THE MORO GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300060002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

3 January 1JG4
SPECIAL REPORT
THE MORO GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM AND PROSPECTS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIG ENCE
Release 2006/12128 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004300060002-~25xi
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 Approved For Release 2006/12128 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004300060002-9
Approved Far Release 2006112!28 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004300060002-9
 Approved For lease 2006/12128: CIA-RDP79-00927~A~004300060002-9
3 January 19f4
Italy has embarked on its long-awaited "open-
ing to the left"--the culmination of efforts to
wean Pietro Nenni's Socialists from their alliance
with the Italian Communist Party into a cabinet
coalition with the Christian Democrats. The "open-
ing" also seeks to modernize Italy's social and
economic institutions. The obstacles, however,
are formidable; the government program of domestic
reforms to;;ether with continuing pro-Western foreign
and defense policies is opposed by irnportant elements
within both main parties.
The Coalition Program
Aldo bgoro's coalition is
the first Italian government
since the cold war began to
have the active participation
of the Italian Socialist Party
(PSI) .
This is the result of an
agreement under which the tra-
ditionally neutralist PSI will
support Italy's NATO commitments
in return for action on an ex-
tensive domestic reform program
hitiiert;o sidetracked by conserva-
tive Christian Democrats (CD).
Most economic posts are held by
reform-minded ministers. The
foreign affairs, defense, and
security ministries are held by
long-time bac?i.ers of pro-Western
policies. By and large, the
present cabinet is younger than
its predecessors, and it has a
high de,~,ree of technical compe-
tence.
Important elerents in both
main parties, however, resisted
the formation of a center-left
government. Even within the
cabinet there is coolness toward
some aspects of the program.
A full turn to the center-
left has long been anticipated
in Italian politics and many
political careers are staked
on its success. If it does
succeed, the center and non-Com-
munist left will probably be
permanently strengthened at the
expense of the extremes. If it
fails, the chances of political
polarization to the advantage
of the Communists will be greatly
enhanced. There will almost
certainly be no return, however,
to the political immobilism which
characterized the 1950x.
The government program,
painfully negotiated among the
four coalition parties in Novem-
ber, is aimed mainly at over-
hauling Italy's social and eco-
nomic structure to give a more
equitabJ_e distribution of the
national wealth. Specifically,
this calls for changing the in-
cidence of taxation, expanding
the educational system, decen-
tralizing government admnistra-
tion, and speeding up industrial-
ization in the economically back-
ward southern areas.
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 Approved For Release ~
The obstacles are formi-
dable. To begin with, Italy's
current economic difficulties
will force the bovernment to
inaugurate a series of austerity
measures not envisa;;ad in the
basic reform program. The pro-
~ram is little different from
those to which all. recent Ital-
ian governments have subscribed
but which have gone largely un-
implemented ~~ecause of well-en-
trenched conservative opposition.
lIow much of the program now will
be carried out depends, to a
ca:xsiderably degree, on the per-
sonal effectiveness of Moro and
certain of his cabinet colleagues.
P79-00927A004300060002-9
Moro and Nenni
Premier Moro (CD) and
Vice Premier Nenni (PSI) domi-
nate the coalition which in-
cludes the Social Democrats
(PSDI) of Giuseppe Saragat and
the Republicans (Pf~I) repre-
sented by Oronzo Reale. Both
P.4ora and Nenni are skillful in
-the art of compromise, but other
qualities are also needed to
implement the government's pro-
gram. Moro has yet to demon-
strate the greater toughness he
will need as Premier, and Nenni
has had no cabinet experience
since 1947.
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r A ( I A N c: A B 1 N E T
~.~~~~s~ in ;ni J >~cemoer 19G3)
Premier
Vice Premier
Minister of foreign Affairs
Minister of Defense
A4inister of the Budget
N+inistar of Finance
Minister of the Treasury
Pvtiinister of Interior
h^,inister of Justice
PAinisler of Education
Minister of Public Works
Pfinisler of Agriculture
Minister of Transport
Minister of Post and
Teiecammun i cations
Pviinister of industry
Minister of Labor
Minister of Foreign Trade
Minis*er of Merchant Marine
1;,Ainister of State Participation
Minis-`er of Health
fvlinister of fourisrn
Ministers without Portfolio
lvlinister and Party
Aida Moro (CD Center)
Pietro Nonni {PSI)
Giuseppe. Saragat (PSDI)
hiulio Andreatti (CD Extrame Right.
Wing)
Antonio C.iiolitti {PSl)
Koberta fremeiloni (PSDI)
tmilro Colombo lCD (..enter}
Paala (avian+~Lti Center}
Jronao Keaie (Pi:1}
Luigi Gui {C:D tenter)
Giovanni Pieraccini {PSI)
Years i n
cabinets since.
Age June 194
Mario Ferrari-Aggrodi (CD Left Wing} 47
Carlo Russo (CD Center)
GiacintoBasco (CD Left Wing)
Bernardn Mattarel la (CD Center)
Giorgio BolCD Left W(ng}
AttifioPiccioni (CD Center} 71
llmk,erto t%elle Fave {CD Center) 51
i_uini Pr:;ii ;PSDI} 49
Althavah belonging: to the center I he four coalition. partners are tf~e Christian
fcctiair holds views similar. to tide Democratic Party (CD), the Socialist Party (PSf},
c