WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4
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RIPPUB
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S
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29
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 9, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 28, 1964
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
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Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 D1= F`ICE -OE CU 9F 41T: .INTLLIGENCE State Dept. review completed 28 February 1964 ()CINQ. 0320/64 Copy. No. RAL I T LL G: A-+GENCY Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 SECRET (Information as of 1200 EST, 27 February 1964) THE COMMUNIST WORLD KHRUSHCHEV DE-EMPHASIZES NEW LANDS He is publicizing the view that his new program for greater use of chemical fertilizers and irrigation in Soviet agriculture will permit eventual reduction of grain farming in the New Lands. MOSCOW AGAIN SHOWS CONFIDENCE IN BULGARIAN LEADER ZHIVKOV He has returned from Moscow with the largest credit the USSR has granted any bloc country since 1961. Some as- pects of the Sino-Soviet dispute and questions of bloc unity may also have been discussed during the visit. EAST GERMANY STEPS UP CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION The regime, with some success, is intensifying its ef- forts to induce neutralist countries to accept the Com- munist "two Germanys" theory and ignore West German threats of political and economic reprisals. POLISH REGIME FACES LABOR UNREST It is preparing for possible serious labor reaction this spring and summer when the already restive popu- lace'feels the impact of wage reductions and employ- ment cutbacks under the new anti-inflationary program. CIIOU EN-LA I VISITS SOUTH ASIA He has assured his hosts in Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon of Peiping's peaceful intentions, blaming India for fail- ure to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute. Chou has also pressed for a new Asian-African conference. NEW TALKS SCHEDULED ON INDONES IA-MALAYSIA DISPUTE However, these, like the earlier talks, will be hampered by Indonesia's refusal to withdraw troops from Malaysian Borneo until a political settlement is reached and by Malaysia's opposition to a settlement before withdrawal. Page 1 KHANH TRYING TO ASSERT CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM General Khanh continues to try to reinvigorate the Sai- gon government's a aratus SECRET 29"' Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 SECRET ASIA-AFRICA (continued) CYPRIOTS TURNING IRE TOWARD UK AND US They are angry over lack of support in the UN Security Council, and are making gestures toward the USSR; Maka- rios may be aiming to force out British troops. GABON REGIME STILL FACES DIFFICULTIES The French intervention to restore President Mba has succeeded in stabilizing the situation temporarily, but the hostile reaction inside and outside the country suggests that Mba and possibly other pro-French African leaders may have been weakened over the longer run. DE GAULLE'S MEETINGS WITH ERHARD AND SEGNI De Gaulle's talks this month with the West German Chan- cellor and the Italian President produced no surprises. NEW AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR Josef Klaus' replacement of Alfons Gorbach signals a shake-up in the government which may jeopardize the two-party coalition which has governed for IS years. SECRET 20 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 swo~ SECRET WESTERN HEMISPHERE Page TI1E SITUATION IN PANAMA to Presidont Chiari, still under conflicting pressures end the US-Panamanian impasse, is quietly supporting dis- cussions to this end under both UN and OAS auspices. The Communists meanwhile are missing no opportunity to pro- long the crisis as long as it suits their purposes. POLITICAL TURMOIL IN BOLIVIA President Paz Estenssoro's bid for re-election is rbeing hindered by dissension in his own party and surpris- ingly ingly stiff resistance from disparate opposition groups. CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO OPEN TRADE MISSION IN BRAZIL While the Brazilian presidential press secretary regards this move as a prelude to full diplomatic relations, the foreign minister has claimed that no decision is likely before the next UN deliberation of the China question. LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT WEEK IN EL SALVADOR The Rivera government, eager to prove that it is genu- inely democratic, is taking pains to avoid the grievances which led all the opposition to boycott the 1962 elections. SECRET 15 HJRR JNT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Available Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 *we SECRET KHRUSHCHEV DE-EMPHASIZES NEW LANDS Khrushchev is publicizing the view that his new program for greater use of chemical fertilizers and irrigation in Soviet agriculture