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December 21, 2016
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June 24, 2008
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December 13, 1963
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13 December 1963 OCI No. 0310/63C Copy N6. PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OSD has no objection to declassification and release. OSD review(s) completed. 25X1 SECRET GROUP I Excluded from automatic dawngradingand declassification Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 *WO NEO SECRET The annual NATO ministerial meeting to be held in Paris from 16 to 18 December will be concerned chiefly with questions of the use and control of NATO's nuclear arsenal. The NATO Force Planning exercise approved by the ministers a year ago has brought to the surface deep differences of view over NATO's strategy, centered on the extent to which the alliance should rely on its nuclear de- terrent force. This basic question is not likely to be resolved soon, however, and the US proposal for sharing nuclear control in a multilateral force (MLF) is still in the exploratory phase. The min- isters meeting in Paris will again review East- West relations, with special attention focusing on the problem of a common credit policy toward the bloc. Reorganization of NATO's military structure and a prospective replacement for Secretary General Stikker will also be considered. Divergent Views on Strategy Every effort is being made to prevent the eruption of a pub- lic dispute over NATO strategy at the meeting, but the question of strategy will, nonetheless, be raised when Stikker reports on the progress of the NATO Force Planning exercise. This exercise is essentially a basic review of the interrelated ques- tions of strategy, force require- ments, and the resources avail- able to meet them. Proposed by the US, this review is intended to bridge, if possible, the "gap" between the minimum requirements set by the military authorities, and the defense efforts which the member governments find it politically feasible to make. The exercise, as initially envisaged, was to have been conducted in two stages. The first stage would determine what forces NATO countries actually plan to maintain in the next three to five years, and what force posture the NATO commanders would recommend for the period 1966-1970. Alternative force levels, based on several stra- tegic concepts, would be con- sidered. With such data in hand, the second phase would proceed with the formulation of a NATO force plan for 1966- 70, including proposals on the forces each country should contribute. Present NATO strategic mili- tary doctrine calls not only for nuclear responses to nuclear attack, but also for early use of nuclear weapons should Western forces be unable to cope with a large-scale Soviet conventional attack. The NATO military pos- ture tends to reflect this doc- trine. The US, however, has proposed increasing the Alliance's SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 SECRET conventional capability in or- der to place less reliance on the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances other than general war and to achieve greater flexi- bility in dealing with situa- tions like Berlin. The major European coun- tries, particularly France and West Germany, hold that the more loosely knit Western forces are incapable of defeating the forces the Soviets command in central Europe without using nuclear weapons. The French, in partic- ular, argue that there is there- fore no justification for a further costly build-up of con- ventional forces and that heavy emphasis on increasing conven- tional strength tends to detract from the deterrent value of the West's nuclear strength. While Bonn is better dis- posed toward the build-up of conventional forces, it too deems it necessary to rely mainly on nuclear deterrence. Status of NATO Forces The uncertainty among the European countries over what is required to assure their security is reflected in their defense efforts. The European forces-- particularly in the central front--chronically fall far short of NATO targets. In con- sequence, NATO's over-all forces are inadequate to support the "forward defense" desired by the military authorities. The French defense budget is being channeled increasingly into the national nuclear deterrent, an increased UK defense effort is unlikely, and contributions of the smaller countries to the central front will probably remain small. On the northern flank neither Norway nor Denmark is prepared to increase defense spending, while on the southern flank the defense efforts of Turkey and Greece are directly related to the amount of external aid they receive. French Obstructionism The main objective of the NATO Force Planning (NFP) exer- cise is to provide a basis for correcting these shortfalls, but that it will do so is doubt- ful. For several months after last May's meeting in Ottawa of NATO foreign and defense min- isters the French blocked the opening of the NFP exercise, objecting in the first instance to the independence of the pro- posed evaluating body, and, in the second, to any steps to de- termine force posture until a common strategy had been agreed SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 V `we SECRET upon. While the