WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

WEEKLY SUMMARY
CEI~ITRAL INTELLIGEI~ICE A~ENGY
~FFfCE OF CURRENT LNTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
CRET
~~ ,,#~~ GROUP 1 ExclLded'~rQrrr autort~cstic
(~~/ dowrtgrodinq and declassifitcrvion-
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(Information as of 1200 EST, J April 100)
MOSCOW OPENS NEW COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST PEIPIIdG
The mid-February Saviet central committee plenum wa.s
clearly a turning point for i4loscow's strategy in file
Sino-Saviet conflict. Plenum documents published last
week and I#hrushchev's speeches in Faungary out"line a long-
range program for coping with what now is acknowledged
as an unbridgeable :schism in the Communist movement.
SUSLOV ON THE FATE OF THE SOVIET ANTIPARTY GI'~OUP
Party Secretary Suslov's recent reference to the expul-
sion of Malenkov, ]4lolotov, and Kaganovich from the par-
ty is the first widely publicized Saviet statement on
the subject, although their ouster has been common knowl-
edge in party circles since early 1J62.
POPULAR OPPOSITION TO PEIPING'S STRINGENT CULTURAL POLICIES
The regime's attempts to force all cultural activities
into the mold of its mounting "socialist education".eam-
paigns is likely to result in a further alienation of
the party from society as a whole .
PARTY RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN IN NORTH VIETNAM
It now is clear that the decision in December to launch
a campaign against "rightist" tendencies in the party
stemmed largely from ideological difficulties created by
Ilanoi's shift toward Peiping in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
SAIGON P,EGIME AT ODDS WITH CIVILIAN POLITICIANS
General Khanh has dissolved the Council of Notables and
dismissed a civilian cabinet member. Hc: has also insti-
tuted some administrative refox~ns.
BURMA MOVES FURTIiER LEFTWARD
General Ne Win has ousted the moderate minister of
trade and development and has nationalized wholesale
and retail outlets. He has also further reduced Burma's
foreign contacts.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
AREA NO'T'E 9
On Bhutan
FACTIONAL SPLIT IN THE INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
The party's current National Council sessions may pro-
duce a formal break between wings oriented toward Mos-
cow and Peiping.
STATUS OF TUI'~1{ISIi REGIMENT RAISES NEih' DISPUTE ON CYPRUS 11
Makarios, foM owing his unilateral abrogation of the
13G0 Treaty of Alliance which allows Turkey to station
troops on Cyprus, is seeking to remrve the 650-man Turk-
ish force from the strategic Nicosia-Kyrenia road.
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS DETERIORATE
A British air attack on a Yemeni fort, the latest in-
cident in the Aden-Yemeni border area, has evoked sharp
res~:tions from Egypt and other Arab states.
ZANZIBAR CONTINUES TO DRIFT APIAY FROM NEST
President Karume, who now has formally demanded removal
of the NASA space facility, is becoming increasingly
isolated from moderlte advice. Despite minor intramural
differences, Foreign P~4inister Babu appears to retain
control of the regime's dominant pro-Communist phalanx.
THE BEPbLIN PASS SITUATION
Talks resumed on 8 April, but prospects are slim that
the negotiators can work out an arrangement similar to
that which allowed i1'est Berliners to visit East Berlin
last Christmas.
AREA NOTES
On Belgium and Western European Socialist Parties
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T~YESTERN HEh4ISPITERE Page
EFFOT;,TS TO FORM NEtiY GOVET,N1t~NT IN BRAZIL
Congress, despite charges from some members that they
are being intimidated, appears to be yielding to pres-
sure from revolt leaders that it swif tly elect a mili-
tary man to serve the remaining 20 months of Goulart's
term. Mass arrests of suspected leftists continue.
CUBAN ARMED FORCES NOtiY RECEIVING DRAFTEES
The better educated men now being inducted will provide
manpower for the advanced Soviet equipment turned over
to the Cubans.
CI3ILEAN POLITICAL SCENE BEGINNING TO STABILIZE
The povaerful Radical Party now has decided not to back
Communist-Socialist presidential candidate Allende but to
run its own candidate, a development which should enhance
the prospects of the Christian Democrats' ~;duarda Frei.
NESY POLITICAL SRUABBLE SETTLED IN BOLIVIA
By persuading party troublemaker Federico Fortun to
cease his attempts to regain the ruling party's vice-
presidential nomination, President Paz has averted what
was shaping up as another severe political crisis.
AREA NOTES
On Panama 20
On Dominican Republic and British Guiana 21
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MOSCOW OPENS NEW COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST PEIPING
The publication on 3 April
of party secretary Suslov's
speech to the Soviet central
committee plenum in mid-February
and of the plenum's resolution
on the Sino-Soviet dispute makes
it clear that this meeting marked
an important turning point for
Moscow's strategy in the conflict.
In addition to launching a public
counteroffensive after a five-
month suspension of polemics, the
3 April documents and Khrushchev's
speeches in Hungary outline a
long-range program for coping
with what now is publicly ackmwl-
edged to be an unbridgeable schism
in the world Communist movement.
Moscow now has virtually
discarded all pretense of a
single movement and recognized
the reality of two Communist
giants competing for ideologi-
cal authority. Suslov made the
usual utterances about restor-
ing fraternal relations, but
implied that further concilia-
tory gestures toward Peiping
would be futile and predicted
a "serious and prolonged strug-
gle."
