WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

6 September 1963
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET 25X1
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 5 September 1963)
CUBA AND THE TEST BAN TREATY
Cuba's failure to signify any intention to sign sug-
gests both a desire to stay out of the Sino-Soviet
dispute and a fear that US-Soviet detente might weak-
en Moscow's support of Cuba against US pressures.
CUBAN FLIGHTS TO BRAZIL
Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and
Brazil have become a major means of transporting
non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba.
KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA
His 20 August - 3 September visit has probably
carried Yugoslav-Soviet relations to a level not
equaled since the 1955-56 rapprochement period.
SINO-SOVIET QUARREL REACHES NEW PITCH
Peiping's increasingly violent verbal attacks sug-
gest it is trying to goad Moscow into taking the
first step toward a formal break.
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The country is outwardly calmer, as the Diem regime
continues its efforts to demonstrate that civilian
elements, as well as the army, are united behind it.
It is gradually relaxing martial law restrictions.
6 Sept 63
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
NEW POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN LAOS
Premier Souvanna is trying to stabilize the
coalition regime before he leaves next week
on an extended trip to Europe and the US.
ALGERIAN REGIME CONSOLIDATES DESPITE OPPOSITION 6
Premier Ben Bella, still widely popular and sup-
ported by the army, is pushing through a new
constitution and will soon become president.
RECONVENING OF CONGO PARLIAMENT WILL REVIVE CONTROVERSY 7
A new tug of war between the Adoula government and
parliament seems in prospect. Meanwhile, Tshombd
says he will return to the country from Europe soon.
FINNISH CABINET CRISIS
The government fell when three labor representa-
tives withdrew from the cabinet following a dis-
agreement over economic policy.
AREA NOTES
Brazil and Bolivia
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CUBA AND THE TEST BAN TREATY
Cuba has failed thus far
to signify any intention of
signing the limited nuclear
test ban treaty, apparently
wishing to avoid commitment on
a sore issue in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Cuban diplomatic of-
ficers abroad have been instruct-
ed to avoid offense to either
the Soviets or the Chinese, and
Fidel Castro has admitted that
the problem posed by the Sino-
Soviet dispute is under high-
level review in his regime.
There is apparently another
reason for Havana's silence on
the treaty. Official Cuban
statements of the past several
weeks have hinted at a growing
realization that any trend to-
ward improved US-Soviet rela-
Chartered Cubana Airlines
flights between Cuba and Brazil
have become a major means of
transporting non-Cuban Latin
Americans to and from Cuba.
The five such flights since
late July have carried nearly
400 non-Cubans.
The first of the recent
series--on 25 July--brought 71
Latin American passengers to
Havana for the 26 July celebra-
tions. The other four flights
--on 15, 22, 28, and 29 August
--transported over 200 Latin
Americans to Brazil from Havana.
Some of the aircraft involved
returned to Cuba with smaller
numbers of passengers. Many of
the 200 Latin American passen-
tions would not automatically
mean any alteration in US policy
toward the Castro regime. Cas-
tro therefore may see the test
ban treaty as the first of a
series of developments toward
a US-Soviet detente that might
ultimately weaken Soviet support
of his regime against US pres-
sures.
The US Embassy in Moscow
noted on 30 August that Castro's
long-delayed reply to Khrushchev's
message of congratulations on
Cuba's 26 July holiday was
couched in militant terms lack-
ing in the Soviet message. Cas-
tro stressed the importance of
the world-wide "anti-imperialist"
struggle, whereas Khrushchev
had focused on Cuba's internal
"progress.'!
gers had been delegates to the
26 July ceremonies, but others
had apparently been in Cuba for
longer periods and some had
probably received training there.
Of the passengers of these four
flights to Brazil, 75 were na-
tives of Caribbean area coun-
tries. Their circuitous travel
through Brazil was evidently
designed to help conceal the
fact that they had been in Cuba.