French objec- tions on the first score were eventually overcome, the exer- cise now has been brought vir- tually to a halt by French re- fusal to permit force planning directives to be issued until NATO agrees on a single strategic concept. There have been numerous indications in recent weeks that the French may intend, sooner or later, to provoke a "showdown" debate on strategy. Prospects are, however, that this debate will occur at a regular weekly meeting of the North Atlantic Council, rather than in the annual December meeting which is so closely fol- lowed by the press. Control of NATO's Nuclear Power The unresolved question of the manner in which NATO should use its nuclear deterrent is entangled with the equally knotty problem of how the deter- rent should be controlled in the future. At the Ottawa meeting, the ministers approved a number of specific steps designed to give the Europeans a sense of greater participation in the control of nuclear weapons and in the plan- ning of their use. Under these new arrangements, the European NATO countries will obtain fuller information regarding nuclear defense. This will be accom- plished, in part, by allowing officers to participate more fully in the nuclear activities of the Allied Command Europe as well as in the coordination of targeting at the Strategic Air Command at Omaha. In addition, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) is to have a deputy for nuclear affairs, and Britain's V-Bomber force and three US Polaris submarines have been assigned to SACEUR. These measures appear to have exhausted the immediate possibilities for increasing "nuclear sharing," and the future possibilities hinge on whether or not the MLF or some alternative project becomes a reality. Within the past few days the Netherlands became the eighth NATO country to join the discussions on the formation of an MLF. A mixed-manning dem- onstration designed to prove the MLF's feasibility has been re- cently approved in principle by the group, but concurrence of the individual countries to participate is still needed. Belgium has already opted out of the demonstration, which will take up to two years to complete. The-progress which the MLF studies is making offers little assurance, however, that the MLF will in fact provide the final answer to the nuclear control problem. Of those participating in the studies, only West Ger- many remains firmly committed; the others are all present on an expressly "no commitment" basis. NATO Organizational Problems NATO is beginning to con- sider a replacement for Secre- tary General Dirk U. Stikker, SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 SECRET who has said he will resign in the spring because of failing health. It has become customary to have a secretary general from one of the smaller European mem- bers, and since the position has already been occupied by a Bel- gian and by a Dutchman, the present search will probably focus on Italy or one of the Scandinavian countries. Brit- ain, however, has also indicated an interest in the post, but selection of a British national would risk stimulating French charges of Anglo-Saxon domina- tion of the Alliance. There is also concern over the liaison between the North Atlantic Council, which consists of political representatives and is based at Paris, and the Stand- ing Group and Military Committee, which are located in Washington and are often accused of conduct- ing their activities in a vacuum. The ministerial meeting is there- fore likely to consider moving both to Paris. West Germany's increasingly large contribution of land forces has raised the question of Ger- man representation on the Stand- ing Group, now composed of the U S . e Several aspects of the West- ern Alliance's relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc will be discussed at the ministerial meeting. NATO committees have been considering the implica- tions of the Soviet-proposed nonaggression pact. There is a clear consensus that a nonag- gression pact is unacceptable as an isolated measure and could only be approved as a part of a broader European security settlement including the prob- lem of Berlin. The Soviet suggestion for the establishment of observa- tion posts is also being con- sidered. On this, the general consensus is that the Soviet position linking the observation post arrangement with the denu- clearization of central Europe and a thinning out of the troops there is unacceptable. A large majority also believe that any system of observation posts should include US and Soviet territory as well. The question of developing a common NATO credit policy toward the bloc will be raised by a report from NATO's committee of economic advisers. Five of the six EEC countries and the US favor a common credit policy and want to discuss the item, while the UK strongly opposes such a policy and does not want it raised at this meeting. Efforts to find a compromise have fo- cused in the last few weeks on the suggestion that any NATO country contemplating credits to the bloc longer than five years should notify the Alliance in advance. At the 10 December meeting of the NATO economic ad- visers, however, Britain refused to agree even to this. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300030004-0 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300030004-0