The fundamental purpose
of the Soviet counterattack
probably is to overcome the re-
luctance of certain foreign par-
ties, such as the Italian and
the Rumanian, to join Moscow
in a collective denunciation of
Peiping. Suslov's speech and
the plenum "decision" emphasized
that Mascow had displayed maxi-
mum restraint, responsibility,
and concern for the cohesion
of the Communist movement, only
to see Peiping treat this policy
as a "'manifestation of weakness."
Suslov asserted that Marxist-
Leninists throughout the world
can no longer restrict them-
selves to "criticism and po -
litical evaluation" of Peiping's
heresies. An editorial in the
same 3 April Pravda added that
'further silence not only would
do no good but would encourage
Peiping's ei'forts to disorga -
nize" the Communist movement .
Moscow's frustrations with
foreign Communist waverers
was reflected in Pravda's com-
plaint that Peiping had pre-
vented foreign parties from
"exposing" it by "blackmailing"
them with threats of a split.
In a show of leadership
solidarity exceeding even the
public displays of loyalty fol-
lowing the removal of the anti-
party group in 1957, top Soviet
leaders have fanned out to
address regional party meetings
on Suslov's speech and the
plenum resolution. Over the
past two weeks, Brezhnev has
spoken at a Kazakh plenum and
in Uzbekistan, Podgorny in
Kiev, Mikoyan in Baku, and
Kosygin in Novosibirsk. Such
activities are clearly intended
to underscore the futility of
any Chinese attempts to meddle
in internal Soviet politics.
Future Tactics
Suslov's indictment of
Peiping included charges of
"subversive activities" aimed
at splitting both the world
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movement and individual parties
and of plans to create a "kind
of special international bloc"
with its "center" in Peiping.
The Chinese were said to be us-
ing "all sorts of renegades,
degenerates, and adventurists"
to overthrow pro-Soviet leaders
in foreign parties. A Soviet
decision to urge these parties
to expel pro-Chinese factions
appears evident in Suslov's
assertion that "fraternal par-
ties could not tolerate the re-
actionary groups and are weed-
ing them out," Pravda under-
scored this tactic T y publish-
ing on 6 April an article by
the leader of the pro-Soviet
Ceylonese party claiming that
his party "has become stronger
by cleansing itself of the op-
portunist and venal elements."
While Suslov put the USSR
on record as favoring a new
world Communist conf erence,
there are no indications that
the Soviets comtemplate early
unilateral moves to farce a
final rupture. They apparently
intend to continue ostensible
efforts to restore unity rather
than. to provoke an early show-
down and expulsion of the Chi-
nese. Suslov, denying that. the
conflict is simply a Sino-Soviet
struggle, insisted that it had
arisen from "differences be-
tween the Chinese leadership and
the international Communist mwe~
ment," He called for a "collec-
tive effort" by all parties to
devise ways to "preserve and
consolidate Marxist-Leninist
unity,"
Moscow?s public commitment
to a conference next fall prob-
ably was conceived primarily
as a means of increasing pres-
sure on reluctant foreign Com-
munist leaders. Pravda summa-
rized a 7 March Soviet Setter to
Peiping proposing a three-stage
program beginning with bilat-
eral talks in May, followed by
a preliminary meeting in June
and July of parties represented
on the editorial committee which
prepared for the 1960 Moscow
conference, and culminating in
a new conference of all parties
next autumn. Although it is
unlikely that the Soviet leaders
expect Peiping to accept this
program, they probably believe
it will afford them considerable
flexibility in determining fu-
ture moves in light of foreign
Communist reaction.
Eastern European Reaction
Reaction to date affords
little ground for optimism in
Moscow.
Not all Eastern European
regimes are fully in favor of
the USSR's latest steps. While
all except Albania and Rumania
have published or at least--
in the case of Yugoslavia and
Poland--summarized the documents
printed in Pravda on 3 April,
local editorial comment has
been sparse and varied, The
East Germans vigorously asserted
their approval, and the Bulgar-
ian and Czechoslovak parties
quickly and unequivocally lined
up behind the USSR but were more
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restrained than the East Germans
in their commentary. T$e Htmgar-
ians and the Poles were even
more reticent but go along with
Moscow.
Sharper differences are
evident in reaction to the Rus-
sianproposal for a new interna-
tional conference of Communist
parties. The East Germans not
only endorse the idea and seem
to favor a strongly anti-Chinese
conf erence
but
hint at
their
impatience
with
further
procras-
tination.
The
Bulgarian
party
"ardently
approves" of a
confer-
ence this
fall, and the
Czech-
oslovak regime backs a conference,
"preferably this year." The
Hungarians do not specifically
back the conf erence proposal
The Polish regime, in its
first independent commentary on
9 April, endorsed Suslav's view
of the need for 'lconsultations"
to achieve unity but stopped
short of calling for a conference
as h8 did ~
The Rumanians, while in
general agreement with Moscow's
substantive position in the
Stno-Soviet dispute, neverthe-
less oppose any move toward a
final break. Bucharest is
likely to maintain its silence
on the conference proposal until
after a central committee meet-
ing scheduled for 15 April. It
sdems likely the Rumanians will
openly express their reluctance
to agree to Khrushchev's time-
table.
Commentary in the Yugoslav
press indicates fear that Khru-
shchev's renewed campaign to
isolate Peiping may result in
some estrangement between Yugo-
slavia and the international
movement.
None of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries has commented
on the implication in Khru-
shchev's 3 April speech in
Budapest that some new form
of Soviet bloc organization
should be formed. Belgrade,
long opposed to blocs, is prob-
ably deeply shocked by the idea,
and the other regimes probably 25X6
fear that any new organ of au-
thority might impinge on their
ability to maintain a limited
degree of independence from
MOSGOW.
