WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

13 September 1963
Copy No. 78
OCI No. 0297/63
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
downgrading and declassification
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SECRET
NEW CHINESE COMMUNIST BLAST AT MOSCOW
Last week's massive polemical attack reveals con-
flicts of national interest heretofore masked by
wrangling over doctrine and points up the test ban
treaty as an especially sore point. Moscow is
trying to maintain its stance of lofty contempt.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
SINO-SOVIET BORDER PROBLEMS
With political relations steadily worsening, both
China and the USSR are paying increasing attention
to their 4,150-mile border.
USSR MAY INTEND TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES
The present rate of conscript inductions and dis-
charges suggests the USSR is allowing its military
manpower levels to fall and thereby reduce mili-
tary spending in favor of the civilian economy.
TITO'S TRIP TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Plans for the trip, now set to begin on 18 Septem-
ber, have long been complicated by Tito's delicate
relations with Castro, whom he will not now visit.
UNREST CONTINUES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Student demonstrations still plague the regime,
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 12 September 1963)
and heavy
Viet Cong attacks have occurred south of Saigon.
LAOTIAN SCENE CALM AS SOUVANNA GOES ABROAD
Before the premier left, several proleftists were
eased out of leading positions in his neutralist
party. Vientiane now is quiet following a shoot-
ing incident between rightist and leftist forces.
MALAYSIA STILL TROUBLED ON EVE OF INAUGURATION
Although the federation is scheduled to come into
being on 16 September, leaders of its territories
are squabbling
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TIGHTENS CONTROL 9
The junta has exiled one principal opponent and ar-
rested another. Civilians have failed to agree on
a candidate for next month's presidential election.
ARRESTS THREATEN TO UNDERMINE IVORY COAST STABILITY 10
During the past two weeks President Houphouet-
Boigny has arrested a variety of political fig-
ures, including six cabinet ministers.
AREA NOTES
Syria and India
EUROPE
SPANISH COLONIAL POLICY IN TRANSITION
By granting some autonomy to Rio Muni and Fernando
Poo, Madrid apparently hopes to head off criticism
of its colonial policies in the UN.
ROME AND VIENNA AGAIN AT ODDS OVER SOUTH TIROL
Italian-Austrian relations have deteriorated sharp-
ly because of recrudescent terrorism in Italy's
German-speaking Alto Adige Province (South Tirol).
HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA MOVE AGAINST GUERRILLAS
Dense jungle and difficult terrain in the border
area will impede efforts by both governments to
eliminate the guerrillas--apparently members of
a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported organization.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
CONTINUING DILEMMA OF VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT 15
Terrorists are striving to demonstrate government
impotence before national elections are held. The
government is trying to contain terrorism without
incurring charges of unduly repressive measures.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
THE 18TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION
This session, opening 17 September, seems likely
to involve less East-West conflict than previous
sessions and to be used by African members to as-
sert a larger role for themselves.
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i"'' SECRET *00
The Communist World
Peiping's latest attack on
the Soviet leadership, in a
massive article by the editors
of People's Daily and Red Flag,
charges that Soviet actions
since 14 July have brought Sino-
Soviet relations to the "brink
of a split." Khrushchev is the
main target of the Chinese phi-
lippic, which is apparently ad-
dressed primarily to Communists
outside the USSR, but perhaps
also to the rank and file of
the Soviet party.
Conflicts of National Interest
The Chinese article presses
the ideological battle with
unabated fury, repeating and am-
plifying previous denunciations
of the Russians for "revision-
ism" and the anti-Marxist sins
associated with it. Peiping's
latest assault, however, puts
increased emphasis on Moscow's
misbehavior in state-to-state
relations. It reveals details
concerning hitherto closely
guarded secret quarrels and
thus shows up more clearly the
conflicts in national interest
which have been partially masked
by open wrangling over doctrine.
Peiping's slashing public
attack follows the line report-
edly taken by Chou En-lai last
s rin
the di
Moscow has "allied itself" with
the US, India, and Yugoslavia
"in flagrant violation of the
wino-Soviet treaty of friendship,
alliance, and mutual assistance."
The statement asserts that Moscow
has been appeasing the US at
China's expense. The evidence
cited, however, suggests that the
real grievance behind this
charge is Russian refusal to
run the risks entailed by Pei-
ping's militant policy, and
Russian insistence on firm con-
trol over the Chinese Communist
military machine as a condition
of Soviet support.
