WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
State Dept. review
completed.,'
-DIA review
'completed.
SECRET
-ROI# I Eluded ft ^ c rnQt3:d
do irgrading,pnd eciossificagbn
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
13-tair'61i 1964
SUMMA
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
w %We
SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EST, 12 March 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
RUMANIAN DELEGATION LEAVES PEIPING 1
The noncommittal Chinese Communist statement following
the week of talks suggests the Rumanians got nowhere in
their apparent attempt to head off an impending showdown
between the Soviet and Chinese parties.
USSR ENCOURAGES PENSIONERS TO WORK 1
The USSR, increasingly short of skilled workers, has
liberalized social security laws to induce older per-
sons to stay on the job and persuade some of its seven
million pensioners to return to the labor force.
SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY ASSISTANCE TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 2
Soviet foreign aid in atomic energy research--initiated
in 1956 by agreements with Egypt and Yugoslavia--has
since been extended to other countries, including Iraq,
Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Ghana.
ASIA-AFRICA
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
General Khanh has announced reform measures and seems
to be making some progress toward broadening his base of
power. Viet Cong activity continues at a relatively
moderate rate.
CAMBODIA TAKES NEW ANTI-US MOVES
Prince Sihanouk evidently staged the 11 March attack on
the US and British embassies and may be planning further
steps to isolate Cambodia from the free world.
VIOLENCE ON CYPRUS NEARS OPEN CIVIL WAR
Turkish communities on Cyprus have been beleaguered by
the Greek Cypriots, and there is increasing domestic
pressure in Turkey to intervene on the island before
the UN peace-keeping force arrives.
PRESSURE ON WESTERN BASES IN LIBYA
Rising domestic and foreign cri-Licism has caused the
pro-Western premier to seek negotiations regarding US
and British bases.
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
1%W11 *me
SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
NEW DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST GABONESE PRESIDENT LIKELY
French troops have kept Mba in power still another week,
but his determination to hold scheduled 12 April elec-
tions under conditions which greatly limit opposition
activity may well trigger more demonstrations.
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CONGO
An army offensive has failed so far to contain the rebel-
lion in Kwilu Province, and there now are indications Ka-
tangan leader Tshombe may be trying for a comeback.
STRAINS IN THE ANGOLAN REBEL MOVEMENT
Dissidents within Holden Roberto's proclaimed government-
in-exile and criticism elsewhere in Africa confront him
with his most serious challenge to date.
SHIFTING POLITICAL BALANCE IN ZANZIBAR
With "Field Marshal" Okello apparently no longer a
threat to either pro-Communist Foreign Minister Babu
or the less radical President Karume, Babu is trying
to build up his own strength at Karume's expense.
ETHIOPIA'S INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES
Emperor Haile Selassie's handling of the February
fighting along the Somali border appears to have fur-
ther alienated powerful elements within his regime.
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
w 1%.
SECRET
EUROPE (continued) Page
DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY
Paris says De Gaulle's visits to Mexico next week and to
South America this fall are intended mainly to promote
closer economic ties, but this objective will be subordi-
nate to De Gaulle's longer range goal of encouraging Latin
American governments to emulate France in asserting greater
"independence" of the US. (Published separately as Spe-
cial Report OCI No. 0322/64A)
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
PROSPECTS FOR CUBA'S 1964 SUGAR HARVEST 15
Labor shortages, transportation difficulties, and bad
weather probably have largely offset the gains which
might have resulted from increased acreage planted to
cane this year.
EFFORTS TO END CORRUPTION IN DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT 16
Key armed forces leaders are showing increasing sympathy
for efforts by the president of the civilian triumvirate
to end corruption and strengthen the provisional regime.
ARGENTINE LABOR TRUCE TALKS 16
Labor leaders will "suspend" for 30 days plans to seize
factories and businesses this month, now that the govern-
ment has agreed to many of their demands.
POLITICAL TENSIONS EASE IN BOLIVIA
President Paz has restored some degree of unity in the
ruling party, recouped some popular support, and as-
suaged the military by accepting the air force chief
as his new running mate for a second term.
CONTEST FOR CONTROL OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN BRITISH GUIANA 18
A union controlled by leftist Premier Jagan has been on
strike for five weeks demanding recognition as sole bar-
gaining agent for all sugar workers.
GROWING LEFTIST ACTIVITY IN SURINAM
CURRENT INTE LIG E WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
'`' SECRET *me
The Communist World
The Rumanian delegation
which apparently has been at-
tempting to head off an impending
showdown between the Soviet and
Chinese parties left Peiping on
11 March for North Korea. Pei-
ping's coverage of the ceremo-
nial aspects of the visit, which
was climaxed by a meeting with
Mao on 10 March, attempted to
give the impression that the
Chinese made progress in enlist-
ing the support of the Rumanians.
