WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 27, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OCI No.. 0312/63
Copy No. 70
WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 26 December 1963)
SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST
Within a week after the central committee approved
Khrushchev's plan for the chemical industry, Soviet
traders apparently had their instructions and were
renewing contacts in the industrial West.
CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR
While Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have been able to
project an aura of Afro-Asian amity during the
first two weeks of their two-month tour, they have
not scored comparable successes in the political or
economic fields.
ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING
The military regime is beginning to take steps to
make its counterinsurgency effort more effective,
but the generals still seem to have little idea of
how to rally significant popular support.
LAOS
Communist forces have moved to erase recent gains by
rightist units in central Laos. Neutralist and Pathet
Lao representatives are continuing thier efforts to
ease tension between the two factions.
FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA
Armed Forces Minister Messmer's visit in early Jan-
uary is designed primarily to strengthen French in-
fluence in the wake of Sihanouk's call for an end
to the US aid program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
The new outbreak of fighting on Cyprus is a reaction
to President Makarios' determination to change the
constitution so as to limit the role of the Turkish
minority.
STAT
THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS
Agreements reached on agricultural policy on 23 De-
cember are apparently sufficient to discourage De
Gaulle from breaking up the community. The agree-
AREA NOTES
NATO and Iceland
ment on a position for the Kennedy Round is not neces-
sarily favorable to the US.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES 14
The killing of 15 guerrillas by army troops apparently
removes the insurgent threat but could provoke danger-
sou political repercussions. The head of the pro-
visional government has already resigned.
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27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
BRAZIL
Appointment of Ney Galvao as finance minister
reduces the already slight prospect that Brazil's
critical financial problems would be handled ef-
fectively. Other cabinet changes may follow.
AREA NOTE 16
Bolivia
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SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST
Within a week after the
central committee approved
Khrushchev's plan for the chem-
ical industry, Soviet traders
apparently had their instruc-
tions and budget allocations
and were renewing their activ-
ity in trade circles of the in-
dustrial West.
Contracts for fertilizer
installations, plastics and syn-
thetic plants, petrochemical
equipment, and mining machinery
are already in various stages of
neg tiation.
The Soviet need for addi-
tional credit to finance planned
expanded purchases is crucial.
The USSR presumably can generate
sufficient funds to meet down
payments on sizable orders.
However, credit arrangements
must be set now to spread out
the heavy crush of payments
which otherwise would fall due
in 1965-66 when equipment con-
tracted for next year will be
delivered.. Soviet ability to
increase hard-currency reserves
is not likely to improve in the
near future. Moscow's current
grain imports will reduce its
gold reserves by 25 percent.
If these continue beyond mid-
1964, the Soviet hard-currency
position will be under further
strain.
Despite the bleak foreign
exchange prospects for the USSR,
Soviet officials appear hopeful
that Western competition for
Soviet orders will be adequate
to foster Western governmental
and banking opinion favorable
to more and longer term credit.
Moscow may also hope that a
continuation of its relatively
restrained foreign policy will
be helpful in this context.
While viewing the USSR as an
acceptable commercial risk, the
banking community has hereto-
fore been unwilling to extend
credits beyond a five-year pe-
riod because of uncertainty
about future political develop-
ments.
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With two weeks of their pro- continent.
jected two-month tour of Africa
completed, Chou En-lai and For-
eign Minister Chen Yi can claim
high marks for their efforts to
project an aura of Afro-Asian
amity and to identify Peiping
with African aspirations. There
is no evidence, however, that
they have scored any comparable
success in the political or eco-
nomic fields.
The joint communiqud issued
on 21 December at the conclusion
of the Chinese leaders' visit to
Cairo contains few surprises`-
Thus far the Chinese have a -
tempted to minimize differences,
play up past contacts, and press
such themes as militant struggle
against colonialism and "US im-
perialism."