will permit an eventual reduction of grain farming in the New Lands_I Of approximately 225 mil- lion acres now being farmed in the New Lands, 100 million were brought under cultivation in the last decade. Production of grains in the area has been de- clining for several years, and mismanagement of the land has 25X1 led to serious wind erosion. This together with a severe drought in 1963 resulted in the poorest crop since the incep- tion of the program. The intention is probably to 25X1 introduce a rational soil con- servation program--rotating grain with other crops, fallow- ing, and seeding the more mar- ginal land to grasses. Some such program probably will be adopted even if--as thus far seems possible--this year's grain harvest in the area is relatively good. Precipitation this past fall and winter has been above normal. 25X1 SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 SE CRET MOSCOW AGAIN SHOWS CONFIDENCE IN BULGARIAN LEADER ZHIVKOV Bulgaria's premier and party boss, Todor Zhivkov, has come home from his 17-19 February trip to Moscow with renewed evi- dence of Russian confidence in his leadership. Moscow has granted Bulgaria a new $333-mil- lion credit and has established a joint Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Coop- eration. The credit, the largest the USSR has given any Soviet bloc country since 1961, will be used to support Bulgaria's Fifth Five- Year Plan, due to commence in 1966, and probably to help fi- nance Soviet equipment and tech- nical aid for Bulgarian construc- tion projects between now and 1969. The new intergovernmental commission is apparently similar to those Moscow recently set up with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which are responsible for bilat- eral coordination of economic plans for 1966-70, including the supply of Soviet raw materials and the development of speciali- zation of labor and cooperation in many economic sectors. The commissions serve to bind these countries to the Soviet economy and will help to lay the ground- work for preparing the new sat- ellite economic plans to 1970. The agreements are probably also intended to give new impetus toward greater intrabloc inte- gration, largely stalled since the defeat last year of Khru- shchev's proposal for a planning staff within the bloc-wide Coun- cil for Mutual Economic Assist- ance. While the communiqud issued at the end of Zhivkov's visit was a routine resumd of Soviet views on international questions, speeches by the Soviet and Bul- garian leaders suggest that as- pects of the Sino-Soviet dispute and questions of bloc unity were also discussed. Although Moscow has always underwritten Bulgaria's economic development, the new credit will be understood in Bulgaria as a fresh sign of Soviet support for the Bulgarian leader. Zhivkov, who lacks a broad base of support in the still hard-line Bulgarian party, has been criticized since assuming the premiership in No- vember 1962 for failing to find quick solutions to chronic na- tional economic problems. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 V SWO k Country extending full recognition All hae,ri I . 1 (;F'r~rnr r nha,sie A"PI 1 eg,inr1, which hrts a Country with Fast German consulate.: general or consulate (All but Syri t bav - nns1,/e,t?s et,('rnL r country with official East German trade mission o Country with unofficial, East German trade mission 28 FGaRUARY 1964 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 East German Representation Abroad Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 low-, V4001 SECRET The Communist World EAST GERMANY STEPS UP CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION The East German regime, with some success, is intensi- fying its efforts to induce neutralist countries to accept the Communist "two Germanys" theory and to ignore West Ger- man threats of political and economic reprisals. These efforts to gain international acceptance have been enhanced by the regime's dealings with West Berlin on the Christmas pass agreement and have been spurred by Bonn's efforts to normalize its relations with the East European countries. The East Germans achieved their most notable success to date in Zanzibar, where their diplomats outmaneuvered nego- tiators from West Germany and. secured the new regime's per- mission to establish full dip- lomatic relations. East Ger- man media now assert that the East German chargd has received Zanzibar's agrement as ambas- sador. This doubtless will be used by regime spokesmen in an effort to induce other African countries to grant East Ger- many, if not de jure recogni- tion,at least semidiplomatic status for its trade missions. While politburo member Bruno Leuschner's recent month- long trip to Indonesia, Cam- bodia, Burma, Ceylon, and India failed to yield spectacular results, he induced Ceylon to raise the East German trade mission in Colombo to consulate general status. Moreover, his welcome by top government