Additional Cuban aircraft--
as well as a Soviet passenger
ship--are to leave Brazil for
Cuba later in the month with
delegates to the seventh congress
of the International Union of
Architects, which opens in Havana
on 29 September.
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SECRET The Communist World
During his stay in Yugo-
slavia from 20 August to 3
September, Khrushchev labored
hard and probably successfully
to convince Belgrade of his sin-
cerity in pursuing closer rela-
tions and of the mutual bene-
fits to be derived. He covered
five of Yugoslavia's six re-
publics, and talked with vir-
tually every leader of national
stature. He had numerous pri-
vate talks with Tito, and gave
three major public addresses.
The visit has probably carried
Yugoslav-Soviet relations to a
level not equaled since the
1955-56 rapprochement period.
Khrushchev comported him-
self as an earthy man-of-the-
people and the world's foremost
champion of peace. Moreover,
he was not above attempting to
rekindle memories of Russia as
the protector of Europe's Slavs..
Everywhere he went, he found
something Yugoslav to admire--
from the dome of an exhibition
hall at Belgrade's fairground
to factory workers' councils at
Rakovica--and broadly hinted
the USSR could learn much from
Yugoslavia.
Although Moscow did not
report Khrushchev's praise of
workers' councils--once cited
by the bloc as prime evidence
of Tito's heresy--the Yugoslavs
have made much of the remark,
apparently hoping to represent
it as a narrowing of doctrinal
differences. The Chinese and
Albanians are already using
Khrushchev's statement and
other aspects of the visit for
polemical purposes.
Tito, with one eye on his
relations with the West and the
nonaligned states, carefully
avoided saying anything during
the visit which would imply he
had compromised his country's
independence. At the same time,
he has obviously been pleased,
and he generously praised Khru-
shchev as a leader and the USSR
as "the first country of social-
ism."
Tito implied on 30 August
that he and Khrushchev had re-
vived their 1956 agreement
which,in declaring their Com-
munist parties equals,had marked
the zenith of their previous
rapprochement. "Cooperation
in certain economic fields has
been agreed on and will be ex-
panded," according to Tito.
This will constitute "compensa-
tion for what has been omitted
in the past." Scientific and
cultural relations are also to
be improved.
Both leaders reiterated
that they were agreed on the
more important international is-
sues, such as peaceful coexist-
ence and extending assistance
to the developing countries.
For the most part Khru-
shchev's speeches suggested he
did not press Tito for any com-
mitments. He did, however, make
a strong bid for increased Yugo-
slav participation in the bloc's
division-of-labor schemes--i.e.,
presumably Yugoslav membership
in the bloc's international
economic organization.(CEMA).
Unidentified sources of the
Western press claim Yugoslavia's
long-standing request for only
observer status in CEMA was ap-
proved in principle shortly
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Expulsion of two more
Chinese--one an embassy func-
tionary--from Czechoslovakia on
2 September for political ac-
tivity is the latest development
in the widening rift between
Peiping and the Soviet-oriented
bloc.
The S.ino-Soviet quarrel has
reached a new pitch of intensity
in the exchange of verbal blows.
The main thrust of Mao Tse-tung's
statement on 29 August about the
situation in South Vietnam was
against the Soviet Union. Al-
though the Chinese leader ap-
parently felt that open personal
attacks were beneath his dignity,
it seems clear that Mao's sneers
were directed at Khrushchev.
On 1 September the Chinese
fired back in reply to the So-
viet attack of 21 August with ar
official blast projecting an
image of white-faced fury. Al-
though Peiping charges the USSR
with treachery in failing to sup-
port Communist China on a broad
range of national objectives,
Chinese anger is still centered
on the issue of nuclear weapons.
The scathing language and cal-
culated insults employed by the
Chinese leave little more which
can be said.
Peiping's calculated vio-
lence suggests the Chinese may
be attempting to goad the Russians
closer to a formal break in dip-
lomatic relations. Moscow, how-
ever, is unlikely to accommodate
them by making the first move.
