THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AND THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400040003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

20 March 1964
OCI No. 0323/64B
Copy No.
61
SPECIAL REPORT
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AND THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AND THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM
The men who rule Communist China are all first-
generation, old-guard party revolutionaries. These
senior citizens are beginning to lose their vigor
at a time when their responsibility for finding so-
lutions to China's intractable problems is especially
heavy. Most of the 18 members of the politburo--
the party's elite ruling body--are in their 60s or
70s, and all have been with the party at least 30
years. Most served together as political commissars
or military commanders during the wars against Ja-
pan and the Nationalist government. All are intensely
nationalistic and appear deeply committed to a mili-
tant brand of Communism, but some seem to take a
somewhat more moderate approach to particular prob-
lems.
Leadership differences in themselves do not
appear great enough to spark a struggle for power
when Mao Tse-tung dies or retires fully. Even so,
because no other leader has anything like Mao's
stature and prestige, the removal of his unifying
influence could introduce a period of disorder
marked by debilitating purges. The regime is deeply
concerned about the succession problem, because Mao
--who was 70 on 26 December 1963--has weakened both
mentally and physically in recent years.
Mao's designated successor &s Liu Shao-chi,
who has already assumed the top position in the
government--but not in the party. After Liu, the
line of succession apparently runs to Secretary
General Teng Hsiao-ping, a member of the radical
group which controls the party apparatus--the main
instrument of power in Communist China.
What little is known about second-echelon
leaders who fill top posts in the bureaucracy just
below the politburo suggests that they are probably
just as dedicated and extreme as their superiors.
Their core is a group, reportedly numbering 800,
who participated in the Long March 30 years ago
when Mao was driven from his base of operations in
Central China to Yenan in the Northwest. Most of
these men, who were junior officers then, now are
their late 40s and 50s.
second-echelon leaders,
subject throng ou eir careers to indoctrination
and strict party discipline, have been even more
insulated from contact with the outside world than
the men at the top.
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Leadership Stability
Peiping is proud of the
leadership's record of compava-
tive stability. It has inti-
mated that, because of this rec-
ord , China is better qualified
than the USSR to lead the world
Communist movement. Mao Tse-
Tung the undisputed leader of
the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) since 1935, was a charter
member of the party when it was
formed in 1921. Liu Shao-chi
and Chou En-lai have held posi-
tions of trust since the mid-
1920s. Teng Hsiao-ping, fourth
in the present hierarchy, is a
relative newcomer. He came to
Chinese Communist Party unity is stressed in this commonly displayed photo of the entire
Standing Committee, labeled "Moo's Close Comrades-in-Arms. " From left to right, party
elder Chu Teh, Premier Chou En-lai,-the sidelined Chen Yun, Liu Shoo-chi, Mao Tse-tung,
Party Secretary General Terjg Hsiao-ping, and the chronically sick Lin Pico.
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the fore in the 1930s and reached
the Standing Committee--the super-
politburo--in 1956.
While the turnover in top
positions has indeed been small,
the Chinese try to make it appear
even smaller by the simple device
of not dropping inactive members
from the politburo except when
they die. Several are inactive
because they are old, sick, or
out of favor. Nevertheless, even
former Minister of National De-
fense Peng Te-huai, who was dis-
missed from his post in 1959 and
who is obviously in disgrace, is
still listed as a member.
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Another remarkable attri-
bute of top Chinese leaders,
besides their long continuity
of service, is their ability to
present a united front in the
face of internal and external
problems. In part, this trait
reflects the care with which
Mao has always selected subor-
dinates, but it is also a trib-
ute to his ability to inspire
loyalty. In the past 25 years,
only three members of the real
inner circle (Mao's closest
lieutenants) have been removed
from positions of influence.
These are Kao Kang, purged in
1953, and Peng Te-huai and top
economic specialist Chen Yun,
both of whom lost favor in 1959.
