situation. The Soviets
maintain that it is up to the
Laotians to settle their own
problems and that the USSR
should not be held responsible
for future developments in Laos.
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"' SECRET 1%W"0
SOUTH KOREAN REGIME PREPARES FOR
South Korea's military
rulers are busily developing
plans to ensure their regime's
victory at the polls this fall.
Fear of the US reaction has de-
terred junta leader Pak Chong-
hui from bringing former se-
curity chief Kim Chong-pil home
from semi-exile in Europe to
manage the government campaign.
Pak will retire from ac-
tive military duty to accept
the presidential nomination at
the DRP convention on 31 Au-
gust. He will continue as chair-
man of the ruling Supreme Coun-
cil for National Reconstruction
and as acting president. The
presidential election is sched-
uled for 15 October and Na-
tional Assembly elections for
26 November.
Worried by the regime's
lack of popular support, Kim's
followers are pressing for the
placement of party men in key
government positions to facili-
tate use of the administrative
apparatus for electioneering.
30 Aug 63
Pak so far
has resisted pressure
from a Kim Chong-pil group
for the appointment of a new
cabinet made up of DRP stalwarts
who would be completely sub-
servient to the party's direc-
tion.
Meanwhile, three of the
four leading civilian opposi-
tion parties have sufficiently
muted strong personal and par-
tisan jealousies to be able to
announce a merger. They have
yet to decide on a single presi-
dential candidate or to solve
the even more difficult problem
of selecting common assembly
candidates. The holdout Demo=
cratic Party, lacking a presi-
dential candidate, has agreed
to support a joint presidential
nominee, but appears to believe
that it can win- the greatest
number of assembly seats, prob-
ably at the expense of other op-
position candidates, by going
it alone.
Public opinion is becoming
increasingly critical of the re-
gime and of the political situa-
tion in general. At the same time,
despite a general desire for re-
turn to civilian administration,
there is little enthusiasm for
the opposition either. The re-
gime's resort to repression and
intimidation appears likely only
to erode whatever limited public
support it has, and to increase
the pros ects for election vio-
lence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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INDIA
CABINET
Jawaharlal Nehru +
Morarji Desai *+
Jagj i van Ram *+
Gulzarilal Nanda +
T. T. Krishnamachari
L. B. 5hastri *+
Swaran Singh
S. K. Pati I * +
A. K. Sen
Y. B. Chavan +
B. Gcq>olo Reddi
C. Subramaniam +
K. L. Shrimali
Humayun Kabir
S. N. Sinha
Prime Minister; External Affairs
Finance
Transport and Communications
Planning, Labor, Employment
Economic & Defense Coordination
Home Affairs
Railways
Food and Agriculture
Law
Defense
Information & Broadcasting
Steel & Heavy Industry
Education
Science & Culture
Parliamentary Affairs
STATE CHIEF MINISTERS
Sonjiva Reddy +
B. P. Chaliha
B. N.Jha
J. Mehta
Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad
R. Sankar
B. A. Mandloi
Kamaroj Naddr *+
M. S. Kannamwar
S. Nijalingappa-
B. Patnoik
P. S. Kairon
M.L. Sukhadia +
C. B. Gupta +
P. C. Sen
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Gujarat
Kashmir
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Madras
Maharashtra
Mysore
Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
Ministers chosen to undertake full-time oraanizational work
for the Congress Party
+ Regular or Ex-Officio Members of the All-India Congress Working Committee.
* Members of the newly reconstituted Congress Party Parliamentary Board, a
highly influential subgroup of the Working Committee charged with selection
of legislative candidates-and resolution of factional problems. -
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mw SECRET VW-VO
India's Congress Party is I form of the proposal by assign-
undergoing its most drastic re-
organization in 17 years of
power. In all, Nehru has called
upon six of his 14 cabinet minis-
ters and six of India's 15
state chief executives to re-
sign their official positions
and to undertake full-time party
work. More may follow.
Nehru's actions put into
effect a concept long discussed
in India as a possible cure for
the Congress Party's internal
disarray. There has been gen-
eral agreement that the Congress
was steadily being sapped of
its organizational talent by
the lure of ministerial rank and
privilege, but few politicians,
including the prime minister
himself, seemed inclined to do
anything but talk about it.
Mounting difficulties within
the party this year and growing
concern for the party's image
with the people led the influ-
ential Kamaraj Nadar, south In-
dian strong man,to raise the
party work idea officially--to-
gether with an offer of his own
resignation--at a meeting of
the party's top policy group
in mid-August. After some de-
bate, the body called on all
other ministers--except Nehru
--to offer their resignations,
leaving ittothe prime minister
to decide who should or should
not undertake party duties.
