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December 21, 2016
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June 19, 2008
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September 27, 1963
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27 September 1963 OCI No. 0299/63 Copy No, 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE State Dept. review completed. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIA review completed. SECRET 25X1 GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET (Information as of 1200 EDT, 26 September 1963) CASTRO-STYLE COMMUNIST PARTY STILL DEVELOPING 1 is proceeding with plans to develop his own Communist-style system over which he will exercise tight personal control. SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS As their bitter exchanges continue, Moscow has found a potent weapon in Peiping's refusal to sign the test ban treaty and is underlining Chinese "war mania." The Chinese are attempting to return the polemic to the issue of Communist orthodoxy, where they are on stronger ground than the Soviets. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK Moscow seems anxious to avoid new crises with the West while dealing with its Chinese adversaries and its serious economic problems. Gromyko's UN speech was the most recent example of Soviet efforts to en- courage an atmosphere of East-West detente. 25X1 25X1 SHAKE-UP IN CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP Stalinist party boss Novotny's changes are only half measures which are likely to encourage de- mands for further liberalization, possibly even for his own ouster. RUMANIA'S GROWING NATIONALISM Having defied Moscow in the bloc economic organiza- tion, Bucharest has apparently been encouraged to follow up with new expressions of independence. PEIPING'S INTEREST IN BURMA Chinese Communist proteges appear to have consid- erable influence in the Burmese Communist Party delegation now engaged, along with other insurgent elements, in peace talks with the Ne Win regime. 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELELI NOT WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET ASIA-AFRICA SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM Despite an outward calm, political restiveness persists, coup talk is again being heard, 25X1 25X1 INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA Djakarta Is continuing its military preparations in Borneo, has broken trade relations with Malay- sia, and is taking other economic measures against the new country. JAPAN TO PROPOSE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN PACIFIC Prime Minister Ikeda hopes to sell this plan dur- ing his current trip in the Southwest Pacific area. PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC Ayub's government has recently concluded trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, and Albania, and others are under discussion. AREA NOTES Iran and Yemen 13 SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET EUROPE Page NEW FRENCH EFFORTS TOWARD ANTI-GAULLIST ALLIANCES 15 .Amid rumors that De Gaulle will seek re-election before his term expires in 1165, his opponents are engaged in new maneuvers--likely to benefit chiefly the Communists--to form alliances against him. LABOR GOVERNMENT RECONSTITUTED IN NORWAY Reconstitution of a minority Labor cabinet on 25 September restores the government to essentially the situation prevailing before Labor was toppled by a nonsocialist four-party coalition last month. OVERTHROW OF DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BOSCH The coup d'etat removed the first freely elected regime in over 30 years and does not augur well for the country's political stability. Foreign reaction has been overwhelmingly unfavorable. HAITIAN DICTATOR CRUSHES ANOTHER EXILE RAID Duvalier, now is a stronger position than at any time in recent months, may try to consolidate his power further by another purge of elements in his regime which he considers unreliable. INCREASING EXTREMIST AGITATION IN BRAZIL The extreme left is increasing pressure on the gov- erment for radical measures, employing the threat of a general strike. The attitude of War Minister Jair Ribeiro is considered the key to the outcome of the present crisis. THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SITUATION 20 Maneuvering for next year's presidential election is already under way, and now may be complicated by some splintering of incumbent President Alessandri's Democratic Front following last week's cabinet crisis. VENEZUELAN TERRORISTS CONTINUE THEIR OFFENSIVE The terrorists for the third week have kept up an intensified campaign to undermine the Betancourt government. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET Castro is proceeding to develop his own Communist-style system based on a party bureauc- racy over which he will exercise tight personal control. The foundation of this system is to be the still developing United Party of the Socialist Revolu- tion (FURS). Although PURS is being structured on the pattern of Communist bloc parties and espouses Marxism-Leninism as its ideology, it is clear that loyalty to Castro is the first prerequisite for membership. This is increasingly evident in the care that has gone into the se- lection of party cadres and the speeches that have been devoted to party activities. veterans of the prerevolutionary ban Communist Party account for only a little more than three percent of the total PURS membership. This appears to be a reasonable estimate, as many "old" Communists are believed to have been bypassed for having been associated with the "sectarian" activities of Anibal Escalante, the veteran Cuban Communist leader purged in March 1962. During a ceremony of 17 Sep- tember marking the formation of a sectional party unit in Ori- ente Province, the provincial party organizer stated that the process of organizing the party there will,be completed by 10 October. When the organizational process is completed in all six provinces, the stage will be set for a national congress to mark the formal establishment of the party. This congress, which had been promised for sometime in 1963, may now be put off to accompany next January's anniver- sary celebrations. SECRET 27 Sent 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 SECRET The Communist World Moscow and Peiping are relentlessly pursuing their political warfare aimed at discrediting each other and winning the allegiance of for- eign parties. The Chinese and Soviet parties are each apparently operating on the assumption that the conflict will be protracted and inconclusive. Neither side seems to believe that the other will allow itself to be provoked into some irreparable action that would precipitate a complete break in party relations and possibly even diplomatic ties. At the same time, each party is making strenuous efforts to place itself in the strongest possible position in the event they are forced into open rupture. The Soviet