Occasional reports of fac-
tionalism--in the sense of active
competition by disciplined groups
--seem to be essentially conjec-
tures based on the supposition
that there must be some leaders
who believe that Mao's decisions
to launch the Leap Forward and
to challenge the Soviets were
inopportune and even disastrous.
However, the limited available
evidence does not indicate that
differences of opinion have
hardened into factionalism.
The regime's anti-Soviet
stand, despite its harmfuleffects
on China's national interests,
has been strongly endorsed by all
of Mao's immediate subordinates.
The Soviets themselves have con-
ceded that they can find little
trace of willingness to accommo-
date at top levels of the Chinese
party. Soviet polemical attacks
on China have criticized Mao,
Liu and. Chou by name, suggesting
that Moscow sees no chance of
encouraging a split at the top
level. In its domestic propa-
ganda Moscow has suggested that
one of the reasons Chinese leaders
now are hostile is that over
the years Mao has purged im-
mediately any leader who became
a friend of the USSR.
Differences
Mao has never tolerated
persistent opposition to any
major policy line and there is
no indication of active opposi-
tion now. Top leaders have long
exhibited temperamental differ-
ences, however, which tend to
divide them into distinct though
not necessarily opposing groups
of radicals and comparative mod-
erates. The influence of both
groups can be detected in current
domestic and foreign policies,
which contain an eclectic mix-
ture of doctrinaire and prag-
matic elements.
The radical grouping, led
by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hs iao
ping, has clearly dominated in
recent years. It is in firm con-
trol of the party apparatus and
it tends to be the group favored
by Mao. Men in this group share
fundamentalist, militant views.
Like Stalin in many ways, they
are naturally disposed toward
ambitious industrial goals, but
the succession of economic dis-
asters in 1960 and 1961 caused
them to retreat grudgingly from
such goals and to place heavier
emphasis on security and ideo-
logical problems. Thus they are
preoccupied with preserving what
they believe is pure Marxism-
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Leninism, with conducting polit-
ical campaigns against "class
enemies"--still in their view a
major threat--and with weeding
out unreliable or wavering ele-
ments from the armed forces and
the party. Their hostility to
Soviet leaders is based in part
on a seemingly genuine conviction
that the Soviets are ideological
backsliders and traitors to the
world Communist movement.
Premier Chou En-lai has ap-
peared to head a moderate group-
ing that is believed to include,
at the politburo level, Foreign
Minister Chen Yi, Finance Minis-
ter Li Hsien-nien, and Li Fu-chun,
the regime's top economic spokes-
man and planner. (It included
Chen Yun, too, before his decline.)
In describing Chou as a moderate,
allowance should be made for the
fact that his position as premier
permits him less opportunity than
some other party leaders to mani-
fest his ideological fervor and
that he has always faithfully
supported even the most radical
of Mao's policies. It is never-
theless apparent, from a long
record of public and private
statements, that he consistently
feels less attracted to radical
Solutions than are Mao, Liu, and
Teng.
Chou's pragmatism--when he
is allowed to exercise it--sup-
plies a useful balance to the
leadership. He is more willing
than the rest to modify doctrine
that is highly unrealistic when
applied to China. For example,
Chou apparently finds it easier
than other leaders to recognize
that overpopulation is a serious
and long-term problem for China,
and to dispute the orthodox Marx-
ist view that it can be a problem
only in capitalist societies.
Chou is the only top leader to
have ever publicly endorsed birth
control and is the chief backer
of the birth control campaign
instituted in 1963. This cam-
paign must certainly have the
silent endorsement of other
leaders, or at least of Mao, but
at the same time these men are
undoubtedly more sensitive than
Chou to its anti-Marxist taint.
In September 1963, Soviet propa-
ganda exploited this point by
charging that current Chinese
population control measures, in-
cluding male sterilization, are
"incompatible with a Marxist ap-
proach."
Chou En-lai is more sophis-
ticated than his colleagues and
has a greater awareness of the
outside world. As a result, he
is particularly persuasive with
foreigners and has a special
appeal to Chinese intellectuals,
attributes shared by his fore-
most current associate on the
politburo, Chen Yi. Chou and
Chen have long demonstrated a
flair for creating an aura of
good will for China abroad.