of- ficials, including Nehru in India, will fuel propaganda claims that East Germany is a respected international entity. In India, Cambodia, and Ceylon, his visit coincided with the signature of cultural agreements. He appears to have laid the basis for a degree of long-term economic cooperation with Cam- bodia. West Germany's response to Ceylon's action was unex- pectedly sharp. Six times before, it had reluctantly tol- erated the setting up of East German consulates general else- where. In this case, however, its concern that other nations might follow suit caused it to terminate economic assistance to Colombo--a sharp reminder that Bonn still follows its Hallstein Doctrine and will break off diplomatic relations with any nonbloc nation that recognizes East Germany. The East German regime is loudly claiming that its suc- cesses have created a real di- lemma for Bonn despite its much greater economic power. For- eign Minister Bolz, greeting Leuschner upon his return, de- clared that Bonn's efforts to enforce its Hallstein Doctrine involved open interference in the internal affairs of neutral- ist countries. Bolz also sought to appeal to West German oppo- nents of the doctrine when he characterized it as "a noose which West German policy has put round its own neck and which dom of movement." SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 POLISH REGIME FACES LABOR UNREST The Polish Government is preparing for possible serious labor unrest in reaction to Gomulka's new anti-inflationary measures, which, among other ef- fects, will result in a signifi- cant unemployment problem for the first time in the postwar period. The most dangerous pe- riod will come this spring and summer when an already restive population feels the full im- pact of wage reductions and em- ployment cutbacks. Approximately 300,000 new workers will be com- peting this year for only 100,- 000 new jobs, and food shortages are at their worst just before the summer harvest begins. As a precaution, the re- gime has been building up its security forces, even though it hopes through nonviolent meas- ures to head off any civil dis- orders. An unusual number of top party leaders, for example, have been visiting industrial plants around the country giv- ing speeches designed to mollify the workers. Gomulka himself spoke at the Zeran automobile works. Local governments also are reportedly scaling down plans for mass participation in this year's observance of 22 July, Poland's national day. Some plans have been made to have 100,- 000 workers return to the coun- tryside, but few jobs are avail- able there. The regime also hopes to halt the flow of labor from rural areas to the cities, but is likely to be only partly successful. Much of the pros- pective unemployment is likely to be among young people, white- collar workers, and women--espe- cially nonparty members. Peasants "commuting" from the fare: to in- dustrial jobs also will suffer. On 3 February a Katowice newspaper reported that of the many workers who had been dis- charged since the end of the year, 4,500 were white-collar workers. The paper frankly stated that "not all would find work this year." A recent is- sue of the party weekly Polityka reported the firing of uppto 10,000 design engineers, and noted that those who were re- tained faced salary cuts. "For many people there will be no work," the paper added, and it quoted "embittered designers" as saying they are the "victims of someone else's errors." There are indications of differences at high party levels over the wisdom of the retrench- ment plan. Jozef Olszewski was recently dismissed from his post as chief of the central committee economic department probably because he outspokenly opposed full implementation of the harsh party program. Ols- zewski apparently stuck to his views even after demotion and "exile" to Katowice, because re- portedly he also was ousted from the post he took there. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 N SECRET Chou En-lai's current trip to Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon is part of Peiping's developing campaign to present itself as a reasonable power, firmly op- posed to imperialism in any form. Chou has sought to assure his hosts of China's peaceful inten- tions and has pressed for a new Asian-African conference. In all three countries he made a special effort to present Pei- ping's case in the Sino-Indian border dispute, to reiterate China's desire for a fair set- tlement, and to blame New Delhi for failure to reach agreement. In Rangoon, Chou got a wary reception, although the Burmese rolled out the protocol red carpet and public statements made much of Sino-Burmese friend- ship. Ne Win's desire to main- tain a neutral stance resulted in a cautious final communique on 18 February which must have been disappointing to Peiping. The Burmese paid lip service to Chinese leadership in Asia and expressed the hope that Peiping and New Delhi would enter nego- tiations "on the basis of the Colombo proposals"--a plan for bringing India and China to the conference table advanced by Ceylon and five other nonaligned states in December 1962. The visit to Pakistan appears to have been more successful. Chou made a strong bid for closer ties by supporting the Pakistani position on the Kashmir question. Breaking a long-standing Chinese silence on the explosive issue, he declared that the dispute should be "resolved in accord with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, as pledged to them by India and Pakistan." Although the joint communi- qu6 issued at the conclusion of Chou's talks with Ayub Khan on 23 February avoided the word "plebiscite"--a solution to the Kashmir problem favored by Pak- istan and firmly opposed by New Delhi--its language has been interpreted by both the Pakistani and Indian press as a solid en- dorsement of Pakistan's position. The statement also endorsed another Asian-African conference, demanded Chinese Communist admis- sion to the UN, and called for a "peaceful negotiated settlement" of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Chou may plan during his stay in Ceylon to suggest new terms for negotiations with India or SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 SECRET The Communist World make a gesture calculated to give the appearance of new Chi- nese flexibility on the Colombo formula., Peiping probably an- ticipates--correctly--that India will reject any suggestion which falls short of full accept- ance of the Colombo proposals as interpreted by New Delhi and is prepared to exploit this as demonstration of stubborn In- dian refusal to accept a peace- ful Chinese overture. NOTE: Tito, Nasir, and other sponsors of a second sum- mit conference of nonaligned nations are pushing hard to ensure that it conies off before the proposed conference of all Asian and African states. A nonaligned preparatory session --at the ambassadorial level-- is scheduled for Colombo for mid- March. The summit meeting it- self is expected to take place sometime in September, probably in Cairo. The rival Asian-African conference, a pet project of the Indonesians as well as Pei- ping, will probably take place in their country at Bandung-- as did the 1955 gathering . The timing of the meeting itself, however, or of any preparatory session, is not yet firm. 25X1 SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 SECRET NEW TALKS SCHEDULED ON INDONESIA-MALAYSIA DISPUTE Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines reportedly have agreed to new ministerial talks which will open in' Bangkok on 3 March. The talks will be ham- pered, however, by the same problem present at the February meeting: Indonesia's refusal to withdraw troops, regular or irregular, from Malaysian Bor- neo until a political settlement is reached, and Malaysia's re- fusal to agree to a settlement until withdrawal is arranged. The Philippines, while essen- tially supporting Indonesia against Malaysia, tries to main- tain an appearance of moderation and mediation. Malaysia declared an "air defense zone" effective 25 Feb- ruary over Malaysian Borneo and adjacent waters to discourage Indonesia from infiltrating new personnel or resupplying its guerrilla fighters by airdrop. The UK, at Malaysia's behest, has ordered that any Indonesian aircraft violating the air zone be shot down. However, Foreign Minister Subandrio reiterated on 24 Feb- ruary that Indonesia will find "ways and means" to resupply its guerrillas in Borneo. If they are not resupplied, he claimed, "they surely would not obey the order given them to cease fire." It is believed that more than 200 Indonesian guerrillas are still inside Malaysian Bor- neo. Malaysian authorities have reported seven incidents there since the cease-fire became ef- fective on 25 January. Although preoccupied with Malaysia confrontation, Indone- sian Government officials have indicated some concern over the more aggressive tactics of the Communist Party and over Indo- nesia's rice shortage, an annual development which this year is one of the worst the country has experienced. Communist-controlled labor unions seized the offices of British estates and companies in Java and North Sumatra last month. Those properties located in Java--but not those in Sumatra --have since been turned over to government "supervisory" person- nel. Indonesian officials may fear disturbances over the rice shortage in East and Cen- tral Java. The Communist Party, although capable of serious ex- ploitation of the rice shortage SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 7 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 u V rv t Jut,a Sea Djakarta Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Ne SECRET through its strength among the peasantry and urban wage-earn- ers, apparently prefers at this time to concentrate on such is- sues as Malaysia, anti-Ameri- canism, and efforts to gain representation in the cabinet. KI-IANII TRYING