Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 30, 2008
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 14, 1964
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3.pdf1.97 MB
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 DHS Review Completed. State Dept. review OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE -CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY completed // SECRET GROUP I Excluded from automatic dnwngnadinqona Jeciassification Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Iftw SECRET "" (Information as of 1200 EST, 13 February 1964) THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page SOVIET PLENUM ON AGRICULTURE The speeches since the plenum began on 10 February give a clear picture of plans for Soviet agriculture in the next few years and indicate no major policy changes. PEIPING INTENSIFIES HATE-THE-US CAMPAIGN The Panama crisis has excited Communist China's anti-US propaganda to new shrillness. EAST GERMANY'S "NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM" Ulbricht's remarks to the recent party plenum suggest he is under pressure both from hard-liners opposed to the new system and from liberals who want changes in the political sphere as well. NORTH VIETNAMESE FOOD PROBLEM WORSENS The persistent agricultural difficulties, however, will probably have no dampening effect on Hanoi's aggressive foreign policy. BOLDER VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM The Communist attacks seem to be eroding morale, but General Khanh's government shows promise of firmer leadership than its predecessor. COMMUNIST PRESSURE RISES IN LAOS Vientiane fears a possible assault at Thakhek, on the Mekong, and is also concerned over Communist attacks in the Plaine des Jarres. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page AREA NOTES On Malaysia and Yemen THE SITUATION ON CYPRUS Serious clashes have occurred between local Greek and Turkish elements and threaten to provoke intervention by Turkey. The Communist Party is exploiting growing anti-Western sentiment among Greek Cypriots. NKRUMAH MOVES TO TIGHTEN GRIP ON GHANA Fear for his personal security has spurred him to further steps to reshape Ghana on Communist models. TENSIONS HIGH BETWEEN RWANDA AND BURUNDI Attempts by exiles of the Tutsi tribe to invade Rwanda have triggered retaliation by Rwanda against its Tutsi minority and may bring clashes between Rwanda and neigh- boring Tutsi-dominated Burundi. THE SITUATION IN EAST AFRICA Lines of power are beginning to clarify in Zanzibar, but instability is likely to continue there and in Kenya and Tanganyika. Uganda's prime minister is consolidating his control. STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE DISCUSSIONS While an eight-nation working group has made consider- able progress in initial examination of political and military issues involved in establishing an MLF, consid- eration of the next steps to be taken has pointed up the political obstacles the MLF still faces. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Aftor, )Ji (.'Ki 1 ' ..F, EUROPE (continued) Page AREA NOTE 13 On Italy THE CANAL CRISIS AND PANAMANIAN POLITICS The hero's welcome staged for Miguel Moreno, the rabid nationalist who presented Panama's charges of US aggres- sion to the OAS, confirms suspicions that he intended to use this mission to further his presidential aspirations. CUBA AND THE US NAVAL BASE Castro's action against Guantanamo was apparently in- tended to dramatize the whole series of Cuban complaints against the US--issues on which he may intend, at a time of his own choosing, to demand formal UN consideration. Hemispheric reaction, however, has been moderate and generally favorable to the United States. MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Mexican foreign policy under President Lopez' successor will probably continue to feature a cordial but "inde- pendent" relationship with the US, a tendency to expand contacts with the bloc, and refusal to cooperate on strong hemispheric action against Cuba. ARGENTINE LABOR PROTEST The General Confederation of Labor has launched the first stage of a militant plan to force government ac- tion on its extensive economic and political demands. The second and third stages could lead to violence. AREA NOTES On Bolivia and British Guiana SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Nftwe SECRET Speeches thus far during the USSR's central committee plenum which began on 10 Feb- ruary give a clear picture of plans for Soviet agriculture in the next few years and indicate no major policy changes. Effort in traditional farm- ing areas is to increase, with little or no expansion of total acreage. The chief emphasis is to be on grain, which for the first time in Soviet practice is to receive large applications of chemical fertilizer. An irriga- tion program is well along in the planning stage and, if imple- mented, will make still another major claim on Soviet economic resources. Over the next several years, land under irrigation is to in- crease by one third--an addi- tional 6.9 million acres (size of Maryland). Two thirds of this new irrigation will take place in the semiarid areas of the Russian Republic and the Ukraine, with only one third in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, where most irrigation now takes place. Virtually all of the new irrigated lands will be devoted to grain--rice, corn, and wheat --and in addition some 6.4 mil- lion acres already under irriga- tion will be shifted to grain crops, principally at the ex- pense of hay. Cost estimates of the pro- gram vary. Last September, Khrushchev, outlining much the same program as described by the chairman of the State Committee for Irrigation at the plenum, set the cost at 7.3 billion rubles (1 ruble nominally equals $1.11). The chairman, however, implied that it might cost con- siderably more. Even Khrushchev's figure is more than the cost of the New Lands grain program of the mid-1950s and even somewhat more than the fertilizer portion ,of the chemical program announced last December. While irrigation does not require the complex machinery associated with fertilizer pro- duction and application, it never- theless will make significant de- mands on industry for tractors, scrapers, pumping stations, and pipe. In addition, maintenance and operation costs will impose a continuing and fairly heavy expense on the economy. The return from the new ir- rigation will almost certainly be less than the regime apparently