leaders clearly are confident that Peiping's refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty has provided them with a potent weapon in their drive to discredit and isolate the Chinese Communists. The long Soviet Government statement pub- lished on 21 and 22 September claimed that the Chinese have suffered a "serious moral and political defeat" and that their rejection of the treaty "amounts to complete apostasy" from the world Communist line. The whole thrust of the statement was to portray the Chinese leaders as bloodthirsty warmongers who are ready to embark on irrespon- sible adventures. It warned that Peiping's desire to acquire nu- clear weapons causes "serious doubts concerning the foreign policy aims of China's leaders," and charged that they are com- mitted to a "military solution of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism." The Soviet statement replied to recent Chinese charges of So- viet subversive activities in Sinkiang Province by claiming that Chinese "servicemen and ci- vilians" have "systematically vio- lated" the Soviet frontier since 1960. Moscow for the first time took notice of Peiping's declared intention to revise or abrogate "unjust" territorial settlements imposed on China by the "impe- rialists." The statement warned that "artificial creation" of territorial disputes would mean "embarking on a very dangerous path" and strongly implied that Moscow will refuse to recognize Peiping's claims. In the latest polemical exchanges both parties have gone so far as to call into question each other's readiness to fulfill commitments under the Sino-So- viet Treaty of 1950. Peiping re- peatedly has cast doubt on So- viet commitments and has accused the USSR of "flagrant violations" of the treaty. The Soviet state- ment charged Peiping with seeking to justify its desire to acquire nuclear weapons by denouncing Moscow as an "undependable ally." It warned the Chinese against as- suming that they could enjoy So- viet nuclear protection and at the same time continue to at- tack the USSR. To underscore this warning, Moscow quoted the Russian proverb: "Do not foul the well; you may need its waters." The Soviet statement con- cluded with a pro forma appeal for a cessation of polemics, but also with a thinly veiled threat of unspecified retaliatory ac- tions if Peiping persists in at- tacking the USSR. It warned that SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 SECRET `-fhe Communist World the Chinese "must clearly realize that the most resolute rebuff from the Soviet party and people awaits them on this road." Moscow's han- dling of two recent frontier train incidents suggests that any future Soviet reprisals may include a drastic curtailment or complete termination of the Chinese training program.in the USSR. It is possible that the Russians are even contemplating a complete break in economic relations along the lines of Soviet action against Albania in 1961. There are also rumors in Moscow of a Soviet deci- sion to break state relations with Peiping. A Pravda article on 19 Septem- ber, whi'-c=amed the Chinese for the failure to settle the Sino- Indian border dispute, constitutes Moscow's strongest and most exten- sive criticism to date of Peiping's policy on this issue. In an ob- vious attempt to discredit China in Afro-Asian eyes, Pravda deplored Peiping's refusal tto "listen to the voice of reason" as embodied in the Colombo proposals of December 1962 and accused the Chinese of playing into the hands of the imperialists. Peiping has shown its extreme sensitivity to Moscow's damaging charges that the Chinese leaders are "war maniacs"--inadvertently confirmed by a fumbling Chinese at- tempt on 1. September to "explain" Mao's remarks in 1957 concerning the probable outcome of a nuclear con- flict--by attempting to return the polemical warfare to the area in which they have the better weapons. In the second major Chinese article in the projected series replying to the Soviet party pronouncement of 14 July, People's Daily on 13 Sep- tember adopte a dis ainful, patron- izing tone toward Khrushchev and assumed the role of faithful defender of Communist orthodoxy against the heretical Soviet premier. The article, which was designed to exploit the disarray and demoral- ization in foreign parties created by Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin, was addressed primarily to hard-line factions in these parties to whom Peiping looks for support. It tried to show that Khrushchev is unworthy to head the world Communist move- ment and defined the ideal "head- quarters of the proletariat" in terms which fit only the Chinese Communist Party. The article struck directly at Khrushchev's most vulnerable point by emphasizing that he had been "particularly active" in carry- ing out Stalin's suppression of So- viet "counterrevolutionaries" in the 1930s. With surpassing inso- lence, Peiping claimed that even a majority of people in the USSR itself disapproved of Khrushchev's attacks and "cherish" Stalin's memory. While the Chinese strain to gain adherents outside China, there are indications that the Sino-So- viet rift, added to domestic eco- nomic difficulties, is creating morale problems in China. Accord- ing to a report of an official in- quiry into popular attitudes in a county of Kwangtung Province, many people are alarmed by the loss of Soviet support for industrialization and are pessimistic about the fu- ture. The US consul general in Hong Kong comments that this and another recent report show that Peiping's challenge to Moscow-- while appealing to Chinese xeno- phobia--has also generated appre- hension over the regime's motives and possibly deepened doubts about its present course. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET The dominant factor shap- ing Moscow's present foreign policy outlook appears to be its desire to avoid new crisis situations with the West while dealing with the increasingly bitter and damaging struggle with the Chinese Communists for leadership of the Communist move- ment. The serious economic problems facing the Soviet leaders, highlighted by the recent large-scale grain pur- chases in the West, probably have also strengthened their interest in a general improve- ment in Soviet-Western relations. The moderate and "states- manlike" tone of Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech to the UN General Assembly on 19 September was the most recent example of Soviet efforts to encourage a detente atmosphere. He urged all governments to use the favorable situation. created. by the test ban treaty to agree on further measures to ease tension and he carefully re- frained from direct criticisms of US policy in such sensitive areas as Cuba and Southeast Asia. He gave only perfunctory attention to'the German and Ber- lin problems and repeated Khru- shchev's theme that, from the bloc viewpoint, the Berlin Wall has reduced the urgency of a German peace treaty. In keeping with long- standing Soviet "detente tac- tics," Gromyko's