Nehru has generally abided
by the spirit as well as the
ing the party problem first-
rate, influential politicians
rather than second-raters.
Among those leaving the central
cabinet are Morarji Desai, L. B.
Shastri, and S. K. Patil. Desai
and Shastri are front-runners
to succeed Nehru as prime minis-
ter, while state leaders Kama-
raj Nadar, C. B. Gupta, and
G. M. Bakshi, also are top men.
Nehru has also used the occa-
sion to ease out a liability
or two, such as Jagjivan Ram,
oldest minister in point of
service but of value mainly be-
cause he represents the Un-
touchables.
The effect of the moves
thus far taken has been to re-
confirm Nehru's paramount posi-
tion and to give the party or-
ganization a needed tonic. The
organization now is becoming
the focus of power in place of
the cabinet. However, adminis-
trative gaps have been created
in the national and state cabi-
nets which will be difficult
to fill. If these gaps are
filled with other strong poli-
ticians, the effect of the
party revitalization campaign
will have been undone. At the
same time, the leaders who have
been shifted to party work, if
they are to accomplish any mean-
ingful improvement, must be
given more independent respon-
sibility than Nehru has normally
allowed party figures.
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0
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA
O G A D E N ea/~
'SOMALI
SOMALI TRIBES
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,SECRET
FRICTION BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALI REPUBLIC
Charges and countercharges
arising out of Ethiopia's rela-
tions with Somali tribesmen in
its Ogaden region have again
sharply increased friction be-
tween Ethiopia and the Somali
Republic. Both governments
profess a desire for a peace-
ful solution, but each warns
that it may have to take further
action if incidents continue.
In the Ogaden, a Somali
tribal "government," set up by
a group of dissidents calling
itself the Nasrulla (Victorious
of God) party, has been attacking
Ethiopian communications and
military forces since early July.
Although Nasrulla's successes
have been exaggerated, the at-
tacks have challenged Ethiopian
security control, and the Ethi-
opians have retaliated sharply.
Several violations of the Somali
border by Ethiopian air and ground
units have been reported, but
these were probably largely in-
advertent.
The Somali Government in
Mogadiscio is pledged to unite
all ethnic Somalis, and the
Ogaden issue will confront it
at municipal elections this fall.
The opposition, particularly in
northern Somalia, is already ac-
tively exploiting the question.
Mogadiscio does not yet ap-
pear to have given military as-
sistance to the dissidents. How-
ever, in mid-August it publicized
the Ogaden events and asked for-
eign diplomats to talk to ref-
ugees in northern Somalia, evi-
dently hoping to focus inter-
national attention on the prob-
lem.
Addis Ababa reacted quickly.
The Emperor told the US ambas-
sador that he saw a link be-
tween the announcement of forth-
coming US military aid to Moga-
discio and the subsequent proc-
lamation of the dissident regime
in the Ogaden. The British
charge was told by the acting
foreign minister that unless
Somali dissidence stopped, Ethi-
opia might use the large number
of Somali refugees in Ethiopia
from the northern region of
Somalia as agents against Moga-
discio.
Most of the dissident
Somali claims that the Ethiopians
are using overwhelming force
against the tribesmen seem to
be exaggerated.
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Thwarted by Ugandan in-
transigence, working-level nego-
tiations for an East African
federation have reached an
impasse which can be resolved,
if at all, only by the heads
of government.
East African representa-
tives meeting earlier this
month at Dar-es-Salaam adjourned
their constitutional discussions
ahead of schedule as a result
of the uncooperative attitude
of the Ugandan delegate, a
proponent of the Nkrumah line
that regional association is
incompatible with pan-African
unity and is sponsored by the
neo-colonialist powers.
Both Tanganyika's Presi-
dent Nyerere and Kenya's Prime
Minister Kenyatta have report-
edly written the Ghanian Presi-
dent protesting his interference
in East African affairs, and
last week Kenya's Home Affairs
Minister, Oginga Odinga, was
sent to Accra, where he claims
that Nkrumah agreed to cease
his fulminations against the
federation project.
Nkrumah's letters and em-
issaries have had some influence
on Uganda's position, but there
is also locally founded opposi-
tion to the strong federal gov-
ernment that Nyerere and Ken-
yatta propose. Uganda's in-
sistence on retaining its UN
vote and its own right to bor-
row abroad is the major issue
on which they are unwilling to
compromise.