Test Ban Treaty
One of the sorest points
is Moscow's acceptance of the
test ban treaty. Leading up to
this "betrayal," according to
Peiping, were Soviet cancella-
tion in June 1959 of an agree-
ment to help China produce nu-
clear weapons--as a "present"
to President Eisenhower--and a
Russian decision to sign a
treaty with the US for the pre-
vention of nuclear prolifera-
tion which the Chinese say was
formally announced to them in
August 1962.
Support for India against
China, first in September 1959
and later during the Sino-Indian
war in the fall of 1962, is cited
as another example of Soviet
treachery. The Chinese note
bitterly that two thirds of
Moscow's economic assistance
to New Delhi has been given
since the fighting last year.
At another point the article
carefully explains that the
slump in Sino-Soviet trade is
a result of unilateral Russian
cancellation of aid agreements
pute between China'and the So-
viet Union originated from a per-
manent and deep-rooted conflict
of national interest and was
not just a matter of ideological
differences.
The Chinese now make the
unprecedented accusation that
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and wholesale withdrawal of techni-
cians after July 1960.
Taiwan, although it receives
scant attention, is clearly another
festering foreign policy issue be-
tween Peiping and Moscow. Chinese
disgust with Moscow's reluctance
to support Peiping's ambitions
against Chiang Kai-shek's govern-
ment is expressed by the charge that
Khrushchev attempted to sell the
"US two-Chinas plot" at the National
Day celebrations in Peiping in
19 59 .
Internal Interference
An important part of the Chi-
nese case against the USSR rests
on charges that Moscow interfered
in Chinese internal affairs. Khru-
shchev is accused of expressing
"undisguised support for antiparty
elements" in the Chinese Communist
Party during conversations with
the Chinese delegation to the So-
viet 22nd Party Congress in Octo-
ber 1961. This, say the Chinese,
is in line with Russian attempts
to subvert the leadership of any
party which opposes the USSR. Pei-
ping also charges the Soviet Union
with subversive activities at a
lower level, asserting that in April
and May 1962 "tens of thousands"
of dissidents were enticed across
the Sinkiang border into the USSR.
Since then the Chinese have dis-
played increasing sensitivity
regarding the long Sino-Soviet
frontier (see next article).
In its catalogue of Russian
sins, Peiping includes for the first
time publicly the charge that in 1958
the USSR made "unreasonable demands
designed to bring China under Soviet
military control." These demands
are not specified but the fact
that the accusation is linked with
Moscow's refusal to help the Chinese
produce nuclear weapons suggests
that insistence on Russian control
over atomic installations in China
may have been involved.
The increasing tempo and vio-
lence of the Chinese polemical at-
tack on the Soviet Union appears
to be part of an attempt to counter
stepped-up.Russian pressure with-
out taking the initiative in a
final break. Although the Chinese
promise a series of articles with
more details about the "sabotage"
of Sino-Soviet relations by the
Russian leaders, they still seek
to maintain an outer shell of bloc
unity, perhaps as a platform from
which to continue the fight. They
continue to profess their "deep
affection" for the Russian people
and the rank and file of the So-
viet party.
Continued Soviet Restraint
Thus far the Russians are seeking
to maintain a stance of lofty con-
tempt regarding China's "shameless
slanders" and "market-square
swearing" and have not deigned
to make a direct reply. However,
Moscow's insulting note of 9 Septem-
ber protesting an alleged Chinese
attempt to smuggle "banned publica-
tions" into the USSR on a Peiping-
to-Moscow train reaches a new
height of provocation. Moreover,
Russian press treatment of an
earthy incident stressing "uncul-
tured and vulgar hooliganism" dis-
played by Chinese members of a train
crew and student passengers puts 25X1
the exchange of abuse with Peiping
on a "people-to-people" basis for
the first time.
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,KOREA
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ir'
SECRET
The Communist World
SINO-SOVIET BORDER PROBLEMS
With Sino-Soviet relations
steadily worsening,. both Commu-
nist China and the USSR have be-
come increasingly sensitive
about security along their 4,150-
mile border.
Tensions probably will rise
further as a result of the charge
made by Peiping on 6 September
that the USSR had created border
troubles in 1960 and 1962 and
that the situation remains "un-
settled." No details of the 1960
incident were offered, but Pei-
ping noted that in 1962 the USSR
had enticed tens of thousands
of "Chinese citizens" from the
Ili area of Sinkiang across the
border and given them asylum.
Chinese complaints that the
USSR has refused to return the
refugees, all of whom are Uighur
and Kazakh herdsmen, suggest
that Peiping believes at least
some of them are being trained
for future subversive missions
in Sinkiang. Such fears would
be justifiable in view of the
long history of Soviet interven-
tion and subversion in western
Sinkiang.