TO ASSERT CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM General Khanh continues to try to consolidate his con- morale has trol in Saigon and to expand dropped in o the regular the South Vietnamese Government's and paramilitary forces. This presence in the countryside. He has made more trips to the provinces and has taken several steps designed to revive the amnesty program for Viet Cong followers, which had bogged down after a promising start early last year. The new regime has also at least promised to set rig- orous standards of conduct for its administrators and to im- pose stiff penalties on corrupt or abusive officials. At the same time, it apparently plans to hold early trials for per- sons accused of misdemeanors under the old Diem regime, and has arrested more of Diem's former ministers. Khanh has not yet indicated, however, when or what formal charges will be brought against the ar- rested generals who composed the recently ousted junta. drop is attributed in part to Khanh's move against popular members of the former junta as well as to increased military resistance from well-armed Viet Con units. ere is grow- ing neu ra is ntiment in the countryside and among urban youth. SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Nwop~ NOW SECRET Viet Cong military pres- sure on the government had grad- ually picked up since the end of the Communists' self-pro- claimed cease-fire during the mid-February lunar new year celebrations, but it is still at normal levels. Recent armed Communist attacks have been on a small scale, but there have been some effective ambushes, raids, and sabotage. There appears to be increased empha- sis on terrorism against stra- tegic hamlet officials and on propaganda to encourage the idea that defeat of the Saigon regime is inevitable. CYPRIOTS TURNING IRE TOWARD UK AND US The Greek Cypriots' grow- ing estrangement from the US and the UK has been accompanied by a closer relationship be- tween'the Makarios government and the Soviet Union. Vice. President Kuchuk, the Turkish Cypriot leader, has denounced President Makarios' plan to recruit an additional 5,000 special police as designed to "legalize acts of murder, arson, and looting." Turkey's Foreign Minister Erkin has also expressed concern over the move and over Makarios' demand that all Cypriot civilians turn in their arms. Erkin complains that if the Turkish Cypriots do not turn in their weapons, they will be treated as outlaws; if they comply with the order, they will be defenseless. Makarios' latest move may also be part of an over-all plan to force the British to leave Cyprus. The new police recruits, added to the present 1,200- member Greek Cypriot police force, will give Makarios nearly as many as the 7,000 troops in the British peace-keeping force. On several recent occasions, the Greek Cypriots have pro- tested activities of members of the British force--alleging that they are preventing the Cypriot police from performing their duties and that they are aiding the Turkish Cypriots to create de facto partition. The Greek Cypriot press continues highly critical of the US and the UK for failing to support Makarios'position before the UN Security Council. Well-known anti-Communists, such as Minister of Labor SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 ~00 %0 Principal BtiUSh sovermgn base uea5 Prncipal roads Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 SECRET IMP, Asia-Africa Papadopoulos,,, are calling for closer relations with the So- viet bloc. Negotiations for a Cypriot-Soviet air agreement are under way in Nicosia. The negotiations were scheduled prior to the outbreak of vio- lence but both governments are utilizing them to emphasize the trend toward closer relations. Leaders in both Greece and Turkey have expressed the view that a Cyprus solution will require an understanding between top officials of their countries. Both sides appear reluctant, however, to initiate soundings for a possible "sum- .mit" meeting. In addition, Greek Premier Papandreou has told the US ambassador he can- not ignore the current wave of emotional feeling for Cyprus in Greece by publicly opposing Makarios. He has promised, how- ever, to try to exercise a re- straining influence on the Greek Cypriots. Papandreou has again warned that while a Greco-Turk- ish war would be "insane," Greece will react immediately if the Turks move into Cyprus. In the Mersin-Iskenderun area of southern Turkey--op- posite Cyprus--there has been a continuation of the build-up of Turkish forces for possible use on Cyprus. Landing craft and trucks have arrived, the former significantly improving Turkey's capability to put troops ashore on Cyprus. Collapse of the UN secre- tary general's efforts to find a compromise resolution on Cy- prus has been followed by a similar effort by the six non- permanent members of the Se- curity Council. If this at- tempt also fails, Makarios may attempt to get a special meet- ing of the General