Some, and possibly all, of
the Eastern European leaders
will meet informally in Moscow
on the occasion of Khrushchev's
70th birthday on 17 April. TASS
has announced that Gomulka is
to lead a Polish party-govern-
ment delegation to Moscow soon.
According to a recent Yugoslav
press report from Moscow, U1-
bricht and possibly other lead-
ers are to be there. A Hungar-
ian press official in late March
reported Kadar would be going
and "speculated" that other Eases
ern European leaders would be
there.
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Soviet party secretary
Suslov's recent reference to
the expulsion of Malenkov, Molo-
tov, and Kaganovich from the
party is the first widely pub-
licized Soviet statement on this
subject. However, their expul-
sion has been common knowledge
in party circles since the ac-
tion was completed in early 1962.
It has been mentioned in at least
one public lecture in Moscow.
Suslov's reference to the group
was intended, like many other
passages in his speech, to under-
score the solidarity of the So-
viet leadership and people be-
hind Khrushchev and to remind
the Chinese of the futility of
attempting to resurrect the anti-
party group as a rallying paint
far opposition to him.
The machinery for expul-
sion was set in motion at the
22nd party congress in October
1961 with renewed attacks on
the members of the group, par-
ticularly Molotov, and submission
of resolutions to the congress
by several party groups calling
for immediate ouster. After the
congress closed, expulsion pro-
ceedings, in conformity with the
party statutes,were initiated by
the primary party organizations
to which members of the group
belonged.
The Soviet leadership ap-
parently was at same pains to
adhere meticulously to every
letter of the statutes to avoid
any suggeston of Stalinist meth-
ods. Accordingly, the decision
of the primary organizations to
expel the members of the group
had to be ratified by the two
next higher party organizations
before expulsion was final. The
statutes also specify the right
of appeal to the party control
commission within two months
after final expulsion.
In early February 1962,
when Molotov had apparently ex-
hausted all avenues of appeal
and all efforts of the regime
to extract same kind of confes-
sion from the stubborn "old
Bolshevik" had failed, the case
was closed.
According to Soviet offi-
cials, Molotov, Kaganovic h
were gran e s a e pen-
sions and are currently living
in retirement in Moscow; h4alen-
kov is still said to be workin
in Kazakhstan
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POPULAR OPPOSITION TO PEIPING'S STRINGENT CULTURAL POLICIES
Peiping's attempts to force
all cultural activities into the
mold of its mounting "socialist
education" campaigns are running
into active as well as passive
opposition. Actors in a recent
"socialist" play were stoned off
the stage, and another troupe
that had contracted for a three-
month tour of the Honan country-
side gave up after two weeks when
its play proved as unpopular
with rural party officials as
with the peasants.
Undeterred by this reaction,
the party is insisting that "so-
cialist" drama be pushed harder,
even if it. is unpopular, The
party journal Red Flag warned
in Febx?uary that-i~~e people
dislike the new plays, the fault
lies with them, not the plays.
New guidelines drawn up a
few months ago prohibit the per-
formance of traditional opera
and foreign plays. This is es-
pecially resented in rural areas,
where opera has long been the
chief form of entertainmeut.~
Stricter party lines have
also been set for the new plays,
necessitating the rewriting of
some. They must nat treat spe-
cial individual problems, sug-
gest that a bright future is
ahead, or hint that leadership
at any level could make mistakes.
The result~~
are incredibly dull. The 25X1
heroes are insignificant figures
like the young soldier-martyr
Lei Feng, who wanted only to
serve Mao and the party in some
small way. The typical villain
is no longer a wrongdoing capi-
talist but a quiet young man
whose only crime is wanting to
be left alone, get married per-
haps, or walk in the park and
watch movies after work instead
of studying the works of Mao or
"helping the collective."
The new stultifying party
line is being applied to other
cultural areas as well. Western
classical music, previously en-
couraged, is giving way to "mili-
tant and revolutionary" Chinese
music, usually sung by choruses.
Literary journals published
in Peiping have been finding id-
eological deficiencies in Chinese
classics previously so revered
as to be above criticism. Ex-
purgation of these works, to pre-
serve their militant portions,
is recommended.
Peiping's goal evidently is
to expose everyone to political
indoctrination, either directly
ar through cultural media, during
all leisure hours. In its total-
itarian extremism, this goal re-
sembles the "leap forward" con-
trols of a few years ago, al-
though the underlying aim now is
not to increase production but to
elicit acceptance of the regime's
point of view. It is more likely,
however, to result in a further
alienation of the part from so-
ciety as a whole.
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The Communist World
PARTY RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN IN NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese cen-
tral committee last December de-
cided to launch an extensive id-
eological education campaign di-
rected at "rightist" tendencies
within the party ranks.
There is no evidence that
the campaign now is under way.
However, a.recent series of ar-
ticles by politburo member Le
Duc Tha suggest that it will
start soon. These articles pro-
vide a clear insight into the na-
ture and motivation of the cam-
paign. They confirm earlier in-
dications that the campaign was
necessitated in large part by the
ideological difficulties created
by Hanoi's shift toward Peiping
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Tho,
a member of the now-ascendant
pro-Chinese wing of the party,
indicated that the campaign would
not be "harsh or vindictive" and
that it would be directed at con-
vincing the middle and lower ech-
elons of the validity of Hanoi's
support for Peiping. Tho is head
of the party organization depart-
ment and will probably be largely
responsible for directing:the drive.