Reports that the Chinese
have been reinforcing regular
troop strength in Soviet border
areas cannot be confirmed, but
a drive to recruit students and
unemployed youth for nonmilitary
work in frontier areas, espe-
cially Siniang was stepped up
in August:-
Peiping is apparently just
as sensitive about border secu-
rity in Manchuria as it is in
Sinkiang.
Moscow Radio on 5 August
twitted the Chinese about their
increasingly unfriendly behavior
on the northern Manchurian
border. A dispatcher at the
port of Blagoveshchensk was
quoted as saying that "things
have gone so far that Chinese
ships sailing on the Amur do not
even reply to the greetings of
our ships when they pass. This
seems to be the limit."
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The Soviet Union must annually conscript 800,000 to
850,000 men to maintain its present force of about 3.3
million in military service, or 600,000 to 650,000 for a
force of 2.4 million, Khrushchev's 1960 demobilization
goal. The normal functioning of the system allows only
a remote possibility that all males available for service
would actually be conscripted in peacetime. The follow-
ing tabulation estimates the number of 19-year-olds
available for military service between the years 1960 and
1965.
Year of Year Reach- Estimated Number (in thousands)
Birth ing Age 19 Reaching 19 Available for Service
1941
1960
1,900
1,700)
1942
1961
1,200
1,075
1943
1962
775
700
1944
1963
850
750
1945
1964
1,425
1,300
1946
1965
1,750
1,600
Most of these
now serving
their three-
year tours of
service.
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'"e SECRET
The USSR may have started I Khrushchev wants to resume such
to cut back its military forces
in line with Khrushchev's avowed
intention to reduce military
spending in favor of the civilian
economy.
Earlier this year, when for
the first time the draft regis-
tration included 18- as well as
19-year-olds, it was expected
that both age groups would be
called into service this fall.
However, the annual draft call
issued on 4 September covered as
usual only the 19-year-olds (the
class of 1944) and the normal re-
lease of three-year conscripts
is to take place.
The 1944 class is one of
the smallest of recent years be-
cause of the very low birth
rates toward the end of World
War II. Almost all its approxi-
mately 850,000 members would
have to be drafted to maintain
the present force level of 3.25-
3.5 million. Past experience
indicates that about 10 percent
of any class is unfit or ex-
empt for family reasons for
military service. Also to draft
all of the remainder in peace-
time would be very unusual. The
implication of this is that
there is to be a resumption of
the demobilization announced in
1960. Demobilization measures,
designed to reduce the force
level from 3.6 to 2.4 million,
were suspended'in 1961.
There is considerable justi-
fication for believing that
a course. He has privately told
Western officials that he in-
tends to curb military spending
in 1964-65 to bring about a more
rapid development of the chemi-
cal industry and to bolster
lagging agriculture. The Soviet
civilian labor market could
readily utilize many additional
workers at this time. In addi-
tion, a troop reduction would prob-
ably accord with Khrushchev's views
on the need to modernize and streamline
the armed forces. If a reduc-
tion is to occur, Khrushchev
may hold off on the public announce-
ment until November or December
when he can give it a joint
propaganda build-up with the
1964-65 economic plans to be
announced at that time.
The evidence for demobili-
zation implied in this year's
draft call, however, is incon-
clusive. There is a possibilty
that combing the earlier classes
for persons heretofore passed
over could yield more than
enough draftees to maintain pres-
ent strength. Also, the gen-
eral review of draft procedures
which resulted in the concurrent
registration of two classes this
year has caused other changes
which could affect the number of
call-ups without its being
readily apparent--the induction
of some 18-year-olds without
formal announcement, for in-
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Ngo,
SECRET
The Yugoslav press is de-
scribing Tito's good-will tour of
Latin America--now set to begin
on 18 September--as an important
initiative aimed at increasing
the activity and influence of the
nonaligned states in interna-
tional affairs. The trip has
been an on-again, off-again prop-
osition for almost three years,
the primary problem being Tito's
delicate relations with Castro--
whom he will not now visit.
A shadow has been cast over
the tour, even before it has
started, by the adverse reaction
of conservative political circles
in Brazil. The refusal of two
governors to receive Tito has
apparently led to the removal of
Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro from
his itinerary and a reduction of
his stay in Brazil from eight to
four days.
This blow to Yugoslav sen-
sitivities will probably be off-
set by the announcement that
President Kennedy has invited
Tito to visit Washington after
his tour of Latin America.