Their recent successful swing
through Africa and South Asia
contrasts with Liu Shao-chi's
colorless, ineffectual perform-
ance in this regard last spring
during a tour of Southeast Asia.
Mao has never visited a non-Com-
munist country, nor has Teng
Hsiao-ping since his student
days in Paris. Chou and Chen
are the politburo spokesmen usu-
ally chosen to represent the
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regime when it wants to concil-
iate intellectuals.
Chou's willingness to oppose
the USSR in recent years is prob-
ably based chiefly on nation-
alistic grounds--that is, on ter-
ritorial disputes, on Soviet ef-
forts to control Chinese foreign
policy and military forces, and
on Soviet refusal to back up
China against India and the US.
Although anti-Soviet, he would
be unlikely to feel as strongly
as Mao, Liu, and Teng about the
ideological aspects of the dis-
pute or share their conviction
that the leadership in Moscow is
permitting Soviet society to back-
slide dangerously. Soviet offi-
cials have said they would rather
deal with Chou than with either
Mao or Liu, because he is more
flexible and intelligent. This
distinction is reflected in So-
viet propaganda, which has dealt
less harshly with Chou than with
either Mao or Liu.
The Aging Leadership
The men at the top may have
their differences, but they also
have one important thing in com-
mon: They are all old-guard,
first-generation Communists, who
are reaching an age where they
must realize that a new leader-
ship generation is almost at
hand. Since 1958, when the newest
members were elected, two polit-
buro members have died and several
others are too old to play an
active role any longer. This
latter group includes the party
elders Chu Teh and Tung Pi-wu,
the superannuated Marshal Liu Po-
cheng, and probably Marshal Ho
Lung. Minister of National De-
fense Lin Piao, who is at 56 the
youngest member of the politburo,
has chronic tuberculosis. In
view of their age, even those
who are still active will be
increasingly sidelined with ail-
ments. Illness may account for
the unexplained failure of top
economic spokesman Li Fu-chun
to make any public appearances
during a five-month period in
1963.
The state of Mao Tse-tung's
mental and physical health, which
has an important bearing on Chi-
nese domestic policy and Sino-
Soviet relations, has been in
question for some years. Al-
though Peiping propaganda has
consistently portrayed him as
vigorous and healthy, there was
strong evidence in the mid-1950s
of several bouts of illness, pos-
sibly including a stroke or two,
and he has declined noticeably
in physical vigor and mental
acuity since 1957. In 1960 and
1961, Moscow conducted a whisper-
ing campaign against Mao, intimat-
ing that he was senile. His fre-
quent public appearances--they
have increased since 1962--belie
the charge, however, and Moscow,
perhaps realizing that it is
dangerous to belittle its adver-
sary, has dropped this line of
attack. Mao appears in fair
health, and while his grasp of
details seems to be slipping,
his leadership has apparently
not been disputed.