expects. Khrushchev's estimate of an extra 15 million tons of grain a year would mean an average yield per acre far above what is obtained through irrigation in the US and, in the case of wheat, nearly four times that presently obtained from irrigation in the USSR--although admittedly wheat now being irrigated is not grown under optimum conditions. It is clear from the emphasis given the use of irrigation and fertilizer in the traditional farming areas of European Russia that these are intended to sup- plant the New Lands as the chief source of large increases in grain. The New Lands program, in its prime, provided nearly one quarter of all grain production, but year- in-year-out cropping on these marginal lands has resulted in SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 TYPICAL ANTI-US CARTOONS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PRESS Kennedy bites the dust. "Give me a little something to wet my whistle." (Peiping )6orker's Daily, 24 Nov 63) (People's Daily, 14 January 1964) Trying his skill for the first time (People's Daily, 13 January 1964) Yankee Peace Banner (People's Daily, 23 January 1964) LINE OF SUCCESSION (People's Daily, 20 January 1964) Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 SECRET rapid deterioration. The re- sulting erosion problem is se- rious and is not likely to be solved without taking huge amout.ts of land out of cultiva- tion and introducing soil con- servation practices on a wide scale. It is not clear whether the regime intends to take these steps, but it evidently is not planning for large increases in grain output from the area. For example, Kazakhstan--which contains a major part of the New Lands--is expected in the future to do no more than equal its 1962 crop, while grain out- put in the Ukraine is intended to double. Summaries of speeches given at the plenum indicate that the regime will take steps to in- crease farm production through greater material incentives-- larger money wages and bonuses for collective farmers--but there has been nothing to suggest plans for any basic alteration in the present system of collectivized agriculture. PEIPING INTENSIFIES HATE-THE-US CAMPAIGN One of the fundamental as- pects of Chinese Communist pol- icy has been a sustained cam- paign of hostility toward the United States both at home and abroad. The outbreak in Jan- uary 1964 of the Panama Canal crisis excited Peiping propagan- da to new shrillness in pursuit of this policy. Nationwide mass rallies in support of.Panama re- portedly involving more than 16 million people highlighted a major campaign of vilification carried on in the press and in both domestic and international radiobroadcasts. The campaign, the most vitu- perative since the 1958 Peiping lambasting of American landings in Lebanon, frankly seeks to use events in Panama to demonstrate that the United States is "the most vicious enemy of the people of all countries." This con- stantly reiterated theme appears most strikingly in Chinese Com- munist press cartoons. Long noted for the vulgarity, rude- ness, and viciousness of their anti-Americanism, they have dem- onstrated fresh vehemence dur- ing this most recent campaign. Although Chinese party officials privately conceded the poor taste of a cartoon following President Kennedy's assassination entitled "Kennedy Bites the Dust," car- toons published since then show no greater refinement. In line with Peiping's con- viction that all American lead- ers are equally malevolent rep- resentatives of a single aggres- sor clique, Chinese cartoonists have merely substituted President Johnson for President Kennedy as the world's number-one bogey- man. Although the Chinese cannot expect to capitalize for long on events in Panama, they will doubtless find other issues on which they can malign the United States in pursuit of their policy SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 SECRET Walter Ulbricht's remarks to the East German party's 3-7 February enlarged central com- mittee plenum called largely to discuss the economic situation show that, despite the opposi- tion of certain extremists, he will continue to implement gen- erally realistic economic poli- cies, including such Soviet-ap- proved devices as allowing greater initiative in industrial man- agement. The tenor of his speech suggests that he is under pres- sure both from hard-liners who oppose the "new economic system" and from more liberal party ele- ments who want changes in the political sphere as well. Ulbricht made an extraor- dinary effort to appear more liberal. He attacked entrenched bureaucrats and advocated some degree of economic experimenta- tion, defending his position in terms of Lenin's method of making a realistic appraisal of a sit- uation and taking appropriate steps. Parts of his speech suggest that he may even have been at- tacked personally as a Stalinist survival, probably by younger party elements, for the regime's economic difficulties. He ad- mitted the use of harsh methods but tried to excuse them on grounds of postwar equipment shortages and lack of economic expertise--precisely the bases for charges leveled at him by, competent economic administra- tors. In an evident attempt ,to silence critics who assert that the USSR forced East Germany to institute de-Stalinization meas- ures, Ulbricht alleged that the East German party leadership, "on the basis of its own analysis of the situation," had corrected the evil effects of Stalinism in a relatively short time. Although he displayed sen- sitivity to charges that the new economic approaches are capital- istic in character, he called attention to Western literature on industrial management which "contains many interesting and useful points." His call for honest appraisal of economic problems was echoed by the younger, technically trained economists who appear to have dominated the meeting. Central committee secretary Guenther Mittag, for example, declared: "Available information and documents are of no avail if we do not, in the interests of our cause, honestly assess our own work and results achieved in other countries, and if we hide or belittle our own faults and arrears." At the same time Werner Jarowinsky, newly installed secre- tary for trade and supply matters, indicated that the regime would make a greater effort to provide consumer goods in the current seven-year plan period. where in the bloc. The results of the party plenum published to date suggest that the regime at long last is making a genuine effort to rid