In both Algiers and Cairo,
Chou's hosts sought to demon-
strate their nonalignment by
actions designed to play down
the impact of the Chinese lead-
ers'arrival. Chou was greeted
in Cairo with a 21-gun salute,
but Nasir was not on hand. In
Algeria, Ben Bella was on hand
to greet his guests, but the top-
level delegation he sent to the
Soviet Union just before Chou's
arrival is receiving more pub-
licity than the Chinese guests.
It has become increasingly
apparent that a major objective
of the trip has been to undercut
Soviet influence throughout the
In Algeria, Chou sounded a
similar note. He cited China's
early support for Algerian rev-
olutionaries--support which ac-
tually pre-dated that of the USSR.
He has also undoubtedly scored
Soviet unreliability. The Chi-
nese may be pressing the Algerians
to use some of the $50-million
credit offered in October. This
offer was made to counter a $100-
million Soviet credit offered
earlier the same month.
Sino-Soviet rivalry for
African support also flared at
the UN, where Peiping outmaneu-
vered Moscow on the question of
enlarging the representation in
principal UN organs to accommo-
date the African bloc. Soviet
delegate Fedorenko had attempted
to make it appear that the Chi-
nese were opposed to the African-
sponsored expansion plan because
they insisted that any change
in the UN be tied to Peiping's
own admission to the Security
Council. The USSR found itself
holding a suddenly emptied bag,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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however, when Peiping loudly
repudiated Federenko's statement
and accused the Soviets of using
the issue as a pretext for op-
posing Afro-Asian demands.
Chou can be expected to
capitalize on this during next
week's'visit to Morocco and in
subsequent stops in Guinea,
Ghana, and Mali. No details of
Chou's itinerary beyond Rabat
have been made public by Peiping.
Such secrecy may well be prompted
by security considerations. Chi-
nese officials were apparently
seriously shaken by the abortive
plot to kill Liu Shao-chi in
Cambodia last spring.
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27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING
Communist guerrilla activ-
ity increased only slightly in
connection with the third anni-
versary, on 20 December, of the
Viet Cong's Liberation Front,
despite advance Communist propa-
ganda exhortation for a major
military effort. The Viet Cong
continued to direct attacks and
harassing activities primarily
at strategic hamlets.
South Vietnam's new govern-
ment is showing extreme sensi-
tivity to discussion of a "neu-
tralist solution'.' to its in-
surgency problem. The Communists'
Liberation Front has repeatedly
proposed such a settlement, and
the idea is gaining new advocates
as a result of Cambodia's call
for an international conference.
Saigon's military rulers last
week closed down a newspaper
which was expressing interest in
neutralism. However, editorials
in the vernacular press, even
though attacking neutralism, have
kept the debate in the public
eye. On 20 December, Saigon
students--possibly encouraged
by the regime--demonstrated
against neutralism.
On the military front, the
government is beginning to take
some steps to overcome the leth-
argy that has affected its coun-
terinsurgency effort since the
coup. A long-range pacification
program has been launched in one
of the most troublesome provinces
in the northern part of the
country, and broad command
changes have been introduced in
two provinces south of Saigon
where security has been deterio-
rating.
In the political field,
the government has named 60
members of the civilian advisory
Council of Notables. Returned
exiles apparently are not rep-
resented, and there is a dearth
of direct provincial represen-
tation. Many appointees, how-
ever, are prominent political,
professional and lay religious
leaders who could provide effec-
tive guidance to the regime if
they are given a chance.
Apathy and disenchantment
over the new government are wide-
spread among such key elements
as middle-grade officers, stu-
dents and politicians. Criti-
cism centers on the lack of
firm direction by the ruling
generals, on repeated reshuf-
fling of local officials deemed
incompetent, corrupt or close
to the Diem regime, and on the
rise in Viet Cong activity.
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27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Communist forces have
moved to erase recent gains
made by rightist units in cen-
tral Laos. Pathet Lao troops,
reportedly supported by sub-
stantial numbers of North Viet-
namese, on 19 December captured
Kam Keut and the nearby airfield,
three days after occupying the
key route junction at Lak Sao.
In other areas, there have been
reports of only limited activ-
ity, involving scattered skir-
mishes and artillery exchanges.
