PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300030004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 13, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

13 December 1963
OCI No. 0310/63C
Copy N6.
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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release.
OSD review(s)
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The annual NATO ministerial meeting to be held
in Paris from 16 to 18 December will be concerned
chiefly with questions of the use and control of
NATO's nuclear arsenal. The NATO Force Planning
exercise approved by the ministers a year ago has
brought to the surface deep differences of view
over NATO's strategy, centered on the extent to
which the alliance should rely on its nuclear de-
terrent force. This basic question is not likely
to be resolved soon, however, and the US proposal
for sharing nuclear control in a multilateral force
(MLF) is still in the exploratory phase. The min-
isters meeting in Paris will again review East-
West relations, with special attention focusing on
the problem of a common credit policy toward the
bloc. Reorganization of NATO's military structure
and a prospective replacement for Secretary General
Stikker will also be considered.
Divergent Views on Strategy
Every effort is being made
to prevent the eruption of a pub-
lic dispute over NATO strategy
at the meeting, but the question
of strategy will, nonetheless,
be raised when Stikker reports
on the progress of the NATO
Force Planning exercise. This
exercise is essentially a basic
review of the interrelated ques-
tions of strategy, force require-
ments, and the resources avail-
able to meet them. Proposed by
the US, this review is intended
to bridge, if possible, the "gap"
between the minimum requirements
set by the military authorities,
and the defense efforts which
the member governments find it
politically feasible to make.
The exercise, as initially
envisaged, was to have been
conducted in two stages. The
first stage would determine what
forces NATO countries actually
plan to maintain in the next
three to five years, and what
force posture the NATO commanders
would recommend for the period
1966-1970. Alternative force
levels, based on several stra-
tegic concepts, would be con-
sidered. With such data in
hand, the second phase would
proceed with the formulation
of a NATO force plan for 1966-
70, including proposals on
the forces each country should
contribute.
Present NATO strategic mili-
tary doctrine calls not only
for nuclear responses to nuclear
attack, but also for early use
of nuclear weapons should Western
forces be unable to cope with a
large-scale Soviet conventional
attack. The NATO military pos-
ture tends to reflect this doc-
trine. The US, however, has
proposed increasing the Alliance's
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conventional capability in or-
der to place less reliance on
the use of nuclear weapons in
circumstances other than general
war and to achieve greater flexi-
bility in dealing with situa-
tions like Berlin.
The major European coun-
tries, particularly France and
West Germany, hold that the more
loosely knit Western forces are
incapable of defeating the forces
the Soviets command in central
Europe without using nuclear
weapons. The French, in partic-
ular, argue that there is there-
fore no justification for a
further costly build-up of con-
ventional forces and that heavy
emphasis on increasing conven-
tional strength tends to detract
from the deterrent value of the
West's nuclear strength.
While Bonn is better dis-
posed toward the build-up of
conventional forces, it too deems
it necessary to rely mainly on
nuclear deterrence.
Status of NATO Forces
The uncertainty among the
European countries over what is
required to assure their security
is reflected in their defense
efforts. The European forces--
particularly in the central
front--chronically fall far
short of NATO targets. In con-
sequence, NATO's over-all forces
are inadequate to support the
"forward defense" desired by
the military authorities.
The French
defense budget is being channeled
increasingly into the national
nuclear deterrent, an increased
UK defense effort is unlikely,
and contributions of the smaller
countries to the central front
will probably remain small. On
the northern flank neither
Norway nor Denmark is prepared
to increase defense spending,
while on the southern flank
the defense efforts of Turkey
and Greece are directly related
to the amount of external aid
they receive.
French Obstructionism
The main objective of the
NATO Force Planning (NFP) exer-
cise is to provide a basis for
correcting these shortfalls,
but that it will do so is doubt-
ful. For several months after
last May's meeting in Ottawa of
NATO foreign and defense min-
isters the French blocked the
opening of the NFP exercise,
objecting in the first instance
to the independence of the pro-
posed evaluating body, and, in
the second, to any steps to de-
termine force posture until a
common strategy had been agreed
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upon. While the French objec-
tions on the first score were
eventually overcome, the exer-
cise now has been brought vir-
tually to a halt by French re-
fusal to permit force planning
directives to be issued until
NATO agrees on a single strategic
concept.