itself of the Stalinist stigma-- but not of Ulbricht--and to deal somewhat more honestly with the population. The new trend cer- tainly reflects developments in the USSR. It may also indicate that younger party elements be- lieve that only in this manner can East Germany become more closely attuned to the liberal- izing tendencies evident else- SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pane 3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 The 1963 food output in North Vietnam was far below even the mediocre harvests of 1962, resulting in the fourth straight year of severe agri- cultural shortfalls. The scanty harvests will require a further tightening-of the already mar- ginal North Vietnamese food ra- tions--at least through the spring harvest of 1964. Famine conditions probably will not de- velop, however, except possibly in some isolated mountainous areas of the country. A combination of severe drought and flooding caused sub- stantial damage to spring and fall crops in 1963. The impact of adverse weather was height- ened by the widespread agricul- tural mismanagement which has been a chronic problem under the Communists. The 1964 outlook is not yet clear, although weather conditions late this winter ap- pear to have been somewhat bet- ter than last year. The 1963 agricultural dif- ficulties have already led to ration cuts in at least some have thus tar seen no evidence that the food situation is des- the past, small Aerate. In amounts part from routine purchases abroad--havein crucial areas, and this has reduced the impact of poor har- There are as yet no in- vests. cations that last year's agri- di difficulties resulted cultural in an extraordinary program of food procurement abroad. depressed by the repeated food shortages. Continuation of mar- ginal conditions into 1964 will doubtless sap morale still fur- ther. There does not appear to be any prospect of serious pub- lic unrest, however, nor does the stability of the regime seem threatened. More important from Hanoi's standpoint is the likeli- hood of a deepening of public apathy and resentment toward gov- ernment efforts to improve agri- cultural production by sociali- zation. The regime is clearly con- cerned over its persistent agri- cultural setbacks. It has ini- tiated a drive to increase 1964 agricultural output, with spe- cial emphasis on better manage- rial and control techniques. Re- gime propaganda has indicated that the "regular and extraordi- nary" activities of the army-- presumably support of insurgency in Laos and South Vietnam--now require larger amounts of food. The armed forces have been mildly admonished to make more economi- cal use of their food, and to participate more wholeheartedly in food production. Current agricultural diffi- culties probably will not have a dampening effect on the aggres- sive North Vietnamese foreign pol- icy. Support of Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam at present levels does not appear to be a particularly heavy drain on North Vietnam's economy. Hanoi has in the past, moreover, demon- strated its willingness and abil- ity to commit very large slices public and party morale in of its resources to prime political North Vietnam has been sharply objectives SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 SECRET `'p Until a seven-day Communist cease-fire began early this week, an intensive level of Communist activity had been sustained in South Vietnam following the 30 January coup. This included a marked step-up in terrorist bomb- ings with American personnel as prime targets. The scale and boldness of these recent Viet Conk; attacks, coupled with an intensified rate of harassing actions, sabotage, and terrorist propaganda, seems to have had an erosive effect on popular and troop morale. There have been numerous re- ports of paramilitary posts and strategic hamlets being overrun or destroyed with little or no resistance from defending forces, and sometimes with their col- laboration. There are signs that much of the rural popula- tion, uncertain of the reason for the latest change in Saigon, is apathetic and willing to resist the Communists only if government military protection is immediately available. A drop in Viet Cong armed attacks is occurring with the onset of South Vietnam's Tet, or lunar new year period, for which the Communists proclaimed a "cease-fire" from 11 to 17 February. While they probably feel they must honor an earlier promise of a holiday respite for their troops, the Viet Cong may also hope to demonstrate a capability to hasten or slow the pace of the fighting at their own whim. Reports from several critical provinces near Saigon suggest rel- atively little progress by the government--and, in some cases, set- backs since the 1 November coup. As a result of the second coup, some province chiefs now appear uncertain of their status and feel that pacification programs must await new directives. Some senior officers appear to regard Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh's takeover as merely the substitution of one generals' clique for another. The government established by Khanh on 8 February nonetheless offers some prospect of firmer leadership than its predecessor. Khanh has assumed the post of premier, and his cabinet is more broadly representative of the country's geographical regions, religions, and leading political parties. Khanh apparently hopes this will result in the crystaliza- tion of a two-party system, with the government party emerging from a unification of the rival Dai Viet party factions now repre- sented in the cabinet. Khanh has persuaded the popular chairman of the deposed junta, Maj. Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh, to serve as nominal chief of state. Minh told American officials he agreed to cooperate. in order to keep the armed forces from fragmenting, but he has ap- peared personally depressed and could become a focal point for potentially discontented elements in the military. SECRET Page 5 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 %We 14W LAOS yang vieng &l NOR'S H VIET`Nt1M Pak Sanei!??