speech focused primarily on disarmament. His proposals for a heads-of- government meeting of the 18- nation disarmament committee during the first half of 1964 and for a US-Soviet treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space were intended to demonstrate the USSR's constructive attitude. He also sought to underline Soviet flexibility by offering a further "concession" in Mos- cow's general disarmament plan which would permit the US and the USSR to retain a limited number of missiles and nuclear weapons until the end of the last stage of the disarmament process. The Soviet leaders appear to see litttle early prospect for further agreements com- parable to the test ban in importance. They are under no pressure, and they remain unwilling to make concessions as the price for agreement on major issues such as Berlin and Germany. They probably believe, moreover, that West German and French opposition will preclude agreement on such measures as a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty, a reduc- tion of foreign forces in the two Germanys, and a nuclear-free SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 1"W k%=010 SECRET The Communist World zone in Central Europe. Khru- shchev, however, probably hopes to draw the US and its allies into a protracted period of negotiation on partial disarm- ament and European security matters. He would calculate that such talks would intensify differences among the Western allies and increase the reluc- tance of some NATO members to proceed. further with a multi- lateral NATO nuclear force. While the Russians see no present opportunities for advanc- ing their aims on major European questions, they apparently attach considerable importance to further bilateral agreements with the US as a means of keep- ing alive the momentum and atmosphere created by the test ban treaty. In addition to Soviet interest in agreements banning nuclear weapons in outer space and establishing legal principles for the peace- ful uses of space, Moscow has indicated a desire to conclude a consular convention and a civil air transport agreement. Although the USSR has termed President Kennedy's UN address an "encouraging" and "sober" approach to world problems, it has not yet re- acted publicly to his pro- posal for a joint manned lunar landing project. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 `'~ SECRET The Communist World SHAKE-UP IN CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP The shake-up in the Czechoslo- vak regime on 21 September removed a number of party boss Novotny's Stalinist colleagues from high po- sitions and extended the influence of a new and somewhat more liberal party grouping. However, while yielding to pressures for political liberalization and economic ration- alization, Novotny has placed mem- bers of his own clique in positions where they can watch the new ap- pointees. This effort to ensure his own position will probably suc- ceed temporarily. The changes which Novotny has made are nevertheless unlikely to satisfy his severest critics. They are, moreover, likely to whet ap- petites and to concentrate further criticism directly on Novotny, who is as guilty of "Stalinist" crimes as those officials recently removed. Premier Siroky, two hard-line deputy premiers, and four ministers were dropped. Two new ministers without portfolio--both Slovaks-- were added, and four new central committee commissions--three deal- ing with economic matters, the other with ideology--were created. Josef Lenart, a member of the Czechoslovak party presidium since December 1962, was made premier. With the appointment of Lenart, a 40-year-old Slovak who is un- tainted by Stalinism, Novotny evi- dently hopes to silence his out- spoken Slovak critics. Three other regime officials elevated to new positions of prom- inence--Cestmir Cisar., Vladimir Koucky, and Drahomir Kolder--are reportedly members of a more lib- eral central committee group hos- tile to Novotny. Koucky--an old- time party secretary responsible for relations with foreign Commu- nist parties and probably also for domestic cultural matters--has been appointed to head the central com- mittee's new ideological commission. Party secretary Kolder is to head the party's new commission on gen- eral economic problems. Cisar was appointed minister of education and culture, a move which will hearten those intellectuals, authors, and SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Joromir Dolotsky Zdenek Fierlinger Jiri Hendrych Alexander Dubcek Antonin Kapek ILudmita Ja ovcoval PERSONNEL CHANGES CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY 20 September 1963 PRESIDIUM Members NEW Jaromir Dolansky Zdenek Fierlinger Jiri Hendrych Alexander Dubcek Antonin Novotny Otakar Simunek SECRETARIAT Secreiories Antonin Kopek Michal Saboicik Martin Vaculik Jiri Hendrych (head of new party commission on standard of living) (head of new party commission on agriculture) (head of new party commission on economy) (head of new party commission on ideology) Position President Premier Deputy Premier Ministers without Portfolio CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT CHANGES 20 September 1963 Joromir Do nsk wt YLGXW Frantisek Krojcir Jon Piller NEW Antonin Novotny Jozef Lenart Oldrich Cernik Frantisek Krajcir Jan Piller Ministers Agriculture, Forestry Vratislav Krutina & Water Economy Education & Culture [Frntisek Kahuda I Finance Transport Food Fuel F tfse rartk Vakac, Josef Krasner Antonin Novotny Antonin Novotny Minister-Chairman Jiri Hendrych Jiri Hendrych State Planning Commission State Commission for Antonin Krcek Antonin Krcek Development and Frantisek Zupka Frantisek Zupka Coordination of NOTE: CENTRAL COMMITTEE Dropped: Julius Duris, ex-Minister of Finance Promoted from candidate to full member: Michal Sabolcik Jaranir Dola Cestmir Cisar Richard Dvorak Alois Indra Vratislav Krutina Josef Odvarka NOTE: Incumbents of remaining 13 ministerial posts and I post of minister-chairman of a government commission were retained. Chairman State Planning Commission replacing Alois India Chairman State Comm. for Investment Construction Chairman Slovak National Council replacing Jozef Lenart [DQwngradedj Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 SECRET LENART journalists who have been press- ing for change. He was report- edly responsible for the publi- cation in June of an open attack on Siroky. Cisar's predecessor has been retained as deputy, how- ever, and Cisar was removed from the party secretariat. As KOUCKY a further counterbalance to the influence of these three, ousted Deputy Premier Dolansky was appointed head of the new party commission on living standards. Also influential party presidium member Jiri Hendrych, long a Novotny supporter, is chairman of the new agriculture commis- sion. The success of Novotny's tactics will depend in consider- able measure on the degree of backing he receives from Hendrych, who has long been in line as Novotny's successor, is sprinkled