There have been numerous
indications in recent weeks
that the French may intend,
sooner or later, to provoke a
"showdown" debate on strategy.
Prospects are, however, that
this debate will occur at a
regular weekly meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, rather
than in the annual December
meeting which is so closely fol-
lowed by the press.
Control of NATO's Nuclear Power
The unresolved question of
the manner in which NATO should
use its nuclear deterrent is
entangled with the equally
knotty problem of how the deter-
rent should be controlled in
the future.
At the Ottawa meeting, the
ministers approved a number of
specific steps designed to give
the Europeans a sense of greater
participation in the control of
nuclear weapons and in the plan-
ning of their use. Under these
new arrangements, the European
NATO countries will obtain fuller
information regarding nuclear
defense. This will be accom-
plished, in part, by allowing
officers to participate more
fully in the nuclear activities
of the Allied Command Europe as
well as in the coordination of
targeting at the Strategic Air
Command at Omaha. In addition,
the Supreme Allied Commander
in Europe (SACEUR) is to have a
deputy for nuclear affairs, and
Britain's V-Bomber force and
three US Polaris submarines
have been assigned to SACEUR.
These measures appear to
have exhausted the immediate
possibilities for increasing
"nuclear sharing," and the
future possibilities hinge on
whether or not the MLF or some
alternative project becomes
a reality. Within the past few
days the Netherlands became the
eighth NATO country to join the
discussions on the formation
of an MLF. A mixed-manning dem-
onstration designed to prove the
MLF's feasibility has been re-
cently approved in principle
by the group, but concurrence
of the individual countries to
participate is still needed.
Belgium has already opted out
of the demonstration, which will
take up to two years to complete.
The-progress which the MLF
studies is making offers little
assurance, however, that the MLF
will in fact provide the final
answer to the nuclear control
problem. Of those participating
in the studies, only West Ger-
many remains firmly committed;
the others are all present on an
expressly "no commitment" basis.
NATO Organizational Problems
NATO is beginning to con-
sider a replacement for Secre-
tary General Dirk U. Stikker,
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who has said he will resign in
the spring because of failing
health. It has become customary
to have a secretary general from
one of the smaller European mem-
bers, and since the position has
already been occupied by a Bel-
gian and by a Dutchman, the
present search will probably
focus on Italy or one of the
Scandinavian countries. Brit-
ain, however, has also indicated
an interest in the post, but
selection of a British national
would risk stimulating French
charges of Anglo-Saxon domina-
tion of the Alliance.
There is also concern over
the liaison between the North
Atlantic Council, which consists
of political representatives and
is based at Paris, and the Stand-
ing Group and Military Committee,
which are located in Washington
and are often accused of conduct-
ing their activities in a vacuum.
The ministerial meeting is there-
fore likely to consider moving
both to Paris.
West Germany's increasingly
large contribution of land forces
has raised the question of Ger-
man representation on the Stand-
ing Group, now composed of the
U S . e
Several aspects of the West-
ern Alliance's relations with
the Sino-Soviet bloc will be
discussed at the ministerial
meeting. NATO committees have
been considering the implica-
tions of the Soviet-proposed
nonaggression pact. There is
a clear consensus that a nonag-
gression pact is unacceptable
as an isolated measure and could
only be approved as a part of
a broader European security
settlement including the prob-
lem of Berlin.
The Soviet suggestion for
the establishment of observa-
tion posts is also being con-
sidered. On this, the general
consensus is that the Soviet
position linking the observation
post arrangement with the denu-
clearization of central Europe
and a thinning out of the troops
there is unacceptable. A large
majority also believe that any
system of observation posts
should include US and Soviet
territory as well.
The question of developing
a common NATO credit policy toward
the bloc will be raised by a
report from NATO's committee
of economic advisers. Five of
the six EEC countries and the US
favor a common credit policy and
want to discuss the item, while
the UK strongly opposes such a
policy and does not want it
raised at this meeting. Efforts
to find a compromise have fo-
cused in the last few weeks on
the suggestion that any NATO
country contemplating credits to
the bloc longer than five years
should notify the Alliance in
advance. At the 10 December
meeting of the NATO economic ad-
visers, however, Britain refused
to agree even to this.
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