DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030002-1
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 29, 2006
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 13, 1964
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030002-1.pdf370.79 KB
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R1ase 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A400030002-1 13 March 1964 OCI No. 0322/64A Copy No.. 56 SPECIAL REPORT DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A0044006,'062Xglded from automatic dnwngradinq and declossification 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved ForlWease 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-009271oW 4400030002-1 SECRET De Gaulle's visit to Mexico from 16 to 19 March and to South America in the fall are billed as exer- cises intended mainly to promote closer French eco- nomic ties with Latin America. Economics, indeed, will be on De Gaulle's mind during these travels, but will be subordinate to his pursuit of subtler, longer range political objectives. He will be aim- ing to reassert French presence in an area where the culture of France already has great prestige and probably hopes to encourage Latin Americans to as- sert their national independence more forcefully. If, as a consequence, the US is obliged to concern itself more with problems of the Western Hemisphere, all well and good so far as De Gaulle is concerned. As he probably sees it, such a development would give him a freer hand to operate elsewhere. Origins of Current French Policy in Latin America France has always played an important cultural role in Latin America.simply because the educated classes there have traditionally admired French civilization. Paris has sought to make the most of this situa- tion. Of the 563 persons it has assigned to its aid mis- sions in Latin America, 418 are designated as cultural-assist- ance personnel. The majority of them serve as secondary- school teachers whose main func- tions are to expand French lan- guage instruction and to main- tain a French "presence." Since World War II, France's cultural position has declined somewhat. This is due in part to the increasing interest in technology as compared with the humanistic culture with which France has long been associated. The Drench are acutely aware of the trend and are energetically trying to build an "image" of France as a modern, technologi- cally advanced society without, at the same time, losing any of the flavor of the old tradi- tions. De Gaulle will probably give this line heavy play dur- ing both his trips this year. Sharpening French interest in Latin America has been ap- parent since 1962 when De Gaulle sent out a fact-finding mission under Jean Chauvel, a trusted adviser. The mission, which visited seven countries, came up with a cautious recommenda- tion for an expanded French eco- nomic and technical assistance program in the area. More French study teams have followed, and on 14 January 1964 the govern- ment's Commission on Foreign Assistance published a report urging a broadening of the French aid program outside the franc zone. This was followed by De Gaulle's statement at his SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved Foelease 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-009204400030002-1 SECRET 31 January press conference an- World Bank had turned the proj- nouncing France's desire to de- ect down. They have also put velop closer economic relations about $50 million into Peru's with Latin America. iron and steel industry and ap- De Gaulle's trip to Mexico --which will also permit brief visits to the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Mar- tinique, and French Guiana--is technically in repayment of President Adolfo Lopez Mateos' visit to France last year. The choice of Mexico as De Gaulle's starting point, however, also reflects a desire to squeeze every political advantage out of France's cultural influence there and out of Mexico's tra- ditional concern over its "in- dependence" from the US. De Gaulle has been invited to visit almost all the other Latin American countries in the fall. His itinerary, which has not yet been completely firmed up, presently includes Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. France's Economic Position In Latin America France's present economic interests in the area are modest. In 1962, total French invest- ments in Latin America amounted to only $350 to $400 million' proximately $15 million into Chilean copper mining. More recently, Paris agreed to guar- antee up to $10 million in pri- vate French credits to finance a variety of Panamanian indus- trial enterprises; about a quar- ter of this has already been al- located. Mexico, which is carried in French books as a good in- vestment risk because of its economic and political stabil- ity, was the recipient in 1963 of one of Paris' largest eco- nomic commitments outside the franc zone. This was a package deal, involving government-guar- anteed credits and government loans amounting to $150 million, granted primarily for purchase of French equipment for Mexico's petrochemical and sugar in- dustries. The agreement also established joint commissions whose functions are to recom- mend development projects Paris might undertake to underwrite and to make periodic reviews of the relations between the two countries in the commercial, financial, and technical fields. in no country did they account France plays a relatively for as much as 10 percent of the small role in Latin America's total foreign investment. foreign trade. In 1962, France's exports totaled about $297.7 French investors have million, and its imports about generally favored the larger, $304.6 million. Even in the more industrially advanced countries where it is economi- countries such as Brazil, Ar- cally strongest, it had a lower gentina, Colombia, Peru, Vene- proportion of their total foreign zuela, and Chile. Some years trade than did Britain and West ago the French provided a $25- Germany. million credit for Colombia's Paz de Rio steel mill after the SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved For RsF6ase 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-009271 4400030002-1 SECRET Plans for Increased Economic oopera ion De Gaulle can therefore be expected to convey France's in- terest in expanding trade with Latin America. In this, he would be impelled in part by a desire to correct the recent slippage in France's over-all balance of trade and payments. The technique for stimu- lating trade that Paris is most likely to use is the one of of- fering more government-guar- anteed credits to cover pur- chases of French commodities, which will increase competition with US exports to Latin America. In terms of additional French aid, the $150-million agreement with Mexico may have exceptional significance. The choice of Mexico and the form