In his articles, Tho re-
lated the ideological issues in
the dispute to specific Vietnam-
ese national policies--the war
in the South, the pace of agri-
cultural cooperativization, and
the necessity for rapid indus-
trialization--thus underscoring
that Hanoi's shift toward the
Chinese was made on the basis
of its own national interests
and is not a result of pressure
from Peiping. His arguments in
this regard will probably be in-
corporated into the campaign ma-
terials.
Tho indicated that the party
is also distressed at a tendency
by some party members to concern
themselves more with physical
comfort, rank, and salary than
with the revolutionary goals of
the regime. In an echo of re-
cent Chinese criticisms of So-
viet life, he declared that such
"rightist" proclivities represent
a potential opening for the "poi-
sons" of modern revisionism.
Neither Tho's articles nor
other regime statements on the
campaign suggest that a purge
is in the offing. Moderate and
hard-line factions clearly dif-
fer over some aspects of party
policy, but there is no evidence
of an acute split at policy-mak-
ing levels over such key ques-
tions as the conduct of the war
in South Vietnam. In fact, the
materials published on the Decem-
ber central committee delibera-
tions suggest that the party re-
dedicated itself to vigorous
support of Viet Cong political
and military action. Any dif-
ferences which do exist in the
heirarchy probably center on the
Sino-Soviet dispute but involve,
not opposition to supporting the
Chinese Communists, but rather
the question of the degree to
which Hanoi should align itself
with Peiping.
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10 Apr 6~ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA~tY
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SAIGON REGIME AT ODDS WITH CIVILIAN POLITICIANS
General Khanh's continuing
differences with South Vietnam's
civilian politicians have over-
shadowed his latest steps to
prevent administrative abuses
and mobilize the nation's man-
power.
On 5 April the government
dissolved the civilian advisory
Council of Notables which had
been appointed under the Minh
regime. Although the move was
billed as paving the way far an
elected constituent assembly,
it resulted from Khanh's wish
to do away with a forum far crit-
icism of his government. The
deposed councilors--dxawn largely
from Saigon's elite, whose ef-
forts to exert a stranger influ-
ence in government had been
thwarted by the Diem regime as
well--will probably revert to
their traditional role of frus-
trated opposition.
Khanh also replaced his
civilian interior minister, Ha
Thuc Ky, a Dai Viet Party mem-
ber who had been chafing over
his lack of influence in police
and provincial appointments.
Other Dai Viet members of the
cabinet, particularly party
leader Nguyen Ton Haan, a vice
premier, remain in the regime.
Precautions reportedly were taken,
however, to prevent any reaction
to Ky's dismissal.
Khanh, meanwhile, continues
to gain respect as a result of
his vigorous efforts to over-
come long-prevailing government
weaknesses. Although he is
gradually replacing additional
province chiefs, many of those
he has appointed--including the
new civilian chiefs in two of
South Vietnam's northern prov-
inces--are reported to be very
active and popular.
In Quang Tin Province, also
in the north, a clear-and.-hold
operation initiated in mid-Feb-
ruary is reported to be effec-
tively preventing Communist
forces there from assembling in
any significant strength. Farther
south in coastal Binh Dinh Prov-
ince, Viet Cong advances re-
portedly have been stemmed in
all but a few areas, and the
government is beginning to re-
gain some lost ground. Some
provinces just north of Saigon
are also showing progress.
The situation in other
provinces, however, continues
to deteriorate. In Darlac, in
the central highlands, poor man-
agement is causing many people to
leave the locale of the clear-and-
hold operation that terminated
in late January. The government's
crash program to rehabilitate
Long An Province just south of
Saigon has deteriorated. to only
a token effort, primarily be-
cause of frequent changes of
administration and rotations of
the militar units involved.
25X1
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General Ne Win has stepped up
the tempo of his two-year-old rev-
olution in Burma. He has recently
shown new determination to complete
his program of socialization and
regimentation of the economy and
society and to remove all foreign
influences.
The ouster on 1 April of Chit
14Tyaing, a moderate, as minister of
trade development leaves economic
policy in the hands of the radical
leftist element in Ne win's Revolu-
tionary Council. Chit Myaing, a
protegd of Aung Gyi, who was the
regime's number-two man until he
was deposed a year ago, had recently
regained control of exports. This
suggested that Ne Win might moderate
his policy of accelerated socialism.
However, semiofficial press accounts
indicate that Chit I~4yaing, now re-
portedly under arrest, was dismissed
because of policy differences--spe-
cifically his opposition to rapid
nationalization.
Qn 8 April the gover-unent
nationalized wholesale and retail
outlets for consumer goods through-
Bhutan: The Maharajas return
to Bhu an rom Europe probably will
ease the confusion created by the
assassination on 5 April of the
Himalayan state's prime minister,
Jigme Dorji. Lendup Dorji, a broker,
reportedly will assume the functions
of the off ice--involving primarily
the responsibility for relations
with India, which controls the slate's
foreign affairs. A Bhutanese sol-
dier has been accused of the slaying,
out the country; Rangoon outlets
had been nationalized in mid-t:-rarch.
This move, aimed primarily at In-
dian and other foreign merchants,
was designed to curb hoarding and
black-marketing, which have been
encouraged by the governments
inefficiency and confusion in
handling imports and distribution.
I~leanwhile, Ne Win has con-
tinued his withdrawal from foreign
contacts and influences by forcing
the closing of public libraries
operated by various embassies.