The noncommittal Chinese state-
ment of 11 March, however, noted
only that the talks held between
The USSR last week liberal-
ized its social security laws
in an attempt to induce older
persons to stay on the job and
to persuade some of its seven
million old-age pensioners to
return to the labor force, which
is increasingly short of skilled
workers. Heretofore pensions
were limited to 15 rubles monthly
(a ruble equals $1.11 at the of-
ficial rate) for persons who
continued to work and earned up
to 100 rubles a month. Payments
were cut off entirely if earn-
ings exceeded 100 rubles. Ac-
cording to a decree to become
effective on 1 April, pensioners
employed in various urban occu-
pations may retain half their
pensions regardless of earnings,
while those employed in agricul-
ture and mining will receive
the entire amount.
3 and 10 March had been "friendly,"
suggesting that there had been
no real meeting of minds.
The Russians so far have
avoided commenting on the Ru-
manian visit. There are mount-
ing rumors and reports that the
Soviet party is preparing the
way for an international con-
ference to condemn the Chinese.
Apparently the Soviets are
merely awaiting the return of
the Rumanians before taking
action.
This change is the latest
of several indications that the
Soviet labor market is feeling
the effects of a slowdown in
employment growth--from 2.6 mil-
lion in 1960 to 1.3 million in
1963--the lowest since the early
1950s. This has resulted prin-
cipally from an increasing full-
time school enrollment in the
14- to 17-year age group as well
as the falling rate of employ-
ment among pensioners. In the
Russian Republic, for example,
only 8 percent of pensioners
were employed in 1961, in com-
parison with 36 percent in 1956
--probably as a result of higher
pensions and the penalties
imposed by a 1956 law.
In addition, the current
labor shortage also provides
justification for regime concern
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
SECRET *MOF
over the relatively poor in-
come position of the rapidly
increasing elderly population.
The population in the retire-
ment ages (60 and over for men
and 55 and over for women) is
expected to increase about
three times as fast as the total
population in the next decade.
The pension program will
continue to apply only to employ-
ees at state-owned enterprises--
currently about 70 million. The
30 million collective farmers
are slated for a pension program
of their own soon but it is not
known whether this pension will
also be paid to farmers who con-
tinue to work.
SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY ASSISTANCE TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Soviet foreign aid in atomic
energy research--initiated in
1956 by agreements with Egypt
and Yugoslavia--has since been
extended to a number of other
countries, among them Iraq, In-
donesia, Afghanistan, and Ghana.
The USSR has built and installed
nuclear reactors for training,
basic research, and the produc-
tion of isotopes for use in ag-
ricultural, industrial, and
medical research. It also has
provided scientists and techni-
cians to assist in developing
research programs and is pro-
viding technical training as
well as academic scholarships
in nuclear physics in Soviet
universities.
An agreement with Cairo
signed last month provides for
the continued supply of Soviet
scientific equipment and tech-
nicians to Egypt to assist in
research being conducted at the
Inchass atomic energy center.
The major facility of this cen-
ter--a two-megawatt research
reactor supplied by the USSR--
was completed in July 1961 and
Soviet scientists have been
guiding laboratory experiments.
In January 1963, Moscow
signed an agreement with Yugo-
slavia providing for expanded
cooperation in the nuclear en-
ergy field, including assistance
in the design and construction
of nuclear power plants.
Construction work at Iraq's
Tammuz atomic reactor center is
progressing under the supervi-
sion of Soviet personnel. Ap-
proximately 60 percent of the
buildings have been completed
and 75 percent of the equipment
received. The center, scheduled
for completion before the end
of next year, will include a re-
actor, radioactive isotope lab-
oratory, and auxiliary facilities.
Soviet aid for this center es-
timated to cost about $5 million,
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
*me
SECRET
Soviet assistance for In-
donesia's atomic energy program
has consisted of supplying a
research tool carted a subcriti-
cal assembly and a two-megawatt
research reactor at a total cost
of about $1.3 million. The sub-
critical assembly, at Gadjah Mada
University, has been used for
training purposes since late 1961
and now needs a new neutron source
costing about $250,000--which
Indonesia has asked Moscow to
finance under the 1960 economic
credit. Preliminary engineering
work for the reactor project,
at Serpong, is virtually com-
plete, and working designs have
been submitted, with completion
scheduled by 1966.
