WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

OFFICE Q ` CURIENT lN`l`a,L1 jGN
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7 taxc.b ,964
ICI s " No .,O 24/64
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL llyT~ELLIGENC
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 26 March 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
SOVIET FARM MANAGERS TO BE GIVEN GREATER AUTHORITY
This attempt by the USSR to solve its agricultural prob-
lems through organizational manipulations is likely to
be as futile as a similar scheme promulgated in 1955.
AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Conditions as of mid-March offered the prospect of better
winter grain crops in the USSR, the European satellites,
and China than the mediocre to poor harvests of 1963.
YUGOSLAV PARTY PREPARES FOR EIGHTH CONGRESS
A central committee plenum held on 16 March to prepare
for the No"ember congress appears to have concentrated
on current economic problems, but also heard proposals
for more democratic practices in the party organization.
WESTERN AIRCRAFT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST CIVIL AIR OPERATIONS 6
Peiping is about to put into operation six Viscounts
bought from Britain. More purchases of Western trans-
ports are likely as China moves to improve domestic
service and open the mainland to Western airlines.
CHIANG CHING-KUO RISES IN TAIWAN'S POWER HIERARCHY
His appointment as deputy defense minister puts him in
an even stronger position than before to succeed his
father eventually.
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27 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
VIET CONG MORE ACTIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Communist military pressure is increasing, with partic-
ular emphasis on a province south of Saigon. Meanwhile,
the Khanh government is encouraging development of coun-
terinsurgency plans at the local level.
AREA NOTES
On Cambodia and Iran
THE SITUATION ON CYPRUS
As the UN force becomes operational, new conflicts are
arising among Greek Cypriots, partly over renewed de-
mands for union with Greece.
AREA NOTE
On Congo
KING REASSERTS DOMINANT ROLE IN LIBYA
By threatening to abdicate, he impressed the politi-
cians with their need for his stabilizing influence
in the face of mushrooming nationalist sentiment.
COMMUNISTS EXTEND CONTROL IN ZANZIBAR
African nationalists are being neutralized, moderate
pro-Western influences eliminated, and the islands tied
economically and militarily to the Communist bloc.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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EUROPE (continued)
THE EEC AND ITALY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
EEC circles were disturbed last week over Italy's by-
passing Common Market machinery to arrange a billion-
dollar credit package to prop up the lira and ward off
a balance-of-payments crisis. Some of the criticism is
directed at the US, the major contributor to the deal.
INTERNAL DISSENSION CONTINUES TO DELAY MALTA INDEPENDENCE 16
Opposing Maltese political leaders are at an impasse
on the question of constitutionally limiting the influence
of the Catholic Church. London now admits independence
may be put off several months after the 31 May target.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
LATIN AMERICAN REACTION TO DE GAULLE'S MEXICAN VISIT 17
The visit was well received and viewed by many Latin
Americans as a harbinger of increased French economic
aid. Public opinion in the hemisphere does not accept
the Cuban-Communist prediction of a now-diminished US
influence.
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT'S BATTLE WITH CONGRESS CONTINUES 18
Goulart is not letting up in his campaign to pressure
Congress into passing his reform program, and the oppo-
sition, although mounting, remains divided.
IMPORTANCE OF RADICAL VOTE IN CHILE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 19
Communist-Socialist candidate Allende's chances of vic-
tory now hinge on whether the defunct center-right coa-
lition's largest component, the radical Party, swings to
him or to Christian Democrat Frei, the only remaining
contender with a chance of defeating Allende.
AREA NOTES
On Panama and British Guiana
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The USSR is trying again to
solve its agricultural problems
through organizational manipula-
tions. Moscow has decided to re-
lax control over some aspects of
farm planning and to give farm man-
agers greater authority at the ex-
pense of the local bureaucracy in
the day-to-day administration of
the farms.
A party-governmental decision
issued on 20 March--and anticipated
in Khrushchev's speech of 28 Febru-
ary--stipulatesthat the farm man-
agers will decide on when and where
to sow their crops, how many cat-
tle to keep, and how to carry out
farm work. Plans for procurement
(sales of crops to the state)--as
well as production--are to be
worked out at each farm, with the
key stipulation that the plans con-
form to the over-all targets set
by Moscow.