The best evidence that Mao
has declined, aside from the bad
judgment shown in his domestic
and anti-Soviet policy decisions
after 1957, lies in his record
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POLITBURO OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
(listed according to party rank)
FULL MEMBERS AGE
MAO TSE-TUNG 70
CHIEF ROLE
Party
Party
Government
Inactive, old
Inactive, out
of favor
TOP POSTS
Chairman, Central Committee of the CCP
Chairman, Chinese Peoples Republic
Premier, State Council
Chairman, National Peoples Congress
None
LIU SHAG-CHI 66
CHOU EN-LAI 66
CHU TEH 78
CHEN YUN 59
LIN PIAO 56 Inactive, sick
TEND HSIAO-PING 64 Party
TUNG PI-WU 78
PENG CHEN 64
PENG TE-HUAI 65 Inactive, out
of favor
LIU PO-CHENG 72 Inactive, old
HO LUNG 68 Less active, old
LI HSIEN-NIEN 57 Government
ALTERNATE MEMBERS
ULANFU 60 Party
CHANG WEN-TIEN 66 Inactive, out
of favor
CHEW PO-TA 59
KANG SHENG 65
Member, Military Affairs Committee;
Minister of National Defense
Member, Party Secretariat; First Secre-
tary, Peiping Municipal CCP Committee
Chairman, State Planning Commission;
Member, Party Secretariat
Member, Military Affairs Committee
Member, Military Affairs Committee
Minister of Finance; Member, Party
Secretariat
First Secretary, East China Regional
Bureau of the CCP; First Secretary,
Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee
First Secretary, Southwest Regional
Bureau of the CCP
Member, Party Secretariat; Director,
Agriculture and Forestry Staff Office,
State Council
First Secretary, Inner Mongolia Auton-
omous Region CCP Committee
Party Director, Propaganda Department
Party Deputy Director, Propaganda Department
Party Member, Party Secretariat
Government Chairman, State Economic Commission
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of productivity. Mao was once
a forceful speechmaker and a
prolific and effective writer,
but no important production has
been claimed for him since 1957.
(Although Moscow now asserts he
was the author of "Long Live
Leninism," a key anti-Soviet
polemic published in April 1960,
he probably did no more than
supply the general line of argu-
ment to his staff writers.) The
last major article to appear
under Mao's signature was in 1956.
He last delivered a public speech
in November 1957, and since then
has made only infrequent addresses
to closed party gatherings.
Greeting and impressing
foreign visitors has become one
of Mao's chief, and perhaps most
useful, activities. Usually he
has little to say to visitors,
but relies instead on his pres-
ence and prestige to dazzle them.
When he does talk at length he
is unim ressive.
Since 1957, Peiping has
republished large gi'antities
of Mao's pre-1949 writings on
political and military doctrine,
as a reminder of the master's
greatness. After the publica-
tion of a one-page article in
June 1958, however, no new work
was attributed to Mao until mid-
1963, when he began issuing brief
personal statements denouncing
various aspects of US policy.
Four statements--all unimpressive
strings of clichds--have been
issued, attacking US treatment
of American Negroes (8 August
1963) and US actions in South
Vietnam (29 August 1963), in
Panama (12 January 1964), and in
Japan (27 January 1964). Another
attempt to show that Mao is still
creative was made by the party
journal People's Daily on 4
January 4when it published
ten short poems by Mao, nine with
post-1958 dates, alongside a
large photograph depicting Mao
in a state of blooming health.
Problem of the Succession
Totalitarian regimes such
as China's historically have had
difficulty arranging for the
orderly transfer of political
power, and Peiping seems aware
that it may soon have to deal
with this problem. The regime
admits that among its foremost
concerns are those of preserving
the revolutionary spirit when
the first generation passes on
and preventing the kind of back-
sliding it claims has occurred
in the USSR.
Peiping has been working
assiduously to groom an immediate
successor to Mao and has been
attempting to develop a second
generation of leadership that
can be relied on to continue
his policies. Mao's openly
designated choice as heir is
Liu Shao-chi, his first lieu-
tenant in the party since 1945.
A major step to increase Liu's
stature was taken in 1959 when
Mao turned ever to Liu the
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chairmanship of the Chinese Peo-
ple's Republic (CPR)--while re-
taining the more important post
of party chairman. Although the
duties of the CPR chairman are
largely ceremonial, this transfer
enhanced Liu's prestige by making
him nominal chief of state and by
conferring on him the title of
"Chairman" hitherto reserved for
Mao's sole use.
are indications that he has be-
come bitter and xenophobic. Some
Soviets are said to regard him
as the most intransigently anti-
Soviet of all Chinese leaders.
Liu's visits to North Vietnam and
North Korea in 1963 were occasions
for strong anti-Soviet speeches,
Non-Communists who talk to??Liu
are usually treated to harangues
against India or the. US.
Next to Mao, Liu is China's
foremost ideological spokesman.