Assembly, where Cyprus probably expects widespread support for its un- derdog role in the dispute. Meanwhile,the refugee sit- uation on the island is be- coming critical, with some 6,000 Greek and 42,000 Turkish Cypriots reportedly in desper- ate need of assistance. These figures could rise to 20,000 and 60,000, respectively, in the next 30 days. SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY page 10 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 :11RRAII&NI IVORY r TO `GABON S'CONGG --/ ,>ENYRAL AFRICAN f' N REPUBLIC IMERGOt, Afro-Malagasy Union ([JAM) RI 1'1 IBLIC \MALAGA Y souflhtO .' REPUBLI RHODESIA RICINANAI ANI Rep. ,IS AI,u.l AFRICA R H P U 6 11 C RWANO~..1 t,-~r' o r T r l e I? RI NI / ~cllTH % Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 SECRET *toe GABON REGIME STILL FACES DIFFICULTIES Gabon's President Leon Mba appears to be moving to stabilize his position in the wake of the French Army's nullification of the 18 February military coup. However, reactions in Gabon and elsewhere in Africa to Paris' military intervention have been unfavorable, and Mba may be per- manently branded as a French puppet. Since his restoration on 19 February, Mba has been pressed by the French to modify the hard line he took immediately after being reinstated. The military participants in the coup are in prison, but Mba has since pro- claimed that the civilian poli- ticians involved--his "children who wandered"--would not be pun- ished unless an "inquiry commis- sion" found they were directly connected with the coup. Mba had taken a number of repressive measures against opponents dur- ing the past few years, however, and associates who supported this policy presumably are urging him to resume it. Currently, ex - eoreign Minis- ter Jean Aubame, who headed the short-lived provisional govern- ment, and most of the other mem- bers of that regime are free, although Mba has decreed that they will not be permitted to contest the legislative elections now rescheduled for 12 April. These elements might nonetheless be allowed to participate in a postelection government, an ar- rangement reportedly sought by the French. The French are making strong efforts to justify their inter- vention and to counter the ad- verse criticism which arose from it. They have reportedly already withdrawn the bulk of the 350 re- inforcements flown into Libre- ville. However, the 15 Gabonese deaths which occurred when the French moved in have aroused strong anti-French passions throughout Gabon, where it is felt that Paris could have forced formation of a coalition govern- ment without bloodshed. The decisive French move in Gabon may over the short run have the intended stabilizing effect on the states of former French Africa. Many of the old-line leaders of the Paris-oriented Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM) states have already blessed the French action. By so doing, however, these conservative "first-generation" leaders have rendered themselves vulnerable to the charges of radical African states that they are dupes of a colonialist power. Within the UAM states them- selves, moreover, youngEi,,better educated elements particularly sensitive to their countries' dependence on Paris are showing their resentment. This kind of reaction, which will sharpen their frictions with the estab- lished leaders, is particularly noticeable so far in Chad, where a split appears to be develop- ing within the government be- tween the "young Turks" and the 25X1 conservative elements. SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 INWO~ SECRET DE GAULLE'S MEETINGS WITH ERHARD AND SEGNI De Gaulle's meetings with West German Chancellor Erhard on 14 and 15 February and with Italian President Segni and Foreign Minister Saragat be- tween 19 and 22 February pro- duced no surprises. The visit- ing leaders stated their re- sepctive positions on European and East-West issues more forth- rightly than did their predeces- sor governments on similar oc- casions in the past, but failed to budge De Gaulle. De Gaulle's session with Erhard was the semiannual heads- of-government meeting provided for by the year-old Franco- German treaty. Some agreement was reached on bilateral mat- ters such as greater use of those areas set aside for joint military training. Discussion of joint projects for the pro- duction of certain weapons ap- parently made little progress, however. The forthcoming Latin American trips of De Gaulle and West German President Luebke brought about a vague "agree- ment" on the coordination of investment in Latin America. SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 SECRET Europe Chancellor Alfons Gorbach's resignation on 25 February sig- nals a shakeup in the Austrian Government which may jeopardize the two-party coalition that has ruled the country for 18 years. Gorbach has been replaced by Josef Klaus, chairman of the Catholic People's Party, the larger member of the coalition. Klaus leads the