BRITAIN''S MALAYSIA POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200080003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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The British Government considers itself obliged
to protect Malaysia against Indonesia's expansionist
"confrontation" policy, partly because of the UK's
commitments under the Anglo-Malaysian defense agree-
ment and partly because it feels itself morally bound
to help Malaysia get off to a good start. With siz-
able forces in the area, London is prepared to use
them, if necessary, to prevent Sukarno from achieving
his stated objectives of "crushing Malaysia" and elim-
inating Western bases there. Britain's long-term policy,
however, nas been to reduce military expenditures in
Southeast Asia, and a long campaign against a deter-
mined Indonesian effort to destroy Malaysia might put
an unacceptable strain on its already thinly spread
military capabilities. Thus London, aware of the
broader Western and US interests in the area, will be
inclined to explore every avenue for a peaceful settle-
ment before resorting to force.
Britain's formal commitment
to the defense of Malaysia stems
from the Anglo-Malayan defense
agreement of October 1957, ne-
gotiated at the time the Federa-
tion of Malaya became an inde-
pendent country within the Com-
monwealth. During the Malayan-
British discussions on the crea-
tion of Malaysia, a declaration
of intentions of November 1961
extended the British commitment
to all of Malaysia and provided
for continued British use of the
base at Singapore. Australia
and New Zealand associated them-
selves with both agreements in-
sofar as the terms concerned
them.
The 1957 agreement provided
for British assistance in Malayan
external defense, British train-
ing of the Federation defense
forces, and the stationing in
Malaya of the forces needed to
fulfill Britain's Commonwealth
and international obligations.
The two parties agreed to co-
operate in the event of an
armed attack on Malaya or on
British Far East forces or
territories, and to consult in
the event of a threat to peace
in the Far East. In the event
of a threat to peace elsewhere,
the UK could withdraw its forces
from Malaya but could not use
Malayan bases operationally
without Malayan agreement.
With respect to Singapore,
the 1961 declaration stated
that the UK would keep its
base for the defense of Malaysia
and of Commonwealth territories
and "for the preservation of the
peace of Southeast Asia," thus
giving Britain freer use of
Singapore for operations in
non-Commonwealth regions of
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the area than it enjoys with
respect to its Malayan bases.
Because of widespread ~antip-
athy, among Malayans to any in-
volvement with SEATO, Prime Min-
ister Rahman in April 1961 pub-
licly forbade any deployment of
British or Commonwealth forces
stationed in Malaya in support
of SEATO military operations.
Privately, Rahman assured Lon-
don in an informal "gentlemen's
agreement" that his public ban
on SEATO use of the bases
would not interfere with Com-
monwealth military action,
whether SEATO-connected or not,
and asserted that as long as
he remained prime minister,
Malaysia would create no dif-
ficulties for the UK military
command.
At the time of the Brunei
revolt in December 1962, when
the British deployed troops
from Singapore and sent 14
warships to assist in crushing
the rebels, Rahman invoked
Article 6 of the defense agree-
ment which provided for UK-
Federation consultation on
joint or separate measures
under emergency circumstances.
Although the Brunei alert of
part of the UK strategic re-
serve in England was relaxed
last February, the British kept
their forces in North Borneo
and recently augmented them
because of increasing Indone-
sian infiltration and guerrilla
activity in opposition to the
creation of Malaysia.
Forces And Capabilities
The British maintain in
the Malaysia area their most
powerful military force outside
of Europe. There are about
13,500 ground troops in Singa-
pore--of which an estimated
8,000 British and Gurkhas now
are on security duty in Sabah..
(formerly North Borneo) and
Sarawak--and in Malaya there is
the 2,800-man Commonwealth
Brigade, consisting of one
British, one New Zealand, and
two Australian battalions. The
6,000-man Commonwealth Far East
Air Force in Malaya is primarily
British, including 58 jet fighters,
28 bombers, 56 transports, and
15 helicopters. Principal Com-
monwealth naval units based at
Singapore are an aircraft car-
rier, an amphibious assault
ship, a light cruiser, about 9
destroyer types, and 4 opera-
tional submarines. In addition,
there are approximately 7,000
British and Gurkha troops in
Hong Kong.