A real decentralization would
be beneficial for agriculture in
general, and important in imple-
menting the fertilizer program,
which can succeed only if adapted
to local conditions.
In practice, however, little
farm autonomy is likely. Essen-
tially the same rules were promul-
gated in 1955, but Moscow's over-
all goals continued to act as an
automatic brake on local initiative.
Local party officials informally
filled the vacuum left by the for-
mal relaxation of administrative
authority, and freely interfered
in the most petty matters, pushing
national campaigns, however ill-
suited to the local area.
Although the farms have not
enjoyed any major degree of freedom
from interference since 1955, the
present decision appears to be
mainly a reaction against the March
1962 reform which set up party-state
territorial production directorates
to oversee farm operations. At
that time Khrushchev said that
these directorates were necessary
because there was "no organ that
can manage agriculture properly...
and delve deeply into the needs...
of the farms." This mandate--as
well as the unfolding production
difficulties--apparently encouraged
the new officials to interfere in
farm work at every turn. One party
chief recently told of a production
administration which sent a barrage
of telegrams to the farms on the
subject of plucking hair out of
horses' tails to meet the plan for
scrap hair.
As long as the sum of the
"locally determined" plans must
be equivalent to Moscow's goals,
and as long as management at all
levels is judged primarily on suc-
cessful fulfillment of these plans,
little actual change is likely re-
gardless of the formal changes de-
creed. For example, a similar at-
tempt last year to "decentralize"
industrial planning for 1964-65 re-
sulted in such "timid" local plans
that midway in the process Moscow
officials were dispatched to "un-
cover hidden reserves." In ad-
dition, as long as Khrushchev,
despite lip service to the con-
trary, continues to give farmers
a multitude of directions and ad-
vice on the most detailed aspects 25X1
of farm operations, his attitudes
will be mirrored in the activities
of lesser officials.
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AGRICULTURAL PROSPECTS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Weather conditions as of
mid-March were generally more
favorable for grain crops than
in the previous year for the
USSR, the European satellites,
and China. Higher soil mois-
ture in the more important
growing areas of these countries
raises prospects for winter
grain crops above the mediocre-
to-poor harvests of 1963.
In the USSR, soil moisture
conditions are good to excellent
in almost all the important
agricultural areas. A record
Ill million acres were seeded
to winter grains last fall,
and some irrigated land appar-
ently is to be shifted from
cotton to grain this spring.
The livestock picture,
however, is less favorable.
Underfulfillment of current
procurement plans for milk
and eggs and overfulfillment
of the meat plan reflect the
very tight feed situation. Live-
stock losses continue, perhaps
including breeding stock, and
future supplies of meat will
suffer because of the need to
rebuild herds.
In the European satellites,
condition of the winter grains
as of mid-March was generally
better than a year ago, except
that drought in Rumania and
Bulgaria has retarded develop-
ment of the wheat crop. Acreage
planted to winter wheat was
reportedly larger than in 1963.
Despite improved prospects for
the northern satellites, total
grain import requirements are
expected to remain relatively
high in 1964. Decreased
dependence on Soviet grain is
illustrated by the three-year
agreements signed by East
Germany, Bulgaria, Czech-
oslovakia, and Poland to import
French and Canadian wheat.
Prospects continue favor-
able in Communist China's winter
and summer crop areas as a
result of generally above-
normal precipitation during
the winter months. However,
if the heavy rains continue in
March and April, planting could
be delayed and yields reduced
in parts of Central and East
China.
North Korean weather
conditions are favorable for
the major spring-sown crops,
due to be planted in late
April and early May. In North
Vietnam, prospects for the early
rice crop--harvested in May--
appear mediocre because of cold
weather and mismanagement;
however, moisture conditions
have been much more favorable
this year than last. Mongolian
agriculture, which depends
mainly on large herds of live-
stock, is recovering from a
severe winter in which some
500,000 animals were lost in
blizzards and heavy snowstorms.
Cuba's heavy stress on the
sugar harvest is unlikely to
change 1964 output signif-
icantly from last year's 3.8
million tons. The high priority
accorded sugar, however, appears
to be cutting down the output
of rice, a staple in the Cuban
diet.