The regime has also t'ightehed its
control over private schools, ended
the teaching of English at the pri-25X1
wary level, and eliminated politi-
cal indoctrination pe~riod~ at pro-
Comrnunist Chinese schools.
Last month the Burmese asked Pei-
ping to close its Mandalay consulate
because of its flagrant violations
of Burmese restrictions on foreign
propaganda. ~
but the motive has not yet been
disclosed.
The assassination may prove
helpful to elements anxious to pro-
mote the traditional distrust of
India among the Bhutanese. The
Chinese Communists can be expected
to look for indications that New
Delhi's grip on the mountain king-
dom has been weakened, but they 25X1
probably will move cautiously in
any attempt to extend their influ-
ence in Bhutan.
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FACTIONAL SPLIT IN THE INDIAN COMMUNIST
Heated sessions of the
Indian Communist Party's 100-
man national council, which
begins on 10 April, seem likely
to produce some sort of formal
split. For the first time in
the party's Long history of fac-
tional strife, leaders on the
so-called "left" and "right"
wings who have been assailing
each other publicly for the
past week seem intent on forc-
ing a showdown.
The "leftists , " who just
a few months ago seemed hope-
lessly divided even among them-
selves, have been emboldened
by the recent discovery in the
Indian National Archives of a
1924 letter in which the current
party chairman, S. A. Dange,
then an imprisoned labor leader,
purportedly offered to work for
British intelligence. They have
publicly called for Dan e's
resignation
With ange dis-
posed of, the "leftist'would hope to
elect a leader more amenable
to the radical action. program
they drew up during the past
week. Should their effort
against Dange fail, some of the
"leftists" may walk out.
Dange, however, does not
intend to let the matter drop
there. The initial furor over
the 1924 letter arose while he
was in Prague attending a meet-
ing of the Communist World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions of which
he is an officer. Even before
he returned to India--via Mos-
cow--there were signs that the
10 Apr 64 CURRENT
01right" was at long last pre-
pared to fight the "left" to
a decision.
A significant factor in
Dange 's noticeably stiffer
approach to the problem of the
"leftist" faction may be his
recent talks in Moscow. Soviet
pronouncements in the past week
opening a new counteroffensive
against Peiping suggest that
Moscow has decided to urge pro-
Soviet foreign Communist leader:
to expel pro-Chinese "renegades
and splitters" Pram their
parties (see first article).
India's Communists have a
long history of blurring their
divisions and avoiding irrevo-
cable decisions. Nonetheless,
at the close of the present
sessions, some participants
will probably be outside the
party. Dange 's Moscow-backed
group probably has the strength
to retain control of the party
organs, but this fight will
sap their energies, and the
party as a whole will be weaker
if it loses some of its most
dynamic radicals. In the event
of an open break, the dissidents
would proceed at full speed to
develop a rival party apparat
favoring the Chinese ideological
position.
1
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INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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7F(tima
Paphos
8oghaz
~,
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A new dispute has arisen on
Cyprus, this one involving the
status of the 650-marl Turkish
regiment stationed there. Ankara
has refused to order this force
away from the Nicosia-Kyrenia
road--where it has been deployed
since December--back to its bar-
racks in Nicosia. As a result,
President Makarios announced on
4 April that he had terminated
Cyprus' Treaty of Alliance with
Greece and Turkey, which permits
them to station forces on the
island .
The disputed road is the
only one still in Turkish hands
linking the capital to the coast.
Makarios has made its reopening
a major goal since the UN peace-
keeping force became operational
on 2? March. General Gyani, the
UN commander, has agreed with
Makarios that establishing free-
dom of movement throughout the
island is his first task . Maka -
rios has threatened to refer the
problem of the Turkish regiment
to the UN Security Council if
Gyani fails to do this, and warns
also that he will cut off all the
regiment's supplies.
With Makarios' approval,
Gyani has attempted to have the
Turkish contingent placed under
his command. The Turks are agree-
able to this, however, only if
any orders from the UN commander
to move the regiment are subject
to review by the Turkish General
Staff--a condition apparently
unacceptable to Gyani.
Terming Makarios' unilateral
abrogation of the treaty "il-
legal and without practical ef-
fect," Ankara has warned that
any Greek Cypriot attack on the
Turkish contingent will be re-
garded as an act of aggression
against Turkey. Bitterness in
Ankara over what is generally
regarded as a lost cause on Cy-
prus has resulted in a determina-
tion to settle the issue in the
context of Greek-Turkish rela-
tions. Turkey's recent suspen-
sion of various bilateral agree-
ments with Greece probably will
be followed by other inimical
moves--such as final legislative
approval of a long-pending bill
to extend Turkish territorial
waters, to the detriment of
Greek fishing interests.
Sporadic clashes on Cyprus
have continued. The heaviest
fighting has occurred about &0
miles west of Nicosia where ele-
ments of the UN peace-keeping
force were hard pressed to es-
tablish a cease-fire.
Among Greek Cypriots, dem-
onstrations have continued in
favor of the return from Athens
of George Grivas, former under-
ground leader and frequent critic
of Makarios.
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Some right-
wing Greek Cypriot newspapers
have joined the Communist press
in warning that the "imperialist
powers" are behind a campaign to
overthrow Makarios and replace
him with one "mare willing to
do their bidding"--an oblique re-
ference to Grivas. 25X1
The British air attack on
the Yemeni border fort of Harib
on 28 March has evoked strong
reactions from almost every
Arab state.