faction in that party which thinks Gorbach has been too conciliatory in his dealings with the Socialist Party, the other partner in the coali- tion. Klaus had resigned his post as finance minister last year to emphasize this view, and it was growing support for Klaus that led to Gorbach's res- ignation. The coalition, which in- cludes the only two parties of any size in Austria, has become increasingly fragile since the end of the Soviet occupation of Austria in 1955. It was held together only with difficulty after a bitterly contested elec- tion in 1962 in which the Peo- ple's Party won 81 seats in the legislature to 76 for the So- cialists. Although Klaus apparently intends to fill several of the cabinet posts allocated to the People's Party with individuals who share his attitude toward the partnership, indications are that the Socialists are agreeable to preserving it. In the imme- diate future, moreover, the pro- gram of a Klaus government is not likely to differ greatly from that of the outgoing regime; over-all defense and foreign policies seem certain of remain- ing firmly fixed. Klaus' rec- ord indicates, however, that he is likely to acerbate long- standing doctrinal differences between the two parties, making a long "honeymoon" improbable. On the EEC the parties ap- pear to be somewhat closer than they were some months ago. The discouraging results of recent efforts to expand Austrian trade with the bloc and poor prospects for exports to Western Europe are lessening Socialist opposi- tion to some sort of association with that community. SECRET Page 14 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 SECRET Western Hemisphere President Chiari continues under conflict- ing pressures in his efforts to bring an end to the impasse in US-Panamanian relations. The strongest of these pressures and the one he cannot resist is the demand from a majority of his countrymen that the US- Panamanian treaty be revised. On the other hand, Chiari remains under pressure from his fellow oligarchs to ease the strained relations between the US and Panama. Although he cannot bow to the urgings of these oligarchs, his past sus- ceptibility to their influence makes him suspect in the eyes of the left. Furthermore, he is aware that any softening in his position would seriously impair the chances of the gov- ernment-sponsored presidential candidate in the May elections. The US Consulate in Panama City feels that economic dete- rioration is close to the point where conditions will be ripe for a move by either leftist or rightist elements to oust the Chiari government. Capital flight since the beginning of the crisis on 9 January now amounts to more than $28 mil- lion and is continuing. Sales of almost all goods have de- clined, and banks reportedly are sharply reducing both per- sonal and business loans. Under these circumstances the local Communist apparatus is missing no opportunity to gain strength and influence. The official line on the crisis developed by Panama's Communist party, however, stresses opposi- tion to a coup effort at this time. This is presumably be- cause the party is convinced that the Chiari administration's inept handling of the current crisis serves Communist pur- poses quite satisfactorily for the time being. Indeed, the Communists can be expected to bend every effort to prolong the US-Panamanian conflict in anticipation that it will eventually produce a revolu- tionary situation. Meanwhile, Chiari has been quietly supporting discussions held under both UN and OAS aus- pices to end the impasse. A Costa Rican move to mediate the US-Panamanian dispute led to a 20 February meeting between Chiari and Costa Rican Presi- dent Orlich. Discussions have continued since then, and on 25 February, the Costa Rican UN am- bassador reported his impression that the conferees were close to agreement on some new proposals. Panama, however, has not given up the idea of appealing its case directly to the UN, or of taking some drastic unilat- eral action. A local radio- broadcast of 24 February spoke of the possibility that the President may call a special session of the National Assem- bly to "reject" all US-Panamanian treaties. SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 15 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 SE CRET ?.rr Western Hemisphere POLITICAL TURMOIL IN BOLIVIA The political situation in Bolivia is becoming increas- ingly turbulent as the presiden- tial campaign approaches the home stretch. President Paz Estenssoro's bid for re-elec- tion is being hindered by dis- sension within his own party, the National Revolutionary Move- ment (MNR), and by surprisingly stiff resistance from disparate opposition groups. Political infighting has been fierce for several weeks; on 22 February it erupted into violence. On that day, the home of Vice President Lechin, Paz' pro-Communist archrival, was bombed. In short order, the homes of two pro-Paz gov- ernment officials got the same