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YUGOSLAV PARTY PREPARES FOR EIGHTH CONGRESS
The central committee of
the Yugoslav League of Commu-
nists met on 16 March to pre-
pare for the party's eighth
congress, which it decided will
be held in November in Belgrade.
Tito's concluding remarks to
the plenum, however, suggest
that current economic problems
became the focal point of its
discussions. Since the first
of the year, rising prices and
lagging wages have sparked
growing dissatisfaction among
industrial workers.
During its deliberations,
the plenum was apparently
diverted from considering the
more basic causes of economic
difficulties and became engaged
in a debate on investment pol-
icies, the standard of living,
and the distribution of national
income. Tito personally advo-
cated relief for the populace,
particularly the lowest income
group. He declined to press
for any crash program, but in-
structed the party's executive
committee to hold "several ses-
sions" on these questions and
to circulate its views to the
membership prior to the congress.
The documents prepared
for the central committee plenum
were circulated in advance so
that the meeting could launch
directly into the debate. This
is a new practice in the Tito
regime designed to increase
the knowledgeability of its
members, now considered a pre-
requisite for greater party
democracy.
Part of the main report
to the plenum was in fact de-
voted to the desire of the
party's moderate leadership to
introduce even more democratic
practices into the organization,
thus continuing a campaign the
moderates and liberals have
been waging to dislodge the
party's more conservative ele-
ment from positions of authority.
To this end, a commission was
elected to recommend to the
coming congress amendments and
additions to the party's stat-
utes. Among the suggestions
made in documents prepared for
the plenum were: preventing
individuals from accumulating
functions, rotating party offi-
cials periodically, publicizing
the party's work at all levels,
and encouraging genuine differ-
ences of opinion within the party.
The report to the plenum
also recommended that the party
adhere to the dogma, first enun-
ciated in 1952, that the organi-
zation is the guiding, not con-
trolling, force in society. This
section of the report, also
aimed at the conservatives, ex-
plained that interference by au-
thoritarian party leaders in the
work of other bodies, such as
workers' councils, disrupts the
proper functioning of the coun-
try's decentralized economic
system. Prior to the plenum,
some regime leaders had blamed
this interference for a number
of recent wildcat strikes.'
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ter N.rir
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The last of six British
Viscount airliners ordered by
Peiping in late 1961 has been
delivered. More purchases of
Western transports are likely
as China moves to improve do-
mestic service and open the
mainland to Western airlines.
Viscounts will begin opera-
tions on several important
long-distance domestic routes
this month, according to Chinese
press reports. Service on
these routes will connect Pei-
ping and the international gate-
ways of Kunming, Canton, and
Shanghai, reducing present
average flying time by about
50 percent.
Peiping's international
air operations may also expand,
requiring additional Western
aircraft. For the moment the
Chinese appear content to per-
mit Western lines to pioneer
routes into China which Peiping
can later use as its own equip-
ment improves. Presumably with
this in mind, the Chinese
continue to explore Western
markets for jet transports,
such as the British Comet and
the French Caravelle, that
may be used on international
flights.
This spring, Pakistani and
Cambodian airlines are scheduled
to begin service to China, the
first non-Communist lines to
fly regular runs to the main-
land. Pakistan plans to begin
flying a weekly service to
Shanghai and Canton in a few
weeks and hopes eventually to
extend its route to Japan.
Cambodia also expects to start
service to Canton next month.
However, air agreements con-
cluded with Burma in 1955 and
Ceylon in 1959 have thus far
resulted in only a twice-weekly
service to Rangoon flown by
CAAC, the Chinese airline.
Other Western airlines are
seeking to extend their service
to China. British BOAC?and
Indonesia's Garuda airlines have
discussed reciprocal flying
rights with the Chinese. Air
France is considering flights
to Peiping via Rangoon, pre-
sumably in hopes of a future
route onward to Japan. A re-
cently proposed Sino-Japanese
air link, however, which could
have opened potentially profit-
able trans-China routes, has
for the present been rejected
by Japan on political grounds.
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CHIANG CHING-KUO RISES IN TAIWAN'S POWER HIERARCHY
President Chiang Kai-shek
on 12 March placed his son,
Chiang Ching-kuo, in a position
more nearly in line with his
already great influence in Na-
tionalist China's affairs by
naming hin, deputy minister of
national defense. This appoint-
ment, an important step forward
in Ching-kuo's career, is ap-
parently designed to groom him
as his father's successor. He
received unprecedented publicity
for his visit to the US last
September and has been playing
an increasingly prominent cere-
monial role during the past few
months.