Uganda's Prime Minister
Obote probably still wants the
strong federation to which he
agreed in principle last June,
but he insists that Uganda must
be a full partner with its
larger and more populous neigh-
bors. He also believes that
the complex problems involved
connot be resolved at the pace
desired by Kenyan and Tangan-
yikan leaders, who have hoped
to form the federation before
the end of this year. Obote
may also wish to see how Kenya
performs after independence be-
fore committing himself and his
government to partnership with
Kenya's aggressive Kikuyu tribal
leadership.
Uganda's true position
will only be evident when the
East African heads of govern-
ment next meet. There is no
firm date for such a meeting,
however. If Uganda remains in-
transigent, Nyerere and Kenyatta
reportedly are prepared to fed-
erate their territories in the
belief that Uganda will have to
join eventually. If the present
opportunity is missed, however,
existing East African coopera-
tive arrangements and common
economic links may gradually
dissolve, and the best chance
for federation is likely to
be lost.
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Portugal's refusal to pull
out of its African colonies and
the racial policies of the South
African Government will prob-
ably be critical issues at the
18th UN General Assembly which
opens in New York on 17 Septem-
ber. Delegates from the African
states are determined to seek
a radical change in both situ-
ations. Their 32 votes make
the African bloc the largest
in the assembly, and they are
more ready than ever to let is-
sues of "colonialism" influence
and even determine their posi-
tions on such other assembly
matters as Chinese representa-
tion and elections to the Se-
curity Council.
Portugal's colonial poli-
cies will come up in connection
with the report of the "Committee
of 24"--the Special Committee
on Implementation of the Decla-
ration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples. The Portu-
guese colonies will also be
discussed when the report of
the Committee on Information
from Not-Self-Governing Ter-
ritories is considered. The
South African issue will come
up when the General Assembly
discusses a report of a special
committee on apartheid which
was set up by the 17th session
to keep the racial policies of
South Africa under review.
Both the South African and
Portuguese issues will also be
considered by the Security
Council at the end of October,
when the secretary general re-
ports on the measures taken to
implement the resolutions the
council passed on these two is-
sues in midsummer.
African leaders view the UN
as a principal means of bringing
pressure to bear on Portugal and
South Africa. This is behind
the efforts of Algerian Premier
Ben Bella to induce African chiefs
of state to attend the coming
session. Even the more pro-
Western African leaders fear
they will lose out to extremists
at home if they cannot point to
ways in which the West and the
UN have helped move these ob-
sessive problems somewhat closer
to solution.
At the 17th General Assembly,
the African states found that
they had sufficient votes to pass
tough resolutions against Portu-
gal (carried 57 to 14, with 18
abstentions) and South Africa
(67-16-23) despite Western ef-
forts to restrain them. This
trend was accentuated in Se-
curity Council voting this sum-
mer. The US delegation believes
that at the new assembly session,
Latin Americans, moderate Asians,
and some Europeans will be un-
willing to take any stand which
looks like support for South Af-
rica or Portugal. The mission
also feels that with the Africans
in their present frame of mind
a serious threat to the UN it-
self is possible if it makes no
significant progress on these
southern African issues.
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NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT
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%W -. ~ SECRET W'"
CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT BRINGS UNCERTAINTY IN NORWAY
Norway has entered a period
of political uncertainty fol-
lowing the resignation last week
of Prime Minister Gerhardsen's
Labor government, which had
held office continuously for al-
most a decade.
Labor's successor, a four-
party nonsocialist coalition
led by Conservative Party leader
John Lyng,which assumed office
on 28 August, faces serious
obstacles and is unlikely to
have more than a brief tenure
in office. Lyng's immediate
problem is the minority status
of his government, which con-
trols only 74 of the 150 seats
in Parliament. Labor similarly
holds 74 seats, while the two
deputies of the extreme leftist
Socialist People's Party (SPP)
hold the balance of power. In
addition, Lyng faces the equally
difficult problem of maintain-
ing cabinet and parliamentary
unity among the disparate and
undisciplined factions included
in the new coalition government.
The longevity of the new
coalition appears to depend
largely on the strategy Labor
decides to adopt. While the
SPP has already declared that
it intends to topple the new
government at the first oppor-
tunity, Gerhardsen and other
Labor leaders are taking the
position that they will not at-
tempt to bring down the new
government merely out of pique.
Instead they have called on it
to issue a policy statement, which
Labor probably would attempt to
use as the basis for a no-confi-
dence motion.