treatment. Then, on 25 Febru- ary, an attempt was made to as- sassinate air force commander Rene Barrientos, who, bitter at losing the MNR's vice-presi- dential nomination to Federico Fortun, has turned against Paz. Also, Paz' refusal to back Bar- rientos for the vice-presidency caused a certain amount of un- happiness among the MNR rank and file. This sentiment has probably now been heightened. Perhaps the most serious reper- cussion of the Barrientos affair is the anger it reportedly caused among leaders of the armed forces. These developments show the deep trouble Paz will have in coping with splintering tendencies within the MNR as well as growing unity among opposition elements. Most of Lechin's followers have already withdrawn from the party, and have scheduled a nominating convention of their own on 2 March. Although Lechin has been noncommittal on whether other groups will be invited to attend with a view to establish- ing an anti-Paz popular front, discussions covering this pos- sibility have been conducted clandestinely for several weeks. It seems inevitable that such politically motivated terrorism will continue in the days ahead. Whether it takes the form of individual acts of violence or develops into some- thing worse remains to be seen. On 26 February the armed forces were put on alert as a precau- tion against further terrorism. In any event, the Barrien- tos incident may be a source of considerable embarrassment to Paz, particularly if it is proved that the government's secret police were implicated in the assassination attempt. Another anti-Paz group within the MNR, known as the Defense Bloc for the National Revolution, was recently organ- ized by a number of prominent members whose political orien- tation ranges from the right to the extreme left. The group, headed by former President Her- nan Siles Zuazo, is dissatisfied with the Paz-Fortun ticket. It hopes to pressure Paz into adopting a new electoral system 25X1 which would allow any number of MNR candidates to run for the top offices. SECRET 28 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 SECRET Western Hemisphere A high-level Brazilian For- eign Ministry official has con- firmed that Communist China will soon establish a permanent trade mission in. Rio de Janeiro. Five Chinese officials who will be at- tached to the mission were last reported in Geneva awaiting com- pletion of visa formalities. President Goulart's press secretary, Raul,Ryff, was quoted this week as saying that the open- ing of the trade office is a prel- ude to the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Peiping. Since he made no allusion to tim- ing, it is.not clear whether his statement is out of line with the foreign minister's repeated allega- tions that Brazil does not contem- plate such action before the Chi- nese representation question is dealt with at the next session of the UN General Assembly. In any event, the Goulart government is likely to reconsider the Chinese "request--turned down last year--to hold an industrial exhibit in Brazil. LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT WEEK IN EL SALVADOR El Salvador is preparing for elections on 8 March in which all 54 seats in its unicameral legis- lature are at stake. President Julio Rivera's National Concilia- tion Party (PCN), which now holds all the seats, is expected to be returned with a solid majority, although the opposition Christian Democratic Party (PDC) may win as many as 10 sealts. Several others may go to the small Renovating Ac- tion Party (PAR). The Rivera administration-- which restored the country to con- stitutional governmeht'in 1962 af- ter nearly two years of military rule--looks on this election as an opportunity to prove that it is a genuinely democratic regime. It has, therefore, taken a number of steps to avoid the grievances which led all the opposition parties to boycott the 1962 elections. The Legislative Assembly, for example, moved to satisfy the PDC when it recently amended the electoral law to simplify documentary require- ments for candidates. At the re- quest of the PAR, the Central Elec- toral Council extended for 20 days the deadline for inscription of candidates. Furthermore, the min- ister of defense has reiterated as- surances that security forces will in no way interfere with the elec- tions. There are, however, some tenu- ous indications that things may not go as smoothly as the government would like. One is a rumor--given wide dissemination in the leading newspaper--asserting that the PCN and the PDC have reached a secret understanding on the distribution of seats. This rumor has been denied by both parties. Moreover, there is still a possibility that the mil- itary may--as in the past--harass opposition parties to the point of causing them to withdraw from the election. SE CRE T Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4 Approved For Release 2008/06/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400010001-4