of the Mexi- can package is important because it demonstrates that France will probably orient its approach along the conservative line of concentrating on countries which are good credit risks and em- phasizing loans over grants. Ile Gaulle is unlikely to stress the subject of military assistance. However, the French have sold arms throughout the world, and Argentina has been an important buyer in the past. The French would be willing to supply more military equipment to other Latin American states although rather strict credit terms are likely to be main- tained. Paris has no intention of assuming the full burden of supplying any Latin American SECRET military establishment, but it would look upon even lim- ited arms sales as contrib- uting to the recipients' independence from the Us. Any increase in France's aid to Latin America probably will be primarily concentrated on scientific and technical as- sistance--partly to minimize the cost. The agreements for the peaceful use of atomic energy which France concluded with Brazil and Argentina in 1962 and 1963 are examples of this approach. De Gaulle is known to pre- fer programs aimed at training indigenous peoples to help them- selves, and has pointed to the need for the developing coun- tries to improve their scien- tific knowledge. Hence, he will probably offer to send more technical assistance teams and secondary-school teachers to Latin America, and to in- crease the quota of Latin Ameri- can students in France. Finally, De Gaulle is likely to encourage the Latin American governments to draw up comprehensive economic de- velopment programs for them- selves, but with a French ac- cent. In particular, he will probably offer assistance in training cadres in interested Latin American countries in the French technique of flexible planning, as a way of aiding these countries in working out development plans. Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030002-1 SECRET Political Aims For De Gaulle, of course, political aims take precedence over economic objectives. It is probably too facile an analysis to surmise that De Gaulle's prime objective in Latin America is to bind adherents to a "third force." Even if he were not faced with the problem of in- creasing instability in Africa, where France has extensive com- mitments, his limited economic resources would make him cau- tious about indiscriminate pledges of aid in another area that is susceptible to sudden political upheavals. He is con- fident, however, that France can draw some advantage from fishing in troubled Latin Ameri- can waters. It is likely that the greatest advantage De Gaulle may hope to derive from increas- ing France's "presence" in Latin America is the prospect that it might help bring about a redirection of United States policies. He has made clear his conviction that the Atlan- tic alliance is breaking down and that US primacy should be more restricted to the Western Hemisphere. By the same token, he stakes out a similar posi- tion for France in Western Eu- rope. Therefore, he probably reasons, wrench political in- fluence in Latin America should be used to encourage situations that promise to absorb Washing- ton's attention in its "natural" sphere of influence and away from Europe. This approach is implicit in his reputed insistence that France is a model for countries determined to make a show of "independence." In a speech last September, for instance, he went so far as to say that the underdeveloped countries should detach themselves from the big power blocs. He is not saying "rally to France," but rather "look to your own inter- ests," confident in the belief that France stands to gain if the "satellites" of the two great powers become increasingly self-assertive. There is presently no rea- son to believe that De Gaulle is contemplating a visit to Cuba on either of his trips. How- ever, France is increasing its trade with Cuba; the latest fig- ures show that French-Cuban trade during the first nine months of 1963 amounted to one third more than for all the preceding year. The prospects are that trade between the two countries will continue on the upswing. This is because Paris is moving away from its policy of cooperat- ing with the US to the extent of restricting trade with Cuba to cash sales. Paris is yielding increasingly to pressure from industrialists for government credit guarantees on exports to Cuba. The French have also shown less willingness recently to defer to US wishes concerning 4 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved For Releet'se 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927A09 400030002-1 SECRET the landing rights of Cubana Airlines in Guadeloupe. Paris has denied some landings while allowing others, and no firm pattern has emerged. The Mexican visit seems bound to produce a considerable propaganda success for De Gaulle. In recent years, no European po- litical figure of his stature has made a state visit to that country, and it is being awaited with great local anticipation. De Gaulle's recent global policy pronouncements, have produced a flood of unofficial statements from Latin American countries proclaiming him "the savior of the free world." Moreover, a French Foreign Ministry official has asserted that De Gaulle would be hailed as the "liberator" dur- ing his South American tour. There is no doubt that De Gaulle's views, particularly those offering a third alterna- tive to the two power blocs, will go down well with the Mexicans. He will probably strike this theme hard in his Mexican speeches and tailor his remarks to appeal to Latin America as a whole. France, nevertheless, has considerable ground to cover be- fore it can achieve a major "presence" in Latin America. Standing in the way of a massive French trade and aid program are such important limiting factors as Paris' current policy of budg- eta,ry.str.ingency,its shortage of technical assistance personnel, its extensive African commitments, and its difficulties in interest- ing private French capital to in- vest in Latin America. De Gaulle probably will stress the advantages of a firmer connection with France as pos- sibly leading to profitable ties with the Common Market and EEC members such as West Germany or Italy. De Gaulle may also promise French support for Latin American interests in the United Nations Conference for Trade and Develop- ment which opens in Geneva on 23 March. At every opportunity he is likely to emphasize the vir- tues of foreign aid extended by European countries with no po- litical ambitions in Latin Amer- ica, and to draw attention to its value in providing a counter- balance of sorts to the dominant US position in the area. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 Approved Release 20067'9 "fY"- ICKDP79-O A004400030002-1 Approved For Release 2006/04/13 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400030002-1 SECRET