Preliminary negotiations have
been concluded on a number of
agreements for Tito to sign
during his visits. In Brazil,
he may formalize arrangements on
economic cooperation, copyrights,
consular matters, and extradi-
tion rights.
A credit
and technical assistance agree-
ment may be announced during
Tito's stay in Bolivia.
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SECRET
Student demonstrations in
South Vietnamese cities contin-
ue to plague the Diem regime,
while the army has effectively
countered increased Viet Cong
military attacks in the delta
area.
Following the
progovernment demonstrations
last week by civil servants and
regime-sponsored organizations,
the regime indicated that it
would relax martial law. The
apparently well-organized tac-
tics of Saigon high school stu-
dents, however, in disregarding
emergency restrictions and their
badgering of military authori-
ties will probably serve to pro-
long present security conditions.
--particularly in the Ca Mau
Peninsula--suggests a possible
attempt to exploit the uneasy
political situation. Although
Communist units have mounted
three company and two battalion
size operations in this area
so far this week, government
forces have responded effec-
tively.
In other parts of the
country most aspects of the
war effort still appear little
changed. However, the fall
season has usually been marked
by some increase in Viet Cong
activity.
The regime's charge that
Communist agents are responsible
for student disturbances has
not been substantiated.
Heavy Viet Cong attacks
south of Saigon in recent days
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Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phouma's departure on 10 Sep-
tember for an extended trip to
France and the US was preceded
by a reshuffling of the leader-
ship of his neutralist party.
The changes include the removal
of two of the most prominent
proleftists from the party's
provisional central committee.
At the same time, in a move ap-
parently prompted by General
Khamouane's continued absence
from Vientiane and his refusal
to support the neutralist mili-
tary effort on the Plaine des
Jarres, Souvanna dropped the
Phong Saly strong man from his
positions on two key tripartite
committees.
By the time Souvanna left,
Vientiane had returned to a
semblance of normalcy following
a 9 September shooting fracas
between members of General Phoumi
Nosavan's right-wing forces and
the small Pathet Lao guard force
stationed there. A compromise
agreement negotiated by the
three factions after the inci-
dent called for the preserva-
tion of the status quo, with
General Phoumi guaranteeing
the security of two Pathet Lao
cabinet members and the guard
force numbering approximately
100 men.
Prior to the compromise
talks, there had been indications
that the rightists might seize
upon the shooting incident to
strengthen their grip on the
capital. A right-wing general
had stated that the Pathet Lao
unit had been "requested" to
leave Vientiane.
Low-level skirmishing
and artillery exchanges con-
tinue near Nhommarath and in
the Plaine des Jarres area.
Meo units have maintained
their pressure on Route 7
near Ban Ban, where road
cuts have prevented any sig-
nificant overland resupply
of enemy forces on the Plaine
des Jarres since early last
month.
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Internal and external prob-
lems continue to plague the Ma-
laysia federation on the eve of
its scheduled 16 September birth.
Top political leaders of
Sarawak, Sabah (formerly North
Borneo), and Singapore have
concluded that Malayan Prime
Minister Rahman has shown in-
creased ineptitude since the
heads-of-government meeting in
Manila in July and will not
play a decisive role in the
independent Malaysia. In turn,
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee's
standing as a future national
leader has risen greatly with
the chief minister-designates
of Sabah and Sarawak. Lee's
"partnership" principle for
allowing the components of Ma-
laysia a large measure of auton-
omy has been warmly endorsed by
the Borneo political leaders.
While the bitter war of
words between Singapore and
Malaya has quieted down, the
underlying suspicions and policy
differences remain. A dispute
between Malaya and Sarawak over
the nomination of Sarawak's
first local governor caused UK
Colonial Secretary Sandys to
summon Sarawak leaders to Kuala
Lumpur for a last-minute effort
to secure agreement.
The UN team sent to Sara-
wak and Sabah to assess senti-
ment regarding the federation
has concluded that a majority
of the surveyed population fa-
vors Malaysia. U Thant has
ordered the report to be issued
by 14 September.
Regardless of the team's
findings, Indonesia apparently
will use the report as the basis
for a renewed overt challenge
of Malaysia. Foreign Minister
Subandrio told Ambassador Jones
on 10 September that although
his government would probably
not question the report regarding
Sabah, if it were inconclusive
as to the validity of pro-Malaysia
sentiment in Sarawak, Indonesia
would demand that the establish-
ment of Malaysia again be de-
ferred. Should the report claim
that Sarawak clearly favors
Malaysia, according to Subandrio,
Indonesia would label the UN
survey a "farce," and oppose the
report on the basis of its own
observers' accounts.