with his opponents. depend on how well and quickly the country's economy--whose success until 1960-61 shored up his political position in the eyes -r Moscow--responds to the new Lcp management, which I lEN DRYCH and who aided the preliminary de-Stalinization moves last January. Novotny's chances also SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM: IRY Page 7 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET ."rPhe Communist World Rumania has apparently been sufficiently encouraged by its suc- cessful defiance of Moscow over certain bloc economic integration policies to follow up with further expressions of independence. Bu- charest now seems to be in a lead- ing position among the East European countries in asserting a right to place its national interests ahead of those of the USSR and other mem- bers of the Council for Mutual Eco- nomic Ass istance (CEMA). This has been reflected in recent weeks in Bucha- rest's noncommittal public stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in its adoption of policies appealing to the nationalistic sentiments of the Rumanian population. Rumania has for many years sought to avoid embroilment in con- troversial bloc affairs, and its present relative silence on the Sino-Soviet polemics is in increas- ingly sharp contrast with the rest of the Soviet bloc. The regime last criticized the Chinese by name on 7 August, and then more in a tone of sorrow than anger. By not opposing the Chinese line in the same terms as Moscow and the rest of Eastern Europe, Bucharest main- tains a constant threat of turning from support of Moscow in the event that the USSR should again attempt to change Bucharest's economic poli- cies. The regime's effort to lessen Soviet influence in the country has direct appeal to nationalistic sentiment. During Rumania's na- tional holiday ceremonies on 23 August, pictures of Khrushchev were not displayed, the usual slogans extolling Rumanian-Soviet friend- ship were missing, and the normal eulogy on the World War II role of the Soviet Army in the liberation of Rumania from the Nazis was practi- cally ignored. More recently the unpopular mandatory Russian-language courses for grades 5 through 11 have been made optional, the Maxim Gorki Institute of Russian Language and Literature at Bucharest University has been abolished, and a Rumanian Language and Literature Department created. Rumania continues to defend its independent economic policies, and to view cooperation with CEMA essentially in terms of serving its own national interests. On 23 August, a Rumanian economic journal criticized an East German article which had said that some bloc states should limit themselves to "passive industrialization"-- a critical allusion to Bucharest's insistence on developing an indus- trial economy. Another article on 30 August sharply defended Rumania's policy of continuing to develop an all-round industrial base. Bucharest's attempts to mani- fest greater independence prob- ably stem in part from fear that the settlement of its differences with CEMA reached at last July's meeting was only temporary. Mind- ful of this, the regime is ob- viously trying to maintain itself in a strong position--both do- mestically and to exploit Moscow's bitter battle with the Chinese --and thus be able to stand up to future pressures from Mos- cow. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 SECRET Peiping's long-term efforts to increase its influence in Burma took a new turn this month, when Burmese ruler Ne Win began preliminary peace talks with Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and other insurgent elements. When Ne Win first proposed negotiations with insurgent groups, the Chinese were quick to "cooperate" with him by arranging for 29 BCP leaders who have been living in China for the past decade to take part. Thus, the Chinese now have well-indoctrinated Burmese protegds bidding for leadership of a Communist party which may soon be legal and may even have a small voice in the government. In the preliminary peace talks with Ne Win, four of the eight members of the BCP dele- gation were returnees from Peiping--an indication that they have regained considerable influence in the indigenous party. Statements made at a press con- ference by the leader of the delegation openly supported Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dis- pute. The recent recall of the Chinese Communist envoy in Rangoon and the consul general in Mandalay suggests that the Chinese are revamping their diplomatic front in hopes of taking advantage of a new era. The new ambassador, Keng Piao, was a vice minister of foreign affairs; both his high-level background and his reputation as an intelligent, aggressive party careerist contrast sharply with those of his less active predecessor. Since 1959 China has pursued a policy of determined friend- ship toward Burma and dropped its bullying hard line against Ne Win, which was counterpro- ductive. In 1960 and 1961 a boundary agreement, cooperation with Burma against Chinese Nationalist irregulars, and an $84-million trade agreement followed the establishment of this policy. Since then, Pei- ping has maintained its friendly and reasonable facade by re- sponding moderately even when Burma stiffened its naturaliza- tion policy, nationalized two Chinese Communist banks, and issued a statement in favor of the Moscow test ban treaty. Therefore, although the Ne Win - BCP talks appear likely to drag on for some time and produce few major government con- cessions, Peiping will probably continue to be most circumspect in dealing with Rangoon. The Chinese have no desire to up- set by overeager action their efforts in one of the few countries in which they may be making progress. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 SECRET Political restiveness per- sists in South Vietnam despite outward appearances of a return to near-normal conditions and of firm control by the Diem government. How- ever, the capabilities of anti- regime' groups are open to ques- tion. The Viet Cong are sustain- ing their high level of activity in the delta area, although the scale of attacks apparently has decreased during the past week. The delta provinces of Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Ba Xuyen SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY have been the primary targets of Viet Cong attacks, partic- ularly self-defense corps out- posts and communication routes. Some elements of the newly arrived infantry division that will be permanently based in the delta have been sent to Vinh Binh. While the current step-up in Viet Cong activity may be designed to exploit the govern- ment's current political diffi- culties, a slow increase has been discernible for four months. Communist forces may sustain a higher rate of activity through- out the approaching dry season than they did last fall. Page 10 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA Indonesia is continuing its military preparations in the Borneo area, while stepping up its confrontation policy against Malaysia in the economic field. On 25 September, Djakarta announced that it has sent elite forces--including commando units --to the Sarawak border area. Defense Minister Nasution stated that these troops are prepared to train and aid northern Borneo rebels. on 25 September that the first serious border incident in Sara- wak's First Divison area in more than a month occurred the previous day when four mortar shells were fired into a Sarawak village. Malaysia, for its part, urgently recalled its chief of staff, Mai Gen. Osman, from a tour of Pakistan, and announced it was sending two more battal- ions to Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) as part of its "preparedness" policy. Osman is to go to Sarawak, where Ma- laysian troops will now number about 2,000. 