Another factor likely to
influence Labor's actions is
the outcome of local elections
on 23 September. While these
elections normally have little
effect on the national scene
and are waged almost entirely
on local issues, Labor may decide
to await their outcome before
moving against the Lyng govern-
ment. If the Labor Party makes
some gains--or even holds its
own--Gerhardsen and other party
leaders are almost certain to
interpret this as a mandate to
reconstitute a Labor government.
In such a move Labor would prob-
ably have the support of the SPP,
which is anxious to redeem itself
in the eyes of its radical sup-
porters for supporting right-wing
parties to overthrow Gerhardsen.
Even if Labor returns to
power, it faces the prospect
of ruling as a minority govern-
ment until new national elections
are held two years hence. The
resulting stalemate and the
opportunity it provides for the
SPP to hold a pivotal position
in Norwegian political life
may lead to popular pressures
for amending the constitution
to permit Parliament to be dis-
solved and new elections called.
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The growing skepticism the
Paris press has displayed in
recent weeks over the practical
effects of the Franco-German
treaty probably reflects French
Government thinking to some
degree.
Several recent events have
emphasized divergent policies
which the non-Gaullist French
press has cited as evidence
that De Gaulle is isolating
France even from West Germany.
The test ban treaty highlighted
the degree to which Paris is
at odds with all its allies.
While France avoided any pres-
sure to discourage other states
from signing the treaty, it
was probably disappointed when
Bonn decided to sign.
The agreement Bonn reached
with Washington on joint de-
velopment and production of a
tank, when Paris was unable to
reach a similar accord with
Bonn, was especially irritating.
French Foreign Ministry offi-
cials maintain that no formal
protest was lodged with Bonn
over the US deal, although Paris
apparently expressed regret that
there was no prior consultation.
West German Foreign Minis-
ter Schroeder's mid-August
visit to London and his discus-
sions of European integration
matters with British Foreign
Secretary Lord Home have also
troubled Paris. Schroeder and
Home agreed to meet periodically,
and the subsequent announcement
that Home would visit Bonn has
been treated by the French press
as evidence of a growing British-
German rapprochement which is
expected to be facilitated by
the retirement of Konrad Adenauer
this fall and the installation
of Ludwig Erhard as the new West
German chancellor.
The transfer from Paris
of West German Ambassador Blank-
enhorn and of General Speidel,
former commander of NATO land
forces in Central Europe, is
symptomatic of French-German
differences. Rumor in Paris
has it that both moves were in-
stigated by the Elysee. Each
has gone to an important new as-
signment--Blankenhorn as ambas-
sador to Italy and Speidel to
the chancellor's office as ad-
viser on NATO affairs--where
their criticism of Gaullist
policies may further weaken
Paris-Bonn ties.
French officials deny
there is anything wrong with
Franco-German relations, and
none of these recent occur-
rences seems sufficiently se-
rious to disrupt the French-
German treaty--which De Gaulle
still considers the keystone
of the European system he hopes
to create. It is increasingly
clear, however, that basic pol-
icy differences between the
two countries will be difficult
to hide when the Adenauer era
ends.
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Western Hemisphere
NEW WAVE OF TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA
Formerly sporadic acts of
terrorism in ,'sogota, attributed
to the National Liberation Front
(FLN), have increased in fre-
quency and seriousness since
mid-August. Several dynamite
bombs were exploded each night
between 21 and 27 August, caus-
ing severe damage to buildings
and automobiles. The propa-
ganda effect of the bombings
was heightened by telephone
calls to security officials be-
fore and after each event by
persons who identified them-
selves as FLN leaders.
The Colombian Army and
other forces were given special
powers to make preventive ar-
rests on 6 August to combat
anticipated disorders arising
from the illegal strike of the
Communist-dominated petroleum
workers'union, FEDEPETROL. Al-
though many workers have re-
turned to their jobs at the
government-owned refinery at
Barrancabermeja, some of the
more vigorous agitators are
still on strike. A few of the
leaders have been jailed, and
non-FEDEPETROL leftists have
threatened strikes and other
disruptions of public order in
reprisal for what they claim
was undue harshness on the part
of the military in suppressing
demonstrations and riots.
The rightist followers of
ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla (the
Rojistas) have protested the
arrest of their leader, who is
accused of plotting a coup
against President Valencia.
Some leaders of the clandestine
United Front for Revolutionary
Action (FUAR), who disclaim
responsibility for the recent
bombings, have accused the
Rojistas of the terrorism. The
same FUAR leaders also have
accused the Movement of Workers,
Students, and Peasants (MOEC)
and the FLN of collaborating
with the Rojistas. FUAR spokes-
men claim that violence directed
against ordinary citizens and
private property is of "no prac-
tical use" and will only produce
popular animosity.