During the same period, the
only other official of compar-
able rank, Chen Cheng, has lost
stature. Although, as vice presi-
dent, Chen remains Chiang's con-
stitutional successor, he re-
signed from the premiership in
December. His chances for a
political recovery seem dim, and
he may eventually be eliminated
from the line of succession.
Ching-kuo will in effect
control the Defense Ministry,
and the nominal minister has
indicated a desire to retire.
Ching-kuo will directly influ-
ence promotions and appointments,
and senior officers who previously
had direct access to the Presi-
dent now may have to use Ching-
kuo as an intermediary. His
prestige on Taiwan will be en-
hanced by the wider contact with
American officials he will have
now. As he already controls
the security forces and dominates
the Nationalist Party's central
committee, he is in a favorable
position to assume political
dominance when Chiang Kai-shek
dies, regardless of the formal
succession.
The appointment may reflect
Chiang Kai-shek's concern that
Taipei's deteriorating interna-
tional position is depressing
military morale. He has previously
assigned trouble-shooting tasks
to his 53-year-old son.
Chiang may have reasoned that
this appointment was necessary
to buttress lagging military
morale and to guard against a
military coup.
The Taiwanese have long
distrusted Ching-kuo because of
his intelligence and security
roles and will regard his appoint-
ment as a further assertion of
mainlander supremacy. Although
Taiwanese antipathy toward the
government may be increased,
open manifestations of opposition
are unlikely.
SECRET
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21st Division
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 15
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
IV CORPS ZONE
a Con Son (Paulo Condore)
CON SON
Military region boundary
Division boundary
Area of intense Communist
pressure
U hU 75
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SOUTH VIETNAM
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES
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SECRET
Communist activity in
South Vietnam, gradually in-
creasing during recent weeks,
has risen substantially in the
past ten days. The focal point
of the Viet Cong effort con-
tinues to be the Mekong delta,
particularly Kien Hoa Province,
where there has been a sharp
rise in armed attacks includ-
ing a battalion-size ambush on
18 March and another on the
23rd. The Viet Cong appear
to be making a determined ef-
fort to obtain complete con-
trol over Kien Hoa, which is
made up of a group of islands
at the mouth of the Mekong.
Recent government opera-
tions have produced some
favorable results. Effective
deployment of army, air, and
naval units and greater use of
armored vehicles and artillery
may be partially responsible.
General Khanh continues to
formulate plans to intensify the
war effort. The military corps
echelon has been made the focal
point for planning and implemen-
tation of the new "Victory" plan,
and requirements to formulate
local pacification plans have
been levied on each corps and
province.
Terrorism and sabotage
continue to comprise the bulk
of the Viet Cong activity.
The Communists are emphasizing
harassment of communications
lines and routes, including the
main north-south railroad. In
the northern provinces, they
are continuing to exert pressure
in the heavily populated coastal
plains. Although they have
the capability to isolate some
areas in the north and to in-
terdict communications and
supply routes at various points,
their current objective appears
to be to draw attention to the
government's inability to main-
tain control.
A "New Rural Life Directo-
rate" has been established to
take over the former strategic
hamlet program. A plan to place
a representative of the direc-
torate at each military corps and
division headquarters should
substantially improve coordina-
tion between military and civil-
ian agencies concerned with
pacification. The directorate
has dispatched teams to travel
about in each province to ex-
plain the rehabilitation policy.
This is the first significant
effort by the Khanh government
to bring national policy to the
attention of the local adminis-
trative level.
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27 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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RMAkus
Area inhabited by
Kurds
agheh
llaoowab
oZan
Hmadm _
1
Persian Gulf
~_ nl
eggez TEHRAN,
rtv_an
vShahpur)
I R A N
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Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk
is exp_oT tng South Vietnam's
attack on the Cambodian border
village of Chantrea (see map
facing preceding page) and
other recent border incidents
to underscore the urgent need
for international guarantees
of Cambodia's neutrality and
borders. He argues that the
incidents "prove" that Cambo-
dia is threatened by US and
South Vietnamese aggression.