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Hard-core followers of
former South Korean security
chief Kim Chong-pil have tight-
ened their control of the gov-
ernment political apparatus.
Fearful that junta leader'Pak
Chong-hui lacks the public sup-
port to win the 15 October pres-
idential election fairly, Kim's
group favors harsh measures to
assure his victory. They are
placing pressure on Pak to sup-
press all critics inside and
outside the regime.
Within the junta, efforts
to rally moderate elements into
a practical alternative to Kim's
group seem to have failed. An-
other former security chief, Kim
Chae-chun, sparked these efforts
and teamed up with former prime
minister Song Yo-than, an out-
spoken critic of Pak. Song, who
had been arrested last month,
was nominated for the presidency
apparently in the hope that this
would help persuade Pak to break
with Kim Chong-pil rather than
risk exposure of past scandals
during a hotly contested elec-
tion campaign. Presumably the
moderates intended that if Pak
made the break, Song would with-
draw from the race and they
would throw their support to Pak.
Forewarned, the regime re-
acted sharply, and rearrested
Song. It also forced Kim Chae-
chun into exile, and thereby
virtually destroyed his political
organization. Song is in the
hapless position of a jailed
candidate without a party.
Meanwhile, leading civil-
ian opposition groups still have
not succeeded in uniting behind
a single presidential candidate.
Three successive sessions of a
joint convention of the parties
ended in wild disorder, mainly
because of the failure of the
leading politicians to bury
their factional differences
and personal rivalries. Jolted
by mounting public criticism
of the spectacle, the convention
on 8 September appointed a 10-
man committee to select a candi-
date.
Public discontent with op-
position bickering will make it
easier for Pak to win, not be-
cause the public wants him but
because it sees no attractive
alternative to him. At the
same time, the Kim Chong-pil
group's desire to resort to
harsh repressive measures could
set off a chain reaction of
public defiance and possibly
violence in connection with
the election.
SECRET
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ARRESTS THREATEN TO UNDERMINE IVORY COAST STABILITY
A series of arrests and
increased security measures in
the past two weeks in Ivory
Coast may usher in a period of
political instability.
Following his return on
28 August from four and a half
months' absence abroad,. Presi-
dent Houphouet-Boigny arrested
a variety of political figures.
Among the 30 high-level govern-
ment officials detained are the
ministers of defense and agri-
culture and four other cabinet
ministers, the vice president
of. the National Assembly, and
a commandant of the gendarmerie.
Most were suspected of complic-
ity in an alleged plot against
Houphouet during his absence
in July. It appears that he
is arresting all people against
whom derogatory reports have
been received, with the inten-
tion of sorting out the innocent
later. In a cabinet resuffle
following the arrests, the Presi-
dent took control of four impor-
tant ministries himself.
Although considerable mal-
aise had developed in the coun-
try during Houphouet's absence,
the extremity of the measures
taken seems out of proportion
to whatever threat had actually
developed to his position. He
has been the leading political
figure in the country--relative-
ly prosperous for West Africa
--since long before its inde-
pendence in 1960, and a major
voice among all of France's
former African colonies. While
some of the detainees have op-
posed Houphouet in the past,
others have a long unbroken rec-
ord of loyalty to his middle-
of-the-road Democratic Party.
Some had a record of leftist
student activities, and others
are moderates who failed to
follow him during his 1946-50
alignment with the Communists.
Both foreign and domestic
events this year apparently gave
Houphouet a mounting sense of
insecurity. In January the as-
sassination of President Olympio
in nearby Togo was followed by
an abortive coup plot in Ivory
Coast. Whatever the true na-
ture of the July "plot," unrest
was clearly growing among stu-
dents and middle and. lower level
government workers in Abidjan.
Houphouet's concern was height-
ened by the recent ouster of
Congo President Youlou and by
warnings from Paris that it was
not prepared to go further to
sustain a president against wide-
spread dissatisfaction in Abidjan
than it had done in Brazzaville.
Houphouet claimed that cer-
tain foreign elements were involved
in the plot. Although he did not
name any countries, he probably
had in mind regional rivals Ghana
and Mali. The President'now has
reportedly disarmed elements of
the army and the gendarmerie and
entrusted his own security to a
personally picked presidential
guard. The US Embassy in Abidjan
fears that Houphouet's concern
for his safety may in the future
cause him to rely more on repres-
sive security measures than on
political controls as in the
past.