-- - .... ' ..Kam' ~? is Tinh TH VI NAM THAILAND Luang Prabang ,Lat Boua Pha Lane ---Q_ Tchepo CHINA A tvll~~ ~, M, ~1es Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 `"e SECRET `?'f COMMUNIST PRESSURE RISES IN LAOS Communist military pres- sure is on the rise in widely separated areas of Laos. While Vientiane's immediate concern remains the threat to Thakhek in the central part of the coun- try, Communist attacks in the Plaine des Jarres area and a troop build-up in Sam Neua Prov- ince, farther north, point to developing campaigns against anti-Communist positions in these regions also. The strong force of sev- eral Pathet Lao and North Viet- namese battalions east of Thakhek still shows no signs of preparing for a direct assault on the strategic Mekong River town. However, small units are reported to be moving deeper into the lowlands to the north and approaching within a few miles of main Route 13. In the Plaine des Jarres area rein- forced Communist forces are moving out from Xieng Khouang town to assault ridge positions from which government forces have operated to virtually iso- late that Communist-held pro- vincial capital for many months. The Pathet Lao contend that they have been forced to take countermeasures against Lao Army provocations in "lib- erated territory." Uncertainty over Communist military inten- tions is causing concern and confusion in Vientiane. Premier Souvanna is anxious to arrange a suitable atmosphere for the tripartite talks that had been contemplated, and has called on foreign representatives in Laos to use whatever influence they may have to restrain the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao, while professing a strong desire for talks, show no inclination of withdrawing to previous posi- tions as a precondition. As an immediate step to ease the military threat, Souvanna is pushing for an International Control Commission (ICC) investi- gation of the recent fighting in the Na Kay area northeast of Thakhek. If the Pathet Lao con- tinue to block such an investi- gation, Souvanna wants at least to establish an ICC presence in that territory outside Thakhek which is still in the hands of neutralist and rightist forces. The Lao Army reverses have damaged General Phoumi's prestige. To defend himself against crit- icism within his own camp and to bolster his arguments against talks with the Pathet Lao, Phoumi is exaggerating the seriousness of the military situation, par- ticularly the extent of North Vietnamese involvement. He also speaks of the need for "drastic action," and has hinted of possible "spontaneous" popular demon- strations against the North Vietnamese Embassy and Pathet Lao mission in Vientiane. There also is talk again of a right- wing coup in Vientiane,-and Souvanna seems increasingly con- cerned for his personal safety. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 SECRET Malaysia: The conference in Bang ook of Indonesian, Phil- ippine, and Malaysian foreign ministers ended on 10 February without agreement on the with- drawal of Indonesian guerrillas from Malyasian territory. The conferees endorsed the principle of the cease-fire, but Malaysia formally noted that the truce could not be fully effective until Indonesian forces with- draw. President Sukarno told the US ambassador in Djakarta on 9 February that the guerril- las would remain "in pockets in the jungles" until some progress is achieved in the political arena. The ministers agreed to meet again in Bangkok, probably within a month, before the pro- posed summit meeting of heads Yemen: Saudi Arabia and Egypt may a moving gradually toward an accommodation. despite their differences, especially over Yemen. Saudi Arabia has offered to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt if out- standing problems are resolved. Cairo has responded favorably of government. The Borneo bor- der area has become relatively quiet, with neither side reporting serious clashes or violations of the cease-fire--to be super- vised by Thai officials. Following the ministerial meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman and Philippine President Macapagal met in Cambodia to settle their differences arising from the formation of Malaysia. Rahman reportedly did not press for recognition at this time and agreed to discuss the Philippine claim to part of Sabah (North Borneo)--the main issue blocking normal diplomatic relations be- tween these two countries. As a first step, each country is also prepared to establish a consulate in the other's ca ital. and indicated willingness to send a delegation to Saudi Ara- bia for talks. Inside Yemen, royalist ac- tivity south of Sana, the capital, has picked up and is interfering with traffic on the roads to the town. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY'SUMMARY Page 7 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 %wif SECRET ..r The most serious clashes since the establishment of a cease-fire in late December erupted throughout Cyprus this past week and threaten to pro- voke early Turkish intervention. A running battle in the south coast port city of Limassol has produced 150 or more casualties. In Nicosia, a dangerous situation has developed over the continued detention of four Greek Cypriot intelligence serv- ice personnel by Turkish Cyp- riots who refuse to release them until told of the whereabouts of up to 180 Turks missing since late December. Vice President Kuchuk has publicly expressed the view that the missing people have been murdered. Both men and women in the Greek community are receiving weapons training. President Makarios in ne- gotiations this week has re- mained firmly opposed to the revised British-American plan for an international police force. He continues to insist on a UN role to provide protec- tion against aggression from Turkey. Proposals to expand the British peace-keeping force by bringing in troops from other NATO countries continue to be denounced in the Greek Cypriot press and at public rallies. A right-wing opponent of Makarios has violently denounced the US in a speech before some 600 Cypriots. The well-organized Commu- nist Party on Cyprus is exploit- ing the present anti-Western sentiment. In Turkey, the government is under increasing pressure to exercise its right under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to in- tervene unilaterally on Cyprus, and will almost certainly do so if the Turkish Cypriots send a direct appeal. In Greece, public concern over Cyprus has increased, and there have been further anti- NATO demonstrations in Athens and Thessaloniki. In the cam- paign for the 16 February na- tional elections, the small Com- munist-front party has tried to capitalize on the Cyprus issue. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 v SECRET `"e President Nkrumah is mov- ing rapidly to strengthen his grip on Ghana and reshape it on models found in Communist coun- tries. While some such action was implicit in the recent ma- nipulated vote endorsing a one- party state, he has also been spurred on by continuing fear for his personal security in the wake of the abortive attempt on his life last month. His anxiety has been heightened by recent rumors--apparently un- founded--of an impending army takeover. - In a seeming effort to distract public attention from these rumors and to provide a scapegoat, Nkrumah last week turned on another intensive anti-American propaganda cam- paign through his Communist- influenced Convention People's Party (CPP). Concurrently he deported four US faculty mem- bers at the University of Ghana for "subversive activities" and reportedly ordered Ghanaian officials to shun Americans. The US Embassy in Accra noted late last week that its contacts with Ghanaians--both official and nonofficial--had already become more limited. Behind all these moves lies Nkrumah's deep conviction that US "imperialists" are bent on liquidating him. The increased number of Soviet personnel re- ported to be functioning now within his heavily guarded resi- dence suggests that he is relying more and more on Moscow to provide him even with physical protection. Nkrumah has cracked down sharply on university students, the bulk of whom have long been critical of the regime's left- ward drift. On 3 February the leader of the independent-minded Ghanaian student organization was arrested. Two days later it was announced that all gov- ernment scholarships--on which most university students depend --will henceforth be reviewed annually. A major requirement for renewals is "good conduct," interpreted in the controlled press as "close identification with the spirit and objects of the party." Students reportedly were seriously considering an early gesture of defiance, but appear to have been intimidated, for the present at least, by a mas- sive demonstration at the uni- versity on 8 February in which CPP toughs were assigned a prom- inent role. There are some in- dications that Western-oriented civil servants may be Nkrumah's next target. follow. Ghana's Parliament meets next week to enact the constitu- tional amendments approved in the late January referendum. The CPP will then legally assume its "leading core" role and the Presi- dent will have discretion to fire at will top-echelon members of the formerly independent judiciary. Replacement of several British- trained judges will probably soon SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 yr vr.r ,Lake ;.i Edward LrxkeJ Victoria REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 i%w 1"0 SECRET Incursions into Rwanda over the last three months by Tutsi tribal exiles living in Uganda, Tanganyika, the Congo, and Burundi have resulted in massive bloody retaliation by Rwandan authorities against Tutsis re- maining in the country, and may bring clashes between Rwanda and Burundi. Conservative es- timates put the Tutsi dead at 10,000. The disturbances find their genesis in the overthrow in 1959-60 of the centuries-old Tutsi feudal kingdom in Rwanda, then a Belgian trust territory. The majority (85 percent) Hutu tribe established anall-Hutu republican regime under Presi- dent Gregoire Kayibanda. The deposed king, Mwami Kigeri V, and 150,000 refugees fled into neighboring countries. There the Mwami and his followers, under the banner of the Rwandan National Union (UNAR), plot a Tutsi return to power. Burundi remains a Tutsi-dominated king- dom although the Hutu majority there have increasingly been brought into the government. Peiping is exploiting the Tutsi cause. Peiping and Burundi established diplomatic relations in Decem- ber and a Chinese embassy is being set up in Usumbura. Ever since Rwanda and Burundi gained independence in July 1962, Tutsis have conducted sporadic forays into Rwanda. Since late November UNAR agita- tors have persuaded large num- bers of refugees to join in a massive "invasion." While as many as 3,500 have formed up for this purpose, only a few small groups have actually crossed the border. On two oc- casions, authorities in Burundi and the Congo thwarted Tutsi attempts to invade Rwanda. In late December, however, one incursion advanced from Burundi to within 13 miles of the Rvandan capital, creating considerable panic. The Rwandan massacre of Tutsis followed. Rwanda and Burundi have charged each other with aggres- sion and appealed to the United Nations, and Rvanda has appealed to fellow Afro-Malagasy Union states and to the Organization of African Unity. President Kayibanda, convinced that Burundi authorities are encour- aging the Tutsis, threatens to exterminate the 250,000 or so who remain in Rwanda if the at- tacks continue. Burundi's charges that Kayibanda has al- ready massacred 16,000-18,000 Tutsis do not seem greatly ex- aggerated. Each side has moved some of its small military forces (some 1,500 each, count- ing police) to the common bor- der. Although each force is under the general control of Belgian training officers, clashes may nevertheless result. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 10 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 SECRET The political picture in East Africa has clarified some- what but, with the possible ex- ception of Uganda, instability is likely to remain the keynote in each of the four countries recently disturbed by mutiny or revolt. In Zanzibar, a month after the coup, lines of power are becoming discernible, although the government's external orien- tation is still hazy. The only US official on the islands re- ports that President Karume and Foreign Minister Babu dominate the regime. Pro-Communists other than Babu reportedly occupy secondary positions. The entire civilian structure oper- ates in the shadow of "Field Marshal" Okello and his gun- toting cohorts, who hold ultimate power but have been generally apolitical since the days im- mediately after the coup. The economy is said to be at a complete standstill, and this fact--coupled perhaps with pressure from neutralists with- in the regime--apparently is tempering any inclination to rely solely on Communist support. Instead, the government seems to be trying to establish the broadest possible connections abroad. Financial considera- tions seem likely to remain an important factor in Zanzibar's foreign policy. Unrest in Zanzibar, with its communal bitterness and evidence of outside involvement, has aroused anxiety in Kenya. In Prime Minister Kenyatta's cabinet, long-standing personal and political differences