Arab press and radio crit-
icism of the UK is being main-
tained at an exceptionally high
level, led by a full-scale cam-
paign issuing from Cairo. Yemen,
backed by its Arab friends and
the USSR, brought the issue be-
fore the UN Security Council on
2 April, seeking condemnation
of the British.
The British attack was in
response to earlier Egyptian air
incursions into territory of
the UK-backed South Arabian Fed-
eration.
A high Egyptian official
has told a US Embassy officer
that Cairo intends to keep up
its propaganda pressure against
the British.
Although Cairo may be chary
of confronting the UK on the bor-
der, further incidents could occur
as the Egyptians and Yemenis con-
tinue efforts to intercept ship-
ments of arms and ammunition reach
ing the royalist opposition from
the south. The Egyptians may also
step up their encouragement of
anti-British groups in both the
federation and the colony. An
increase in agitation for UK with- 25X1
drawal from the area would prob-
ably follow and might include acts
of sabotage.
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Asia-Africa 25X1
ZANZIBAR CONTINUES TO DRIFT AWAY FROM WEST
The Zanzibar regime is con-
tinuing efforts to eliminate all
Western activity on the islands.
President Karume now has demanded
that the NASA space station be re-
moved by 30 April. While his im-
mediate pretext was a recent state-
ment by a US official pointing out
the threat Zanzibar poses to
mainland East Africa, this is an
old demand which members of his
regime pushed far several years
when they were in the opposition.
Karume is becoming increas-
ingly isolated from moderate ad-
vice. He appears both to be per-
suaded that the West is seeking to
reinstate the Sultan and to be im-
pressed with support received from
Communist countries. Despite minor
differences within the regime's
dominant pro-Communist phalanx,For-
eign Minister Babu still seems to
be in control. ~
~ The tend-
ency o some o is more extreme
cohorts to act rashly may pose some
difficulty, however.
Communist-trained militants
loyal to Babu hold the key posi-
tions in the new People's Libera-
tion Army, even though a Karume
supporter is its nominal commander.
Moscow, for its part, appears
to be approaching the situation
with relative caution. A recent
public lecture in Moscow suggests
that the USSR is uncertain of the
orientation of the Zanzibar re-
gime's leaders. It probably
wishes to avoid jeopardizing its
position with leaders of neighbor-
ing mainland countries, who are be-
coming alarmed at trends on Zanzi-
bar. From its past dealings with
radical nationalist movements, Mos-
cow may have concluded that undue
haste can be self-defeating to
long-range Soviet goals in Africa.
Peiping, meanwhile, continues
to expand its presence. The newly
arrived. Chinese Communist ambas-
sador heads a mission of some two
dozen men--already four times the
size of the Soviet mission. The
Chinese have provided $250,000
in direct budgetary support and
apparently intend to send agricul-
tural technicians.
The East Germans maintain
a mission about as large as the
Chinese.
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THE BERLIN PASS SITUATION
The Berlin pass negotiators
resumed their talks on 8 April, but
prospects are slim that they can
work out an arrangement similar to
that which allowed some 1.2 million
visits by West Berliners tc. East
Berlin last Christmas. Thus far,
neither side appears willing to
budge on the question of stationing
East German officials in West Ber-
lin for the purpose of issuing
passes. This was the issue on which
negotiations for an Easter agree-
ment bogged down in late February.
Bonn and West Berlin have gone
back to a proposal, first advanced
on 24 January, which would make all
West Berliners eligible to receive
a 12-month pass from offices manned
by West Berlin officials.
Europe 25X1
Instead, the East Germans
probably will push now for a tem-
porary agreement to cover the
Whitsuntide holiday, 16-18 May.
Pankow has scheduled a mammoth
"all-German" youth rally in East
Berlin for that week end and has
indicated a desire to have a large
number of West German and West Ber-
lin youths on hand for the occasion.
The fact that the Western ne-
gotiating position remains frozen
is chiefly attributable to the re-
straints that Bonn has placed on
West Berlin. This inflexibility
is, in turn, probably traceable
to Chancellor Erhard's concern that
any breakthrough on the pass issue
will mostly benefit West Berlin
Mayor Willy Brandt, his chief ri-
val on the national political scene,
Brandt, for his part, had made
no secret of his willingness to
reach an Easter agreement on terms
almost identical to those applica-
ble at Christmas. Prior to the
current round of negatiations, he
had indicated that he was amenable
to giving East Berlin officials
some indirect role in the handling
of pass applications in West Ber-
lin.
With the lines drawn as they
are, a breakdown of the current ne-
gotiations would seem to set the
stage for a public flareup of the
Brandt-Erhard feud which has lain
dormant since the two men held a
"unity" conference last month.
10 Apr 64
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Europe
Belgium: The dadtors' strike,
now in its second week, has raised
Belgian political temperatures to
the point where the government's
stability may be threatened if the
strike continues much longer.
Both the Social Christians
and the Socialists, the two major
parties which make up the govern-
ment coalition, backed the national
insurance legislation that sparked
the strike. There is reason to
believe that the strike caught the
government off guard, and this
probably explains its present quan-
dary.
Top labor leaders fear the
doctors' strike may provoke factory
~,vorkers to walk out in protest, a
development which could metastasize
Western European Socialist
Parties wi 1 hol a summi meet-
ing an London on 12-13 April. There
is no formal agenda, but an impor-
tant topic of discussion for the
assembled. party leaders will be the
choice of a new president of the
Socialist International to take the
place of the late Erich 011enhauer.