Meanwhile, neutralist and
Pathet Lao representatives are
continuing their efforts to
negotiate an easing of tensions
between the two factions. At
a meeting on 20 December in the
Plaine des Jarres, both sides
called for an "early" meeting
between Premier Souvanna and
Prince Souphannouvong. They
also agreed, in principle, that
elements of the coalition govern-
ment should be transferred from
Vietiane to the royal capital
at Luang Prabang, which would be
neutralized and placed under tri-
partite control. Both factions
reiterated their support for
the formation of a mixed police
force in a neutralized Vietiane.
General Phoumi's right-
wing faction, which was not
represented at the meeting,
remains skeptical of Pathet
Lao intentions. Phoumi apparently
believes that an agreement for
the neutralization of Luang
Prabang is unlikely, but he may
join in talks on the subject.
He has indicated, however, that
the neutralization of Vientiane
is contingent on the willingness
of the Pathet Lao to allow free
movement in areas of Laos now
under their control.
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Armed Forces Minister
Pierre Messmer's visit to Cam-
bodia from 4-7 January is de-
signed primarily to strengthen
French influence there in the
wake of Prince Sihanouk's call
for an end to the US aid pro-
gram. Messmer's high-level
entourage, which includes the
chiefs of the Foreign Ministry's
Indochina and Cultural and Tech-
nical divisions, will probably
recommend some increases in aid,
but De Gaulle apparently has
no intention of taking on any
large new commitments.
French-grant aid to Cam-
bodia since 1956 has amounted
to only $15 million. Current
assistance is threefold: a
military training mission of at
least 250 men; cultural aid in
the form of a university mission
and 319 teachers in Cambodian
schools; and the maintenance of
about 40 experts in the fields
of health and public works. In
addition, a number of French
nationals hired by the Cambodian
Government hold positions of
considerable influence in the
Ministry of Finance, the Treas-
ury, and the premier's office,
and are among Prince Sihanouk's
advisers.
Paris has indicated it has
no intention of equaling the
US aid program. Any increase
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27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in military aid probably would
be limited to reconditioned and
obsolete equipment, such as
trucks and light armored vehicles.
Increased cultural and technical
assistance probably would include
further help for the French uni-
versity mission, more teachers,
and 30 or 40 additional technical
experts, especially agricultural-
ists.
The extension of French aid
will be complicated by Cambodia's
claims for compensation for
losses incurred as a result of
the 1958 devaluation of the
French franc. Since 1958 France
has asserted that a large-scale
aid program would be impossi-
ble until there is agreement on
an exchange rate, but a compro-
mise may now be in sight.
Sihanouk has sought French
help in maintaining Cambodia's
policy of neutrality, and in
recent talks with the US and the
UK, France has supported his
call for an international con-
ference on Cambodian neutral-
ity, despite US objections.
Indeed, De Gaulle has consist-
ently sought to meet Sihanouk
more than half way, and Paris
may now encourage Sihanouk
to press this issue.
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CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
Fighting between the Greek
and Turkish Cypriot communities,
which began on 21 December and
was continuing on 26 December
despite efforts to obtain a cease-
fire, is the culmination of a
steady growth of tension on the
island during the past few weeks.
The new tension followed Presi-
dent Makarios' presentation to
Turkish Cypriot leaders of propos-
als for changing the Cyprus con-
stitution. The proposals, which
essentially involved removing the
guarantees to the Turkish minor-
ity that had been written into
the Cyprus settlement of 1959,
were rejected by the Turkish Gov-
ernment even before the Turkish
Cypriots had made their views
known.
Most of the initial fight-
ing appears to have been between
Greek Cypriot police and the Turk-
ish underground, and to have taken
place in the Turkish areas of Nic-
osia.. The situation there de-
teriorated progressively during
the week, as the police lost con-
trol to extremist groups of ir-
regulars from both communities.
A cease-fire, to be supervised
by the British, had not been ef-
fective as of the morning of 26
December. Fighting had also con-
tinued at the port city of Lar-
naca; the rest of the island was
quiet but tense.