Although the two powers can be
expected to show their antago-
nism more and more clearly, the
trappings of protocol will be
maintained for the immediate
future.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
The Diem government is re-
storing a facade of political
unity and an appearance of or-
der in South Vietnam following
the crackdown on the Buddhists
two weeks ago. Saigon and other
urban centers are outwardly
calm, and conditions have re-
turned to near normal.
The regime continues to
publicize statements of support
from various government-manip-
ulated groups. Progovernment
rallies have also been staged
in larger towns throughout the
country, including Saigon,
largely by civil servants and
government-sponsored organiza-
tions such as the Republican
Youth and Women's Solidarity
movements.
At the same time, the gov-
ernment is moving rapidly to re-
lax martial law restrictions,
reopen schools, and return some
functions from military to ci-
vilian control. It has announced
the release of almost all Bud-
dhists and students arrested
since the state-of-emergency
declaration and has permitted
Buddhist pagodas to reopen un-
der new leaders, who have voiced
their confidence in and grati-
tude for the government's con-
ciliatory policy and for the
satisfaction of their demands.
6 Sept 63
Although there is still no
indication when martial law may
be lifted, troops are less con-
spicuous. The Saigon commander,
General Dinh, has publicly de-
nied any serious dissidence within
the army. The government ap-
pears in fact to be maintain-
ing disciplined loyalty from
most ranking officers and unit
commanders, although one entire
Civil Guard company reportedly
has deserted as a result of the
crisis.
While there has been a drop
in the total of government forces
fully committed to counterinsur-
gency operations and some dis-
ruption has occurred in rural
rehabilitation projects, mili-
tary pressure on the Viet Cong
is being maintained and most ci-
vilian agencies charged with di-
rection of provincial programs
are functioning normally. The
crisis still has had no discern-
ible effect on the pattern of
Viet Cong activity. A slight
increase in attacks during the
past two weeks appears to be a
normal step-up which occurs pe-
riodically. The absence of in-
tensive Viet Cong military ex-
ploitation of the crisis may re-
fleet a wariness of actions
which might strengthen the gov-
ernment's hand.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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VIETNAM
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SECRET
Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phouma is scheduled to leave
Vientiane on 10 September on a
trip.which will take him to
Paris, Washington, and the
United Nations. While the pri-
mary purpose of the trip appears
to be to obtain medical treat-
ment in France, Souvanna has
indicated that he wants to dis-
cuss recent developments in
Laos with Presidents De Gaulle
and Kennedy. In New York, he
will head the Laotian delegation
at the opening of the General
Assembly. Souvanna expects to
return to Laos before the end
of October.
In an effort to restore
a semblance of stability to
his tripartite government, Sou-
vanna is again trying to smooth
the way for the Pathet Lao to
resume an active role in the
coalition. He has had several
meetings with Phoumi Vongvichit,
Patbet Lao minister of infor-
mation, who arrived in Vien-
tiane last week with the terms
on which Pathet Lao leader
Prince Souphannouvong would
return to the capital.
Following these meetings
with Vongvichit, Souvanna told
Ambassador Unger that he be-
lieves the Pathet Lao are "com-
ing around" and will be pre-
pared to cooperate much more
than in the past. Souvanna
revealed that be had agreed to
the formation of a tripartite
police force in Vientiane, one
of the conditions Souphannouvong
had set for his return. Sou-'
vanna hopes that General Phoumi,
the rightist leader, will show
"good faith" and support the
creation of the new police
force.
Phoumi may agree to some
token arrangement to satisfy
Souphannouvong's conditions,
but he is not likely to allow
any such arrangement to under-
mine his control over the
capital.
Meanwhile military activ-
ity remains at a low level.