The new president will be elected
at next fall's congress, which will
also be celebrating the centenary
of the International. The most
likely choice presently appears to
be Haakon Lie, the strongly pro-
Western secretary of the Norweigan
Labor Party.
Although the London meeting
comes at a time when Socialistpros-
pects in various European countries
into a general strike. They are
also concerned that _left-wing So-
cialists and Communists might be
able to turn such a strike into a
protest against a "high-cost-of -
living government."
Some left-wing Socialists,dis-
satisf ied with their lack of in-
fluence in the present government,
were suggesting back in January
that the health insurance reform
might be an attractive issue on
which to contest an election, A
principal assistant of Prime Min-
ister LeFevre recently expressed
the belief--perhaps too hopefully--
that the Socialists will not try
to precipitate elections on this 25X1
issue. National elections must,
in an case be held b March 1965.
are improving, Socialist solidar-
ity is still beset by traditional
difficulties. For example, Social-
ists on the Continent who strongly
favor European integration, are
dismayed by the insularity of the
British Labor Party. The French
Socialists are boycotting the
meeting because of their annoyance
at the British party's success in
postponing an earlier meeting sched-
u7_ed for France and moving the pres-
ent one from Copenhagen to London,
The French regard these moves as
"cheap election tactics."
The Socialist leaders from
the NAT? countries in a separate
meeting may discuss European defense
problems--in particular, support
for the proposed multilateral
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Political activity in Bra-
zil is focused on the election
of a president to serve out the
remaining 20 months of Joao Gou-
lart's term. Congress appears
to be yielding to pressure from
those who led the movement
against Goulart--bath military
and civilian--to elect a mili-
tary man.
A key figure in that move-
ment--General Humberto Castello
Branca, the 63-year-old army
chief of staff---appears to be the
likely choice. He has no partic-
ular political following, but
is considered strong enough to
carry through to completion the
purge of extreme leftists now
under way. He is also regarded
as the man with the best chance
of maintaining the unity which
brought about Goulart 's overthrow.
However, Castello Branco
faces competition from Second
Army Commander General Amaury
Kruel. Growing support far
Kruel's candidacy has cast some
doubt on the final outcome.
Some congressmen are alarmed
at what they consider an at-
tempt to intimidate Congress.
They are especially disturbed by
an "institutional act" drafted
by the so-called Revolutionary
Council which would give the new
regime sweeping prerogatives,
including authority to cancel
congressional immunity and aLnost
unlimited powers of arrest.
While the immeaiate objective of
the act appears to have been to
spur Congress to act quickly on
the presidency, some observers
feel that it has more far-reach-
ing implications and is aimed at
purging Communist and pro-Com-
munist congressmen.
Whatever the government's
ultimate intentions, there is
considerable apprehension over
the extent of its security pre-
cautions. Estimates of the
number already taken into custody
in the continuing mass arrests
run as high as 3,000--including
more than 100 student and labor
leaders and other suspected left-
ists in the city of Belo Horizonte
alone. Known leftists at all
levels of the armed forces are
being removed. In some areas
radio and press censorship is
in effect.
Foreign reaction to Goulart 's
overthrow has generally been
favorable. Chile and Guatemala
have indicated they will con-
tinue relat3:ons with Brazil.
Other Latin American governments
appear disposed to follow suit,
but may be awaiting the election
of a new president before decid-
ing. The bloc, as expected,de~
scribes the recent events in
Brazil as a US-sponsored "re-
actionary plot."
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Western Hemisphere
The economic picture is
showing some improvement. The
cruzeiro has strengthened con-
siderably in the last few days.
More encouraging is the fact
that Finance Minister Bulhoes
is pulling together what looks
like a competent team of econo-
mists to deal with Brazil's ur-
ent financial roblems. 25X1
CUBAN ARMED FORCES NOW RECEIVING DRAFTEES
The Cuban armed forces now
are receiving draftees inducted
under the compulsory military
service law enacted last year.
Some 25,000 personnel--mostly
young men with high school
training or better--will be
drafted this year for three
years' service. Similar numbers
will probably be inducted during
the next two years. Recent
high-altitude photography shows
three new military camps on the
island, probably reception
centers or basic training camps,
with facilities for about 3,000
men.
The better educated induc-
tees will provide a manpower pool
for the operation of advanced
Soviet equipment turned over to
the Cubans. Those with less
education will probably be formed
into labor battalions for work
in agricultural and construction
projects to replace troops now
assigned to such nonmilitary
projects. The draft will also
serve as a useful vehicle for
political indoctrination of the
new generation. Concurrent plans
to discharge sizable numbers of
veteran personnel suggest that
the over-all size of the armed
forces--now about 100,000--
will not be substantially in-
creased.
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Western Hemisphere
The Chilean political situa-
tion, badly muddled by the vic-
tory of the Communist-Socialist
Front (FRAP) in the by-election
in Curico Province last month,
is beginning to stabilize.
The powerful Radical Party,
following a meeting last week
to decide on its position in the
forthcoming presidential election,
now has backed away from endors-
ing FRAP's candidate Senator Sal-
vador Allende. It has decided
instead tv run its own candidate,
Senator Julio Duran, who previ-
ously had been the standard-
bearer of the government-ori-
ented Democratic Front until it
fell apart in the wake of the
Curico debacle.
As the presidential race
now shapes up, Senator Eduardo
Frei, the candidate of the Chris-
tian Democrats (PDC), remains
the front-runner. According to
a poll taken since the Curico
by-election, he was favored by
49 percent of the voters as
against 33 percent for Allende.