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Syria: Dissension over
policy issues is increasing
among the leaders of the Syrian
regime. Several basic problems
are confronting the top Baath-
ists and the National Council
of the Revolutionary Command--
the ruling junta composed of
both civilian and military
Baathists and certain other
military leaders. Points of
friction are how to conciliate
a dissident Baathist faction,
Syria's position vis-a-vis Nasir,
the role of the Baathists paramili
tary national guard, and eco-
nomic: policies.
Syrian strong man General
Hafiz remains committed against
rapprochement with Nasir, as
are many Baathists. At the
same time, he is resisting
urgings by the more doctrinaire
Baathists led by Prime Minister
Bitar for more socialistic pol-
icies. The final arbiter of
Syrian politics remains the
army, and its general loyalty
still appears to be with Hafiz.
India: The leadership of
the Congress Party's newly beefed-
up organizational wing is showing
considerable initial energy. It
has moved quickly to maintain the
momentum in party affairs created
by Nehru's recent shifts of in-
fluential politicians from min-
isterial posts to full-time party
work.
charges.
Scarcely a day has passed
since 1 September that the party's
top body for organizational mat-
ters, the Central Congress Parlia-
mentary Board, has not created
news with its bustling activity.
Nehru's presence at the board's
first meeting under its new man-
date and with its expanded mem-
bership has served to emphasize
the importance of its new role.
Its activities during the past
two weeks have included inter-
vention in state party elections,
review of a variety of membership
and candidate selections made by
lesser party bodies, and the es-
tablishment of several high-powered
subgroups charged with such matters
as rewriting the party's constitu-
tion and probing corruption
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SPAN ISH DEPENDENCIES
IN AFRICA
LIBYA I UAR
(EGYPT)
TOGO //II
SIERYR LE." .q IVORY 7 / NIGE'RIt~.
E WAST 1`
HANA
Vf'
REPUBLIC my N
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%Wf
SECRET
The immediate motive behind
Madrid's recent decision to
grant administrative autonomy
to its equatorial African ter-
ritories of Rio Muni and Fernando
Poo is to head off attacks on
Spanish colonialism in the forth-
coming UN General Assembly.
Over the longer run, however,
Spain may hope that this action
will improve its international
image and induce Morocco to
abandon claims to the enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla at such
time as it achieves a favor-
able settlement of its claims to
Ifni and Spanish Sahara.
On 9 August the cabinet
authorized the drafting of legis-
lation to give Rio Muni and
Fernando Poo a degree of self-
government, largely at the in-
sistence of Foreign Minister
Castiella. Castiella asserted
that Spain must make some dramatic
gesture regarding these territories
or else find itself isolated
and on the defensive in the UN.
The foreign minister also made
the point that the two territories
are an expense and contribute
nothing to Spain. Another
factor influencing the Spanish
action may be the prospect of
mounting pressure from national-
ists from the two territories
who are presumably based in
neighboring Cameroon. At a 20-
25 August meeting these national-
ists agreed to form a common
front with the objective of "un-
conditional independence in the
very near future."
As presently outlined,
Madrid's plan will provide for
greater home rule at the local
administration level and, even-
tually, the appointment of indig-
enous governors. It is ex-
pected that legislation to this
effect will be approved by
Parliament toward the end of
this yea- and become effective
1 January 1964.
On 4 September a member
of the Spanish UN delegation,
with an eye to reducing African
attacks on Spain's overseas
policy, told the US delegation
that his country is not opposed
to having the Committee of 24
on colonialism consider the
two territories. He hinted,
however, that Spain might counter
by demanding that the committee
also take up Gibraltar's colo-
nial status.
SECRET
13 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12
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["') Approximate area of Gefman-
speaking population in
northern Italy (South Tirol)
?-W-Region boundary
-? Province boundary
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SECRET vowe Europe
Italian-Austrian relations
have deteriorated sharply be-
cause of recrudescent terrorism
in Italy's German-speaking Alto
Adige Province--the so-called
South Tirol. The foreign minis-
ters of the two countries were
to have discussed the problem
this month in Salzburg, but the
meeting was canceled, at Italy's
request, because of the rising
tensions.
Italy feels Vienna is not
doing enough to prevent terror-
ist use of Austrian territory
for sanctuary and supply
An estimated young neo-
Fascists held an anti-Austrian
rally in the provincial capital
of Bolzano on 8 September and
several hundred of them clashed
with the police.