In Cartagena on 27 August,
military and naval commanders
claimed to have discovered a
plot among the NCOs and lower
ranks. The nature of the plot
was not disclosed in the press
announcement made after the
event, but a number of arrests
were reported. There seems to
be no connection between the
Cartagena plot and the incidents
in Bogota.
Colombian security forces
began a roundup of suspected
terrorists on 24 August, and
thus far have jailed at least
30 "Communists."
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Tension over the Ecuador-
Peru boundary issue continues
to mount, and there may be
another major confrontation.
This issue--which dates from
1822 but had been dormant since
December 1960--was revived when
Peru took exception last month
to the Ecuadorean junta's re-
quest for, recognition.
The junta's request in-
cluded an assurance that it
would respect international
agreements that Ecuador had
"freely entered into." This
statement alarmed the Peruvians,
because the former Velasco
Ibarra government in Ecuador
had taken the position in 1960
that the 1942 Rio Protocol--
which defined the border--was
null because it had imposed on
Ecuador against its will.
As a prelude to recognition
of the junta,therefore, Peru
sought written assurances from
the four guarantors of the Rio
Protocol--Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and the United States--
that they retained their 1960
position that the protocol was
in force, valid, and could not
be modified unilaterally by
Ecuador. The three South Amer-
ican guarantors complied. Peru-
vian Foreign Minister Schwalb
inaccurately informed the press
on 17 August that favorable
written replies had come from
all four guarantors.
On 17 August, the Peruvian
Chamber voted to request the
Foreign Ministry to complete
the demarcation of the boundary.
When work stopped in 1952, about
44 miles remained undemarcated
between the last emplaced border
markers. The Ecuadoreans desire
to keep that portion of the
frontier open in hopes of even-
tually gaining an outlet on the
Amazon system. They chose
erroneously to regard the Peru-
vian legislature's action as
portending unilateral demarcation.
Foreign Minister Ponce, who
earlier wished to quiet the
matter, denounced as illegal
any boundary work not jointly
undertaken.
Peruvian Navy Minister
Texeira told the press that a
mobilization of armed forces
"to bring to bear maximum power"
may be necessary. Ecuador moved
on 22 August to bring units on
the Peruvian border to full
strength. Ecuador's normal
strength in the region is two
small divisions, while Peru
maintains a corps of about
11,000 men near the frontier.
Since the boundary is an ex-
ceedingly sensitive national-
istic issue in Ecuador, pressure
is building for a reiteration
of the thesis of the nullity of
the entire Rio Protocol. Unless
the junta can resist such de-
mands, a major crisis may soon
develop.
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Western Hemisphere
Haiti: A committee of the
Organ zion of American States
arrived in Hispaniola on 22
August to investigate the charges
levied by the Haitian Government
of Dominican complicity in the
recent exile invasions of Haiti.
Although the Haitian Government
has told the committee that the
rebels have been driven back
into the Dominican Republic,
some small rebel groups may be
hiding in the mountainous re-
gion of northeastern Haiti. Mean-
while, dictator Duvalier con-
tinues to seek arms and muni-
tions from abroad.
The rebel activities of the
past four weeks have presented no
serious threat to the Duvalier
regime. However, it could be
considerably weakened by a re-.
ported scarcity of government
funds and by the apparently
widening rift between the Haitian
Armed Forces (FAd'H), and the
hated civil militia (VSN)--
created by Duvalier in 1958 as
a buffer to the power of the
army.
Bolivia: Negotiations be-
tween Bolivia's state mining
corporation (Comibol) and the
tin miners' union continue to be
deadlocked over government ef-
forts to implement much-needed
reforms in the mining industry.
There are indications, however,
that friction is developing
among union leaders at Catavi,
the center of the miners' current
unrest, and enthusiasm for the
general strike supporting the
Catavi miners seems to be waning
among workers at other nationalized
mines. At the San Jose mine the
workers returned to work on 26
August, and at Huanuni, the coun-
try's second largest mine, there
is agitation by some non-Com-
munist workers to end the strike.
The Communist Party (PCB)
appears to be following a two-
faced policy regarding the
strike. It reportedly favors a
rapid solution to the mine con-
troversy to avert a possible
government crackdown.
The PCB's a or o
play both ends against the middle
is unlikely to pay off in help-
ing the miners' cause, or in
obtaining increased prestige
for the party among Bolivia's
working class.
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