are increasingly taking the form of rivalry between Kikuyu and Luo tribesmen. Luo leader Oginga Odinga, a radical opportunist with many financial ties to the Communists, is trying to under- mine Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. Ken- yatta, who reportedly deprecates the tribalism issue, neverthe- less has come to rely on an inner circle of advisers who are nearly all Kikuyu. He is reluctant to force a showdown with Oginga, however, because to do so would probably lead to a period of extensive tribal conflict. In Tanganyika, President Nyerere and Foreign Minister Kambona apparently have shelved their differences for the time being. They will try to impose penalties on the leaders of January's mutiny that are stiff enough to discourage further attempts, but not so severe as to cause serious political re- percussions. The brief mutiny of Ugandan troops in late January and the government's subsequent request for British troops do not seem to have affected Prime Minister Obote's drive to set up a one- party state and to concentrate power in his own hands. Last week he felt strong enough to deliver a verbal attack on the important Baganda tribal group which is nominally allied with his party in the legislature. Obote has alienated many Ugan- dans during this drive, but the opposition, while vocal, seems divided and lacking in positive plans. SECRET Page 11 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 ``W SECRET STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE DISCUSSIONS An eight-nation working ful political reactions" in group has made considerable prog- Italy. The embassy reports ress in its initial examination that recent contacts with Ital- how of the political and military is- sues involved in the establish- ment of a NATO multilateral nu- clear force (MLF). Several im- portant questions remain unan- swered, however, and political problems within some participat- ing countries make it uncertain how the talks will now proceed. The Italian cabinet would prob- ably collapse if called on to commit itself formally to the project at this time, and the British Government apparently hopes to spin out the study phase until after this year's general elections. The working group and its military and legal subgroups have examined the questions of membership, juridical status, organization, and financing of the proposed force and its rela- tionship to NATO. The delegates have also broached the control problem, which will probably be one of the hardest to solve. The working group did agree to set up a mixed-manning demonstration, but the participation of Greece and Turkey may be affected by the Cyprus dispute. 'rihile the MLF has thus main- tained some momentum, considera- tion of the next steps to be taken has pointed up the formid- able political obstacles. The US Embassy in Rome has cautioned that any strong inference that the MLF has passed from the study to the treaty-drafting stage would likely result in `'unhelp- n ian Socialist leaders have s stiffening opposition to an MLF --centered on grounds that it would lead to the nuclear arma- ment of West Germany. Moreover, the embassy feels that Socialist objections would be reinforced if West Germany were to become the only major European power in an MLF--contrary to the claim of the West German ambassador to NATO that Italy would not be able to stay out if Bonn joins. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 grope Vftw JL+ Ut[r_Jl w AREA NOTE Italy: Recurrent nationwide measures. In all of the dis- strikes in Italy involving about putes the two major non-Com- 1,250,000 unionists pose a direct munist labor confederations threat to government efforts to have coordinated action with fight inflation with austerity the Communist-dominated one. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU1,11MARY Page 13 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 `"+ SECRET w Western Hemisphere A 24-hour general strike of over a million government employees on 5 February completely disrupted a number of public utilities and other services. The government has offered to implement long-prom- ised civil service reforms but wants to spread the cost over a three-year period to reduce the ef- fects on its austerity program. The union leaders rejected this plan but did call off another strike scheduled for 13-14 Febru- ary and express some optimism about a solution. Other major strikes involv- ing some 650,000 workers in the chemical and textile industries are under way or planned. Each group is seeking a 20-percent in- crease in wages. THE CANAL CRISIS AND PANAMANIAN POLITICS The hero's welcome staged for OAS Ambassador Miguel Moreno when he returned to Panama on 10 Febru- ary enhanced his prospects as a candidate in the forthcoming presi- dential elections and overshadowed the arrival of the OAS investigat- ing committee the next day. Moreno's intemperate presenta- tion to the OAS of Panama's charges of US aggression confirmed suspi- cions that he would use this mis- sion to further his presidential ambitions. These two groupings have been divided thus far in support of two lackluster candidates. If they combine behind Moreno, the tradi- tiona]. ruling group would have a single candidate with sufficient popular appeal, financial resources, and governmental backing to defeat Arnulfo Arias, whose chances for election have been mounting. Some Panamanians reportedly fear, how- ever, that Moreno's rabid national- ism might lead him to an accommoda- tion with pro-Communist elements. A scheduled 15 February rally of the Communist-guided Committee for the Rescue of National Sover- eignty, which is being widely pub- licized by news media, may be timed to impress the OAS committee as well as to maintain "popular" pres- sure on the Chiari government to stand fast on the canal dispute. The minister of government recently echoed extremist criticism of the slowness of OAS procedures and threats to resort to the UN when he received student marchers at the presidential palace. An editorial in the newspaper owned by the Chiari family subsequently asserted that the time had come for "Panama to abrogate the canal treaties unilat- erally." SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 SECRET Western Hemisphere CUBA AND THE US NAVAL BASE Castro's 6 February action against the US Guantanamo Naval Base water supply was apparently intended to dramatize the whole series of Cuban complaints against the US. The 5 February Cuban note to the UN Secretary General