The USSR is to provide the
universities of both Afghanistan
and Ghana with nuclear reactors
for research purposes. In Sep-
tember 1963 Moscow agreed to
give Kabul University a $300,000
reactor, and to send technicians
to install it and operate it
until Afghan personnel have com-
pleted their training in the
USSR. However, construction is
not known to have been started.
The necessary housing and
storage facilities at Kwabenya
near the University of Ghana are
almost finished, and construction
of the building to house the re-
actor will probably begin soon.
date has been slight.
gram, actual implementation to
Although the October 1961
Soviet-Indian atomic energy
agreement provided a framework
for extensive Soviet assistance
to India's nuclear energy pro-
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
o ..._.,__..,,...._.
o Kampot
Ream
Duong Doegt -
OAO PHI
Qu0c
~n m \ e hou~do.
robl~shed br the Gov
Indochin, NIgl
NORTH
Dong Hoi
\VIETNAl?
Truc Gian
C;O,
(Ben Tre)CC)Nc)
8OUNDARY REPRESENTATION 18
NOT NXCB88ARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Con Son (Poulo Condore)
CON SON
M. Duc
N"GA.I 0
oSong Coo
HC?N'
FUYFN
Da Lat 0
N joy Hoa
SOUTH VIETNAM
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES
0 t t 25 50 75 100 W-
6 25 50 7r5 160 Kilometers
?~ ~,,, DEMARCATION LINE
~Bo Ho Su OQuang Tri
T.heponel
0
0 ? ~ - Quang Ngai
Gi.
t e? ^'/ oBo Duc ...,v5 0
Lod f ON nh oPhuoc Binhi~---C
oA.` pIIUOC~": .., ?
Loci LONG
I NII
Nki? v ho
- PH ,0('
oPhuoc Vinh
Hoa
Dinh
GON
ter:
o Da Nang (Tourane)
4 A.^I ii NAblo Hoi An
I.( IN 11
e HA N}f
OXuan Lo
BI N H
TU`:
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
SECRET
South Vietnam's General
Khanh appears to be making some
progress in establishing a
broadly representative base of
power and in consolidating con-
trol by balancing power factions.
Khanh has announced new
reforms for bolstering the
counterinsurgency effort. The
measures include health aid to
villages, improvement of para-
military and military forces,
land reform, encouragement of
private industry, and improve-
ment of social conditions. De-
tails have not yet been revealed.
Khanh has also assigned a large
number of civil servants in
Saigon to work in the provinces.
However, there has been little
actual effort so far to imple-
ment the new policies.
Some politicians continue
to criticize the Khanh regime.
The leader of the northern branch
of the Dai Viet Party--an ele-
ment in the government--claims
that the coup led by General
Khanh has destroyed the people's
confidence in the military. On
the other hand, the Leader of the
Dai Viet's southern branch, Dep-
uty Prime Minister Nguyen Ton
Hoan, is reported to have settled
his differences with Khanh.
Some political and military
leaders are apprehensive that
the recent appointment of a gen-
eral of the Cao Dai sect as a
province chief may encourage
a resurgence of an autonomous
Cao Dai movement.
Communist activity in-
creased slightly during the
first week of March, but re-
mained at a comparatively mod-
erate rate with emphasis on
terrorism. Viet Cong nilitary
activity appears to be intensi-
fying, as three Viet Cong com-
pany-sized attacks have been
reported since 8 March.
Also in the delta, the
Viet Cong this week destroyed
a large POL dump near Can Tho.
At Sa Dee, headquarters of South
Vietnam's 9th Division, they
attempted to sabotage a Civil
Guard ammo dump and did destroy
the district signal center.
Field reports suggest possible
concentrations of Viet Cong
troops near Can Tho and two
other provincial capitals far-
ther east, My Tho and True Giang
(Ben Tre).
In the north, Viet Cong
movements of battalion-size
strength in the mountains near
the town of Quang Ngai have
been reported, but there is as
yet no indication that large-
scale attacks are imminent in
these areas.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
``"'' SECRET `"i"
Sihanouk's evident sponsor-
ship of the 11 March attack on
the American and British embassies
and his renewed sharp criticisms
of US policy suggest that he
may be planning to isolate Cam-
bodia further from the free
world.
Sihanouk has long been sen-
sitive to what he regards as the
territorial designs of Cambodia's
neighbors, and his latest state-
ments indicate a heightened con-
cern over the demarcation of its
boundaries. Differences persist
with South Vietnam over the dis-
position of coastal islands and
Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma
refused during his visit to Cam-
bodia last week to accord formal
recognition of the present bound-
aries.