Until the acquittal two
weeks ago of ten Italian police-
men charged in 1961 with brutal
treatment of Tirolean pris ners,
Austria adopted a generall3 un-
ruffled attitude toward the area.
Both Chancellor Gorbach and For-
eign Minister Kreisky condemned
outbreaks of violence as inimi-
cal to the success of negotia-
tions with Italy. Now, however,
the Austrian press, as well as
Kreisky, have become sharply
critical of Italian justice, and
Austrian politicians are increas-
ingly inclined to express sym-
pathy for extremist Austrian and
South Tirol opinion. Rome sent
a strongly worded protest to Vi-
enna this week regarding Austrian
criticism of Italian justice.
Before the police
acquittal,
Rome
had suggested an
"interim
and
informal" meeting
between
the
foreign ministers in New
York
in connection with the
opening of the UN General As-
sembly. There is some possibility
this meeting may still take
place
There has been speculation that
the Italian Foreign Ministry is
considering economic pressures
against Austria.
Late this month Rome plans
to release a long-awaited two-
year study of the Tirolean prob-
lem, which may provide a basis
for giving the province a larger
measure of autonomy. Its propos-
als would require Italian parlia-
mentary action, however, and this
is unlikely to occur while Italy
has only a caretaker government.
SECRET
13 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 13
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BRITISH
HONDURA GULF
OF
HONDURAS
Puerto
Cortes Tela ~~ ~~
a Cieb
Puert rrio *Balfat
P~U?n
GUATAL Sa Pedro Sula f- o- 0
G moo
o J~~;a nta Ri a
oro
, Azacualpa lencia
ntaRsa H O fi D U ,-R A, $ aP P co ?
de Cop \ Goy 9~0 ~;o
w-//: Raiti Ramon
Mrcola TEGGAt1'lk Bocay
EL. SALAD } c p El Par is Puerto Cabezas
? ~Garrobo`
Ail ALVABOR San ? iguel 'oco ?Golondrina
Paso Real de Cua p,a
?a J j de M
Sauce Matagalpa
Puerto azan o so 1013 Chinande I CA! A G U A
Miles
33A1A =G
L- r~K L,
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*MW *400~
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA MOVE AGAINST GUERRILLAS
The Honduran armed forces
have begun to move against a
group of pro-Castro guerrillas
operating against the Nicaraguan
Government and active in the
vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Hon-
duran border. The Nicaraguan
National Guard has been con-
ducting operations on its side
of the border against the in-
surgents since July. The dense
jungle and difficult terrain,
however, will impede the efforts
of both forces to eliminate the
guerrillas.
Information on the guerrilla
force is scanty and conflicting.
It is apparently composed of
members of the National Libera-
tion Front (FLN), a Communist-
dominated and Cuban-supported
revolutionary organization ac-
tive primarily in Honduras and
Nicaragua since the fall of 1962.
Probably less than 100 of the
guerrillas are operating in
Nicaragua, about 300 in Hon-
duras.
In late July, Nicaraguan
units made contact with the
insurgents along the Coco River
near the river towns of Raiti
and Bocay. On 29 August, a
Nicaraguan patrol was ambushed
13 Sept 63
by guerrillas near San Ramon,
also on the Coco.
The Honduran armed forces
plan to airlift about 300 troops
to the Patuca River in an at-
tempt to destroy a number of
guerrilla camps that are said
to be located along its banks.
As of 6 September, 200 field-
equipped troops had been de-
ployed. These troops
plan to establish
bloc ia es at the junctures of
the Cuyamel and Patuca and of
the Guayape and Guayambre rivers
and then make a sweep through
the intervening area. Thus far
no contact has been made with
the guerrillas.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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January: (heft of five French paintings valued
at $660,000--later returned.
ebruary: Arson at American Chamber of Commerce
in Caracas and Sears, Roebuck warehouse.
Damage: $2.5 million.
March: Sabotage of two major petroleum pipe-
lines with combined capacity exceeding
u n;llion barrels s day.
Damage: at ieasi $ 100,000.
April: Arson at Radio Tropical transmitter:
Accms Chiclet piant, and Daugherty
Cordage mill.
Damage: $410,000.
Mav: Arson at warehouse of Armed Forces
social Welfare Institute and Union
Cyinfica Company (jointly owned US-
Verezuelan enterprise).
P image: $540,000.
Raid on courtroom where leader of
group tnor stole French paintings was
being tried. Raiders and prisoner
,.raped.
June: Several cases of arson.
iotai damage: more than $500,OOC.
1Jusuccessful attempt to assassinate
President Betancourt.