pointed out that the seizure of the four Cuban fish- ing boats in US waters was just one more incident in a US "pol- icy of aggression." It bla- tantly warned that this latest episode, unless "urgently neu- tralized in a proper manner," could lead to a situation simi- lar to the 1962 missile crisis. Statements by Cuban leaders since 6 February have repeatedly stressed that the naval base is- sue is only one facet of the US "policy of aggression" which "should be discussed." Castro himself specifically referred to violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters, alleged US subversive activities in Cuba, "pirate" raids against Cuban targets, and US efforts to isolate Cuba diplomatically and economically from the non- Communist world. This in ef- fect reiterates the "Five Points" Castro put forward in October 1962 as the requisites for peace in the Caribbean area. The Cubans are apparently staking out their positions on issues on which they may intend, at a time of their own choosing, to formally demand UN considera- tion. Castro declared on 6 Feb- ruary that "we are not proposing a fight over the base," and Presi- dent Dorticos repeated the next day Cuba's long-standing posi- tion that its claim to the base territory will be formalized "at such time as we consider convenient... through interna- tional channels and organs." Although the evidence re- mains circumstantial, there are indications Havana may have de- liberately touched off the lat- est series of incidents to pro- voke a US response. The fish- ing boats acted provocatively when they knew they were under US Coast Guard surveillance on 2 February. Some of the crew- men told US authorities they had been ordered into US waters, that they were advised before leaving Havana of their "his- toric" mission, and that, if their boats were not molested by US authorities, other ships would be sent. some military equip- ment, including tanks and artil- lery, have been. moved from Cuban military encampments in eastern Cuba. While Soviet statements suggest readiness to give Cas- tro strong propaganda and diplo- matic support for his present SECRET Page 15 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 `"j SECRET `"f actions, Moscow probably will seek to prevent his anti-US agitation from inflicting seri- ous damage on US-Soviet rela- tions. Reaction in Latin America has been. moderate and generally favorable toward the US. The strongest support came from the Central American governments and the Dominican Republic. However, official and public opinion in some countries is op- posed to an intensified US eco- nomic offensive against Cuba. The embassy in Mexico City reported that even the leftist press there did not react strongly on the Guantanamo is- sue and that Cuban-US develop- ments were generally overshad- owed by other events. A sub- secretary of the Mexican For- eign Ministry expressed the be- lief that the fishing boat in- cident was a deliberate effort on Cuba's part to provoke a US response which would provide a pretext for cutting off the Guantanamo water supply. A Chilean Foreign Ministry official. stated a similar view, adding that the provocation was designed to bring pressure for revision of the Guantanamo treaty while the atmosphere was clouded by the events in Panama. On the other hand, he was "noncommittal" on the need. for increased eco- nomic pressure on Cuba. Noting the continued trade between Cuba and various European coun- tries, he stated that the US economic offensive against the Castro regime is not proving successful. Colombian and Costa Rican officials had similar opinions on the effectiveness of the US economic campaign. The Argentine press stressed US efforts to become self-sufficient in water at the naval base. The press in Brazil emphasized other aspects of the problem, such as the de- fection of US citizen Dennis Kirby, but no adverse editorial reaction was evident in Brazil- ian radio or newspaper accounts. Foreign Ministry spokes- men in Nicaragua, Honduras,. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti expressed solid support for the US. Most of them asserted that Castro will continue his "ag- gressive course of action" in the hemisphere and that the US policy toward Cuba "must remain firm." Some criticized those US allies whose pursuit of trade is "overcoming their interest in an anti-Castro alignment." The Dominican regime, possibly attempting in part to ingratiate itself with Wash- ington, gave the most categor- ical support to the US of all the governments in the hemis- phere. The president of the ruling junta said the Domini- can Republic was willing to provide all assistance "with- in its capabilities" for any action Washington wished to take against Castro. He spe- cifically offered to supply water, equipment, manpower, transportation, and "bases." SECRET Page 16 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 `"'' SECRET V"W Western Hemisphere Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos will meet with President Johnson in California on 21 and 22 February in the first of a series of talks Lopez has planned with other heads of state before his term ends this December. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, who as presidential can- didate of the ruling, semioffi- cial party is Lopez' certain successor, is likely to retain the main lines of his foreign policies. These include a cor- dial but "independent" relation- ship with the US, a tendency to expand contacts with the bloc, and refusal to cooperate on any strong hemispheric action against Cuba. The settlement late last year of the long-pending Chami- zal territorial dispute leaves US-Mexican relations relatively free of serious difficulties at present. However, one poten- tially grave problem is that raised by US water conservation policies in southwestern Arizona which have caused adverse effects in the Mexicali valley, an impor- tant agricultural area in north- western Mexico. The Lopez gov- ernment has long been pressing the US to take measures to re- duce the excessive salinity of Colorado River water of US ori- gin which is used in irrigating the Mexicali valley. Mexico al- so charges that the projected drilling of 200 deep wells near the Mexican border will dry up the Mexicali underground water supply. Mexican authorities in the area regard the latter issue as potentially the more harmful to US-Mexican relations. Communists, who perhaps are more numerous and politically influen- tial in the valley than in most other regions