Meo and neutralist forces have
continued harassing actions
along Route 7 near Ban Ban
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Premier Ben Bella's easy
victory last month in securing
the approval of the Algerian
Constituent Assembly for his
draft constitution seems likely
to be repeated when the consti-
tution is submitted to a popular
referendum on 8 September. The
electorate soon will be called
upon to endorse Ben Bella--prob-
ably without opposition--as the
country's first president.
Ben Bella's opponents, most
of whom are erstwhile supporters,
are campaigning hard for nega-
tive votes in the referendum.
They may succeed in some areas
of traditional dissidence--such
as the Orleansville area, the
Kabylie, and the Constantine
region--but even here Ben Bella's
popularity is still strong.
The draft constitution es-
tablished a single political
organization, the National Lib-
eration Front (FLN), as the
source of power. With Ben Bella
as its head, the FLN executive
will continue its attempts to
forge a national organization
encompassing all facets of Al-
gerian life. Particular atten-
tion is being given the army.
Efforts during the past
year to unify the body politic
and develop a reliable cadre
have not been notably success-
ful, however. Recently the
FLN's student organization won
the first round in its efforts
to establish itself as an in-
dependent organization by
electing a predominantly pro-
Communist executive. This suc-
cess has spurred the illegal
Algerian Communist Party again
to seek recognition as a sep-
arate entity within the FLN.
The draft constitution terms
Algeria a socialist state, and de-
tractors of Ben Bella claim he
will eventually align openl,, with
Moscow. However, the Algerian am-
bassador to Washington--one of Ben
Bella's closest supporters--has
expressed confidence that after
he has been elected and has reor-
ganized his government, the premier
will seek closer ties with the
West.
Ben Bella, a pragmatic rather
than a doctrinaire socialist,
meanwhile continues to consoli-
date his position with the sup-
port principally of Col. Boumed-
ienne, defense minister and army
commander. Boumedienne's forces
may be called on to suppress some
outbreaks of violence during the
next few weeks s Ben Bella's op-
ponents seek to arouse national
feeling against him. This alli-
ance may not last over a longer
term, however.
AL04RIA
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SECRET w
Premier Adoula, as required
by law, has called the turbulent
Congolese Parliament back into
session at Leopoldville, and a
new tug of war between the govern-
ment and the parliamentarians
seems in prospect. Hoping to
restrict the activities of the
deputies and senators, Adoula has
designated the Parliament a
constituent assembly to complete
the long-discussed but still
unborn Congo constitution. Par-
liamentary leaders are already
protesting Adoula's move; they
insist that they will do busi-
ness as usual. The parlia-
mentarians have their eyes on
the 1964 elections, and there is
likely to be even more maneuvering
around and against the govern-
ment than usual.
The danger of antigovern-
ment demonstrations developing
out of labor troubles in Leopold-
ville has abated. Leaders of
the government employees union
dropped some of their more extreme
demands, and the government,
disturbed by the role labor
played in the recent upheaval
across the Congo River in Braz-
zaville, agreed to negotiate a
new civil service statute. Union
leaders continue to warn that
serious difficulties will occur
if the government does not act
to reform the currency, to curb
inflation, and to narrow the
gap between high living standards
of ministers and those of the
workers. Army patrols meanwhile
are being maintained throughout
the capital.
Adoula has formally asked
UN Secretary General Thant to
retain 3,000 UN troops in the
Congo until mid-1964. Thant
says he will present Adoula's
request in his forthcoming re-
port to the Security Council,
but he has told US officials
that, without strong African
support and improvement in the
UN's critical financial situation,
he was not optimistic. Lagging
financial contributions, Thant
said, might force the UN to
close its civilian technical
operations as well.
. A joint force of UN and
and Congolese troops on 28
August began a "mop-up" of
ex-Katangan gendarmes who have
been operating in eastern Ka-
tanga. So far the ex-gendarmes
have merely faded unpursued into
the bush. In view of the gradual
withdrawal, the joint force
probably will not accomplish
much.
safety.
in Barcelona that he plans to
return to Elisabethville by mid-
September. He said he plans
to enter the national Congolese
political arena and not limit
himself to Katangan politics.