Except for Mao, Liu is the only
Chinese whose works are required
reading for party members. The
chief document available for study
is a 1939 pamphlet "How To Be
a Good Communist," which was
dusted off in 1962 and reissued
in a re-edited version. The party
rank and file have been told that
in this work Liu made an "out-
standing contribution" to Marxism-
Leninism. A campaign is cur-
rently developing to have party
officials study a speech given
by Liu in October 1963 attacking
"modern revisionism" and the USSR..
The speech, described by Radio
Peiping as "important" was not
published, possibly because it
was so imtemperate that it would
have given Moscow propaganda am-
munition to support the charge
that Chinese leaders are overly
militant.
Liu has few apparent attri-
butes of a leader. He is color-
less, humorless, and shares none
of Mao's charisma. Since the
dramatic failure in 1960 of Leap
Forward policies, with which Liu
was closely associated, he has
not publicly spoken out on do-
mestic economic affairs. There
Because Liu, now 66, is,
nearly as old and frail as Mao.,
the regime faces a problem of
establishing-,a third in line.
believe
that after Mao and Liu, the suc-
cession will pass to Teng Hsiao-
ping, party secretary general,
rather than to his nominal su
perior, the comparatively moderate
Chou En-lai. Teng seems to be
favored by both Mao and Liu, has
a strong position in the party,,_
probably including supervision
of the secret police, and is
slightly younger than Chou.
Although the old guard may
be able to retain control for
several more years, they will
soon have to begin admitting
younger leaders into the inner
circle of policy makers. They
have been reluctant to do this
because of their distrust. of
men who have not fully shared
their revolutionary experiences.
In recent years almost no new
blood has been brought into the
top echelons of party, government,
or armed forces.
Little is known about the
individuals who make up the next
generation of leaders. Opinions
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on their character vary widely.
Peiping has scoffed at US pre-
dictions that leadership atti-
tudes might soften when younger
men take over. In propaganda
directed at domestic audiences,
however, it is clear that Pei-
ping fears that the newcomers
will be a relatively pragmatic
group that tends to set purely
national interests above ideo-
logical considerations. These
fears may well be valid when
applied to the next generation
of leaders. The core of the
second echelon of leadership,
however, is still made up of
first-generation men who were
junior officers during the Lon
March in the early 1930s.I
this second echelon
is just as dogmatic as the res-
ent incumbents.
second-level lea ers have e-en
even more insulated from contact
with the outside world. and have
been nurtured entirely in the
indoctrinated atmosphere of the
party apparatus.
An unstable situation could
develop in several ways. Mao may
deteriorate so far that Liu is
tempted to push him aside before
he is willing to retire volun-
tarily. Even if Liu takes over
according to scheduled arrange-
ments, he might be challenged by
Teng Hsiao-ping--a highly am-
bitious man who might be unwilling
to wait his turn. Either Liu or
Teng could be challenged by Chou,
although this seems unlikely.
Chou has always given the impres-
sion that he is content to play
a subordinate role, but he might
be forced into the contest in
self-defense to preserve even
this position. Liu and Teng
probably would win such a contest25x1
handily, because of their control25x1
of key instruments of power--the 25X1
party machine and the armed forces
--but there is an outside chance 25x1
that in an intraparty dispute
Chou might find enough support
from moderate elements, partic-
ularly in the army, to over-
power forces controlled by Liu
and Teng.
In spite of Peiping's pre-
cautions, the succession may turn
out to be disorderly. Men who
had been willing to submerge their
differences to work under Mao
might be unwilling to accept the
leadership of a less impressive
person with differing views. A
new, insecure leader might feel
(as did Khrushchev) that he had
to act swiftly to remove poten-
tial opposition.
In any case, there is little
prospect for a reinvigoration of
the Chinese leadership during the
next few years. The process can-
not even begin until Mao leaves
the scene; and his departure may
lead to a protracted power struggle,
to the growth of factionalism, and,
conceivabl to debilitatin
purges. 25
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