Respondents to the question of
who would win, however, gave
Frei a margin of only 44 to A1-
lende's 41 percent.
Duran has no chance of win-
nin but
Should Duran
remain to the end, however, or
should his strategy fail, his
candidacy promises to help FRAP.
This is because he will probably
attract some votes that would
otherwise go to the PDC without,
at the same time, preventing
left-wing Radicals from voting
for FRAP.
Frei, while conceding very
little of his own support to
Duran, believes that as much as
two thirds of the Radical vo
could still go to Allende. ~~
Allende, meanwhile, has
gone on record as saying that,
if elected, he will nationalize
US-owned copper companies, but
was vague on the question of
compensation. He also indicated
that he does not feel that na-
tionalization would cause Chile
to lose any of its world co er
markets.
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Western Hemisphere
Bolivian President Paz
Estenssoro has resolved yet an-
other intramural struggle in
his party, the Nationalist Revo-
lutionary Movement (MNR), by
persuading party troublemaker
Federico Fortun to cease his
attempts to regain the MNR
vice-presidential nomination.
Paz thereby averted a dispute
that might have returned the
Bolivian political situation to
a state of confusion and dis-
rupted plans for the 31 May
election.
Last week Fortun formed an
intraparty bloc for the purpose
of recapturing the vice-presi-
dential candidacy to which he
was nominated at the party con-
vention in January. General
Rene Barrientos, who replaced
Fortun on the ticket last month,
then threatened to resign his
candidacy if Fortun persisted in
asserting that the nomination
was legally his.
Fortun now contends that
his bloc is designed solely to
support MNR candidates, not to
weaken them.
In other pre-election
developments, incumbent Vice
President Juan Lechin--Paz' only
declared opponent for the presi-
dency--is having difficulty
forming an alliance with oppo-
sition parties. The Bolivian
Communist Party (PCB) has said
that it "will do everything
possible" to form a common
front with Lechin's National
Leftist Revolutionary Party
(PRIN), but that such a pact
must exclude .Bolivia's tradi-
tional rightist opposition
parties. The right and center
parties--whom Lechin has been
cultivating because of their
relatively greater popular
appeal--are wary of his over-
tures, and believe they will
fare better by going it alone.
The more so since a recently
promulgated electoral law has
improved the prospects of their
winning some congressional seats.
An electoral alliance of
PRIN, the PCB, and other small
leftist groups is about the best
Lechin can hope for. Such a
combination, however, would
seem to have little chance of
victory at the polls.
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Western Hemisphere
Panama: President Chiari
has appoin ed two extreme na-
tionalists--Special Representa-
tive Jorge Illueca and Ambassador
Miguel Morena--to represent Pan-
ama in discussions with the US
over the Canal. This move has
strong domestic political over-
tones in that it simultaneously
undercuts charges that Chiari
has compromised Panama's posi-
tion in dealing with the US, and
removes two highly ambitious fig-
ures from the confused political
arena prior to next month's na-
tional elections. Neither man
is a member of the ruling oli-
garchy, and each probably
considers his new task an ex-
cellent platform to bolster his
political stature and presiden-
tial possibilities--but not un-
til the 1968 race.
Precautions taken by the
National Guard have thus far
prevented pro-Castro revolution-
aries from carrying out plans to
stir up trouble among striking
banana workers and in the cities.
This drawn-out struggle is
keeping tensions high anion Pan-
ama's ~olatile'students.
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Western Hemisphere
Dominican Republic: The
replacemen on pri of tri-
umvirate member Ramon Tapia
Espinal by Ramon Caceres Tron-
coso, the Dominican ambassador
to Italy, has put an end to a
political storm that was rap-
idly approaching crisis propor-
tions. Tapia stepped down af-
ter nearly three days of pres-
sure from the other triumvirs
and his own political confi-
dants.
British Guiana: Premier
Cheddi agan s eople's Progres-
sive Party (PPP) is torn by
growing dissension between ex-
tremist and moderate factions;
Jagan's own sympathies and the
degree of his control. of the
party are unclear. This fac-
tionalism was probably the real
reason for the indefinite post-
ponement of the party's annual
Easter week-end conference, and
not the two-month-old sugar
workers' strike, as the PPP
asserts. With a parliamentary
majority already reduced to one
by the resignation in February
of one of its legislators, the
PPP can scarcely risk a meeting
that would publicly expose its
internal divisions.
Two new anti-Jagan groups
have been formed. It is too
early to say, however, whether
they will be able to muster
Caceres, a 33-year old at-
torney, will be an improvement
aver
Tapia, who is generally regarded
as a crony of former provisional
President Rafael Bonnelly.
Caceres has served previously
as secretary of state for fi-
nance and in the Foreign Min-
istry. At one time he was a
leading member of the conserva-
tive National Civic Union party.
enough support to become effec-
tive political parties before
the general election antici-
pated later this year. The
Guyana United Muslim Party,
announced on 8 March, has so
far been handicapped by its
inability to obtain the back-
ing of the colony's most re-
spected Muslim leader. The
Guyana AL1-Indian League, estab-
lished a week later, is presently
a social and cultural organiza-
tion for Indians of all reli-
gious persuasions. Its leader
believes such a group might be
converted into a political
party, however, once a cross-
section of support is obtained.
In any event, the PPP's sharp
attacks on both groups suggest
that it regards them as at
least a. potential threat to
its grip on mast. East Indian
voters.
SECRET
10 Apr 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 21
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