In statements since the mob
demonstrations, Sihanouk has re-
nounced a large Geneva-type con-
ference to guarantee Cambodia's
neutrality because of alleged
US obstruction. He claims the
same thing was happening to his
proposal for a conference with
participation restricted to Cam-
bodia, the US, South Vietnam,
and Thailand. On 11 March, he
declared that he would recognize
North Vietnam. Last month, he
had threatened to do just this
--as well as to conclude a mili-
tary pact with Communist China- -
unless his demands for interna-
tional guarantees were met.
A high-level Cambodian
military mission, now in Com-
munist China and scheduled to
proceed to the USSR, probably
will discuss additional mili-
tary assistance.
The length of the mission's
stay in Communist China--three
weeks--suggests that the party
will be given an extensive tour
of China's military showplaces
to impress it with Peiping's
power. It seems likely that
the Chinese will offer to supply
additional modest shipments of
trucks, small arms, and other
infantry weapons and would prob-
ably be prepared to sign a formal
military aid agreement.
However, Peiping's over-all
attitude toward Sihanouk remains
wary. The Chinese have been re-
luctant to grant substantial
material aid to Phnom Penh until
Sihanouk's policies become clearer.
Peiping has limited itself to
statements of support for Cam-
bodia's neutrality, without any
advance commitment to a specific
line of action.
SECRET
Page 5
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
CYPRUS
Principal British sovereign base area
to 20
STATUTE MILES
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
v SECRET %Nor
During the past week, violence
increased on Cyprus to the point of
virtual civil war. The possibility
of intervention by Turkish armed
forces also increased, as Turkish
Cypriot communities either surren
dered to the better armed Greek Cy-
priots or were placed in a state of
siege.
Turkish forces in the
Iskenderun-Mersin area near Cyprus
continue in a high state of readi-
ness. On 10 and 11 March, fleet 25X1
units based in Iskenderun engaged
in what were termed "routine ex-
ercises."
North of the Kyrenia mountain
range which parallels the north
coast, only one village, Temblos,
remains in Turkish Cypriot hands.
New attacks against Turkish posi-
tions in Limassol, Polis, and Lefka
are probable. A cease-fire pre-
vails in Ktima, following a battle
earlier in the week, but the Turk-
ish community there is surrounded
and in desperate straits.
A major battle appears to be
shaping up in Nicosia, which has
the largest concentration of Turk-
ish Cypriots. Greeks have again
manned roadblocks and machine-gun
posts near the cease-fire line
which divides the city. Press re-
ports state that part of the 650-
man Turkish Army contingent on Cy-
prus has moved closer to the Turk-
ish quarter--indicating that the
Turkish troops will, if necessary,
help defend the Turkish Cypriots
as they did in December.
The Greek Cypriots are eager
to use any opportunity to establish
control over the entire island.
They probably hope to eliminate
most organized opposition before
the arrival of the UN peace-keep-
ing force tends to freeze the ex-
isting tactical situation. The
Turkish Cypriots, described as de-
spondent over their future, may be
provoking incidents in the hope of
forcing Turkish intervention.
In Turkey, public and parlia-
mentary pressure is again mounting
for the government to send troops
to Cyprus. The Inonu government,
however, is aware that unilateral
military intervention now could
lead to war with Greece and incur
world-wide condemnation for ini-
tiating hostilities while the in-
ternational peace-keeping force
is being created. Further dete-
rioration of the security situa-
tion on the island, however,
could lead to another request by
Ankara to both Athens and London
to participate in joint interven-
tion before taking such action
alone.
Secretary General Thant's
efforts to create the UN force
have been aided by assurances of
financing aid by some NATO mem-
bers. Sweden and Canada appear
ready to provide troops, although
Stockholm insists that at least
one other neutral nation must
also do so. Finland is likely
to join now that the financial
burden of participating has
been removed, and there is
some possibility that Brazil
might also volunteer. London
has indicated that it will
permit 3,500 of the present
7,000-man British force on
Cyprus to be placed under UN
SECRET
Page 6
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
LIBYA
BENGASI Tobruk
EL ADEM
(U. K.)
UAR
(EGYPT)
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
SECRET
The Libya, Government finds
itself increasingly hemmed in
by rising domestic and foreign
pressure on the issue of the
American and British bases in
Libya.
Premier Muntassir, a con-
servative pro-Western politician
who negotiated the agreements
establishing the bases in the
early 1950s, feels that he could
not keep the loyalty of the po-
lice, the army, or the Cyrena.i-
can tribes--traditionally a
loyal element--if he or King
Idris were to permit the bases
to remain. Accordingly the gov-
ernment swiftly responded to
Egyptian President Nasir's 22
February criticism of the bases
with a statement that the agree-
ments with the US and Britain--
which expire in 1971 and 1973
respectively--would not be re-
newed. This statement, however,
did not still either Egyptian
propaganda on the issue or do-
mestic criticism of the govern-
ment's position. Other Arab
states--in particular Syria--
have also denounced the presence
of the bases on Libyan soil.