27 Sept 63 Indonesia's break in trade relations with Malaysia on 21 September has been followed by a number of specific actions aimed at giving some teeth to the economic war. Oil companies operating in Indonesia are forbidden to. ship oil to Malay- sia, and Indonesian tin concen- trates--formerly smelted in Penang, Malaya--will be shipped directly to Europe in the future. On 24 September, the Indonesian Government denied landing rights to all interna- tional airline flights with stops in Malaysia and next day temporarily cut all telegraphic and telephone links with the new nation. Several high-ranking Indo- nesian officials have expressed concern over the effect of the Malaysian trade break on In- donesia's economy, and some efforts have already been made to develop new trade pat- terns. On 23 September an agreement was signed with Com- munist China for the sale of 2,000 long tons of rubber start- ing this month. Two days later, Indonesia and the Philippines signed a memorandum implement- ing trade agreements concluded last May. In a joint communi- qud issued after the signing, the Djakarta government ex- pressed its willingness to shift its traditional trade from Malaysia to the Philippines. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 %W %0 0 MILES 1000 J 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET In view of the great diffi- culties involved in reorientat- ing trade from Singapore and the attendant serious effects on the Indonesian economy,- Sukarno may not be willing or able to hold the line against all economic relations with Malaysia. Meanwhile, both Thailand and Japan have separately of- fered to mediate the Malaysian situation. Australia and New Zealand have publicly given pledges of military assistance to help defend the territorial integrity and political inde- pendence of Malaysia. Prime Minister Ikeda of Japan is using the good-willtour on which he embarked on 23 Sep- tember as a major effort to fur- ther Japan's influence in the Southwest Pacific area. Founda- tions are already laid for the trip to fulfill its original purpose of stimulating expansion of Japanese trade, especially with Australia. On the eve of his trip, Ikeda publicly announced Japan's interest in playing a peace- maker'role in the Malaysia dis- pute. Privately, he told Ambas- sador Reischauer that he planned specifically to propose a West- ern Pacific organization to the leaders of the countries he is visiting: the Philippines, In- donesia, Australia, and New Zealand, where his tour concludes about 4 October. He hopes sub- sequently to announce a prelim- inary meeting in Tokyo for next year of representatives of Japan and those four powers--composing what he has called "the colossal archipelago" of the South Seas. The purpose of the gathering would be to discuss a grouping of these four together with Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and possibly others. The Japanese foreign minister told the US that in his talks with Presidents Maca- pagal of the Philippines and Sukarno of Indonesia, Ikeda planned to emphasize the im- portance of good mutual rela- tions among the peoples of the Malay archipelago. He will reportedly offer Japanese assist- ance generally in settling regional differences. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET .00~ PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC The economic agreements which Pakistan is concluding with several Communist coun- tries seem primarily intended to underline Pakistan's "inde- pendence" of its Western allies rather than to signal a substan- tial shift in its economic rela- tions. Repeated publicity on each step in negotiations with Communist representatives does, however, encourage further de- mands by Pakistani neutralists for disengagement from free world alliances. Last year, when faced with the likelihood that the United Kingdom would join the Common Market, Pakistan began to look for new markets, including bloc countries with which it had traded only sporadically in the past. Although the failure of Britain's bid reduced the need to diversify Pakistani trade, Rawalpindi continued to publi- cize its desire for expanded economic relations with the bloc as part of its reaction to US and UK military assistance to India. In August and September, Pakistan concluded barter trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, and, most recently, Albania, and it has held barter discussions SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY with Communist China and Czecho- slovakia. These agreements call for the export mainly of raw jute, cotton, wool, hides, and skins, in return for cement, other building materials, and petroleum products. There will probably be only a limited expansion in the bloc's 5-percent share of Pakistan's world trade. Although the Com- munist countries are chiefly in- terested in raw jute, Pakistan is not likely to divert large quantities of its best hard- currency earner from Western markets. Cuba has reportedly arranged to purchase 15,000 bales of manufactured jute, in the form of sugar bags, from Pakistan, in addition to 60,000 bales from India. Additional propaganda play will probably be given to the expansion of Pakistan's civil air ties with the Communists. Rawalpindi seems eager to imple- ment its well-publicized civil air agreement with Communist China, but the many practical arrangements which must be made seem likely to cause repeated postponements. The USSR has also sent a civil air negotiation Page 13 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 %me SECRET Iran: The carefully man- aged 17 September elections to the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) carried the government one step further in the Shah's aim of remaking Iranian society, but hostile elements are prepared to continue their opposition. Although the government's han- dling of the elections may have been somewhat less restrictive than on previous occasions, its devices to prevent the election of any opposition candidate will leave it open to continuing criticism. One of the first steps the Majlis will be asked to approve is the creation of a new minis- try that would