Although these forces in
place in the area are sizable
and could, to a limited extent,
be augmented by the Strategic
Reserve in England in an emer-
gency, Britain probably would
be hard put to counter a long-
drawn-out guerrilla campaign
such as the Indonesians ap-
parently plan to continue in
the Borneo territories. More-
over, any actual conflict would
curtail London's capabilities
to respond to other demands
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where it has commitments, such
as the Persian Gulf or Western
Europe, and Britain's strength
overseas, already thinly spread.,
may soon feel the effects of
the serious decrease in army
recruiting.
Before the current Malaysia
situation became acute--during
a 1962 British military attachds'
conference in Singapore--the
Deputy Commissioner General
for Southeast Asia admitted
that the British were playing
nothing but a supporting role
for the US Army in that area.
When the unified command for
British military forces in the
Far East was established a year
ago, one of its first tasks
was to expedite detailed plan-
ning of British and Common-
wealth participation--under US
operational command--in any
future ho-sTJ es engaged in
by SEATO.
The UK must consider sev-
eral uncertainties regarding
its future military stance in
the area--whether Malaysia's
joining with the Philippines
and Indonesia in "Maphilindo"
affects the UK--Malayan Defense
agreement, whether
Rahman will live up to the
supplementary "gentlemen's
agreement," and what will hap-
pen when he goes. The Tunku's
statement last August that the
defense agreement with UK was
not permanent and could be re-
voked by either art obviously
disturbed London
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Australia and New Zealand
are committed to defend Malay-
sia against both overt military
attack and Indonesian-inspired
subversion. While their com-
mitment is clear-cut and is in
accord with prevailing public
sentiment, both countries will
probably confine their mili-
tary operations, for the next
few months at least, to Malaya
and Singapore as they have in
the past. Should the situation
worsen, however, both will be
prepared to play a more exten-
sive role. In Australia par-
ticularly there is a strong
feeling that if Sukarno is not
stopped in his anti-Malaysian
campaign, he will subsequently
move against Australian New
Guinea and eventually attempt
to extend Indonesian domina-
tion to the other island areas
.lying between Australia and
Japan.
There is no question of
the depth of Britain's feelings
regarding Sukarno, nor is Lon-
don operating under any illu-
sions regarding the serious-
ness of the Indonesian-Malay-
sian confrontation. A Common-
wealth Relations Office offi-
ciaL has quoted Lord Home as
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describing Sukarno as "worse
than a Communist because the
Russians represent one kind of
Communism, the Chinese another,
but Sukarno is both and is a
fascist to boot."
London in general regards
Sukarno as its Castro and is
convinced that Djakarta is out
to destroy Malaysia--if not this
year, then next--and to elimi-
nate the Singapore bases. The
British Government thinks that
further concessions are worse
than useless as they would en-
courage rather than deter Sukarno
and also create serious domestic
political difficulties in Ma-
laysia, which is a major con-
sideration in British thinking.
London has apparently also
relied to some extent on the
hope that Djakarta would not
break relations or push too
hard, and that the US would
be able to restrain Sukarno.
If these hopes are disappointed,
Britain has said it would en-
courage the Malaysian Govern-
ment to turn, initially at
least, to the UN and ask for
a peace-keeping force on the
border.
Recently there has been
evidence of a stiffening at-
titude. It is likely that the
Indonesian abuse of the ambas-
sador and the embassy in Dja-
karta, and the consequent deeper
involvement of British prestige,
contributed to this change.