Tshombd still has wide support
in Katanga but it is unlikely
he will risk a return without
some solid assurances from Leo-
poldville. regarding his personal
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The cabinet crisis precipi-
tated on 30 August by the resig-
nation of the three trade union
representatives from Prime
Minister Karjalainen's Agrarian-
led coalition foreshadows a
period of political maneuvering
in Finland.
The economic issue which
toppled the government was a
disagreement over a proposed
agricultural price increase.
The government planned to
raise food prices, while the
labor representatives demanded
subsidies in order to maintain
current consumer prices. The
three labor members, who repre-
sented the leftist-dominated
Confederation of Trade Unions
(SAK), recently have tended to
regard cabinet participation
as a liability in the face of
increasing criticism of wage
policies by the Social Demo-
cratic Party and its allied
Finnish Trade Union Federation
(SAJ). Withdrawal of its rep-
resentatives from the cabinet
leaves the SAK free to advocate
its own views on wage policy
more aggressively.
Alternatives to the present
cabinet, which remains in a
caretaker capacity, are few.
President Kekkonen's Agrarian,
Party has long refused to ac-
cept Social Democrats in any
coalition, arguing that their
inclusion would bring Soviet
pressures on Finland. Strong
objections by a majority of
Parliament have prevented inclu-
sion of Communists in a coalition
since 1948. The Agrarians main-
tain that a majority government
is necessary to demonstrate wide
support for their official policy
of friendship toward the USSR.
The four political parties
in the Karjalainen coalition
represent a parliamentary ma-
jority, but the Agrarians in-
sisted when the cabinet was
formed in 1962 that the three
trade union members also be
included in the cabinet to pro-
vide labor representation and a
counterbalance to the Conservative
right.
(FOLLOWING FEBRUARY 1962 ELECTIONS)
SOCIAL IIRERALS
DEMOCRATIC 13 IIR ERAL
OPPOSITION UNION
(SNOGISTS)
2 200 SEATS
It is likely therefore
that Karjalainen will try to re-
constitute the four-party coali-
tion cabinet and again seek to
include individuals from outside
Parliament who would represent
labor. Should the fragmented
Finnish trade union movement fail
to provide such representatives,
however, the Agrarians would
probably resort to re-forming
a majority government of the
present four parties to share
the burden of unpopular economic
decisions to be made. The re-
maining alternatives would be a
minority government or a non-
political "government of ex-
perts."
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Western Hemisphere
AREA NOTES
Brazil: President Goulart
has appointed a career diplo-
mat as Brazilian foreign minis-
Joao Araujo Castro, the
new foreign minister, is re-
garded as a competent professional
well informed on current in-
ternational problems, whose
attitude toward the US has been
cooperative. His most recent
assignment was as secretary
general for foreign affairs--
the number-two post in the
Foreign Ministry. He succeeds
extreme leftist Evandro Lins e
Silva, whom Goulart recently ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court.
The US Embassy, however,
believes that Foreign Minister
Castro's appointment may be
only temporary. Goulart may
seek political advantage by re-
placing Castro in the near
future with someone from either
his own Brazilian Labor Party
or its ally, the Social Demo-
cratic Party, both of which
apparently feel entitled to
the post.
Bolivia: The tin miners'
union- Livia has suspended
its strikes, but its agreement
to do so seems unlikely to pro-
duce an early solution to Bo-
livia's two-month-long labor
controversy.
them.
The accord merely allows
additional time for negotiations
on the government's proposals
for modernizing the operation
of the nationalized tin mines,
which reportedly lost over $16
million last year. The govern-
ment desires to replace several
.hundred featherbedding workers
and institute other reform meas-
ures. These proposals remain
,highly controversial, and further
unrest is likely to accompany the
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QT`!n D TAT
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