In the face of this con-
tinuing outcry Muntassir, who
already was the object of con-
siderable criticism by the
younger, Arab nationalist - ori-
ented elements who sparked last
January's riots against the po-
lice and the monarchy, felt that
a further step to placate op-
position to the regime was nec-
essary. At the opening of
parliament on 9 March his gov-
ernment publicly announced that
it had asked the British and
Americans to enter into negotia-
tions on the "future" of the
bases. Muntassir believes that
it may be possible to prolong
negotiations over a period of
several years but has made it
clear to the US ambassador that
Libyan Government policy calls
for evacuation of the bases be-
fore 1971.
While minor demonstrations
occurred in Tripoli. coincident
with the opening of parliament,
the government's maneuvers will
probably relieve some of the
pressure. It is unlikely, how-
ever,that Muntassir can satisfy
opposition elements or quiet
criticism from other Arab states
if negotiations, once begun,
are greatly prolonged. With
oil revenues rapidly increasing,
the traditional government ar-
gument that the bases are an
economic necessity to Libya
no longer holds. Older, con-
servatively oriented elements
of the population--and in par-
ticular King Idris himself--
continue to recognize that the
bases provide protection against
possible encroachment by Libya's
neighbors--notably Egypt--but
this consideration carries much
less weight with younger, urban
elements of the population mo-
tivated by pan-Arab. proneutral-
ist sentiments.
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
%W r SECRET
NEW DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST GABONESE PRESIDENT LIKELY
French troops have main-
tained Gabonese President Mba
in power for still another week,
but his obvious lack of popular
support raises the possibility
of further antigovernment
demonstrations.
Opposition to Mba appears
particularly strong among Ga-
bonese youth, some of whom were
probably involved in the L8
February coup plot. In an ef-
fort to combat student demon-
strations, Mba has closed
schools in Libreville for an
early Easter vacation.
Security is in the hands
of the approximately 75 French
troops now in the country and
the Gabonese gendarmes who
A Congolese Army offensive
against insurgents in Kwilu
Province led by Peiping-trained
Pierre Muleie has so far failed
to contain the rebellion. An
additional battalion has been
sent to reinforce the equivalent
of three battalions already
there. de-
scribes the situation as "rela-
remained loyal to Mba. The
Gabonese Army has reportedly been
disbanded.
Mba's apparent determination
to hold his scheduled 12 April
elections under conditions which
greatly limit opposition partici-
pation may well trigger more dem-
onstrations. All but one member
of the short-Lived provisional
government which took over after
the abortive 18 February coup, in-
cluding Mba's principal political
opponent Jean Aubame, now are in
prison.
French propaganda that US of-
ficials had supported Aubame has
given rise to anti-Americanism,
particularly on the part of some
French citizens in Libreville.
Three attacks on the US Embassy
during the week may have resulted
from these feelings.
tively quiet" at the present
time
but
25X1
central
government troops
25X1
have
run into
stiff resistance
from
rebels armed with rifles
and
automatic
weapons--possibly
captured from array troops in
earlier actions. The insurrec-
tion appears to have spread
southwest of Kikwit, Kwilu's
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
"Lambarene
Port Gentil G A B ON Franceville
.+J
CENTRAL
CONCH
Angolan Reb' I
Training Cap
Santo Antonio ?
do Zaire
THE CONGO
Port1rancqui
Area o Congo1ee
Ribel Activity
lnluabo rg
Area ofAngolan
Rehel Activity
rmona
NIGERIA
Vila Luso
13 MARCH 1964
20P 400
3 .rkr
F.duvtrd
EIisab~thville
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Malanje
Concentration of Kc~Mangan
GenWarrnesi
A N G OyLIA
(Port.) i -/
Benguela
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
SECRET
capital, to an area previously
unaffected by rebellion (see
map); it is unclear, however,
whether the tribes living there
have joined the insurgents.
Indications increase that
former Katangan leader Moise
Tshombd may be trying for a
comeback. Last week, some 400
former gendarmes left Katanga
for Tshombd-organized gendarme
camps in eastern Angola, according
to the Belgian vice consul in
Elisabethville.\ Belgian offi-
cials warn that white mercenaries
are being recruited and sent to
Angola from Europe and Katanga.
Spanish officials in Madrid re-
port a flurry of activity around
Tshombd's headquarters there.