A Stiffening Policy
Despite its claim of harbor-
ing no illusions about the sit-
uation, London has been chary of
specifying just how and in what
circumstances it would "act
forcefully" to counter continued
Indonesian obstructionism and
subversion of Malaysia. More-
over, its policy has tended to
appear essentially negative since
it views the problem as a long-
term one with no prospect of
any early solution. Returning
home after the formation of Ma-
laysia, Commonwealth Relations
Secretary Sandys on 21 Septem-
ber simply parried a question
about the possibility of Brit-
ain's increasing its commit-
ments because of the difficulties
in the area.
British ships and planes
have been instructed to refrain
from entering what Indonesians
regard as their territorial
waters--they claim a 12-mile
limit--but if British lives or
property are endangered, or
if Malaysian shipping is mo-
lested, protection will be
afforded to the point of direct
engagement with Indonesian
naval vessels. The British,
moreover, are determined to
take military and other counter-
measures against the increased
infiltration and subversive
action expected to be taken by
the Indonesians in Sabah and
Sarawak, but at present they
see no evidence of this in-
creased Indonesian activity
leading to more serious hos-
tilities.
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There continues to be Brit-
ish reservations regarding US
support of Thai efforts to bring:
about a tripartite foreign min-
isters'meeting or even a summit
meeting to lesson tension in
the area. The British doubt
the value of either approach
at this time, as they are fear-
ful that Rahman would be out-
maneuvered by the other two
participants--as he was at the
Maphilindo conference.
London, however, must be
painfully aware of the costs of
fulfilling its commitments in
the area should Sukarno remain
opposed. One of the main objec-
tives of the Malaysia plan was
to reduce military expenditures
throughout Southeast Asia in
accordance with a Macmillan
directive to the Foreign Office
in 1961. This may explain the
apparently ungenerous response
to Malaya's request for aid in
expanding its defense forces
for its Malaysia requirements.
The UK now is giving Ma-
laysia total aid approximating
$84 million during the three
years 1963-65; of this,$50.4
million is the estimated value
of buildings and equipment
turned over and military train-
ing assistance. No cost figure
is available for the promise to
raise, train, and maintain
until the end of 1965 two Ma--
laysian battalions to be formed
in Borneo. The UK contribution
to the defense program will be
reviewed in 1965.
In 1962 the British were
spending $420 million per year
to maintain their military
forces in the Far East--$140
million on the services, and
$280 million on back-up machin-
ery in the UK.
The Critical Gap
It is evident, therefore,
that London has been wrestling
with a critical gap--between
its commitments in the Malay-
sian areas and its capabilities.
Britain has fought hard for
what it considered good reasons
to establish Malaysia, and it
feels morally committed to see
the project through. It feels a
sense of responsibility for the
Borneans, whom
it wishes not to abandon in an
area of intrigue and subversion.
There are substantial economic
investments in Malaysia and a
number of the high-ranking Ma-
layan civil and military serv-
ice officials are from Britain
or the Commonwealth. Finally,
London has always considered
the Singapore base vital to
Britain's strategic position in
Southeast Asia, the South Pa-
cific, and the Far East; and it
has repeatedly affirmed its in-
tention to stay there.
Given the conflicting con-
siderations involved, it must
be recognized that any firm
conclusions regarding Britain's
ultimate intentions in the Ma-
laysian dispute would of necessity
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beery speculative,
pronouncements on Malaysia and
Far East problems.
In formulating a
course of action London must
also consider such factors as
prestige, its international com-
mitments elsewhere, and its long-
range strategic aims. An addi-
tional fact which should not be
overlooked is that ultimate
decisions may fall to a Labor
government, and Labor Party
Finally, and perhaps de-
cisively, whatever London might
like to do in the confrontation
with Sukarno, it is fully aware
that any workable policy would
have to have the acquiescence if
not the active support of Wash-
ington. Britain thinks that US
and UK policies can be mutually
supporting while recognizing
they cannot be identical. It
is hard to imagine, therefore,
any British cabinet now embark-
ing on a Suez-type venture in
an area so remote from British
centers of power.
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