As part of this effort, he is
pushing for a UN Security Coun-
cil airing of the Chantrea in-
cident.
Sihanouk evidently has
not yet abandoned hope that he
can get; a full-blown Geneva-
type conference. He has ad-
dressed pleas to Khrushchev and
Iran: The Iranian Govern-
ment Has-recently arrested some
120 Kurdish leaders in an at-
tempt to stem growing unrest in
Iranian Kurdistan. Kurdish na-
tionalist propaganda activities
reportedly had been increasing,
and Tehran believed that Com-
munists were penetrating the
Democratic Party of Kurdistan,
the area's principal political
organization. Many of the 750,-
000 Kurds in northwestern Iran
appear to be impressed with the
benefits their brethren in Iraq
gained from their three-year re-
volt, and unimpressed with the
benefits obtained from the
De Gaulle for their intervention
on behalf of such a meeting and
has renewed threats to go to Pei-
ping and later Hanoi unless the
West agrees by 9 April to attend
a conference. He says that re-
cent developments rule out a more
limited quadripartite conference
with the US, South Vietnam, and
Thailand.
Nevertheless, the surpris-
ingly nonhostile terms under which
bilateral border talks with South
Vietnam were postponed on 23
March suggest Sihanouk wants to
keep channels open to Saigon.
He now says that he will con-
clude a border agreement with
South Vietnam as soon as a date
is set for a Geneva conference.
Shah's land reform program or
with other plans to improve eco-
nomic conditions.
As in the past, the Shah
appears to be relying primarily
on a heavy military concentration
to dampen Kurdish nationalist
activities. He ordered the latest
arrests against the counsel of
his principal security and mili-
tary advisers, who considered the
action both unnecessary and
likely to harden Kurdish resist-
ance. In fact, the initial Kurd-
igh reaction has been a combina-
tion of confusion, fear, and anger.
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w.. 'ti/
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Cyprus has remained gener-
ally calm during the past week
as the UN moved ahead in imple-
menting the Security Council
resolution of 5 March.
Meanwhile, new conflicts
are arising within the Greek
Cypriot leadership. Minister
of Interior Georkatzis appears
to be trying to undermine the
power and influence of President
Makarios. Georkatzis currently
is supporting the suddenly re-
vived demand among Greek Cyp-
riots for "enosis"--union of
Cyprus with Greece. Makarios
has paid lip service to enosis
but probably opposes ending the
island's independence inasmuch
as this would inevitably lessen
his own political power. As
the movement for enosis has
strong anti-Communist overtones,
Makarios may soon be forced to
rely more heavily on the power-
ful local Communist party or,
alternately, attempt to assume
leadership of the enosis move-
ment himself.
Turkish Cypriot leaders are
described as despondent and
fearful for their safety should
they leave their quarter of Nic-
osia and try to reassume their
positions in the Cypriot Govern-
ment. The Turkish Cypriots
have not participated in the
government since the outbreak
of violence in December. Both
Turkish Cypriots and the Turk-
ish Government want a federation
of cantons, with Turks grouped
in about six of them. The Turk-
ish Cypriot minister of agricul-
ture, now in Ankara, has asked
the Inonu government for assur-
ances that the Turkish Cypriots
will not be "let down" in any
final agreement reached on the
Cyprus problem. Otherwise, he
claims they want Ankara's assist-
ance for mass migration to Turkey.
such a movement may be the
only solution for Cyprus but
it will have
serious long-term effects on
Greek-Turkish relations. The
presence of some 12,500 Greek
nationals in Istanbul gives
Turkey an opportunity to exert
pressure on Athens in future
negotiations. Turkey has al-
ready decided to terminate the
Greek-Turkish Treaty of 1930,
which granted certain special
privileges to this minority,
and has expelled several Greeks
from the city for alleged "il-
legal activities. These moves
indicate that the Inonu govern-
ment intends to exploit Greek
vulnerability in this instance
both to strike back at Greece
for its strong support of Maka-
rios and to demonstrate domesti-
cally that it is still willing
to act militantly on the Cyprus
issue.
The UN peace-keeping force
is scheduled to become opera-
tional on 27 March under the
command of Indian General Gyani.
Nearly the entire 1,150-man
Canadian contingent is on the
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27 Mar 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/13: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400050001-0
CAMEROON - " - _.
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