STRAINS IN THE ANGOLAN REBEL MOVEMENT
Angolan nationalist leader
Holden Roberto is under increasing
fire from dissidents within his
movement and from critics else-
where in Africa. As long as the
squabbles inside the Leopoldville-
based Angolan leadership persist,
they will further hamstring the
efforts of rebel forces inside
Angola to cope with the continu-
ing pressure from the Portuguese.
The rebellion's lack of
progress is in fact at the root
of Roberto's problems. His mili-
tary forces are ill-equipped and
poorly clothed and fed, partly
because of his failings as an
administrator. Although the
Portuguese are not capable of wip-
ing out these forces, the rebels
cannot do more at this stage than
harass the Portuguese. Discontent
apparently is endemic at the An-
golan training camp in the Congo
south of Leopoldville, and it
probably was his desperate need
to mollify his troops which led
Roberto to announce in January
that he would seek aid from Com-
munist countries.
Both the military stalemate
and Roberto's ill-planned lurch
toward the Communists have re-
inforced the restiveness of his
associates in his "government-
in-exile. "
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
'"` SECRET _Oww
On the international front,
12 African states have recognized
Roberto's proclaimed government
but many of these have been dis-
illusioned by the stalemate in
the rebellion itself and by Ro-
berto's inefficiency.
Roberto may still be able
to surmount these challenges.
He has many things working in
his favor: his proven ability
to keep internal dissidence
under control, the lack of unity
ever.
among his critics, his control
of funds, the support he has
always received from Congolese
Premier Adoula, and his estab-
lished position as a leader of
the Bakongo, who so far have
done most of the fighting. The
present discontent is his most
serious challenge to date, how-
SHIFTING POLITICAL BALANCE IN ZANZIBAR
"Field Marshal" Okello ap-
pears no long to be a power in
Zanzibar. As long as he was on
the political scene, the unpre-
dictable
Okello was as much reams to
pro-Communist Foreign Minister
Babu and his group as to the less
radical President Karume. Three
weeks ago Babu and Karume got
him to leave the country, possi-
bly by buying him off.
Since then, Babu has dis-
armed most of Okello's thugs and
has built up a paramilitary force
of his own that may already be
more effective than any force
responsive to Karume. Now Babu's
followers in the government appear
to be systematically challenging
Karume's authority on a wide
variety of issues.
Karume has so far met these
challen es
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
%000~ SECRET `''f
ETHIOPIA'S INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES
Fighting last month between
regular army units of Ethiopia
and Somalia has given fresh
impetus to many long-standing
grievances within Ethiopia.
Emperor Haile Selassie's auto-
cratic handling of the border
situation appears to have further
alienated powerful elements
within his regime, although there
is no firm evidence that these
malcontents are at present
planning to remove him or are
capable of doing so.
The Somali radio's attacks
on the Emperor and his authori-
tarianism and its calls for army
mutiny and open encouragement of
dissident elements have probably
found sympathetic listeners in-
side Ethiopia. Increased activ-
ity by armed dissidents in
Ethiopia's northern province of
Eritrea threatens to overextend
its security forces, which were
unable to control the Somali
guerrillas in the eastern Ogaden
region. The US Embassy in Addis
Ababa believes that the Emperor's
authorization for Ethiopian
forces to cross into Somalia,
however briefly, during the
February fighting, when viewed
against his well-known concern
for his international reputation,
indicates great anxiety over his
position.
The February action may
have temporarily relieved the
frustrations of the nearly
10,000 troops in the Ogaden--
who for some months had been
badly mauled by Somali tribes-
men. However, it also highlighted
weaknessess in supplies, communi-
cations, and command structure
within the Ethiopian military,
the only force in the country
which could conceivably mount a
successful coup.
The military and many civil-
ian officials are also concerned
over the Emperor's evident reli-
ance on the Organization of
African Unity to effect a settle-
ment with Somalia, as well as
what they take to be his "soft"
attitude toward Soviet military
aid to Somalia.
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Vale
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
PROSPECTS FOR CUBA'S 1964 SUGAR HARVEST
This gear's sugar crop in
Cuba is not expected to be much
greater than last year's harvest
of 3.8 million tons, despite an
all-out effort by the regime to
boost production. The harvest
now under way has been hampered
by labor shorcages, transporta-
tion difficulties, and bad
weather. These handicaps prob-
ably have offset the gains which
might have resulted from the in-
creased acreage planted to cane
this year.
Labor shortages a.. re-
ported especially acute. The
regime is throwing additional
military work units, augmented
by volunteers, into the pro-
duction effort. This technique,
however, is not likely to be
any more helpful this year than
in the past when voluntary cane
cutters were relied on to boost
output.