Attack on US Military Mission and on
home of 'JS atta'he.
Ju~v- Arson and pipeline combings.
L) inuge: more man ,.$300,000.
August: Several cases of arson, bombings,
xauits on security personnel.
i to n^ r: Three daylight raids on units of
.ec=arity forces--air force headquarters
in ~2aracos, Douce headquarters in
Maracaibo, home of captain of Betan-
a:c.urt's personal i>odyguard. Several
.-usual ities.
Numerous instan,::es at arson, bombings,
uric sabotage, directed mainly at
IIS-owned enterprises.
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Western Hemisphere
CONTINUING DILEMMA OF VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT
Venezuelan terrorists be-
longing to the Castroite Armed
Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) in Caracas and Maracaibo,
determined to undermine the gov-
ernment of President Romulo
T3etancourt, have intensified
their activities since 1 Sep-
tember. Their avowed purpose
is to demonstrate the impotence
of the government before the
national elections, which prob-
ably will be held on 1 December.
Terrorist strategy has a
threefold objective. By weak-
ening public confidence in dem-
ocratic processes, the leftists
hope to reduce popular partici-
pation in the election. Sec-
ondly, they hope to provoke the
government into strong repres-
sive measures., thereby giving
substance to their claim that
it is dictatorial.
Responsible military lead-
ers recognize the need for con-
tinuing to uphold the constitu-
tion and to serve loyally under
a civilian government. As a
consequence, most officers will
support the winner of the elec-
tion, at least as long as the
government remains free of Com-
munist influence.
Betancourt's domestic pol-
icy is to walk a narrow line.
He must attempt to contain the
terrorist activities of the
FALN without exposing his gov-
ernment to the charge of using
unduly repressive measures. He
must be sufficiently forceful
in his dealings with the FALN
to retain the confidence of the
people and the loyalty of the
military. Above all, as he
sees it, he must conduct a free
election late in 1963 and turn
the government over to elected
civilians in March 1964.E
SECRET
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SECRET
International Organizations
THE 18TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION
The 18th UN General Assembly,
which opens on 17 September, seems
likely to be marked by less East-
West conflict than previous sessions.
The spotlight this time will prob-
ably center on efforts by African
members to assert a larger role
for themselves.
Only a few heads of state or
government plan as of now to partic-
ipate this year, although slightly
more than half the foreign ministers
will attend. An earlier move for
attendance by African chiefs of
state has apparently been undercut
by political worries at home.
chance that once again the term
of one of these seats will be
divided as a compromise between
an Asian-African representative
and an East European.
While the USSR will miss no
opportunity to exploit the colonial-
ism issue, East-West polemics are
likely to be less heated, Also,
the nonaligned powers will probably
use the limited nuclear test ban
agreement to urge the great powers
to work for a greater relaxation
of tensions, notably through nego-
tiations on a nonaggression pact
or "partial" disarmament measures.
Chief among issues the Africans
are expected to press are Portu-
guese colonialism, apartheid in
South Africa, the South-West Africa
question, and perhaps Southern
Rhodesia. Their moves might in-
clude walkouts, attempts to have
South Africa and Portugal excluded
from the work of the Assembly, and
disruptive tactics they have used
against these countries at other
recent conferences.
The Africans, arguing that they
now form the largest bloc in the UN,
are also expected to renew pressure
for expansion of the Security Coun-
cil and the Economic and Social
Council. Such enlargement requires
amendment of the Charter, an ac-
tion the USSR has hitherto opposed.
Meanwhile, the Africans and
their Asian allies have intensified
their lobbying for the three non-
permanent Security Council seats
up for election this year. The
present leading candidates are Bo-
livia, Ivory Coast, Malaya, and
Czechoslovakia. There is a good
In view of the Sino-Soviet
breach, the Sino-Indian dispute,
and Peiping's attitude on the test
ban agreement, the perennial Chi-
nese representation issue will
probably get less attention than
usual. The USSR, in all likelihood,
will inscribe the question on the
agenda, but Soviet support for it
will probably be even more perfunc-
tory than in 1962.
The question of retaining
UN forces in the Congo beyond the
end of this year may arise early
in the session. U Thant's report
on this to the Security Council is
expected on 16 September and will
recommend withdrawal unless a min-
imum of 6,000 men can be retained.
He has indicated that, in order to
reopen the supply pipeline, which
is already being shut down, it may
be necessary to interrupt the
Assembly's general debate to ini- 25X1
tiate the required committee ac-
tion on funds and other arrange-
ments.
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