In the face of these de-
velopments, the Turkish Govern-
ment threatened to exercise its
right under the 1959 agreement
to intervene on Cyprus. Three
Turkish jet fighters flew over
Nicosia on 25 December, and
Turkish naval units appeared-off
the island. Part of the 650-man
Turkish garrison on Cyprus left
its barracks to move into one
of the Turkish quarters of the
capital. Part of the 950-man
Greek contingent then moved to
protect Greek areas. The situa-
tion evidently prodded Athens
and London into a more active
role, and Greek, Turkish and
British forces on Cyprus have
been placed under a unified Brit-
ish-led command. Britain has an-
nounced it is sending 150 ad-
ditional troops.
The violence may make lead-
ers of both sides more cautious
in pressing political demands.
Soon after the outbreak, Makarios
told the US ambassador he would
go more slowly in pushing his con-
stitutional revisions. Both eth-
nic groups, however, will be fur-
ther embittered--particularly
the Turkish community, which
is believed to have suffered
much the heavier casualties.
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27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The tariff disparities issue which has plagued preparations for the Kennedy Round for many
months originates in the fact that there are substantial differences between the EEC and US
tariffs on individual items, even though over-all tariff levels are roughly the same. Because
the EEC common external tariff was arrived at by averaging the tariffs of the member states,
theEEC tariff schedule is characterized by the absence of "peaks and lows"; in the US schedule,
on the other hand, the rates vary much more, and some individual tariffs remain very high in
comparison with those of the EEC. Accordingly, the EEC and the French in particular have
long insisted that a 50-percent cut in tariffs by both the US and the EEC would leave the US
with substantial protection on certain items and deprive the EEC of bargaining power to effect
their future reduction.
The disparities issue was believed to have been settled at the GATT ministerial meeting
last May with a formula which provided that tariffs on industrial items would in general be
reduced, equally and across the board, except that "special rules" would apply where sig-
nificant adverse effects on trade would result from disparities in tariff levels." In fact, how-
ever,this formula merely shifted the argument to the problem of determining what disparities
are "significant" or "meaningful in trade terms." Because the "special rules" would mean in
most cases a smaller tariff reduction by the EEC than by the US, the EEC has attempted to
maximize the area to which these rules would apply while the US has sought to minimize their
application.
After lengthy negotiation, a GATT subcommittee reached a considerable measure of
agreement last month on a formula which would identify a "significant" tariff disparity in
the first instance as one in which the high rate is at least 30 percent of value and at least
10 percent above the lower rate. Because this formula would identify some 850 US items as
eligible for "special treatment," --,the subcommittee proposed seven additional qualitative cri-
teria which would reduce considerably the number of eligible items. The three to which the
US attaches special importance would (1) require that there be substantial imports of the item
concerned from the high tariff country into the low; (2) exclude items where there are sub-
stantial imports into the high tariff country; and (3) exclude items on which the low tariff
country maintains quotas.
The formula approved by the EEC on 23 December would substitute for the 30/10 criterion
a 2/1 formula. A disparity would be identified as one in which the high tariff is twice as
high as the low one, apparently with the additional qualification that, in most cases, there
would have to be a ten-point percentage spread between the two rates. This formula would
provide for special treatment for far more than 850 items, including items of special US
export interest. The arrangements for qualitative criteria also seem to have been modified
to the US' disadvantage.
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The Common Market appears to
have averted disaster for the sec-
ond time in less than a year. The
eleventh-hour agreements reached
on agricultural policy on 23 De-
cember are apparently sufficient
to discourage De Gaulle from carry-
ing out his threat to break up the
community. Moreover, the Germans
and Dutch succeeded in extracting
limited commitments from Paris on
EEC participation in the Kennedy
Round of tariff negotiations. These
agreements do not cover all the out-
standing issues, however, and the
manner in which they were reached
will leave a residue of bitterness.
Nor is it certain that major US
interests have fared well.