of Mexico, are ex- ploiting both problems. Mexico's dealings with Com- munist China are at present an- other important aspect of Lopez' foreign policy. Mexico recently has taken several steps--includ- ing greater sales of agricultural products--which will increase commercial and cultural contacts. The government reportedly will permit Chinese Communist press representatives--in Mexico since last July--to remain at least six months longer and authorize Peiping to establish a permanent five-man trade delegation. More- over, increasing speculation F_ that Mexico will grant ip oma is recognition to Commu- nist China will probably be even more pronounced during and fol- lowing the scheduled 16-19 March visit to Mexico of French Presi- dent de Gaulle. Recognition of Peiping would not be out of line with Mexico's eagerness to demon- strate its "freedom" from US in- fluence and might possibly be inspired in part by a need to placate the ruling party's ex- treme leftist wing. Mexico's relations with other Latin American countries continue to be dominated by rigid adherence to the tradition of "nonintervention." The Lopez government, which maintains dip- lomatic relations with Cuba, will probably oppose any move in the OAS to censure Cuba for its clan- destine delivery of arms to Vene- zuelan rebels last year. However, Mexico continues quietly to imple- ment measures to reduce travel to and from Cuba by way of Mexico. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 17 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 SECRET Western Hemisphere ARGENTINE LABOR PROTEST The Argentine General Con- federation of Labor (CGT) has launched the first stage of a militant plan to force govern- ment action on its extensive economic and political demands. These tactics could lead to vio- lence and compound President Illia's economic problems. The CGT gave the Illia administration, which took of- fice last October, three months' grace before beginning its sharp criticism of government inaction on labor's problems. Heading its complaints are unemployment and the decline in real wages accompanying the economic recession of the past two years. Living costs rose 27.6 percent during 1963, accelerating during the last quarter and into 1964. Unemployment amounts to some 10 percent of the labor force, but both unemployment and under- employment are proportionately more severe in the industrial sector, the stronghold of the CGT. In addition to economic demands, such as a minimum wage law, price control, and steps to reduce unemployment, the CGT is pressing several politi- cal issues. These include re- peal of "repressive legisla- tion"--that is, current bans on Communist and Peronist ac- tivity--and a "generous and effective amnesty." Several Peronist labor leaders are still under detention for crimes not included in the political amnesty last year. The first stage of the three-stage plan calls for ex- tensive publicity and organiza- tional activity to prepare for the more aggressive strike ac- tion to follow. The second stage, scheduled for the period 1-25 March, provides for the "partial occupation" of fac- tories and business establish- ments throughout the country. The third stage is to be "com- plete occupation" of these facil- ities for a period of 24 hours sometime between 25 and 31 March, and is to be carried out if the government does not act on the CGT demands. The government's failure to make a formal reply to the CGT's petition presented in early December has increased pressure on the confederation's leadership to assume a more aggressive stand. The relatively moderate leaders now in control of the CGT fear that their posi- tion will be undermined by the agitation of extremist elements. They hope that the government will respond to some of their demands in order to preclude carrying out the second- and third-stage plans and thereby giving the extremists a pre- text for provoking violence. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SW MARY Page 18 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 SECRET IWAW Western Hemisphere Bolivia: Vice President Juan Lechin's decision of 6 February to challenge President Paz in Bolivia's June elections seems likely to mark the beginning of a prolonged period of mounting tension and sporadic violence. This move is the most serious break in the unity of the ruling Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) since it came to power in 1952. Both the Lechin and Paz factions have substantial paramilitary forces which are rel- atively undisciplined. Lechin's pro-Communist sup- porters in the left sector of the MNR will hold a convention begin- ing on 2 March. They will decide at that time whether to seek the backing of other opposition polit- ical parties of Communist and non- Communist orientation in an elec- British Guiana: The 1-9 Feb- ruary freedom march organized by British Guiana's ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP) took place without serious incidents despite advance reports that the PPP was spoiling for trouble. The turnout of only 7,000-8,000 PPP supporters at the final rally in the capital was characterized by the US consul general as "unimpressive." In his address to the rally, Premier Cheddi Jagan called for a merger of the PPP and the oppo- sition People's National Congress (PNC`, attacked British and US "imi. :ialism," and declared "open season" on the conservative United Force party. The consul general interpreted the speech as a tacit instruction to the party faithful to refrain from provocations pend- toral front. The Bolivian Commu- nist Party has already announced its support of the Lechinists. The MNR may be faced with ad- ditional defections which could cloud the electoral outlook.\, ing discussions Jagan hopes to ar- range with the PNC and the media- tion efforts of a Ghanaian mission .which arrived this week. Aside from Jagan's apparent desire not to foreclose these pos- sibilities for some solution of the colony's crucial racial and polit- ical tensions--which continue to block elections leading toward in- dependence--the largely peaceful character of the march may also be attributable to the precautionary measures taken by the police and by the British troops. Moreover, the opposition parties advised their members to keep off the streets and avoid trouble. SECRET 14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Page 19 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3 w SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3