bring vast reli- gious properties under govern- ment control and thus end the economic independence of the Conservative religious leaders (mullahs) and lessen their polit- ical power. Both the mullahs and the radical Freedom Move- ment may turn their frustrations into extremist action. The new Majlis draws heav- ily on professional people in keeping with the government's attempt to switch the base of its support from the landlord and merchant groups. While the new deputies will follow the Shah's lead for the present, independent leadership trouble- some to the Shah could emerge in the Majlis over the longer run. In any event, the US Em- bassy in Tehran believes that the re-establishment of the Majlis after a two-year lapse should have a healthy effect on business confidence both in- side and outside the country. Yemen: There is mounting evidence that a drastic change in the leadership of the re- publican regime in Yemen may be imminent. A recent confer- ence attended by tribal, reli- gious, and other Yemeni leaders called for a new council of ministers, led by a strong prime minister. President Sallal apparently would be retained, but only as a figurehead chief of state. The conference also re- solved to create a tribal army and to seek the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from noncombat areas. The delegates did not express opposition to the re- public itself or profess any devotion to the old religious imamate which the royalists wish to restore. the Egyptians also may believe that the present regime is un- workable, and they may be pre- paring to help reconstruct it on a broader basis. Egyptian Field Marshal Amer and another of Nasir's top aides, Anwar Sadat, were sent to Yemen on 25 September, possibly to take part in such an effort. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET N%Wvf NEW FRENCH EFFORTS TOWARD ANTI-GAULLIST ALLIANCES Reports that De Gaulle plans to seek re-election be- fore his present term expires in 1965, and recent opinion polls showing a decline in his popularity, have led to new ef- forts by anti-Gaullists to form alliances against him. The chief beneficiary of these ma- neuvers is likely to be the Com- munist Party (PCF). The latest authoritative poll shows the percentage of Frenchmen satisfied with De Gaulle's performance as presi- dent down from 50 in June to 44 in late August, and the number of undecided respondents up from 13 to 22 percent. The greatest decline in De Gaulle's popular- ity occurred among farmers. On 15 Spetember, the oppo- sition held the first of a se- ries of "banquets of a thousand" designed to promote the unity of all anti-Gaullists behind a single presidential candidate. The banquet was attended by lo- cal office-holders representing parties ranging from the PCF to parties on the right. The non- Communist left furnished most of the big-name speakers. Nota- ble for its presence was a dele- gation of the Socialist party (SFIO), which last spring refused to participate in a "study group" aimed at achieving much the same goal but which included more center and rightist figures. The success of the "ban- quets," as with any endeavor to formulate joint opposition to De Gaulle, depends on a solu- tion of the perennial problem of relations between the PCF and the non-Communist left-- particularly the SFIO. There has been no letup in the PCF's campaign to publicize the simi- larity of its own and SFIO op- position and to encourage joint activities. SFIO leader Guy Mollet, meanwhile, has continued to swing his party toward the left. The SFIO congress last May sought to distinguish between a politi- cal accord with the PCF and a "defensive tactic against a de- clared peril." Mollet further obscured this distinction when he spoke hopefully of "worker unity" in France during a 16 September radio interview. In early November Mollet will lead an SFIO delegation to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Communist Party. Rightly or not, the visit will be inter- preted by many French voters as evidence that the PCF and SFIO are drawing closer together. Despite hints dropped dur- ing his current provincial tour that he will run again, De Gaulle continues to keep his own coun- sel as to his ultimate inten- tions. Recent reports that he will seek re-election next spring may have been floated by leaders of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (UNR) in an attempt to bring into the open political alliances which will appear to the electorate to be Communist- dominated. Such a strategy would be consistent with continuing UNR efforts to create the impres- the Communists. sion of a black-and-white elec- toral choice between itself and SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 15 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 V411111,11 mw~ NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT LIBERALS 14 LABOR PARTY 74 CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY CENTER PARTY (AGRARIAN 16 150 SEATS CONSERVATIVES 29 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 The reconstitution of a minority Labor cabinet on 25 September restores the Norwegian Government to essentially the same situation prevailing before Labor was toppled by a coalition of the nonsocialist parties late last month. The new govern- ment will again be headed by the veteran Labor Party chairman, Einar Gerhardsen, who has held the post of prime minister for most of the postwar period. The foreign affairs and defense ministries will also be beaded by the previous Labor incumbents, Halyard Lange and Gudmund Harlem. The principal cabinet changes have been made in those posts responsible for administer- ing domestic economic matters. The new ministers in these posts seem to be identified with Labor's left wing and may reflect the more aggressively socialist pro- gram Gerhardsen has said he in- tends to pursue. In addition to expanding the already exten- sive social welfare programs, Gerhardsen has proposed that the government increase the number of publicly owned in- dustries and utilities. He also favors tightening govern- ment control over banks and other credit institutions. The victory Labor won in the local elections of 23 Sep- tember is already being inter- preted by party leaders as a mandate from the electorate to implement these proposals. The opposition parties, however, charge that the leftward turn in Labor's domestic economic program represents the price Labor paid to secure the sup- port of the extreme leftist splinter Socialist People's Party (SPP) in bringing down Conservative Prime Minister Lyng's short-lived government. An immediate problem con- fronting Gerhardsen is the need to restore some measure of co- operation with the four parties of the outgoing' government. These parties deeply resent Labor's actions in toppling Norway's first nonsocialist government in 28 years without giving it a reasonable period to demonstrate its ability to govern. Consequently, Labor will face a bitter fight in parliament over its domestic economic program. On basic foreign policy and defense questions, however, there is a wide area of agreement among all the non-Communist parties, and these matters will not be affected by the tug of war between Labor and its opposition. Both Labor and the non- socialist parties are expected to support a constitutional amendment that would permit the dissolution of parliament and the calling of new elections before their regularly scheduled date in 1965. Neither group is satisfied with the present parliamentary line-up, in which each of the two major blocs controls 74 seats, leaving the balance of power in the hands of the two SPP deputies. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET Western Hemisphere OVERTHROW OF DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BOSCH The chief instigator of the 25 September coup d'etat that over- threw Dominican President Juan Bosch was army Colonel Elias Wes- sin y Wessin. He was successful largely because of the support he got from air force commander Gen- eral Atila Luna. Wessin previously has been described by US military officials as a tough and virulent anti-Com- munist, backed by a group of the more reactionary young officers. Bosch's demand early on the morn- ing of the 25th that Wessin be re- moved for antigovernment plotting reportedly led to the coup. The degree of civilian partic- ipation is unclear. However, would- be strong men Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiama--only survivors of ex- dictator Rafael Trujillo's assas- sins-signed the initial military communique. Also, police chief Belisario Peguero, an Imbert crony, apparently collaborated with the plotters. The military forces, meanwhile, are continuing their efforts to form a provisional government com- posed of civilians. They are con- ferring amid rumors that Bosch's followers will attempt to organize a general strike or other protest action. Representatives or right- ist political parties reportedly were still meeting at the National Palace in Santo Domingo 24 hours after the coup and had. not reached agreement on who should be included in the new government. The end of Bosch's seven-month- old government--the first freely elected democratic regime in the country in over 30 years--does not augur well for Dominican political stability. There is bound to be haggling and cliquishness among the new rulers, particularly on the part of opportunistic politi- cians who are cooperating with the military and were involved in pre- coup plotting. None of them com- mands any sizable popular support, and the extreme rightist policies adopted. by the armed forces will not find favor among most Domini- cans. The police have cracked down on Castro-Communist parties--which were outlawed by the military im- mediately upon ousting Bosch. The arrest of numerous extreme leftist leaders may deter significant anti- military action by their followers for the time being. However, the new regime's repression of the left has also removed the only moderate leftist parties from the political scene. This may eventually redound in favor of extreme leftists. Except in Haiti, foreign reac- tion to the Dominican coup has been overwhelmingly unfavorable. A Radio Moscow commentator intimated that US military elements had been encouraging such action since mid- summer. The broadcast concluded that the Dominican military "with the blessing of their American bosses" were attempting to force on the Dominican people a new dic- tatorship and to "resurrect the the gloomy years of the Trujillo rule." Latin American reaction has been especially sharp. Venezuela and. Costa Rica have suspended dip- lomatic relations, and several other countries will follow suit. Venezuelan President Betancourt, a close friend of Bosch, was visi- bly shaken by the potential SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 17 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 %ftof %0 HAITI Railroad ----- Road 0 20 40 60 ~aint Marc PORT AIJN lacmel?,fi A T L A N I T I C O C E A N Port de Paix h' U R D I" F TM :~ / ?.,J#i tien .'Yv we..:.. Petion- Petit Goa'v ville C Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SECRET repercussions of the Dominican events on his own relationship with the Venezuelan military, who long have been displeased with Betancourt's failure to take strong action in the face of widespread Communist and pro-Communist terrorism. In New York, Latin American delegates to the UN General Assem- bly appear upset by the Dominican coup. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Falcon Briceno, on instructions from Betancourt, met with Secretary Rusk to discuss the convening of a meeting of OAS foreign ministers. This is in line with Falcon's and Betancourt's belief that it is high time for a hemispheric discussion of the threat posed by military coups. Western Hemisphere The Costa Rican, Salvadoran, and Honduran UN delegates have also voiced their deep concern over Do- minican developments. The Cuban representation in New York, however, is said to be "jubilant" about Bosch's fall. US Charge Curtis in Port-au- Prince reports that Haitian Foreign Minister Chalmers, probably speaking without instructions from President Duvalier, intimated that the military take-over in the Dominican Republic might facilitate a solution of Haiti's problems with that country on a bi- lateral basis without further OAS in- volvement. He said nothing,however, about Haiti's reported intention to seek UN action on its charges of Do- minican complicity in recent exile The threat posed to the Du- valier regime in Haiti by General Cantave's exile forces seems vir- tually eliminated following their decisive defeat on 23 September. A few rebels may remain in the Ounaminthe area An northeastern Haiti, scene of the recent raid, but they do not constitute any threat to the government. While it is too early to as- sess how badly the exiles have been shaken by their latest setback, it is unlikely that they will try any more raids in the near future. Their prospects over the longer run appear to be little better unless they can somehow pull together a larger, better trained, and disciplined force. According to the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince, the immediate result of the rebel defeat is that Duvalier now is in a stronger position than at any time in recent months. Since April, the dictator has broken 27 Sept 63 up an extensive military plot, re- pelled three raids by exiles, and survived a period of severe eco- nomic and fiscal hardship. Obliv- ious to foreign censure, he has relentlessly pressed his ruthless campaign to suppress all internal opposition to his rule. And he now has the satisfaction of the overthrow of Juan Bosch, his arch- enemy in the neighboring Dominican Republic. With all these developments adding to Duvalier's confidence, there probably is worse to come. During a political rally last week, Duvalier pointedly remarked that his revolution has already devoured some of its