The main agricultural elements
in the "package" deal are the reg-
ulations concerning intracommunity
trade in beef, rice, and dairy prod-
ucts and the rules governing the
community farm fund. Their effect
is to open the large west German
market to farm exports of France,
Italy, and the Netherlands--gen-
erally at a substantial advantage
over the exports of nonmembers. Al-
though approval of these and the
financial regulations is an im-
portant step forward, the key ques-
tion of grain price unification is
still unsettled. Further considera-
tion of the formula proposed by Com-
missioner Mansholt has been delayed
until next year.
The agreement on a Kennedy
Round position is likewise an ad-
vance for the community, but from
the US view not necessarily favor-
able. On the long-standing problem
of tariff "disparities," the EEC
adopted a formula which would
exempt from the proposed 50-per-
cent linear reduction in tariffs
a far larger number of items than
the US hoped for. The EEC position
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27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on farm products in the trade ne-
gotiations--although an improvement
over the initial Mansholt propos-
als--also leaves much to be desired
from the US view. In general, the
EEC proposes that, if its levy sys-
tem operates in such a way as to
cause difficulties for the exports
of nonmembers, then the EEC Commis-
sion will be called on to propose
"appropriate," but unspecified,
measures. These would not apply
if it is technically impossible to
determine how much protection is
actually involved in the levy sys-
tem.
The general relief within
the community which greeted these
agreements reflects both the
depth of the crisis and some op-
timism that the Common Market's
unity may have been restored. The
prominent role played by the
EEC's commission in achieving
the compromise has in particu-
lar encouraged those who hope to
strengthen the community's in-
stitutional structure.
In France the conviction
was evidently widespread, how-
ever, that both Bonn and The
Hague were quite prepared to see
the French "leave" the Common Mar-
ket, and in the event of its
breakup, to seek alternative
ties with the Outer Seven. More-
over, while it may prove healthy
that Bonn "stood up" to De Gaulle
in this instance, its motive was
strongly colored by a desire to pro-
tect its inefficient farmers. Nor
does it augur well for US-EEC re- 25X1
lations that the French blame the
US for much of the opposition
they encountered.
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NATO: The NATO ministe-
rial meeting in Paris, which
ended on 17 December, avoided
serious discussion of the more
contentious issues facing the
alliance. There was, for in-
stance, only passing reference
to the matter of nuclear shar-
ing. While NATO's military
posture was generally recognized
as still inadequate, the Force
Planning exercise--which is
designed to help correct this
situation--was not discussed
at all. The dispute over basic
strategy, the chief stumbling
block to the exercise, was put
off until after De Gaulle's
press conference sometime in
January.
All but the French agreed
that the alliance should explore
possibilities of negotiating
with the Soviets on outstanding
East-West issues. The Germans,
as usual, indicated some reser-
vations because of their sensi-
tivity regarding Berlin and Ger-
man reunification. The question
of restricting Western credits
to the Soviet bloc was reserved
for future consideration."
Iceland's near general
strike was settled on 21 Decem-
ber when labor and management
agreed to a 25-percent wage in-
crease. The 11-day work stop-
page was led by Communist-dom-
inated unions seeking, as in
the past, to force the resigna-
tion of the Conservative - So-
cial Democratic government by
discrediting its economic poli-
cies. The settlement is regarded
as a political victory for Prime
Minister Benediktsson's govern-
ment, since the Communists were
unable to maintain a solid grip
on labor.
The settlement, however,
will intensify inflationary
pressures and will probably
force Benediktsson to take ex-
traordinary measures to maintain
economic stability. For polit-
ical reasons he will try to avoid
another currency devaluation,
but it is doubtful that the
government can maintain its
economic stabilization program
without resorting to this meas-
ur e.
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Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES
The killing of 15 guerrillas
by Dominican Army troops on 21
December apparently removes the
last pocket of insurgents op-
posing the government. However,
the incident could provoke dan-
gerous political repercussions.