The much vaunted mechaniza-
tion.of cane loading is also
turning out to be a disappoint-
ment. The use of Russian-manu-
factured loaders was supposed
to have permitted a 20-percent
reduction in the field labor
force. However, the failure of
improperly trained operators
to use their equipment to best
advantage has ruled out any pos-
sibility of such a prodigious
saving. Their inadvertent col-
lection of dirt and leaves and
skimpy loading of the cane has
meant a reduction in the sugar
yield and is creating mechani-
cal problems at the mills.
A measure of the sugar in-
dustry's transportation dif-
ficulties is the fact that all
mills are operating at less
than full capacity; some are
reported to be working only
half the time. This is trace-
able primarily to the deteriora-
tion of American-made trucks
used to haul the cane, the poor
quality of tractors bought from
the bloc, shortages of locomo-
tives, and a paucity of spare
parts for all transportation
equipment.
In addition, the ravages
of Hurricane Flora are still
being felt. In Oriente Prov-
ince, for instance, many bridges
and stretches of highway washed
out in October have not yet been
repaired, and this is impeding
the movement of cane to the mills.
Another setback to sugar
production was last month's un-
seasonably heavy rains. These
downpours have probably reduced
the sugar content of the cane.
In spite of these problems,
there is some evidence of im-
provement over last year, at
least in terms of organization.
For example, much less emphasis
is given this year to calling
out revolutionary enthusiasts
on week ends to "hack" at the
cane. Furthermore, the addi-
tional cane planted for this
harvest is the first such in-
crease in several years.,
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 15
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
'low
SECRET
Key armed forces leaders
in the Dominican Republic are
showing increasing sympathy for
initiatives by triumvirate pres-
ident Donald Reid Cabral to end
government corruption and
strengthen the provisional re-
gime. They now favor ousting
the cabinet ministers represent-
ing the National Civic Union
and the Dominican Revolutionary
Vanguard, the two political par-
ties in the government. Such
a move would be designed to put
an end to the use of official
jobs and funds for partisan pur-
poses by those parties.
There is also increasing
disenchantment within the mili-
tary with the other two civilian
triumvirs--Ramon Tapia Espinal
and Manuel Tavares Espaillat.
These officials are considered
lacking in forcefulness and to
be unduly influenced by a small
group of?ambitious politicians,
Argentine labor leaders
have announced a 30-day "sus-
pension of their plan to begin
seizing various factories and
businesses during March, now
that the government has agreed
to many of their economic and
political demands. Most lead-
ers of the General Confederation
of Labor (CGT) hope not to have
to execute their plan at all.
They fear that it might lead to
violence, especially since it
could be exploited by extremist
elements favoring revolutionary
tactics.
The government has agreed
to submit to Congress proposals
including would-be strong men
Luis Amiama and Antonio Imbert.
This feeling may eventually
bring on the removal of Tapia
and Tavares, leaving Reid in
sole charge.
Meanwhile, the military
has remained passive while Reid
has gone ahead with his effort
to promote reform by relieving
the corrupt chief of police.
Another potent political
problem--the question as to
whether ex-President Joaquin
Balaguer should be allowed to
enter next year's presidential
election--may be resolved soon.
Military leaders are said to
favor his return, while Imbert,
who has violently opposed such
a move in the past, recently
told he 25X1
woul
way.
for a minimum wage and for price
controls and to include both
CGT and business representatives
on various advisory boards. It
also agreed to ask Congress to
repeal "repressive legislation,"
meaning mainly the present bans
against the Peronist and Commu-
nist parties. The last conces-
sion, although promised in the
government's electoral campaign,
will cause considerable contro-
versy in military and political
circles.
CGT officials will recon-
vene on 10 April to review the
government's progress in ful-
filling its reemen
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
14AW 1400
SECRET
A temporary calm has settled
over Bolivian politics as a result
of President Paz' acceptance of
the air force commander, General
Rene Barrientos, as his new run-
ning mate in next June's elections.
Opposition elements have apparently
suspended much of their political
activity pending a refinement of
their strategy to meet the new
situation.
Paz decided to drop his hand-
picked running mate, Federico Fortun,
because he was concerned that Bar-
rientos was on the verge of becoming
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Iftw
*MW
SECRET
a presidential candidate in his
own right, and a formidable one.
He was also anxious to head off
a split in the loyalties of the
armed forces, which heretofore
have been an important prop of
his regime.
By agreeing to the shift,
Paz has restored some degree of
unity within the Nationalist Rev-
olutionary Movement (MNR), the
ruling party. He probably also
has managed by this move to re-
coup some of his sagging popular
support. Unrest in the military,
precipitated by younger officers
seeking revenge for the attempted
assassination of Barrientos on 25
February, reportedly has subsided
considerably.