undisciplined children and would continue to do so. De- termined to consolidate his power further, he may well begin an- other purge of elements in his regime he considers unreliable. Significantly, the Legislative Assembly recently declared Haiti a one-party state SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 18 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 SEGII I T Brazil's extreme left, hop- ing to exploit continued unset- tled conditions, is increasing pressure on President Goulart and Congress for actions favor- able to it. On 23 September the Communist-dominated General Workers Command (CGT) and its allies issued a "manifesto" demanding the immediate adoption of a sweeping reform program by the government which would require drastic constitutional changes. These groups have been threat- ening for some time to instigate a general strike if their demands are not met. To lend emphasis to the threat, the CGT called a bank workers'strike on 24 Sep- tember. An immediate goal of the extreme left appears to be the removal of General Peri Bevilacqua from command of the Second Army in Sao Paulo. Bevilacqua has publicly proclaimed his opposition to politically motivated strikes, and has gone so far as to publicly denounce the CGT and other leftist labor groups as "enemies of democ- racy and traitors." The US army attache reports information from War Ministry sources that Bevilacqua will in- deed be removed soon. If this does occur, it could precipitate a strong reaction by conservative elements. Outwardly, Goulart has main- tained an equivocal position. However, he may actually be co- operating with the leftists and even encouraging them to press their case. The key figure at the moment seems to be Minister of War Jair Ribeiro, who appears to be torn between conflicting pressures. On the one hand he has sworn to up- hold the constitutional government and remain out of politics, while on the other he is being pushed by the military to seize the ini- tiative and crack down on the leftists. Ribeiro has a reputation as a man without deep personal con- victions who, while not pro-Com- munist, finds it expedient to cooperate with leftists. He did, however, act firmly to put down the leftist sergeants' outbreak in Brasilia in early September and endorsed the use of troops against strikers in Santos. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 19 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 iftw SECRET THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SITUATION Although Chile's presi- dential election is still a year away, intense maneuvering is already under way. The political scene is still highly fluid, however, and likely to become more so. There are three major can- didates in the field: Radical Senator Julio Duran, representing the government-oriented Demo- cratic Front, Senator Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democrats, and Socialist Senator Salvador Allende, who heads the ticket of the Communist-supported Popular Action Front. It is presently impossible to gauge their re- spective strengths accurately because of numerous current re- ports and rumors of shifting loyalties. The picture is also clouded by the candidacy of a fourth individual, independent Jorge Prat, and by uncertainty as to the intentions of incum- bent President Jorge Alessandri, for whom a re-election movement is under way. Alessandri has denied am- bitions for a second term, and Duran came away from a recent interview with him convinced that he would not run again. However, persistent pressure from his supporters might weaken Alessandri's resolve. The Presi- dent, however, has done little on Duran's behalf, but has in- stead praised Prat, and this has led to speculation that Alessan- dri hopes that Prat will under- mine Duran's candidacy. In this case the President would appear as the only rightist capable of winning the elections. For Alessandri to succeed himself, the constitution would have to be amended. A simple majority of the congress may do this,. but the process is cum- bersome and would require a minimum of four months. Should congress reject an amendment, Alessandri could submit the issue to a national plebiscite. Meanwhile, the recent cabi- net crisis, brought on by dis- agreement over settlement of a labor dispute, nay affect the presidential race. As matters stand, the coalition of Liberals, Conservatives, and Radicals (who make up the Democratic Front) has been broken at the ministerial level. The Radicals have withdrawn from the govern- ment and adopted an independent position. The Conservatives also left the cabinet, but will con- tinue to support the adminis- tration. As a consequence, Alessandri on 25 September appointed a com- pletely new government. This government, nonpolitical in character, is composed of vet- eran technicians and will be only loosely associated with the Democratic Front. SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Arson at US-owne-&'Niafr'o-C`,o1 Mayer office. 16 Sept Near Coro Guerrillas raid three villages, stealing arms and killing guard. Caracas Police clash with terrorists: one policeman killed. Recent Terrorism in Venezuela Attg'( 6s1-- -rnc7c set gflre (damage $igitbom6 pmage to Creole '0petlrie'(sikfh'attack in seven months on this US-owned installation). Headquarters of Accion Democratica party destroyed by bombing. US-owned DuPont warehouse destroyed; loss estimated at $270,000. Adams Shirt Store set afire in mistaken belief US-owned. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 SECRET Western Hemisphere Venezuelan terrorists have kept up for the third week their intensified campaign to undermine the government of President Betancourt. During the period 15-20 September, there were eleven major incidents of arson, bomb- ing, and murder in six widely separated cities. Four of the targets were US-owned enter- prises. At least one other concern was attacked in the mistaken belief it was American. This record is almost certainly incomplete. The terrorists probably carried out a number of less spectac- ular raids which went unre- ported either because they escaped the notice of the press or because the government has suppressed their disclosure. Antiterrorist activity continues to be hampered by the government's desire to avoid lending substance to the FALN's charge that it is dictatorial. Thus far, Betan- court has relied primarily on the police rather than the armed forces, with indifferent results. Also, the recent unification of the security forces under the command of the chief of armed forces intelligence still has not been wholly implemented. measures. The intensification of terrorist attacks, however, and the increasing restive- ness in the officer corps of the armed forces may yet force Betancourt to take stricter SECRET 27 Sept 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 21 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3 INEG'RET SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200040001-3