Emilio De Los Santos, head
of the governing military-in-
stalled triumvirate, resigned in
protest over what he regarded as
the brutal and unnecessary kill-
ing of the insurgents, includ-
ing the president of the pro-
Castro 14th of June Political
Group. The army commander of
the area in which the incident
took place insists the deaths
were the unavoidable result of
a fire fight. If stories of
armed forces "brutality" be-
come widespread, however, they
could provoke dangerous hostility
toward the regime from rank-and-
file Dominicans, who recall the
repressive measures of former
dictator Trujillo.
The resignation of De Los
Santos precipitated frantic ma-
neuvering within the government
among civilian and military
elements. Only the prompt ap-
pointment of Foreign Minister
Donald Reid to the vacant post
in the triumvirate appears to
have helped avert a serious
political crisis for the moment.
The triumvirate has asked
the cabinet--which was chosen
from and is responsible to six
minority political parties---to
resign to permit the appoint-
ment of a more independent group.
This move has prompted strong
protests from four of the splinter
parties backing the regime, who
stand to lose patronage; the
outcome is unclear.
However, the National
Civic Union, the only sizable
party in the government, backs
the cabinet reorganization.
More important, the key leaders
of the armed forces are provid-
ing the triumvirate with their
support, which could prove cru-
cial in a political showdown
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Further changes in the Bra-
zilian cabinet are expected fol-
lowing the resignation last week
of Finance Minister Carvalho
Pinto. A moderate leftist, Ney
Galvao, was appointed Pinto's
successor, but there remains a
possibility that Leonel Brizola--
who had been actively pushed for
the post by the extreme left--
may eventually receive some min-
istry. There is widespread be-
lief in the army that War Min-
ister Jair Ribeiro will also be
replaced in the near future. As
one responsible Brazilian com-
mentator has remarked, with Gou-
lart "every minister is an in-
terim one."
Ney Galvao's appointment
actually reduces the previously
slight prospect that Brazil's
critical financial problems would
be handled effectively. Galvao's
qualifications in the economic
field are weak at best and his rec-
ord as head of the Bank of Brazil
Goes not command confidence with-
in the business community. Be-
fore taking his new post, he
served as minister without port-
folio in charge of coordinating
foreign trade policies, a job
he performed without any par-
ticular distinction.
Goulart's, Galvao can be expected
to toe the adminstration line
faithfully. Moreover, Galvao's
appointment may be a temporary
expedient designed to allay
fears that Brizola would succeed
Pinto. Galvao is a personal.
friend of Brizola and there is
speculation that Brizola will,
in fact, eventually move into
the Finance Ministry.
The new finance minister
inherits almost insurmountable
economic and financial problems.
Chief among these are a rampant
inflation that may see the cost
of living increase 80 percent
this year, and a staggering
foreign debt involving approxi-
mately $1 billion in payments
due over the next two years.
The severity of the eco-
nomic situation and Goulart's
apparent intention to assume
greater personal direction over
financial policies increase
the possibility of radical meas-
ures that might be detrimental
to foreign creditors and in-
vestors. Goulart reportedly is
considering nationalization of
all public utilities and can-
cellation of mining concessions.
Measures such as these could
lead to further deterioration
of Brazil's economic position.
Although his views are
perhaps somewhat to the right of
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Western Hemisphere
Bolivia: The political
competition between Bolivian
Vice President Juan Lechin and
President Victor Paz Estenssoro
is bound to intensify sharply
as each maneuvers to line up
support for the presidential
nomination at next month's con-
vention of the Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR).
Lechin probably still hopes to
pull an upset by dislodging Paz
or at least to demonstrate suf-
ficient strength to assure him-
self of retaining his vice-
presidential post. Paz seems
certain, however, to be able to
control the party's convention,
assure his renomination, and
designate his own running mate.
If the forthcoming conven-
tion repudiates Lechin, he may
well withdraw from the MNR and
establish a "popular front" po-
litical party. He probably
could count on the support of
political groups ranging from
leftist extremists to disgruntled
factions within right-wing parties.
It would seem unlikely, though,
that these disparate groups could
coalesce into an organization
powerful enough to defeat Paz'
well-organized machine in the
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,%MW" Soso,
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