With Barrientos taken care of
Vice President Juan Lechin, a left-
ist, is the only rival of any con-
sequence opposing Paz for the pres-
idency at the moment. Lechin, how-
ever, is having trouble getting his
campaign into high gear. His newly
grganized National Revolutionary
Party of the Left (PRIN) is already
divided over tactics; it cannot de-
cide whether to try for an alliance
with right and center parties or
with the Communists, or to remain
independent. As things stand, a
Lechin victory at the polls, even
with the help of other opposition
groups, would be an upset. Time
is running out for Lechin to decide
whether to go down gracefully or to
try to overthrow Paz by violent
There has been no break in the
five-week-old jurisdictional strike
in British Guiana organized by the
sugar workers union (GAWU) con-
trolled by leftist Premier Cheddi
Jagan's People's Progressive Party
(PPP). Approximately .10 percent
of the sugar workers, who account
for about half the colony's organ-
ized Labor, are out on strike, and
GAWU extremists are using intimida-
tion to keep them idle. There
have been several violent incidents
in the past two weeks which have
increased tension between the Ne-
groes and the East Indians.
The aim of the strike is to seemed to be a veiled threat to
get sugar producers to recognize call a general strike if the sugar
GAWU as the sole bargaining agent producers gave in to GAWU. This
for all sugar workers. For Jagan's threat together with a condemnation
People's Progressive Party (PPP), of GAWU tactics by the AFL-CIO may
The extent to which Jagan him-
self is involved in the strike sit-
uation is not altogether clear. He
has, however, asked Sir Jock Camp-
bell, chairman of the largest sugar
producing company, to see what he
can do about arranging a settlement.
This move does not bode well for
the anti-Jagan forces; Sir Jock is
known to be pro-Jagan.
The anti-Jagan Guiana Trades
Union Congress (TUC) issued a
statement on 7 March condemning
GAWU intimidation. The statement,
according to the US consul, also
such recognition would represent a help to deter the sugar producers
Long stride in its drive to achieve from surrendering.
Labor.
SECRET
13 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 18
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
~`~HAITI ,J REPUBLIC
VtRG~~ B (U U K.)
lNet~.lSetia,
S O~tunu,~~?~ 0
IN,en,a ,Antigua
Guedeloup
lr.l
SURINAM
,.:.'(Neth:)
B R. A 2 I
Caribbean
Aruba
a (Netn.)
-`(Ne~n.l Curacao
?s' ( j 1 "Eonaire
_~.r. (Netn.l
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
SECRET ``'''
Western Hemisphere
The self-governing Dutch ter-
ritory of Surinam, which has thus
far been relatively immune to the
political and social unrest ex-
perienced by its Latin American
neighbors, faces the prospect of
increasing leftist activity.
In Surinam, where there is
no Communist Party, the principal
vehicles of subversive activity
are the Nationalistic Republic
Party (PNR), led by Edward J.
Bruma, and its seven or eight af-
filiated front organizations.
Bruma's party received less than
4 percent of the vote in the March
1963 national elections and is
not represented in the 36-member
legislative council. The PNR,
however, has taken a strong pro-
independence line and probably
hopes to profit from the growing
racial tension between the Creoles
(Negroes) and East Indians who,
together, account for more than
two thirds of Surinam's popula-
tion.
Meanwhile, Bruma has estab-
lished close ties with Cheddi
Jagan's People's Progressive Party
(PPP) in neighboring British Gui-
ana.
The PNR is conducting a
vigorous campaign to draw atten-
tion to itself and to expand its
influence. It has sponsored an
increasing number of antigovern-
ment demonstrations and is try-
ing to organize labor into a
single, ro-PNR trade union
r oup .
While no trace of pro-
Castro activity has yet come
to light, there is some senti-
ment within the essentially
pro-Western coalition govern-
ment favoring the development
of trade ties with Cuba.F
Moderates in the govern-
ment, including Minister-Presi-
dent Pengel', are reluctant to
promote commerce with Cuba. Their
reluctance springs primarily
from the fact that any such
trade is expected to be conducted
chiefly through the port of
Springlands in the remote Brit-
ish Guiana - Surinam border area.
Trade aside, the Pengel govern-
ment has indicated its concern
over British Guiana's plans to
develop port facilities for deep-
sea vessels at the mouth of the
Courantyne, which forms the bor-
der with Surinam. The Surinam-
ers fear this would facilitate
arms smuggling and other sub-
versive activity directed against
their regime.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 19
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2
.SW R I T
Approved For Release 2008/03/06: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030001-2